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ROLE OF INDIA AFTER BREAK-UP OF SOVIET UNION IN

DEVELOPMENT, PEACE AND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

OF RUSSIA SINCE 1989-2000

In this context, we can say that both the countries were firm on their

continued efforts to develop and strengthen relations in every sphere through

regular visits and dialogues and to support each other endeavor so what ever the

case may be. Hence we will continue examining relations under various heads:

Indo-Russian Relations from 1989-1990-VP Singh Regime

On 12 March 1990, V.P. Singh spoke to Gorbachev on phone

congratulating him on his election as Soviet president. Again on 27 May he had

an 18 minute telephone conversation with Gorbachev covering the Indo-Pak

confrontation situation over Kashmir. His call was motivated by India’s concern

that Gorbachev should remain well informed of India’s position before he went to

Washington for his coming summit with the US president George Bush. It was

also particularly motivated by certain reports emanating from American sources

that India was getting ready for a nuclear confrontation with Pakistan.1

In a significant foreign policy move, V.P. Singh decided to go to Moscow

on 23 July 1990. It was the first summit level visit after the installation of the

National Front Government in India and the first contact at the top between the

two countries after a year. Considering the developments in the Soviet Union,

East Europe and Washington Moscow détente on the one hand and the sea change

in the south Asian region and end of the Congress rule in India, they had enough

to talk about.2

V.P. Singh’s main concern was to seek clarification on the economic

policy of Gorbachev which he had outlined at the Communist party congress. He

was reported to have called for introducing certain corrections in the Soviet

Union’s cooperation with third world countries with particular reference to the

conversion of rouble value. During the discussions the rupee-rouble exchange rate

figured in a big way as the entire amount of trade relations between the two

countries revolved around the rupee payment. Under the protocol signed in

Moscow last month, the trade and payment agreement between India and the

Soviet Union which formed the basis of rupee payment had been extended up to

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31 December 1995. The Indo-Soviet trade plan for 1990 envisaged a trade

turnover of Rs. 8800 crores of which the exports to the Soviet Union would

amount to Rs. 5300 crores and imports from that country to Rs. 3500 crores.3 The

Soviet Union offered to sell high technology aircrafts IL-76, YAK 42 and

helicopters to India. USSR maintained that India and Pakistan should resolve the

issues through bilateral cooperation as envisaged in the Shimla Agreement.

V.P. Singh had taken with him the external affairs minister I.K. Gujaral,

finance minister Madhu Dandwate and commerce minister Arun Nehru, each

meant to meet his Soviet counterpart. Both the leaders were engrossed with their

domestic worries. As V.P. Singh and Gorbachev met at the summit neither could

shake off the shadows of his domestic crisis. At one of the meetings, Gorbachev

looked twice at his wrist watch. A hundred critical domestic issues claimed his

attention in the wake of the CPSU’s 28th

Congress V.P. Singh’s mind too

continued to turn back to Delhi where a larger agenda of image repairing jobs

cried out for his return. His was a minority coalition of the two disparate allies

BJP and the leftists, who had hardly seen eye to eye on any issue, national or

international. In the week before he left for Moscow his government faced its first

serious crisis. Despite these handicaps the two leaders worked sincerely for two

days to see that Indo-Soviet relations remained stable.4 Gorbachev in his talks

with V.P. Singh categorically stated that the Soviet Union stood as firmly as ever

behind India on this issue in reiterating that Kashmir was an integral part of India.

Moscow was against internationalizing this issue and Washington had already

been informed accordingly. Shevardnadze, on behalf of his boss declared that

there was complete understanding between the two sides on the Kashmir issue.5

The Indian side was left with no doubt whatsoever, that if it came to the

confrontation or conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir, the Soviet Union would

stand firmly by India.

However, as a sort of parting message Gorbachev told V.P. Singh that the

Soviet Union did not compare their ties with India with those with any other

country, the Indo-Soviet relationship was unique. The relationship was still

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relevant to both countries and to a world searching for a new order of peace and

cooperation, India had to reciprocate these sentiments.

On his way back home, V.P. Singh said that the policy decisions on

cooperation between India and the Soviet Union taken during talks would take a

concrete form in a comprehensive agreement which would be signed during

Gorbachev’s visit to India early next year. The proposed agreements would cover

the entire gamut of economic issues besides science and technology. The

proposals were meant for long range economic cooperation covering the period

upto 2000 and were included to set the tone for the 21st century. The agreement

could record the decision to continue the rupee trade till 1995. Meanwhile, some

ancillary agencies would be set up to explain the rules and procedures of one side

to the other apart from taking care of coordination and monitoring of cooperative

arrangements.6

Indo-Russian Relations from 1991-P.V. Narsimha Rao Govt.

On August 8, 1991, the two countries renewed the Indo-Soviet treaty of

1971 for another twenty years reaffirming their faith in the treaty as having

served the national interests of both the countries providing a reliable basis of

cooperation between the two countries in defence and economic matters and as

a potential factor in maintaining peace in Asia. Hardly the ink was dry on new

renewed document treaty when a coup was staged in Moscow on 19 August

challenging reforms introduced by Gorbachev. The developments took place so

rapidly that the Indian Govt. could not keep pace with trends to realize how this

event would interact on Indo-Soviet relations. However the Govt. on 22nd

August

sent congratulatory message to both Gorbachev and Yeltsin expressing relief at

the outcome and reiterating their faith in the abiding nature of Indo-Soviet

friendship.

It was well realized in official circles that in the light of momentous

changes taking place in Soviet Union, India’s relations would have to be

restructured. First step in this direction was taken when the external affair

minister Madhav Singh Solanki was chosen to visit Moscow as a special envoy of

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Prime minister from 13-15 November, 1991.He was have been preceded by a

team of top officials but their visit was cancelled because of sweeping changes

introduced by Boris Yeltsin in Russian Federation, by scraping old ministries,

creating new ones and merging some giving an entirely new look to the

administrative set up. Hence it was very difficult to identify the counterparts. For

a variety of reasons, including domestic preoccupations, Russian leaders were

slow in responding to India’s move for renewal of contacts with Russian

Federation. By what he said and observed, Solanki inferred that the incessant

struggle of supremacy between Gorbachev and Yeltsin was likely to unsettle

India’s traditional ties of friendship with Soviet Union. While Gorbachev as head

of Union still valued the Indo-Soviet connections, Yeltsin as head of Russian

Federation was reluctant to commit himself to anything until India acknowledged

him to be its valid and indeed the only spokesman of what remained of the

country. Yeltsin was more interested in maintaining status quo. His entourage had

made it clear that Indo-Soviet relationship had lost its dynamism and momentum.

Solanki wind up his visit with the assurance of continuing goodwill of Soviet

leaders but trade and defence issues were uncertain.

Disintegration of Soviet Union

The weakening of the Soviet government led to a series of events that

eventually caused the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a gradual process that took

place from about January 19, 1990, to December 31, 1991. This process was

characterized by many of the republics of the Soviet Union declaring their

independence and being recognized as sovereign nation states

In February, 1990, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union agreed to give up its monopoly of power. Over the next several weeks, the

15 constituent republics of the USSR held their first competitive elections.

Reformers and ethnic nationalists won many of the seats.

The constituent republics began to assert their national sovereignty and

started a "war of laws" with the Moscow central government, wherein the

governments of the constituent republics repudiated union-wide legislation where

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it conflicted with local laws, asserting control over their local economies and

refusing to pay tax revenue to the central Moscow government. This strife caused

economic dislocation as supply lines in the economy were severed, and caused the

Soviet economy to decline further.7

The pro-independence movement in the Lithuanian SSR, Sajudis,

established on June 3, 1988, caused a visit by Gorbachev in January 1990 to the

Lithuanian capital, Vilinius, which provoked a pro-independence rally of around

250,000 people. On March 11, 1990, the Lithuanian SSR, led by Chairman of the

Supreme Council Vytautas Landsbergis, declared restoration of independence.

However, the Soviet Army attempted to suppress the movement. The Soviet

Union initiated an economic blockade of Lithuania and kept troops there "to

secure the rights of ethnic Russians.8

On March 30, 1990, the Estonian Supreme Council declared Soviet power

in Estonian SSR since 1940 to have been illegal, and started a process to

reestablish Estonia as an independent state. The process of restoration of

independence of the Latvian SSR began on May 4, 1990, with a Latvian Supreme

Council vote stipulating a transitional period to complete independence.

On January 13, 1991, Soviet troops, along with KGB Spetsnaz Alpha

Group stormed the Vilnius TV Tower in Vilnius Lithuania to suppress the

nationalist media. This ended with 14 unarmed civilians dead and hundreds more

injured. Later that month in Georgian SSR anti-Soviet protesters at Tbilisi

demonstrated support for Lithuanian independence.9

On March 17, 1991, in a Union-wide referendum 76.4% of all voters

voted for the retention of the Soviet Union in a reformed form.10

The Baltics,

Armenia, Georgia, Chechnya (which was by now referring to itself as Ichkeria

and despite previously being a region within Russia officially, had a strong desire

to emulate the independence of its neighbors) 11

and Moldova boycotted the

referendum. In each of the other nine republics, a majority of the voters supported

the retention of the renewed Soviet Union. Following the results, Armenia

indicated it wanted to rejoin in Union discussion.

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On June 12, 1991, Yeltsin won 57% of the popular vote in the democratic

elections for the post of president of the Russian SFSR, defeating Gorbachev's

preferred candidate, Nikolai Ryzhkov, who won 16% of the vote. In his election

campaign, Yeltsin criticized the "dictatorship of the centre", but did not suggest

the introduction of a market economy. Instead, he said that he would put his head

on the rail track in the event of increased prices. Yeltsin took office on July 10.

