roland tarushi | could european union achieve the common foreign and security policy

8/12/2019 Roland Tarushi | Could European Union Achieve the Common Foreign and Security Policy

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E p o k a U n i v e r s i t y

5 / 1 7 / 2 0 1 2

Roland Tarushi

Could European Union achieve

the common foreign and

security policy ?


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I. Acknowledgements... 3II. Abstract..... 4

III. Theoretical Background.................................................................................5IV. Preface...........6V. European Union Foreign Policy: A Historical

Overview... 8

- European Defense Community .......8

- The Origins of the Pact on European Political

Cooperation...9

- The Birth of the European Council....10

- Troubled Relations with the US and the World in the 1970s.11

VI. CFSP as a pillar of the EU12VII. The EU foreign policy machinery14

-The Policy Unit...15

-The Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN)15

-Establishment of EEAS.....15

-The Role of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and

Security Policy after Lisbon Treaty ....16

VIII. The European Neighborhood Policy: Assessing the EUs Policy toward theRegion...17

IX. EU Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality ?..............18X. Conclusions...19

XI. Bibliography......20

Contents


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This paper is the result of a hard work and a collaborative research

project that depended at every stage on support from my

supervisor professor, Niuton ulleti, to whom I am grateful.

Furthermore, I want to attribute my diploma thesis to all my

professors, whose contribute on my accumulated knowledge is

fundamental. I express my gratitude and appreciation for their

efforts to make the students progress ,be prepared and succeed in

the post university graduation stage.

Acknowledgements


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This paper aims to examine the European Union foreign policy and security policy. It is a

wide and controversial topic as the most questioned function of EU is foreign policy but also

it is a very important one. I will use qualitative research methods by making text analysis ofprimary sources as: Treaties, Conventions or EU Commissions decision ,and also text

analysis of secondary sources as: books, journals or web articles.

I want to quote former Spanish Minister of foreign affairs, Ana Palacio, who in 2003 wrote

In the recent history of the CFSP, we have had to choose between the C and the P: if

consensus enabled us to reach a Common decision, the result could hardly be considered a

real and effectivePolicy, but if we wanted a realPolicy, it could not be Common.(Palacio,

2003) This paradoxical foreign policy has even been commented by ex External Relations

Commissioner Chris Patten who referred to CFSP as a misconstructed sentence, with too

many adjectives but no verb. And it is true that EU foreign policy has been judgmental and

opinionated, but not executive.

One of the main purposes of the inter-Governmental Conference which led to the signature

of the draft Amsterdam Treaty was to make common foreign and security policy (CFSP)

more effective and to equip the Union better for its role in international politics. Is it

achieved ? Is the role of High Representative of foreign affairs and security policy

consolidated ?

After disintegration of former Yugoslavia , it was necessary an immediate reform. Theunexpected and drastic course of events were an alert to the European Union to act, not just

react after occurrence. The Yugoslav crisis was an apparent indication of weak and

uncoordinated policy of European Union, as an International Governmental Organization.

How can EU be more effective incase of disputes or crisis inside European countries ?

The Amsterdam Treaty aims to overcome contradictions between the particularly ambitious

objectives of the CFSP and the means available to the Union for achieving those objectives,

which did not live up to expectations or provide adequately for the matters at stake.

(Europa.eu)

Will the EU in a near future, as a number of intellectuals think it should, have its own seat on

the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)? And how realistic can it be after the open

disagreements of the Europeans over the Iraq war?

Abstract


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Politics is dynamic, and its always in motion. There happen many events in the world and

they definitely need an explanation . In social sciences is difficult to make everyone agree tosame concepts and same endpoints but political scientists seemed to have accepted widely

six levels of analysis: Individual decision making, role of decision maker, governmental

structure, characteristics of society, international relations and world system.

In world politics there are three main theories: Realism , Liberalism and Radicalism.

Realism: Main focus of realism is state security and power as primary realists such as E.H.

Carr and Hans Morgenthau stated that states are self-interested, power-seeking rational

actors. Realist are also opponents of idealism, by considering power as the main influential

tool.

Realists believe that political realism is governed by objectives laws which are based in

human nature. Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Theodore Roosevelt are considered as

founding fathers . Realism has an competitive nature.

We can mention Otto von Bismarck as a representor of Realpolitik.

