caesar 32 -khrushchev's role in the current controversy over soviet defense policy

8/2/2019 Caesar 32 -Khrushchev's Role in the Current Controversy Over Soviet Defense Policy

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OCI No. 2010/63Copy No.17 June 1963

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* * * * * *KHRUSHCHEVs ROLECONTROVERSYO V E R SOVIET

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KEIRUSIICHEV'S ROLE I N THE CURRENT CONTROVERSYOVER SOVIET DEFENSE POLICYSUMMARY

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Since the Cuban c r i s i s , which n u r tu r e d t h e cause oft h e a d v o c a t e s of greater defense spending, Khrushchev'sbasic p l a n h a s been t o keep up t h e p rese n t pace of growthof S o v ie t armed s t r e n g t h w i th o ut f u r t h e r i m pa i ri n g t h ecountry 's economic growth. To h i s way o f t h in k in g , f u r t h e rs e r i o u s re t rea ts i n t h e economic process of " b u i l d in gCommunismt1 could be as d i s a s t r o u s f o r S o vi e t f o r e i gnp o l i c y a n d p r e s t i g e as f a l t e r i n g i n t h e arms race.shchev.'s method of dea l ing wi th the mi l i t a ry -economicdilemma has been t o m a in t a in t h e " s t a t u s quo ante Cuba"i n t h e resource a l l o c a t i o n s e q ua t io n . S i nc e l a s t November,he has a rgued th a t a rad ica l r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of r e s o u r ce sis n6t needed t o v i t a l i z e t h e economy and m e e t t h e c o u n t r y ' sm i l i t a r y o b j e c t i v e s ; grea t resources could be found, heh a s s a i d r e p ea t e d ly , i f "hidden reserves t1 were e x p l o i t e d ,i n e f f i c i e n c y i n p ro d uc t io n reduced , and economic manage-ment s t reamlined.

In addi t ion, Khrushchev appears t o be campaigningbehind t h e s c en e s f o r a n ot he r s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c t i on i nconventional forces--which do n o t f i g u r e i m p o rt a n t ly i nh i s c o n c e p t i o n of t h e requirements for d e t e r r e n c e andwaging nuclear war.f o r new c u t s , h i s scheme has been r e f l e c t ed i n h i s r e c e n td e p r ec a t i on s df c o n v en t io n al f o r c e s ; i n h i s l i k e l y successi n o b t a in i n g a t r o o p c u t i n t h e Bulgar i an army (re po r te dlymade p o s s ib l e b y i ts a c q u i s i t i o n of "newer weapons"); i nh i s d e p i c t io n of f u t u r e w a r as l a s t i n g on e d ay ; i n t h et r a n s f o r m a t i o n of h i s "one-day war" f or mu la i n t o m i l i t a r yd o c t r i n e i n some m i l i t a r y f or um s; i n t h e new emphasis givent he do c t r i na l impofi tance of h i s January 1960 ( t roo p c u t )speech; and in t h e s t u d i e d a s s e r t i o n of t h e p r e r og a t i ve sof t h e p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p i n t h e s p h e r e of d e f e n se p o l i c yand m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e , as w e l l as t h e p r o p a g a n d a e f f o r tt o bui ld up the image of Khrushchev personal ly as a m i l i -t a r y a u t ho r i t y.

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In s h o r t , we have found Khrushchev t o be successfu lin r e s i s t i n g t h e e f f o r t s of o t h e r s t o s h i f t more of t h ec o u n t r y 's s t r a i n e d r e s ou r c e s from the cons6mer t o t h ed e f en s e s e c t o r . T ha t h i s p o s i t i o n in t he inner sanc tump o l i c y d i s p u t e s has been app rec i ab l y s t r eng t hened s i n cehis gloomy economic forecast of l a s t February is seen int h e sus t a ined propaganda emphasis s i n c e March on improvingconsumer welfare. (In t h i s r e g a r d , t h e m o s t n o t a b l edevelopments have been. an in cr ea se in March in t h e plannedc a p i t a l investment in l i g h t i ndus t ry and t h e p u b l i c a t i onin June of Khrushchev ' s gu ide l ines fo r t h e 1964-65 economicp l a n t h a t g iv e p r i o r i t y t o t h e c he m ic al i n d u s t r y e x p l i c i t l yi n s u p po r t of agricul ture and consumer goods. ) On t h eo t he r hand, Khrushchev t h u s f a r Bas been t hwar t ed i n hisown e f f o r t s t o c u t back S ov i e t conven t i ona l fo rce s , by asomewhat weakened but still unyie ld ing and a r t i c u l a t e con-s e r v a t i v e m i l i t a r y element (which, in t u r n , e v i d e n t l y hasimportant backing i n h i g h e r p a r t y c i r c l e s . ) .

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. . . 'KHRUSHCHEV'S ROLE IN TE CURRENT CONTROVERSYOVER SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY

The co l l apse l a s t f a l l of t h e S o v i e t s t r a t e g y t opu t miss i l e s i n Cuba seems i n re t rospect t o have generateda s t r o n g c u r r e n t of opin ion in favor of i n c r e a s i n g t h e, .. de fense e s t ab l i shm en t ' s share of t h e c o u n t ry ' s l i m i t e d re-sources. Both t h e deployment i n and t h e wi thdrawa l of m i s -s i l e s from C u b a were t a c i t admissions of S ov i e t s t r a t e g i ci n f e r i o r i t y . As S o v ie t p r e s t i g e dipped l o w i n t h e wake of

t h e crisis , t h e remaining dynamism went o u t of S ov i e t fo re i gnpol i cy i n much t h e same way t h a t a i r escapes from a t i r e andw i t h t h e same r e s ul ta n t immobi li ty . The Chinese and t h e i rc o h o r t s used t h e occas i on t o d i s c r e d i t t h e S ov i e t l eadersw i t h charges of "adventur i sm and ca p i t u l a t io n ." Sovie tm i - l i t a r y morale seemed t o s l i p t o i t s l o w e s t l e v e l sincet h e announcement i n Janu ary 1960 of a d r a s t i c u n i l a t e r a lt roop-cu t . Ind i r ec t ev i dence sugges t s t h a t t h e r e was d i s -s a t i s f a c t i o n among t h e mi l i t a ry over Khrushchev' s handl ingof t h e Cuban op er at io n. * Under such circumstances , t h eneed t o improve t h e r e l a t i v e s t r a t eg ic p o s i t i o n of t h e USSRw i t h genuine increment s t o t h e m i l i t a r y became a p o l i t i c a l l yi r r e fu t a b l e argument, and t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e advocates ofgreater defense spending w a s consequen t l y s t r eng t hened ., . ..That t h e S ov i e t l e a d e r s h i p would g i v e greater impetust o defense w a s f u r t h e r sugges ted by t h e d e c l a r a t i o n of

