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RISK ASSESSMENT &

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

Block No: 313, 286 – P, Kheda – Dholka Highway, Village: Hariyala, Kheda, Gujarat

PRAKRUTI ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERS 1, Utkanth Society, b/h Alkapuri Club, Alkapuri, Vadodara – 390 007, Gujarat, INDIA. Ph. No.: +91 265 2356171 • Fax: 2331854 • Email: [email protected] • URL: www.prakruti.co.in

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The Risk Assessment is prepared on the basis of information and details

provided by M/s. KGN BIOTECH LTD; (Subsidiary of KGN ENTERPRISES

LTD.), Plot No. 313-318, 321, 286/P. , Kheda-Dholka Highway, Village

Hariyala Tal. Matar, Dist. Kheda;Pin-387411 to HELPS during their course of

the study. The assessment has been formulated by team of qualified,

experienced and competent persons, who have exercised all reasonable

skills and care.

The industrial emergency / disaster resulting from the accidental release of

huge quantity of volatile substances having toxic, flammable or explosive

chemical properties are not new to the chemical units.

Therefore, the process of the chemical industries have been continuously

updating and developing its design and operating techniques to overcome

such problems. Further, a technique known as “Risk Assessment” has been

developed to assess the risk associated in the handling the plants, storage

areas and its consequences on human environment etc, if involves either due

to fire, explosion or toxic gas release.

The present Risk Assessment is carried out with referring the following :

(1) Technical Guidance for Hazard Analysis – U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency.

(2) Major Hazard Control – A Practical Manual – International Labour

Office – Geneva.

(3) Various techniques adopted by different experts, are published in

Periodicals, Magazines, Seminars, Books and Leaflets.

(4) Various Softwares

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We are thankful as the matters are used in a good faith.

We are thankful for help and co-operation received from Mr. Babulal Jethalal

Hirani, Occupier, Mr. Ravi Prakash Thakur , GM and others from M/s. KGN

BIOTECH LTD; (Subsidiary of KGN ENTERPRISES LTD.) during our course

of conduct.

Date : 28.09.2010

For Managements (M/s. KGN BIOTECH LTD; (Subsidiary of KGN ENTERPRISES LTD.) Document Approved by

Date: Signature Designation:

B.E.(Mech), LL.B., Sr. Factory Inspector (Retrd.), Competent Person

B.E.(Civil), DIS, PGDIEM, MISNT,FIV Competent Person, Chartered Engineer, Valuer

For HELPS

J. J. VAGHELA MAYOOR J. VAGHELA

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RISK ASSESSMENT

KGN BIOTECH LTD (Subsidiary of KGN ENTERPRISES LTD.)

Plot No. 313-318, 321, 286/P, Kheda-Dholka Highway, Village Hariyala Tal. Matar, Dist. Kheda.

INDEX

CHAPTER SUBJECT PAGE NO.

Preface --- 2

Index --- 4

DESCRIPTION SECTION:

1 Objective --- 8

2 Profile of Plant --- 11

3 Hazard Identification --- 21

4 Consequences Modelling --- 38

5 Risk Level --- 65

6 Suggestion and Recommendation --- 77

ANNEXURE SECTION:

Annexure 1 to 16 --- 83-109

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RISK ASSESSMENT

REPORT SECTION


Plot No. 313-318, 321, 286/P, Kheda-Dholka Highway, Village Hariyala Tal. Matar, Dist. Kheda

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1.1 INTRODUCTION

Chemical Process industries have undergone tremendous

changes during the last f ive decades. Process Conditions

such as Pressure & Temperature have become severe,

concentration of stored energy has increased. Plants have

grown in size and are often single stream. The Scale of

possible Fire, Explosion, Toxic Release, Body Injuries, and

Occupational Diseases has grown considerably. These

Factors have greatly increased the risk for major industr ial

disasters, involving loss of human l ives, plant & property and

environmental degradation.

1.2 work

KGN Biotech Ltd (Subsidiary of KGN Enterprises Ltd), is

s i tuated at Plot No. 315,316/1,318,286/P, Kheda-Dholka

Highway, Vi l lage- Hariyala, Taluka Matar, Dist. Kheda Pin-

387411. The Unit is engaged in manufacturing of Derivatives

of Castor Oi l. KGN Enterprises Ltd is engaged in the product

of Castor Oi l from Castor –Seeds. HELPS Consultants has the

requisi te software and specialist manpower resources for this

purpose.

1.3 OBJECTIVES

The overall objectives considered for Risk Assessment study

are as follows:

To identify various hazards in the plants, processes,

storages and uti l i ty area of the unit.

CHAPTER - 1

OBJECTIVES

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Assessing the various r isks involved

To consider the consequential impact on nearby areas,

population, etc. in case of any accidental emergency

situation arising from the factory premises.

To evaluate and quantify the avai lable measures and

resources for containing any eventuality.

To study and suggest safety and control measure. 1.4 METHODOLOGY

The Risk Assessment as presented in the report is prepared

based on the Maximum Credible Accident Scenario (MCA)

for critical areas where potential of r isks are higher. The

various models are used to quantifying the loss of

containment scenario by estimating discharge rate, the total

quantity released, duration, extent of f lash and evaporation

etc. Sequence of Risk Assessment is given below

1. Gather required information and documents

2. List out hazardous inventories and storage tank/ vessels

detai ls

3. Define the fai lure scenarios and identify probable hazards

associated with them

4. Define parameters for each of the chemicals and each of

hazards.

5. Define release type (continuous/ instantaneous) and

determine release rates.

6. Simulate selected cases for consequence of fai lure

scenarios.

7. Summarize the consequences.

8. Superimpose vulnerable zones on the plot plan.

9. Appraise the extent of damage to plant and personnel.

10. Recommendation additional control measures/ remedial

measured required

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1.5 Study are under this QRA

This Quantitative Risk Assessment is carried out for Storage

and associated loading and unloading faci li t ies for fol lowing

chemicals:

• Storage area of Hexane

• Storage area of Hydrogen

1.6 Software used

ALOHA was developed jointly by the National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA).

ALOHA (Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres) is a

computer program designed especially for use by people

responding to chemical releases, as well as for emergency

planning and training. ALOHA models key hazards—toxicity,

f lammabili ty, thermal radiation (heat), and overpressure

(explosion blast force)—related to chemical releases that

result in toxic gas dispersions, f i res, and/or explosions.

1.7 References

Some of the references which were used for QRA are

i l lustrated as under;

1. The Factories Act 1948(1987) and Gujarat Factories Rules

– 1963 (2004)

2. Manufacture, Storage & Import of Hazardous Chemicals

Rules 1989 (2000)

3. Environmental (Protection) Act – 1986 (2004)

4. World Bank Technical papers “Techniques for assessing

Industrial Hazards – A Manual”.

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5. Methods for calculation of Physical effects (Yellow Book)

by TNO

6. The Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk

Analysis, Second Edition by CCPS

7. ALOHA software Manual

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2.1 INTRODUCTION


s i tuated at Plot No. 315,316/1,318,286/P, Kheda-Dholka

Highway, Vi l lage- Hariyala, Taluka Matar : Dist. Kheda Pin-


of Castor Oi l. KGN Enterprises Ltd is engaged in the product

of Castor Oi l from Castor -Seeds

The manufacturing process was started by the Unit in 1997.

The Unit is registered under the Factories Act – 1948 and

holding the licence. Further, the Unit has obtained the

l icense to store, bulk quantities of Hexane from Petroleum &

Explosive Safety Organisation (PESO). Further, the Unit has

obtained the NOC from G.P.C.B.

2.2 Location of the unit

KGN Biotech Ltd (Subsidiary of KGN Enterprises. Ltd.), is

si tuated at Plot No. 313,315,316,318,286/P Kheda-Dholka

Highway. Vi l lage Hariyala, Tall. Matar, Dist. Kheda,Pin-

387411. There are two main gates for each Section

Separately. Both located on North side. Kheda is about 3 Km

away from the Unit and National Highway No.8 is about 2.5

km from the unit.

CHAPTER - 2

PROFILE OF THE UNIT

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The surroundings of the Unit are given below: North : Kheda- Dholaka Road, Main Entry of

the unit

South : Agricultural Open Land

East : Agricultural Open Land

West : Agricultural Open Land

The Location Plan is given at Annexure – 1.

2.3 Layout

The total land-area of the Unit i s 75524 Sq, Metres &

constructed area is 10445 Sq. Metres. The main entry to the

unit is in the North Side. The main approach road to the unit

is from Kheda – Dholka Highway.

Unit consist of following sections/areas;

(A) KGN Biotech Ltd:

(1) Hydrogenated Castor Oi l Plant,

(2) HMR Plant,

(3) 12 HSA+RA Plant,

(4) Glycerine Plant (Evaporation),

(5) Flacker Section,

(6) Laboratory (Fi rst Floor),

(7) Boi ler house,

(8) D.G. Set,

(9) Water Tank (o/g) 42M3,

(10) Work Shop,

(11) Cooling Towers,

(12) Toi let Block,

(13) Office (First Floor)

(14) Guard- Cabin,

(15) Hydrogen Rack Park-Area.

(B) KGN Enterprises Ltd.

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(1) Castor seeds Storage Area.

(2) Castor Oi l Mi ll .

(3) Refining & Bleaching Unit.

(4) Solvent Extraction Plant.

(5) Cold Process (Pharma).

(6) Tank Farm.

(7) Uti l i t ies; Boi ler, Heat Recovery System, R. O.

Plant, Cooling Tower, D.G Set., R. & D.,

Laboratory, etc.

The layout of unit is given in Annexure-2.

2.4 THE UNIT AT A GLANCE

Sr. No Description Details

1. Name & Address of Unit

KGN Biotech Ltd (Subsidiary of KGN Enterprises Ltd). Plot No. 313,315, 316/1, 318, 286/P, Kheda-Dholka Highway,Village- Hariyala,Tal. Mater, Dist- Kheda. Ph. No. (02694) 291042,291043, 224460.

2. Name & Address of Occupier

Mr. Babubhai Jethabhai Hirani , Managing Director, Res. : 302,Vraj Appartment, Naranpura, Ahmedabad. Mobile : 099253 86072

3. Name & Address of Regd. Office

Mumbai Office Address: 401, Shriniwas Building, 382-384, Narshi Natha Street, Katha Bazar, Mumbai – 400 009 Contact Person : Amrin Memon Mobile No. : 09619686678

4. Name & Address of Manager

Mr. Ravi Prakash Thakur, E-325,Ambica Complex, Nr. S.T.Stand,Kheda. M. 094270 04508

5. Manufacturing Process Caster Oil and Derivatives

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2.5 WORK FORCE & TIMING

The Industrial Activity is carried in shift duties; as indicated

below;

Direct Employees Contractors Security

Guards Total Sr. No.

Name of Shift

Shift Timing M F M F M F M F

1 General (G)

09:30 to 18.30 12 02 - - 04 - 15 02

2 First Shift 08:00 to 16.00 08 - 10 - 07 - 21 -

3 Second Shift

16.00 to 24.00 08 - 10 - 07 - 20 -

4 Third Shift 24.00 to 08.00 08 - 10 - 06 - 20 -

Total 36 02 30 - 24 - 76 02

2.6 Listing of hazardous chemicals

(Under Study)

Sr. No. Name of Chemicals

Sr. No. in Schedule -I of

GFR 1963(2004)

Sr. No. in Schedule -I of MSIHC Rules 1989(2000)

Sr. No. in Schedule -I of

CA (EPPR) Rules 1996

1. Hexane 306 218 217

2. Methanol 377 259 258

3. Hydrogen 214 224 223

4. HCL 313 223 222

2.7 Finished products

List of Products for KGN Enterprises Ltd

1. Castor Oi l (Different Grades)

2. De-oi led Castor Cake

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List of Products for KGN Biotech Ltd

3. Hydrogenated Caster Oi l

4. 4.Methyl Ricinoleate

5. 12 Hydroxy Stearic Acid

6. Ricinoleate Acid

7. Hydrogenated Methyl Ricinoleate

8. 6.Undecylenie Acid

2.8 Factory licence

Factory l icense No. 003436, Reg. No. 15142/189-A, for not

more than 1000 HP & 100 Workers, Valid upto : 31.12.2012.

License transferred to KGN Enterprises Ltd. on 23.04.2010 By

DISH is obtained for the unit. The license is renewed up to

31.12.2013.

2.9 Explosive licence

Petroleum Class Licensed Qty. License No. Validity

Petroleum Class-A 42 KL

Petroleum Class-B 21 KL

P/HQ/GJ/15/2090 (P12402) 31.12.2012

2.10 SAFETY & HEALTH POLICY:

The Safety & health Policy prepared by the management ,

which is appended in Annexure - 3.

2.11 STORAGE AREA

The unit i s storing, handling & processing hazardous

chemicals as per Table -1, below:

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T a b l e : 1 : MAJOR HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL S TORAGE

Sr. No

Name of Hazardous Chemicals

Max. Storage Capacity

Place Of Storage

Operating Parameter

Type Of Hazard

Control Measure Provided

1 Hydrogen Road skid G/F New Plant

5 kg/cm2 Ambient

Fire & Explosion

2 Hexane 21 KL X 2 U/G tank farm NTP Fire

3 Methanol 21 KL U/G tank farm NTP Fire

• Flame-proof area • Flame-proof

equipments are used

• Fire fighting equipment

• PPEs will be provided

• Safety shower, eye wash provided

• Earthing-bonding provided for static charge.

• Level gauge provided.

• Tanker unloading procedure.

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2.12 HANDLING OF MATERIALS

The liquid & gases materials are transferred by pipe lines.

The colour code system for pipelines is adopted &

accordingly notice is displayed. The colour code system for

pipe line is given at Annexure- 12.

The solid & powder materials are transferred manually and

mechanically.

2.13 SHORT PROCESS DESCRIPTION

2.13.1 HYDROGENATED CASTOR OIL

Refined Castor oi l is to be taken in Autoclave and It is

to be heated to 110 degree centigrade under

vacuum. On achieving temperature about 110

degree centigrade. Addition Ni catalyst is added.

After addition of Ni catalyst, Hydrogen gas is charged

to the reactor. Temperature in autoclave wi l l go up.

Maintain temperature between150 to160 degree

centigrade. On completion of reaction send sample

to laboratory to check Iodine value. I f Iodine value

comes below 3 units, cool the entire mass to 100

degree centigrade and transfer. Fi lter the batch and

send final product for f laking. Flaked material i s then

packed and stored in Godown.

The process f low diagram for hydrogenated castor oi l

production is given at Annexure – 5A.

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2.13.2 12 HYDROXY STEARIC ACID

Hydrogenated castor oi l i s taken in the reactor.

Caustic lye is then added gradually to saponify the

material. On completion of Saponification, send

sample for testing in laboratory. On approval from

laboratory, start acidification with sulphuric acid. On

completion of acidification send sample to laboratory

for approval. After approval of sample, wash the

reaction mass give washings with hot water. On

completion of washing send material for drying and

flaking. Flaked material i s then packed and same is

transferred to Godown

The process f low diagram for 12 HSA (12 Hydroxy

Stearic Acid) production is given at Annexure-5B

2.13.3 RICINOLEATE ACID

Castor oi l is taken in the reactor. Caustic lye is then

added gradually to saponify the material. On

completion of Saponification, send sample for testing

in laboratory. On approval from laboratory, start

acidification with sulphuric acid. On completion of

acidification send sample to laboratory for approval.

After approval of sample, wash the reaction mass

with hot water. On completion of washing send

material for drying and flaking. Flaked material i s then

packed and transferred to Godown.

The process f low diagram for Ricinoleate Acid

production is given at Annexure-5C

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2.13.4 METHYL RICINOLEATE

Castor Oi l i s taken in to reactor in molten condition.

Methanol is added in the reactor along with catalyst

(NaOH). Str i r for two hours. After completion of

reaction remove Glycerine layer from bottom. Excess

methanol is then recovered by heating the mass.

After recovery of methanol, Transfer the reactor mass

separator for washing & than drying. On completion

of drying, final product is f laked to recover Methyl

Ricinoleate. The process f low diagram for Methyl

Ricinoleate Acid production is given at Annexure-5D

2.13.5 HYDROGENATED METHYL RICINOLEATE

Hydrogenated Castor Oi l i s taken in to reactor in

molten condition. Methanol is added in the reactor

along with catalyst (NaOH). Str i r for two hours. After

completion of reaction remove Glycerine layer from

bottom. Excess methanol is then recovered by

heating the mass. After recovery of methanol,

Transfer the reactor mass separator for washing &

than drying. On completion of drying, final product is

f laked to recover Hydrogenated Methyl Ricinoliate

The Process f low diagram for f low chart of

Hydrogenated Methyl Ricinoliate production is given

at Annexure-5E.

2.13.6 PROCESS OF UNDECYLENIC ACID

Methyl Ricinoleate is passed through heating zone in

the temperature of around 7000 C during this process

methyl Undecylenic acid and Heptaldehyde acid are

separated, Heptaldehyde crude is disti l led and get

Heptaldehyde about 98 %.

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Methyl Undecylenic acid is split in high pressure and

high temperature autoclave with water and crude

Undecylenic acid get. Balance is disti l lated residue.

The process f low diagram for f low chart undecylenic

acid production is given at Annexure-5F. 2.14 Utility Area

1. Boi ler (Coal Fi red)

2. Cooling Tower

3. D.G. Set

4. Water storage

5. Workshop

6. Laboratory

7. E.T.P. etc.

2.15 Safety Measures PROVIDED IN

PROCESS

The following various Safety Measures are provided at the

unit;

1. All the revolving & moving parts of machineries are

properly guarded.

2. Electrical cables, Earthing, Earth Leakage circuit,

Breakers Lighting Arrestor, Shock proof safety

equipments are provided to avoid electrical hazards.

3. All the tanks of corrosive chemicals l ike H2SO4, NaCl

are marked with lable, capacity, Proper material of

construction, level indicator, dike wall with acid proof

brick lining, etc safety measures are provided.

4. The statutory notice for acid & alkali danger is

displayed in storage area.

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5. Total two safety showers - Eye washers are provided, in

case of any chemical spi l lage on body parts.

6. The vessels, Barrels, Pipeline are properly earthed and

continuity test of such earth wire is done regularly.

7. The adequate quantity of DCP, ABC type of Fi re

Fighting Equipments are avai lable.

8. Overhead and underground water tank for emergency

purpose is provided,

9. Lighting arrestor provided at the factory – Top.

10. Workmen are well trained to use Personal Protective

Equipments like Hand Gloves, Helmets, Safety Shoes,

Masks & SCBA.

11. The complete plan is having total f lame proof

electrical f i tting.

12. Raw materials are stored separate as per their

characteristics.

13. The complete plant and storage area are declared no

smoking zone for which proper sign board, notice

displayed.

14. No welding cutting operation is carried out without

proper care and safety permit.

15. All spi l lage is directed to effluent closed under ground

plant.

16. Fi rst Aid Box, necessary Medicines etc are provided at

emergency health centre.

17. On Site Emergency Plan is prepared & Mock dri l l wi l l be

carried out periodically.

18. IN order to overcome chemical hazard during day to

day working, the management has taken almost al l

precautionary measures during various stages l ike

design, selection of materials of constructions, layout

erection, atomisation, preventative, breakdown

maintenance, etc.

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19. Hazardous processes are carried out under quali fied

and experienced supervision.

20. Flameproof electrical motors, switches, l ights, wiring

etc. are provided in Methanol, Hexane and Hydrogen

storage & Usage area.

21. Earthing provided to each electrical motors, storage

vessels, equipments, storage tank, Road Tanker

(Flexible) and testing is carried out periodically.

22. Flange to f lange earthing jumper is provided in

Methanol, Hexane and Hydrogen pipeline.

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3.1 INTRODUCTION

A hazard is an inherent physical or chemical characteristic

that has the potential for causing harm. A hazard

Identi fication study is an organized effort to identify and

analyze the significance of hazardous si tuations associated

with a process or activity. Specifically, Hazard Identi fication

studies are used to pinpoint weaknesses in the design and

operation of faci li t ies that could lead to accidental

chemical releases, f i res, or explosions. These studies provide

organizations with information to help them to improve the

safety and manage the r isk of their operations.

Hazard Identi fication studies usually focus on storages,

process safety issues, l ike the acute effects of unplanned

chemical releases on plant personnel or the public. These

studies complement more traditional industrial health and

safety activities, such as protection against s lips or falls , use

of personal protective equipment, monitoring for employee

exposure to industrial chemicals, etc. Although Hazard

Identi fication studies typically use quali tative methods to

analyze potential equipment fai lures and human errors that

can lead to accidents, the studies can also highlight gaps in

the management systems of an organization's process safety

program.

CHAPTER - 3

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

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3.2 TECHNIQUES OF HAZARD

IDENTIFICATION

Different techniques are adopted for Hazard Identi fication

based on hazardous substances, quantity, type of process,

gravity of hazards etc.

The various techniques can be i l lustrated as below;

1. Personal Visi ts & Inspection of Plant by Team members

2. Safety Audits

3. On - Si te Emergency Plan

4. Check li sts

5. Feed back from plant personnel

6. Accident records

7. Safety Reports

8. Safety Manuals

9. Hazard & Operabi li ty Study (HAZOP)

10. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

11. Event Tree Analysis (ETA)

12. Preliminary hazard Analysis (PHA)

13. Fai lure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), etc.

3.3 Present RISK Assessment of the

Unit

Present Risk Assessment is carried out for considering the

storage, handling & use of Hydrogen, Hexane & Methanol.

3.4 Development of various scenarios

The chart on next page is showing all potential incident

outcomes from the release (loss of containment) of a

hazardous chemical. Further, the properties of chemical,

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conditions of release etc. al l influence, which of the logical

paths shown in the chart. Though, i t i s not detai led enough

to cover al l possible permutations of phenomena that can

immediately result from a hazardous materials release.

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3.5 Type of Hazards

3.5.1 Pool Evaporation The released flammable material which is a l iquid

stored below its normal boi ling point, wi l l collect

in a pool. The geometry of the pool wi l l be

dictated by the surroundings. I f the l iquid is

stored under pressure above i ts normal boi ling

point, then a fraction of the l iquid wi l l f lash into

vapor and the remaining portion wi l l form a pool in

the vicinity of the release point. Once sustained

combustion is achieved, l iquid f i res quickly reach

steady state burning. The heat release rate is a

function of the liquid surface area exposed to air. An

unconfined spi l l wi l l tend to have thin fuel depth

(typically less than 5 mm) which wi l l result in

slower burning rates. A confined spi l l i s l imited by the

boundaries (e.g. a dyked area) and the depth

of the resulting pool is greater than that for an

unconfined spi l l .

Vaporization scenarios

Vaporization can occur when there is a leak in

any of the following Situations:

• A liquid at atmospheric temperature and

pressure.

• A liquid under pressure and above normal boi ling

point.

• The rates of vapourisation of the liquid are

different for each of the two cases. In the case

• The l iquid after spi l lage is approximately at

equi librium and evaporates relativity slowly.

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• In the case, the l iquid f lashes off when released,

and the liquid remaining then undergoes slow

evaporation. Evaporation of a l iquid at

atmospheric temperature and pressure.

Evaporation from a pool of l iquid is essential ly a mass

transfer process that depends on the vapour pressure

of the liquid, wind velocity across the surface of the

pool and ambient weather condition.

A spi l lage of this kind consti tutes a steady

continuous source of vapour. Unless the rate of

evaporation due to the combination of vapour

pressure and wind velocity is high enough, i t is

usually assumed that the heat transfer from the

air and the ground is sufficient to provide the

latent heat of vapourisation.

Evaporation of a l iquid under pressure and

above normal boi ling point When a pressurized

l iquid is released from containment, a portion

f lashes off. This heat is obtained by cooling the

remaining liquid to i ts boi ling point thus reaching a

state of equi librium from the high in equi librium

prevalent immediately on loss of containment. In

practice, i t frequently happens that there is a

significant amount of spray formation caused by

the sudden release of pressure and the violent

boi ling of liquid. This spray vaporizes rapidly by

taking heat for vaporization from air. This spray

l iquid formation is assumed to equal to the gas

fraction generated by flash. The proportion of l iquid

airborne is thus considerably high. Following f lashing,

the residual l iquid is at i ts boi ling point. Vaporization

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then continuous by gaining heat from surrounding

as an essential ly heat or mass transfer limited

process.

This secondary stage of rate l imited vaporization

is usually relatively less important compared with the

flash off, particularly with respect to formation of

f lammable gas clouds.

3.5.2 Vapour Cloud dispersion Following a continuous leak and formation of gas

cloud, i f cloud does not ignite i t undergoes

atmospheric dispersion in accordance with the

prevalent wind direction, speed, and stabi l ity

category. The objective of carrying out analysis of

cloud dispersion is two fold. First, i t provides the

distance (from the leak) at which the concentration

of f lammable material falls below the lower

f lammabili ty l imit (LEL). Second it provides the

concentration of the toxic substance to which people

may be exposed for short time, at varying distance

(from the leak).

3.5.3 POOL FIREs A POOL FIRE, also referred to as a flame jet, occurs

when a flammable chemical is rapidly released from

an opening in a container and immediately catches

on fi re—much like the flame from a blowtorch. ALOHA

can model a POOL FIRE from the Gas Pipeline and

Tank sources. For the Tank source, ALOHA can model

gas and two-phase POOL FIREs. A two-phase POOL

FIRE occurs when a gas that has been liquefied under

pressure is released. Because the liquid evaporates as

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i t escapes, the chemical is released as an aerosol

spray—that is, a mixture of gas and tiny l iquid

droplets. ALOHA assumes the POOL FIRE release is

oriented vertically, although the wind can ti lt the

flames in the downwind direction. Thermal radiation is

the primary hazard associated with a POOL FIRE.

Other potential POOL FIRE hazards include smoke,

toxic byproducts from the fi re, and secondary fi res

and explosions in the surrounding area, although

ALOHA does not model these hazards. In some cases,

heat from the POOL FIRE may weaken the tank and

cause it to fai l completely—in which case, a BLEVE

may occur. Typically, a BLEVE poses a greater threat

than a POOL FIRE. I f the chemical inside the tank is

l ikely to BLEVE (for example, i f the tank contains a

l iquefied gas), in addition to modeling the scenario

as a POOL FIRE, you should also rerun the scenario as

a BLEVE to compare the size of the threat zones.

3.5.4 Pool fire A pool f i re occurs when a flammable liquid forms a

puddle on the ground and catches on fi re. ALOHA

only models pool f i res on land; i t does not model pool

fi res on water. Thermal radiation is the primary hazard

associated with a pool fi re. Other potential pool f i re

hazards include smoke, toxic byproducts from the

fi re, and secondary f ires and explosions in the

surrounding area (although ALOHA does not model

these hazards). In some cases, heat from the pool fi re

may weaken a leaking tank and cause it to fai l

completely—in which case, a BLEVE may occur.