Liberalism: Is based on equality ,liberty and democracy.

Liberalism consists on freedom of the individuals, on a fair and free elections and capitalism.

Nature of liberalism is collaborative and accepts states and international organizations asmain actors. International Organizations play a monitoring role and helps on consolidation

of democracy.

An early liberal messenger, we can mention John Locke but the main ideologists developer

are Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant.

Radicalism: Is focused on denoting social structures.

By its economic and socio-politics perspectives, radicalism main concern is a common

property owned by working class. Radicalism is mostly related with class struggle. The

political ideology that radicalists offer is communism, which opposes the liberal democratic

principles. Main developers of this theory are Karl Marx and Engels.

Regarding the topic, the theory which vindicates the case, is realism , as EU foreign policy

decision making is based on unanimous decisions, and every state as the veto power.

External sovereignty is the core element of a state, since Realism is based on power.

Theoretical Background


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In a time when American power is lessening and China showing itself still indecisive and

hesitant about its global role, the European Union evidently has the possibility to exercisegreat influence in world affairs. Soft and hard power, are the main elements which compose

a global power, and economically EU can challenge US, because European Unions member

states combined GDP and its foreign investments are both comparable to those of the United

States, in addition its population is 50% larger.

It has the largest total development aid budget in the world, and it has 27 votes in the United

Nations, including two permanent seats on the Security Council. It has even demonstrated a

capacity for united military action abroad. Some observers thus suggest that the EU has

already achieved superpower status. (Thomas, 2011, p. 45)

Nevertheless, there are other academicians who are profoundly skeptical about foreign policy

as a functional area of EU policy-making. For example, they refer to the EUs failure toattain a cohesive position on the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the recognition of Kosovo

in 2008, or the Libyan no-fly zone in 2011 as evidence of insuperable divergences in the

member states foreignpolicy preferences. According to David Allen the EU cannot have a

real foreign policy unless it becomes a state: A European foreign policy could only be

achieved by creating central institutions within a European Union capable of identifying,

selecting, and implementing a coherent set of objectives that could be legitimized as being in

the European interest. (Allen, 1998, p. 67)

There was a hope that the EUs Lisbon Treaty, which was lawful valid in 2009, would get to

the bottom of this problem by creating a non-rotating President of the European Council anda newly-empowered High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy supported

by a new External Action Service. Although severe doubts persist, despite these institutional

innovations.

Former Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, himself a strong promoter of EU unity in

world affairs, conveys the following joke: President Barack Obama discovers with interest

that Europe now has a phone number. Hes told that,responding at last to Henry Kissingers

famous taunt (When I want tocall Europe what number do I ring? the European Union has

assigned a President named Herman Van Rompuy from Belgium and given him a 24/7 phone

line. So, Obama makes his mind up to try out Europesphone number. Henry will be tickled.

But the president forgets about the time difference and gets an answering machine: GoodEvening, youve reached the European Union, Herman Van Rompuy speaking. We are

closed for tonight. Please select from the following options. Press one for the French view,

two for the German view, three for the British view, four for the Polish view, five for the

Italian view, six for the Romanian view. Obama hangs up in disappointment (Cohen,

March 8 2010, p. 13)

Preface


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This saga exhibits the most fundamental challenge that the EU confronts as it works to

convert its vast resources into a common attitude to foreign policy decades of integration

have transformed Europesnation states into member states but not into a unitedsuper-

state.

So, despite the fact that the EU instantly has more vigorous mechanisms for diplomacy, and

the revised Treaty on European Union re-binds member states to pursue common policies,they still frequently scuffle to come to an agreement. Comprehending the European Unions

actual position in world affairs thus requires, absorbing the process by which member states

pursue (and often reach) agreements on common foreign policies.

Therefore the research question that drives this paper is: How do EU member states

overcome their contradictory inclinations and reach agreement on common policies

regarding issues and actors beyond their collective external border? By realizing the evident

significance of this question, it is surprising how diminutive consideration it has received in

the existing scholarly literature. Instead, most work on EU foreign policy has focused on

explaining the evolution of the EUs foreign policy competence andprocedures, examining

its impact on foreign policy formation and culture at the member state level, and most often,on assessing the effectiveness or normative consistency of the EUs international actions .