On the night of July 31, 1991, Russian Omon from Riga, the Soviet military

headquarters in the Baltics, assaulted the Lithuanian border post in Medininkai

and killed seven Lithuanian servicemen. This further weakened the Soviet Union's

position, internationally and domestically.

Faced with growing republic separatism, Gorbachev attempted to

restructure the Soviet Union into a less centralized state. On August 20, 1991, the

Russian SFSR was scheduled to sign the New Union Treaty, which was to convert

the Soviet Union into a federation of independent republics with a common

President, foreign policy and Military. The new treaty was strongly supported by

the Central Asian republics, which needed the economic power and common

markets of the other Soviet republics to prosper. However, this meant the

preservation of the Communist Party's control over economic and social life.

The more radical reformists were increasingly convinced that a rapid

transition to a market economy was required, even if the eventual outcome

included the disintegration of the Soviet Union into several independent nation-

states. Disintegration of the USSR also accorded with the desires of Yeltsin's

presidency of the Russian Federation as well as regional and local authorities, to

establish full power over their territories and get rid of pervasive Moscow

ideological control. In contrast to the reformers' lukewarm approach to the new

treaty, the conservatives and remaining 'patriots' and Russian nationalists of the

USSR, still strong within the CPSU and military establishment, were completely

opposed to anything that might contribute to the weakening of the Soviet state and

its centralized power base.

On August 19, 1991, Gorbachev's vice president Gennadi Yanayev, prime

minister Valentin Pavlov, defense minister Dmitriy, KGB chief Vladimir

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Kryuchkov, and other senior officials acted to prevent the signing of the union

treaty by forming the "General Committee on the State Emergency." The

"Committee" put Gorbachev (vacationing in Foros, Crimea) under house arrest,

reintroduced political censorship, and attempted to stop the perestroika English

means Restructuring rebuilding.

Perestroika was a political movement within the communist party of

Soviet Union widely associated with the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Its

literal meaning is "restructuring", referring to the restructuring of the Soviet

political and economic system. Perestroika refers to major changes initiated by

Mikhail Gorbachev to the structure and function of both the political and

economic control of the Soviet Union allowing more independent actions from

the various ministries and eventually to the dismantling of the Soviet-era

command economy and its replacement with a market economy. However, the

process arguably exacerbated already existing social and economic tensions

within the Soviet Union, and no doubt helped to further nationalism among the

constituent republics, as well as social fragmentation.12

Glasnost means publicity or openness to public. This was the policy of

maximal publicity, openness, and transparency in the activities of all government

institutions in the Soviet Union, together with freedom of Information, introduced

by Mikhail Gorbachev in the second half of the 1980s. The word was frequently

used by Gorbachev to specify the policies he believed might help reduce the

corruption at the top of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, and

moderate the abuse of administrative power in the Central Committee.13

Perestroika is often argued to be one reason for the fall of communism in

the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and for the end of the Cold War. The coup

leaders quickly issued an emergency decree suspending political activity and

banning most newspapers. While coup organizers expected some popular support

for their actions, the public sympathy in large cities and in republics was largely

against them. Russian SFSR President Boris Yeltsin was quick to condemn the

coup and grab popular support for himself.

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Table 3.1 : Leaders of Union of Soviet Socialists Republic (USSR) 14

Sr.

No.

Leaders Started & Ended

1.

Vladimr Lenin

Nov.8, 1917- Jan.21, 1924

2. Grigory Zinoview

Joseph Stalin

Lev Kamenev

1922-1925 (Troika)

3.

Joseph Stalin

April 3, 1922- March 5,

1953

4.

Georgy

Malenkov

March 5, 1953- Feb. 8, 1955

5. Georgy Malenkov

Lavrentiy Beria

Vyacheslav Molotov

March 13, 1953-June 26,

1953 (Troika)

6.

Nikita Khrushchev

Sep. 7, 1953-Oct. 14, 1964

7. Alexei Kosygin

Anastas Mikoyan

Nikolai Podgorny

Leonid Brezhnev

Oct. 14, 1964-June 16, 1977

(Troika)

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8.

Leonid

Brezhnev

Oct. 14, 1964- Nov. 10, 1982

9. Yuri Andropov

Nov. 12, 1982- Feb. 9, 1984

10.

Konstantin

Chernenko

Feb. 13, 1984- March 10,

1985

11.

Mikhail

Gorbachev

March 11, 1985-December 25, 1991

The August developments marked a turning point in the history of the

erstwhile USSR. The coup fizzled out within 72 hours and Mr. Gorbachev, who

had been placed in a sort of preventive custody, returned to Moscow in his

capacity as the President of the Soviet Union. President B N Yeltsin of the

Russian Federation, displaying rare courage and qualities of outstanding

leadership, played a crucial role in bringing about the collapse of the coup. The

restoration of constitutional order following the abortive coup marked the victory

of the will of the people and a reassertion of democratic values.

Thousands of people in Moscow came out to defend the White House (the

Russian Federation's parliament and Yeltsin's office), then the symbolic seat of

Russian sovereignty. The organizers tried but ultimately failed to arrest Yeltsin,

who rallied mass opposition to the coup. The Special Forces dispatched by the

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coup leaders took up positions near the White House, but would not storm the

barricaded building.

The final round of the Soviet Union collapse took place following the

Ukranian popular referendum on December 1, 1991, wherein 90% of voters opted

for independence. The leaders of the three principal Slavic republics (the Russian,

Ukrainian and Belarussian SSRs) agreed to meet for a discussion of possible

forms of relationship, alternative to Gorbachev's struggle for a union.

On December 8, 1991, the leaders of the Russian, Ukrainian, and

Belarusian republics met in Belavezhskaya Pushcha and signed the Belavezha

Accords declaring the Soviet Union dissolved and replacing it with the

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Gorbachev described this as an

unconstitutional coup, but it soon became clear that the development could not be

halted.

On December 12, 1991, Russia's secession from the Union was sealed,

with the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR formally ratifying the Belavezha

Accords and denouncing the 1922 Treaty on the creation of the Soviet Union.

On December 17, 1991, alongside 28 European countries, the European

Community, and four non-European countries, twelve of the fifteen soviet

republics signed the European Energy Charter in the Hague as sovereign states.

Post Soviet States in alphabetical order:

1. Armenia, 2. Azerbaijan,

3. Belarus, 4. Estonia, 5. Georgia,

6. Kazakhstan, 7. Kyrgyzstan,

8. Latvia, 9. Lithuania, 10. Moldova,

11. Russia, 12. Tajikistan,

13. Turkmenistan, 14. Ukraine,

15. Uzbekistan

Doubts remained over the authority of the Belavezha Accords to affect the

dissolution of the Soviet Union, since they were signed by only five of the Soviet

Republics. However, on December 21, 1991, representatives of all member

republics except Georgia signed the Alma-Ata Protocol, in which they confirmed

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the dissolution of the Union. That same day, all former-Soviet republics agreed to

join the CIS, with the exception of the three Baltic States and Georgia. The

documents signed at Alam-Ata also addressed several issues raised by the Union's

extinction. Notably, Russia was authorized to assume the role of the USSR in the

United Nations, which meant inheriting its permanent membership on the

Security Council. The Soviet Ambassador to the UN delivered to the Secretary

General a letter by Russia's president, Boris Yeltsin, dated December 24, 1991,

informing him that, in virtue of that agreement, Russia was the successor state to

the USSR for the purposes of UN membership. After being circulated among the

other UN member states with no objection raised, the statement was declared

accepted on December 31.

On December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned as President of the USSR,

declaring the office extinct and ceding all the powers still vested in it to the

president of Russia: Yeltsin. Mikhail Gorbachev in a televised broadcast said,

“We live in a new world. The cold war is finished…..”15

That new world saw the

emergence of Russia as the continuer state 16

of the Soviet Union losing its super

power status but retaining the permanent seat in the United Nations Security

Council (UNSC). On the night of that same day, the Soviet flag was lowered for

the last time over the Kremlin. Finally, a day later on December 26, 1991, the

Council of Republics (a chamber) of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR recognized

the dissolution of the Soviet Union and dissolved itself (another chamber of the

Supreme Soviet had been unable to work during some months before this, due to

absence of a quorum). By December 31, 1991, all official Soviet institutions had

ceased operations, as individual republics assumed the central government's role.

A combination of many factors leaded to the disintegration of the USSR which

are as under:

1. The USSR was stagnating economically during this time. The socialist

economic setup meant that state was paying for all the Arms that the USSR

bought. It had a huge burden on the state.

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2. There was large scale red tapism & corruption in the country. The

state became unaccountable to the people and they refused to support a

government that did not give them any political freedom.

3. The people of USSR had been isolated from the west for a long time.

In the 1980s, when they finally saw that they were economically, politically,

culturally and technologically behind USA, there was a huge psychological

shock.

4. Gorbachev tried to introduce reforms, but the Communist Party felt

that he was going too fast and the people thought he was going too slow. He

was stuck in the middle and lost support everywhere. The people decided that

they could do without the Soviet Party.

5. There was a rise of nationalism in states like Belarus, Estonia and

Ukraine. Revolts here were not crushed and finally they began to break off.