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*As a coun t e r , t h e regime launched a propaganda campaigna s s e r t i n g t h e wisdom of t h e p a r t y leaders and t h e i r preroga-t i v e s i n t h e planning of t h e c o u n t r y ' s d e f e n s e s . For example,in RED STAR on 7 November, Marshal Chuikov c i t e d a h i t h e r t ounpublished exchange of messages between S t a l i n and Lenini n 1920 t o r e f u t e t h e notion t h a t "our diplomacy sometimesv er y e f f e c t i v e l y s p o i l s t h e r e s u l t s achieved by o u r m i l i t a r yv i c t o r i e s . " S t r e s s i n g t h e dominant ro l e of t h e p a r t y inm i l i t a r y a f f a i r s , Chuikov c r i t i c i z e d unnamed o f f i c e r s fo rf a i l i n g t o "main ta in p roper a t t i t u d e s and opinions ."- 1 -


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m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y a s a goal of S o v i e t p o l i c y soon a f t e rt h e c u r t a i n f e l l on Cuba.m i l i t a r y p o l i c y and d o c t r i n e p u b l i sh e d in November, t h eSovie t Defense Min i s t e r wrote: "The most c ha ra c t e r i s t i cf ea t u r e of t h e p r e s e n t s t a t e of t h e development of S ov i e tm i l i t a r y d o c t r in e is t h e f a c t t h a t i t bases i t s e l f on t h es u p e r i o r i t y of t h e armed forces 0% t h e USSR ove r t h e a r m i e sof t h e most powerful c o u n t r i e s of cap i t a l i sm, w i t h respectt o mil l t a ry- t echnolog ica l means and moral-combat I q u a l i t i e s . IAlong t h e same l i n e s , t h e 30 March CPSU l e t t e r t o t h e ChicomP ar t y i n t roduced a new slogan: l l A s l ong as there is no d i s -armament, t h e s o c i a l i s t commonwealth m u s t always have supe -r i o r i t y in armed fo rces over t h e imperial is ts ."* S i nce C u b a ,S ov i e t p ropagand i s t s have a l s o p roc la i med cu r ren t m i l i t a r ys u p e r i o r i t y - - a t times q u a l i f i e d and a t t i m e s not--over t h e .West. Boas t s of m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y had dropped o u t of t h epropaganda i n ea r l y 1961, and un t i l l a s t f a l l t h e S o v i e t swere con t en t t o a s s e r t m i l i t a r y p a r i t y w i t h t h e West. Amongt h e r ea sons f o r r e i n t r o d u c i n g boasts of c u r r e n t s u p e r i o r i t y ,e v i d e n t l y , were t h e Soviet need t o s a l v a g e some of t h ep r e s t i g e l o s t in t h e wreckage of t h e Cuban ope ra t ion , and ,. in t h e case of some S ov i e t l eaders , t o p l a y down t h e s t r a t e g i cd e f i c i e n c i e s of t h e USSR in o r d e r t o draw o f f some of t h eurgency t h a t o t he r S o v i e t l e a d e r s at tached t o t h e problemof improving t h e Sovie t ' s t r a t e g i c p o s t u r e .

In an impor tan t p-mphlet on S ov i e t

.. .,D e s p i t e t h e s t r o n g m o ti v a ti o n t o improve t h e coun t ry ' ss t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n i n t h e a f t e rm a t h of t h e Cuban debacle,t h e USSR h a s a p p ar e n tl y n ot r a d i c a l l y . s t e p p e d up i t s kn i l i t a ryprogram. I t does no t appear on t h e b a s i s of a v a i l a b l e e v i de n ce

-is s l o g a n w a s subsequent ly r e i t e r a t e d by MarshalGrechko in IZVESTIYA on 8 May and by RED STAR in an a r t i c l eon t h e W a r s a w Pact ann i ve r sa ry on 1 4 May. I t has been madec lear in these and other S ov i e t mater ia ls , however, t h a tt h e e f f e c t i v e m i l i t a r y o r g a ni z at i on p r o t e c t i n g t h e s o c i a l i s tcommonwealth is t h e S o v ie t c o n t r o l l e d W a r s a w P a c t , i n whichChina is n e i t h e r a member nor an o b s e r v e r . A t h o u g h t f u la r t i c l e in t h e FBIS Bloc Survey of 31 May 1063 "Mi l i t a ryS u p e r i o r i t y Declared Basis of Bloc Pol i cy , '' expands on t h es u b j e c t .- 2 -


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t h a t t h e r e has been a s u b s t a n t i a l s h i f t i n resources fromth e consumer t o t h e de fense sec tor . On t h e con t r a ry , f roma l l i nd ica t ions measures t aken have t ended t o main ta in t h e' * s ta tus quo a n t e Cuba" i n economic p r i o r i t i e s . ( I n f a c t ,there have been in d ic a t ion s i n recen t months of a d e c i s i o nt o i n c r e a s e t h e ra t e of expans ion of consumer programs beyondprev i ous p l an f i g u r e s . Thus an a r t i c l e i n t h e bfarch KOMM"IST,c la iming t h a t t h e "correct proport ions" between heavy andl i g h t i n d u s t r y are being maintained, changed t h e f i g u r e f o r the in-crease i n . i nves t m en t in l i g h t i n du s tr y i n 1963 from 22.3 'per-c e n t - t o 37 pe rcen t .been a s h i f t in some consumer r e s i d u a l s t o t h e de fense sec to rcannot be r u l e d o u t .)