(Tonra, 2001, p. 10)

A practical intent of establishing the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in 1999,

was to tackle challenges in the field of security by removing various police and military

missions in alerting troubled crisis areas.A more consolidated CSDP, meant a more

influential EU, so it raised EUs hope for playing a more important role in external affairs.

However, the majority of CSDP missions are still on a small scale. Strategic disagreements

among EU partners persist on issues of UN legality, NATO neutrality and the geographicdeployment of missions. This lack of consensus is due to a lack of common ideas, values and

practices regarding the use of police and military force in Europe. In short: there is no

common strategic culture. (Margas, June 2010, p. 5)

Lets analyze and try to answer the questions that can pop out by these paraphrase and strive

to understand if European Unionsmember states can have the foreign policy in same line.


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European Union Foreign Policy: A Historical Overview

I want to quote Walter Hallstein, who back in 1962 said : One reason for creating the

European Community [was] to enable Europe to play its full part in world affairs.. . . [It is]

vital for the Community to be able to speak with one voice and to act as one in economic

relations with the rest of the world. (Hallstein, 1962, p. 39) Nevertheless, the early

European Community did not possess a consistent foreign policy in a strict sense. The

European Economic Community (EEC) treaty did, however, contain important provisions in

the field of external relations that evolved and became increasingly substantive as the years

went by. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive view of the evolution of

European foreign policy (EFP) in its various forms and stages. The chronological description

presented here links the different actions and decisions taken by the EEC with the external

and domestic events facing the member states at that time. (Bindi, 2010, p. 168)

The European Defense Community

Throughout the negotiations for the Schuman Plan (1950), which was the initiator of the

agreement to set up the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), concerns emerged

about a probable German rearmament. German disarmament after World War II formed a

variety of power vacuum in the nucleus of Europe, which was radically accentuated after the

Korean War. The United States of America proposed creating an integrated operational

structure within the subject of the Atlantic alliance within which a German army could

partake under direct American control. This pact came to be North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO).

The French government opposed this plan and recommended as an alternative the so-called

Pleven Plan (1950), named after French prime minister Ren Pleven. The Pleven Plan

intended to create an European army that would be in charge under European ministry of

defense. This army would be made of soldiers from the participating countries. It included all

the members of the North Atlantic alliance, plus Germany.

The EDC also involved a certain degree of economic integration, indispensable regarding

that military integration in different demanded the standardization of industrial-war

capabilities.

While the German rearmament remained a discussing issue, English foreign secretary,

Anthony Eden came up with a new initiative. This initiative benefited from U.S. support.

In1954, several agreements were signed allowing for Germanys membership in NATO,

Italian and German membership in the Brussels Pact, the creation of the Western European

Union (WEU), Germanys assurance that it would not engage in the creation of atomic arms,


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and a British agreement to station two British divisions in Germany. The question of

European defense thus became a transatlantic issue and a taboo in Europe for decades to

come. (Bindi, 2010, p. 186)

The Origins of the Pact on European Political Cooperation

On July 10, 1969,during a press conference Pompidou acquainted with his ideas for the

prospect of Europe in what is commonly known as Pompidous Triptique. These ideas were

approved in the summit which took place in Hague on December 1-2, 1969. They contained

three principles: completion, deepening, and enlargement.

More particularly, the Triptique required completion of the Common Market by January 1,

1970, with specific concentration to the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)

through the resources of the Community; the deepening of the Community, especially in thefield of economic and monetary policy; and enlargement to include Great Britain and other

countries, with the condition that the Community would adopt a common position before

negotiations.

The Hague Summit Declaration mentioned the establishment of the Common Market as the

way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world.(The Hague

Summit Declaration, December 2, 1969, point 3.)

Showing consideration for deepening, Etienne Davignon, former political director of then

Belgian Foreign Ministry, was responsible for studying probable future steps down the path

of European integration. The Davignon Report, approved 27, 1970, in Luxembourg by theforeign ministers on October, was of a great essence to policymaking and European foreign

policy. It settled on the principle of regular meetings between the European Economic

Community foreign ministers, meetings of the heads of state and government, and

consultations on subject of foreign policy amid member states.

The report brought out the so-called European Political Cooperation (EPC), which

institutionalized the attitude of consultation on all major questions of foreign policy. The

member states could suggest any subject for political consultation. And if the work of the

foreign ministers would had an effect on the activities of the European Community the

European Commission would be consulted and every six months meetings would be held

between ministers and the members of the Political Affairs Committee of the European

Parliament.