The Russian Federation inherited 75 percent of former territory of USSR,

51 percent of its population 60 percent of basic assets and 76 percent of Industrial

enterprises17

. It accounts for 90 percent of oil output, 73 percent of extraction of

gas, 63 percent of the production of electricity, 80 percent of the export of crude

oil and almost 100 percent of the export of natural gas (compared with USSR).

The GDP is about 50 percent of that produced by the Soviet Union on the eve of

its collapse.18

Impact of Disintegration of USSR on India

The initial two years (1991-93) were most difficult years in bilateral

relations. The confusion and intense debate in Russian foreign policy

establishment regarding the course of action to be undertaken i.e. whether to

pursue a vigorous pro-west policy giving up the old relations or maintain a

balance among old and new partners, further delayed the evolution of a concrete

foreign policy. Russian economy was undergoing difficult phase of transition

from a socialist society moving towards a market oriented pattern; the transition

swept the whole society that was unprepared for such a drastic change. In this

complex scenario, it was but natural that Indo-Russian relations underwent a huge

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churning process. T.N.Kaul former ambassador to the Soviet Union observed :

“there is bound to be some changes in these(Indo-Russian) relations because of

the systematic, geographical and geo-political mutations taking place in the far

flung areas, regions and states of the erstwhile USSR.”19

The post-disintegration Russian political scene witnessed serious debates

among various political leaders and factions regarding foreign policy choices.

Various scholars and political leaders criticized the extreme pro-Western

orientation of Kozyrev. Georgy Kundadze, Deputy Foreign Minister argued

against retaining the `special relationship’ with India that the Soviet Union had

cultivate in the interests of cold war confrontation with the United States and

China. Yevgeny Pudovkin, member of the Foreign Relations Committee,

contested this position and said it was a major mistake of Russian diplomacy to

renounce the special relationship with India. He said there were few countries in

the world with which Moscow had such a long standing not be squandered.

Yevgeny Chelysev, an academician and an authority on India, said it was deeply

distressing to see Russian-Indian relations coming to ruin because of Moscow’s

pro-Western orientation. India is a great power, while Pakistan and other

countries are just states like others.

Russian’s policy of developing closer ties with both, India and Pakistan,

was evident when its foreign policy documents stated: “Economic and geo-

political considerations demand close ties with India. Russia’s policy must be

formed with considerations of India’s significance as a country affirming itself as

a regional power among the developing countries.” The gap in the mutual

understanding between Russian and India leaders was one of the important factors

that led to the worsening of relations. Yeltsin offered to sign a treaty with India

during Foreign Minister Madhav Singh Solanki’s visit to Moscow, but much to

the chagrin of Yeltsin government it was quietly rejected. Times of India wrote,

“despite the chagrin it causes to Mr. Boris Yeltsin, India like other countries still

regards Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev as the principal interlocutor….”20

This was the

first direct contact between Indian Government and the Russian leaders after the

August Coup. Yeltsin in a welcome address on 15 Nov., 1991 stressed that this is

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the first visit in the history of Russian Indian Links 21

and stated that the changed

situation in USSR has made the present meeting historically necessary. He

expressed his keenness to establish ties with India and accepted the Indian PM

invitation to pay an official visit to India.

India and Russia finalized a new political treaty and signed memoranda

of understanding on trade and supplies of defence and power generation

equipment on 15 January 1992. The political treaty contained elements of the

1971 Indo-Soviet friendship treaty; the memoranda on trade and defence and

power equipment supplies had been structured to allow flexibility to meet changes

in the economies of the two countries, as stated by the Indian Foreign Secretary

J.N. Dixit.22

Yeltsin and Narasimha Rao met in New York where they were

attending UNSC meeting. In their discussion, Yeltsin stated that Russia followed

the old Soviet line; there was no change in their policy on Kashmir and other

issues.

Initially Russia’s policy towards India was thus not identical with that of

the erstwhile Soviet Union. India's response to the developments in the erstwhile

Soviet Union was in keeping, inter alia, with her geopolitical, strategic and

economic imperatives. India has in the past had wide ranging and intensive

cooperation with different Republics under the overall umbrella of Indo-Soviet

cooperation. The Government thus undertook task of disaggregating, Republic-

wise, Indo-Soviet ties.23

In September, India recognized the independence of the three Baltic

States. In December, India positively assessed the proposed Commonwealth of

Independent States and accorded diplomatic recognition to all the Republics of

the former Soviet Union. It is intended to establish diplomatic relations with all 15

Republics. Accordingly, it was decided to concurrently accredit India's

Ambassador in Helsinki to Estonia, India's Ambassador in Stockholm to Latvia

and India's Ambassador in Warsaw to Lithuania. A decision was also taken to

open, at this stage, new Embassies in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and upgrade

India's Consulate General in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) and to open Consulates/CGs

in Vladivostok and St. Petersburg. For the present, the other countries, viz,

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Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kirghizstan, Turkmenistan and

Tajikistan would be covered by concurrent accreditation.

The Minister for External Affairs visited Moscow from 14 to 19

November. He held extensive, and useful discussions with the Soviet and Russian

leaders on International and bilateral issues. His meetings with President Yeltsin

and other senior leaders of the Russian Federation were extremely useful as they

laid the foundation for further development of relation between India and the

Russian Federation, The Russian leadership conveyed that it attached priority to

development of multi-sectoral ties with India.

India’s Assistance to Russian Federation

India offered humanitarian assistance to the Russian Federation

amounting to Rs 15 crores. The purpose was to offer some succor to those

sections of the population which have been adversely affected by the dislocation

of economic activities following the recent political and economic changes in the

erstwhile USSR. The amount is to be used to supply urgently required items

including baby food, rice, standard medicines, including sulphur drugs and

antibiotics.

India also contributed an amount equivalent to US$ 250,000 for assistance

to those affected by the Chernobyl disaster. This pledge was made in the context

of the United Nations' efforts towards this end. A Russian delegation visited India

from 14 to 22 February and finalized the first-ever India-Russia Trade Protocol.

The Protocol is valid for 1992.

Many of the critical issues in Russian-Indian defence ties were to be

negotiated and resolved by defence officials from both sides in the course of a

series of visits all through 1992-98, including exclusive defence visits and of

military delegations accompanying the high-level political visits. The first in the

series of defence visits was that of Indian Defence Minister Sharad Pawar to

Moscow in September 1992. It took place at a very critical phase when India was

in dire need of spare parts for the massive inventory of its MIG aircraft acquired

from the Soviets over the years. It was then feared that the MiGs would have to be

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grounded soon unless replenishment of spare parts was resumed. In fact, exactly a

year earlier, Pawar’s visit to Moscow ( September 1991) had not yielded much,

forcing India to turn to Ukraine for the supply of spares for the AN-32 and TU-

142 M aircraft, in return for the export of “medicines and cloth and partial

payment in hard currency”. In May 1992, in the course of Russian Deputy Prime

Minister Gennedy Burbulis’ visit, while assuring India that Russia would continue

the supply of defence spare parts, the condition laid down was that ‘the new

credits would be available at double the existing interest rates plus one-tenth of

the payment was required in advance’. Against this background of hard

negotiations characterizing the Russia position in the opening years of the Yeltsin

period, Pawar was extended a “red carpet treatment”, including a meeting with

Yeltsin. Under an agreement signed in September 1992, India received a credit

line of US$830 million to buy special equipment. Soon thereafter, India received

a proposal from the Russian’s for co-production of spare parts for the MiG 21s

and they also offered the sale of the latest MiG model on favourable terms.

Boris Yeltsin visit to India

In 1993 New Delhi and Moscow worked to redefine their relationship

according to post-Cold War realities. During the January 1993 visit of Russian

president Boris Yeltsin to India, the two countries signed agreements that signaled

a new emphasis on economic cooperation in bilateral relations. The 1971 treaty

was replaced with the new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which

dropped security clauses that in the Cold War were directed against the United

States and China. Yeltsin stated that Russia would deliver cryogenic engines and

space technology for India's space program under a US$350 million deal between

the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the Russian space agency,

Glavkosmos, despite the imposition of sanctions on both organizations by the

United States. In addition, Yeltsin expressed strong support for India's stand on

Kashmir. A defense cooperation accord aimed at ensuring the continued supply of

Russian arms and spare parts to satisfy the requirements of India's military and at

promoting the joint production of defense equipment. Bilateral trade, which had

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fallen drastically during the 1990-92 period, was expected to revive following the

resolution of the dispute over New Delhi's debt to Moscow and the May 1992

decision to abandon the 1978 rupee-ruble trade agreement in favor of the use of

hard currency.

An agreement signed in 1993 terminated the rupee trade arrangement and

mandated all bilateral trade transactions to be conducted on hard currency basis.

The issue of repayment of civilian and military loans taken by India also came up.

After prolonged negotiations, the rouble credit was denominated in rupees and

repayment schedule was drawn up. It was agreed that India will pay about

Rs.3,000 crores annually to Russia for 12 years from 1994, and that Russia would

use the rupees to buy Indian goods. Later, it was also agreed that this amount

could be put to auction to Russian and third party enterprises at discount to make

Indian goods more economically viable. Today, Indo-Russian bilateral trade is

based on payments in freely convertible currencies. All Russian exports to India

follow the new system. But only about 20 per cent of Indian exports follow the

new route. The rest are financed through the renegotiated rupee-debt repayment

mechanism.

As a result of these economic policy changes, traditional actors in Indo-

Russian trade and other economic relations, such as the public sector units and

state trading corporations, are no longer as relevant as they used to be in the

Soviet era. Sections of the Indian private sector, which used to get away with

selling many products of questionable quality under the bilateral trading system,

are finding it difficult to adjust to the radically changed economic and commercial

environment in Russia today, driven by market forces.

