Morten Heiberg

Men Who Would Be Emperors?

Franco, Mussolini and the Fascist Struggle for

Mediterrranean Supremacy, 1936-1943

ROMANSK INSTITUTKøbenhavns Universitet

Nr. 152 . 2002

© Forfatteren og Romansk InstitutKøbenhavns Universitet 2002

ISSN 0108-5948

Romansk InstitutKøbenhavns UniversitetNjalsgade 80DK-2300 København S

Layout: Ole Kongsdal Jensen

Men Who Would Be Emperors?Franco, Mussolini, and the Fascist Struggie for

Mediterranean Supremacy, 1936-19431

Francisco Franco and Benito Mussolini are among the most studied dictatorsof the last century. Nonetheless, their military and politi cal collaborationduring the Spanish CivilWar and World War II is not so frequently dealt with.It seems that many historians sincerely believe that there is little more to say.For them, the traditional, defensive anti-French policy aims behind the Italianintervention in the Spanish CivilWar on the side of General Franco have beensufficiently proved.' On the other hand, historical revisionists (or "anti-antifascists" as their critics call them) have never missed an opportunity todistinguish between Mussolini's relatively benign warfare in Spain, whichinvolved some 80.000 Italian soldiers, and Franco's murderous purges. This hascontributed mightily to their main argument (or rather hidden agenda), namelythat the differences between the regimes were so significant as to exelude anysubstantial similarities between Francoism 'and Fascism.'

l Talk at the Canada Blanch Centre for Contemporary Spanish Studies, Tbe EuropeanInstitute, London School of Economics and Political Science, 15 May 2002. lamgrateful10 tbe Director, Professor Paul Preston and the Deputy Director, Reader Sebastian Balfourfor their kind invitation.

2 One fine exception from tbis general pattem is Paul Preston. O. Paul Preston,"Mussolini's Spanish Adventure: From limited Risk to War", in Paul Preston & AnnMackenzie: The Republic Besieged, Civil War in Spain 1936-1939, Edinburgh UniversityPress, Edinburgh 1996; Paul Preston, "Italy and Spain in Civil War and World War, 1936-1943", in Sebastian Balfour & Paul Preston: Spain and the Great Powers in the TwentiethCentury, Routledge, London and New York 1999.

3 O. Indro Montanelli, "L'avversario? Squalificatelo", in Nino lsaia & Edgardo Sogno,Due Frorui. La grande polemica sulla guerra di Spagna, Libri Liberal, Firenze 1998, pp.163-65; Sergio Romano, Confessioni di un revisionista. Uno sguardo sul secolo dopo lamorte delle ideologie, Ponte alle Grazie, Milano 1998, p. 12.

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Without passion there is no research. Guided by a sincere disbelief in bothof these interpretative tendencies, my own investigation has concentrated itsefforts on answering the folIowing questions:

1) Were the aims ofltalian intervention in Spain as limited and defensiveas claimed by some historians?

2) Was the Italian Fascist regime an accomplice of atrocities committedin Spain?

3) Was Mussolini's Spanish policy part of a larger aggressive imperialisticplan?

4) Did Mussolini's desire to subordinate Spain to his project collide withFranco's imperial ambitions, and if so, what were the consequences?

These correlated questions concerning hegemonic aspirations and coerciveactions are left happily unexplored in the "revisions" of the fascist era that iscurrently being carried out by historians across Europe. In my consideredopinion, however, they constitute a sine qua non for our understanding ofMussolini's Spanish policy and of how it developed. They deal with aspects,which are inherent in the Fascist nature: an explosive mixture of revisionism,brutality, racism, and opportunism.

A good argument for studying Spanish-Italian relations is that entirearchives have not even been taken into consideration by the existinghistoriography. Secondly, a series af interesting topics have never beenproperly examined. This certainly applies to the role of the secret services inthe civil war and WW2. It is not only that main documents have beenunavailable. More significant is the general tendency to underestimate, attimes even ignore, the importance of military and political intelligence fordecision -making processes. The lesshistorians knew about intelligence, the lessthey were interested in integrating intelligence output in their explanation ofcomplex political and military processes. And, this is quite a paradox, if weconsider the vast and complex intelligence-nets that different Europeancountries were building in Spain prior to the outbreak of the civilwar. an 25August 1935, the Italian Consulate in Tangier sent the foJlowing message toRome:

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The English, Gennan, French, Russian and Japanese intelligence serviceshave fiJled Spain with emissaries. No ane ean remember that since theWar there has been such an influx. It is a sheer invasion [... ]. TheGermans and the French rnake their old services appear like tradecompanies. Many tradesmen, who sell nothing at all, travel through outSpain, pay visits, especially to the ports [...l. Large sums of money arecirculating from the different services."

The hesitation to consider intelligence material is all the moreincomprehensible, if we consider that the first crucial months of Italianintervention in Spain were conducted exclusively as a military intelligenceoperation. It is also telling that in several of the incidents of the civil warperiod, which I have examined, intelligence output seems to be vital not onlyfor our understanding of what actually happened, but also of how political andmilitary decisions were made.