The consequent Copenhagen Report of July 23, 1973, detailed the EPCs role and

mechanisms. According to the report, the EPC established a new procedure in international


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relations and an original European contribution to the technique of arriving at a concerted

action.(Europa.eu, 2012)

It resulted in an institutional framework which deals with problems of international politics,

is distinct and additional to the activities of the institutions of the Community which are

based on the juridical commitments undertaken by the member States in the Treaty of

Rome.(Ibid.)

The Copenhagen Report ascertained that the ministers of foreign affairs were required to

meet four times a year and whenever they felt it was needed. It stressed the role of the

Political Committee as the body entrusted with the preparation of the ministerial meetings

and created the Group of Correspondentsand the system of European telex (COREU). The

Copenhagen Report also emphasized the importance of subcommittees and working groups.

The first ones were to deal with the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

(CSCE), the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and Asia. They established the principle that

ambassadors accredited to countries other than members of the EEC could consult with each

other.

The Birth of the European Council

In 1974 an additional key actor in European foreign policy was established: the European

Council. On April 2, 1974, Pompidou died. Valry Giscard dEstaing was elected president

on May 19, 1974. In Germany, there was a switch of chancellors, Helmut Schmidt had

replaced Willy Brand. Giscard dEstaing although he was not really a supporter of

supranational institutions, because he was persuaded that process of European construction

needed a restore, he came up with the adage lEurope est ma priorit. Tagging along Jean

Monnets advice, on September 14, 1974, GiscarddEstaing arranged an appointment with

the other heads of government and with the (French) president of the European Commission,

Franois-Xavier Ortoli. The result was the agreement to organize such meetings every three

or four months.

At the ensuing Paris summit in December 1974 the European Council was founded under the

slogan The Summits are dead, vive les Conseils Europens! TheEuropean Council was

composed of heads of state or government and their foreign ministers, with the participation

of the president of the European Commission. They were to meet three times a year, and anyother time deemed necessary, within the framework of European Political Cooperation.

Moreover in 1974 the initial meeting of what was later called Gymnich formulawas held

at Gymnich Castle in Germanys Rhineland region. The formula referred to the unofficial

gatherings of the foreign ministers to consult on matters of foreign policy.


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Troubled Relations with the United States and the World in the 1970s

On the beginning of the 1970s, international community started pushing pressure in the

EEC to engage further in international affairs. Several events in the world, such the Arab-

Israeli wars, the oil crises, the war on Vietnam were all outsider occurrences pushing the

Europeans together. Afterward, the incursion of Afghanistan by Soviets, the Iranian

revolution terminating with hostage crisis (1980) putted emphasis on the need for a common

European response. Further happenings affecting the EPC included the establishment of

military law in Poland, the Argentinean invasion of the Falklands, and the Israeli offensive

on Lebanon.

In the 1970, transatlantic relations became tense. Previously, up to the end of the Kennedy

administration, there was a support from United States to the European integration process.

But in the late 1960s, things started to alter. EEC was perceived as an economic competitor

and was blamed for the deficit that the United States experienced in its balance of payments.

U.S. comportment in relation to the EEC became rather contradictory. The United States

was adamant that Europe had to contribute more to NATO costs while the U.S. president,

Richard Nixon, confirmed the principle of American leadership over the organization. In the

same way, Secretary of State and the famous diplomat, Henry Kissinger called 1973 the

year of Europe. Yet United States had the idea that essentially Europes interests were and

could only be regional, while the United States had global responsibilities and interests.

In return, the EEC foreign ministers, adopted in Copenhagen on December 14, 1973 a

Declaration on European Identity. Its purpose was to define and make comprehensible the

EECs relations and responsibilities to the other parts of the world and their role in world

affairs. The Nine affirmed and stated that European Unification is not directed against

anyone, nor is it inspired by a desire for power. Quite the opposite, the Nine were persuaded

that from their union will benefit the whole international community. The Nine intend to

play an active role in world affairs and thus to contribute to ensuring that international

relations have [a] more just basis. In pursuit of these objectives the Nine should

progressively define common positions in the sphere of foreign policy. (Declaration on

European Identity, December 14, 1974)

AT last, Europes relations with Asia in between 1970s and 1980s were meant to be lesscomplex. China, in 1975 became the foremost socialist country to recognize the EEC, and in

1978 a first agreement was signed, pursued in 1985 by an agreement on trade and economic

cooperation. In 1978, a co-operation agreement was also signed with ASEAN.