Indo-Russian trade has declined substantially in the last decade. In 1999

bilateral trade was only $1,5 billion which accounted for only 2.5 percent of

India’s Exports and about 1.3 percent of imports. Through out the 1990s the trade

balance was in favour of India.

The main items of traditional export from India are tea, readymade

garments, drugs and pharmaceuticals, coffee, tobacco, rice and leather goods.

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Recently, some non-traditional items like electronic goods have also shown strong

growth. But there has been some negative growth in respect of tea and coffee.

Table 3.2

Indo-Russian Trade

(1993-94 to 1999-2000)

in dollars million

Year Total

exports to

Russia

% share in total

exports

Total imports

from Russia

% share in

total imports

1993-94 648.80 2.92 256.89 1.10

1994-95 807.80 3.07 504.54 1.76

1995-96 1046.55 3.29 857.53 2.33

1996-97 811.84 2.42 628.96 1.61

1997-98 954.12 2.72 679.02 1.63

1998-99 709.26 2.14 54.42 1.29

1999-00 952.60 2.53 618.23 1.31

Source CMIE

Traditional imports from Russia include fertilizer, iron and steel, non-

ferrous metals, newsprint, synthetic rubber and chemicals. Last year, India

imported coal, coke and briquettes, worth $40 million, from Russia. There has

also been strong growth in r aw cotton, electronic goods and printed books.

Negative growth is noticed in iron and steel, organic and inorganic chemicals and

gold and silver.

These statistics do not reveal the full story. Many imports from Russia,

particularly of metal, metal scrap, fertilizers, paper and paper products, are

sourced through international suppliers. Hence they do not reflect in the

figures. Similarly, many Indian goods enter Russia via "shuttle trade'', or

through third countries.

At the governmental level, an Indo-Russian Inter Governmental

Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural

Cooperation has been engaged in certain activities through 11 joint working

groups. Some infrastructural projects are being implemented with Russian

participation. India and Russia have also cooperated in the oil and gas sector. But

most of these initiatives are cooperation at the public sector level. Since the future

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of most of these units are uncertain in both countries, the presence of some big

Indian business houses in the Russian market is important. Indian industry has

already identified areas of mutual interest - IT, pharmaceuticals,

telecommunications, financial services, hydro-carbons, energy and power, oil and

gas, food processing, financial consultancy, management services, textiles and

diamond processing.

The agreement on an India-Russia transport corridor may help in

reducing transport costs. The present shipping route, which passes through the

Suez Canal and enters the Russian port of St. Petersburg via Kotka (Finland) and

Rotterdam (the Netherlands), is long and time-consuming. The proposed route

comprises sea and land links across India, Iran and Russia, and will shorten travel

time by as much as 10 days. The new route will be Mumbai- Bandar Abbas (Iran)

Astrakhan (Russia).

The joint declaration also says that both countries would enhance

cooperation and coordination at international trade, economic and financial

bodies. This may be useful in formulating common positions and responses to

emerging global economic issues. In fact, there is also great scope for learning

from each other in the area of economic policy making. The experiences of both

countries concerning privatization and liberalization of trade could be understood

better through regular consultations. Overall, future bilateral economic relations

will depend on the importance Russia gives to India's developmental needs. The

USSR had played an important role in India's industrialization process. It had a

comparative advantage in sectors like steel, which was central to India's industrial

needs. India has to assess Russia's current comparative advantage. Similarly, India

can help Russia in the process of restructuring and modernization through its

expertise in IT, management and financial services.

Two factors will determine the immediate future of Indo-Russian

economic relations. First, sustained growth of the Russian economy and

second, competitiveness of Indian industry, commerce and services. Further,

things would have been much more transparent if the majority of Indian exports

to Russia were not financed through the rupee-debt repayment mechanism. The

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strong political will in both countries to improve bilateral economic relations

could have been converted into real economic gains if some bold policy initiatives

have been taken. The present level of Indo-Russian trade is certainly not

commensurate with the existing potential. In order to improve these relations,

some bold policy initiatives were needed. The joint declaration says that both

countries will explore the possibilities of regional trading arrangements with third

countries. If policy-makers were serious and imaginative, they could have

proposed a bilateral free trade agreement, although there would have been

reservations from some industries in both countries. The free-trade agreement had

the potential to give a new direction to bilateral relations. It could have created a

feeling of special economic relationship. There are strong signs that the Russian

economy is picking up. This year it is expected to grow by 5 to 6 per cent. This

was the right time to give a boost to Indo-Russian economic relations.

Pressure from the United States, which believed the engines and

technology could be diverted to ballistic missile development, led the Russians to

cancel most of the deal in July 1993. Russia did, however, supply rockets to help

India to develop the technology to launch geostationary satellites, and, with

cryogenic engine plans already in hand, the ISRO was determined to produce its

own engines by 1997.

Despite Yeltsin's call for a realignment of Russia, India, and China to

balance the West, Russia shares interests with the developed countries on nuclear

proliferation issues. In November 1991, Moscow voted for a Pakistani-sponsored

UN resolution calling for the establishment of a South Asian nuclear-free zone.

Russia urged India to support the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons and decided in March 1992 to apply "full-scope safeguards" to future

nuclear supply agreements. Russia also shares interests with the United States in

cooling antagonisms between India and Pakistan, particularly with regard to

Kashmir, thus making it unlikely that India could count on Russia in a future

dispute with Pakistan.

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Rao's Moscow visit

However, it was with Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to Russia in

June 1994 that Indo-Russian ties were put on a firm foundation. “The Moscow

Declaration on the Protection of Interests of Pluralist States” signed by India

and Russia has become the bedrock of the relations. The Declaration drew

attention not only to the nature of the challenges faced by the two countries, but

also focused attention on the source from which this threat emanated for both. It

also reiterated support of the signatories for each other’s territorial integrity. This

is highly important given the fact that India and Russia were battling with these

challenges in Kashmir and Chechnya, respectively. In the changed context, it was

the space that lay between India and Russia that acquired significance. Once

again, it was the commonality of their geopolitical interests that paved the way for

the relationship to become strong and stable. Later, India and Russia backed

opposition to the Taliban that had crystallized into the Northern Alliance. On the

issue of religious extremism and terrorism, India and Russia share many

commonalities: the source of tension, funding, training, etc. India and Russia

wanted a secular Central Asia working towards a democratic setup. From this

perspective, stability and security were important. Instability hampers growth and

helps in sustaining extremism and terrorism to an extent. Consequently, India and

Russia have established institutional linkages to strengthen this aspect. To date,

this commonality has not diminished. Russia views India as a major regional

power whose involvement in international politics would make a positive

contribution. The two leaders signed declarations assuring international and

bilateral goodwill and continuation of Russian arms and military equipment

exports to India. Rao's Moscow visit lacked the controversy that characterized his

May 1994 visit to the United States and was deemed an important success

because of the various accords, one of which restored the sale of cryogenic

engines to India. In the course of this visit, Yeltsin, as per press reports, is said to

have informed the latter about his decision to “auction 50 per cent of the import

quota for India to Russian businessmen.” This included agreements to set up joint

ventures in the fields of civil and military aviations; the Indo-Russian Aviation

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Private Ltd was set up in India to ‘manufacture spare parts to upgrade and service

military aircraft of Russian origin…such ventures are to be based on purely

commercial considerations’. Soon thereafter, in the course of the Russian Deputy

Prime Minister Yuri Yarov’s visit to India in the summer of 1994, follow up

discussions took place and plans to set up engine overhaul plants for MiG 29 and

for upgrading of T-72 tanks were also finalized.

Bilateral relations between India and Russia improved as a result of eight

agreements signed in December 1994. The agreements cover military and

technical cooperation from 1995 to 2000, merchant shipping, and promotion and

mutual protection of investments, trade, and outer space cooperation. Political

observers saw the visit of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin that

occasioned the signing of the eight agreements as a sign of a return to the earlier

course of warm relations between New Delhi and Moscow. In March 1995, India

and Russia signed agreements aimed at suppressing illegal weapons smuggling

and drug trafficking. And when Russian nationalist Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky

visited India in March 1995, he declared that he would give India large supplies

of arms and military hardware if he was elected president of Russia.

During the same time frame as the cryogenic engine fiasco, the "rupee

versus ruble" debate flared up in Indo-Russian relations. As the Cold War

concluded, India had an amassed debt of $12-16 billion owed to the Soviet Union

for arms purchases. While India proved willing to pay off its debt, a dispute

emerged between the two states over the nature of the currency and the exchange

rate that would be used. As noted earlier, the Soviet Union had been willing to

accept rupee-for-arms arrangements since the initial Soviet intent in the military

cooperation was to use India as a strategic counter-balance, not a financial pool.

Since there was not a huge demand for Indian imports in the Soviet Union, almost

half of the rupee-based debt remained in Indian banks uncollected. When the new

and financially strapped Russian state took over the old Soviet trade books, the

vast Indian debt became an issue of concern. "Goodwill alone cannot forge

mutually advantageous economic ties. Trade between Russia and India almost

collapsed in 1991-92 because of arguments over the rupee-ruble exchange rate

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and the amount India owed Russia as the successor state to the USSR." After

much domestic squabbling in each country, a resolution was reached in January

1993 that called for India to repay Russia $1 billion a year in Indian goods until

2005, after which the remaining thirty-seven percent of the debt would be repaid,

interest free, over forty-five years.