Typically, a BLEVE poses a greater threat than a pool

fi re. I f the chemical inside the tank is l ikely to BLEVE

KBL-RA-2010 HELPS

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(for example, i f the tank contains a l iquefied gas),

you may want to model the situation fi rst as a pool

fi re and then rerun the scenario as a BLEVE to

compare the size of the threat zones.

3.5.5 BLEVEs BLEVE stands for Boi ling Liquid Expanding Vapour

Explosion. BLEVEs typically occur in closed storage

tanks that contain a l iquefied gas, usually a gas that

has been liquefied under pressure. A gas can be

liquefied by either cooling (refrigerating) i t to a

temperature below its boi ling point or by storing it at

a high pressure. Although both f lammable and non

flammable l iquefied gases may be involved in a

BLEVE, ALOHA only models f lammable l iquid BLEVEs.

Propane is an example of a chemical that has been

involved in many BLEVE accidents. Most propane

tanks at service stations contain l iquid propane.

These tanks are neither insulated nor refrigerated, so

the tank contents are at ambient temperature. Since

the ambient temperature is almost always

significantly above propane's boi ling point of -43.7 ºF,

the tanks are highly pressurized.

A common BLEVE scenario happens when a container

of l iquefied gas is heated by fi re, increasing the

pressure within the container unti l the tank ruptures

and fai ls. When the container fai ls , the chemical is

released in an explosion. I f the chemical is above its

boi ling point when the container fai ls, some or all of

the liquid wi l l f lash-boi l—that is, instantaneously

become a gas. If the chemical is f lammable, a

burning gas cloud called a fi reball may occur if a

KBL-RA-2010 HELPS

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significant amount of the chemical f lash-boi ls. ALOHA

assumes that any l iquid not consumed in the fi reball

wi l l form a pool f i re. ALOHA estimates the thermal

radiation hazard from a fi reball and/or a pool f i re.

Other potential BLEVE hazards include overpressure,

hazardous fragments, smoke, and toxic by products

from the fi re (although ALOHA does not model these

hazards). ALOHA focuses on the thermal radiation

because in most BLEVEs thermal radiation impacts a

greater area than the overpressure and is the more

significant threat.

3.5.6 Fireball When you model a BLEVE, ALOHA assumes that a

fi reball wi l l form. The fi reball is made up of both the

chemical that f lash-boi ls when the tank fai ls and the

chemical that sprays out as an aerosol during the

explosion. ALOHA estimates that the amount of

chemical in the fi reball is three times the amount of

chemical that f lash boi ls. Any liquid that does not

participate in the fireball wi l l form a pool f i re. When

you choose to model a BLEVE si tuation in ALOHA, the

program estimates the thermal radiation from both

fi res; i t is not necessary to run an additional Pool Fi re

scenario. The primary hazard associated with a

fi reball is thermal radiation. However, i f there are

other chemicals near the fi reball, i t can trigger

additional f i res and explosions. Explosion and

hazardous fragments. In a BLEVE, a high-pressure

explosion typically causes the container to fragment.

As the container breaks apart, i t may str ike objects in

the surrounding area and create additional debris.

The container fragments and other debris—hazardous

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fragments—are swept up in the explosion and rapidly

propelled by the explosion over a wide area. ALOHA

does not model the dispersion of hazardous

fragments or overpressure (blast force) in a BLEVE. I f a

BLEVE is l ikely to occur, f i rst responders must take the

necessary precautions to protect themselves and

others from the overpressure and hazardous

fragments.

3.5.7 Flash fires (flammable area) When a flammable vapour cloud encounters an

ignition source, the cloud can catch fi re and burn

rapidly in what is called a f lash fire. Potential hazards

associated with a f lash fire include thermal radiation,

smoke, and toxic by products from the fi re. ALOHA

wi ll predict the flammable area of the vapour cloud—

that is, the area where a flash f ire could occur at

some time after the release. The flammable area is

bounded by the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) and the

Upper Explosive Limit (UEL). These limits are

percentages that represent the concentration of the

fuel—that is, the chemical—vapour in the air. If the

chemical vapour comes into contact with an ignition

source, i t wi l l burn only i f i ts fuel-air concentration is

between the LEL and the UEL, because that portion of

the cloud is already pre-mixed to the right mixture of

fuel and air for burning to occur. I f the fuel-air

concentration is below the LEL, there is not enough

fuel in the air to sustain a fi re or an explosion—it is too

lean. I f the fuel-air concentration is above the UEL,

there is not enough oxygen to sustain a fi re or an

explosion because there is too much fuel—it is too

rich. (This i s simi lar to an engine that cannot start

KBL-RA-2010 HELPS

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because it has been f looded with gasoline.) I f a flash

fi re occurs, the part of the cloud where the fuel-air

concentration is above the UEL may continue to

slowly burn as air mixes with the cloud. You might

expect that the LEL could be used as the LOC to

determine the areas in which a fi re might occur.

However, the concentration levels estimated by

ALOHA are time-averaged concentrations. In an

actual vapor cloud, there wi l l be areas where the

concentration is higher than the average and areas

where the concentration is lower than the average.

This is called concentration patchiness. Because of

concentration patchiness, there wi l l be areas, called

pockets, where the chemical is in the flammable

range even though the average concentration has

fallen below the LEL. (ALOHA uses a shorter averaging

time when estimating the flammable areas, to help

compensate for this effect, but it cannot completely

compensate for this effect.) Some experiments have

shown that f lame pockets can occur in places where

the average concentration is above 60% of the LEL.

ALOHA uses 60% of the LEL as the default LOC for the

red threat zone. Another common threat level used

by responders is 10% of the LEL. ALOHA uses this

concentration as the default LOC for the yellow

threat zone.

3.5.8 Vapour cloud explosions When a flammable chemical is released into the

atmosphere, i t forms a vapour cloud that wi l l disperse

as i t travels downwind. If the cloud encounters an

ignition source, the parts of the cloud where the

concentration is within the flammable range

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(between the LEL and UEL) wi l l burn. The speed at

which the flame front moves through the cloud

determines whether it is a deflagration or a

detonation (see next page). In some situations, the

cloud wil l burn so fast that it creates an explosive

force (blast wave). The severity of a vapor cloud

explosion depends on the chemical, the cloud size at

the time of ignition, the type of ignition, and the

congestion level inside the cloud. The primary

hazards are overpressure and hazardous fragments.

ALOHA can help you model the overpressure hazard.

No, there is no difference. The two terms can be used

interchangeably. Some people may prefer to use the

terms Lower Flammable Limit (LFL) and Upper

Flammable Limit (UFL), particularly i f they are only

concerned with fi res.

3.5.9 Overpressure. A major hazard associated with any explosion is

overpressure. Overpressure, also called a blast wave,

refers to the sudden onset of a pressure wave after

an explosion. This pressure wave is caused by the

energy released in the initial explosion—the bigger

the initial explosion, the more damaging the pressure

wave. Pressure waves are nearly instantaneous,

travelling at the speed of sound. Although a pressure

wave may sound less dangerous than a fi re or

hazardous fragments, i t can be just as damaging and

just as deadly. The pressure wave radiates outward

like a giant burst of air, crashing into anything in its

path (generating hazardous fragments). I f the

pressure wave has enough power behind it, i t can li ft

people off the ground and throw them up against

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nearby bui ldings or trees. Additionally, blast waves

can damage bui ldings or even knock them flat—often

injuring or ki l l ing the people inside them. The sudden

change in pressure can also affect pressure-sensitive

organs like the ears and lungs. The damaging effects

of the overpressure wi l l be greatest near the source

of the explosion and lessen as you move farther from

the source.

3.6 Thermal Radiation Levels of

Concern

A Thermal Radiation Level of Concern (LOC) is a threshold

level of thermal radiation, usually the level above which a

hazard may exist. When you run a fi re scenario, ALOHA wil l

suggest three default LOC values.

The thermal radiation effects that people experience

depend upon the length of time they are exposed to a

specific thermal radiation level. Longer exposure durations,

even at a lower thermal radiation level, can produce serious

physiological effects. The threat zones displayed by ALOHA

represent thermal radiation levels; the accompanying text

indicates the effects on people who are exposed to those

thermal radiation levels but are able to seek shelter within

one minute.

ALOHA's default thermal radiation values are based on a

review of several widely accepted sources for this topic

(e.g., American Institute of Chemical Engineers 1994, Federal

Emergency Management Agency et al. 1988, and Lees

2001). I f you set your own LOC values, consider Table 1-2

(Federal Emergency Management Agency et al. 1988),

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which lists some physiological effects at specific thermal

radiation levels and durations (on bare skin):

Note: The durations that correspond to effects like pain or

second-degree burns can vary considerably, depending on

circumstances. The effects above were observed on bare

skin that was exposed directly to the thermal radiation.

Some types of clothing can serve as a protective barrier

against thermal radiation and can affect the exposure

duration. However, exposure duration should be kept to a

minimum, even at low levels of thermal radiation.

3.7 OVERPRESSURE Levels of Concern

The most basic definition of an explosion is a sudden, intense

release of energy that often produces a loud noise, high

temperatures, and flying debris, and generates a pressure

wave. There are many types of

explosions and the causes and effects wi l l vary. ALOHA

primari ly models explosions that are the result of accidents

involving industrial chemicals. Intentional explosions wi l l

generally—but not always—result in greater hazard damage.

Consider three primary hazards when dealing with an

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explosion: thermal radiation, overpressure, and hazardous

fragments (f lying debris). Al l three of these hazards are not

present in every explosion and the severity of the hazard wil l

depend on the explosion. These hazards typically last only

for a brief period directly following the explosion. However,

i t i s important to consider the potential for secondary

explosions and fi res to occur before deciding that these

hazards no longer exist.

When you use ALOHA to predict an explosion's effects,

assess the surroundings at the explosion site as you interpret

ALOHA's threat zone plot. Large objects (l ike trees and

bui ldings) in the path of the pressure wave can affect its

strength and direction of travel. For example, i f many

bui ldings surround the explosion site, expect the actual

overpressure threat zone to be somewhat smaller than

ALOHA predicts. But at the same time, more hazardous

fragments could be generated as the blast causes structural

damage to those bui ldings. Overpressure Levels of Concern.

An Overpressure Level of Concern (LOC) is a threshold level

of pressure from a blast wave, usually the pressure above

which a hazard may exist. When you run a vapor cloud

explosion scenario, ALOHA wil l suggest three default LOC

values. ALOHA uses three threshold values to create the

default threat zones:

ALOHA's default overpressure values are based on a review

of several widely accepted sources for this topic (e.g.,

American Insti tute of Chemical Engineers 1994, Federal

Emergency Management Agency et al. 1988, and Lees

2001). If you choose to set your own LOC values, consider

Table 1-3 (Lees 1980), which relates overpressure values to

the structural and physiological effects produced.

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Thermal damage The effect of thermal radiation on people is mainly a function of

intensity of radiation and exposure time. The effect is expressed in

terms of the probability of death and different degrees of burn. The

following tables give the effect of various levels of heat flux.

DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL RADIATION INTENSITY

Radiation intensity (kW/m2)

Observed effect

1.2 Solar heat at noon

1.6 Minimum level of pain threshold

2.0 PVC insulated cables damaged

4.0

Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach

cover within 20 s.

however blistering of the skin (second degree burns) is

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likely; 0% lethality

6.4

Pain threshold reached after 8 secs.

Second degree burns after 20 secs.

12.5

Minimum energy to ignite wood with a flame;

Melts plastic tubing.

1% lethality in one minute. First degree burns in 10

secs.

16.0 Severe burns after 5 secs.

25.0

Minimum energy to ignite wood at identifying

long exposure without a flame.

100% lethality in 1 minute.

Significant injury in 10 secs.

37.5

Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment,

Severe damage to plant

100% lethality in 1 minute.

50% lethality in 20 secs.

1% lethality in 10 secs.

3.8 HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH

TOXIC MATERIALS

It is necessary to specify suitable concentration of the toxic substance under

study to form the end-point for consequence calculations. The effect of

exposure to a toxic substance depends upon the duration of exposure and

the concentration of the toxic substance. Short-term exposures to high

concentration give Acute Effects while long term exposures to low

concentrations result in Chronic Effects. Only Acute Effects are considered

under hazard analysis, since they are likely credible scenarios. These

effects are:

a) Irritation (respiratory system skin, eyes)

b) Narcosis (nervous system)

c) Asphyxiation (oxygen deficiency)

d) System damage (blood organs)

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The considerations for specifying the end-points for the hazardous

material involved in the failure scenario are described in the following

paragraphs. The Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) are

Toxic Levels of Concern (LOCs) that you can use in ALOHA to predict the

area where a toxic gas concentration might be high enough to harm people.

The ERPGs were developed by the ERPG committee of the American

Industrial Hygiene Association. The ERPGs were developed as planning

guidelines, to anticipate human adverse health effects caused by exposure to

toxic chemicals. The ERPGs are three-tiered guidelines with one common

denominator: a 1-hour contact duration. Each guideline identifies the

substance, its chemical and structural properties, animal toxicology data,

human experience, existing exposure guidelines, the rationale behind the

selected value, and a list of references. For toxic releases, there are several

hazard classification systems in use. Some chemicals have not been

classified in every system. ALOHA determines its default toxic LOC values

based on the following hierarchy of well-known LOCs:

1. ERPG

2. IDLH

Following are some of the common terms used to express toxicity of

materials:

• ERPG 1: The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all

individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing other than

mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly defined,

objectionable odor.


individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or

developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms which

could impair an individual's ability to take protective action.

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individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or

developing life-threatening health effects.

• TLV: Threshold Limit Value – is the permitted level of exposure for a given

period on a weighted average basis (usually 8 hrs. for 5 days in a week).

• STEL: it is permitted Short Time Exposure Limit usually for a 15-minute exposure.

• IDLH: Immediately Dangerous To Life & Health

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4.1 CONSEQUENCE MODELLING

Consequence analysis and calculations are performed by

computer software using various models validated

over a number of applications. Consequence modelling

is carried out by AHOLA.

ALOHA was developed jointly by the National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA).

4.2 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE SCENAIRO

This QRA study is carried out for Storage and Unloading

Tanker of Styrene Monomer area Only. Following maximum

credible scaenairo are considered for this QRA study ;

1. Jet Fi re scenario due to Catastrophic Fai lure of

Hydrogen Gas Skid outlet l ine rupture

2. Un Confined Pool Fi re Scenario due to hole or pipeline

fai lure for Hexane Storage Tank

3. Un Confined Pool Fi re Scenario due to hole or pipeline

fai lure for Methanol Storage Tank

4. Un-confined Pool Fire Scenario due to catastrophic

fai lure of Hexane Tanker

CHAPTER - 4

CONSEQUENCES MODELLING

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5. Un-confined Pool Fire Scenario due to catastrophic

fai lure of Methanol Tanker

Radiation Heat due to above scenarios are calculated and

summary of the same is tabulated in next page ;

4.3 QRA Summary

4.3.1 Radiation Heat Distance due to BLELVE

Worst Case Scenario (WCS): 100 % Catastrophic

rupture of Truck Tanker ;

Thermal Radiation Distance in meter at

Radiation Intensity (Kw/m2) Sr. No. Chemical Capacity Weather

Condition

Fire Ball Diameter

and Duration 37.5 12.5 4

4.4.1 Hexane 20 KL (Truck

Tanker) 2/F, 2/D,

5/D 55 Mtr. (5 Sec.) 71 138 247

4.4.2 Methanol 20 KL (Truck

Tanker) 2/F, 2/D,

5/D 49 Mtr. (7 Sec.) 68 133 237

Legends : • 37.5 kW/m2 = 100% lethality in 1 minute

• 12.5 kW/m2 = 1% lethality in one minute. First degree burns in 10 secs.

• 4.0 kW/m2 = Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover

within 20 s.

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4.3.2 Vapour cloud Explosion – Overpressure

Worst Case Scenario (WCS): 100 % Catastrophic

rupture of Hydrogen Skid outlet pipeline ;

Overpressure Level in psi Sr. No. Chemical Capacity Weather Condition

8 3.5 1

4.4.3 Hydrogen 1500 m3 Rack 2/F Less than

10 10 16

Legends : • 1.0 psi = shatters glass

• 3.5 psi = serious injury likely

• 8.0 psi = destruction of buildings

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4.3.3 Radiation Heat Distance due to Pool Fire

Worst Case Scenario (WCS): Leakage from Hole of

Storage tank ;

Thermal Radiation Distance in meter at

Radiation Intensity (Kw/m2) Sr. No. Chemical Capacity

of Tank Weather

Condition 10 5 2

2/F Less than 10 15 25

2/D Less than 10 15 26 4.4.4 Hexane

20 KL (Truck

Tanker)

5/D 16 20 28

2/F Less than 10 14 20

2/D 10 14 20 4.4.5 Methanol 20 KL (Truck

Tanker)

5/D 12 14 18

Legends : • 10 kW/m2 = Potentially lethal within 60 sec

• 5.0 kW/m2 = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec

• 2.0 kW/m2 = Pain within 60 sec

Risk Assessment For M/s. KGN Biotech Limited

Prepared By HELPS October 2010

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Consequence Analysis Work Sheet No.Weather Condition : 2/F, 2/D, 5/D Scenario

Hexane Truck Tanker (20 KL) BLEVE

4.4.1 Catastrophic Failure of Hexane Truck Tanker (20 KL)


Prepared By HELPS October 2010

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Consequence Analysis Work Sheet No.Weather Condition : 2/F, 2/D, 5/D Scenario

Hexane Truck Tanker (20 KL) BLEVE

4.4.1 Scenario Overlapping on Map

(Catastrophic Failure of Hexane Truck Tanker (20 KL))

Continue…


Prepared By HELPS October 2010 Consequence Analysis Work Sheet No.

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Weather Condition : 2/F, 2/D, 5/D Scenario Hexane Truck Tanker (20 KL) BLEVE

4.4.1 Scenario Overlapping on Map

(Catastrophic Failure of Hexane Truck Tanker (20 KL))

Continue…

The worst case considered is Catastrophic Rupture. By

comparing all the Pasqui l l stabi li ty i .e. weather category

(2/F, 2/D, 5/D) for all distances after explosion, i t can be

concluded that for release of material from the Storage

Tank due to Catastrophic Rupture, can lead to the BLEVE

Scenario.

100 % lethali ty lethal within 60 seconds can be felt when

any person comes under 37.5 Kw/m2 and wi l l cover the

distance of 71m, Whi le the chances of 1 % lethality within

60 seconds can be felt up to a distance of 138m with

12.5 Kw/m2 radiation intensity. The chances of cause pain

to personnel i f unable to reach cover within 20 seconds

under the 4 Kw/m2 effect zone. And it wil l be cover up the

distance of 247m. The radiation intensity generated during

BLEVE is outside the boundary of Unit.

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Weather Condition : 2/F, 2/D, 5/D Scenario

Failure of Methanol Truck Tanker(20 KL) BLEVE

4.4.2 Catastrophic Failure of Methanol Truck Tanker(20 KL)

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Scenario Overlapping on Map

(Catastrophic Failure of Methanol Truck Tanker(20 KL))

Continue…

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Continue…

The worst case considered is Catastrophic Rupture. By


(2/F, 2/D, 5/D) for all distances after explosion, i t can be

concluded that for release of material from the Storage

Tank due to Catastrophic Rupture, can lead to the BLEVE

Scenario.

100 % lethali ty lethal within 60 seconds can be felt when

any person comes under 37.5 Kw/m2 and wi l l cover the

distance of 68m, Whi le the chances of 1 % lethality within

60 seconds can be felt up to a distance of 133m with

12.5 Kw/m2 radiation intensity. The chances of cause pain

to personnel i f unable to reach cover within 20 seconds

under the 4 Kw/m2 effect zone. And it wil l be cover up the

distance of 237m. The radiation intensity generated during

BLEVE is outside the boundary of Unit.

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Weather Condition : 2/F Scenario

Failure of Hydrogen Skid outlet pipe Vapour Cloud Explosion

4.4.3 Catastrophic Failure of Hydrogen Skid Outlet Pipe

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(Catastrophic Failure of Hydrogen Skid outlet pipe)

Continue…

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4.4.3 Catastrophic Failure of Hydrogen Skid outlet Pipe

Continue…

The worst case considered is Catastrophic Rupture of outlet

pipe of Hydrogen skid. By comparing all the Pasqui l l stabi li ty

i .e. weather category (2/F, 2/D, 5/D) for all distances after

explosion, i t can be concluded that for release of material

from the Storage Tank due to Catastrophic Rupture, can

lead to the BLEVE Scenario.

Destruction of bui lding can be took place when

overpressure level of 8.0 psi reached and this wi l l cover the

distance less than 10 meter, Whi le the chances of serious

injury l ikely can be took place up to a distance of

10m with 3.5 psi overpressure level. The chances shatter

glass occurs under the 1 psi overpressure. And it wi l l be

cover up the distance of 16m.

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Failure of Hexane Truck Tanker (20 KL) POOL FIRE

4.4.4 Catastrophic Failure of Hexane Truck Tanker (20 KL)

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(POOL FIRE in Hexane Truck Tanker (20 KL))

Continue…

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Weather Condition : 2/D Scenario


4.4.4 Catastrophic Failure of Hexane Truck Tanker(20 KL)

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(POOL FIRE in Styrene Monomer)

Continue…

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4.4.4 Catastrophic Failure of Hexane Truck Tanker(20 KL)

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(POOL FIRE in Hexane Truck Tanker(20 KL))

Continue…

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4.4.4 POOL FIRE in Hexane Truck Tanker(20 KL)

Continue…

As a worst case scenario, it is considered that due to fai lure

of Pipeline or hole on Storage tank, chemical is spi l l into

unconfined pool area around truck and it catch the fi re. By


(2/F, 2/D, 5/D) for radiation heat due to POOL FIRE scenario

has been calculated and given below.

Potentially lethal within 60 sec can be felt when any

person comes under radiation heat of 10 Kw/m2 and wi l l

cover the distance of less than 10m, less than 10m and 16

for weather condition 2F, 2D & 5D respectively.

Whi le the chances of 2nd degree burns within 60 sec can

be felt under radiation heat level of 5 Kw/m2 for distance

of 15m , 15m and 20m for weather condition 2F, 2D & 5D

respectively.

The chance of causing Pain within 60 sec comes under the

2 Kw/m2 effect zone. And it wi l l be cover up the distance of

25m, 26m & 28m for weather condition 2F, 2D & 5D

respectively. The radiation intensity generated during

POOL FIRE is within the boundary of Unit.

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Failure of Methanol Truck Tanker (20 KL) POOL FIRE

4.4.5 Catastrophic Failure of Methanol Truck Tanker (20 KL)

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(POOL FIRE in Methanol Truck Tanker (20 KL))

Continue…

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KBL-RA-2010 HELPS

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(POOL FIRE in Methanol Truck Tanker)

Continue…

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KBL-RA-2010 HELPS

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(POOL FIRE in Methanol Truck Tanker(20 KL))

Continue…

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4.4.5 POOL FIRE in Methanol Truck Tanker(20 KL)

Continue…

As a worst case scenario, it is considered that due to fai lure

of Pipeline or hole on Storage tank, chemical is spi l l into

unconfined pool area around truck and it catch the fi re. By


(2/F, 2/D, 5/D) for radiation heat due to POOL FIRE scenario

has been calculated and given below.

Potentially lethal within 60 sec can be felt when any

person comes under radiation heat of 10 Kw/m2 and wi l l

cover the distance of less than 10m, 10m and 12 for

weather condition 2F, 2D & 5D respectively.

Whi le the chances of 2nd degree burns within 60 sec can

be felt under radiation heat level of 5 Kw/m2 for distance

of 14m , 14m and 14m for weather condition 2F, 2D & 5D

respectively.

The chance of causing Pain within 60 sec comes under the

2 Kw/m2 effect zone. And it wi l l be cover up the distance of

20m, 20m & 18m for weather condition 2F, 2D & 5D

respectively. The radiation intensity generated during

POOL FIRE is within the boundary of Unit.

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5.1 INTRODUCTION

Accidents begin with an incident, which usually results in

the loss of containment of material from the process. The

material has hazardous properties, which might include

toxic properties and energy content. Typical incidents

might include the rupture or break of a pipeline, a hole in

a tank or pipe, run away reaction, f i re external to the

vessel etc. Gas dispersion describes how the material is

transported downwind and dispersed to source

concentration level. For f lammable releases, fi re &

explosion describes the information on the release into

energy hazard potentials such as thermal radiation &

explosion overpressures.

Additional refinement shall be to mitigate such as water

sprays, foam systems, sheltering or evacuation, which tend

to reduce the magnitude of potential effects in real

incidents.

Accidental release of f lammable or toxic vapours can

result in severe consequences. Delayed ignition of

f lammable vapours can result in blast over pressures

covering large areas. This may lead to extensive loss of fi re

CHAPTER - 5

RISK LEVEL

KBL-RA-2010 HELPS

72

and property. Toxic clouds may cover yet a larger distance

due to the lower threshold values in relation to those in

case of explosive clouds (the lower explosive limits). In

contrast, f i res have localized consequences. Fires can be

put out or contained in most cases; there are few

mitigating actions one can take once a vapour cloud gets

released. Major accident hazards arise, therefore,

consequent upon the release of f lammable or toxic

vapours or BLEVE in case of pressurized liquefied gases.

5.2 HUMAN ELEMENTS

Risk Assessment should not focus exclusively on random

fai lure of hardware, but should also consider all types of

operator error that can result in a major accident or a

dangerous si tuation. The operator should describe the role,

operatives play in controlling hazard and show that their

potential errors are identi fied. He should also describe

measures that have been taken to reduce their probabi li ty

and how they are accounted for in the major accident

analysis. The safety report should demonstrate that his

systems and procedures are fi t for purpose and incorporate

adequate attention to human factors. This may be

described in the management section dealing with staff

training, competence assessment, and the way incidents

and near misses are dealt with.

Accounting for human error in risk assessment is not straight

forward because some human reliabi li ty l i terature data are

not universally applicable. Assessors should primari ly be

concerned with checking that human reliabi li ty is included

in the analysis rather than with the accuracy of the data

used.

KBL-RA-2010 HELPS

73

Fai lure to successful ly carry out an operation that is

part of normal duties.

tank fi l l ing and discharging errors made by the tanker

driver.

Erroneously carrying out an operation that is not part

of normal duties.