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That- t h e r e s o u r ce a l l o c a t i o n s e q u at i on h as not beenchanged, i t seems, is l a r g e l y t h e r e s u l t of Khrushchev'sde t e rm i na t i on (backed by h a r d cam pa igni ng i n r u l i n g c i r c l e s )n o t to lose more ground i n t h e economic competi t ion w i t h t h eWest. For i n t h e t a u t economic s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e USSRfound i t s e l f , t h a t w o u l d be t h e p e n a l t y of f u r t h e r s i zeab les h i f t s i n a l l o c a t i o n s t o d e f en s e . K hrushchev has c o n s i s t e n t l yregarded t h e growth r a t e of the Soviet economy, t h e improve-m e n t of t h e l i v i n g s t an d ar d s of t h e Sovie t people , as import-an t an index of t h e growing power of t h e S o v i e t cause asS o v ie t m i l i t a r y m i g h t . H e has been w i l l i n g t o l i v e w i t hl ong p e r i o d s of s t r a t e g i c i n f e r i o r i t y so as t o promote t h ecountry ' s economic growth. For example, between 1955-1958he had secured a d e c l i n e of t w o b i l l i o n rub l e s i n m i l i t a r yspending , w i t h t he s a v i ngs d i ve r t ed i n t o i nves tm ent andconsumption, and t h e r e b y enab l ed t he S ov i e t GNP t o i n c r e a s eannua l l y by seven pe rcen t . T h i s is no t to s a y t h a t K h r u -shchev h a s neg l ec t ed t h e de fense sec tor ; he h a s i n f a c t l e dt he pack of reformers i n r emo ld i ng t he S ov i e t armed forcesfo r nuc l ea r warfare.of h i s m i l i t a r y program; cu t t ing back t h e convent iona l armsof s e r v i c e t o o f f se t t h e grea t cos t of advanced weaponsand t o nour i sh t h e economy w a s t h e o t h e r p a r t of h i s scheme.B u t modernizat ion was on l y one s i d e

A t t h e h e i g h t of Khrushchev's power i n 1958, t h e up-ward t re nd i n p roduc t ion and inves tment w a s r eve r sed as t h epace of m i l i t a ry p rocu rement , R&D and space cos t s r a p i d l y, i nc rea sed . T hese t r en ds were t h e main reason for t h e slow-down i n S ov ie t economic growth .( the r a t e of GNP i nc rea se

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dropped t o 4-5 p e r c e n t ) i n r e c e n t y e a r s . Fa ced w i t h adimini shing economic growth r a t e a n d r i s i n g c o s t s of newweapons, Khrushchev i n Ja nua ry 1960 took s teps t o moderatet h e h igh t o t a l defense spending by d r a s t i c a l l y c u t t i n g b a c k(by one- th i rd) t h e older arms of s e r v i c e a nd d i v e r t i n g t h es a vi ng s i n r u b l e s , materiel and manpower resources t o t h eexotic weapons program and t h e economy. Once a g a i n h e wasw i l l i n g t o l i v e w i t h r e a l s t r a t e g i c i n f e r i o r i t y w h i l e bas'ingt h e S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c pos tu re t o a l a r ge e x t e n t on decep t i vepropaganda claims a b o u t S ov i e t ICBM s t r e n g t h . A f t e r i n i t i a lsuccess i n g e t t i n g h i s t roop c u t program adopted, ,Khrushohevsaw h i s program founder as a r e s u l t of a combinat ion ofi n t e rna l and ex t e rna l c i r cum s t ances .U And he himself rend-ered i t t h e coup de grace i n announcing t h e "temporary" s u s -pension of t h e t roop c u t in Ju ly 1961 . Again in e a r l y 1 962 ,in making the dec i s ion t o place s t r a t eg ic weapons i n Cuba,Khrushchev and his co l l eagues s e e m t o h a v e b e e n p a r t i a l l ymot ivated by economic con sid era t io ns. The ve ntu re offeredt h e o p p o r t u n i t y for a r e l a t i v e l y i n ex p e ns i v e way t o m e e tt h e f e l t need f o r a t rans-ocean ic s t r a t e g i c a t t ack c a p a b i l i t y .The f a c t t h a t t h e r i s k s involved in t h e o p e r a t i o n were un-u s u a l l y h i g h , as S o vi et f o d i g n po l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s g o, under-scored t h e d e s p e r a t i o n f e l t in Moscow t o f i n d a s o l u t i o n t ot h e dilemma of mee t ing mi l i t a ry and economic requ i rement s ,as w e l l as t o r e v e r s e t h e f a l l i n g momentum i n t h e i r f o r e i g np o l c y .w i t h t h e great dilemma of meeting t h e demands of t h e economyand t h e m i l i t a r y , a t t h e C e n t r a l Committee Plenum in November1962, where he acknowledged t h e cont inued primacy of defense--heavy i nd us t ry i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e . coun t ry' s resources.B u t he a l so made i t c lea r t h a t h e w o u l d not accept an "e i the r -or" p r o p o s i t i o n : he wanted t h e USSR t o s t a y in both t h e armsrace ( to b o l s t e r t h e coun t ry ' s s t ra tegic p o s i t i o n ) and t h eeconomic competi t ion ( t o score important p o l i t i c a l p o i n t s ) .

Khrushchev began t o unfold h i s s t r a t e g y for d e a l i n g

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For t o h i s way of t h i nk i ng , t o d ro p back s e r i o u s l y i n e i t h e rcompet i t i on w o u l d have disas t rous r e s u l t s f o r S o v ie t f o r e i g npo l i cy and p r e s t i g e . K hrushchev' s s t r a t e gy , hence , w a s to,f i g h t a h o l d i n g a c t i o n on t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f resources. "'Al-though heavy indust ry has p r i o r i t y , f l e x i b l e p r o p o r t i o n s .should be main ta ined , " Khrushchev s a i d ; "consumer goods aren o t a second - ra t e matter ." That Khrushchev won t h e f i r s tround of t h e con t rove r sy is s ee n i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e 30,000-word plenum r e p o r t con t a i ned on l y one r e f e re nce t o de fense .S t a t i n g t h e n eed t o "main ta in" na t io na l defe nses a t t h e "dueand p rope r l eve l , " t h e phrase w a s much weaker t h a n t h e ver-s i o n i n t he .budge t for 1962 t h a t ca l l ed upon the c o u n t r y t o" i nc rea se i n eve ry pos s i b l e way" i t s d e f e n s e s .Khrushchev agai n p l a in ly dec la red f o r both t h e armsrace and economic compet i t i on in h i s 27, February speech a tKal in in . When ass ess ing av a i l a b le resources, he s a i d , "w em u s t s o b e r l y t a k e i n t o a c co u nt t h e needs of peace-timeeconomy and t h e requ i rement s of de fense . W e m u s t ba l anceboth s i d e s so as t o prevent one s ide from being overempha-s i zed . " In t h e speech, Khrushchev painted a gloomy pic turem e u t u re , l am en t i ng t h a t t h e h i g h cost of d e f e n s e pre-paredness w o u l d no t permi t a se r i ous improvement i n t h econsumers' l o t i n t h e foreseeable f u t u r e . T h u s he f o r t h -r i g h t l y c on fi rm ed what he had ind ica ted in t h e prev i ousNovember a t t h e C e n t r a l Committee plenum--that he had she l vedf o r a n i n d e f i n i t e time h i s l ong-s t and ing proposals fo r sub-