Although a repayment schedule was established, controversy over

distribution of the "Rupee Fund" continued. Russia had originally agreed to

establish a three-year import schedule with India which would allow Indian

exporters to forecast the amount of products needed in advance. In September

1994, the Russian government reversed this decision out of fear that long-term

financial commitments would be too constricting. The new plan offered by

Moscow provided a 180 day’s export forecast to Indian producers.

Strained Indo-Russian Relations

It was in this atmosphere of uncertain Russian foreign policy objectives

that the post-Cold War relations between Russia and India were further strained

by two events. The first of these destabilizing events centered around a contract

dispute between the Russian space directorate "Glavkosmos" and the government

of India for the purchase of cryogenic engines and the related technology. The

contract, signed on 18 January 1991, stemmed from India’s desire to gain

knowledge of the liquid oxygen propulsion system of Russian cryogenic engines

in order to advance India’s Geo-synchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV)

program. If produced indigenously and without Russian assistance, the project

was forecast to require fifteen years until it would be operational. For

Glavkosmos, the $350 million deal would provide crucial funds during a period of

tremendous reductions in Russian defense expenditures.

Over the next two years, the United States protested the proposed transfer

of missiles and technology to India on the grounds that the sale would violate the

April 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The growing threat of

missile proliferation became well known to the United States following the Iraqi

Scud missile attacks during the Gulf War and the testing of India’s Agni IRBM

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missile in 1989. However, the ability of the United States to coherently protest the

sale was hampered by the changing of governments in Moscow as the Soviet

Union collapsed and as the U.S. Executive Branch changed administrations from

President Bush to President Clinton.

From the Indian and Russian perspectives, the cryogenic engine deal was

legal under the MTCR on the grounds that the treaty did not block the support of

"peaceful space ventures." Furthermore, India asserted that U.S. attempts to block

the sale were financially motivated since General Dynamics and the French

space-booster manufacturer Arianespace had both been outbid by Glavkosmos.

The new Russian government under Boris Yeltsin promised India’s

leadership that it would not give in to U.S. diplomatic pressure. This promise was

compromised, however, after the United States applied sanctions in May 1992,

and threatened further economic measures. On 16 July 1993, Boris Yeltsin agreed

to suspend the transaction and to alter the nature of the transfer to the sale of only

the cryogenic engines and not the technology. In exchange, Glavkosmos was

given bidding rights on over $950 million worth of future U.S. space projects.

While the ability of India to indigenously produce GSLVs and ICBMs was

delayed by several years due to the cancellation of the original cryogenic engine

deal, the main concern in New Delhi was that the Yeltsin government had given

in to Western pressure. "The conclusion they drew was that Russia’s overriding

need for American economic aid would make it susceptible to American pressure.

In Indian eyes, Russia is unreliable, and it has also lost its international stature."

As Indo-Russian relations appeared to weaken under Western pressure, direct

bilateral interactions between the two states also revealed tensions.

To further stimulate investor interest in India’s currency, the Russian

government began to auction off vast sums of the Indian currency to Russian

importers at discounted rates. The average discount of fifteen percent during the

auctions led to rampant corruption and manipulation of the rupee fund, especially

among Russia’s banking oligarchy. Meanwhile, the Indian government continued

to petition Russia to accelerate the repayment schedule while it simultaneously

maintained its protectionist import-export policies. By 1993, the level of bilateral

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trade between India and Russia had dropped to one-fifth of the 1990 level of $5.5

billion.

In 1995, the sale of Russian arms on the international market increased by

sixty percent over the previous year’s total as the state shifted from "an

ideological to a market-driven approach to selling its military hardware."

Old traditional relations gained momentum

India was finally revived in the Russian strategic focus in January 1996,

when Yevgeny Primakov replaced the pro-Western Andrei Kozyrev as Russia’s

Foreign Minister. The result was an immediate swing in Russia’s foreign policy

focus that included considerations for both the Western and Eastern Hemispheres.

A clear signal was sent by Moscow to New Delhi, and the rest of the world, one

year later when an agreement was reached to build two Russian light-water

nuclear reactors (LWR) in India in defiance of a Nuclear Suppliers Group ban.

"The two countries signed an accord paving the way for the construction of two

1,000 MW light water nuclear reactors at Kudankalam in Tamil Nadu. Hence it

seems that Russia would not succumb to external pressure this time."

Diplomatically, Russia appeared to no longer look strictly westwards. Within a

month of his taking over in March 1996, Primakov visited India where in a

meeting with the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, he

underscored the durability of Russian-Indian relations by emphasizing that they

would remain ‘unaffected by the political fortunes of the ruling parties in the two

countries’. He ‘spoke of India as a global power and a priority partner for

Russia’. The idea of a ‘strategic partnership’ between India and Russia was set

afloat.

The Deputy Director of the Rosvooruzhenie, Oleg Sidorenko, who

accompanied Foreign Minister Primakov on his visit to India from March 29 to

30, 1996, is said to have given assurances that there would be no interruption in

the supply of spare parts. In August1996, Yeltsin sent his top adviser on defence

and foreign policy, Boris Kuzyk, to New Delhi to settle ongoing discussions on

the proposed Sukhoi-30 deal ‘billed as one of the biggest aircraft deals between

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the two countries in decades of defence cooperation…. As of now, no plane in the

IAF (Indian Air Force) possessed such an interception range…as the Su-30’. This

deal, which was signed by the Narasimha Rao government, in its last days, when

election campaign was in full swing, came under a cloud of suspicion when a

leading National Daily, the Indian Express broke the story in 1996. Almost a

decade later on March 18, 2005, Shekhar Gupta, Chief Editor of this daily, in his

article ‘One Aircraft and Great Statecraft; the Sukhoi-30 Deal and how it

brought three India-Russia Strategic Partnership mutually hostile political

parties together in India’s interest’, revealed some interesting tit-bits of this

deal, based on his conversations with top leaders of the two parties that

succeeded the Rao government and also with Narasimha Rao himself upon

retirement. Gupta claims to have learnt that the Rao government ‘had paid an

advance of around $350 million to the Russians without any final price

settlement’. He went on to add that the Indian Express ‘checked out their usual

sources… and it did not seem that the decision, though hasty, was malafide’.

Gupta then reveals the more juicy tit-bits without on this occasion, revealing the

specific source, and adds ‘it seems that Yeltsin had told Narasimha Rao that he

too was heading for elections, that the Sukhoi factory, which happened to be in

his constituency, was too broke to even pay salaries to its staff and if India could

pay it, that advance it (sic) would work like magic in his election campaign. That

advance was, therefore, a political deal…to be adjusted in the final pricing later’.

Gupta goes into interesting details of his conversations with the leaders of three

different political parties, which were in power in close succession, citing this as

an example of how they were able to close ranks by not making an issue of this in

the larger national interest. Gupta concludes his article by contrasting this with

‘general antagonism in our politics through this past month and you know why

that Sukhoi story is so worthy of recall’. If this story is credible, then as a

researcher, I found it useful for pointing to the following: First, it once again

reveals the superb, almost cunning negotiating skills of Yeltsin, though often used

to serve his own larger interest. Second, it also confirms a broad national

consensus cutting across party lines in India, a point I have made earlier on

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continuing the traditional close ties with the Soviets/Russians, even while

diversifying and upgrading their strategic partnership with other global players.

From Russia’s vantage point, the unfolding developments in Europe,

Eurasia, and the energy security issue were reminiscent of the Cold War mindset.

Its response was the propagation of the idea of a multi polar world. In this regard,

a historic agreement with China on a “Multi polar World and the Formation of

a New World Order” was signed in Moscow in April 1997. This was the

beginning of a partnership with China. A multi polar world is an order that is just

and fair and democratic in which all nations are considered as equals and more

importantly, enjoy equal security. It is a world order in which there is no place for

hegemony. In this order, the UN would occupy a position of centrality. On its

part, India upheld that the world order was not a unipolar one, as new centers of

power and influence were emerging. While acknowledging the need for a

multipolar world, the Indian approach was not in terms of blocs, but the need to

maintain a balanced and stable world order. Since a unipolar world could lead to

instability, there was a need for a balancing force. Among the other initiatives

taken by Russia is the idea of an India- Russia-China strategic triangle, coming

together in the interests of the challenges faced by them in the region. During

Primakov’s visit to India in December 1998, he proposed at an informal level that

India-Russia-China should come together and form a strategic triangle in the

interests of peace and stability in the region. The initial response of India was one

of caution that could be explained by the fact that a strategic triangle implied

common perceptions and convergence of interests vis-à-vis a common threat.

Similarly, China expressed no opinion on this idea.

In the course of Primakov’s second visit to India in 1998, Russia came out

in full support of India’s candidature for the Security Council as was reflected

in the joint statement, according to which “Russia considers India . . . to be a

strong and appropriate candidate for permanent membership of an expanded

UN Security Council” and it also “underscored the commonality of approach of

the two countries on a number of international issues.”

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India-Russia cooperation in the developmental activities of Central Asia

can be accelerated if they can provide the landlocked countries access to the

outside world. In this regard, the North-South Corridor connecting St. Petersburg

with Mumbai is the best option. The corridor, a combination of sea, rail, and road

routes was planned in 2000 with Russia, Iran, and India agreeing to this ambitious

project.

The congruence of views between India and Russia had a favorable impact

on defense cooperation. This cooperation was put on a firm footing with the

landmark Sukhoi deal signed in late 1996. The salutary features of Indo-Russian

defense cooperation were its long-term-basis transfer of technology,

modernization of existing equipment, and access to the latest equipment,

weaponry, etc. in the Russian arsenal. In fact, defense cooperation had gone

beyond the main “buyer-seller” syndrome and had moved to the plan of joint

design, research, and production. The chief of the Indian Armed Forces was in

Russia to assure the Russians that enhanced interaction with the United States

would not lead to a drift towards that country on the question of defense

cooperation.