No hard-core evidence has emerged so far in favour of the "conspiracytheory", according to which Rorne, and for that matter also Berlin, wereinvolved in the planning and execution of the Nationalist coup. an thecontrary, most historians emphasize the entirely opportunistic and improvisednature of the Italian involvement in Spain. True, if the western democracieshad supported wholeheartedly the Republic, Mussolini would never haveintervened militarily in Spain. But does this mean that the drasticdevelopments in Spain during the month of July took him by surprise? Hardly.Documents from hitherto hermetically closed military archives add anotherdimension. The SIM (Italian Military Intelligence Service) had been in "closecontacts" with the "Moroccan" rebelleaders at least since the beginning ofJune.' Why had the SIM infiltrated the rebel movement at such an early stage,

4 Archivio Centrale delIo Stato (Rome), Ministero dell'Interno, Divisione pol., materie,busta 50. Quoted in Romano Canosa, I servizi segreti del Duce. I persecutori e le viuime,Mondatori, Milan 2000, p. 29l.

s According to an interrogation made by the Italian Military intelligence (SIM, ServizioInforrnazioni Militari) in 1944, the Italian MilitaryAttache Giuseppe Luccardi was leadingSIM-operations in Morocco during the civil war period. Cf. Ufficio Storico delIo StatoM.aggiore dell'Esercito (USSME), SIM 45, "Riservato, informazione di grado B, 7Dicembre 1944". "Movimento militare et della Falange spagnola sernbra irnminente. Sonoa stretto contatto con eJementi dirigenti tale movimento in Marocco. Essi assicurano

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and with what purpose? Just to be kept informed? Perhaps. Still, given the faetthat both in 1932 and 1934 Rome had been actively involved in coup-plansagainst the Spanish Republic, perhaps it would be worthwhile for futurescholars to re-examine this question more carefully,"Historicai memoirs, basedon different sources, c!aim that agreements between the Italian and theSpanish military actually existed or were in the making prior to the putsch.'

In August, when General Roatta, head of the SIM met with his Germancounterpart Admiral Canaris, they agreed to meet Franco's request for futuremilitary supplies, and that the aid should be directed exc!usivelyto him. In thisway, General Mola, who also coveted the leadership of the rebellion, waseffectively put out of the game. In late October, Hitler rnet with Ciano inBerchtesgaden. This meeting resulted not only in a strengthening of the bondsbetween Rome and Berlin, it also led to an increased political and militarycommitment to General Franco. The German engagement in Spain was nowundergoing a drastic development, as a real German expeditionary force wasin the making. In the days from 15to 16November, Rome and Berlin officiallyrecognised Franco's new regime. Bythis step, the German-Italian involvement

adesione della maggioranza della truppa, della marina, delIa guardia civile et confermanopartecipazione GeneraJe Sanjurjo", USSME, F6, R. 327, Luccardi, telegram to SIM via DeRossi, 6 June 1936.

• The most thorough study of the Italian aggression against Republican Spain 1931-36remains Ismael Saz:Mussolini contra la IlRepublica. Hostilidad, conspiraciones, intetveneion(1931-1936), Edicions Alfons el Magnånim, Instituci6 Valenciana d'Estudis i Investigaci6,Valencia 1986.

7 Most recently the memoirs of Carmen de Zulu eta, whose father was the last RepubIicanAmbassador to the Holy See in 1936: "Mi herman o Luis recuerda que en su cuartodescubri6 en un caj6n de un escritorio un par de calcetines de seda negra y una cartadirigida a Pepe y firmada con un nombre como chiqui o algo parecido. Se detallaban en lacarta los contactos con el ejercito italiano para su intervenci6n en lo que seria la guerra civilespafiola, dellado de los militares insurgentes. La clave de este contacto era el agregadomilitar de la embajada de Espana ante el Quirinal. Se lIamaba Manuel Villegas y eracomandante de Estado Mayor y para el temamos una presentaci6n que me habfa dado micompafiera de facultad, Matilde de Hinestrosa, amiga de Milagros Santa Cruz y sobrina delrnarques de Magaz, que al estallar el Movimiento, fue el representante oficioso de Francocerca de la Santa Sede. Cf. Carmen de Zulueta, La Espaiia que no puede ser. Memorias deun institucionista republicana, Universidad de Murcia, Murcia 2000, p. 141. I am grateful toAngel Vifias, who provided me with this information.

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in Spain changed profoundly. Franco's vietory had now become a question ofthe fascist leaders' personal prestige.

Before taking the drastic step to ensure Franco's vietory by sending Italiancombat troops to Spain, Rome insisted on the signing of a bilateral agreementin which Nationalist Spain should oblige itself to follow a policy linecompatible with Mussolini's Mediterranean policy."Historians have subjectedthe agreement to various interpretations. John Coverdale, author of the mostexhaustive study so far on Italian intervention in the civilwar, rightly sustainsthat by this agreement Italy imposed a "sweeping series of rights" on Spain."Still, the American historian c!aims that Fascist foreign policy was basicallydefensive. These two notions are not easily compatible, or at least call forfurther explanation.

The November 1936-protocol had important similarities with aseeretagreement signed in Rome in 1934between Spanish insurgents and the Fascistgerarco Italo Balbo. Both agreements guaranteed Spain astatus quo with regardto its territorial integrity. This has often been interpreted as a c!ear sign of thebasieally defensive nature of the Italian aid to the rebeis. Still, one should becareful oot to fall into this trap. Both agreements fail to mention any restraintswhatsoever on Italian expansionism in the rest of the western Mediterranean.Moreover, by signing the agreement in the autumn of 1936, the NationalistGovernment not only obliged itself to a much deeper involvement than justbenevolent neutrality; it also opened up for the possibility of a more permanentItalian presence on the Balearic Islands, where the Italians had spread horror(and venereal deceases) sinee the arrival of Bonaceorsi and his fascist terrorsquad in late August.