s t a n t a l l y i n c re a s in g a l l o c a t io n s t o a g r i c u l t u r e and 1 g h ti n d u s t r y . T h i s a l o ne c o ul d h av e b ee n s u f f i c i e n t r e a so nfo r t h e pess imis t jc t one of t h e s p e e c h : Khrushchev w a sa p o lo g i zi n g t o t h e Sovie t people for no t be i ng able t o f u l -fill ea r l i e r promises of a change in f a v o r of t h e consumerby, say, l i f t i n g t h e p o l i c i e s of r e s t r a i n t brought t o bearon t h e consumer e a r l i e r i n t h e y e a r as a r e s u l t of over-committed reso urce s . ( In 1962, meat p r i c e s w e r e raised by30 p e r c e n t , p r i v a t e h o us i ng c o n s t r u c t i o n w a s c u t back f u r t h e r ,and a promised re duc t i on i n the pers ona l income tax was"postponed.") On t h e o t h e r hand, Khrushchev's uncharacter-i s t i c a l l y pess imis t ic tone may also h a v e r e f l e c t e d t h e pe r i odof gr ea t e s t weakness i n h i s s t r u g g l e t o resis t f u r t h e r i n -roads by t h e i n s a t i a b l e m i l i t a ry mach ine i n t o economi cI

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investment.* There have probably been s t a r t s an d s t ops i na number of d i r e c t i o n s i n t h e d ef en se -e ab no mic s p h e r e overt h e .past h a l f y e a r , as v a r io u s e le m e nt s i n t h e m i l i t a r y andc iv i l i a n b u r e a u c r a c i e s c o m p e te d f o r t h e c o u n t r y ' s s t r a i n e dresources. B u t as subs equen t ev en ts have shown, Khrushchevsucceeded in beat ing down a l l a tt em p ts t o d i v e r t more re-sources from the consumer sec to r . (This w a s made c l e a r byt h e end of March when KOMMUNIST, as mentioned e a r l i e r , r a i s e dthe p lanned f i g u r e f o r t h e i n c r e as e i n l i g h t i n d u s t r y i n v e s t -ment i n 1963 f r o m 22.3 p e r c e n t t o 37 p e r c e n t . )W are a l so i n c l i n e d t o view t h e appointment i n Marchof t h e former d e f e n s e i n d u s t r y boss Ustinov t o t h e chairman-s h i p of t h e Supreme Economic Council not as a n i n d i c a t i o nof a s h i f t i n l h e a l l o c a t i o n of resources toward d e f e n s e , b u tas an e f f o r t t o apply t h e more e f f i c i e n t methods used i n t h ed e f e n s e i n d u s t r y t o other i n d u s t r i e s . ( A t t h e Novemberplenum, Khrushchev had s i n g l e d o u t t h e d e f e n s e i n d u s t r y asa model of ef f i c i en cy . Even in h i s 24 A p r i l speech , i nwhich he voiced d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e hPgh c o s t of wea-pons i n t h e p a s t , he s a i d t h a t t h e former defense ch ie f wasse l ec t ed f o r the new post because "he d e s e r v e s i t . " Also,Rudnev, t h e Chairman of t h e St a t e Committee f o r t h e Coordina-t i o n of S c i e n t i f i c Research p r i v a t e l y g a v e t h a t e x p l a n a t i o nof Ustinov 's appointment t o Ambassador Kohle r i n A p r i l .Such a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is f u l l y i n k ee pi ng w i t h t h e marchof o t h e r developments in Sovie t economic pol icy .S t i l l more re ce n t ly , i n l a t e May, Khrushchev againmade p l a i n h i s scheme f o r d e a l i n g w i t h t h e economic- '

.

defense dilemma. With high confidence ne t o l d 7 1t h a t t h e USSR w o u l d bei t h o u t ser ious i n t e r f e r -ence w i th o t h e r investment programs." A b o u t t h e same t i m e ,L *""-2y ~ . c . u D b r - n

*About t h same t i m e rushchev w a s t a l k i n g t o t h ee l e c t o r a t e i n K a li n i n , Kozlov w a s d e l i v e r i n g a much moreo p t i m i s t i c s pe ec h- -i n which he ca l l ed f o r new "huge" i n v e s t -ment i n heavy mach ine bu i ld ing e n t e r p r ia es ( i . e . , defenseind ust ry) - - in Leningrad.

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.. . .

, . .. . .... . _.. . '..,,, .. .

.. .

on 23 May, he t o l d the Sov ie t peop le a t a r a l l y fo r Castrot h a t w hi le t h e USSR r a n ks s e c o n d - i n t h e world i n volume ofproduct ion, t h i s is o n l y f o r ' ' the t i m e being," and t h a t " inf i v e or s e v e n y e a r s w e s h a l l s a y : move over and give u sf i r s t place! And we w i l l u n f a i l i n g l y be f i r s t I1T h is f r e s h i n j e c t i o n of o p t i m i s m , i n c o n t r a s t t o t h egloomy speech of l a s t February , undoubtedly re f le c t e d K h r u -s h c h e v ' s c o n s id e r a b l e success i n g e t t i n g Castro, d u r i n g h i ss t a y in t h e USSR, ts declare s t rong sympathy f d r t h e Sovie tcause i n t h e Sino-Boviet polemics. B u t t h e new op t imism m ayh l s o have mirrored Ehrushchev ' s im p r o v e d s i t u a t i o n i n t h e