Based on continuity, trust and confidences relations with the Russian

Federation are an important foreign policy priority for India. Both countries have

emphasized the importance which they attach to bilateral relations and consider

them not to be subject to political vicissitudes. With post Cold War transitional

difficulties now left well behind, India's relations with Russia are progressing well

in almost all areas of bilateral cooperation, including trade and economy, science

and technology, culture and defence. There is recognition both in India and Russia

of the strategic dimension of Indo-Russian relations. Both countries share similar

perceptions on many international issues. Interactions on developments in the

region lying between the borders of India and Russia have been found to be

beneficial and contacts are being maintained on the evolving situation in

Afghanistan. A major event during the year was the landmark official visit to the

Russian Federation undertaken by the Prime Minister from 24- 26 March 1997,

which provided a new impetus to the traditionally close, friendly and multi-

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faceted ties between India and Russia. While in Russia, the Prime Minister had

meetings with President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin

during which the high priority accorded to bilateral relations and the importance

of intensifying these further to mutual benefit was reaffirmed by both sides.

Opinions and assessments on a wide range of international and regional issues

were also shared. Several important bilateral documents were signed during the

visit.

There have been many frequent high level exchanges between India and

Russia during 1996-97, effectively contributing to the further strengthening of

bilateral links in a very wide range of areas of mutual interest. A delegation of

young Russian Parliamentarians from the State Duma (Lower House of the

Russian Parliament) visited India from 12-17 September 1996. Mayor of Moscow

Yuri Luzhkov visited India from 16-19 September 1996 at the invitation of the

Chief Minister of Delhi. Apart from his host, he called on the Prime Minister and

the Minister of External Affairs. Russian Defence Minister Igor Rodionov visited

India from 21-23 October 1996. This was the first visit by the Russian Defence

Minister to India following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russian Defence

Minister Igor Rodionov, signed an agreement with his Indian counterpart, M S

Yadav, wherein the two sides inter alia agreed to conduct joint exercises between

the armed forces of the two countries to promote friendly ties and also to hold

periodic exchange of information on military matters Soviet/Post-Soviet Security

Perspectives towards South Asia ‘including operational doctrines of military

equipment’. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Davydov, in the course of his

visit to India declared on October 30, 1996, that his country ‘would not supply

arms to any country inimical to India’ and the major outcome of his discussions

with Defence Minister Yadav was that it was decided that a large number of

important defence related projects between the two countries should be

implemented. During Yadav’s return visit to Moscow in 1997, it was decided to

extend the existing defence agreement for 10 years, i.e., up to 2010, and in the

course of Prime Minister Primakov’s visit in December 1998, the two countries

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formally signed the long-term military technical cooperation agreement till the

year 2010, estimated at $10.15 billion.

During the visit, an agreement providing for cooperation between the

armed forces of the two countries was signed. Russian Deputy Prime Minister

Oleg Davydov visited India from 26- 30 October 1996 to participate in the India

Economic Summit organized by the Confederation of Indian Industry. He called

on the Prime Minister and held discussions with the Minister of External Affairs,

the Finance Minister and the Minister of State for Commerce.

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Fortov visited India from 9-13

November 1996 for attending a Conference on high pressure physics at Mumbai.

He met the Minister of External Affairs and the Minister of State for Science and

Technology while in New Delhi. A seven-member delegation of the Russian State

Duma Committee on Nationalities Affairs visited India from 25-30 November

1996 at the invitation of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs.

Russian Minister for Fuel and Energy Pyotr Rodionov visited India from

6-9 December 1996 in connection with the Fifth International Conference on

Energy held in Goa. While in Delhi, he held discussions with the Minister of State

for Power. From the Indian side, the Minister for Human Resource Development

Shri S R Bommai represented the Government of India at the inauguration of the

"Days of Indian Culture" in Russia from 16-28 September 1996. During his stay

in Moscow, he met Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and other high level Russian

dignitaries.

A Parliamentary delegation, led by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha Shri P A

Sangma visited Russia from 20-26 October 1996 and met Prime Minister

Chernomyrdin apart from the Chairmen of both Houses of the Russian

Parliament. Home Minister Shri Indrajit Gupta visited Russia from 4-8 November

1996 at the invitation of Russian Minister for Interior Anatoly Kulikov. Apart

from his host, he met the Secretary of the Security Council Ivan Rybkin and other

senior Russian dignitaries. The Defence Secretary visited Russia from 26

November 2 December 1996 during which a contract for the supply to India of

SU-30 MKI aircraft was signed.

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The Seventh Review Meeting of the Integrated Long Term Programme

of Cooperation in Science and Technology (ILTP) joint Council between India

and Russia was held in New Delhi on 8 & 9 January 1997 under the co-

chairmanship of Director General of Council of Scientific and Industrial Research

(CSIR) Prof C N R Rao, and Member of the Presidium of the Russian Academy

of Sciences Academician Guriy Marchuk. Meetings of the concerned Working

Groups under the Indo-Russian Inter-Governmental Commission were held as

follows-i) Working Group on Pharmaceuticals met in New Delhi from 1-5 April

1996; ii) Working Group on Coal met in New Delhi from 10-13 July 1996; (iii)

Working Group on Metallurgy met in New Delhi from 23-28 September 1996; iv)

Working Group on Science and Technology met in Moscow from 24-28

December 1996; (v) Working Group on Power met in Moscow from 13-15

January 1997; (vi) Working Group on Culture met in New Delhi from 15-17

January 1997; (vii) Working Group on Trade and Economic Cooperation met in

Moscow from 23-27 January 1997, while its Sub-Group on Transport met in

Moscow from 22-24 January 1997; (viii) Working Group on Information

Technology met in New Delhi from 23-25 January 1997; and ix) Working Group

on Petroleum met in Moscow on 24 & 25 January 1997.

Minister of External Affairs Shri I K Gujral visited Russia from 9-13

February 1997 as a guest of the Government of the Russian Federation. During

the visit, he met Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, First Deputy Prime

Minister Viktor Ilyushin, Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, Speaker of the

State Duma Gennady Seleznyev, Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov, Secretary of

the Security Council Ivan Rybkin and other senior Russian dignitaries. He also

co-chaired the Third Session of the Indo- Russian Inter-Governmental

Commission (IGC) on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural

Cooperation. Besides the Protocol of the Third IGC Session, an Agreement on the

Establishment of a joint Shipping Service between India and Russia and a

Memorandum of Understanding on Certification in the field of information

Technology were signed during the visit.

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The Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation Sergei

Dubinin visited India from 10-16 February 1997 at the invitation of the Governor

of the RBI. Chief Justice of India justice Shri A M Ahmadi visited Russia from

15-23 February 1997 at the invitation of the Chairman of the Russian

Constitutional Court Vladimir Tumanov.

Pokhran II and Russia’s response

Even on the nuclear issue, Russia showed considerable understanding of

the Indian position when the Pokhran-II blasts took place in 1998. Initially, there

was disquiet in Russia over the blasts, but later, Russia did not go public in

criticizing India. Importantly, it did not impose sanctions. In fact, in June 1998, an

agreement for the construction of two 1000-MW reactors at Kundankulam was

signed during the visit of the Russian minister for atomic energy, Evgenii

Adamov.

On 17 August 1999, India’s National Security Advisory Board (NSAB)

released a draft copy of its long awaited nuclear doctrine. Arriving fifteen months

after the May 1998 Pokhran II nuclear tests, the draft document refueled the

debate within the United States over the future course of American policy towards

India. But while the U.S. State Department was warning, "We think it would be

unwise [for India] to move in the direction of developing a nuclear deterrent" due

to the potential "action-reaction cycle" for a South Asian arms race, the Russian

response was diametric. Rather than aligning Russia’s reaction with that of the

other global powers, Grigory Karasin, the Russian Deputy Minister in charge of

relations with India, stated, "We shall carefully study this draft and in due time

clearly state our opinion." More telling is the fact that as the Clinton

Administration pushed for a continuation of sanctions against India, Russia was

negotiating with India for the sale of TU-22 BM strike-bombers. This contrast in

American and Russian approaches to Indian "security needs," and the legacy

created by these polar approaches, typifies Indo-Russian and Indo-American

relationships over the last five decades.

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Contrary to America’s nuclear-focused approach to India, Russia adopted

a more balanced approach to India in the period following Pokhran II. While the

reaction of Russia’s political leadership to India’s proliferation was mixed, the

signing of a ten-year treaty of military and technological cooperation in

December 1998 sent a clear signal that Russia would neither condemn India

nor would it support American nonproliferation efforts in South Asia. Claiming

that it would continue to honor the historically "special" relationship, Russia

would solidify the Indo-Russian military bond during this period.

11 may 1998: Pokhran II

The current disharmony, therefore, between India and rest of the globe is

that India has moved from being totally moralistic to being a little more realistic,

while the rest of the nuclear world has arrived at all its nuclear conclusions

entirely realistically. With a surplus of nuclear weapons and the technology for

fourth-generation weapons, the other nuclear powers are now beginning to move

towards a moralistic position. Here is the cradle of lack of understanding about

the Indian stand.