The lifting of the ban against research on the civilwar has made it possibleto reaeh a more complex understanding as to why Mussolini so heavilyincreased his presence in Spain to a full-scale expeditionary army of 45,000soldiers within a few months. Still, it would probably be fair to say thatimportant aspects of this decision have been left happily unexplored. Given the

• The agreement of 28 November 1936 is reproduced in [Galeazzo Ciano]: Ciano'sDiplomatic Papers, (ed. Maleolm Muggeridge), Oldham Press Limited, London 1948.

• Cf. John F Coverdale. Italian Intervention in the Spanisb Civil War, Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton (New Jersey) 1975, p. 153-154.

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limited time at my disposal, I eannot go into details with the complexinternational situation relating to the escalation of the Italian involvement inSpain. Suffice it to say that the prevailing view today that Mussolini conceivedthe idea of a large-scale intervention sometime in November (or at the earliestin late October) lacks important nuances. Fresh documents actually show thatMussolini and his inner cabinet had planned, apparently on Spanish request, alarge-scale intervention at a much earlier point than the one finally agreed uponon 6 December. An Italian note of 27 September reads that it was actually thetrustee of the Spanish rebel s in Rome, Antonio Magaz, who in the name of theJunta de Burgos had urged the Italian government to send voluntary troops toSpain. According to aseeret political report by Magaz, at least 20,000volunteers were expected to leave.1t is noteworthy that the intervention plansof September were almost identical with those finally approved in December:divisions of Italian combat troops under the leadership of an Italian General.In late September, Mussolini seemingly managed to convince the fervent fascistGeneral Ezio Garibaldi that he was the right man to lead the expeditionaryforce. 10

The first large-scale intervention plans of 1936were apparently approved inthe end of September, then given up, examined again only to be discardeddefinitely by Franco on 9 October in a telegram in which he c1aimed that anItalian aggression might lead to both a British and a Soviet armed intervention.More than the farfetched hints to a British intervention, the Generalisimo wasprobably concerned that his domestic leadership could be endangered at thispoint by a heavy foreign presence in a formally nationalist uprising. It wasexactly in this period that he had suddenly slowed down the pace of the war tobuy more time to secure hisownpolitical position. Franco's hesitation perfectlymatehed the Italian indecisivenessin the same matter. After the initial approvalof the plan, the Italians now had second thoughts: the internationalenvironment was proving less favourable, just as the Navy, which was to

.0 For further discussion of the significance of this failed mission and the sources related toit, see Morten Heiberg, "Franco, Mussolini and the Spanish Civil War, an Afterthought",in Gert Sørensen & Robert MaJlett (eds.), International Fascism 1919·1945, Frank Cass,London and Portland (Oregon) 2002, pp. 55-68.

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organise the important sea transport, apparently did everything in their powerto sabotage the adventure."

With regard to Italy's motive for entering the conflict at this point, it isimportant to stress that in September the possibilities of ending the war quicklywas much greater than in November-December, where the military situationseerned much more compromised. It might have been Rome's idea toannihilate the Republic through a swift military operation, before any vitaldecisions in the Non -Intervention Committee would come into effect. Still, theGaribaldi-mission may not have been the first intervention plan. Ciano actuallytold Hitler at their meeting in Berchtesgaden that during the struggle for theBalearic Islands in late August, Italy had held two entire divisions of FascistMilitia in readiness. It might be that he was trying to impress the Fuehrer. If hewas telling the truth, though, it means that before or shortly after the coup Italyhad concrete plans for a grand-scale intervention. To have two such divisionsin readiness simply eannot be arranged for overnight.f

Albeit it never materialised, the Garibaldi-plan is interesting, because itindicates a certain parallelism in the Italian and Soviet assessments on the needto intervene massively in Spain. Furthermore, the mission coincides withMussolini's increasing determination to challenge London and Paris over theSpanish question and his growing convietion of the need of an alliance withGermany. Neither should we underestimate the purely anticommunist factor.Mussolini's disgust at Republican Spain can only have increased after 4September, which saw the creation of a cabtnet headed by the socialist leaderLargo Caballero, "the Spanish Lenin". It is likely at this point that Mussoliniwas convinced of the prophetic nature of his unpublished 1931 aphorisms onRepublican Spain. Here he had predicted that the Spanish Republic, likeLiberal Republics in general, would inevitably lead to communism. Perhaps,Largo Caballero's entry on the political scene convinced Mussolini that themoment for concrete action had come. Having said that, it is important to stressthat anti-communism might also have been a perfect disguise for expandingItalian intluence into the western Mediterranean. In the autumn of 1936,Cianomentioned the strategicobjectives ofthe policy in the Western Mediterranean:

II Ibid., pp. 58-59.

12 Cf. [Galeazzo Ciano], Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, p. 58.

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Ceuta and the Balearic Islands. Re also referred to Spain as the "extension ofthe Axis towards the Atlantic Sea". Mussolini too was optimistic: ''TheBalearics are in our hands" ,he uttered in the Gran Consiglio on 18December .13

Perhaps MacGregor Knox has a point, when he claims that in autumn 1936Mussolini, Ciano and the Germans, to mask the expansionism of the Axis,raised the anti-bolshevist flag."