Fai lure to respond correctly to an alarm situation

(fai lure to control or making a situation worst).

Deliberate of inadvertent degradation of the safety of

a plant (e.g. switch an alarm off, or bypass a safety

system).

Deliberate rule floating (e.g. smoking in a non-smoking

area).

Fai lure to detect fai led components during testing.

Introduction of fai lures by damaging equipment or

leaving equipment misaligned during testing or

maintenance.

5.3 PRELIMINARY THREAT

IDENTIFICATION

Threat identi fication is the stage where equipment and

operations that have the potential to do harm are

identi fied. Threats can be to damage of equipment storing

or processing hazardous substances or operations that

have the potential to lead to a release of hazardous

material and possible ignition resulting in fi re, or explosion.

In order to calculate the effects of incidents, computer

based models are used when the likelihood and

consequence of incidents are evaluated, they can be

combined to produce a numerical recantation of the r isk.

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74

The level of r isk can be represented in a number of ways.

Two of the most useful ways in this context are individual

and societal r i sk.

5.3.1 Individual Risk :

Individual r isk is the risk of a nominated adverse

effect, usually fatali ty, i f an individual remained fixed

at a location for a set time, usually a year, adjacent

to an industrial hazard. Individual r isk contours are

derived by calculating at a specific location, the

impacts resulting from each fai lure mode

identif ication and summing the risk value associated

with each fai lure mode.

Individual r i sk criteria can be presented as a diagram,

known as the “Dagger Diagram”, to faci li tate

understanding. Figure 1 given next page shows the

VWA interim criteria for individual r isks of fatali ty, and

some risks experienced in day to day li fe.

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KBL-RA-2010 HELPS

76

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77

5.3.2 Interpretation of Risk to Public :

BLEVE Scenario of catastrophic fai lure of Methanol

and Hexane truck tanker can effect outside boundary

of Factory area. Some observations are as under :

(1) The chances of cause pain to personnel i f

unable to reach cover within 20 seconds under

the 4 Kw/m2 effect zone. And it wil l be cover up

the distance of 237m and 247m for Methanol

and Hexane repectively.

5.4 OFF - SITE ACCIDENT

INITIATORS

The method of measuring the frequency of accidents

caused by Off-Site Events should be fi t for purpose. In other

words i t should be proportionate to the level of r isk. Thus, i f

a si te is located far away from any airport or f l ight path

(mi li tary or civi l), then it i s acceptable for the safety report

to refer to the background crash rate for the UK. On the

other hand, i f the site is located close to a busy airport

then a much more detai led assessment of aircraft impact

should be carried out.

5.4.1 Table 1

Initiator Method of Model

Aircraft impact AEA methodology

Seismic event geological survey data

Lightning strike Electricity council data and methodology

Severe environmental conditions:- Abnormal rainfall Abnormal snow fall Very low temperature High temperature Gale force winds

Historical data plus reasoned argument

Flooding Site and met office data plus reasoned argument

Subsidence Historical data plus reasoned argument

Land slip Historical data plus reasoned argument

Fire or explosion at adjoining plant Site environs information plus relevant data where relevant

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78

Missile from Off-Site Site environs information plus relevant data

Hazardous substance pipeline rupture Site environs information plus relevant data

Collapse of high voltage cable Site environs information plus relevant data

Impact by out of control road or rail vehicle Site environs information plus relevant data

5.4.2 Possible Major Accident Scenario

Plant Item Failure Accident Scenarios

Storage or Transport Vessel Catastrophic failure

Flammable/ Toxic gas cloud

Hole in vessel wall

Flammable/Toxic gas cloud

Filling line Rupture

Flammable / Toxic gas cloud

Puncture


Small hole


Flange leak

Export line Rupture


Puncture


Small hole


Flange leak

Process Equipment, Compressors, liquefied, vaporisers

Pumps

Disintegration

Toxic gas cloud

Leak

Toxic gas cloud

Loss of control


Explosion

Abatement Equipment Disintegration

Toxic gas cloud

Leak

Toxic gas cloud

Loss of control


Overload


5.4.3 Probable Accident Initiators

Off-site Events Operator Error Abnormal Load Arson or Sabotage

Inadequate Management

Loss of Service

Aircraft impact system opened impact by vehicle fire corrosion Loss of electricity.

Seismic event filled when not closed

impact by missile explosion erosion loss of cooling water.

Subsidence system overfilled impact by dropped load

valve opened vibration failure of process controls.

loss of nitrogen

Extreme environmental conditions abnormal rain fall abnormal snow fall very low temperature high temperature flooding gale force winds lightening strike

containment degraded.

internal temperature or pressure outside design limit.

safety system degraded.

cyclic load .

loss of compressed air

Vehicle/train impact excess load external temp/ pressure outside design limit.

contamination inadequate materials or specification.

loss of steam

Land slip failure to respond correctly to an

pressurisation. control system degraded.

chemical attack

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79

alarm.

Explosion incorrect valve action.

under pressure containment system degraded.

hidden defect in containment system.

Fire Contamination failure to detect dangerous situation.

Missile Loss of control

failure of process controls.

5.4.4 Typical Failure Frequencies

Event Probability/Frequency

Rupture of pipe on a pressurised storage system 1 x 10-5/yr

Lightning strike 1 x 10-7/yr

Severe earthquake capable of rupturing pipe work 1 x 10-6/yr - 1 x 10-7/yr

Sudden catastrophic failure of vessels 3 x 10-6/yr

Failure of an excess flow control valve on demand 1.3 x 10-2/yr

Failure of an automatic shutoff valve to close 1 x 10-2/demand

Failure of a level sensor (sticking) 50 per 10-6 hrs

Failure of a flow sensor 40 per 10-6 hrs

5.4.5 Typical Failure Frequencies

Event Probability/Frequency

Rupture of pipe on a pressurised storage system 1 x 10-5/yr

Lightning strike 1 x 10-7/yr

Severe earthquake capable of rupturing pipe work 1 x 10-6/yr - 1 x 10-7/yr

Sudden catastrophic failure of vessels 3 x 10-6/yr

Failure of an excess flow control valve on demand 1.3 x 10-2/yr

Failure of an automatic shutoff valve to close 1 x 10-2/demand

Failure of a level sensor (sticking) 50 per 10-6 hrs

Failure of a flow sensor 40 per 10-6 hrs

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5.5 RISK MATRIX

Risk assessment should be seen as a continual process.

Thus, the adequacy of control measures should be subject

to continual review and revised if necessary. Simi larly, i f

conditions change to the extent that hazards and risks are

significantly affected then risk assessments should also be

reviewed.

Risk level for Following maximum credible scenario are

calculated;

Sr. No. Failure Mode Scenario Probability Consequence Risk

BLEVE ER C Med 1

Failure of Styrene Monomer Truck

Tanker Pool Fire O L Low

BLEVE ER CR Med 2

Failure of Styrene Monomer Truck

Tanker Pool Fire O L Low

3. Failure of Hydrogen Skid Outlet pipeline VCE O L Low

Probabil i ty • F = Frequent • RP = Reasonably probably • O = Occasional • ER = Extremely Remote • I = Impossible

Consequence• C =Catastrophic • CR =Crit ical • M = Marginal • N = Negl ig ible

Risk Rtn. = Routine Low = Low risk Mod.= Moderate risk

High = High risk

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Probability Classification

Frequent (>1.0) : Likely to occur many times during the life cycle of the system

(test/activity/operation).

Reasonably probably (0.1-1.0) : Likely to occur some time during the life cycle of the system

Occasional (0.01-0.1) : Likely to occur some time during the life cycle of the system.

Remote (10-4 -10-2 ) : Not likely to occur in the life cycle of the system, but possible.

Extremely remote (10-6-10-4 ) : Probability of occurrence cannot be distinguished from zero

Impossible (<10-6 ) : Physically impossible to occur.

Hazard Consequence Classification

Catastrophic : May cause death or system loss

Critical : May cause severe injury or occupational illness or minor system damage.

Marginal : May cause minor injury, occupation illness, or system damage.

Negligible : Will not result in injury, occupational illness, or system damage.

Risk Category

Routine: : Risk no different from those experienced by any individual in his or her daily life

Low risk : Events may have impact within a facility but little or no impact to adjacent facilities, public health, or the environment.

Moderate risk: : Events have potential impacts within the facility but at most only minor impacts off site.

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82

High risk : Events have the potential for on-site and off-site impacts to large numbers of persons or major impacts to the environment.

5.6 NOISE POLLUTION

5.6.1 On-Site :

The Process Area, Uti l i ty & Anci l lary Area, are not

probable noise created areas. However, air

compressor, D. G. Set may create high noise level.

5.6.2 Off-Site :

(A) Residential Areas

The vi l lages are is located about 2-5 km away

from the si te. There is no high noise created in the

vi l lage which may create noise pollution.

(B) Industrial Noise

The unit is not surrounded by other unit , so

Industrial Noise from surrounding is not possible.

5.7 HISTORY OF PAST ACCIDENTS

Knowledge and Safety measures are tested when any

incident / happening takes place which teaches us a

lessons and we are compelled to acquire the knowledge of

the causes of the accidents and of preventative measures

to prevent its reoccurrences.

The management is maintaining records in respect of

recorded reportable accident detai ls. Past Accident

History is given in Annexure-15.

5.8 LIMITATIONS & UNCERTAINTY

The hazard identification procedures are coupled with

good engineering judgement, regulations, and guidelines

KBL-RA-2010 HELPS

83

together constitute a better strategy to ensuring safety.

The accuracy and usefulness of r isk assessment are

critically dependent on the quali ty of the model

assumptions and that of the relevant database. In case of

accident frequency assessment, the sources of errors are

also varied. In many instances only very general data are

avai lable on equipment fai lure, for which statistical

accuracy is often poor. In other cases, these may be very

li tt le data avai lable at al l . In India, the databases on

equipment fai lure and human error are not readily

avai lable. There is indeed a strong need to bui ld up a

national reliabi li ty database through co-operative effects

between industry and instrument / equipment

manufactures.

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84

6.1 INTRODUCTION


si tuated at Plot No. 315,316/1,318,286/P, Kheda-Dholka

Highway, Vi l lage- Hariyala, Taluka Matar : Dist. Kheda Pin-


of Castor Oi l. KGN Enterprises Ltd is engaged in the

product of Castor Oi l from Castor -Seeds

The manufacturing process was started by the Unit in 1997.

The Unit i s registered under the Factories Act – 1948 and

holding the licence. Further, the Unit has obtained the

license to store, bulk quantities of Hexane from Petroleum

& Explosive Safety Organisation (PESO). Further, the Unit

has obtained the NOC from G.P.C.B.

6.2 ORGANOGRAM

The management has given proper status & importance to

Health, Safety & Environment Area.

6.3 HEALTH & SAFETY POLICY

The management has declared the Health & Safety policy

& displayed at certain places & circulated to the workers.

CHAPTER - 6

SUGESSTION & RECOMMENDATION

KBL-RA-2010 HELPS

85

6.4 SAFETY MANUALS

The management wi l l prepare the Safety Manual, Safety

Booklet, etc. for enhance safety culture in company.

6.5 ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN

The management has developed the On-Site Emergency

Plan. This plan shall be updated for adding the detai ls on

new products.

6.6 M.S.D.S.

The M.S.D.S. of Hazardous Chemicals is prepared &

avai lable with the management.

6.7 INSTRUCTION BOARDS

The various instruction Boards, Cautionary Notices, etc. are

displayed at different locations.

6.8 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH CENTRE

Medical checks up of all the employees wi l l be carried out

periodically and health records wi l l be maintained in

prescribed format.

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86

6.9 INSPECTION & MAINTENANCE

The frequency for various activities in the plant, process &

Storage are mainlined with attentively by the

management ,as per fol lowing:

Sr. No.

Frequency Inspection & Maintenance Activi ty

1 Daily

Inspect ion

Crit ical equipments, controls, indicators, levels, switches, sett ings, drain valves, leakages, storage tanks

2 Weekly Inspection & maintenance of Rotary Equipments.

3 Monthly Al l Interlocks

4 Quarterly Al l Indicators Alarms, tr ips & Control

5 Half Yearly Ult rasonic Thickness Gauge, Earthing check

6 Annual Al l valves, safety valves, Paint ing of vessels Pipe l ines.

6.10 ACCIDENT RECORD KEEPING

Accident investigation format is avai lable. Records of

Investigated accident are maintained in this format.

Reporting of accidents is maintained in prescribed Form No

29.

6.11 TEST, EXAMINATION &

CERTIFICATION

Test & Examination of Lifting Tackles, Li ft, Hoist, Pressure

Vessels etc. are carried out & records in prescribed forms

are maintained.

6.12 HOUSE KEEPING

House keeping and cleanliness is going together. I t gives

the impression of the status of the organization. It is

observed that al l equipments, accessories, tanks, vessel,

KBL-RA-2010 HELPS

87

etc. are painted with good colour; identif ication marking,

name of content, capacity etc. are maintained. Thus,

good house keeping wi l l save time & add convenience in

the production. The Japanese concept of “5-S” (Five-Ass) is

recommended for maintaining high standard on house

keeping.

6.13 Colour Code System for Pipe

lines

Colour code system for pipe lines is adopted as per IS

Colour Code System.

6.14 SAFETY TRAINING PROGRAMME

Safety training programmes shall be organised for all level

of workers, supervisors including contract workers.

6.15 SAFETY MEASURES PROVIDED

1. All the revolving & moving parts of machineries are

properly guarded.

2. Electrical cables, Earthing, Earth Leakage circuit,

Breakers Lighting Arrestor, Shock proof safety

equipments are provided to avoid electrical hazards.

3. All the tanks of corrosive chemicals l ike H2SO4, NaCl

are marked with lable, capacity, Proper material of

construction, level indicator, dike wall with acid proof

brick lining, etc safety measures are provided.

4. The statutory notice for acid & alkali danger is

displayed in storage area.

5. Total two safety showers - Eye washers are provided,

in case of any chemical spi l lage on body parts.

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88

6. The vessels, Barrels, Pipeline are properly earthed and

continuity test of such earth wire is done regularly.

7. The adequate quantity of DCP, ABC type of Fire

Fighting Equipments are avai lable.

8. Overhead and underground water tank for

emergency purpose is provided,

9. Lighting arrestor provided at the factory – Top.

10. Workmen are well trained to use Personal Protective

Equipments l ike Hand Gloves, Helmets, Safety Shoes,

Masks & SCBA.

11. The complete plan is having total f lame proof

electrical f i tting.

12. Raw materials are stored separate as per their

characteristics.

13. The complete plant and storage area are declared

no smoking zone for which proper sign board, notice

displayed.

14. No welding cutting operation is carried out without

proper care and safety permit.

15. All spi l lage is directed to effluent closed under

ground plant.

16. Fi rst Aid Box, necessary Medicines etc are provided at

emergency health centre.

17. On Site Emergency Plan is prepared & Mock dri l l wi l l

be carried out periodically.

18. IN order to overcome chemical hazard during day to

day working, the management has taken almost al l

precautionary measures during various stages l ike

design, selection of materials of constructions, layout

erection, atomisation, preventative, breakdown

maintenance, etc.

19. Hazardous processes are carried out under quali f ied

and experienced supervision.

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89

20. Flameproof electrical motors, switches, l ights, wiring

etc. are provided in Methanol, Hexane and Hydrogen

storage & Usage area.

21. Earthing provided to each electrical motors, storage

vessels, equipments, storage tank, Road Tanker

(Flexible) and testing is carried out periodically.

22. Flange to f lange earthing jumper is provided in

Methanol, Hexane and Hydrogen pipeline.

23. The company shall disclose the information to the general public as required under Act 68-K/L/P/Q & Rules 41- B/C/H of amended Factories Act, 1948 & 1963.

6.16 RECOMMONDATION &

SUGGESTION

1. Non sparking tools should be used in f lammable zone.

2. Prevent the creation of f lammable or explosive

concentrations of vapour in air and avoid vapour

concentration higher than the Occupational

exposure limits.

3. Do not pressurize, cut, weld, braze, solder, dri l l ,

grind or expose containers to heat or sources of

ignition.

4. To avoid ignition of vapours by static electricity

discharge, al l metal parts of the equipment must be

grounded, and periodically i t shall be checked.

5. Plant should meet provisions of the Manufacture,

storage & Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1986

& the factories Act, 1948.

6. Mock Dri l ls on On Site Emergency shall be conducted

periodically.

7. Emergency handling faci li t ies shall be maintained in

working condition at all t ime.

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90

8. Safe operating procedure shall be prepared for

hazardous process and material handling process.

9. Safety devices and control instruments to be

calibrated once in a year.

10. Proper colour work as per IS 2379 to plant pipeline

and tank, equipments to be done once in a six month

to protect from corrosion.

11. Preventive maintenance schedule shall be prepared

for all equipments.

12. Work Permit System shall be introduced for hazardous

work in the plant.

13. Hydrogen gas leakage detector shall be provided at

storage and usage area.

14. Unloading of Methanol and Hexane shall be carried

out under str ict supervision only.

15. During unloading of Methanol and Hexane , fi re

extinguishers shall be kept avai lable near by.

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Annexure 91

RISK ASSESSMENT

ANNEXURE SECTION



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Annexure 92

RISK ASSESSMENT


Plot No. 313-318, 321, 286/P, Kheda-Dholka Highway, Village Hariyala Tal. Matar, Dist. Kheda.

ANNEXURE INDEX

Annexure No.

Subject Page No.

1 Site Plan 85

2 Layout Plan 86

3 Safety, Health & Environment Policy 87

4 Organisation Structure 88

5A TO 5F Process Flow Diagram 89-94

6 Storage of Hazardous Chemicals 95

7 Salient Properties of Selected Hazardous Chemical 96

8 Risk in Utility 97-98

9 Fire Fighting Equipment 99

10 List of Personal Protective Equipments 100

11 List of Safety Equipments 101

12 Adopted Colour Code System for pipelines 102

13 List of Trained Persons in Fire Fighting 103

14 List of First Aid Trained Person 104

15 Past Accident History 105

16 Hazard Ranking Of Selected Chemicals 106-109

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Annexure 93

Annexure – 1

S I T E P LAN

KGN BIOTECH LTD

(Subsidiary of KGN ENTERPRISES LTD.) Plot No. 313-318, 321, 286/P, Kheda-Dholka Highway, Village Hariyala Tal. Matar, Dist. Kheda

KGN

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Annexure 94

Annexure – 2

LAYOUT P LAN

Safe Assembly point

Safe Assembly point



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Annexure 95

Annexure – 3

KGN BIOTECH LTD (SUBSIDIARY OF KGN ENTERPRISES LTD.)

KBL-RA-2010 HELPS

Annexure 96

Annexure – 4 KGN BIOTECH LTD

(SUBSIDIARY OF KGN ENTERPRISES LTD.)

ORGAN I SA T ION S TRUCTURE

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Annexure 97

Annexure – 5A KGN BIOTECH LTD


PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR HYDROGENATED CASTOR OIL

Castor Oil Hydrogen + Ni

CatalystHCO

Filtration

Storage Tank

Flaker

Final Product - HCO

Godown

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Annexure 98

Annexure – 5B KGN BIOTECH LTD


PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR 12 HSA (12 HYDROXY STEARIC ACID)

Hydrogenated Castor Oil

Saponification with Caustic

Acidification with sulphuric Acid

12 Hydroxy Stearic Acid

Washing & Drying

Flaking

12 HSA Final Products

Godown for Storage & Packing

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Annexure 99

Annexure – 5C KGN BIOTECH LTD


PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR FLOW CHART OF RICINOLEATE ACID



Ricinoleate Acid

Washing & Drying

Flaking

R A Final Products


Castor Oil

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Annexure 100

Annexure – 5D KGN BIOTECH LTD


PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR FLOW CHART OF METHYL RICINOLIATE

ACID

Castor Oil

Methanol + Catalyst

Methyl Ricinoliate

Washing & Drying

Methyl Recinoliate

Flacking

Silo + Packing

Methyl Ricinoliate (Final Product)

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Annexure 101

Annexure – 5E KGN BIOTECH LTD


PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR FLOW CHART OF HYDROGENATED

METHYL RICINOLIATE


Methanol + catalyst

HMR

Washing & Drying

Hydrogenated Methyl

Flacking

Silo + Packing

Hydrogenated Methyl Recinoliate

(Final Product)

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Annexure 102

Annexure – 5F


PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR FLOW CHART UNDECYLENIC ACID

Heptaldehyde crude Methyl Undecylenic Acid

Distillation Splitting

Heptaldehyde Undecylenic acid crude

Distillation

Undecylenic Acid

MR

Cracking

103 HELPS



S TORAGE OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS

Sr. No Name of Hazardous Chemicals Max. Storage

Capacity Place Of Storage Operating Parameter

Type Of Hazard

Control Measure Provided

1 Hydrogen Road skid G/F New Plant 5 kg/cm2 Ambient

Fire & Explosion

2 Hexane 21 KL X 2 Tank farm NTP Fire

3 Methanol 21 KL X 2 Tank farm NTP Fire

• Flame-proof area • Flame-proof equipments are

used • Proper ventilation • Fire fighting equipment • PPEs will be provided • Earthing-bonding provided for

static charge. • Level gauge provided. • Tanker unloading procedure.

104 HELPS

Annexure – 7

KGN BIOTECH LTD


SA L I EN T PROPERT I E S OF CERTA IN HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS

Explosive limit

LEL UEL Name of Chemicals State Colour Odour Sp.

Gravity Vapour Density

Melting Point

0C

Boiling Point

0C

Flash Point

0C % %

TLV ppm

Solubility in Water

Hazardous Combustion

Products

Methanol Liquid Colourless, watery.

Alcoholic Odour 0.79 1.1 -97.8 64.5 16.6 6 36.5 200 20

Emits acrid smoke & irritating fumes

Hexane Liquid Colourless , Watery

Gasoline like

Odour. 0.659 2.97 -95.6 69 -25.6 1.2 7.5 50 Not

Soluble

Emits acrid Smoke &

fumes.

Hydrogen Gas Colourless Odourless 0.0899 0.069 -259.18 -252.8 - 4.1 74.2 - Not Soluble -

105 HELPS



R I SK IN U T I L I T I E S

Sr. No.

Name of the possible hazards or emergency Its Source & Reasons Its effects on Persons,

Property & Environment Place of Effect Control Measures provided

1 Steam pipe line failure Puncture in pipe joint failure valve failure

Burn injury Damage to the material Steam pipe lines Checking, preventative

maintenance

2 Material handling Seeds, oil, cake etc. material handled by mechanical & failure

Mechanical – fault & Body Injury

Mill-1, 2 Refeinery-1, 2

Godowns

Proper conveyance system Inspection & Préventive

Masures

3 Electrical Electrical spark shot-Circuit & Elect. Hazard

Injury to workers Fire instrument damage

Property damage

Electric installation panel board

distribution system Monitoring instruments

4 Stack of bags Not proper stacking Serious injury or fatal Godown Constant supervision & proper stacking

5 Mechanical hazard

Expeller, pumps El-Motor, transmission

elevator straw conveyer etc. machines

Serious body injury, fatal Working machinery Mechanical guarding supervision instruction

6 Work in at height Unprotected area Falls, injury Elevator platform stairs PPE

7 Slippery Spillage of oils Falls, injury Working areas Cleaning & good house keeping

8 Explosion Air receiver Explosion effect Air-tank area Safety valve, pressure gauge, auto control etc.

106 HELPS

Annexure – 8 Continue..

KGN BIOTECH LTD

(SUBSIDIARY OF KGN ENTERPRISES LTD.) R I SK IN U T I L I T I E S

Sr. No.

Name of the possible hazards or emergency Its Source & Reasons Its effects on Persons,

Property & Environment Place of Effect Control Measures provided

1 2 3 4 5 6

Earthquake Natural calamities Loss of properties and bldg,

disruption of production activities.

Whole facility Nil

Bomb Threat Terrorist attack Fire, explosion, disruption of production activities. Whole facility Follow bomb threat

procedure

Flood Unprecedented rain Loss of production Whole facility Nil

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Annexure 107

Annexure – 9


F IRE PROTECT ION DE TA I L S

Sr. No. Name Nos.

1 Fire Extinguishers

a) ABC Type – 5 Kg 10

b) DCP Type – 5 Kg 10

c) Foam Type – 9 Lit. 02

d) CO2 Type – 4.5 Lit. 03

2 R.O.System 15M3

3 Hose Real -10 M 2

4 Fire Bucket -5Buckets,10 Lit. Stand- Post 2

5 Water Storage Tank

Above ground 42M3+10,000 lit

Overhead 10,000 lit

Cooling Tower 600TR+200TR

6 Bore well with pump 4

7 Sprinkler system at Solvent Extraction Plant 1

8 DG Sets 1300KVA

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Annexure 108

Annexure – 10


L I S T OF PERSONAL PROTEC T IVE EQU IPMENTS

SR. NO NAME ISSUE RESERVED TOTAL

1 Safety Helmet (Executive) - 5 5

2 Safety Helmet (General) 4 10 14

3 Safety Goggles 6 4 10

4 Hand Gloves (Rubber) 10 10 20

5 Hand Gloves (Asbestos) 2 4 6

6 Ear Muff 4 4 8

7 Canister Mask - 2 2

8 Cotton Nose Mask 25 15 40

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Annexure – 11

KGN BIOTECH LTD


L I S T OF SAFE TY EQU IPMENTS

Sr. No. Name of Equipments Nos.

1 S.B.A. Set 45( Minutes) -

2 Emergency siren (Electrical) 1

3 Emergency Siren ( Manual) -

4 Wind Indicator 1

5 Spark Arrestor -

6 Fire Bell 1

7 Safety Shower with Eye Washers 1

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Annexure – 12


ADOPTED COLOUR CODE S YS TEM FOR P IPE L INES

Sr. No. Name of Chemical/ Material Colour

Solvent Extraction Plant

1 Hexane Postman Red

2 Vacuum Orange

3 Misalla Orange

4 Vapour Cream

5 Water Green

6 Oil Yellow

Other Area

1 Castor Oil Golden Yellow

2 Steam Black

3 Vacuum Sky Blue

4 Water Sea-Green

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Annexure – 13


L I S T OF TRA INED PERSONS IN F IRE F IGHT ING

1. Sambhubhai D Bhoi

2. Raghuvirsinh S Vaghela

3. Narendrasinh K Gohel

4. Imtiyazkhan N Pathan

5. Maksud A Malek.

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Annexure – 14

KGN BIOTECH LTD


L I S T OF F IRS T A ID TRA INED PERSONS

1. Sambhubhai D Bhoi

2. Raghuvirsinh S Vaghela

3. Narendrasinh K Gohel

4. Imtiyazkhan N Pathan

5. Maksud A Malek.

113

Annexure – 15


PAS T ACC IDENT H I S TORY

Sr. No.