inner sanctum po l icy d i sp u tes . Pe rhaps t h e best t e s t i m o n i a lof h i s success w a s t h e announcement on 3 June, of t h e govern-ment"guide1ines" fo r t h e 1964-65 economic pl an . Follow ingt h e g e n e r a l l i n e s of Khrushchev's program s e t f o r t h a tl a s t November ' s C e n t r a l Committee plenum, t h e g u i d e l i n e sr e f l e c t h i s personnal concern ovdr t h e l a ck of progress i na g r i c u l t u r e a n d h i s awareness of t h e need f o r f u r t h e r im -provements in consumer incentives t o s p a r k t h e o v e r a l l eco-nomic program. S i g ni f i c a n t l y t h e guide l ines -a p lann ing in -nov&Ion--give pr ior i ty to t h e chemical i n du s tr y e x p l i c i t l yin s u p p o r t of agr icu l tu re , consumer goods, and chemicals u b s t i t u t e s for c e r t a i n metals. B u t t h e r e w a s no mention ofm i l i t a r y p r i o r it ies in t h e announcement.Thus f a r , w e have d i scus sed ghrushchev's program interms of h i s objectives--which have become official policy--of keeping t h e USSR in bo th t h e armed and peaceful competi-t i o n s . W have a l so d i scus sed h i s method of d e a l i n g w i t ht h e mil i tary- economic dilemma i n terms of h i s e f f o r t s t omainta in t h e "s t a tus quo a n t e C u b a 1 * in t h e resource'alloca-t i o n s e q u a t i o n (in which defense a l ready had primacy). L e tu s nex t cons ide r how Khrushchev has b e e n t r y in g t o m e e t h i sp r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i v e s i n a v e r y t i g h t e c o n o m ic s i t u a t i o nwithout making bo ld changes in t h e a l l o c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s .Khrushchev, i t seems t o u s , i n t e n d s t o f i n d th e where-w i t h a l t o accomplish t h e d i f f i c u l t t a s k s f a c i n g t h e coun t ryin two ways:(a ) save by streamlining economic management, re-duc ing ine f f i c ie ncy and exp lo i t i ng un tapped rese rves ; and

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. , . .. ., . (

Ib) c u t .back t h e convent iona l - - in h i s view obsoles-cent--arms of s e r v i c e .

H e has voiced conf idence t h a t t h e sav i ngs t o be had fromr e d u c i n g i n e f f i c i e n c y i n a l l sec tors of t h e economy w i l lbe cons i de rab l e .w i t h o u t new major s h i f t s in r e s o u r c e s h a s been h i s b a t t l ehymn s i n c e t h e t e rm i na t i on of t h e Cuban cris is . B u t hee v i d e n t l y does n o t ca lcu la te t h a t t h o s e s a v i n g s w i l l bes u f f i c i e n t t o meet t h e r i s i n g cos t s of advanced weaponsR&D, pr odu cti on and deployment. Although he has n o t y e tmade e x p l i c i t i n a publ i c fo rum h i s i n t e n t i o n to makef u r t h e r s a v i n g s by c u t t i n g back conven t i ona l fo rces , heh a s done much shor t of t h a t t o prepare t h e ground f o r even-t u a l l y b r i n g in g t h e i s su e t o a head.

That economic pr od uc t iv i ty can be raised

A t t h e November plenum, Khrushchev re ve al e d t h a t amajor i n g r e d i e n t i n h i s remedy f o r t h e c h r o n i c a i lm e n t s oft h e Soviet economy was another sweeping admin i s t ra t ive re-o r g a n i z a t i o n . In h i s November speech, he ca l l ed f o r t h eb i f u r c a t i o n of t h e p a r t y i n t o two separate o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,one t o c o n t r o l i n d u s t r y and t h e other t o c o n t r o l a g r i c u l t u r e ;t h e es t ab l i shm en t of f i v e new Central Committee bu reau s ;t h e c r e a t i o n of a s i ng l e agency t o be r e s p o n s i b l e f o rmanagement of t h e economy; and a p a r t y - s t a t e committee t oove r see t h e f u l f i l l m e n t of d i r e c t i v e s a t a l l l e v e l s . Bymid-March 1963, these proposals--which amounted t o a r e i n -s t i t u t i o n of s t r i n g e n t , c e n t r a l i z e d c o nt ro l- -w er e adoptedw i t h some mo di fi ca t io ns . However, t h e e f f e c t of t h e re-o r g a n i z a t i o n on produc t i v i t y r em a i ns as y e t a ques t i on .A second ing re die nt i n Khrushchev 's remedy, i t w a smade clear , was a r ad i ca l i n c r e a s e i n t h e e f f i c i e n c y of pro-duct ion. Thus, Khrushchev 's 24 A p r i l speech w a s e n t i r e l ydevoted t o t h e probl em o f u t i l i z i n g "hi dden r e se rves" i n 'a l l programs, f r o m m i l i t a r y t o consumer. Repudiat ing recom-mendations (made ea r l i e r by Kozlov inter a l i a ) f o r h ugeinc rea ses i n investment i n machine-bu ild ing , Khrushchevc a l l e d f o r a campaign to reduce t h e f f w a s t e l t i n t h a t i n d u s t r y ,which amounted t o a lmost one - f i f th of t h e metal it consumedo r 10 m i l l i o n t o n s . He i n s i s t e d t h a t t here were " g t e a t re-

s e r v e s i n l i g h t and food indust ry" as w e l l as in t h e machinebu i l d i ng . B u t m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t was h i s a s s a u l t on t h e de fense

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.... . .... . . . .

. . I

i n d u s t r y .produ ct ion i n th e past--under Ust ino v 's aegis--and arguedt h a t w i t h be t t e r o r g a n iz a t i on m i l i t a r y cos ts can be lowere"The d efens e in du st ry has many re se rv es f r i nc rea sed pro-The new defense c h i e f , Smirnov, is younger, Khrushchev s a i dand "we s h a l l b e able t o shake h i m j u s t as we used t o shakeU s t nov. 'I And before l e a v i n g t h e subject , Khrushchev an-nounced t h a t a c a r e f u l s t u d y of how production capaci t iesare being used i n t h e defense i n d u s t r y w i l l be made byUs tin ov 's Supreme Sovnarkhoz.shchev is coun t i ng on i nc rea sed p roduc t i v i t y a l one t os a t i s f y t h e f i n a n c i a l , resource and manpower incrementsdemanded by t h e Soviet mil i t a ry-space R&D e f f o r t . I t isbecoming increasingly c lear t h a t he is a l so campaigningbehind t h e s c e n e s t o win acceptance f o r ano t he r t roop c u t .Khrushchev, i t seems in r e t r o s p e c t , n e v e r gave up t h e ideaof d r a s t i c a l l y c u t t i n g b ack t h e older arms o f s e r v i c e whichdo not f i g u r e impor tan t ly in h i s concept of de t e r r ence andw a r . Even before t h e 1960 t roop c u t was much underway, hespoke of f u r t h e r r e d u c t i o n s as w e l l as t h e p o s s i b l e e v e n t u a lconversion of t h e s t a n di n g army i n t o a t e r r i t o r i a l army("If a disarmament agreement i s no t reached"). When acombination of c i rcumstances- -mos tno tab ly oppo s i t i on f romt h e mil i tary--brought h i m t o announce t h e suspens ion oft h e t roop c u t iti 1961, he made i t c l ea r t h a t he regardedt h e m e a s u r e as 'ftemporary.'f Even a f t e r t h e s c u t t l i n g ofh i s t r o o p c u t program, Khrushchev occasional ly indicatedt h a t he d i d not endorse t h e m i l i t a r y ' s deeply-entrenchedp o s i t i o n bn the need f o r a l a r ge s t and i ng army i r r e sp ec t i v e

H e complained about t h e high c o s t of weapons

d u c t i o n , " h e s a i d , t h a t are "not being us!d s u f f i c i e n t l y . "

As suggested e a r l i e r , i t does n o t a p p e a r t h a t K hr u-

, ......