As the Italian involvement grew, there can hardly be any doubts as to the faetthat Mussolini became increasingly aware of the importance of a subordinatedSpain. To draw Spain into her orbit was simply a strategic necessity in order tobreak the French and the British power in the Mediterranean. An intelligencereport of Spanish origins, sustained that in a meeting of 2 December 1938, theItalian Fascist Grand Council discussed the possible frontiers of the newRoman Empire. In particular, the principal concem was zone "b" and "c". Inzone "c" the frontier of the Spanish Levant and the Balearic Islands areincluded in the Italian Reign. Further, the report sustained that the ItalianOceanographic Service had been instructed to prepare maps with the newempire in ten secret copies." In myconsidered opinion, all thismight well havebeen true. Still, I find it more an expression of what has rightly been labelled as"ginnastiea mentale", or mental exercises,whichcould distract the leaders fromthe real and sad state of Italian power. More realistic planning can be found indifferent Italian Naval reports. A report of January 1938 noted that in thecoming war alongside Germany and Japan, Italy should use Spain as a transitpoint. As Nationalist Spain controlled the 'Strait of Gibraltar, which Francocould seize from the British, it would be possible to maintain a communicationline for goods from the Atlantic Sea. This was important, as the Suez Canal andthe Dardanelles would be blocked in the case of war."

13 Giuseppe Bottai, Diario, Rizzoli, Milan, 1997, entry for 19 November 1936.

" MacGregor Knox, "II fascismo e la politica estera" , in R. J. Bosworth and Sergio Romano(eds.), La politica estera italiana; 1860-1985, II Mulino, Bologna 1991, p. 326.

is Public Record Office (London), FO 371, Intelligence Report of Basque Origin fromDecember 1938.

16 Cf. Robert Mallett, The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism 1935-1940, Frank Cass,London 1998, p. 113.

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Leavingaside for a moment the hegemonic aspirations sustainingMussolini'sactions, I shall now briefly comment on some of the coercive measures takento strangle the Republic. On the battlefield in Spain there was much tensionbetween the fascist and the nationalist high command. Eventually, the Italianclaimfor autonomous militarycommand and planning finally crumbled with thedefeat at Guadalajara in March 1937, where the Italian legionaries weredefeated, in part also by Italian anti-fascist volunteers. The Duce was nowforced to complywith Franco's demands, ifhe wanted a military revenge, whichcould wipe out the "brutta figura" that his troops had cut. The humiliation ofMussolini reached its peak in September-October 1937, when the Italiancommander Bastico was literaUysacked by Franco and replaced with GeneralBerti. Contrary to widely held beliefs, though, the Italians ground forcesactuaUy fought well in most battles of the civil war. Still, to eaUthe stingingdefeat at Guadalajara "a defensive victory", as officialltalian historiographydoes, is hardly the most adequate description." Notwithstanding their fineperformances in most of the war, we should be eareful not to overrate t~econtribution of the Italian ground forces to the final victory. Far more crucialwas the Italian participation in the air war and the effective blockade of theRepublican ports, which strangled the Republic until it ceased to exist.

The tension between the Spanish and the Italian high command chieflyregarded the speed of military operations. Where Franco would try to conquerSpain inch byinch and physieallydestroy all resistance which might complieatethe future political control, Mussolini desired to annihilate the Republicthrough a series of swift military actions according to the Italian principle ofguerra di rapido corso. These strategic differences are perfectly documented.What eannot be sustained by the evidence is that Italian warfare was guided byhumanitarian considerations. The idea that the Italians behaved like truegentlemen is still today widely acknowledged, especially in official Italianmilitary publications.

17 Alberto Rovighi & Filippo Stefani, La partecipazione italiana alla guerra civile spagnola1936-1939, Vol. 1, Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito (Ufficio Storico), Rome 1992-1993, p. 343.Cf. also Lucio Ceva, "Ripensare Guadalajara", Italia Contemporanea, 192, (September1993), p. 478.

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The question of atrocities against civilians in Spain is complex, because wemust consider the context in which military actions took place. There can be nodoubt that the Nationalists exceeded their Italian aJlies in violence. In thespring of 1939, when the war was practically won, Nationalist war operationswere conducted almost exclusivelyaccording to the principle of exterminationof the adversary, whom Franco publicly labeled as "bastards" and "anti-Spaniards". The Italian regime, on the other hand, was often concerned aboutwhich strategy to apply, as it feared both international accusations and domesticcomplications in Spain. Ciano thought that the fact that it was a civil warbetween two fractions, which eventually needed to be reconciled, should putsome restraint on the Italian military campaign. He also believed that tooviolent an approach might have the opposite effect, namely to "harden theresistance of the adversary", instead of encouraging the Republicans to giveuptheir arms. It is significant, though, that the historians, who rightly point outthat the Italians were horrified by the terrible executions carried out in Malagain the Spring of 1937, forget that in exactly the same days Fascist Italy initiateda revengeful campaign of extermination in Ethiopia. This carnage may wellhave cost up to 30.000 victims. The faet that Mussolini was convinced that theCatalans had 99 drops of Negro-blood in their veins does not suggest that inmore favourable politi cal circumstances, the duce would have acted lessviolently against civiliansin Eastern Spain than he did in Ethiopia. In the springof 1937, naval documents reveal, he followed the cannoning of civilians in thecoastal towns of Eastern Spain with a boyish enthusiasm."

In 1992, Ferdinando Pedriali published the first comprehensive study of theItalian airwar in Spain." This officialMinisterial publication expresses the firmconvietion that it "has reached the objective of illustrating without myths andreticence the participation of the Italian militaryin the Spanish CivilWar".20Tojustify his self-appraising attitude, Pedriali mentions the faet that his book has

II For more. references and documentation regarding fascist atrocities in Spain consultMorten Helberg: Mussolini and Franco. Men Who Would Be Eemperors. The Spa~ish CivilWarand the FasCIStStruggle for Supremacy, Doetoral thesis, University of Copenhagen 2001,pp.81-124.