Date & Time of

Occurrence

Name of injuredperson(Age, Designation)

Its Place

Type of Accident

Fatal/Reportable

Causes of Accident

Nature of injury

What exactly injured person doing

Date of return to work

Man days lost

Remark

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

10 11

No Major Accident Reported in last one year

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Annexure 115

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Annexure 116



HAZARD RANK ING OF SE LEC TED CHEMICAL S

Note :

• U.S. EPA has developed a system that ranks chemicals based on their chronic toxicity to human health as part of its Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) project, which is used to evaluate the potential health impacts of chemical releases reported to the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). The RSEI system assigns a toxicity weight to a chemical depending on where its risk assessment value falls relative to other chemicals with risk assessment values for cancer and noncancer health effects. Separate toxicity weights are assigned for ingestion and inhalation exposures.

• Combined scores require both scientific judgments about to assess a chemical's potential environmental hazards with available data and ethical judgments about the relative weight that should be accorded to human health vs. ecological concerns. Ranking systems with detailed information requirements (like the UTN Total Hazard Value Scores) cover fewer chemicals compared to those that rely on screening-level, surrogate indicators of potential hazard (like the WMPT Overall Risk Screening Score). The UTN ranks included in Scorecard weigh human health and ecological concerns equally, while the WMPT ranks put double weight on a chemical's persistence in the environment. The IRCH system uses a more complicated weighting system, where ecological effects are combined with occupational health effects.

• WHAT DO THE SCORES MEAN?

EPA's toxicity weights indicate how a chemical compares with others in terms of its capacity to cause chronic human health effects (either cancer or noncancer effects). The graphic shows where a chemical's toxicity weight falls relative to all chemicals that have been ranked using the RSEI system, and indicates whether a chemical is more or less toxic than most chemicals. Chemicals that score at the far right end of the scale are significantly more hazardous (in the worst 5% according to this scoring system).

• UTN NOs.

The University of Tennessee's Center for Clean Products and Clean Technologies has developed a hazard evaluation system for TRI chemicals that produces separate rankings for ecological effects and human health effects, as well as a total hazard score that integrates information about a chemical's toxicity to humans and ecosystems with information about chemical characteristics that influence the likelihood of exposure to a substance

• WMPT U.S. EPA developed the Waste Minimization Prioritization Tool (WMPT) to help guide the national effort to reduce the quantity and toxicity of hazardous wastes. WMPT is a software system that provides relative rankings of more than 1,300 chemicals according to their environmental persistence, bioaccumulation potential, and human and ecological toxicity. The WMPT ranks chemicals separately according to their human health risks, their ecological health risks, and their overall environmental health risk.

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Note :

• EDF Cancer risk scores indicate how a chemical compares with others in terms of the cancer risk posed by release of one pound to air. The graphic shows where a chemical's air cancer score falls relative to all chemicals that have been ranked using this website's scoring system, and indicates whether a chemical is more or less toxic than most chemicals. Chemicals that score at the far right end of the scale are significantly more hazardous(in the worst 10% according to this scoring system).

• IRCH The Indiana Clean Manufacturing Technology and Safe Materials Institute (CMTI) at Purdue University has developed a hazard evaluation system for chemicals that produces separate rankings for ecological effects and occupational health effects, as well as a total hazard score that integrates both types of hazards. This system, the Indiana Relative Chemical Hazard Ranking System (formerly known as 3P2M), combines information about a chemical's toxicity to humans and ecosystems with information about chemical characteristics that influence the likelihood of exposure to a substance.

• Toxicity

Ranking systems vary in the number of toxicity measures they consider. The Toxicity Weights (RSEI) developed by US EPA for its current human health Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators are based on a chemical's chronic risk assessment values: reference doses or cancer potency values are used to rank chemicals. In contrast, the UTN Human Health Effects Score (and the UTN Ecological Effects Score) are based on indicators of both acute and chronic toxicity.

• Toxicity and Exposure Potential Scores

EDF’srisk scoring system is based on consideration of a chemical's toxicity and exposure potential. The likelihood that a chemical will harm human health or wildlife depends on the dose that organisms receive, so rankings systems that use environmental modeling to estimate doses to target organisms provide the most reliable indicator about whether adverse impacts will occur. To describe human exposure potential, EDF estimates the concentration of a chemical in different media (e.g., water) that result from a chemical's release to the environment and then predicts the dose people will receive given their intake rates (e.g., amount of water ingested daily). EDF Risk Scores then combine these dose estimates with toxicity data to characterize cancer or noncancer health impacts. Separate Risk Scores are developed for chemical releases to air and water. EDF Risk Scores can be combined with environmental release data to weight and rank chemicals by toxicity and exposure potential. Since the exposure modeling is based on releases to ambient air or water, the scores are not appropriate for ranking chemicals released to land (like a landfill) or to an indoor environment (like a workplace).

• Combined Human and Ecological Scores

Three of Scorecard's ranking systems generate an "integrated" score that accounts for risks to both human health and ecosystems. Combined scores have the advantage of considering multiple attributes that society desires to safeguard from harm. Chemicals that pose no threat to human health, for example, will still rank high relative to others if they pose serious risks to aquatic life or other ecosystem components.

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Emergency can neither predicted nor anticipated, it is sudden occurring events. But proper

training, safe habits, preparedness and awareness among the employees are definitely

helpful to control the emergency. As a guideline for emergency preparedness this “Disaster

Management Plan” has been prepared for KGN BIOTECH LTD. (Subsidiary of KGN

Enterprises LTD.), Plot No. 313-318, 321, 246/P Kheda-Dholka Highway, Village Hariyala,

Tal. Matar, Dist. Kheda-387 411, as per details and information provided by them.

This Disaster Management Plan has been developed by qualified and competent persons.

Further, it is prepared in conformity with the national and international norms, codes,

standards & guidelines on the subject to meet statutory requirements. However, this plan is

not deemed to be any warranty, undertaking or certification.

This document consists of following sections;

1. Description Section – Describes emergency plan, preparedness actions etc. in

1 to 8 chapters.

2. Annexure Section –Specific required details are included in different Annexures.

It is suggested that Disaster Management Plan should be distributed to all concern persons

and the department and made use of in day –to- day preparedness, training , updation and

rehearsal for controlling the emergency by prompt actions by the various levels of persons ,

teams and outsiders, who called for.

We extremely thankful to Shri Ravi Prakash Thakur, GM (Engg.) & others, who co-operated

& helped us.

For HELPS

Place : VADODARA. Date: 08.10.2010

For Managements (M/s. KGN ENTERPRISES LTD. [Subsidiary of KGN Enterprises LTD.]) Document Approved by

Date: Signature Designation:

J. J. VAGHELA B.E.(Mech), LL.B., Sr. Factory Inspector (Retrd.), Competent Person

MAYOOR J. VAGHELA B.E.(Civil), DIS, PGDIEM, MISNT,FIV Competent Person, Chartered Engineer, Valuer

FORE WORD

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INDEX

CHAPTER SUBJECT PAGE NO.

• Foreword 2

• Index 3-5

DESCRIPTION SECTION:

1. CHEMICAL INDUSTRIAL DISASTER --- 7

2. UNIT PROFILES --- 17

3. HANDLING OF EMERGENCY --- 33

4. ACTION PLANTORESPONDING SPECIFIC EMERGENCY

--- 45

5. OFF SITE EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN --- 55

6. POST EMERGENCY ACTION --- 59

7. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC

--- 62

8. MOCK DRILL / REHEARSAL / EXERCISE --- 64-67

ANNEXURE SECTION:

--- 68-113

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INDEX OF ANNEXURE

ANNEXURE SUBJECT PAGE NO.

1 Emergency Telephone Numbers --- 69

2 Organogram --- 71

3 Health & Safety Policy --- 72

4 Site Plan --- 73

5 Layout Plan --- 74

6 Storage of Hazardous Chemicals --- 75

7 Process and Vessel Hazard and Control --- 76

8 Process Flow Chart (8- A to 8-F) --- 77-82

9 Other Hazard and Control --- 83

10 Salient Properties of Hazardous Chemicals --- 84

11 Trade Waste Disposal --- 85

12 Meteorological Data --- 86

13 Fire Protection Details --- 87

14 Personal Protective Equipments & Safety Equipments --- 88

15 Colour Code System for Pipe lines --- 89

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INDEX OF ANNEXURE (Continue…)

ANNEXURE SUBJECT PAGE NO.

16 Emergency Organisation Structure --- 90

17 List of Trained Persons In Fire Fighting 91

18 List of First Aid Trained Persons 92

19 Chart of Initiation of Actions --- 93

20 A Form To Record Emergency Telephone Call --- 94

21 Typical Damage Due To Thermal Radiation --- 95

22 Typical Radiation Intensity & Overpressure --- 96

23 Record of Past Incident --- 97

24 Format for Mock Drill / Exercise --- 98

25 Glossary of Terms & Definitions --- 99-104

26 M.S.D.S. --- 105-113

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1.1 INTODUCTION

The growth of chemical sector in our country has led to

increase in manufacture, storage and use of hazardous

chemicals resulting in enhanced threats of accidents.

Occurrence of the chemical accidents and probabi li ty

thereof, manifesting in a chemical disaster remain a cause

of concern.

Unlike emergencies caused due to natural disasters, some of

which are difficult to prevent, the chemical accidents can

be prevented and impacts minimized by better planning,

preparedness and response.

Disasters natural or man-made have short comings in every

facet of Disaster Management including approaches for

minimization and alleviating the sufferings of the affected

person and population in vicinity.

The chemical disasters are traumatic causing at times

i rreparable damage to environment including human kind

and the prosperity.

Major chemical accidents in the past have highlighted need

for proper planning prevention, mitigation and management

including preparedness, response, relief and rehabi li tation.

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1.2 Disaster

Disaster means a catastrophic mishap, calamity or grave

occurrence in any area, arising from natural or man made

causes or by accident or negligence which results in

substantial loss of li fe or human suffering or damage to and

destruction of, property by damage to or degradation of,

environment and is of such nature or magnitude as to be

beyond the coping capacity of the community of the

affected area.

(The Disaster Management Act – 2005) 1.3 Source of chemical Disasters

Manufacturing and formulation installations of chemical-

products, particularly during commissioning, process

operations, maintenance and disposal. Further, huge storage

of chemicals or during handling or transportation of

hazardous chemicals also lead to chemical accidents.

1.4 Incidences leading to chemical

disasters

Material handling and storage in manufacturing faci li t ies,

and isolated storages, warehouse and godowns including

tank farms in ports and docks and fuel depots.

1.5 Basic Reasons of Major Chemical

Accidents

Chemical disasters, in general, may result from :

1. Fi re

2. Explosion

3. Toxic Release

4. Poisoning

5. Combinations of the above Chemical disasters may occur due to process deviations

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concerning the chemistry of the process, pressure,

temperature and other identif ied parameters with regards to

the state of the Substance i .e. solid, l iquid or gas, proximity

to other toxic substances and the probabi li ty of a runway

reaction due to the incidental mixing of two or more

HAZCHEMs with dissimi lar properties. In addition, i t may be

due to hardware fai lure, resulting in large-scale spi l ls of toxic

substances (in any form) due to loss of containment, or an

explosion (BLEVE) may occur due to sparks, shocks or

frictional forces on the chemical during transportation. The effect can be further, compounded by the micro-

meteorology of the area, wind speed and direction, rate of

precipitation, toxicity / quantity of chemical released,

population in the reach of release, probabi li ty of formation

of lethal mixtures (fuel-air of other mixtures) and other

industrial activities being performed in closer vicinity.

I t is very important to understand that the state of the

chemical substance (solid, l iquid or gas) contributes

substantial ly to the gravity of the accident and affects

control measures. Chemicals in solid form may have

devastating effects i f their properties are suddenly changed

(e.g. sublimation) due to pressure and temperature

conditions to which they are accidentally exposed. I f sol ids

continue to remain in solid form, the damage wi l l be

negligible.

Any human / mechanical fai lure may cause large scale spi l ls

of l iquids or of compressed gases like chlorine or Liquid

Petroleum Gas (LPG) which can cause BLEVE and can

directly affect human lives and the environment. The release

of compressed gases give rise to thermal and cryogenic

structure or bui lding, compounding the damage.

1.5.1 Process & Safety System Failure

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Technical Errors :

Design defects, fatigue, metal fai lure, corrosion

etc.

Human Errors :

Neglecting Safety instructions, deviating from

specifies procedure etc.

Lack of Information :

Absence of emergency warning procedures, non-

disclosure of line of treatment etc.

Organisation Errors :

Poor emergency planning and coordination, poor

communication with public, non-compliance with

mock dri l ls / exercises etc; which are required for

ensuring a state of quick response and

preparedness.

1.5.2 Natural Calamities

The Indian subcontinent is highly prone to natural

disasters, which can also trigger chemical disasters.

Damage to phosphoric acid sludge containment

during the Orissa super cyclone in 1999 and the

release of acrylonitr i le at Kandla Port, during an

earthquake in 2001, are some of the recent examples.

1.5.3 Terrorist attacks / sabotages Vulnerabi li ty to chemical disasters is further

compounded by l ikely terrorist and warfare activit ies,

which include sabotage and attack on HAZCHEM

installations and transportation vehicles. This can

occur at sources, anywhere, and at any time.

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1.6 Impacts of Chemical Disasters

In addition to loss of l i fe, the major consequences of

chemical of chemical disasters include impact on livestock,

f lora/fauna, the environment (air, soi l, water) and losses to

industry as given below;

Chemical accidents may be categorised as a major

accident or a disaster depending upon the number of

casualties, injuries, damage to the property or environment.

A major accident is defined in the Manufacture, Storage and

Import of Hazardous chemicals (MSIHC) Rules, 1989, issued

under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, whereas

‘disaster’ is defined in the DM Act, 2005.

1.7 Major Chemical Accidents in India

Following the Bhopal Gas Disaster in 1984, major incidences

of Chemical disasters in India include a fi re in an oi l well in

Andhra Pradesh (2003), a vapour cloud explosion in the

Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited Refinery (HPCL),

Vishakhapatnam (1997) and an explosion in the Indian

Petrochemicals Corporation Limited (IPCL) Gas Cracker

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Complex, Nagothane, Maharastra (1990). Over 20 major

chemical accidents have been reported in MAH units during

2002-06. Detai ls of these accidents that involved chemicals

l ike Chlorine, Ammonia, LPG and other HAZCHEMs are

examples

1.8 Statutory Regulations

The government has reinforced the legal framework on

chemical safety and management of chemical accidents by

enacting the rules and amending them time to time. The

following major chemical class specific regulations are:

1. The Factories Act & State Rules

2. The Explosive Act 1884

3. The Insecticide Act 1968

4. The Petroleum Act 1962

5. The Environment (Petroleum) Act 1986.

Further, a number of regulations covering safety in

transportation, insurance, l iabi li ty and compensations were

enacted thereafter

The regulatory framework on chemical safety can be traced

to the Factories Act, 1948 and chemical calls specific

regulations l ike the Explosive Act. 1884; the Insecticide Act,

1968; and The Petroleum Act, 1934. Later, an umbrella Act,

the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, was enacted, which

also deals with chemical management and safety. A number

of regulations covering safety in transportation, insurance,

l iability and compensations were enacted thereafter. The

Government of India has further reinforced the legal

framework on chemical safety and management of

chemical accidents by enacting new rules and by way of

amendments to them.

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1.9 Legal Back Ground

The regulatory framework on chemical safety could be

traced back to the Factories Act, 1948(1987) and chemical

class specific regulation l ies in the Explosive Act 1963 and

Petroleum Act. Later on umbrella act, The Environment

(Protection) Act – 1986 was enacted, which also deals with

chemical management and safety. Further, Oi l India Safety

Directorate is also issued certain directives on industrial

chemical emergency. Simi lar ly, other concerned

department/implementing authorities have given certain

instructions/guidelines. Expert persons/institutes have

published articles on this subject.

In view of the large losses of l i fe and property, the central

government has institutionalized the disaster management

and focus on prevention, enhanced level of preparedness,

prompt and effective responsibi li ty and capacity bui lding.

1.9.1 Chemical Accidents ( Emergency Planning, Preparedness and

Response ) Rules’1996

The Government of India published the “Chemical

Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness and

Response) Rules-1996 (CA(EPPR) Rules)”under The

environment (Protection)Act-1986. The main objectives

of the rules are to provide administrative structure at

different levels (central, state, distr ict and local) for

effective planning, preparedness and response to

chemical accidents. Crisis groups at such levels have

been defined with their composition and functions

under these rules. Further, various definitions; l ike

Hazardous Chemicals, Chemical Accident, MAH

installations, Off-site emergency Plan, Transport etc are

explained.

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1.9.2 The Disaster Management Act, 2005 & Rules 2006

The Govt. of India has published the ACT and Rules to

provide an insti tutional framework, for drawing up and

monitoring the implementation of plans of the disaster

management and faci li tate the government machinery

in mitigating the eventuality of the disaster. Further, i t

provides constitution, power, and functions of the

National Authority, State Authority, and Distr ict

Authority etc. 1.9.3 National Disaster Management Guidelines (Chemical Disasters )

April 2007 (NDMG-CD)

The objective of the guidelines is to formulate a single

national plan integrating existing awareness,

prevention, preparedness, response, relief and

rehabi li tation plans and follow a li fe cycle approach.

1.10 Disaster Management Plan

(Dmp)

Minor accidents on chemical do not much impact or

damage, but major accidents involved large volume of

inventories called as Disaster / Emergency cause extensive

damage to person, property and environment. Emergency

situation arises all of a sudden and contains high potential to

caused havoc.

Therefore, advance emergency planning and proper training

of every employee in the emergency functions is very

essential to make emergency control measures more

effective.

There are two types of emergency control plans,

1. On Site Emergency Plan

2. Off Site Emergency Plan

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The fi rst is to be prepared by an industrial unit under the

guidance of government & local authorit ies, whi le second

one is to be prepared by the local authority or the

government itself with the help of government machinery

and resources including the concerned industrial units also.

1.11 Level of the Emergency

The level of Emergency can be classif ied according to the

gravity of the situation at si te. The command and control wil l

fol low as per the level of emergency.

• Level-I : On-Site

The type of emergency, which can be handled and

control led by the management with own resources as

per On-site emergency plan, is called as On-site or Level-

I .

• Level-II : Off-Site -Mutual Aided / Local crisis

I f the Level-1, is uncontrol lable by the management,

further help is needed, the neighbouring units or mutual

aided local units wi l l provide their resources to tackle

the situation. The emergency of the unit which is

handled and control led by the out side resources, is

called as Mutual Aided local crisis or Level-I I . Further, i f

this type of emergency is governed by Local Crisis Group

then it is called as Local Crisis.

• Level-III :Off-site- District Crisis

Even after putting efforts as explained in Level-I I , the

si tuation becomes uncontrollable and beyond the

control of Local Crisis Management, than the Distr ict

Crisis Group wi l l take over the charge & handle the

emergency si tuation. This is termed as Level-I I I or Distr ict

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Crisis.

• Level-IV :Off-site- State Crisis / National Crisis

I f gravity and situation of the emergency is beyond

control of Local or District Crisis Group, The

State/National Crisis Group has to command and control

such crisis by uti lizing all resources from the State or

Nation, as prevai ling circumstances, and then it is called

as State Crisis or National Crisis.

1.12 STAGES OF THE PLAN

The plan consists of the actual performance of duties &

responsibi li t ies by designated personnel and other agencies.

Therefore, the plan is divided into three stages. The stage

one is pre-emergency period i .e. Normal activities before

emergency or preparedness, awareness and training parts.

Whi le stage second explains actions during emergency

period i .e. during actual emergency period, specific duties

are to be performed by designated personnel, using

avai lable resources & control measures in systematic ways.

The third stage indicates post emergency period, which

describes how to safe rehabi li tation, restarting, to face

inquiry, to preserve evidences and records for remedial

measures etc; as required by various authorities. It also

explains corrective steps from the incident and finding out

the correct reason behind the emergency, so that such type

of incident wi l l not occur again.

The chart of emergency plan, explaining how enti re

arrangement is required to manage, is produced below;

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1.13 ASSINGNMENT

The management has assigned the job of preparation of

Disaster Management Plan-2010; vide their Work Order No:

WO/KGN/021/ 10-11 Dated 24.09.2010, for mitigating any

industrial disaster .

1.14 REFERANCES

The document is developed by Team of qualif ied and well

experienced persons who have in worked in the industrial

Safety, Health and Environment System last more than 30

years. We followed various publication, books, articles etc. in

preparation of this report. Some of then are i l lustrated as

below;

1. The Disaster Management Act 2005 & Rules 2006

2. National Disaster Management Guide lines – Chemical

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Disaster (NDMG-CD)- 2006

3. The Gujarat State Disaster Management Act 2003 & Rules

2006

4. The Gujarat Factories Rules- 1963 (2004)

5. C. A. (EPPR) Rules- 1996 (2000)

6. M. S. I . H. C. Rules- 1989 (2000)

7. The Central Motor Vehicles Rules- 1989 (2005)

8. The Petroleum Act -1934 & Rules 2002

9. The Explosive Act -1884 (1983)

10. The Insecticide Act, etc.

Further, we referred guidelines issued by Director, Industrial

Safety & Health (CIF), Gujarat State and Standard norms,

codes, standards and articles published in books magazine

or chronicle etc.

1.15 PRESENTATION of documents

The document Disaster Management Plan is presented in two

pars;

Part - I : Description Section

Part - II : Annexure Section

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2.1 Introduction

The chemical Factories or Chemical-Products units which

are engaged in producing huge quantities of various

chemicals; are threat of chemical emergency/disaster

because of storing or handling or processing of large

quantities of different chemicals at si te. Further, activities

on transportation of chemicals are also tremendously

increased. Minor accidents on chemical do not much

impact or damage, but major accidents involving large

quantities of chemicals in industries or during transportation

of hazardous chemicals; would cause extensive damage to

person, property and environment. Emergency situation

arises all of a sudden and contains high potential to cause

havoc. This is called as chemical accidents/ Disaster /

Emergency.

I t i s noted that such types of incidents were str ike at the

most unexpected time. Further, chemical emergency may

in form of any particular major emission of gas, Chemical

l iquid release, fi re, or explosion involving one or more

hazardous chemicals and resulting uncontrollable

developments during the course of industrial activities or

transportation or due to natural events leading to severe

effects both immediate or delays; inside or outside the

installation likely to cause substantial loss of l i fe and

property including adverse effects on the environment.

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Therefore, advance emergency planning and proper

training of every employee in the emergency functions are

very essential to make emergency control measures more

effective.

2.2 Chemical Hazards

Chemical means a basic structure that used in chemistry or

produced by chemistry. Hazard means something that is

dangerous 1; a Fire Hazard, 2; a Health Hazard, 3; an

Occupational Hazard 4; a something unpleasant that

happens to people who do a particular job. Further,

Chemicals have different properties l ike Fire, Explosion,

Toxic, Corrosion, Poisonous, Reactive etc.

The large numbers of industrial units are engaged in

manufacturing various chemical-products and they are

storing, handling, using large & bulk quantities of different

hazardous chemicals. It has also resulted into the heavy

transportation & movement of hazardous chemicals by

vehicles; l ike tankers, trucks, carriers, lorries, etc. on

road/rai l.

Chemical accidents/disasters may occur due to process

deviations concerning the chemistry of the process,

pressure, temperature or other identif ied parameters with

regard to the state of substance i .e. solid, l iquid or gas;

proximity to other toxic substances and probabi li ty of

runaway reaction due to the incidental mixing of two or

more hazardous chemicals with dissimilar properties.

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In addition, i t may be due to hardware fai lure, resulting in

large-scale spi l ls of toxic substances (in any form) due to

loss of containment, or an explosion. Further, Boi ling Liquid

Expanding Vapour Explosion may occur due to any source

of ignition (l ike any type of spark, shock, frictional force

etc) on the chemicals during transportation.

The effect can be further compounded by micro-

meteorology of the area, wind speed and direction, rate of

precipitation, toxicity/quantity of chemical released,

population in the reach of release, probabili ty of formation

of lethal mixtures and other industrial activities being

performed in closure vicinity.

I t is very important to understand that that the state of the

chemical substance (solid, l iquid or gas) contributes

substantial ly to the gravity of the accident and affects

control measures.

The release of compressed gas gives r ise to thermal and

cryogenic stresses, which may also impact the surrounding

structures or bui lding, compounding the damage.

Any human/mechanical fai lure may cause large scale spi l ls

of l iquids or of compressed gases l ike Chlorine or Liquefied

Petroleum Gas (LPG), which can directly affect human l ives

and the environment.

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2.3 HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS

The total nos. of Hazardous Chemicals by name are 684 in

part-I I , and Part –I provides as Indicative Criteria of

chemicals by properties of Toxic, Flammable, Explosives; as

provided in the “Manufacturer, Storage or Import of

Hazardous Chemicals- Rules-1989(2000)”. Simi larly, The list

of Hazardous Chemicals by name are 432 by name Part –I I,

and Part-I provides simi lar indicative cri teria of chemicals

by properties of Toxic, Flammable, Explosives as provided in

the “Gujarat Factories Rules-1963 (2004)”, and “Chemical

Accidents(Emergency Planning, Preparedness & Response)-

Rules- 1996”. Thus, certain hazardous chemicals; as

identi fied by names as per above Rules, alongwith United

Nations’ Numbers, C.A.S. Nos.; and Hazardous Classi fication

are given in the Table below;

TABLE

Sr. No

.