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CFSP as a pillar of the EU

Earlier, in August 1990, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a source of division among EEC

member, in particular between Prime Minister Thatchers government in the UnitedKingdom and the others, which led to disputes over concerns of security, majority voting,

and how to integrate foreign policy into the Community.

The Maastricht Treaty, signed on 7 February 1992 and entered in force on 1 November 1993,

established a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the European Union.

Ultimately, the European Political Cooperation was replaced by the Common Foreign and

Security Policy, which represented the second pillar of the new three-pillared EU.

The CFSP was to safeguard the common values, the fundamental interests, and the

independence of the Union; to strengthen its security and its member states in all ways; topreserve peace and strengthen international security; to promote international cooperation; to

develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and

fundamental freedoms, as spelled out in article J.1.2 of the TEU. Articles J.1.3 and J.3

stipulated that such objectives were to be pursued through systematic cooperation between

member states and by joint actions. (Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) -

Overview)

Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar was meant to unify actions of member states,

under the belief of spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity,avoiding any act of contrary to

the interest of the Union or to decrease its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international

relations. Beside that, member states had to inform and consult with each other and set

common positionsin order to be consistent with their national policies.

In addition, they were also to synchronize in international organizations and international

conferences. The WEU was required to be strongly associated with the CFSP, acting as a

link to NATO, and the CFSP was finally allowed to address the previously taboo question of

defense, with the probability of steadily moving on the way to a common defense system.

The Presidency was to represent the EU in CFSP matters. Overseas, there had to be

cooperation between member state diplomatic missions and European Commissiondelegations, also the European Parliament was to be consulted. The general guidelines

concerning the CFSP were to be defined by the European Council, to which the TEU granted

the proper status of EU institution, and implemented by the Council, both acting on the basis

of unanimity, as stipulated by the article. (Smith, 2006, p. 120)


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At the European Council on June 2627, 1992, before the implementation of the TEU, the

Lisbon Report specified what areas would be of interest to the EU (the so-called Lisbon

goals). These areas were defined geographically, as, for example, central and eastern

Europe (including Eurasia); the Balkans; Maghreb and the Middle East; transatlantic

relations (the United States and Canada); the North-South dimension (Africa, Latin America,

the Caribbean, and Asia); and Japan. They were also defined with respect to horizontal issues

such as security issues (the CSCE process and the policy of disarmament and arms control in

Europe, including confidence building measures); nuclear and nonproliferation issues; and

the economic aspect of security, in particular control of the transfer of military technology to

third countries and control of arm exports. (Blanke, 2012, p. 135)

In addition, eight joint actions were engaged in during November 1993 and May 1995. These

proceedings took account of observing elections in Russia and South Africa, supporting

measures to develop stability and peace in the central and eastern European countries

(CEECs) and the Middle East, granting humanitarian aid to Bosnia, promoting the indefiniteextension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), controlling the export of dual-use (civil and

military) goods, and strengthening the review process of the anti-personnel landmines.

Throughout the same phase, fourteen common positions were also adopted, mostly

concerning economic sanctions against third parties.

The articles of the treaty concerning the common commercial policy were adjusted in the

TEU. It had turned out to be vital to clarify the proper trade policy affairs and the new CFSP.

Besides that, new article 228a of the TEU denoted that in case that the CFSP generated a

need for sanctions, the Council would decide this based on qualified majority voting (QMV)

on a proposal from the Commission. The new diction of the EU commercial policy enhanced

the European Parliaments power of acquiesce regarding all accords in the subject of external

trade. As specified in article 228 of the TEU, this area concerned policy areas comprised by

the co-decision making procedure in domestic affairs, as well as in matters probable to have

budgetary implications of a great consequence for the Community.

As a final point but not less important, the new treaty took the steps and the created

conditions needed to finally establish an economic and monetary union by 1997, or 1999.

Moreover, in response to qualms about wrongdoings and crimes from the East after the fall

of the Berlin Wall, the Maastricht Treaty established funds of cooperation among memberstates in the field of internal security. This cooperation became depended on the jurisdiction

of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).