19 Fer~nand~ Pedriali, Guerra di Spagna e aviazione iialiana, Aeronautica Militare Italiana(UffiCIOStorico), Rome 1992.

æ Ibid, p. 7.

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obtained splendid reviews and even a gold medal. However, if one tries toscratch on the surface of Pedriali's shining gold medal, one may find asomewhat rusty argumentation underneath. His version of the destruction ofGuemica exceeds even sorne of the most problematic Francoist narratives.

The Italian air raids from Mallorca against cities and ports in Eastem Spain,had no precedents in European history, especially with regard to persistence.The' 8th stormo of Savoia Marchetti bombers made 639 attacks upon differentcities in 268 days of flying. Valencia was hit 70 times and Bareelena 51 timesdropping no less than 1.293 bombs. In Pedriali's view, however, the terri~ngbombings of Barcelona (to take the most discussed example) had an excluslvelyaccidental nature to them. Until Mussolini personally ordered the terrifyingbombing of Barcelona on 16 March 1938, only indirectly, and unintendedly,Italian air raids had caused civilian losses. The truth is that just as in theNorthern campaign the distinction between civilian and military aims inCatalonia was highly arbitrary. In faet, Italian leaders, whether military orpolitical, were not at all displeased with the civilian losses they actually didmanage to inflict upon the Republican enerny. Some of them even lamentedthat the bombings were not terrifying enough. General Francesco Pricolo,commander of the II Air Squad, allows us to get a unique insight into theproblem constituted by the civil war in a report on the use of Aviazione

Legionaria:

Still today I confirm that [... ] that the efficient arm of the Air force isterror, whereas that of the Navy may be starvation, and that of the Armythe efficient occupation of the territory - one has to create immediateterror amongst the adversary population, destroying continuously the city,the city centres, all sources of life and subject it [the population] to anunbearable nightmare, which will force it to surrender. Some willscreamingly denounce these barbarian acts and the violation of humanrights _ but one should not take notice of it. War is certainly not anexhibition of courtesy or of humanitarian sentiments: what is important isto impose one's own will [...]. The foreignjoumalists have admitted thatifthe intensive bombing of Barcelona had continued with the same rhythmfor another two weeks, no Government could have prevented it from

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surrendering completely [... ]. As can be seen, even with the gravelimitations imposed for political reasons, there was still space for real airwarl If at least they had made a try, at least for one monthl Nothing!"

The faet that Francesco Pricolo wasappointedsottosegretario of theAeronauticaonly a few months after the end of the civil war does not suggest that hiscomplaints were incompatible with the waythe fascist leaders in Rome viewedthe implementation of modem warfare. Giulio Douhet's strategic studies onhorror against civilians were indeed the moral reference for the most criminalcote of the Italian regime.

No publication on the Italian air war so far has compared documents fromthe Italian archives with new findings in the Republican archives ofSpain. Suchan effort may be worthwhile, because Republican documents actually providea devastating pieture af the Fascist air raids. In theArchivo General de GuerraCivil Espanola documents on Fascist atrocities are numerous. In faet a completelisting of all the bombings during the first half af 1938provides a unique insightinto fascist destructiveness. The statistics made by Informaciån del EstadoMayor de Tierra list most of the bombings af cities and villages in theRepublican re ar from January to June 1938.It is aseeret document, not meantfor publishing, and it even underlines that the numbers of victims (dead andwounded, destroyed buildings) are not definite, because this type af information"is not communicated to this section, because of its non military character". Tothese already much reduced numbers (albeit they count thousands of dead andwounded) we must certainly add the people, who died from their wounds andthose who were reported missing but neverfound plus a number af air raids notaccounted for. During my research in Rome, I could not fail to notice that anumber af operation al orders only mentioned the name of a village to bebombed without any further specification of the aim. Even if these orders donot state "centro demografico" as seems to be the only proof accepted byPedriali of destructive warfare, sufficient proof of the villages levelled to theground ean be found in Spanish archives.f

21 Pricolo quoted in Heiberg, Franco and Mussolini, p. 115.

22 Cf. ibid., pp. 118-19.

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an several occasions, Franco and his fascist allies had given proof of theirwillingnessto strike the adversary in a completely indiscriminate fashion. Littleless comforting are their collaboration in the field of chemical warfare."Documents cause us to think that several "Africanistas" af the Spanish Annywere playingwith the ide a of using poison gas in the civilwar. A secret telegramindicated that even Franco considered using arsenical projectiles on theZaragoza-line on 15October 1937,providing feeble excuses that the enemy wasplanning to use taxie weapons. Mussolini, an the other hand, never reallytrusted Franco's intentions, probably fearing international repercussions muchstronger than those which had followed the use of toxic weapons in Ethiopia.This may explain his initial hesitation in sending chemical weapons to Spain,and the faet that in the end he prevented the Spaniards from obtaining physicalcontrol with the toxic gases he eventually sold to the Nationalists. A number ofhigh-rank Spanish officers felt betrayed by this preventive measure. The headaf the Spanish Secciån de Guerra Quimica claimed that these weapons had beenbought with "the purpose af being used".