Major Hazardous Chemical

UN NO CAS No Hazardo

us Classif ic

at ion

Schedule- I of MSIHC

Rules 1989 (2000)

Schedule- I of

Rule 68-J of

GFR1963 (2004)

Schedule- I of CA (EPPR) Rules -

1996

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

1. Acetic Acid 2789 64-19-7 C 2 - -

2. Acrilonitrile 1093 107-13-1 T,R 12 6 6

3. Ammonia 1005 7664-41-7 T 31 16 16

4. Aniline 1547 T 37 21 21

5. Benzene 1114 71-73-2 T,F 56 32 32 6. Chlorine 1017 7782-50-5 T 119 88 84

7. Chloro Sulphonic Acid 1754 7790-94-5 C 136 110 106

8. Ethyl Acetate 1173 141-78-6 F 247 - - 9. Ethylene Oxide 1040 75-21-8 T,F,R 269 200 196 10. Ethion 3018 563-10-2 T 245 186 182

11. Motor Spirit (Petrol) 1203 8006-61-9 F Part I (b) (iv) Part I (b)

(ii) Part I (b) (ii)

12. LPG 1075 68476-85-7 F,E 347 243 242 13. Methyl Alcohol 1230 67-56-1 F - 259 258 14. Oleum 1831 8014-95-7 C 444 301 301 15. Parathion T 466 315 315

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16. Phorate T 490 334 333 17. Sulphuric Acid 1830 7664-93-9 C 591 371 370 18. Thionyl Chloride 1836 7719-09-7 C 620 387 386 19. Toluene 1294 108-88-3 F 628 389 388 20. Xylene 1307 1330-20-7 T,F - 430 429

C: Corrosive, E: Explosive, F: Flammable, R: Reactive, T:

Toxic 2.4 MAJOR CHEMICAL ACCIDENT

(Definition)

The definitions of word “Major Chemical Accident” or

“Major Accident” are expressed as below:

2.4.1 MAJOR CHEMICAL ACCIDENT

An occurrence including any particular major

emission, fi re or explosion involving one or more

hazardous chemicals and resulting from uncontrolled

developments in the course of industrial activity or

transportation or due to natural events leading to

serious effects both immediate or delay, inside or

outside the installation likely to cause substantial loss

of li fe and property including adverse effects on the

environment. --Rule 2(f) of C,A,(EPPR)Rules -1996.

2.4.2 MAJOR ACCIDENT

“MAJOR ACCIDENT” means an incident involving loss

of li fe or outside the si te or ten or more injuries inside

and /or one or more injuries outside or release of

toxic chemical or explosion or fi re or spi l lage of

hazardous chemical resulting in “on-site” or “off-site”

emergencies or damage to equipment leading to

stoppage of process or adverse effects to the

environment.

Rule 68-J (1) (d) of Gujarat Factories Rules-1963

(2004).

Rule 2(j) of M.S. & I . of H.C. Rules-1989(2000).

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2.5 IMPACT OF CHEMICAL

ACCIDENTS/DISASTERS

Accidents on chemical which are near missing or minor

types, do not much impact or damage, but in case of

major accidents, involved large volume of inventories of

hazardous chemicals or high toll of injuries, or release of

toxic gas or spi l lage of hazardous chemicals or explosion,

called as Major Chemical Accident/Emergency/Disaster;

cause extensive loss of l i fe, damage to property and

adverse effect on environment. Further, emergency

situation arises all of sudden and at most unexpected time

with high potential to cause havoc. In addition to above,

the major consequences of chemical disaster include

impact on livestock, f lora and fauna, the environment (air ,

soi l, water) and tremendous losses to the industr ies.

2.6 Raw Material of the Unit

The maximum storage capacity of the raw materials, as following; 1. Caster Seeds : (A) Si lo – 60,000 MT,

(B) Ware House – 12000 MT 2. Hexane (L) – 42 KL 3. Methanol (L) – 21 KL 4. Hydrogen (g) – Cylinder Bank -4 5. Carbon (P) – 10 MT 6. Sulphuric Acid (L) – 100 KL 7. Caustic Lye (L) – 100 KL

2.7 Major Products

The products with capacities are as given as below; A) KGN Enterprises Ltd 1. Caster Cake – 5,000 MT

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2. Caster Oi l – 3,000 MT B) KGN Biotech Ltd

Derivatives of Castor Oi l

2.8 Production Capacity

A) KGN Enterprises Ltd: 1. Oil Mi l l Plant – 400 Tons per Day 2. Refining Unit – 200 Tons per Day 3. Solvent Extraction Plant – 250 Tons per Day 4. Pharma – 200 Tons per Day B) KGN Biotech Ltd Derivatives: 1)Hydrogenated Castor Oi l=30 000 MT/Year 2) 12 Hydro Stearic Acid- 11700 MT/Year 3) Methyl Ricinoleate-1560 MT/Year 4) Hydrogenated Methyl Ricinoleate-4800 MT/Year 5) Undecylenic Acid- 600 MT/ Year 6) Ricinoleic Acid-3900 MT/Year

2.9 Utilities

1. Boi ler

2. Electric Sub-station

3. D. G. Set

4. Laboratory

5. Work shop

6. E.T.P. ETC

2.10 List of Products

1. Castor Oi l (Different Grades)

2. De-oi led Castor Cake

3. 12 Hydroxy Stearic Acid

4. Hydrogenated Caster Oi l

5. Methyl Ricinoleate


7. Undecylenie Acid

8. Ricinoleate Acid,etc.

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2.11 Utilization of Products

There are different uses of the products, which can be

listed as per below;

A. Refined Castor Oil of Different Grade 1. Commercial Grade

2. Refined B.S.S Grade

3. First special Grade

4. Extra special Grade

5. Pale pressed Grade

6. Low moisture Grade

7. Electric Grade

8. B P Grade

9. U S Pharma

10. DAB-10

B. De-oiled castor cake (Natural ferti l izer) • Apart from this the company can also offer any

other grade with specifications as per buyers’s

requirement.

C. Castor Oil Derivatives 1. 12 Hydroxy Stearic Acid

2. Hydrogenated Castor Oi l

3. Methyl Ricinoleate


5. Undecylenic Acid

6. Ricinoleic Acid

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2.12 Location of the Unit

The Surroundings of the Unit can be described as below ;

North Side : State Highway (Kheda- Dholka)

South Side : Agricultural Open Yard

East Side : Agricultural Open Yard

West Side : Agricultural Open Yard

The Location Plan of The Unit is given in Annexure – 4.

2.13 LAYOUT PLAN OF the Unit

The Unit consists of the following areas /departments/

sections; Section I : KGN Enterprises Ltd.

1. Oil Mi l l 2. Tank Farm – Hexane (UG) 3. Tank Farm (Caster Oi l Products) 4. Boi ler House 5. DG Set 6. Cooling Tower 7. Work Shop 8. DOC 9. SE Plant 10. Cake Godown 11. Seeds Godown 1,2 12. ETP 13. Canteen 14. Main Gate

Section II : KGN Biotech Ltd 1. Hydrogenated Castor Oi l Plant

2. HMR Plant

3. 12 HAS + RA Plant

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4. Glycerine(Evaporation) Plant

5. Flacker Section

6. Workshop

7. Laboratory (First Floor)

8. Water Tank, o/g

9. Boi ler house

10. D.G. Set

11. Office (First Floor)

12. E.T.P.

13. Toi let Block

14. Watch-Guard Cabin

The Layout Plan is given at Annexure-5.

2.14 Tank Farm

The Unit has good layout of tanks. There are total 10 tanks,

storing different Grade of Castor Oi l products. Raw

Materials l ike; Hexane, Sulphuric Acid, Caustic Lye,

Methanol etc are also stored in the tanks. The storage

detai ls of materials are given at Annexure- 6.

2.15 WORK FORCE & Timing

Direct Employees Contractors Security

Guards Total Sr. No.

Name of Shift Shift Timing

M F M F M F M F

1 General (G) 09:30 to 18.30 12 02 - - 04 - 15 02

2 First Shift 08:00 to 16.00 08 - 10 - 07 - 21 -

3 Second Shift 16.00 to 24.00 08 - 10 - 07 - 20 -

4 Third Shift 24.00 to 08.00 08 - 10 - 06 - 20 -

Total 36 02 30 - 24 - 76 02

2.16 Category of Staff

Officers 2

Operatives 6

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Direct workers 28

Contractor Person 30

Security Guards 10

Total 76

2.17 The Unit at a Glance


1. Name & Address of Unit

KGN Biotech Ltd (Subsidiary of KGN Enterprises Ltd.) Plot No. 315, 316/1 318, 321,286/P, Kheda-Dholka Highway,Village- Hariyala,Tal. Matar, Dist- Kheda. Ph. No. (02694) 291042,291043, 224460. E-mail :

2. Name & Address of Occupier

Mr. Babulal Jethalal Hirani, Managing Director, 302, Vraj Appartment, Naranpura. AHMEDABAD Phone (02694) 224460/61, M-099253 86072

3. Name & Address of Regd. Office

Mumbai Office Address: 401, Shriniwas Building, 382-384, Narshi Natha Street, Katha Bazar, Mumbai – 400 009 Contact Person : Amrin Memon Mobile No. : 09619686678

4. Name & Address of Manager

Mr. Ravi Prakash Thakur E/325, Ambica Complex, Nr. S. T. Stand, KHEDA. M. 096016 03315

5. Safety Officer Mr. Ravi Prakash Thakur, DME, PDIS

Sr. No. Name

Schedule-I of

MSIHC Rules 1989

(2000)

Schedule-I of Rule 68-J of

GFR 1963 (1995)

Schedule-I of

CA(EPPR) Rules 1996

1 Hexane 306 218 217 2 Methanol 377 259 258 2 Hydrogen 214 224 223

6. Identification of major Hazardous Chemicals

3 Sulphuric Acid 591 371 370

7. Products Caster Oil and Derivatives

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8.

Hazardous Manufacturing Process as per First Schedule of Section 2(cb) of the F.A.

1. Sr. No. 25 : Extraction of Oil from vegetable (Seeds)

2. Sr. No. 29 : Highly Flammable Liquids & gases

3. Sr. No. 17 : Chemical Industries (Acid & Alkalis, Hydrogen Gas

9. Dangerous Manufacturing Process or Operations under GFR

Schedules under Rule 102 of GFR 1963 (1995), Prescribed under Sec.87 of The Factories Act 1948 (1989) 1. Schedule 12 – Manipulation of Acids &

Alkales 2. Schedule 19 – Chemical Works 3. Schedule 21 – Process of extracting Oils

from vegetable in Solvent Extraction plants

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2.18 The Unit at a Glance (continue…)


10. Factory Licence from DISH, Gujarat State

License No. 003436 Reg. No. 15142/189-A for not more than 1000 HP & 100 Workers Valid upto : 31.12.2012 License transferred to KGN Enterprises Ltd. on 23.04.2010 By DISH

11. Plan Approval by DISH 1. 3629/07 Dtd. 29.06.2007

12 Organogram Annexure – 2.

13 Health & Safety Policy Annexure – 3.

License from Petroleum & Explosive Safety Organisation (PESO) Sr. No. Act / Rule Licence No. Licence For Licence

Capacity Validity

Petroleum Class ‘A’ 42 KL

P/HQ/GJ/15/2090 (P12402) Petroleum Class

‘B’ 21 KL 31.12.2012

14

1 The Petroleum Act

Total 63 KL

15 GPCB Consent Applied

16 Maximum Work Force

Officers – 2 Employees – 34 Contractor Person – 30 Security Guards – 10 Total - 76

17 ISO Certification 1. ISO 9001 : 2008 2. ISO 14001 : 2004 3. ISO 18001 : 2007 4. ISO 22000 : 2005

2.18 Impact Assessment of the Unit

2.19.1 Introduction

Detai ls on Identi fication, Analysis and Assessment of

Hazards and Risk wi l l provide vital information for Risk

Management.

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However, in absent of fai lure rate data, suitabi li ty of

Industry for Indian environment, acceptable r isk

criteria to public & environment etc. the adequate

Risk Assessment is not possible.

At the date provided by the management, the

preliminary hazard identif ication of the Unit,

considering the proper technology used in design,

installation, operation and maintenance of different

process, plants, equipments, bui ldings & machines

etc. are as below

Sr. No. Type of Hazards Area

1. Fire

1. Tank Farm (Hexane, Methanol, Products Storage, Seeds Godown

2. Process house (Oil Mill, Solvent Extraction Plant, Bio Tech Plant)

3. Handling of Materials (Seeds, Oil, Chemicals)

4. Loading & Unloading of receiving of flammable & toxic liquids & gaseous substances

5. Electrical short circuit, heating etc.

2. Explosion Boiler, Solvent Extrusion Plant, DG Set, Hydrogen Rack

3. Toxic Leak - Spillage Sulphuric Acid, Caustic Lye

4. Release of Liquid Tank Farm (Products), Sulphuric Acid,

Caustic Lye etc. Castor Oil from Plant Process

2.19.2 Process & Storage Details

Detai ls on Identi fication, Analysis and Assessment of

Hazards and Risk wi l l provide vital information for Risk

Management.

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Process Description

1. HYDROGENATED CASTOR OIL

Refined Castor oi l i s to be taken in Autoclave

and It is to be heated to 110 degree

centigrade under vacuum. On achieving

temperature about 110 degree centigrade.

Addition Ni catalyst is added. After addition of

Ni catalyst, Hydrogen gas is charged to the

reactor. Temperature in autoclave wi l l go up.

Maintain temperature between150 to160

degree centigrade. On completion of reaction

send sample to laboratory to check Iodine

value. I f Iodine value comes below 3 units, cool

the entire mass to 100 degree centigrade and

transfer. Fi lter the batch and send final product

for f laking. Flaked material i s then packed and

stored in Godown. Flow chart is given at

Annexure-8-A

2. 12 HYDROXY STEARIC ACID

Hydrogenated castor oi l is taken in the reactor.

Caustic lye is then added gradually to saponify

the material. On completion of Saponification,

send sample for testing in laboratory. On

approval from laboratory, start acidification

with sulphuric acid. On completion of

acidification send sample to laboratory for

approval. After approval of sample, wash the

reaction mass give washings with hot water. On

completion of washing send material for drying

and flaking. Flaked material i s then packed and

same is transferred to Godown Flow chart is

given at Annexure-8-B

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3. RICINOLEATE ACID Castor oi l is taken in the reactor. Caustic lye is

then added gradually to saponify the material.

On completion of Saponification, send sample

for testing in laboratory. On approval from

laboratory, start acidification with sulphuric

acid. On completion of acidification send

sample to laboratory for approval. After

approval of sample, wash the reaction mass

with hot water. On completion of washing send

material for drying and flaking. Flaked material

is then packed and transferred to Godown.

Flow chart is given at Annexure-8-C

4. METHYL RICINOLEATE Castor Oi l i s taken in to reactor in molten

condition. Methanol is added in the reactor

along with catalyst (NaOH). Str i r for two hours.

After completion of reaction remove Glycerine

layer from bottom. Excess methanol is then

recovered by heating the mass. After recovery

of methanol, Transfer the reactor mass

separator for washing & than drying. On

completion of drying, f inal product is f laked to

recover Methyl Ricinoleate. The process f low

diagram is given at Annexure 8D.

5. HYDROGENATED METHYL RICINOLEATE

Hydrogenated Castor Oi l is taken in to reactor

in molten condition. Methanol is added in the

reactor along with catalyst (NaOH). Stri r for two

hours. After completion of reaction remove

Glycerine layer from bottom. Excess methanol

is then recovered by heating the mass. After

recovery of methanol, Transfer the reactor mass

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separator for washing & than drying. On

completion of drying, f inal product is f laked to

recover Hydrogenated Methyl Ricinoliate. Flow

chart is given at Annexure-8-E

6. PROCESS OF UNDECYLENIC ACID

Methyl Ricinoleate is passed through heating

zone in the temperature of around 7000 C

during this process methyl Undecylenic acid

and Heptaldehyde acid are separated,

Heptaldehyde crude is disti l led and get

Heptaldehyde about 98 %.

Methyl Undecylenic acid is spli t in high pressure

and high temperature autoclave with water

and crude Undecylenic acid get. Balance is

disti l lated residue. Flow chart is given at

Annexure-8-F

2.19 SAFETY MEASURES

1. Separate Tank Farm

2. Dyke wall to tanks

3. Handling of liquids by closed system.

4. Electric Equipments & fitting are flameproof type

5. Earthing to the tanks and equipments

6. Bonding to f lange couplings and joints on the

pipeline.

7. Provisions of spark arrestor / muffler to the exhaust

pipe of auto motive tankers, coming for unloading

purpose.

8. Flexible earthing to vehicles

9. Smoking is prohibited

10. Safety training & education

11. Introduction of Work Permit System

12. Only single entry to the Unit

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13. Provision of Fi re Extinguishers

14. Fi rst Aid Box

15. Installation of Siren

16. Emergency Control Centre (Office Room can be used)

17. Marking of Assembly Points

18. Disclosure of Information to all workers, person and

operatives.

19. Displyament of Safety Poster

20. Declaration of Health & Safety Policy

21. Preparation of Off Site emergency Plan & conduction

of mock dri l l

22. Provision of D. G. Set

23. Pipe lines are used liquid material & colour code

system for pipe line is adopted.

24. ‘No Smoking Zone’ declared.

25. Issue of Personnel Protective Equipments

26. All exposed various moving pars of machines are

provided with suitable adequate guards.

27. MSDS are avai lable for all hazardous chemicals.

28. Preventative maintenance is carried out.

29. Operatives and workers are trained for their

respective jobs and Safety training is also given.

30. No major accident is so far recorded in the past.

2.20 STRESS & STRAIN CAUSED

DURING NORMAL OPERATION

Stress & Strain occur in manual and in mental work, yet its

sensation is appreciated in the mind only. The result of

Stress and Strain on worker generally inefficient and

accident prone is a fair ly recent one and not always

appreciated. The muscular stress and Fatigue, mental and

nervous fatigue, Boredom and Chronic fatigue, improper

environment, climate, l ighting, noise, vibration, venti lation,

some effect of Insomnia (frequent s leep problem) etc are

the stress & strain effects. There are nearly always potential

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accidental hazards.

2.21 Maximum credible Scenario

The maximum credible loss Scenarios for On Site Emergency

is identif ied for the Unit based on above discussed criteria

are given in following table;

Sr. No. Scenario Probable area

1. BLEVE Catastrophic failure of Hexane & Methanol Truck Tanker

2. FIRE Puncture on Hexane & Methanol Truck Tanker

3. VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION Hydrogen Skid outlet pipeline failure

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3.1 INTRODUCTION

A major emergency is industrial unit is one which has

potential to cause scenarios injury or loss of l i fe. I t may

cause extensive damage to property and service disruption

both side or may out side of instal lation. Wherever, be the

causative factors l ike human error, equipment fai lure,

earthquake, l ighting, Vehicle crush, Bui lding collapse, fi re in

neighbourhood, sabotage etc; they wi l l normally happened,

but it wi l l be any of fol lowing forms:

Viz, 1. Fi re

2. Explosion

3. Flammable Gas Release

3.2 EMERGENCY Structure

Detai ls on the emergency actions during the emergency

period are explained below. However, every incident

requires special treatment, because, i t is difficult to predict

type of situation wi l l take place & how it turn and how

person wi l l react. Following actions are suggestive and guide

l ine to tackle the incident;

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3.3 Handling of EMERGENCY

Various actions are required to be initiated according to the

situation. However, some systematic codification is required

to control such emergency, the following sequential actions

wi l l be helpful to contain emergency.

3.4.1 INCIDENT There are possibi li t ies of various types of accidents or

mishaps occurring in the factory premises. When any

incident occurs, i t should be distinguished immediately

with the subsequent development or seriousness of

such occurrence. So, subsequent response actions

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can be taken immediately to handle & control the

si tuation. The person noticing (First Eye Witness) the ”Fire” or

“Emergency” condition shall shout " Fire, F ire, Fire " or

“Emergency” and also manually sound the nearest

bell kept in the field for attracting the attention of the

personnel in the near vicinity.

Then, he wil l rush to the control room and inform

Supervisor/ Officer.

• Exact Location of Fi re/ Occurrence

• Type of Fi re/ Occurrence, and involved

substances

• Time, when noticed,

In case of “Fire”, he shall immediately Attack the Fi re

with, appropriate type of fi rst-aid fire fighting

extinguishers avai lable everywhere in the field and

ask help of avai lable trained persons at si te.

On receiving “Message of Fire / Occurrence”, One of

the Supervisor wi l l proceed to the trouble spot and

Other may remain avai lable in control room for

guidance and coordination.

The Supervisor wi l l access the si tuation, consulting with

technical persons then, he wi l l hold the charge of

“Incident Controller” and wi l l inform immediately to

Site Main Controller [Sr. Terminal Manager]. On

consultation and accessing situation, Site Main

Controller wi l l order to operate ON-SITE EMERGENCY

PLAN and declare emergency.

Response actions shall be initiated immediately by the

concerned Team-Heads with their members, by use of

avai lable resources as per instruction by IC. Looking

to the situation, information regarding development

of incident, type & nature of incident, in case more

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help needed etc. shall be communicated to the

Emergency Control Centre by IC.

Unit Head/General Manger (Engg) / Shift In Charge

wi ll initiate following actions as “Incident Controller”.

• Inform the employees / persons working around to

leave the area immediately & go to the safe

assembly point.

• Continuous responding actions, with the use of Key

Persons, Essential Workers and other helps, t i l l

control the incident.

• Constantly brief & inform the higher authority.

• On control l ing the situation, he wi l l communicate

the SMC & Higher authority. On hearing, SMC wil l

assure the safety of the area, & then declare

withdrawal of Emergency and ask to sound the

si ren accordingly.

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Chart of Communication

Any Incident Serious Bodily

Injury Death

Any Fire/ Gas Leakage or Chemical

Liquid spillage/ Collapse of Crane/

Building

Immediately Notify to Supervisor

Incharge or Operational Head

Manager / Unit Head Safety Officer

Advice communication to requisite Authorisation

Monitor & Assess Situation

Declaration of Emergency On Site

If Off Site, then intimate local Crisis

Group or district Crisis Group

Hand over the control, Assistant helps to call co-

ordinate to LCG/DCG

Inform – Fire, Police, Medical (If

required)

Suspend Operations /

Process

Arrange for handling &

controlling by SMC + IC + EW / KP

Inform – Adjacent Factories

Intimation to Statutory Authorisation FI + Collector

+ GPCB Officer

Siren

Fire Brigade

First Aid Team

Safe Assembly & Control

Emergency Team – Fitter, Electrical, Welder, Operatives, helpers etc.

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3.4 Responding actions BY

DESIGNATED PERSON

The role & responsibi li ty as prescribed against designated

person has to perform the response activities during the real

emergency as specified below; however, it may differ

according to the prevai ling situation.

3.5.1 ACTION BY SITE MAIN CONTROLLER (SMC)

On receiving information on Incident / Accident or emergency

Si te Main Controller [Unit Head] wi l l be in overall In-

charge of the Situation.

1. He wil l reach to the incident place.

2. He wi l l access the si tuation in consultation with

Incident control ler and declare emergency

accordingly.

3. He wi l l ensure the mobilization of emergency

response according to scale of emergency.

4. He wi l l ensure the constant avai labi li ty of IC,

section head and other required persons at the

site of incident.

5. He wi l l ensure that the information wi l l reach to

the Head Office.

6. He wi ll ensure necessary shut down of other

related plants to control the emergency

situation.

7. He wi l l ensure adequacy of fi re f ighting and

rescue aid at site to control the incident.

8. He wi ll ensure that all statutory authorities (such

as Distr ict Collector, local crisis group, Director;

Industrial Safety & Health, Explosive Department,

GPCB Authority, Electric Inspector, (as

applicable) are kept informed about the

incident.

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9. He wi l l ensure that in case of scale of emergency

turn to level - 2 or level - 3, Local Crisis Group/

Distr ict Crisis Group called upon at the scene of

site.

10. He wil l ensure that injured or casualties are

receiving adequate attention for medical

treatment and their relatives are kept informed.

11. He wi l l continuously review the possible

development of emergency and rescue

operation.

12. He wi l l ensure the counting of total numbers of

persons at si te, l i st of missing/trapped person,

injured person and fatality. Further, he wi l l ensure

to convey the message to the relatives of injured

or death.

13. He wi l l ensure press release about the incident

for information to the public.

14. I f the scale of emergency escalates to level-2,or

3, he wi l l ensure that information is passed on to

the public likely to be affected in the area.

15. He wi l l ensure that victims are get rehabi litation,

i f required.

16. Arrange chronological records on the

emergency.

17. On control l ing situation and attaining the

normalcy, he reviews the situation with IC,

Managers and other technical persons then he

wi l l declare the withdrawal of emergency.

18. He wi l l constitute the internal investigation

committee to investigate the incident,

recommendations, and corrective measures to

prevent reoccurrence of incident.

19. Before restarting the receiving and dispatch

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operation , he ensures environment clearance

from the Environment expert for safe restarting

and from Director, Industrial Safety & Health as

required.

20. He wi l l ensure reporting to the statutory

authorities in the format as prescribed.

3.5.2 ACTION BY INCIDENT CONTROLLER (I.C.)

General Manger (Engg) / Shift In Charge wi l l work as

Incident Control ler.

Further, He wi l l hold the position of SMC, ti l l SMC wil l

take over. IC has to perform the following duties,

along with other duty as directed by SMC.

1. Immediately rush to emergency site and access

the si tuation. Further, he starts the handling and

control l ing actions on consultation with SMC.

2. He wi l l ensure that emergency information

passed to the all Key persons, Essential workers

(Team-Heads), emergency services i .e. Fi re,

Engineering, Emergency Control Centre , etc for

responding actions by their teams and avai lable

at incident si te.

3. He ensures that all steps are taken for

mechanical and electrical isolation to control

the situation.

4. He ensures co-ordination among all working

teams & agencies on the si te.

5. He ensures that all team-persons avai lable at site

are deployed for emergency handling such as

Fire Fighting, Causali ty searching, rescue and

fi rst aid.

6. He ensures the avai labi li ty of equipments,

machineries and devices avai lable in the

terminal is mobi lized at si te for li fting and shifting

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

47

of material from the scene of emergency site.

7. He passes on the information about emergency

to ECC, Administration Department, other

respective departments.

8. He wi l l ensure that affected area is barricaded

and evidences of incident are retained at site.

9. He wi ll take all appropriate decision, on

consulting with SMC, for the operation / running

of the terminal activities.

10. He wi l l ensure that truck drivers & cleaners has

instructed to assemble at Safe Assembly Point.

11. He wi l l ensure to post the person at strategic

location to guide the route of incident to the

out-side agencies/authority.

12. He wi ll keep update about the happening and

development on si te to SMC.

13. On withdrawal of emergency and getting

clearance from SMC, he wi l l initiate the start-up

of the terminal activities.

14. He wi ll ensure to preserve all documents,

relevant evidence etc. for subsequent

investigation & inquiry.

15. Minimize damage to property, environment and

material loss by taking necessary action within

control.

16. Dy. Incident controller wi l l perform the role as

Incident Controller ti l l the arrival of incident

controller.

3.5.3 ACTION BY KEY PERSONS

Key persons to convey the messages properly, in time,

& proper men, have to carry out the specific

performance under directions of IC/ SMC. As

described previously the various officers from the

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48

organisations have to carry out certain specific

functions and they wil l be treated as key persons in

On Site Emergency Plan. The List of Key Personnel as

per Annexure - .