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of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l atmosphere .* And once again,a f t e r t h e Cuban debacle, Khrushchev could be s e en maneuver-i n g a g a i n s t a s t r o n g v e st e d i n t e r e s t to c u t back t h e s izeof t h e l a rge conven t iona l forces . H i s u r g i n g t h e m i l i t a r yt o absorb as m u c h of t h e h i ghe r costs of weapons as p o s s i b l eis o n e i n d i c a t i o n of h i s i n t g n t . B u t there are a l s o o t he r ,l e s s ambiguous manifes ta t ions of h i s scheming.t o e f f e c t new c u t s i n c o n v e nt i o n a l forces in the Sov ie t a rmyis a l o y a l sa t e l l i t e - -Bu lgar i a . There is s t r o n g , b u t as y e tinconc lus ive , ev idence t h a t t h e Bulgarian armed forces arebe ing r e duc e d . Ia reduction may already be unaerway is a l s ot h e p u b l i c a t i o n on 23 A p r i l of a decree of t h e Bulgar ianp r es id iu m a mending p r e v io u s l e g i s l a t i o n a nd e s t a b l i s h in gc i v i l i a n e q u i v a l e n t s f o r some m i l i t a r y s p e c i a l i t i e s .)forces components, o t he r l e s s a u t h o r i t a t i v e sources haves a i d t h a t t h e c u t might amount t o as Much as 20 p e r c e n t oft h e p r e s e n t estimated s t r e n g t h of 164,000.

One lever t h a t Khrushchev may be u s i n g i n h i s campaign

L=zi d n o t s t a t e t h e s i z e of t h e r e d u c t i o n or g i von how a c u t migh t be d i s t r i b u t e d among the armed. . . . ,.. ...

.s:,>.:. . .. . ., ..

*Thus i n a message t o P re s ide n t Kennedy on disarmamentprob lems , ev iden t ly t imed t o c o in c id e w i th t h e c e l e b r a t i o nof S o v ie t &my-Navy Day in February 1962, Khrushchev s a i d :In t h e n u c l e a r rocket weapons age--and w ehave en te red t h i s age--the n u m e r i c a l s t r e n g thof t h e forces does not by a l o n g way have t h eimportance it had i n World Wars I and 11.War now would a t once become t o t a l , worldwide;and i t s outcome would depend not on t h e a c t i o n sof t r o o p s s t a t i o n e d a l on g t h e l i n e d i v i d i n g t h ecombatants but on t h e u s e of n u c l e a r rocketweapons, w i t h which t h e d e c i s i v e blow can bes t r u c k even before v a s t armies can 'be mobil izedand th ropn in to b a t t l e .

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i n e a r l y March 1963, when he t o l d

. ...I I

The r e p o r t e d j u s t i f i c a t i o n gi v en for t h e c u t is t h er e c e i p t of newer weapons,* t h e same ra t ionale used by Khru-shchev for t h e S o v i e t t r o o p c u t i n 1 96 0.problems i n Bulgaria also bear comparison with the USSR.Moreover, any major change in the Bulgar ian fo rces wouldhave t o be eng ineered in Moscow. The Bulgarian armedforces are r e g u l a t e d in l a r g e p a r t by the S o v ie t h i g h com-mand as a resu l t of t h e i r i n cl u si o n i n t h e Warsaw P a c t .And th a t o rga niz at i on s i nc e 1960 has assumed growing import-ance in S o v ie t m i l i t a r y p l an n in g . A ls o, t h e B u lg ar i a nPar ty ch i e f Zhivkov owes h i s p o l i t i c a l l i f e t o Khrushchev.In e a r l y F e br u ar y , a c c o rd in gZhivkov sent h i s Defense Min t,b*--wWmeraL l i ! m I m a I I O V , TOMoscow t o do a "sor t of p u b li c r e l a t i o n s job f o r ComradeZhivkov with t h e to p eche lon o f t h e Soviet army.'.'and May, r e p o r t s reached here on t h e B u lga r i a n t r o o p c u td e c i s i o n . In s h o r t , i t w o u l d seem t h a t a d e c i s i o n t o reducet h e s i z e of t h e B u lg a ri a n army would*-mean t h a t t h e t r a d i t i o n -a l i s t off i cer s i n t h e So vi et hig h command had ceded groundin the con t roversy over whe ther mass ive l and a r m i e s aree s s e n t i a l f o r t h e bl oc ' s de fenses . (On th e o th e r hand, t h eground-or iented o f f i c e r s could probably be expected t os p r in g b ac k w i th t h e ar gum ent t h a t t h e c u t s i n t h e B u l g ar i anforces make i t im p e r a t i v e t h a t no new reductions be madei n S o v i e t c on ve nt i o n a l f o r c e s .

Tigh t budge ta ry

In Apr i l

*Bulgar ia has re ce n t ly rece ived new-generat ion Sov i e tf i g h t e r s and s u r f ace-to-air miss i les and may have receiveds h o r t r a n g e s u r f a ce -t o- su rf ace. miss i l es .

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..........:.. . .

; . . .

. .

.. .,.,. I . ... . . .. .. , ,. .. ,,I '.... . ... ..

, . .. . .