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The EU foreign policy machinery

Since the beginning we mentioned the paradox of EU foreign policy and its impossible to

avoid discussing of highly complicated EU external relations machinery, due to the existence

of uncommon systems or pillars for various aspects of external policy (foreign and security

policy, trade, development etc). At some point the 1990s and early 2000 there was astrengthening of the institutional system in Brussels that included the creation of the position

of High Representative for the CFSP, a political and security committee plus a military staff

and committee. Extra attempts were made to deepen the machinery in the constitutional

treaty, but the treaty is in abeyance after the double refusal by French and Dutch voters in

2005. Even so, some of the stipulations in the treaty are probable to re-emerge, including the

posture of an EU foreign minister and an EU diplomatic service. The feedbacks of member

states to these initiative are assorted. Foreign and security policy remains a very sensitive

area.

Actually, as a matter of fact bureaucracies consume much time on domestic power struggles.

Concerning EU foreign policy there are persistent turf wars within and between the

Commission and the Council. There are strives inside Commission over who should control

which directorate generals (DGs) and budget lines. Commission and the Council were

competing for authority, command and influence. Simultaneously, the member states make

their altering moves, episodically supporting the EU institutions and sometimes have a

preference to plough their own crease. The major member states have been unwilling to

concede the Commission increased authority vis--vis what they regard as to be foreign and

security policy. Nevertheless, it is up to the definition of foreign policy. The Commission is

vastly in the heading position relating to trade policy, enlargement and development policy;

but it is the Council, that directs the politicalsecurity issue on behalf of the member states.

Although is not always obvious where the dividing line rests, and this has ongoing turf warsamong the Commission and the Council which are damaging to the aim of a more coherent

foreign policy.

There was a thwarting case when the Commission actually took the Council to court over

who had right authority to implement a program aimed at averting the proliferation of small

arms in West Africa (21 February 2005, Case C-91/05).

Nowadays, The European Council is composed of the heads of state and government of the

twenty-seven member states, is the utmost decision-making body in the EU but it pays out

modest time on external affairs. It dedicates most of its time to discussing and negotiatingchallenging issues such as the budget or new treaties and, as regards foreign policy, it

frequently rubber-stamps verdicts and announcements that have been prepared at lower

levels. One of the critiques to the European Council is that it misuses the time on other issues

rather than debating strategic issues. It comes to an agreement that Common Strategies

towards countries such as Russia and China are lacking to have a real exchange of views on

the strategy.


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The Policy Unit

A further innovation made at Amsterdam Treaty was the establishment of a Policy Planning

and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), which are normally recognized as the Policy Unit,

composed mainly of representatives from the member states, together with Commission and

Council representatives, with a mandate to provide policy advice to Mr Solana. The fearlyhead of the Policy Unit, Christoph Heusgen, turned out to be Angela Merkels foreign policy

adviser in November 2005.

The Policy Unit is made up by eight divided taskforces: European Security and Defense

Policy, Western Balkans/Central Europe; Early Warning/Conflict Prevention/Terrorism;

Horizontal Questions; Latin America; Russia/Ukraine/Transatlantic/Baltic States; Asia;

Mediterranean/Middle East/Africa; and Administration/Security and Situation Centre/Crisis

Cell.

The Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN)

The Policy Unit also managed the setting up of a Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), whichconnected the (civilian) Policy Unit and the military Situation Centre. The SITCEN was set

off on 1 January 2003, to correspond with the launch of the EUs police mission (EUPM) in

Bosnia. It has employed intelligence officers to make possible information exchange with

member states and put protected secure communications networks into place. It merges early

warning, situation monitoring and assessment; supplies conveniences for a crisis taskforce;

and functions as an operational point of contact for the SG/HR. Its tasks contains risk

assessment, ad hoc intelligence briefings, and urgent reports in the wake of terrorist attacks

outside the EU. Reports are given out to members of the PSC and the EUMC. The SITCEN

has a low number of staff who collect information from diverse sources including the EUs

Satellite Imaging Centre at Torrejon, Spain. Not only collecting information, but also there is

an outflow of information from the SITCEN to the member states.

Establishment of the European External Action Service

In turn to permit in a mutual way, both the High Representative and, in some respects, the

President of the European Council, to completely exercise their obligations and

responsibilities in foreign policy, the Treaty, as did already the Constitutional Treaty (Art.