3.5.4 Essential Workers (Maintenance Workman, Helper, others ):

1. To reach the Fi re Spot along with the Fire Entry Suit.

2. To report situation of the fi re spot to the incharge

3. To take care of 2nd emergency if i t occurs

simultaneously.

4. To put on Fire Entry Suit on instructions of Team

Leader and act according to the instructions given

by the leader.

3.5.5 Responsibilities of Security Guard :

1. To stop the entry of al l the unauthorized

persons into the Terminal and control the

traffic.

2. To Guide the fi re tenders etc. for the approach

to Fi re Spot & to Keep the route open to

faci li tate external help.

3. To maintain discipline in the truck parking area.

4. To control and disperse the crowd from the

main gate.

5. The team wi l l insist all the persons other then

the employees of IOCL to vacate the Terminal.

3.5.6 Action by other officials

The quali fied, experienced, senior officers shall be

selected to carry out l iaison, communication, pool out

resources, conveying messages etc emergency duties

as per instruction by SMC/IC or si tuations and they

have to perform their duties on urgent basis. Further,

they have to ensure that proper messages along with

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49

statutory documents/formats/detai ls should reach to

the Factory Inspector/DISH and other authorities in

time. They wi l l also keep liaison with Explosive

Department, GPCB, etc. They wi l l perform liaison work

with hospital Authorities for admitted injured person

and inform their relatives. I f emergency extend for

prolong period, then they wi l l arrange for water and

food as per prevai ling si tuation under consultation

with SMC.

3.5.7 ACTION BY NON-ESSENTIAL WORKERS /

CONTRACTORS’ PERSONS / VISITORS etc.

The persons, who are not taking part/ allotted duties

during emergency, they suppose to rush immediately

at safe assembly point upon hearing emergency

si ren/alarm;

• Leave site immediately by safest route to

assembly point

• Proceed at right angels to wind direction

• Do not re-enter si te unless al l clear si ren or

directed personally or via PA system.

• Assist in head count at assembly point

• Inform contractor personnel to stop work upon

hearing fi re / gas/ emergency si ren/ alarm and

ask to assemble at the main security gate or

Assembly Point.

• Do not go to incident place, unless specifically

instructed by Emergency in-charge.

• Avoid Panic

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3.5.8 EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE

Shift Manager's cabin/Shift office wi l l be uti lized as

emergency control centre during the disaster. This is

furnished with external and internal telephones

connections; l ist of essential telephone numbers etc.

are avai lable.

3.5.9 SAFE ASSEMBLY POINTS

In affected and vulnerable areas, all non-essential

personnel l ike workers (who are not assigned any

emergency duty) shall evacuate the area and

assemble at a specified point. The assembly point has

been clearly identif ied where these personnel shall

assemble in case of any emergency.

The assembly point for this terminal has been kept

near the Old Duty room and the Rescue Team In

charge shall ensure that the non-essential persons

have assembled at this point.The Safe Assembly Points

are mentioned at marked in the Lay out plan.

3.5.10 Alarm & Siren

Electrical si ren is provided along with hand operated.

3.5.11 EMERGENCY EXITS

The emergency exit route is pre-decided and the

boards are displayed accordingly so person can

come out safely from the si te during emergency.

3.5.12 SHUT DOWN PROCEDURE

We cannot neglect the adverse effect of the Terminal

dispatch activities during emergency. Therefore, it is

advisable and safe that the safe shut down procedure

should be adopted, i f running. Fi rst of all main

electrical supply l ine should be cut-off. Simi larly, the

pipelines carrying flammable l iquid or chemicals are

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

51

to be isolated immediately.

Arrange to transfer or remove the flammable, toxic,

dangerous, explosive, poisonous materials, goods,

cylinders, drums etc. to safe place or try to isolate

from the fi re. Arrange the water shower on flammable

storage tanks to keep it in cool conditions, i f near the

fi re. The shut down procedure should be laid down in

the safety manual, which wi l l be useful during such

emergency.

3.5.13 DISCIPLINE

The plan assumes certain discipline amongst workers

/persons at si te during emergency, which includes as ;

• Do not get panicky.

• Do not approach the si te of incident, as a

spectator.

• Do not engage telephone unnecessary.

• Do not move about unnecessary.

• Do not approach unnecessari ly for information

or more inquiry.

• Arrange medical f i rst aid care to the injured.

• Do not al low unnecessary crowd nearby

incident.

3.5 NEEDFULL

INFORMATION/DETAILS

The detai ls in respect of chemical emergency are prepared

and are provided in the annexure. These information should

be updated time to time.

3.6 Training & Skill Development

Employees need to be aware of the emergency plan

avai lable at the si te. They wi l l need to clearly understand

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52

their roles and responsibi li t ies during an emergency. The

success of an emergency plan depends largely on the level

of awareness of the plan by the employees, for, their

response directly is based on the awareness level. Employees

need to be aware of the basic contents of the plan, the

evacuation procedures, the si te assembly points, handling of

the fi re fighting equipment and also administering fi rst aid.

Sites wi l l need to have a clear training plan for their

employees and also check their level of understanding.

a. Training

Employees - Emergency Plan & Dri l l

Contractors - Evacuation procedure, Assembly

point

Visitor - Evacuation procedure, Assembly

point

Emergency Control Team - Role Play

b. Skill Development

Fi re Fighters - Minimum X Persons per shift

Fi rst Aiders - Minimum X Persons per shift.

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4.1 NATURAL CALAMITIES

Extrinsic factors l ike possibi li t ies of Floods, Heavy Rain,

l ightening, Tsunami, Storm, Missi le Attack during war,

Sabotage & Bomb Threats, etc; have been considered

for response actions, as follows. 4.2 RESPONSE FOR FLOOD

1). Source

Following conditions are the sources of f looding inside

the plant or bui ldings;

a. Cloud bursting

b. Heavy Rainfall

c. Cyclone

d. Tsunami

e. High tide in River or Ocean

2). RESPONSE

a. Assess the si tuation and inform Emergency Control

Centre.

b. Go to the high level, i f escape is not possible

c. Shut off hazardous chemical supply valves of LPG,

LNG, Chlorine, close the Furnace operation.

d. Remain calm, reassuring. Alert staff to potential

hazards.

e. Look for loose or downed power l ines. Avoid area.

Report problems to Emergency Control Centre

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54

f. Look for electrical system damage: sparks,

broken/frayed wires, smell of burning insulation.

Turn off electricity at main switch if you can without

r isk.

g. Do Not Re-enter the Bui lding unti l declared safe by

authority or emergency management officials.

h. Stay well clear of any downed or damaged power

l ines. Establish a safe distance from the lines and

report the incident to the responsible authority.

Only Adequately-trained electrician wi l l handle

damaged power l ines for corrective action.

i . Electrician wi l l f i rst assess the hazards present in

order to minimize the chances of exaggerating the

situation. Idle the lines involved wi l l be de-

energized

j. When working on downed or damaged power lines,

electrical workers must uti l ize proper electrical safe

work practices and proper personal protective

equipment.

3). Do & Don’ts

• Remember flood-warning signs and alert signals

• Go to the safest routes to shelters

• Don't walk through flooded areas. As l i tt le as six

inches of moving water can knock you off your

feet.

• Stay away from downed power l ines and electrical

wires. Electrocution is another major source of

deaths in f loods. Remember electric current passes

easi ly through water

• I f the water start to r ise inside your plant/Bui lding

before you have evacuated, go to the higher

levels.

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55

• Take dry clothing, a flashlight and a portable radio

with you. Then, wait for help.

• Don't try to swim; wait for resource to come to you.

• I f outdoors, climb to high ground and stay there.

• There is a possibi li ty of spread of water born

diseases after f lood, and hence medical treatment

shall be taken immediately.

• Inspect plant/Bui lding for any cracks or other

damage. Check all the walls, f loor, cei ling, doors

and windows, so that any chance of house fall ing

down can be ascertained and you wi l l be aware

about the imminent danger.

• Move to your process/plant only when instructed by

the HOD. It i s not safe to believe that the problems

have ended after the f loodwaters have receded.

• Check properly all the electric circuits, f loor level

furnace, boi lers, gas cylinders, or electric

equipments like motor pump etc. Check whether

any inflammable or explosive material has not

entered along with the floodwater.

• Sewerage system wi l l be checked and any damage

shall be repaired immediately so as to curtai l

spread of diseases.

• Empty the water clogged in the basement with

help of De watering pump so that damage to

infrastructure can be minimised.

• Rescue work wi l l be undertaken immediately after

f lood situation as per the instruction. Do not fol low

any shortcut for rescue work.

• Do not try to leave the safe shelter to go back

plant/home unti l the official declare normalcy after

f lood and instruction to return home/plant are not

given.

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4.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FOR

HANDLING HEAVY RAIN

Stay out of the basement.

Stop all jobs outside.

Heavy rain many times accompanies high-speed wind.

Stop all work at height.

Disconnection power supply to all electrical Machines

in open yards.

Cover all JBs\DBs where chances of water coming to it

are there.

Keep Gumboot, Raincoat and umbrellas ready.

Keep all dewatering pumps ready in working order.

Move valuable objects upstairs only i f safe to do so,

without straining yourself

Keep yourself indoors and away from rivers and creeks

Stay away from low/lying areas

Avoid walking through a waterlogged area on foot; you

can get swept away easi ly.

Assemble everyone inside shelters or bui ldings.

Close windows and blinds.

Evacuate rooms that might bear the ful l force of the

wind

Avoid enclosures that have long roof spans.

Keep the office radio tuned to a local station for

current advisory information

4.4 Response FOR TSUNAMI

The phenomenon Tsunami is a series of travell ing ocean

waves of extremely long length generated primari ly by

earthquakes occurring below or near the ocean floor;

occurrence of tsunami:

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57

• BEFORE

Be familiar with the tsunami signals. People l iving

along the coast should consider an earthquake or a

sizable ground rumbling as a warning signal. A

noticeable rapid rise or fall in coastal waters is also a

sign that a tsunami is approaching.

• DURING

Listen to a radio or television to get the latest

emergency information, and be ready to

evacuate i f asked to do so.

I f you hear a tsunami warning, move at one to

higher ground and stay there unti l local

authorities say i t is safe to return home.

Move in an orderly, clam and safe manner to the

evacuation.

Stay away from the beach. Never go down to the

beach to watch a tsunami come in.

Return home/plant only after authorities advise i t

is safe to do so.

• AFTER

Stay tuned to a battery- operated radio for the

latest emergency information.

Help injured or trapped persons.

Stay out of damaged bui ldings. Return

plant/home only when authorities say i t is safe.

Enter your home with caution. Use a flashlight/

torch when entering damaged bui ldings. Check

for electrical shorts and l ive wires. Do not use

appliances or l ights unti l an electrician has

checked the electrical system.

Open windows and doors to help dry the bui lding.

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Shovel mud while it is st i l l moist to give walls and

floors an opportunity to dry.

Check Accumulated mud & do not drink, drinking

water retained in the pot or container.

I f Fresh food that has come in contact with

f loodwater may be contaminated and wi l l be

thrown out.

4.5 RESPONSE FOR THUNDERSTORM &

LIGHTNING STRIKES

• BEFORE

Thunderstorm is invariably accompanied by lightning A

single stroke of l ightning has 125,000,00 volts of

electricity. That’s enough power to light a 100-watt

l ight bulb for more than 3 months, or enough to

seriously hurt or to ski l l someone. Know what steps to

take in the event of an oncoming thunder storm &

lightning. Lightning is something you should not be

careless about, so seek a safe shelter immediately! Be

warned, l ightning can and does str ike just about any

object in i ts path. When you see lightning, fol low these

safety rules.

• INDOORS

o Stay or go indoors! If you hear thunder, don’t go

outside unless absolutely necessary. Stand clear

from windows, doors, and electrical appliances.

o Stay away from anything that could conduct

electricity. This includes electric, l ines, Electric

Instruments, wires etc and phones Unplug

appliances well before a storm str ikes – never

during.

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59

o Don’t use any plug-in electrical appliances like TV,

music systems, mixers blenders, i ron press, hair

dryers, or electric razors. I f l ightning str ikes your

house they can conduct the charge to you.

o Don’t use the telephone during the storm. Lightning

may str ike telephone l ines outside. Use the

telephone only for emergencies quickly. Avoid

contact with piping including sinks, baths and

faucets.

• OUTDOORS

o When outdoors, seek shelter from lightning!

Bui ldings are best for shelter, but i f no bui ldings are

avai lable, you can find protection in a cave, ditch,

or a campus. Trees are not good cover. Tall trees

attract lightning. Never use a tree as a shelter.

o Stay in your vehicle i f you are travelling, vehicles

gives you excellent lightning protection. Get in a

hard topped car.

o I f you can’t find shelter avoid the tallest object in

the area. I f only isolated trees are nearly, your best

protection is to crouch in the open, keeping twice

as far away from isolated trees are high. Avoid

areas that are higher than the surrounding

landscape.

o Don’t use metal object s outside. Keep away from

metal objects including bikes, electric or telephone

poles, fencing, machinery etc.

o Get out of the water. Immediately get out and

away from pools, lakes, and other bodies of water.

o When you feel the electrical charge – if your hair

stands on end or your skin tingles- l ightning may be

about to str ike near you. Immediately crouch down

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and cover your ears. Do not l ie down or place your

hands on the ground.

o Victims of lightning shock be administered CPM

(Cardio pulmonary resuscitation) i .e. Arti ficial

respiration, i f necessary. Seek medical aid.

4.6 RESPONSE FOR CYCLONE/

HURRICANE (COASTAL AREA) &

TORNADO

The nature of a hurricane provides for more warning than

`other natural and weather disasters. A hurricane watch

issued when a hurricane becomes a threat to a coastal area.

A hurricane warning is issued when hurricane winds of 74

mph or higher, or combination of dangerously high water

and rough seas, are expected in the area within 24 hours.

• Once a hurricane watch has been issued:

Stay calm and await instructions from the Emergency

Coordinator or the designated official.

Continue to monitor local TV and radio stations for

instructions.

Move early out of low-lying areas or from the coast,

at the request of officials.

I f you are on high ground, away from the coast and

plan to stay, secure the bui lding, moving all loose

items indoors and close windows and openings.

Collect drinking water in appropriate containers.

• Once a hurricane warning has been issued:

Be ready to evacuate as directed by the Emergency

Coordinator and/or the designated official.

• During a hurricane:

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Remain indoors and consider the following:

Small interior rooms on the lowest f loor and without

windows,

Remain on the lowest f loor away from doors and

windows, and Rooms constructed with reinforced

concrete, brick, or block with no windows.

Stay away from outside walls and windows.

Use arms to protect head and neck.

Remain sheltered unti l the tornado threat is

announced to be over.

4.7 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FOR

EARTHQUAKE

• DURING EARTHQUAKE, If indoors:

1. Take cover under a piece of heavy furniture or

against an inside wall and hold on.

2. Stay inside.

3. The most dangerous thing to do during the shaking of

an earthquake is to try to leave the bui lding because

objects can fal l on you.

• DURING EARTHQUAKE, If outdoors:

1. Move into the open, away from bui ldings, street

l ights, and uti l i ty wires.

2. Once in the open, stay there unti l the shaking stops.

• DURING EARTHQUAKE , If in a moving vehicle:

1. Stop quickly and stay in the vehicle.

2. Move to a clear area away from bui ldings, trees,

overpasses, or uti l i ty wires.

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3. Once the shaking has stopped, proceed with

caution. Avoid bridges or ramps that might have

been damaged by the quake.

• AFTER EARTHQUAKE

1. Be prepared for aftershocks. Although smaller than

the main shock, aftershocks cause additional

damage and may bring weaken structures down.

Aftershocks can occur in the fi rst hours, days,

weeks, or even months after the quake.

2. Help injured or trapped persons.

3. Give fi rst aid where appropriate.

4. Do not move seriously injured persons unless they

are in immediate danger of further injury.

5. Call for help.

6. Listen to a battery-operated radio or television for

the latest emergency information.

7. Remember to help your neighbours who may

require special assistance--infants, the elderly, and

people with disabi li t ies.

8. Stay out of damaged bui ldings.

9. Return home only when authorit ies say i t is safe.

10. Use the telephone only for emergency calls.

11. Clean up spi l led chemicals or other f lammable

liquids immediately. Leave the area if you smell gas

or fumes.

4.8 RESPONSE FOR Bomb Threat

(Terrorism)

In the case of a threat being received at the site, the

telephonist / security staff wi l l record detai ls of the threat

using the Bomb Threat Checklist as per Appendix - T. They wi l l

then, immediately inform the control Room (F & S)/ Security

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63

Incharge. He wi l l decide whether to alert the rest of the

Emergency Response Team.

The following factors are to be considered:

1. The seriousness of the threat.

2. Resources avai lable at the time. (e.g. For threats

received out of normal working hours)

3. communication with local authorities, i .e. Police / Fi re

Services

4. Act on advice from local authorities.

5. Decide on the following action:

a) To search and evacuate i f anything suspicious is

found

b) Evacuate and then search.

c) To evacuate immediately.

d) In the event of a search, i f an area was specified

in the call, this would be searched first.

e) At our site the most vulnerable areas to be

searched fi rst i f no area is specified.

A) ACTION FOR PERSON WORKING IN AN AREA WHERE A SUSPECT PACKAGE, PARCEL OR LETTER BOMB IS FOUND

1. Do not touch or temper with the object.

2. Report finding to Security/Emergency, Control

Room (F & S) immediately.

3. Evacuate the immediate area.

4. Do not create panic.

B) SUSPECT VEHICLE Action 1. Check person’s car registration list (Security)

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2. Commercial vehicles currently on the si te during an

emergency wil l be documented in the security

record book.

3. Inform Security officer/Plant manager/HR manager.

4. Inform Local authorities/Emergency control Centre (F

& S).

C) SUSPECT PERSONS / INDIVIDUALS

Action 1. Inform Security/Human Resources.

2. Do not approach, wait for security.

3. Observe from a distance if possible and make

notes.

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5.1 Off Site Emergency

When the industrial disaster can not controlled by using unit’s

own resources, then, it is necessary to involve Govt.

resources to control such emergency. Even when Industrial

disaster spread outside its premises and likely to affect or

affect surrounding population, other industr ies, etc. then also

Govt. resources needed to control i t. This emergency called

as Off Site Emergency & it wi l l be controlled by either Local

or Distr ict authority under DCG/ LCG.

The emergency location wil l not change but the line of

actions wi l l be govern by crisis group instead of units’

authorities. The unit’s own Authority has to extend faci lit ies,

l iaison, and coordination to the Local Crisis Group or District

Crisis Group as per requirement or si tuation.

5.2 Outside Participation/

Government Body

The emergency operations outside the factory premises are

not different in character from those applicable to on sites.

Hence the approach to and preparation for on-site

emergency detai led in previous chapters wi l l be applicable

in case of Off-Site action also. However, the following points

should be kept in mind:

The groups involved are not as enlightened and

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66

responsible as those within the factory.

In off-si te actions, the local participants particularly

the administration, fi re & police play the dominant

role. Industrial management has a limited and

comparatively submissive role.

The diversities of the problems and response are

bigger.

Humanitarian work assumes more importance.

The correct management strategy in this si tuation wi l l be to

involve the local participants’ fully in emergency operation

and provide technical and financial support to them to

manage the emergency. This task is more difficult than

managing the on-site emergency operation in many ways

and call for elaborate and consistent efforts.

5.3 Action By SMC & IC- During Off

Site Emergency In Brief

The Unit’s Si te Main Controller, Incident Controller and

Incharge of ECC have to perform the duties and

responsibi li ty different from On Site Emergency Plan. The

Government Authority (Chairman of DCG/LCG) wi l l take

charge of si tuation and they wil l be called as “Site Main

Controller” or chairman for Off Site Emergency plan.

Therefore, the Unit’s Site Main Control ler wi l l act “Site Co-

ordinator”, Incident Controller wi l l act as “Incident Co-

ordinator” and Incharge of ECC wi l l act as Liaison Man,

which is shown in chart as below;

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5.3.1 DUTIES OF SITE COORDINATOR [SMC] (Now Site Coordinator)

During Off Site Emergency, Unit’s Site Main Controller

becomes Co-ordinator and his duties are as fol lows:

1. He has to extend liaison, co-ordination and

faci li ty to the Chairman of local crisis group or

Chairman of distr ict crisis group.

2. He has to explain about disaster, his efforts and

what type of help is needed in brief to Chairman

of Local Crisis group (Govt. Authority) and

Central Control Room.

3. He has to communicate about avai lable

resources, fatali ty/injury to his own employees

and probable affected surrounding area with

maximum credible scenario.

4. He has to keep ready with maps, layout of unit,

records, documents, On Site Emergency Plan,

M.S.D.S., Detai ls of Process Hazards, Safe

Handling procedure on specific hazardous

chemicals etc.

5. He has to advise for special medical treatment

and availabi li ty of antidotes.

Chairman of District Crisis Group /Local Crisis Group

(Govt. Authority) Central Control Room

Site Co-ordinator (Unit’s Site Main

Controller)

Incident Co-ordinator (Unit’s Site Main

Controller)

Unit’s Facilities

Liaison (I/C of ECC)

Expert Group

Response Agencies

Working Action Group

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6. He has to divert Communication system for Off

site emergency.

7. He has to divert al l avai lable resource for Off si te

emergency.

8. He has to provide aid and assistance for Off Si te

Emergency.

9. Shutdown plant safely, i f hazards is not involved.

10. He has to reorganize the work of Key personal &

essential worker.

11. Arrangement of food, water, rest etc. for the

person engaged in the duty.

12. Arrangement of disposal of contaminated water,

eff luent, solid waste, etc.

5.3.2 DUTIES OF INCHARGE OF EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE (Now Liaison Man)

The Unit’s Incharge of Emergency Control Centre have

to perform the duties as liaison man and to

communicate messages to emergency services,

outsiders and as instructed by authorities of DCG /

LCG.

5.3.3 WITHDRAWAL OF EMERGENCY (CALLING OFF EMERGENCY)

The emergency declared both within the works and

the community should be called off only after making

sure that the incident is brought under control and

that no further dangers are possible to property or l i fe.

The Site Main control ler, Govt. Authority in

consultation with the work groups concerned, should

take a decision to this effect. The decision has to be

based on prudence and actual information of

assessment by work groups and should not be one

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based or hearsay or speculation. A system of

documentation recording the recommendations of

work groups, opinion of senior officers and

endorsement by the works main control ler – wi l l be a

check against hurried decisions.

Once the decision to call off the emergency is taken,

the concerned persons should be informed. The co-

ordinator of the off-si te emergency operation and

local participants has to be informed. The co-

ordinator in turn wi l l give information to the other local

participants and members of the public.

Even after calling off the emergency certain

operations may need to continue. Hence the work

groups should be released only after ensuring that the

jobs attended to by them are over. The works main

controller should take the decision. Also after the

cessation of emergency the plant involved should not

be left unmanned for quite some time and should be

watched.

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6.1 POST EMERGENCY

The following actions are suggested as per prevail ing

situation depending upon the level of emergency.

6.1.1 IN CASE OF ON-SITE EMERGENCY

After controll ing the emergency and ascertained for

no possibi li ty of re-occurance, the management wi l l

indicate the following actions.

(1) Declare termination of Emergency & blow the

si ren accordingly.

(2) Disclose the authentic statement on incident to

the authority & news media.

(3) Collect & preserve the documents, records,

instruments, evidence etc. on incident.

(4) To set up the internal enquiry committee,

appearing the internal or external expert person.

(5) Cleaning work after obtaining the permission from

Authority.

(6) Preparation of restarting the process work.

(7) Detai led related work & procedure, as described

below ;

• Sound the emergency clear si ren.

• The rehabi li tation work wi l l start in the

affected area.

• To ensure that all f i res are extinguished and

there is no r isk of re-ignition, before starting

work.

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

71

• To ensure that there is no chance of

secondary explosion.

• Do not disturb wreckage and debris except to

rescue the injured or recover bodies, unti l

permitted to do so by statutory authority.

• All victims, dead or alive, are systematically

identi fied and keep the records accordingly.

Give information to their relatives, i f asked.

• Record all relevant information.

• Take photograph / video or make suitable

sketches of the incidence.

• Report the accident / incident, with detai ls, to

the statutory authorit ies, i f not informed.

• Permission for restarting is required to be

obtained from statutory authorities.

• Keep registers for recording the entries,

detai ls, inventory, l i st of persons etc. &

preserve the all the documents, log books,

maps, registers all records taken from the site.

• Keep the record of help; Co-operation,

Mutual aiders sought from others & write

thanks giving letters to them.

• Arrange the compensations to the affected

persons, injured persons, dead etc. as per

circumstance and i f applicable, keep the

records accordingly.

• Estimate the expenses incurred during the

emergency.

• Estimate the various expenses under different

head & prepare the total expenditures

statement.

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

72

• Appoint the internal committee to investigate

into the causes of the accident / incident, i f

necessary and get report.

6.1.2 IN CASE OF OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN:-

Being apex body during the Off-Site Emergency

Period, the Crisis Group wi ll get the report from

emergency services for safe rehabi li tation and

Pollution Control Authority for safe environment

condition and then decide the declaration of

termination of emergency. The authority may

constitute the enquiry committee, by appointing

inclusive of expert persons and ask to submit the said

report within specified period. Then, Crisis Group wi l l

ask the explanation from management on the said

report. On winding up the actions, the Crisis Groups

wi l l permit the management to clean and re-starting

the work for process and other related work.

6.2 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The accident is eye opening toward the irregulari ties.

Simi lar ly, the occurrence of major emergency directly

indicates the shortcomings or weaknesses of the plant,

handling method, transportation, working procedure, storage

procedure, unsafe condition or unsafe actions etc. I t may

reveal from the investigation or recommendations of the

committee.

Necessary corrective steps / actions in l ight of the

investigation report or findings are required to be taken to

ensure that such emergency accident does not repeat.

Therefore, modification, alterations, changes in operation,

instruction, process, and handling are suggested, should be

implemented accordingly to make working safe.

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

73

6.3 Learning From Emergency

Situations

At the end of the Emergency it wi l l be useful for the

emergency control team to meet and take stock of the

si tuation. It wi l l also recommended that a section of the

employees are included. The employees wi l l need to be

thanked for the efforts taken on their part during the

emergency.

Typically, learning on what right during the emergency

and the areas of concern wi l l need to be discussed.

Points on scope for improvement to be documented

and actioned with responsibi li t ies and time frame

assigned.

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

74

7.1 DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO

THE GENERAL PUBLIC

1. The management has taken ample steps to run the

terminal safely & has prepared the On-Site Emergency

plan to meet emergency, i f arise. However, an

emergency may strike at any time due to unavoidable

circumstances & beyond control by the management.