In his strategic planning, Mussolini's advisers had for same time pondered onhow to inflict the final wound on the enemy in the future showdown withFrance that Mussolini so often had presented as inevitable. Pariani stated inearly 1939that Italy ought to prepare for an intensive use of chemical agents inan attack on the Maginot line over a front of 40 to 50 kilometres." As pointedout by MacGregor Knox, the Italian adviser favoured such solutions, alsobecause Italy had already the raw materials needed for such a war, while theywere lacking iron and other vital ores for conventional warfare. Perhaps it is inthis strategic scenario that the Spanish -Italian plans for future collaboration inthe chemical field should be viewed. In faet, plans were made to build two-tonper day mustard gas factories in Spain, which could supply an Italian

2l Cf. Morten Heiberg, "Nu ove considerazioni sulla Guerra di Spagna: la storia segretadell'intervento militare italiano", in M. Abbate (ed.), Pensiero ed azione totalitaria tra ledue guerre mondiali. Atti del Seminario Intemazionale di Orte 5febbraio 2000, CentroFalisco di Studi Storici, Civita Castellana-Orte 2000. See also Sebastian Balfour, AbrawMortal. De la guerra colonial a la Guerra civil en Espaiia y Marruecos (1909-1939),Peninsula 2002, pp. 565-68.

" Cf. MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge &New York 1982, p. 27.

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expeditionary corpse "in actions against foreign powers in North Africa or in

Europe"."In sum, genuine fear of retaliation and lack of precise information on enemy

stocks of toxic gases, and of domestic and international complications in generalprobably decided the negative outeorne of the speculations on chemical warfareduring the civil war. Moral scruples were never a heavy burden upon Franco orMussolini's shoulders. Nonetheless, a Spanish historian has recently claimedthat the faet that Franco did not use the toxic weapons he received from Italyis sufficient proof of the Generallsimo's condemnation of destructive modemwarfare." I hope my study of the Italian-Spanish collaboration in the chemicalfield (the first of its kind ever, I might add) has questioned the truthfulness ofsuch claims.

U nlike what influential scholars have argued Mussolini intervened not onlyin military affairs, but also in matters of Spanish domestic policy. Coverdalemaintained that Franco united the various political parties of the Spanish Rightwithout consulting his supporters, Germany and Italy. De Felice went as far asto state "it eannot be proved that, during the first period of war, the Italianattitude was influenced by short term plans to make a fascist dictatorship ofSpain" .27 The first statement is wrong, and the second one fails to understandthe complexity of the Italian involvement in the unification process of thepolitical parties within the Nationalist zone. In the Italian archives, there isabundant evidence of how Mussolini through various peculiar missions tried tosecure a fascistization of Spain during the spring of 1937. Still, only the missionby Roberto Farinacci (who in a conversation with Franco urged for the creationof a "Spanish National Party"), is fully recognised by Defelician historiographyas an Italian attempt at fascistisation; still only as an initiative promoted by theItalian fascist party against the foreign office. There is no proof of that. an thecontrary, this mission was one in a series of interesting initiatives, not onlyduring the spring of 1937, but through out the civil war and beyond, upon thesurface of which historians have so far only scratched. Suffice it to mention

25 Heiberg, "Nu ove Considerazioni".

26 Luis Torres, Franco o la venganza de la historia, Criterio Libros, Madrid 2000, p. 190.

l7 Renzo De Felice, Mussolini i!duce. II: Lo Stato totalitario 1936-1940, Einaudi, Turin 1981,p.359.

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Guglielmo Danzi, the Italian press attache in Salamanca, who was also workingfor the Italian intelligence services. He seems to have played a not negligiblerole in the unification of the Spanish Right along fascist lines. In 1939, Danzideveloped another cunning plan, which aimed at securing a more long-Iastingfascistization of Spain, namely to buy considerable amounts of shares in themost important newspape~s in order to secure permanent influence of Italianfascism in Spain. This plan was soon given up in favour of a more effective one,already experienced in the past, namely to corrupt the 40 most influentialjournalists and public figures to promote Italian fascism in Spain. Neithershould we forget Gimenez Caballero, a Spanish catholic-fascist writer, who inJanuary 1937 was assigned personally by Mussolini with the task of convincingFranco to unite the various political fractions into one party organised alongfascist lines. af course, we should be careful not to overrate the aetual influenceof such missions. Still, if Mussolini's policy in Spain was a "hand-off policy" asclaimed by Coverdale and De Felice, then it was certainly a peculiar andpersistent variety. The faet is that Mussolini liked acting as an ideologist, muchmore than most Defelician historians are willing to admit. The duce wasfurtherrnore convinced that to fascistise Spain was by far the most secure wayto subordinate it his will. And, there are indeed some signs that MussoIini'shopes in thi s respect were not entirely without foundations. In 1939, Francotold Ciano that he was waiting for Mussolini to give him instructions. Albeit theCiano-diary may not be entirely credible on this point, Spain subservientlysubscribed the Anti-Comintern Pact and left the League of Nations."

There ean be little doubt that Francoism eventually moulded itself along thepatterns of Italian fascism. However, the fascistic facade was not only due toFranco's increasing admiration for his allies, but also a useful tool to offsetother fractions of the political right. If we accept the view of Payne, Thomasand others, namely that the unification mainly took place, because Franconeeded to clip the wings of the different politi cal fractions including the oldfalange, then I would like to call the intention to another point, intelligentlyraised by Ismael Saz-Campos. The Spanish right, and therefore not only theoriginal Falange, changed profoundly atter it had been in contact with Italian

" For more detaiIs on the various attempts at fascistising Spain, consult Heiberg,"Mussolini, Franco", 61-66.

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fascism. It did not become Fascist in the ltaJian sense, but neither did it reverseto what it was before the encounterwith Italian fascism. In this way, Spain, andnot Italy, is the country where Italian fascism has had the longest surviving

legacy."In the end Mussolini's vietory in Spain revealed itself ro be a pyrrhic victory.