III-296 TCE), provides for the establishment of a European External Action Service (EEAS)

(Art. 27.3 TEU). The Council approved a decision establishing on 10 July 2010 this EEAS,

which is to be set up by December 2010 for the first anniversary of the entry into force of theTreaty of Lisbon. (Council) Current High Representative Catherine Ashton explained that

Europe needs to shape up to defend better our interests and values in a world of growing

complexity and fundamental power shifts.(Ashton, 2010)

EEAS headquarters will be established in Brussels, the European capital,and its staff will

mainly be by contribution of personnel coming from the Commission, the General

Secretariat of the Council and the Diplomatic services of the Member States .


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The EEAS was set out to be a functionally autonomous body of the European Union [. . .]

under the authority of the High Representative with the necessary legal capacityto perform

its tasks (Arts. 1.2, 3). It shall both support the High Representative and assist the

President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the Commission

in the exercise of their respective mandates and functions (Art. 2). (Blanke, 2012, p. 159)

This configuration in arrangement with the Union delegations abroad will make the EEAS atrue diplomatic service of the Union inclusive, central as well as an externalcomponent.

The Role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security

Policy after Treaty of Lisbon

The role of the High Representative for the CFSP should be strengthened, that was

indubitable, when it was re estimated by the Convention on the Future of Europe and

afterward during the negotiation of the Treaty of Lisbon. There were three principal

objectives of an enhanced role for the High Representative: first,greater i ndependence from

the Counci l and f rom the Presidency in formation of poli cy proposals; second, a higher

international profi le for the post and its occupant; and third, unitary representation of the

Unionto replace the complex rules under which the European Commission represented the

Union in some areas of competence and the Presidency or High Representative in others. The

changes contained in the Treaty of Lisbon reflect all of these three ambitions. (Blanke, 2012,

p. 195)

Once it had into force it created a post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, and as cited

in paragraph 1 the Minister was empowered to conduct the Unions common foreign and

security policy. Thisaccountabilityalthough it was to be performed within the mandate ofthe Council of Ministerswould have been a innovative concept for an individual operating

within and representing an international organization, and considering that only States

presently appoint ministers for foreign affairs, the title was comprehended as implying

aspirations of statehood for the European Union.

In reviewing the position of the High Representative and of the establishment EEAS under

the Treaty of Lisbon as well it is important to recall that the Member States have

communicated their willpower regarding their own powers to accomplish independent

foreign policy and to preserve separate representation in other States and in international

organizations.

It must be emphasized that although the Foreign Affairs Council is now presided over by the

High Representative, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the

supporting Working Groups within the Council will persist to be chaired by the rotating

Presidenciesso sooner than an item get hold of the level of the Council main decisions and

compromises may already have been forged under national influence.


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The European Neighborhood Policy:Assessing the EUs Policy

toward the Region

European neighborhood policy is basically a regional foreign policy with the aim of

developing privileged relations with the new neighbors of the enlarged EU. The purpose of

the ENP towards neighboring countries is strengthening stability, security and well-being for

all concerned. It intends to avoid the coming out of new dividing lines among the enlarged

EU and its neighbors and to offer them the chance to be involved in different EU activities,

through greater political, economic, security, and cultural co-operation.

The understanding of privileged relations in initial statements wasquite demanding. The

Commissions president, Romano Prodi, said that the ENP countries would share

everything but the institutions.

Almost sixteen ENP target countries, more or less are separated into four geographic areas:

the southern Mediterranean (Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria) the eastern

Mediterranean (the Palestinian Territory, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon) eastern Europe

(Ukraine, and Belarus, Moldova) and since 2004, the southern Caucasus (Azerbaijan,

Armenia, Georgia). While Russia, at first involved in the blueprints, is not included the in

ENP.

The instruments used have distinct names but they are quite alike. European Commission,

prepare country reports which assess the political, institutional, and economic situation in a

country and, followed by tailor-made ENP Action Plans set up for every state.

Even though in principle they are bilateral, they essentially display the strong asymmetry that

characterizes relations between the EU and its neighbors.

To conclude this part, I would say that this part of the research indicates the positive

approach to the research question. We must highlight that when it comes to neighborhood

policy, EU members are more unified in their decisiveness.