-Jaswant Singh

Russia’s Support of Indian Expansion

While India continues to invest in the development of its indigenous

aviation, naval, and tank programs, notably the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) and

Arjun tank, it has been forced to continue to rely upon imports to meet its

requirements for modernization of its conventional forces and the development of

a nuclear triad. For strike aircraft, India is acquiring forty SU-30MKIs aircraft,

plus IL-78 refuelers and IL-76 airborne early warning aircraft for strike support.

Additionally the purchase of four Russian TU-22Ms strike aircraft and 16 to 18

French 2000 D Mirage fighter aircraft "soft wired for carrying nuclear missiles" is

also being negotiated. To compensate for the high cost associated with the direct

purchase of these systems, Russia has even offered to "lease" IL-76s and Tu-22s

to India.

136

The most controversial area, however, where India is reported to be

receiving military assistance is in the development of its "indigenous" nuclear-

powered submarine and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). India’s

Advanced Technological Vessel (ATV) program dates back to 1988 when India

leased a Soviet Charlie-I Class SSN for three years. The knowledge shared and

relationships established with the Soviet Navy during this period are reported to

continue today as India struggles with the design of its propulsion plant and the

installation of the reactor in the submarine hull. Additional reports indicate that

the hull design and reactor design of the two unfinished ATVs are based on the

new Russian Project 885 Severodvinsk Class and its 190MW pressurized water

reactor. Additionally, the former "apprentices" of the Indian Navy during the

three-year period of the submarine lease "have taken key posts in Indian design

offices developing nuclear submarines." Finally, an entire Indian submarine crew

is reported to have spent at least six months during 1999 "on an official mission"

in the closed northern Russian city of Severodvinsk.

The U.S. Department of State reported during 1998 that Russia was

helping India develop the "Sagarika," a submarine-launched ballistic missile. The

Sagarika has caused Indian scientists difficulty, especially with its guidance

systems, and many foreign observers state that the system is a "far cry" from

being operational. Again, Russian scientists are reported to be supporting this

"indigenous" project.

While the transfer of nuclear technology for military purposes is in

violation of numerous international treaties, it is difficult to determine whether

"Russian support" of the ATV and Sagarika projects is state-sponsored or a

product of individual scientists left unemployed and unaccounted for after the

collapse of the Soviet Union. "No one knows where all the weapons scientists

have gone." However, if one considers the role of Russian interest groups in

influencing Russian policy decisions, it is worth noting that the Rubin design

bureau of St. Petersburg, one of Russia’s two major submarine design bureaus,

designed and developed the Severodvinsk-class submarine.

137

Kargil Conflict and Role of Russia

However, when hostilities on the Indo-Pakistan border broke out as Kargil

Conflict in 1999, in keeping with the time-honoured traditional Soviet position,

Russia did not hesitate to brand Pakistan as the aggressor. A press release by

the Russian Foreign Ministry in June 1999 made an ‘earnest appeal’ to Islamabad

to ‘refrain from violations of the Pakistani-Indian accords on the location of the

agreed line…any attempt to change this line may have grave consequences’.

The Indian armed forces began Operation Vijay on 26 May 1999 with the

objective of completely evicting Pakistan’s armed intrusion and aggression. While

the Operation was on, the External Affairs Minister also received the Foreign

Minister of Pakistan for talks in New Delhi (12 June, 99). The Pakistan Foreign

Minister was told clearly that Pakistan’s armed intrusion and aggression was

completely unacceptable, that it constituted a blatant violation of the Line of

Control (LOC) and the Shimla Agreement and that there was no question of any

talks on this issue without Pakistan first addressing itself to vacating its

aggression against India and restoring status quo ante on the LOC. India’s outrage

at the inhuman and barbaric treatment meted out to our soldiers in Pakistani

custody was also conveyed to him. We demanded that those guilty of these

atrocities be brought to justice. The Pakistan Foreign Minister was also told that

Pakistan’s aggression was a grave breach of trust and while its territorial

aggression against India would be evicted, it would be extremely difficult to

restore the trust and confidence that had been damaged by Pakistan’s betrayal.

India-Russia Strategic Partnership quite often it is sentiments such as

these, outside the pale of conventional diplomatic jargon, which truly touch the

heart of the leaders and people in question, and contribute towards laying solid

and deep foundations in relationships, as has been in the case of the time-tested

Soviet/Russian-Indian partnership. On 27 July 1999. EAM once again had a

meeting with Mr Ivanov in Almaty, Kazakhstan, on 14 September 1999 on the

margins of the Conference on Interaction on Confidence Building Measure

(CICA) and on the sidelines of the 54th UNGA in New York. During these

meetings, bilateral, regional and international issues were discussed. The Russian

138

Foreign Minister, Mr Igor Ivanov, transited through New Delhi on 25 July 1999

and on 28 July 1999 on his way to and from the 6th ASEAN Regional Forum

(ARF) Meeting in Singapore. A delegation from the Central Election Commission

(CEC) of the Russian Federation led by Mr Sergei Bolshakov, Commissioner,

paid an official visit to India from 2 -7 September 1999. The delegation called on

the Chief Election Commissioner of India and visited polling stations in and

around Delhi and Haryana during the first phase of the Lok Sabha poll on 5

September 1999. Interaction between the Election Commissions of the two

countries has been institutionalized since 1997.

Mr Vladimir Putin, Chairperson of the Government of the Russian

Federation, transited through New Delhi on 14 September 1999 on his way back

to Moscow from the APEC Summit in Auckland. Principal Secretary to PM had

detailed discussions with Mr Putin on issues of mutual interest and concern.

Foreign Secretary visited Moscow on 16 September 1999 for Foreign Office

Consultations. He called on Mr Igor Ivanov, Foreign Minister of the Russian

Federation and had detailed discussions with Mr Alexander Avdeev, Mr. Grigory

Karasin, First & Deputy Foreign Ministers. The Chief of Naval Staff paid an

official visit to the Russian Federation from 15 - 20 September 1999. Gen.

Anatoly Kornukov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force, visited India

from 4 - 10 October 1999. The Days of Delhi were held in Moscow from 26

October – 2 November 1999. The official delegation from the Government of the

NCT of Delhi was led by Dr. Narendra Nath, Minister of Education of the

National Capital Territory of Delhi. More than 130 artists from India participated

in this event. The Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation in-charge of

military-technical cooperation, atomic energy, space and other subjects, Mr Ilya

Klebanov paid an official visit to India from 4 – 8 November 1999. Mr Klebanov

was accompanied by a high-powered delegation which included the Minister for

Atomic Energy, the First Deputy Defence Minister, the First Deputy Minister of

Trade, the Chairperson of the Inter State Aviation Committee and many senior

Government representatives. During the visit, Mr Klebanov called on PM and had

separate meetings with the External Affairs Minister, Raksha Mantri and Principal

139

Secretary to PM. The 6th Meeting of the Indo-Russian Group on Military-

Technical Cooperation was also held, coinciding with the visit. At the conclusion

of the visit, a joint statement was issued.

After the hijacking of IC-814, EAM spoke to the Minister of Foreign

Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr Igor Ivanov on 26 December 1999. The

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation issued an official statement

on 27 December 1999 and two official statements on 28 December 1999

condemning the hijacking.

The Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation and

Co-Chairman of the Indo-Russian Inter- Governmental Commission for Trade,

Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural Cooperation (IRIGC), Dr

Viktor Khristenko, visited India from 14 - 15 January 2000. The 6th session of the

IRIGC was held during the visit. It was co-chaired by the Finance Minister (Co-

Chairman of the IRIGC) and Dr Khristenko. Dr Khristenko called on the

President of India and the Prime Minister of India and met the Minister of Power,

Minister of Civil Aviation and Minister of Surface Transport. A Protocol on the

6th Session of the IRIGC was signed on 15 January 2000. The Acting President

and Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Mr Vladimir Putin called the Prime

Minister on the hotline on 27 January 2000 to offer felicitations on the occasion

of the 50th

anniversary of the creation of the Republic of India. The 1st session of

the Indo-Russian Working Group on Export Controls took place in Moscow from

2 - 3 February 2000.

Table 3.3 : Presidents of Russian Federation since 1991

Sr.

No.

Name Term in office as

President

1.

Yeltsin, Boris

Nikalayevich

June, 1991-July,

1996

July, 1996- Dec.

1999

140

2.

Putin, Vladimir

Vladimirovich

Dec. 1999-

Mar.2004

March,2004-May,

2008

3.

Medvedev, Dmitry

Anatolyevich

May, 2008-

1. On 12 June, 1991 Yeltsin was elected as First President of Russian Federation.

He was reelected President on 3 July, 1996.

2. On 31 Dec. 1999 Yeltsin appointed Putin as acting President. On 26 March,

2000 Putin was elected in office and on 7 May, 2000 he was inaugurated as

President. On 14 March, 2004 Putin was elected for his second term.

3. On 2nd

March, 2008, Medvedev was elected in office. On 7 May, 2008, he

was inaugurated as President.24

In the new Foreign Policy Concept released by Russian Federation on July 10,

2000, it has been stated that one of the crucial directions in the Russian foreign

policy in Asia will be to develop friendly relations with the leading Asian states

including India. It further states that Russia intends to strengthen its traditional

partnership with India, including in international affairs.25

Putin visits India

A major breakthrough was achieved

when the Russian President, Vladimir

Putin visited India in October 2000. Both

countries signed a Declaration on

strategic partnership, and 10 (ten)

141

agreements on various aspects of India and Russia bilateral relations. The

strategic partnership is a dynamic and forward-looking principle which provides

an anchor of certainty and dependability. The Declaration on strategic

Partnership spelt out in detail the long-term nature of Indo-Russian relations in all

aspect of mutual cooperation, like political, defence, economic and trade, science

and technological and cultural spheres. Russia continues to occupy a very

important place in our foreign policy and this approach is reciprocated by Russia.

The Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the bilateral talks affirmed Indian

and Russian positions on various bilateral, regional and international issues.

India will acquire 300 T-90 tanks, licence for the production of 150 multi-

role Sukhoi-30 MKI fighter aircraft and the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov

from Russia under five defence agreements signed on Wednesday to give a new

impetus to bilateral military and technical co-operation. The single largest defence

pact, estimated to be in the range of three billion dollars, will enhance India's

defence capabilities and meet its long-term requirements. The agreements

signaled a new era in Indo-Russian defence ties, which are poised to enter a phase

that will focus on joint defence production, shifting away from the existing buyer-

seller relationship. Defence Minister George Fernandes and Russian Deputy

Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov also inked an umbrella agreement for the setting up

of an intra-governmental commission on military-technical co-operation. Until

now, defence co-operation between the two countries was at the joint working

group level. The commission will be co-chaired by Fernandes and Klebanov. The

agreement for the purchase of the T-90 tanks was signed by joint secretary

(ordnance) Ranjit Issar and the Deputy Director General of Rosvooruzheniye,

Russia's state owned arms manufacturer. The tanks will substantially increase

India's capabilities to carry out armored thrusts. The tank, reported to cost over

two million dollars each, has underdone desert trials in Rajasthan and will equip

the Indian army to meet the challenge from across the border. In December 1998,

the cabinet committee on security had taken the decision to acquire 124 fully built

tanks and 186 in semi-knocked down and completely knocked down condition.

The SU-30 MKI, which will go in for licensed production in India, will be a

142

multi-role fighter with much more improved avionics. The Indian Air Force

currently possesses SU-30s, which have aerodynamics that are upfront, air

defence capability and radars. However, what India requires is multi-role

capability and thrust vectoring for additional maneuvering. India and Russia have

an ongoing deal for the purchase of 40 SU-30s, which have been designed in the

genre of the current generation of multi-role fighter aircraft with awesome

performance. While one squadron is already with the IAF, another ten warplanes

are expected by 2001 end.

The licensed production of the fighter plane in India marks a new thrust in

Indo-Russian defence co-operation with Moscow willing to go beyond being just

a seller by transferring licence and technological documentation to manufacture

the fighter aircraft in India. Fernandes and Klebanov, who signed the SU-30

licensed production deal, also initialed the agreement on Admiral Gorshkov, the

45,000-tonne vessel, which was withdrawn from the Russian Northern Fleet in

1995 and is being given as a 'gift' to India. However, refitting and upgrading the

ship, before it is delivered from its base in Rosta shipyard, is expected to cost

India about $700 to $800 million. The modifications to the aircraft carrier, which

can hold 24 planes, is likely to take about three years. The ship suffered a major

fire in its engine room in 1994, but that has been repaired. Besides, India will also

have to buy the warplanes and helicopters that it intends to keep on the aircraft

carrier, two squadrons of MiG-29K and six Kamov-31 helicopters. The Admiral

Gorshkov proposal has been pending since a Memorandum of Understanding

was signed during Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov's visit to India in

December, 1998. After the de-commissioning of the INS Vikrant, India has been

left with just one aircraft carrier INS Viraat, which is currently undergoing an

upgrade in Bombay. The indigenous project to build an air defence ship is

underway at Cochin, but the ship is not likely to be inducted before the end of the

decade. Admiral Gorshkov is bound to give more teeth to the Indian Navy on the

western and eastern seaboards. Besides this, Klebanov and principal secretary to

the prime minister and national security advisor Brajesh Mishra signed an

agreement for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

143

Putin displayed dynamism is not only cultivating relations with the US but

also with the powers such as China, India and Japan. Regarding the expansion of

NATO, Putin observed, “we do not see NATO as a hostile organization, but given

the demise of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, we do not see why it is needed

anymore.”24

He listed international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction, regional conflicts as some of the most serious threats of the 21st

Century, which can only be resolved by the united efforts of the international

community, relying on the tools of the UN and International law.

Declaration on Strategic Partnership 2000

The Declaration was signed during above mentioned the Russian President

Putin’s visit to New Delhi in 2000. In full text as Annexure-II26

Highlights of the declaration:

Not directed against any other State or group of States and does not seek

to create a military-political alliance.

Convening of Annual Summit Level Meetings, closer cooperation at

international and regional forum and joint initiatives on key international

and regional issues.

Deepening and diversifying cooperation in sectors such as metallurgy, fuel

and energy, information technology, communications and transport.

Consolidating defence and military technical cooperation in a long-term

perspective; deepening service to service cooperation.

Cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and peaceful use of

outer space.

Cooperating in areas such as ocean logy, agricultural sciences, medical

sciences and biotechnology.

Cooperating in the fight against international terrorism, separatism,

organized crime and illegal trafficking of narcotics.

144

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee expressed hope that the strength of

the Indo-Russian relations will prevail in the creation of a global order which

fosters international peace, security and stability. Addressing a special meeting of

both Houses of Parliament, organised in honour of the visiting Russian President

Vladimir Putin, the prime minister said both countries have given a formal shape

to their relations by signing the declaration on strategic partnership. He said it was

of significance that the views of both India and the Russian federation overlap and

intersect on a wide range of international issues. The prime minister also referred

to the need for reform of the United Nations. "We welcome Russia's continued

support to India's candidature for permanent membership in an expanded United

Nation's Security Council," he said. Vajpayee made a mention to the dangers of

international terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking and narco-terrorism.

He said these dangers did not recognize borders and affected all. "Terrorism

cannot be allowed to become an instrument of state policy. The international

community should resolve to overcome these challenges through concerted

efforts," he added. The prime minister said India and Russia shared common

concerns and had common interests. "The history of the past five decades

demonstrates that close Indo-Russian understanding is essential to peace and

stability in Asia and the world. This is what makes us strategic partners. Our

friendship is not based on short-term calculations, but transcends the twists and

turns of history and politics," he added.

Welcoming the Russian President to Parliament, Rajya Sabha Chairman

Krishan Kant spoke of the technological horizons that the two countries together

were capable of creating in the 21st century. He said India and the Russian

Federation were home to some of the highest achievements of the human mind

and spirit. "We will not allow this to be wantonly destroyed by those self serving

merchants of death," he said. "Both our countries have suffered the destructive

consequences of this ferocious phenomenon, which wears several garbs -- now

religious, now ethnic, now regional and, often times, all of them," he added. In his

address, Lok Sabha Speaker G M C Balayogi said both India and Russia were

committed to the cause of world peace and a democratic and just global order.

145

"We believe in a multi-polar world where nations co-exist peacefully, and where

progress, prosperity and development is ensured," he said. We have been

working very fruitfully with India in the atomic energy sector for a long time

now, on peaceful nuclear technologies,' Putin told India Today magazine ahead of

his visit.

146

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1. Hindu 30 May, 1990 for Moscow denial.

2. K.Subrahmanyam, ‘Discovering a new USSR’ Hindustan Times 17 July, 1990

3. Indian Express, 13 July, 1990

4. Bhavani Sen Gupta, ‘VP Goes to Moscow’ Hindustan Times, 21 July, 1990; Nikhil

Chakravarti, ‘Facing a New USSR’, Times of India 22 July, 1990

5. Indian Express, 13 July, 1990

6. G.K.Reddy in Hindu; Amulya Ganguli in Statesman; Bharat Bhushan in Times of

India 25 July, 1990

7. Acton Edward, Russia, The Tsarist and Soviet Legacy (Longman Group Ltd. 1995)

8. Nina Bandelj, From Communists to Foreign Capitalists : The Social Foundations of

Foreign Direct Investment in Postsocialist Europe (Princeton University Press, 2008)

p.41

9. Time Magazine, Hastening the End of the Empire, January 28, 1991

10. 1991: March www.referendum Soviethistory.org

11. King Charles, The Ghost of Freedom: History of the Caucasus

12. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/prestroika

13. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/glasnost

14. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/list_of_leaders_of _soviet_union

15. Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics, Coexistence, Revolution and

Cold War1945-91(London: Routledge, 1999), p.100

16. Line followed of the former Russian Minister Andrei Kozyrev who said in an interview

on April 1, 1992,” the legal successor states are in fact allthe former republics of the

Soviet Union but the continuer is precisely Russia” in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow,

Summary of World Broadcast, April 3, 1992

17. V.Stoyan, ‘Brief Analysis of Geostrategic Consequences of Disintegration of the Soviet

Union’ Russia and the Muslim World, no.7(145), p.19

18. Ibid

19. T.N.Kaul, The Future of CIS…Will it survive(New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt.

Ltd. 1992), p.77

20. Times of India (New Delhi), 22 November, 1991

21. Summary of World Broadcast, 18 November, 1991, p.SU/1232, A3/3

22. Summary of World Broadcast, 16 January, 1992, p.SU/1279, A3/1

23. Indian Express (New Delhi), 2 Feb., 1992, quoted in J.A.Naik, Russia’s Policy towards

India from Stalin to Yeltsin(New Delhi: MD Publications Pvt. Ltd., 1995) p. 179

24. http://globalpolitician.com/articles.asp

25. Bilateral Relations between India and Russian Federation on www.indianembassy.ru

26. Embassy documents of Russia in India http://www.rusembassy.in /index.php?option=

com_alphacontent&view