. .

c o n v en t i o na l f o r c e s , s a y in g t h a t t h e McNainara t h e s i s ofconven t iona l war w a s a f a i r y t a l e s i n c e n u c l e a r w eaponsw o u l d be used f rom th e outse t .* (La te r , on 10 June, heWould agadn b e l i t t l e conventional weapons. -In a meet ings t r a t e g i c bombersand s u r f ace warsh ips because of t h e i r " t o t a l v u l n e r a b i l i t y . " )

We i n t e r p r e t as f u r t h e r evidence of Khrushchev'se f f o r t to c u t .b a c k c o n v e nt i o n al forces t h e t w o unprecedentedr e f er e n c es i n h i s 27 February speech t o a "one-day w a r . "F i r s t he s a i d , " i f a new w a r is unleashed, i t w i l l endw i t h t h e f u l l col lapse of th os e who lau nch i t on t h e v e r yf i r s t day of t h e w a r . " Later i n t h e speech he sa id: "Thei m p e r i a l i s t s m u s t know t h a t if t h e y s t a r t a w a r o u r armedforces w i l l d e a l a c r u s h i n g blow t o t h e enemy in order tot o p p l e him and c r u s h him on t h e very f i r s t day of t h e w a r . "in t h e form of a warning t o t h e West, made o n ly f o u r d a y sea r l i e r by Marshal Malinovsky i n a RED STAR a r t i c l e celebrat-ing armed forces day: "The power of o u r c o u n t e r s t r i k e i smore t h a n s u f f i c i e n t t o burn t h e aggressors in t h e f i r s thours of war."a w a r i n which t h e main enemy is consumed i n a n u c l e a rho locaus t w i t h t h e f i r s t m i s s i l e s a l v o e s . B u t MaLinovskyis more ambiguous than Khrushchev on t h e f i n a l i t y of t h enuclear exchange fo r t h e w a r . While a l l three s t a t e m e n t sare obvious ly , in tended for t h e West, t h e y a l s o f i g u r e int h e i n t e r n a l d i al o gu e on m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e a n d p o l i c y . Int h e l a t t e r c o n t e x t , t h e y lay t h e b a s i s f o r a fo r c e fu l argu-ment against t h e need t o mainta in l a rge conven t iona l fo rcesf o r g e n e r a l n u c l e a r w a r . Moreover, t h e s t a t e m e n t s of t h et w o S o v ie t leaders have s i n c e t u rn e d up i n t h e m i l i t a r yl i t e r a t u r e . 'Thus f a r , o n l y one s e n i o r m i l i t a r y f i g u r e has

rushchev r e p o r t e d l y

Khrushchev may have taken h i s c u e from a s t a t e m e n t ,

Both PLhrushchev and Malinovsky t h u s p o r t r a y

*Shor t ly , w e s h a l l see how t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i s t spokesmanMarshal Rotmistrov makes a c o n t r a r y s t a t em e n t on t h e s ub j e c tof conven t iona l war i n order t o j u s t i f y t h e maintenance ofla rge conven t iona l forces .

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a l l u d e d t o t h e one-day w a r p r e d i c t i o n in a publ ic pronounce-ment; t h a t , s u r p r i s i n g l y , is Marshal Konev; 'who a p p a r e n t l yhad l e f t h i s number t w o post i n t h e de fense e s t ab l i shm en ti n S p ri ng 1960 because of h i s o p p o si t io n t o Khtushchev 'st r oo p c u t plan. (The ways of S o v ie t m i l i t a r y leaders areunpred ic t ab le : Marshal Rotmist rov, who l e d t h e r e fo rm ersof Sovie t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e i n 1954-55, has in recent y e a r sbeen a leader of the conse rva t i ve g roup i n t h e m i l i t a r y . )mouthed t h e one-day war s l ogan seems to u s t o p o in t up i t spolemical n a t u r e .

_ _ ~ The f a c t t h a t more of t h e t o p m i l i t aE y leaders have n o t

More remarkable still is t h e t r an s fo rm a t i on of Khru-. shchev 's p a s s i n g r e f e r e n c e s t o $ on e - d ay w a r i n h i s 27 Februaryspeech i n t o l l m i li t a r y d o c t r i n a l p o s i t i on s" i n r e c e n t i s s u e sof K0M"IST OF THE ARMED FORCES, organ of the Main P o l i t i -c a l Admini s t ra tion . Thus, i n an a r t i c l e i n t h e No. 8 i s s u eof t h e j ou rna l ( s i gned t o press 4 A p r i l 1963), a s l i g h tparaphrase of one of Khrushchev 's s ta tements on one-day w a r--with t h e consp icuous add i t ion of t h e Russ ian word for"bl i tzkrieg"--was included i n a l i s t of t h e l l m o s t impor tan tp o s i t i o n s of S ov i e t m i l i t a r y doct r ine . " The a r t i c l e as awhole, i n terms of t h e d i a l ogue on m i l i t a r y d o c t r in e , iss t rongly "modern i s t " or pro-Khrushchev. The a u t h o r s , t w oc o l o n e l s , (1) stressed t h e p a r t y ' s e x c lu s i ve c a p a b i l i t y t odec ide t h e complex questions connected w i t h t h e "complicatedt a s k s i n t h e s p h e r e of m i l i t a r y c o n s t r u c t i o n " ; (2 ) t ookpo t sho t s a t Zhukov, a symbol of m i l i t a r y p r o fe s s io n a li s mand autonomy, th er eb y he lp in g t o scotch recen t rumors ofan i m pend i ng r ehab i l i t a t i on of t h e o f f i c e r whom Khrushchevf i r e d i n October 1957; (3) emphasized t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n ofKhrushchev's 14 January 1960 speech t o t h e m i l i t a r y d o c t r in e ;(4) b u t made no r e f e r e n c e t o Malinovsky's 1961 22nd CPSUCongress speech in which he se t f o r t h t h e " t e n e t s of m i l i t a r ydoc tr i ne '' t h a t depa r t ed in some i m por t an t r e spec t s fromKhrushchev 's January 1960 speech ; ( 5 ) claimed Sovie t sup-e r i o r i t y i n t h e "means of armed s t r u g g l e " o v e r t h e armiesof t h e West, showing t h e adequacy of t h e p a r t y ' s p o l i c ytoward t h e army and defla t ing t h e urgency of a r a p i d m i l i -t a r y b u i l d - u p ; (6) made no mention of t h e " t r a d i t i o n a l i s t "catchword "mult i-mil l ion man a r m i e s " ; ( 7 ) d i d however,acknowledge trhe weaker " t r a d i t i o n a l i s t " t e n e t on t h e needf o r combined forces t o conc lude v ic tory ; ( 8 ) s t ressed t h e