Kosovo case best describe this feature of European Union foreign policy. The cohesive

reaction of each member state and of EU as an entire body toward Serbian aggression toward

Kosovo, is a sign that EU common foreign policy can work out, but is it the only case ?


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EU Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?

The key point of this question is to acquaint with the fact that foreign policy of the European

Union has evolved and expanded in scope over the years, it remains an unusual institution; it

is neither a nation-state nor an accurate intergovernmental organization. EU foreign policy

have been adjusted it still cannot be assessed according to the terms of a national foreign

policy. I assume that EU foreign policy is in an inconsistent condition, and it has come to

mean and the terms on which it can be assessed.

What I want to bring out is to appraise its efficiency and its capability to distribute results for

its member states and Europes population. As a final point, this part discusses the degree to

which foreign policy was an actor for establishing the EU domestically and abroad as an

independent actor in world affairs.

The Nature of the European Unions Foreign Policy

Within Europe, exist three different views on the possibility and desirability of a European

foreign policy. The most rough critics claim that there is no such thing as a European foreign

policy, that there never will be, and what is more, there never should be. A more soft and

nuanced view presume that Europes foreign policy is not imperative, but it should if the

states of Europe want to comprehend their foreign policy objectives.

To end with the remaining point of view, whose contributors believe that a European foreign

policy does exist but that Europes leaders often withstandusing the term for fear that it will

alarm their publics or reduce their influence. On this patterns of analysis, the key to

recognizing and figuring out the European foreign policy is to go ahead of the brief

definition of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the Common Foreign

and Security Policy (CFSP) to cover all of the broader policy areas in which the EU operates

at the international level.

We are knowledgeable about considering foreign policy broadly as the strategy or approach

chosen by a national government to attain its aspirations and purposes in relation to external

entities. On this condition, the EU evidently has a foreign policy. The perplexity comes when

taking into account that the most studies of foreign policy focus on the decision making

process itself as part of the explanation. As Chris Hill put it, Foreign policy analysis

enquires into the motives and other sources of behavior of the international actors,

particularly states. It does this by giving a good deal of attention to decision-making. . . . In

doing so it tests the rather plausible hypothesis that the outputs of foreign policy are to some

degree determined by the nature of the decision-making process.


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Conclusions

The EUs deficient in institutional consistency is demonstrated in its failure to give birth to a

unified foreign policy actor. Yet, the EU is not a nation-state, and the achievements or

malfunction of its foreign policy should not be assessed by the same standards.

Certainly, if we estimate the EU foreign policy in contrast to the standard of

intergovernmental organizations, it is obvious that the EU has reached certain level of

success.

We can definitely assume that the most successful EU foreign policy, even though it is not

considered as such, has been enlargement. The EU has been confirmed on its capabilities to

attract former neighbors. But still, enlargement is a card that cannot be played perpetually. It

is costly, not only financially but also institutionally and culturally.

Another sphere where the EU could prove remarkably successful is in its commercial policy.

In this field the EU evidently acts effectively as the unquestionable agent of its member

states, which as a result now put little effort into performing independent commercial

policies. The principal economic partners, counting the United States and China, recognize

the EU as the interlocutor in this area and basically have renounced the divide and conquer

strategies. But this does not mean that there are no quarrels in commercial policy among the

EU and its partners.

Notwithstanding these decisive successes, the EUs record on foreign policy is

unequivocally a mixed one. In some particular areas that one might regard as significant and

vital for Europe and for specific member countries, the EU has not been very effective. This

is basically because the EU has no real mechanism for unraveling internal disputes.

As a result, if there is no compromise, no consensus, there is no policy. We can refer to some

cases, from very prominent issues such as disputes over U.S. policy in Iraq to profound

divergences over Russias intentions, to less interestedbut embarrassing issues such as the

disability to come up with a common position for the Durban Review Conference against

racism. Even in Georgian crisis in August 2008, EU did not have the capacity to guarantee its

enforcement and as a consequence achieved much less than what was necessary.

EU states sometimes are using their membership in the EU as a megaphone for national

foreign policy, according on ability to influence the EU machinery and to generate consensus

on their matters with the other states. Not even large states make maneuvers, even small

states have used the megaphone, though in different wayslarge states by forcing

consensus, small states by penetrating the EU institutions, especially through the Presidency.


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roland tarushi | could european union achieve the common foreign and security policy

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