The huge military effort in Spain seriously weakened the Italian military in thewake ofWorld War II. Ifthe Italians had had the equipment they left in Spain,they would have hade 40 fully equipped divisions instead of 19, when theyentered war in 1940, not to mention all the money wasted- It may be sustainedthat many of the historians, who shared the view that the effort in the civil war

did not influence the performance in WW2, have contributed to absolving theregime. By accrediting the defeat in World War II exclusively to nationalpoverty and to the lack of primary materials, they have refused to learn one ofthe most obvious lessons that can be derived from the Italian participation inthe war: the intrinsic national poverty and lack of primary rnaterial did not even

get the chance to play a major factor before defeat was certain."On 19 June 1940, Antonio Magaz, now ambassador in Berlin, delivered a

memorandum to Ernst von Weizsåcker, then state secretary, in which it wasstated that Spain would enter the war, once France had been effectively put outof the game." Interesting, though, is the list of territorial cancessions that Spainwould want to claim: Oran, the union of Morocco under Spanish dominion,part of Algeria, and an extension of the territories in the Sahara and in the Gulfof Guinea. Furthermore, Spain aske d for military aid to capture GibraItar and

29 Jo~n Maria Thomas, Lo que fue la Falange. La Falange y los falangistas de Jose Antonio,Hedilla y la Unificaciån. Franco y el fin de la Falange Espaiiola de las Ions, Plaza & Janes,Barce!ona 1999;StanleyG. Payne, Fascism in Spain 1923-1977, Madison (Winsconsin) 1999,e~peclally pp. 239-273; Ismael Saz-Campos, "El Franquismo. bRegimen autoritaric °dictatura fascista?", in Javier Tusell, Susana Suiero, Jose Maria Marin and MarinaCasanova, El Regimen de Franco, UNED, Madrid 1993, Vol. l.

"'Cf. Brian R. Sullivan "Fascist Italy's Military Involvement in the Spanish Civil War", TheJo~,:"a~of ~~lilary Hist~ry, (Oct~ber 1995), p. 711; Lucio Ceva, "Conseguenze politico-rruh:an dell'intervento italo-fascista nella guerra civile spagnola". in Gigliola SacerdotiManano, Arturo Colombo and Antonio Pasinato (eds.): La guerra civilespagnola trapoliticae letteratura, Shakespeare and Company, Firenze 1995, p. 223.

31 Angel Viiias, Franco, Hitler y el estallido de la guerra civil. Antecedentes Y consecuencias,Alianza, Madrid 2001, p. 469.

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for help to defend the Canary Islands. On the following day, Franco presenteda similar shopping list to the Italians. His territorial dem ands definitely clashedwith Mussolini's. During Serrano Sufier's visit to Rome a year earlier, Mussolinihad drawn the future geopolitical division of the Western Mediterranean:"Morocco would go completely to Spain; Tunisia and Algeria would go to us.An agreement with Spain should ensure our permanent outlet to the Atlanticthrough Morocco"." This fundamental conflict of aims would never be

resolved.Pro-Francoist historians have claimed that Spain's territorial claims in 1940

were just momentary tactical manoeuvres of distraction. Still, we mustremember that Spain actually declared "non-belligerence", when Mussolinientered the war on 10-11 June, and that on 14 June he also occupied Tangier.Further proof of the persistency of Spain's aims in Africa are the topsecretSpanish military plans, which Italian agents captured in November 1940. Theyrevealed that Franco was considering a massive attack on French Morocco inconcert with indigenous forces. More extreme wings of falangism also dreamedaf annexing Portugal. It is important to note that both the military and theFalangists, despite their spiteful and sometimes violent encounters, both sawthe revival of Spain's imperial past as an important task. The shared imperialaspirations and preference for autarchy made pro-Axis views widely acceptablein both military and Falangist environments, What has not penetratedsufficiently into the existing historiography, or indeed only as random remarksis the fact that Franco's territorial claims was sustained by the determination t~become a major power at sea. The fact is that Nationalist Spain planned toobtain complete control ofthe Strait of Gibraltar and fullliberty at sea. In June1938, a secret strategi c study of a new Navy, Introducciån a un anteproyecto dela Flota Nacional was conceived in Burgos. The long document is interesting,because af the double nature it expresses: the need for an alliance with the Axisand its political premise, which aims at being free and able to choose thepolitical bloc most convenient to Spanish interests."

J2 [Galeazzo Ciano], Ciano's Diary 1937-1938, (ed. Maleolm Muggeridge), London 1952entry for 14 June 1939. '

JJ Cf. Heiberg, Franco and Mussolini, pp. 163·69.

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This top-seeret document was submitted to Franco who approved it. Iteventually became the basis of the Ley de Construcci6n de Nuevas UnidadesNavales, whieh was ratified a year later. It was indisereetly leaked to an Italianadmiral, who immediately passed it on to his superiors. The strategie studycalled for the construetion of various types of battleships, surface vessels,eruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The extraordinary budget consisted of4,335,2millionpesetas to be divided into 12annual rates of 344,6million. Giventhat the Spanish GNP was 25,934 million pesetas in 1935and 38,189million in1940(but measured in constant peseta value it was much lower in 1940than in1935), the price for the naval-program in a Spain on the borderline of thefamine of the 1940swas absurdly high.