. . a

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dependence of m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y on p o l i t i c s ; ( 9 ) mentionedthe impor tance of c i v i l d ef en se ;In a d d i t i o n t o e c l i p s i n g t h e m i l i t a r y ' s c o n t r i b u t i o nt o m i l i t a r y d o c t r in e , t h e a r t i c l e gave grea ter di rec t reco-gn i t i on t o K hrushchev' s J anua ry 1960 speech t h an has beent h e case s i n c e t h e suspens ion of t h e t r o o p c u t . Whereasprev ious a r t i c l e s acknowledged th a t Khrushchev's speech had" l a i d t h e f o u n da t io n s " of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e , t h ep r e s e n t a r t i c l e s t a t e s f l a t l y t h a t Khrushchev's speech pre-s e n t e d t h e "most impor tan t po s i t i on s of S o v i e t m i l i t a r ydo c t r i ne worked o u t by the Central Committee." Among these

"pos i t ions" - -s t ro ngly impl i ed t o have been s t a t e d by K h r u -shchev in Jan uar y 1960--were inc lud ed t h e r e f e r e n ce s t o t h eb l i t z one-day w a r and t h e need t o be ab le t o pre-empt anenemy s u r p r i s e a t t ack . Khrushchev in January 1960, far froms t r e s s i n g t h e i mp or ta nc e of a s u r p r i s e a t t ack a g a i n s t t h eS ov i e t Union, denied t h a t s u c h a n a t t a c k c o u l d be d e c i s i v e .I t was Malinovsky, i n h i s speech at t h e 22nd Party Congressin October 1961, who f i r s t pre sen t ed t h e problem of prepared-ness f o r an enemy s u r p r i s e a t t ack as t h e most importantt a s k b e f o r e t h e Sovie t a rmed forces . .In doing so,, owever,Malinovsky invoked t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e CPSU Presidium.An an c i l l a r y deve lopm en t is t h e r enewed e f f o r t be i ngmade i n some qua r t e r s t o p o r t r a y W r u s h c h e v as a seasonedm i l i t a r y leader. Of l a t e , he h a s once aga i n been i d en t i f i edi n t h e p r e s s as t h e "Supreme High Commander of t h e S ov ie tA r m e d Fo rc es ." (4 May 196 3 RED STAB, . i n an uns igne d ac co un tof t h e May Day Parade.) The l a s t p r e vi o u s p u b l i c r e f e r e n c e st o h i m as m i l i t a r y c h i e f t a i n , t o o u r knowledge, appeared i nt he f a l l of 1961.* Also, a r e c e n t IZVESTIYA (8 Yay) f ea tu reda 1942 p i c t u re of Khrushchev i n uniform w i t h members of ana n t i - a i r c r a f t crew a t t h e f r o n t . And l a s t March, some

. .

*The 1962 Def en se Min i s t r y book "Sovie t S t r a t egy" no t edt h a t i n t i m e of w a r , t h e f u n c t i o n s of Supreme High Commanderw i l l be ves t ed in t h e " F i r s t S e c r e t a r y of t h e C e n t r a l Com-mittee and Head of Government," b u t d i d no t s ay t h a t Khru-shchev ho l d s t he sup reme m i l i t a ry p os t in peacet ime as w e l l .

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I .. .. . . s33eMCzI I

commemorative a r t i c l e s on t h e B a t t l e of S t a l i n g r a d p la y edothe rs s u b t l y det racted from it. (More w i l l be s a i d on t h edetractors l a t p r . ) T he re have a l s o been occas iona l r efer -e n c e s i n t h e m i l i t a r y l i t e r a t u r e i n r ec en t months t o Khru-shchev ' s other wartime e x p e r i e n c e s , such as t h e Kursk b a t t l e ,. in v a r i o u s m i l i t a r y pub1i c a t o n s . *

. up Khrushchev's wartime r o l e as a m i l i t a r y leader , w h i l e

. ....... ..

*A r e ce n t v i s i t o r t o t h e USSR, F i d e l Castro, a l s o sangpra i ses of Khrushchev's World War I1 exper i ence and m i l i -t a r y p rowess in a m arat hon t e l ev i s i o n i n t e r v i ew i n Havanaon 5 June. Note how he characterized Khrushchev's r o l e i n' t h e d e f e ns e p o l i c y f igh t s - -wh ich seem t o b e a r . o n h i s p r e s e n tas w e l l as p a s t a c t i v i t i e s - - i n t h e fo l l ow i ng pas sage :

W e m u s t keep i n mind o n e t h i n g : Thef a c t t h a t t h e So vi et Government, t h e S ov i e tl e a d e r s h i p , and Comrade Khrushchev haveshown grea t i n t e r e s t - - 1 had a s p e c i a l op-p o r t u n it y t o see i t i n m y t a l k s w i t h t h eS ov i e t o f f i c e r s on s t r a t e g i c mat te rs - - int h e d e c i s i o n t o b u i l d rockets . T h i s wasa d e c i s i o n i n which Khrushchev cont r ibutedw i t h h i s l e a d e r s h i p . H e defended t h i sp o l i c y c o n s i s t e n t l y , t h a t is , t h e develop-.merit of rocketry--a weapon t h a t has made i tp o s s i b l e f o r t h e USSR t o f ac e , from a m i l i t a r yp o i n t of view, t h e danger of an i m p e r i a l i s tagg re s s i on . P a r t of t h e t echnica l equ ipmentof t h e S ov i e t armed forces has i nc ludedrockets in t h e p a s t f e w years , and t h e numberof r o c k e t s I s i nc rea s i ng . T h i s is t h e s i t u a -t i on . A s i de f r o m Khrushchev 's preoccupat ionw i t h peace, I w a s c o n s t a n t l y aware of h i s de-t e r m i n a t i o n t o be i n a p o s i t i o n t o res is t andof h i s dete rmina t ion t o main ta in a f i r m p o l i c y .W must r e a l i z e t h a t Khrushchev has p a r t i c i p a t e di n wars: i n t h e c i v i l war and i n t h e mostd e c i s i v e b a t t l e s of w a r . He has p a r t i c i p a t e d i nwar; he has t aken p a r t i n t h e most d i f f i c u l tb a t t l e s , and he showed gr e a t a u d a c i t y in thosed i f f i c u l t moments. H e w a s a l s o bo ld i n p o l i t i c sand i t is a d m i t t e d t h a t he is a bold p o l i t i c i a n .Thi s is t h e conc lus ion I drew.

PRAVDA c a r r i e d t h i s passage i n i t s coverage of t h e Castroi n t e rv i ew . - 15 -


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caesar 32 -khrushchev's role in the current controversy over soviet defense policy

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