2. The probabi li ty of type of emergency depends upon the

operation, storage, of the hazardous chemicals, the

quantity and prevai ling weather conditions, etc.

3. The Declaration of emergency wil l indicate by sounding

si ren. The public in vicinity shall take prompt action to

protect them as instructed.

4. The following suggestions/actions are to be implemented

immediately, in case of any emergency arising in the

Factory and escalate outside:

4.1 Do’s

a. Shut down open flame, gas, electrical appliances

etc. to disconnect any sources of ignition, in case of

release of f lammable chemicals.

b. Smoking is prohibited.

c. Be calm, and try to come out safely from

emergency.

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

75

d. Shut down the windows, doors and sit in open

ground or terrace.

e. Follow the instruction and convey to others.

Ascertain the type of emergency and its gravity.

f. Allow animals to leave the place.

g. Listen, Radio, TV or Public Addressing System.

h. Rush to the safe shelter, as instructed by authority and

report there.

i . Inform the other person in vicinity and draw their

attention regarding the emergency to save their l i fe.

j . Rush to the crosswind direction in case of gas

dispersion & reach safe shelter immediately, ask

others fellow also.

k. Wash with plenty of water, i f, contaminated the body

part due to exposure of chemicals. Otherwise get

medical treatment immediately under intimation to

authorized person.

l. Offer your services of your abi li ty, knowledge, ski l l etc

in respect of emergency. Help and Co-operate the

handling or rescue operation during emergency.

4.2 Don’t 1. Do not move any vehicle near the site.

2. Do not carry mobile phone or any source of ignition,

l ike Bidi/Cigar/Lighter etc.

3. Do not move near the incident & don’t allow others.

4. Do not al low unnecessari ly crowd nearby incidence

place.

5. Don’t panic.

6. Do not believe in rumours.

7. Do not worry your home, save your l i fe.

8. Don’t keep engaged your radio, TV or other

communication system and get correct information

& inform accordingly amongst the public in vicinity.

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

76

9. Do not take any food or water i f contaminated; and

inform others.

5. On announcement of withdrawal of emergency or

clearance single/siren, you can start your routine work.

6. During emergency, you can deposit your statement on

emergency as experienced by you to the authority, i f

called for.

7. Co-operate, help & provide assistance to the

person(s)/authority during the Mock dri l l / exercise on

handling of emergency operation.

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

77

8.1 SUBJECT

Exercise / Rehearsal / Simulation on ON–SITE-EMERGENCY

PLAN, Considering any one of the event related with

hazardous chemical which may create maximum credible

scenario.

8.2 AIM

It i s necessary that all aspect of emergency plan is tested,

often to ensure that they carry out their responsibi li ty &

function as specified and in particular to:

8.2.1 Test the response from workers, emergency

services, and other responsible persons.

8.2.2 Test and evaluate the interaction of various

agencies / authorities involved and ensure that all

components are properly coordinated.

8.2.3 Evaluate the avai lable resources, equipments, i ts

effectiveness, accuracy etc.

8.2.4 Gain experience to create the confidence to

handle & control the emergency amongst the

participating persons/ workers.

8.2.5 The Mock dri l l of the on-site Emergency Plan is to

be conducted at least once in every six months

(Please see Rule 68 - J (12) (5) of Gujarat Factories

Rules 1963 (2004).

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

78

8.3 AUTHORITY OF EXERCISE /

REHEARSAL

The Director / Occupier is required to assume

responsibi li t ies & make decisions as seen to be legitimate.

8.4 TABLE DISCUSSION

The fi rst part of exercise is ‘Table Top’ exercise to test that

emergency plan do not interrupt the day-to-day running

of their concerns. This wil l identify the diff iculties involved

and practical approaches. The scenarios wi l l be decided

and consideration shall be given to l ive practical involving

all concerned at suitable intervals, in addition to those of

a theoretical nature.

8.5 BLUE PRINT

A blue print is prepared as guideline to act, accordingly in

a selected scenario. The detai ls, maps, affected areas,

role & responsibi li ty wi l l be specific and information wi l l be

supplied to all concerned persons. The scenario wi l l be

explained by co-ordinator. The On Site Emergency Plan

wi l l be helpful.

8.6 CODE-NAME FOR REHEARSAL

The code name shall be given to identify the case of

rehearsal not real incident. So that, on getting message,

there wi l l be no panicky amongst the operative person.

The code name wi ll not be indicated, in case of real

emergency str ikes. Further, the code name wil l be

announced for conveying the message to authority,

operative persons, etc whi le carrying out the

exercise/mock dri l l/rehearsal.

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

79

8.7 NATURE

Origin, Date & time, location and Duration of exercise etc.

wi l l be pre-decided in particular manner.

8.8 AFFECTED AREA

It i s the indication of the spread of disaster. This wi l l be

reflected in Blue print & give detai ls of original place,

units, surrounding identities, vi l lages, roads, locations etc.

8.9 EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE

An Emergency Control Centre wi l l be established for

exercise purpose where communication & other activities

can be performed. The control centre wi ll have

emergency faci li t ies. The required documents like On-Site

Emergency Plan, Detai ls on weather conditions, l i st of

persons to participate, Emergency scenario, maps,

affected areas, emergency telephone numbers, l ist of

hospitals, l i st of emergency vehicle & equipment wi l l be

kept ready. An experienced & expert person wi l l be

posted in Emergency Control Centre.

8.10 PREPARATION STAGE

The responsibi li t ies & duties wi l l be allotted to each group,

services and involving al l personnel. Educative meeting

wi l l be arranged to explain the role of each participant.

Blue print, scenarios and arrangements wi l l be discussed

at large. Charts, maps, Posters, Banners etc. wi l l be

prepared for good performance.

8.11 RESOURCES AND FACILITIES

Certain essential faci li t ies shall be provided to the

participants as required during actual emergency period.

Further, adequate resources shall be made avai lable to

handle the si tuation. The some dummy-person have to

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

80

select as to play and act as dead, serious injured, minor

injury for purpose of realization of scenario, and they wi l l

be identi fied by colour badges l ike, RED indicates as

dead, GREEN indicates as immediate admission to the

hospital for operation, YELLOW indicates fi rst aid

treatment, WHITE indicates no physical injury. The

Experienced person shall be invited as OBSERVERS and

separate identity cards shall be issued to them.

8.12 SEQUENTIAL ACTIONS

The whole exercise /rehearsal wi l l be arranged in

sequential actions as per on-site emergency plan. Thus

rehearsal wi l l be conducted, as actual performance.

8.13 OBSERVATIONS

The outsiders / third party wi l l perform the role of observers

and they wi l l submit their reports on various si te-

observations with shortcomings & good features.

8.14 DE-BRIEF MEETING

On completion of exercise, a de-brief meeting wi l l

convene to discuss the conducted exercise, give views on

performance of each areas; explain difficulties, resources,

l imitation, planning etc. All these observations, with

corrective steps wi l l be noted & reports wi l l be prepared.

8.15 PHOTOGRAPHS, VIDEO & PRESS

COVERAGE

Photography, videography shall be carried out for the

work performed, and that shall be used to educate

company’s employees, contract workers, etc.

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

81

8.16 format for

rehearsal/exercise/mock drill

A format for rehearsal/ exercise/ mock dri l l i s given in

Annexure- 22.

8.17 DETAILS OF LAST CONDUCTED

rehearsal /exercise / mock drill

Sr. No. Date Place Type of

Emergency

1

8.18 Rehearsal

Emergency plans wi l l need to be practiced and rehearsed

through mock dri l ls . The entire activity wi l l need to be

documented in the emergency dri l l log. What went r ight

and the area for improvement to shoot the enti re mock

dri l l on a video for better learning to take place. Practice

certainly is needed to enable employees cope and

respond appropriately during an emergency.

8.19 Emergency Drill

Once in Six Month

(As per Rule 68J(12)(4) of Gujarat Factories Rules 2004)

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

ANNEXURE SECTION



KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE-1

KGN BIOTECH LTD. (SUBSIDIARY OF KGN ENTERPRISES LTD.)

EMERGENCY TELEPHONE NUMBERS Sr. No. Name Office Resident / Mobile

KGN BIOTECH LTD. (Subsidiary of KGN BIOTECH LTD. (SUBSIDIARY OF KGN ENTERPRISES LTD.)) Village Hariyala

02694-291042, 291043, 224460 -

1. Mr. Babulal Jethalal Hirani, MD 02694-224460 / 61 M. 099253 86072

2. Mr. Ismail G. Menon, Director 02694-291042, 291043 M. 099250 78100

3. Mr. S. S. Tiwari, Unit Head 02694-291042, 291043

079-25860842 M. 098793 55423

4. Mr. Raviprakash P. Thakur, GM (Engg.) 02694-291042, 291043 M. 094270 04508

5. Mr. Tosif Kamruddinbhai Sheikh 02694-291042, 291043 M. 099049 27929

6. Mr. Chandtrkant C. Patel, Engineer 02694-291042, 291043 M. 093289 19963

7. Mr. Majidkhan Sultankhan Pathan 02694-291042, 291043 M. 096018 36953

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

Telephone Number Sr.

No. Designation / Post STD Code Office Resident Mobile

1 2 3 4 5 6

A. EMERGENCY RESPONSE CENTRE :

1 Central Control Room – KHEDA 0268 2562799

2 Police Control Room – KHEDA 0268 222033

3 Ambulance 108

B. COLLECTORALAY – KHEDA :

1. Collector & District Magistrate, Nadiad 0268 2550856 2556700 99784 06212

2. RDC, Nadiad 0268 2551997 2555174 99784 05184

3. Mamlatdar, Nadiad (Rural) 0268 250583 02696-222790 98254 75393

4. Mamlardar, Matar 02694 285544 285675 98248 24332

C. POLICE DEPARTMENT, KHEDA :

1. S. P., Nadiad. 0268 2550249, 2550250

02694-224330 99784 05072

2. Dy. S. P., Nadiad 0268 2551144 2532563 98250 83245

3. Dy. S. P. Kheda, HQ 0268 2551750 99251 53277

D. FIRE SERVICES :

1. Fire Brigade, Nadiad. 0268

2550106, 2560101,

2551376/77/78

2. Kapadvanj Nagarpalika, Kapadvanj. 02691 252365 -- --

3. Municipal Burro, Dakor, Thasara. 02699 246638 -- --

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE – 1 Continue...


EMERGENCY TELEPHONE NUMBERS Telephone Number Sr.

No. Designation / Post STD Code Office Resident Mobile

1 2 3 4 5 6

E. HOSPITAL

1. Civil Surgeon, Nadiad 0268 2521386/ 529074 2556335 98253 62192

2. Civil Surgeon, Kheda 02694 224932 / 224838 27433472 94270 26454

3. Chief Medical Officer, Nadiad 0268 0268

2521386, 2529074, 2550143

0268 2556815 97121 33366

4. Ambulance, Nagarpalika KHEDA 02694 224932, 222074 --- ---

F. GOVERNMENT OFFICERS :

1. D. D. O., Nadiad 0268 2557262 2532802 99784 06237

2. T. D. O., Matar. 02694 285238, 285523 285688 98255 10965

1. Joint Director, Industrial Safety and Health, Vadodara 0265 2434464

2. Dy. Director Industrial Safety and Health 0268 2568986 - 98255 77968

3. Asst. Director Industrial Safety and Health 0268 2568986 98256 27085

4. Dy. Controller of Explosive, Vadodara 0265 2420511 - -

5. Regional Officer, GPCB, Vadodara 0265 2354850

6. Executive Engineer, GEB Nadiad. (Rural) 0268 2581397, 2581836 2528960 94264 17123

7. RTO, Nadiad 0268 2550213 26858634 98795 95555

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE – 2 KGN BIOTECH LTD.


ORGANOGRAM

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS



KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE-4

SITE PLAN

KGN

KGN ENTERPRISES LTD. (Subsidiary of KGN Enterprises LTD.)

Plot No. 313-318, 321, 246/P Kheda-Dholka Highway, Village Hariyala, Tal. Matar, Dist. Kheda-387 411

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE-5

LAYOUT PLAN

KGN ENTERPRISES LTD. (Subsidiary of KGN Enterprises LTD.)

Plot No. 313-318, 321, 246/P Kheda-Dholka Highway, Village Hariyala, Tal. Matar, Dist. Kheda-387 411

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS



STORAGE OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS

Sr No.

Name of Chemicals State Place of

Storage Mode of Storage

Capacity of each

Container Nos. of

Containers Max.

Storage Capacity

Present Stock

RAW MATERIALS

1. Castor Seed Seed Silos Open 5000 MT x

6 6 30000 MT NIL

2. Carbon Powder Godown Bags 25 Kgs. - 10 MT 10 MT

3. Galion Powder Godown Paper Bag 25 Kgs. - 10 MT 10 MT

4. Hexane Liquid SEP UG Tank 21 KL x 2 2 42 KL 24000 ltrs.

5. Hydrogen Gas Mobile Truck

Cylinder Bank - -

6. Nickel Catalyst Solid HCO M S

Drum 200 Kgs. - 400 Kgs. Nil

7. NAOH Liquid Tank Yard Tank 50 KL 2 100 KL NIL

8 H2SO$ Liquid Tank Yard Tank 50 KL 2 100 KL NIL

9 Methanol Liquid SEP UG Tank 21 KL 1 21 KL NIL

PRODUCT

1. Castor oil Liquid Tank Yard Tank 365 KL 10 + 2 4000 KL NIL

2. DOC Powder Godawan G. Bags - 2500 MT NIL

3. HCO Flack Godawan Paper Bags 25 Kgs. - 8000 MT NIL

4 12 HSA Flack Godawan Paper Bags 25 Kgs. - 6000 MT NIL

5 HMR Flack Godawan Paper Bags 25 Kgs. - 4000 MT NIL

6 RA Liquid Tank yard Tank 25 KL 1 25 KL NIL

7 MR Liquid Tank yard Tank 25 KL 1 25 KL NIL

8 UDA Liquid Tank yard Tank 25 KL 1 25 KL NIL

By Product

1. Glycerin Liquid Tank yard 100 KL 100 KL NIL

2. Sodium Sulphate Solid Godawan P P Bag 25/50 Kgs. 100 MT NIL

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE – 7


PROCESS & VESSEL HAZARDS & CONTROLS

Operating Parameter Sr.

No. Identification

/ Marking Name of

Equipment Location CapacityDate of

First Used

Service / Used Pressure Temp.

HP

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

1. E-1 Expeller Oil Mill 50 Ton - - 2 Kg/Cm2 1000C -








9. N -1 Nutilizer Oil Mill 9.5 MT 120 ° C

10 HP

10. N-2 Nutilizer Oil Mill 9.5 MT 120 ° C

10 HP

11. N-3 Nutilizer Oil Mill 9.5 MT 10 HP

12. B-1 Bleacher Refinery 10.0 MT 15 HP




16. A-1 Autoclave HCO Plant 10 MT Propose 10 kgm 160 °

C 10 HP

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE – 8A KGN BIOTECH LTD.


PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR HYDROGENATED CASTOR OIL

Castor Oil Hydrogen + Ni

CatalystHCO

Filtration

Storage Tank

Flaker

Final Product - HCO

Godown

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE – 8B KGN BIOTECH LTD.


PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR 12 HSA (12 HYDROXY STEARIC ACID)




12 Hydroxy Stearic Acid

Washing & Drying

Flaking

12 HSA Final Products


KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE – 8C





Ricinoleate Acid

Washing & Drying

Flaking

R A Final Products


Castor Oil

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE – 8D

KGN BIOTECH LTD.



Castor Oil

Methanol + Catalyst

Methyl Ricinoliate

Washing & Drying

Methyl Recinoliate

Flacking

Silo + Packing

Methyl Ricinoliate (Final Product)

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE – 8E

KGN BIOTECH LTD.


PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR FLOW CHART OF HYDROGENATED METHYL RICINOLIATE


Methanol + catalyst

HMR

Washing & Drying

Hydrogenated Methyl

Flacking

Silo + Packing

Hydrogenated Methyl Recinoliate

(Final Product)

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE – 8F


PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR FLOW CHART UNDECYLENIC ACID

Heptaldehyde crude Methyl Undecylenic Acid

Distillation Splitting

Heptaldehyde Undecylenic acid crude

Distillation

Undecylenic Acid

MR

Cracking

HELPS



OTHER HAZARDS & CONTROLS In-Charge Person Sr.

No. Name of the

possible hazards or emergency

Its Source & Reasons

Its effects on Persons, Property

& Environment Place of Effect Control Measures

provided Name Phone No.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

1 Steam pipe line failure

Puncture in pipe joint failure valve

failure

Burn injury Damage to the

material

Steam pipe lines

Checking, preventative maintenance

2 Material handling

Seeds, oil, cake etc. material handled by

mechanical & failure

Mechanical – fault & Body Injury

Mill-1, 2 Refeinery-1, 2

Godowns

Proper conveyance system Inspection & Préventive Masures

3 Electrical Electrical spark shot-Circuit & Elect. Hazard

Injury to workers Fire instrument

damage Property damage

Electric installation

panel board distribution

system

Monitoring instruments

4 Stack of bags Not proper stacking

Serious injury or fatal Godown Constant supervision &

proper stacking

5 Mechanical hazard

Expeller, pumps El-Motor,

transmission elevator straw conveyer etc.

machines

Serious body injury, fatal

Working machinery

Mechanical guarding supervision instruction

6 Work in at height Unprotected area Falls, injury Elevator platform stairs PPE

7 Slippery Spillage of oils Falls, injury Working areas Cleaning & good house keeping

8 Explosion Air receiver Explosion effect Air-tank area Safety valve, pressure gauge, auto control etc.

Mr. Ravi Thakur M. 96016 03315,

9427004508

HELPS

ANNEXURE – 10


SALIENT PROPERTIES OF CERTAIN HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS

Exposure limit

LEL UEL Sr. No.

Name of Chemicals State Colour Odour Sp.

Gravity Vapour Density

Melting Point

0C

Boiling Point

0C

Flash Point

0C % %

TLV ppm

Solubility in Water Hazchem Hazards

Hazardous Combustion

Products

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

1. Caustic Soda Lye Solid WhiteFlakes Odourless 2.12 - 318.4 1390 - - - 2 Soluble 2 R C

Emit toxic Fumes of

Na2O

2. Haxane Liquid Colourless , Watery

Gasoline like

Odour. 0.659 2.97 -95.6 69 -25.6 1.2 7.5 50 Not

Soluble 3 * E C,F

Emits acrid Smoke &

fumes.

3. Hydrogen Gas Colourless Odourless 0.0899 0.069 -259.18 -252.8 - 4.1 74.2 - Not Soluble

2 * E C,F,E -

4. Methanol Liquid Colorless Alcoholic 0.79 1.1 -91.5 64.5 16.1 6 36.5 200 Mixible 2 PE F

Emits Acrid Smoke & irritating fumes

5. Sulphuric Acid Liquid Colourless Pungent 1.84 - 10.49 315 - - 5 Mixible 2 R E T,C

Emits Toxic Fumes of

SO2 F : Flammable, E : Explosive, C : Corrosive, T : Toxic, P : Poisonous, R : Reactive

Y

S

HELPS



TRADE WASTE DISPOSAL

In-Charge Person

Sr. No.

Type & Name of the Trade

Waste

Its Generation per Day

Place of its Generation

Place of its Safe

Disposal

Treatment Method adopted for Safe

Disposal

Alarm indicating accidental release or release in excessive proportion

Monitoring & Control

Measures provided Name Telephone

No.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

1 Water 20000 Ltr/Day Plant

E.M.C underground

Drainage system

As per G.D.C.B. Consent - E.T.P

2 Gaseous - Plant

Boiler House (FAD)

Open air as per GBCB

As per GPCB Consent Cyclone

sepulture

230 kg / Day Refinery Disposal of as per authorisation by

GPCB

Stored in HDPE Bags &

Disposal Regularly as per GPCB 3 Solid

150 kg / Day ETP NECL

Mr. Ravi Thakur

M. 96016 03315,

9427004508

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS



METEOROLOGICAL DATA

(WEATHER CONDITION)

Wind Direction

Month Avg. Max. Temp

oC

Avg. Min.

Temp oC

Wind Velocity M/Sec Day Night

Weather Conditions

January 28°C 11°C 8.0 SE/NE NE/NW COLD

February 30°C 13°C 5.1 SE/NE W/NW COLD

March 36°C 19°C 7.3 NE/NW W/NW DRY

April 39°C 23°C 7.8 NW/W W/NW HOT

May 41°C 26°C 9.5 NW/W SW/W HOT

June 38°C 27°C 10.8 SW/W SW/W HOT + RAINY

July 33°C 26°C 10.8 SW/W SW/W HOT + RAINY

August 32°C 24°C 8.3 SW/W SW/W HOT + RAINY

September 34°C 24°C 7.00 S/NW SW/W HOT + RAINY

October 36°C 21°C 4.6 NE/W NE/NW MOIST

November 33°C 16°C 4.1 NE/E NE/E COLD

December 29°C 12°C 2.6 NE/E NE/NW COLD

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE – 13


FIRE PROTECTION DETAILS

Sr. No. Name Nos.

1 Fire Extinguishers (Total) 44

a) DCP Type – 10 Kg 12

b) DCP Type – 5 Kg 19

c) Foam Type – 9 Lit. 06

d) Foam Type – 45 Lit. 02

e) CO2 Type – 4.5 Lit. 05

2 Fire Hydrant point -

3 Hose Real with nozzle -

4 Fire Bucket 10

5 Water Storage (Total) 592 KL

Above ground (3 Tanks) 56,000 lit

Cooling Tower 500,000 lit

6 Bore well with pump 4

7 Sprinkler system at Solvent Extraction Plant 1

8 DG Sets 75KVA

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE – 14


PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENTS & SAFETY EQUIPMENTS ARRANGEMENT

PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENTS

SR. NO NAME ISSUE RESERVED TOTAL

1 Safety Helmet (Executive) - 6 6

2 Safety Helmet (General) 4 10 14

3 Safety Goggles 6 4 10

4 Hand Gloves (Rubber) 10 10 20

5 Hand Gloves (Asbestos) 5 10 15

6 Ear Muff 4 4 8

7 Ear Plug 6 6 12

8 Cotton Nose Mask 25 15 40

SAFETY EQUIPMENTS

Sr. No. Name of Equipments Nos.

1 S.B.A. Set 45( Minutes) -

2 Emergency siren (Electrical) 1

3 Emergency Siren ( Manual) -

4 Wind Indicator 1

5 Spark Arrestor -

6 Fire Bell 1

7 Safety Shower with Eye Washers 1

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE – 15


ADOPTED COLOUR CODE SYSTEM FOR PIPE LINES

Sr. No. Name of Chemical/ Material Colour

Solvent Extraction Plant

1 Hexane Postman Red

2 Vacuum Orange

3 Misalla Orange

4 Vapour Cream

5 Water Green

6 Oil Yellow

Refinery (Old & New)

1 Castor Oil Brown

2 Steam Black

3 Vacuum Sky Blue

4 Water Green

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS



EMERGENCY ORGANISATION STRUCTURE Place of Availability

& Phone No. Alternate

Place of Availability & Phone No.

Sr. No.

Duty of Nominated

Person under Emergency

Plan

Name Designation In Factory Residential Name &

Designation In Factory Residential

1. Site Main Controller

Mr. S. S.

Tiwari Unit Head

2. Incident Controller

Mr. Ravi

Prakish Thakur

GM (Engg.)

3. 1. Key Personnel

2. Key Personnel

3. Key Personnel

4. Essential Worker (Fire)

5. Essential Worker (Safety)

6. Essential Worker (W/S)

7. Essential Worker

(Electrical)

8.

Essential Worker

(Material Handling)

9. Essential Worker

(Transportation)

10. Essential

Worker (Plant Oil Mill)

11.

Essential Worker (Plant

Solvent Extraction)

12.

Essential Worker

(Storage Tank Farm)

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE – 17


CHART OF INITIATION OF ACTIONS

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE – 18


A FORM TO RECORD EMERGENCY TELEPHONE CALL

Details of call as reported

Date Caller’ s Name & Designation

Phone No.

Time Part A: Essential Information

Purpose of Call Is any particular advice required immediately?

Name of Chemicals To be spelt out clearly

Brief Description of Incident Fire / Explosion / Liquid Spill / Gas Release

Quantity Involved Packaging / Storing / Handling / Using details

Location of Incident

Cause, if known, if brief

Part B : Essential to be obtained if readily available

Has any one been injured? Yes/No (If yes, how many)

Affected by Chemicals? Yes/No (If yes, how many)

What First-Aid has been given?

Has any one been taken to hospital? Yes/No If yes, address of the Hospital

Is the road blocked? Yes/No

Closed to traffic? Yes/No

Who owns the Chemicals? Has the owner been informed? Yes/No

If caused by Vehicle, Vehicle Number

Name & Address of the Owner

Has the owner been informed? Yes/No

To whom was the load consigned?

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE – 19


DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL RADIATION

Radiation intensity (kW/m2) Observed effect

1.2 Solar heat at noon

1.6 Minimum level of pain threshold

2.0 PVC insulated cables damaged

4.0

Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20 s. however blistering of the skin (second degree burns) is likely; 0% lethality

6.4

Pain threshold reached after 8 secs. Second degree burns after 20 secs.

12.5 Minimum energy to ignite wood with a flame; Melts plastic tubing. 1% lethality in one minute. First degree burns in 10 secs.

16.0 Severe burns after 5 secs.

25.0

Minimum energy to ignite wood at identifying long exposure without a flame.

100% lethality in 1 minute. Significant injury in 10 secs.

37.5

Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment, Severe damage to plant

100% lethality in 1 minute. 50% lethality in 20 secs. 1% lethality in 10 secs.

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RADIATION INTENSITY & OVERPRESSURE

Over Pressure

Bar Psi. Effect

0.8 11.6 100% fatality & 100% eardrum rupture, 100% structural damage & glass break

0.8 6.8 100% structural damage, vertical pressure vessel move breaking pipe work.

0.5 6.8 Vertical columns and horizontal pressure vessel move breaking pipe work. Floating roof tank uplifts (full)

0.2 2.9 Pipe support frames deforms, floating roof or fixed roof uplifts (Half Full)

0.07 1.0 Roof of cone roof tank collapse

0.03 0.04 Cooling Tower louvers fail

EFFECT OF OVER PRESSURE ON BUILDING/ STRUCTURE

Over Pressure

Bar Psi. Effect

0.7 10.0 Total destruction of conventional structures.

0.5 7.2 Unreinforced brick panels 200-300 mm thick fail.