The Italian admiral, was rightly perplexed by the faet that the white book"reasserts the neeessity to ereate a Navy which makes Spain the arbiter of thecommunieation in the Mediterranean" and which determined the Spanishliberty of politieal orientation and allowed it to follow the direetives fitting toits interests. Espeeially, the Spanish statement that "Spain ean in that waybreakthe equilibrium between the two groups, whieh are striving now in Europe,deeiding whieh of the two groups should win" made the Italians upset. It wasprobably not what they had in mind for what they patronizingly considered tobe a satellite nation. Italy would hardly have relished breaking the prison barsof the Mediterranean with Spanish help only to find out that Franeo would seta high price for his help. In this sense, the Spanish strategic study lacked thedegree of gratitude that the Italians felt they were entitled to. In viewof Italy'swaning military power and the knowledge the ltalians then possessed of theSpaniards' ambition to become the "arbiter of the Mediterranean", it is notsurprising that the elimate for the subsequent Italian-Spanish negotiationsabout the reconstruction of the Spanish navy became increasingly tense andeventually collapsed.

Despite the negative outcome ofthe naval talks, Spain's strategic importanceto Italy remained unaltered. This was confirmed by the continuous Italian-German talks concerning the Balearics.ltalian bases on the Balearics were notonly considered a way of impeding French sea communications with Africa,they were also capable of inflicting damage to British sea routes, just as theyprovided Italy with a position much doser to GibraItar.

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On 15August 1940,Franeo reminded Mussolini of Spain's territorial claimsin North Africa and claimed that the Spanish intervention was imminent. Rewas only awaiting German supplies before he would begin his endeavour. In hisreply of 23 August, Mussolini pointed out that if Franco did not enter soon,Britain would fall anyway, and the CaudiUowould have to withdraw from all hisclaims. Mussolini eventually met with Franco in Bordighera on 12 February1941 without a Spanish intervention having taken place. This meeting hasrightly become famous in history books for its complete pointlessness, as theyhad nothing to convey to one another. They were coveting the same territoriesin North Africa and by now entirely dependent on Hitler.

"Franco and Mussolini, men whowould be emperors". This statement seemsto me substantially correet, but not with out some modifieations. Disillusionedby the faet that he had no longer any prospeets of becoming a new Lenin, theyoung Mussolini eventually withdrew from socialism to imperialistic dreams,something that is quite teJling of the opportunism, whieh sustained his actionsthroughout his life. This does not mean that he did not genuinely seek anempire along the shores of the Mediterranean. Still, it was only after thebreaking of the European power balance in 1933that Mussolini became tru ly"scatenato" or unleashed in his foreign policy. lt is also noteworthy thatMussolini only took up arms against adversaries weaker than him, or which hethought were weaker than him. For the realisation of more ambitious militaryaims, he had to rely entirely on a strong Nazi-Germany. 34 As sustained byLucioCeva, "At its heart the lethal combination of revisionism with racismin the later1930swas bound to lead to an alliance with Nazi Germany [... J. Mussolini wasdesperately seeking an allywith the same moral and ideological charaeteristicsas Fascism"." Still, if he had understood the German vietories in 1940as non-definitive, something that his own ignorance in military matters clearlyprevented him from, intervention would probably never have occurred.Nevertheless, the five wars that Italy fought in twenty years suggest a constantelement of aggression in Italian foreign policy.

"Cf. Lucio Ceva, Pianificazione militare e politica estera dell'Italia fascista 1923-1940, ltaliaConternporanea, n.219 (June 2000), pp. 291-292.

'l Lucio Ceva, "Strategy of Fascist ltaly: A Prernise" in Sørensen & Mallett (eds.),International Fascism, p. 51.

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Despite what the pro-Francoist narrative c1aims, Spanish neutrality duringWorld War II was more fictitious than real. Spain actuaIly kept its official nonebelligerence well into the autumn af 1943, and offered important favours bothto Germany and Fascist Italy. As the Spanish N aval attache in London admittedin 1944: "Spain had not been neutral, that was quite c1ear, but the change overto neutrality was being made and had to be made as if nothing was takingplace". Still, even as late as March 1945, the Americans were appalled by thefaet that the N ationalists continued to cover up for Axis intelligence activities."This does not mean that Spain's failure to enter the war was not important tothe West. Franco was actually in a position, where he could have done muchgreat damager to anglo-American interests, but in the end he abstained fromaction due to the absence ofAxis support. Franco's difficulties in finding aproper collocation in an Axis, where HitIer was insensible to his demands andMussolini incapable af fulfilling them, had he wanted to, defined his policy lineaf survival between the two power bloes quite precisely." As the general wartheatre was moving away from the Mediterranean towards the east in thesummer of 1941, Franco had better opportunities to manoeuvre between theAxis and the Allies. In the end, to simplify a rather complex matter, the successaf Franco's non-belligerence and subsequent neutralitywas not so much due toable diplomacy as to the force af circumstance. An important differencebetween Franco and Mussolini, however, lies in the faet that the formerwantedreassurances from Germany befare entering the war, This, perhaps more thananything, saved him from disaster, as Hitler was unwilling to issue anyguarantees. In the summer af 1943, Franco wept in front af the cabinetmembers, when he passe d an the news af the arrest of Mussolini, albeit morefor the fear af facing the same tragic end, than due to any genuine compassionfor the distant soldier. The world war eventuaIly strengthened Franco's grip anSpain. And, a few months af ter Mussolini had been shot an 28 April 1945, thefascist salute was no longer the obligatory greeting in Spanish public life. Butthe Fascist legacy lived an.

" PRO, NAF 870, "top-secret routine", l March 1945.

37 Paul Preston, The Politics af Revenge. Unwin Hyrnan, London 1990, p. 56; Lucio Ceva,Guerra Mondiale. Strategie e industria bellica, Franco Angeli 2000, 129-73.

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