0.3 4.3 Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptured. Self-framing steel panel building demolished.

0.2 2.9 50% destruction of brickwork in house.

0.15 2.2 Particle collapse of walls and roof of houses.

0.1 1.4 Steel flame of clad building distorted.

0.07 1.0 Partial demolition of houses.

0.05 0.07 Minor damage to house structures.

0.03 0.04 Windows shattered. Occasional damage of frame.

HELPS



RECORDS OF PAST INCIDENTS

Accident Details Detected Occupational Diseases Incident /Dangerous Occurrence/ Emergency Person Affected

Inside Out side Sr. No.

Dat

e

Tim

e

Plac

e Type of Accident

Nature of

Injury

No of Person Injured

No.

of D

eath

Day

s Lo

st

Name of Disease

Chemical

Involved

Date of Detection

No. of

Person

s involved

Type of effect

Remedial Measures

Dat

e

Tim

e

Plac

e

Chemical

Involved/ Type

of Incident /D.O.

Inju

red

Die

d

Inju

red

Die

d

Dur

atio

n of

Em

erge

ncy

Oth

er D

etai

ls

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

No Accident is reported.

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS



FORMAT FOR EXERCISE / MOCK DRILL / REHEARSAL

1 DATE & TIME :

2 LOCATION :

3 SCENARIO :

4 NAME OF PARTICIPANTS WITH DESIGNATED ROLE AS PER ON SITE EMERGENCY PLAN

:

5 NAME OF OBSERVERS, AND LOCATION :

6 START TIME OF MOCK DRILL :

7 ACTION BY SMC :

8 ACTION BY IC :

9 ACTION BY KEY PERSONNEL :

10 ACTION BY IN CHARGE OF EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE :

11 ACTION BY ESSENTIAL WORKERS :

12 ACTION BY ASSEMBLY POINT OFFICER :

13 SEQUENTIAL ACTION FOR COMBAT EMERGENCY

:

14 TIME OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOCK DRILL :

15 DURATION OF EXERCISE :

16 OBSERVATION BY OBSERVERS :

17 DE BRIEFING MEETING :

18 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

:

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE – 23


GLOSSARY OF TERMS

1 . ACC IDENT

An accident may be def ined as “an undes i rable and unplanned ev ent w i th o r w i t hout o r majo r o r minor damage consequence to l i fe and/or p roper t y .”

2 . ACGIH

Amer ican conference of gov ernment al I ndus t r ia l Hygi en i s t s

3 . ACU TE SEVERE but o f the shor t du rat ion . ACUTE heal th e f fect s a re t hose that occur immediate ly af t er exposure to hazardous chemica l .

4 . AEROSOL Par t ic les (So l i d or L iqu id) that remains suspended i n a i r fo r a per i od o f t ime. (M i s t s , Smokes , Fumes , Dus t s etc . )

5 . AIRBORNE RELE ASE Release of f any chemi ca l i nto the a i r .

6 . AMBIEN T ambient temperature i s temper ature of the su r roundi ng area.

7 . AMOR PHOUS Non-crys ta l l ine , hav ing no def in i te form or shape.

8 . AN INCIDEN T An inc ident i s emergent s i tuat ion o f any c r i t ical dev iat ion in the process cont ro l o r otherw i se that may lead to a majo r acc ident / potent ia l emergency and di sas ter .

9 . ANEMOMETER

A dev ice used t o measu re speed of w i nd or any other mov ing gas .

10. ANSI Amer ican Nat ional S tandards I ns t i tute

11 . ATM OSPHERIC STABIL ITY

Atmospher ic S tab i l i t y i s def ined in te rms of v er t ical temperat u re g rad ient i n t he at mosphere . I t i s usual l y desc r ibed us ing the sys tem of cat egor ies deve loped by Pasqu i l l . The cat egor ies o f s tabi l i t y c las s a re i dent i f ied by the l et ter A t o F (o r somet i mes A-G)

Neut ra l s t ab i l i t y occur s typ i cal l y , when there i s to ta l c loud cov er and i s des igned by category D (The temperat u re gradi ent = ad iabat ic l apse rat e) Uns tabl e condi t ions occur when the sun i s sh inn ing. The uns tabl e condi t ions are des ignated by the let te r s A-C w i th A i s the leas t s tab le condi t ion s table condi t ions occur on c lear , cal m n ights , when the a i r near the ground i s s t rat i f ied and f ree f rom tu rbu lence and are des i gnat ed by the let te r E & f . Some t imes an addi t ional category G i s used fo r except i onal l y s t ab le condi t ions . Neut ral condi t ions cor respond to a r ate of decrease i n t emperatu re w i t h he i ght o f about 1 Deg C per meter s , v er t ical l y . For the d i sper s ion s tudy D & C s t ab i l i t y c l as s has been cons idered.

12. BLEVE (BOIL ING L IQUID EXP AN DING V APOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION) The ev ent may have two fo lds , one; f lammable l iqu id under pres sure rap id ly spread in to t he open area in fo rm o f vapour c loud, two; i f th i s sp readi ng v apour c loud gets any sou rce of ign i t ion , t hen v io lent l y expl os i on took p lace produce mi s s i les e f fect w i th secondary f i res and c reate h eav y damages to the su r roundi ng area. The phenomena i s cal led as BLEVE.

13. BUND/DYKE Rai sed ground or a wal l bu i l t a round a tank o r t ank fa rm, to reta i n sp i l l s and prevent the i r sp read, thus reducing hazards .

14. BURNING R ATE The v a lue i s t he rate ( i n mi l l imet res per mi nut e) at which the dept h o f a poo l o f l iqu id decreases as the l iqu id burns .

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

15 . C AS (CHEMIC AL ABSTRAC T SERVICE REGISTRY NUMBER) :

The un ique ident i f icat ion number as s igned each compound/ chemi cal s reg i s t e red wi t h the Chemical Abs t ract Serv ice (CAS) i s l i s t ed to a id in qu ick ident i f icat i on of the compound.

16. C AR CINOGEN A subst ance capable of p roducing cancer (carc inoma) .

17. CHRONIC Of long durat ion o r hav ing f requent recur rence. Chron ic heal th e f fect s a re those that become apparent or cont inue fo r some t ime af te r exposu re to hazardous chemi cal s .

18. COMBUSTION PRODUC T Mater ia l p roduced o r ; generated dur ing the burn ing o r ox i dat i on of a mater i a l .

19. CONTAMIN AN T

A harmfu l , i r r i ta t ing o r moi s tu re mater i a l that i s fo re i gn t o t he normal at mosphere.

20. D AN GEROU S OCCURRENCE Dangerous Occur rences inc lude bur s t ing of ves se l co l l apse o f crane, der r ick , ho i s t , expl os ion , f i re , l eakage, escape of any mo l ten met al / hot l iqu id , exp los ion of rece iver /container , co l lapse of bu i ld ing/ s t ructu re , as spec i f ied under schedul e of Ru le 103 of GFR 1995 and prov i s ion under sect ion 88-A of t he Fact or ies Act 1948 , where i n a factory any dangerous occur rence as speci f ied occur s weather caus i ng any bodi l y in ju ry o r d i sab i l i t y o r not .

21. DENSITY The mass o f Un i t Vo lume o f a subs tance e .g . kg /M 3

22. D IS AS TER

A d i sas te r i s catas t rophic consequence of a majo r emergency / acc ident t hat leads to , not on ly extens iv e damage t o l i fe and proper ty but a l so d i s rupt s a l l normal human act i v i ty fo r a pret t y long t ime and requ i res a maj or nat ional and int ernat ional ef for t fo r rescue and rehabi l i tat ion o f those af fect ed.

23 . D ISTRICT CRISIS GROUP(DCG)

“Di s t r ic t Cr i s i s Group” means a . The D i s t r ic t Cr i s i s Group i s the apex body i n the d i s t r i c t to deal w i th major

chemical accident s and to prov ide exper t gu idance fo r handl ing chemical acc i dent s . Ref ; Schedul e 7 o f Ru le 8 o f Chemical Acci dent s (Emergency P lann ing,

P reparednes s & Response) Ru l e , 1996 .

24. DOMINO EFFECT An ef fect by wh ich a smal l hazardous i nc idence in a un i t can esca late to su r round ing area caus i ng heav y damages t o man, proper t ies &env i ronment .

25. DOW Index

Dow index i s s y s t em of i ndex ing f i re , exp los ion & t ox ic i t y leve l so as to categor i zed p lant/ sect ion into d i f fe rent hazard zones i nvo lv ing f i re , exp los ion & tox ic i ty hazards .

26. EMERGENCY Emergency means a s i tuat ion leading t o a c i rcumstance o r set o f c i rcumstances in wh ich there i s danger to the l i fe o r heal th o f per sons o r whi ch could resu l t in b i g f i re o r exp los ion o r po l lu t ion to the work and outs ide env i ronment , af fect i ng the workers o r ne ighbourhood in a se r ious manner , demanding immediate act i on . (Ref . Para 2 ( j ) o f Par t I o f Schedul e X IX of Gu jarat Factor ies Ru l es 1963 (1995) .

27. EMERGENCY INFORM ATION P ANEL

Ev ery Goods car r iage used fo r t ranspor t ing any dangerous o r hazardou s goods shal l be leg ib ly and conspicuous l y marked w i th an emergency i n fo rmat ion pane l in each of th ree p l aces of the car r iage.

28. ENDOTHERMIC PROCESS A process accompan ied by the absorpt ion o f heat .

29. EV ACU ATION Remov al o f res i dent s and other per sons f rom an area of danger .

30. EXOTHERMIC PROCESS A process , i n which energy in the form of heat i s re leased.

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

31. F IRE B ALL The burn ing of a f lammable gas c l oud, the bu l k o f which i s in i t i a l l y ov er- r i ch i .e . (U .F .L . ) . The whole c loud appears to be on f i re as combus t ion i s tak ing p lace at eddy boundar ies , when a i r i s ent ra ined.

32. FL AM M ABILITY L IMITS (UFL- LFL) I n fue l -a i r sy s tem a range of compos i t ion ex i s t s out s ide which a f lame wi l l not propagat e a subs tant ia l d i s tance f rom a ign i t ion source. The l imi t ing fue l concent rat ion are te rmed the upper f lammable l imi t (UFL ) and lower F lammable L imi t (LFL )

33 . FL ASH F IRE

A burn ing of a f lammabl e v apour c loud at v ery low f l ame pr opagat ion speed.

34. FL ASH POINT Th i s i s def ined as the l owest t emperature at which vapours abov e a combus t i b l e subst ance wi l l ign i te in a i r when exposed to a f lame. Depending on the tes t met hod used , the v alues g iv en are e i ther Tag c losed cup (C. C. ) o r C leveland open cup (O , C. ) The va lues , a long wi th those in 6 .2 and 6 .5 g ive an ind icat i on of the re l at iv e f lammabi l i t y o f the chemi cal . I n genera l , t he open cup va lue i s about 10o to 15oF h i gher than the c l osed cup value.

35. H AZ ARD Hazard may be def i ned as “ the pot ent ia l o f an acc ident .” Hazard ex i s t s i n man and the sys tem of mater ia l s and machines .

36. H AZ ARDOU S CHEMIC ALS Any substance o r mat er ia l i n a quan t i t y o r fo rm whi ch may be h armfu l to humans , an i mal s , c r ops , wat er sy s tems , o r o ther e lements o f t he env i ronment i f acc idental l y re leased. Hazardous chemical s i nc lude, exp los ives , gases (compres sed , l i quef ied o r d i s so lved) , f lammabl e o r combus t i b le l iqu ids , f lammable so l ids subs tance, t ox ic , cor ros ives ,

ox id i z ing subs tance, po i sonous and insect ic ides substances .

“Hazardous Chemical s” means

a. Any Chemi cal , which sat i s f i es any o f the c r i t er i a , la id down in Par t I o f Schedule I and i s l i s ted in co l umn 2 o f Par t I I o f the schedule.

b. Any Chemi cal l i s t ed in Column 2 of Schedule 2 . c . Any Chemi cal l i s ted in Co lumn 2 o f Schedu le 3 , . as per p rov i s ions g iven

bel ow;

Ru le 68J 1 (a) o f GUJARAT FACTORI ES RULES 1963 (A mended- 1995) Ru le 2 (e) o f MANUFACTURE , S TORAGE AND I MPORT OF HAZARDOUS

CHEMI CAL RULES , 1989 . Ru le 2(b) o f Chemi cal Accidents (Emergency P l anning, P reparedness &

Response) Ru l e, 1996 . 37. H AZ ARDOU S PROCESS

Any process o r act i v i ty i n re lat i on to an i ndus t ry spec i f i ed in the F i r s t Schedu le under the Sect ion 2(cb) o f t he F actor ies Act 1948 (1987) .

38. H AZCHEM CODES

The HAZCHEM code sys tem was dev e loped by the B r i t i sh F i re Serv ice fo r use on vehic les t ranspor t ing dangerous subs tances . I t cons i s t s o r e i ther two or th ree character s . The f i r s t charact er s i s a numera l i n the range of 1 t o 4 . 1 – Jet s , 2 – Fog, 3 – Foam, 4 - D ry Agent The second charact er i s a let t e r se lected f rom t he range P , R . S , T , W , X , Y , Z . Per sonal P rot ect ion – 1 . The let te r P , R , W or X indi cat e t hat a fu l l chemical su i t and breath ing appar atus shou ld be warn . 2 . The l et te r s S , T , Y & Z indicate t hat breat h ing apparatus need only be warn i f the subs tances are inv o lv ed in a f i re . Cont ai n o r D i lu te – The l et te r s P , R , S , & T i ndicat e d i lu t ion whi le W X Y & Z ind icate containment . The t h i rd charact er when appear ing i s E i nd icates that ev acuat i on o f persons in the neighbour ing areas mus t be taken int o cons iderat ion .

39. IC ( INCIDENT CONTR OLLER)

He has to tack le the s i tuat ion o f oper at ions on process/ s to rage/event/occur rence by tak ing techn ical deci s ions to cont ro l t he emer gency by respond ing the requi s i te exper ienced per sons .

40. INDUSTRI AL AC TIVITY

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

“ I ndus t r ia l Act iv i ty” means

i . An operat ion o f process car r ied out in an indust r ia l i ns t al lat ion re fe r red to in Schedule 4 invo lv ing o r l i ke l y to invo lv e one o r more hazardous chemical s and inc ludes on- s i te s t orage o r on- s i te t ranspor t which i s as soc i at ed w i t h that operat ion or process , as the case may be , o r

i i . I so lated Sto rage, or i i i . P i pel ine . I ndus t r ia l act i v i t ies a re g iven in fo l lowing;

a . Rule 68(J ) (1) (b) o f GUJARAT FACTORIES RULES 1963 (A mended-1995) b . Rule 2(h ) o f MANUFACTURE , STORA GE AND IMPORT OF HAZARDOUS

CHEMI CAL RULES , 1989 . c . Rule 2(c ) o f Chemical Acci dent s (Emergency P lann ing, P reparedness &

Response) Ru l e , 1996 .

41. IDLH ( IMMEDI ATEL Y D AN GEROUS TO L IFE AND HEAL TH)

The l evel o f concent rat ion immediate l y dangerous t o l i fe o r heal th f rom wh ich a worker cou ld escape w i thout any impai r ing symptoms or any i r rev ers ib l e heal th ef fect (NI OSH/OSHA) . The concent rat i ons a re repor ted e i ther par t s per mi l l i on (ppm) or m i l l ig rams per cubi c meter (mg/m3 ) .

42. IGNITION TEMPER ATU RE Th i s i s the min i mum t emperatu re at which the mater i a l w i l l ign i te w i thout a spark o r f l ame be ing present . A long wi th the v al ues i n 6 .1 and 6 .2 abov e, i t g i ves an ind icat i on of t he re lat i ve f l ammabi l i t y o f the chemical . I t i s somet i mes cal led “aut o ign i t ion temper ature” .

43. LC 5 0 (LETH AL CONCEN TR ATION)

Lethal Concent rat ion l evel fo r a i r Bourne tox ic subs tance. 44. LD 5 0 (LETH AL DOSE)

The te rm LD 5 0 s ign i f i es that about 50% o f the an imal s g iven the speci f i ed dose by mout h wi l l d i e . Thus fo r a g rade 4 chemi cal (be low 50 mg/kg) t he tox ic dose fo r 50% of an imal s weight ing 70 kgs (150 lb) i s 70 50 = 3 , 500 mg=3.5 g r o r les s than 1 tea spoonfu l , i t might be as l i t t le as a few drops . Fo r a Grade 1 chemi cal (5 to 15 g/kg) the LD50 wou ld be between a p i nt and a quar t fo r a 150 l b man .

45. LOC AL CRIS IS GROUP (LCG) “Local Cr i s i s G roup” means

a. I t i s body cons t i tut ed by Government , i n the indus t r ia l pocked t o deal w i th chemical acci dent s and co-ord inat e ef for t s i n p l ann ing, p reparedness and mi t i gat i on of chemical acc i dent s .

Ref : . Schedule 8 o f Ru le 8 o f Chemi cal Acci dent s (Emergency P lanning, P reparedness & Response) Ru le1996 .

46 . M AJ OR AC CIDENT

Major Accident means an inc ident invo lv ing l oss o f the l i fe in s ide o r out s ide t he s i te o r ten or more i n ju r ies i ns ide and/or one o r more in ju r ies out s ide o r re lease o f tox ic chemical o r expl os i on o r f i re of sp i l lage of hazardous chemi cal resu l t in ‘On S i te ’ o r ‘Of f S i t e’ emergenc i es o r damage t oo equ ipment s leading to s toppage o f process o r adv er se ef fect s to t he env i ronment . (Re f . 1 . Ru le 68 (J ) (1 ) (d ) o f Gujarat F act or ies Ru les 1963(2004) , 2 . Ru le 2 ( j ) o f Manufact ure, S t o rage and I mport o f Hazardous Chemical Ru les , 1989 . 3 . Ru l e 2 (f ) o f Chemi cal Acci dent s (Emergency P l anning, P reparedness & Response) Ru le , 1996) .

47. M AJ OR AC CIDENT H AZ ARDOUS (M AH) INSTALLION “MA H ins ta l la t i on” means a . I so lated s torage and indust r ia l act i v i ty at a s i t e , h and l ing ( inc l uding

t ranspor t th rough car r i e r o r p ipe l ine) o f hazardous chemical s equal to or in excess o f the t h reshol d quant i t ies spec i f ied in co lumn 3 of Schedule 2 and 3 respect iv e ly . Ref : Ru l e 2 (g) o f Chemical Acci dent s (Emergency P lann i ng, P reparedness

& Response) Ru le1996 .

48. M AN OMETE R An ins t rument that measures gaseous pressu re , espec i al l y , i t i s an U- tube par t ia l l y f i l led wi th water / mercu ry / l ight o i l . The d i f fe rence i n lev e l o f the l i qu id between two s ides o f tubes ind icates the pressu re .

49. MORBIDITY

Abi l i ty to cause i l l ness o f d i seases .

50. NFP A

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

Nat i ona l F i re Pro tec t i on Assoc ia t i on-USA 51. NGO (NON GOVERNMEN T ORG ANIZ ATIONS) :

Voluntary and soc ia l se rv ices agenci es such as Sa lv at ion Army , Red Cros s soc iety , Soci a l worker groups , Church Group etc . , who prov ide communi ty suppor t serv ices par t icu la r l y dur ing emergencies and natura l calami t ies .

52. N IOSH

Na t i ona l Ins t i t u te for Occupat iona l Sa fe ty & Hea l th -USA

53. ODOUR THRESHOLD The l owes t concent ra t i on o f an a i r con tam inan t t ha t can be de tec ted by sme l l .

54. OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PL AN

The obj ect ive of an Off S i te Emergency P lan i s to protect the l i fe and proper ty o f the ne i ghbourhood areas o f t he indus t r i a l un i t . O f f S i t e Emergency P lan shal l be prepared by Government A uthor i t ies as per Ru le 14 of MSI HC Ru les 1989 and fo l low the ins t ruct ion under p rov i s ion o f CA (EPPR) Ru les 1996.

55 . ON SITE EMERGENCY PL AN

On S i te Emergency P lan i s to be prepared by occupi er o f i ndust r i a l Un i t s as per Schedu le 8A under Ru l e 68 (J ) (12 ) o f Gu j arat Factor ies Ru les 1963 (2004) . Ref : Sect ion 41(B ) (4 ) o f The Factor ies Act 1948 , Schedule X I under Ru l e 13 o f MSHI C Ru les 1989 , and Ru le 5 ,7 , & 9 o f CA (EPPR) Ru les 1996 .

56. OSH A Oc cupat i ona l Sa fe ty and Hea l th Admin is t ra t i on – U . S . Federa l Agenc y

57. OVER PRESSURE Maxi mum pressu re above atmosphere pres su re exper ienced dur ing the pres su re of a b las t wav e f rom an explos ion .

58. PLUME

Hazardous gas / vapour / c loud resu l t ing f rom a cont inuous source re lease .

59. PUFF P lum i s i ns tantaneous re lease of a gas / v apour f rom the source.

60. POLYMERIZATION

A few chemical s can undergo rapi d po lymer i zat i on to fo rm s t icky , res inous mater ia l s , w i th the l iberat ion of much heat . The containers may expl ode.

61. POOL F IRE A pool o f f lammable l iqu id burn ing w i th a s tat ionary d i f fus ion f lame.

62. PPM (P AR TS PER MILLION)

63 . PYROLYSIS

Chemical decompos i t ion by the act ion o f heat . 64. QR A (QU AN TITATIVE RISK ASSESSMEN T)

QRA i s ident i fy ing, quant i fy i ng & computer model l i ng o f a l l the pot ent i a l emer gency scenar ios .

65. RESPONSE

The ef fo r t s t o mi n imi ze the r i sk s created in an emergency by prot ect ing t he people , the env i ronment and the proper t y , and the ef fo r t s to retu rn the scene to normal pre-emergency condi t ions . Per sons who per fo rm the var ious response funct ions are te rmed “RESPONDERS”.

66. R ISK Ri sk o f an accident may be def ined as “ the chance or p robabi l i ty o r l i ke l ihood of an acc ident be ing caused in a given man-mat e r i a l -mach ine sys tem.

67. SENSITIVE POPUL ATION S Groups o f people t hat may be mor e suscept ib le than the general populat ion to the tox ic e f fect s o f t he re lease due to pre- ex i s t ing heal th condi t ion (pat i ent s i n hospi ta l s , pregnant women et c . ) o r age (e lder l y people in fants , handi caps) .

68. SPILL Spi l l i s la rge l iqu id re leases f rom a bu lk s t o rage t ank/process ves se l .

69. SEVERITY RATING

1. The Sev er i t y rat i ng o f 1 , wou ld be te rmed as most sev er which wou ld ca l l fo r compl ete ev acuat ion o f pub l ic at la rge and would ho ld potent ia l fo r sever damage bot h to l i fe as wel l as proper ty .

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

2. The sev er i ty rat ing of 2 , wou ld be te rms as grave fo r i t would have pot ent i a l to cause damage t o l i fe and a por t ion o f p roper t y .

3 . The sev er i ty rat ing of 3 , wou ld be t ermed as h i gh i .e . i t has potent ia l e f fect on l i fe and ext ens iv e damage i n te rms o f p roper ty .

4 . The sev er i ty rat ing o f 4 , wou l d be te rms as moderate i .e . would cal l fo r par t i a l ev acuat ion as we l l as act iv at ion of mater ia l a i d .

5 . The sever i t y rat i ng of 5 , wou l d be te rms as low. Th i s would hav e both local i zed ef fect most l y in t erms o f p roper ty damage and would cal l fo r dec l arat ion o f local emergency.

70. SMC : S ITE M AN C ONTROLLER He i s overal l respons ib le fo r d i rect i ng operat i ons & deci de the act ions , consu l t i ng wi t h i nc i dent cont ro l le r &sen ior s , and handl e &cont ro l the emergency.

71. SHORT – TERM INH AL ATION L IMIT (STEL) The par t s o f v apour (gas ) per mi l l ion par t s o f contaminat ed a i r by vo lume at 25oC (77oF) and at one atmosphere o f pres su re i s g iv en . The l imi t s a re g iven i n mi l l i g rams per cub ic meter fo r chemical that fo rm a f i ne mi s t o r dus t . The v al ues g iven are the max imum permi s s ib le av erage exposures fo r t he t i me per iods spec i f ied .

72. SPECIF IC GR AVITY

The spec i f i c Grav i ty o f a chemical s i s the rat io o f the wei ght o f t he so l id o r l i qu id to the wei ght o f an equal vo lume of water at 4oC (o r at some other spec i f ied temperat ure) I f t he spec i f ic grav i ty i s les s than 1 .0 (o r l es s than 1 .03 i n sea water ) the chemical w i l l f l oat , i f h igher i t w i l l s i nk .

73. TLV (THRESHOLD LIMIT V ALUE) TLV re fe r to a i rborne concent rat ion of subs tances . There are t h ree categor i es o f TLV. TLV – TWA - T ime Weighted Av erage. TLV - STEL – Shor t te rm Exposu re l imi t TLV - fo r gases and vapour i s u sual l y expres sed in PPM. (Par t o f t he gas/v apour/mi l l ion par t s o f a i r ) mg/m3 : m i l l i gram/cub ic met er .

74. Tox ic C loud Ai r borne mass of gases , vapours , fumes , dus t o r aeroso l s o f t ox ic mater ia l s .

75. Tox ic i t y

The ab i l i t y o f a subs tance t o cause damage t o l i v ing t i s sue , impai rment o f t he cent ral nervous sys tem, se rv e i l lnes s o r death when i ngest ed, i nhal ed or absor bed by the sk in .

76. V APOUR CLOUD

Ai r borne d i sper s ing hazardous vapours , which may o r may not be v i s ib le as a “Cl oud”

77. VULNER ABILITY

I t can be def ined as “ the zone of i n f l uence of an emergency in and around t he fac i l i t y concerned.

78. W ATER FOG A f ine l y d iv ided mi s t produced by e i ther a h igh or low ve loc i ty fog nozz le . I t i s used fo r knock ing down f lames and coo l i ng hot su r faces .

KGN-DMP-2010 HELPS

ANNEXURE – 24 KGN BIOTECH LTD. (SUBSIDIARY OF KGN

ENTERPRISES LTD.)

LIST OF M. S. D. S.

SR. NUMBER HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS PAGE NO.

1. Hexane 103-104

2. Methanol 105-106

3. Sulphuric Acid 107-108

4. Hydrogen 109-110

risk assessment disaster management …gpcb.gov.in/pdf/kgn_bio_tech_ra_dmp.pdfrisk assessment &...

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