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China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEANRelations during the

Post-Cold War Era

Lai Foon Wong*

China–ASEAN relations developed quickly from an absence of diplomatic

ties in the immediate post-Cold War period to close interaction andcooperation in the late 1990s. Japan–ASEAN political relations, however,

lacked the impetus for advancement during the same period. Japan had, as

early as 1977, established dialogue partner relations with ASEAN, and

began the process of institutionalizing its dialogue and cooperation with

ASEAN at various levels in the areas of industry, science, technology,

culture, trade, and investment. China, on the other hand, did not actively

seek to establish official relations with ASEAN until the 1990s, after the

Cold War. China first participated in the ASEAN Foreign Minister Meeting

in 1991 and became a full dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1996. By thebeginning of the 21st century, the nature of China–ASEAN relations had

evolved from one based largely on bilateral relations to a multilateral

relationship built on expanded areas of cooperation including finance,

human resources development, health and quarantine as well as judicial

matters. In the spheres of security and military relations, China signed the

Declaration on the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and

became the first major extra-regional power to accede to the Treaty of

Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. In 2002, China and ASEAN also

released a Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional

Security Issues. Since the beginning of the 21st century, China’s military

relations with ASEAN counties had also shifted from one of unofficial to

official nature. The contrast between the rapid pace of development in

China–ASEAN relations and the lack of advancement in Japan–ASEAN

relations was most pronounced in the realm of economic relations. Since the

year 2000, the trade volume between China and ASEAN has risen at the

average rate of 12.4% annually, while the trade volume between Japan and

ASEAN has been decreasing at the average rate of 3% annually.1

* Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

1 These statistics are provided by the ASEAN Secretariat. See http://202.154.12.33/trade/publicview.asp.

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2007, 373–404

doi:10.1093/cjip/pom003

Reproduced from the Science of International Politics , with kind permission of the authors

and the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University

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That their relationship represented a convergence of (Asian) values5 also

accelerated development of China–ASEAN relations.

There are, however, shortcomings to these explanations. The first

emphasizes the benefits that the end of the bi-polar world order and of

opposing ideologies brought to China–ASEAN relations. But it does not

explain the rapid advance of China–ASEAN relations in the late 1990s, at a

time when Japan–ASEAN relations made minimal progress. The second

explanation emphasizes the influence of changes in China/ASEAN policy

on the development of China–ASEAN relations, an approach with which

this article concurs, albeit recognizing that it is an explanation that does

not take into account all other possible reasons for accelerated growth in

China–ASEAN relations during the late 1990s.

There are also two general explanations for the slow development of

Japan–ASEAN relations. The first stresses the constraining influence of

Japanese domestic factors on Japan–ASEAN relations, such as its historical

problems, long period of economic stagnation, low public morale, political

upheaval, and a dearth of innovative thinking by the political leadership,

evident in its resolute protection of domestic markets.6 Scholarship in

support of this view argues that despite the need for a restructuring

of Japanese foreign policy, particularly that with regard to East Asia

(including Southeast Asia),7 Japan’s leadership generally gives precedence to

maintaining the domestic political and economic status-quo over its foreignaffairs.

The second view asserts that Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy

underwent changes, but was unable to shed certain of its traditional

principles and psychological constraints. Japan’s focus on relations with the

United States, its clear intent to do what’s best for Japan and lack of a sense

of East Asian (including Southeast Asian) identity all constituted major

obstacles to Japan’s relationship with the region.8 Certain works within this

body of research highlight the role of the Japan–US alliance in constraining

Japan’s foreign policy; others cite Japan’s inability to ‘break away from theUS and enter East Asia as an inhibiting influence on the development of its

relations with East Asian nations. Another argument raised within the

5 Joseph S. Y. Cheng, ‘ASEAN’s Role in the Chinese Foreign Policy Framework,’ in SharonSiddique and Sree Kumar, eds., The 2nd ASEAN Reader (Singapore: Institute of SoutheastAsian Studies, 2003), pp. 430–4.

6 For instance, see Li Wen, ‘Riben yu Dongmeng guanxi de fazhan quxiang’ (‘Trendsin the Development of Japan-ASEAN Relations’), http://iaps.cass.cn/xueshuwz/showcontent.asp?id¼239; Yoichi Funabashi, ‘New Challenges, New Frontier: Japan andASEAN in the 21st Century’, Asia & Pacific Lecture Series, No. 3 (Singapore: ISEAS,

2003).7 T. J. Pempel, ‘Japanese domestic politics and Asian regionalism’, in S. Javed Maswood,ed., Japan and East Asian Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 44–5.

8 See, for example, Liu Jiangyong, ‘Guoji luntan: Riben yanzhong de yazhou’(‘International Forum: East Asia’s Japanese Eye’), Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times),April 2, 2004, No. 15.

China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN Relations during the Post-Cold War Era 375


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relevant research is that Japan does not take its relationship with Southeast

Asian countries as seriously as it does its dealings with the US, or with

China, South Korea, Russia and Europe.9

These two views are also problematic. The first explanation contends that

strongly conservative forces in Japanese domestic politics limited changes to

foreign policy. But it is inconsistent with the facts. Japan’s post-Cold War

foreign policy actually did commence restructure, particularly under

Hashimoto and Koizumi, both of whom took action intended to deepen

relations with ASEAN. The second view, which cites Japan’s preoccupation

with its relations with the United States and its lack of an East Asian identity

as a constraint on Japan–ASEAN relations, has its merits. But it disregards

internal changes that have occurred in ASEAN foreign policies, thereby

falling short of a full explanation.Some research analyzes this phenomenon from an ASEAN perspective, as

regards the impact of changes in ASEAN policy toward China and Japan.10

Yet, the facts reveal that these changes had minimal influence on the

development of bilateral relations. For instance, ASEAN nations were

increasingly wary of China during the mid-1990s owing to intensifying

territorial disputes between China and ASEAN, and also the influence of the

‘China threat’. But this in no way impeded China from becoming a

consultative partner with ASEAN in 1991, or from being upgraded to full

dialogue partner in 1996. Conversely, ASEAN suspicion and wariness of Japan has decreased immensely since the 1980s, yet there has been no

obvious progress in the relationship.

The factors influencing the development of China–ASEAN and Japan–

ASEAN relations are multi-faceted; there is no single factor that explains

developments and changes to bilateral relations. This article, therefore,

adopts a multi-factor methodology that integrates domestic and foreign

criteria.11 The relative progress in ASEAN’s political relationships with

China and Japan appear to the author to have been most apparent since

1997. The East Asian financial crisis of 1997 brought China and ASEANcloser, as regards promoting East Asian cooperation and integration. China

played a stabilizing role during the crisis that gained it the trust and

appreciation of ASEAN. In the wake of the crisis, China worked in concert

with ASEAN toward strengthening East Asian regional cooperation;

it proposed establishing a China–ASEAN free trade area as a means

9 Lam Peng Er, ‘Perceiving Japan: The View from Southeast Asia’, in Derek da Cunha, ed.,Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security (Singapore: ISEAS, 2000), pp. 144–5.

10

Chin Kin Wah, ‘Regional Perceptions of China and Japan’, in Chandran Jeshurun, ed.,China, India and Japan and the Security of Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 1993),pp. 3–25; Julius Caesar Parrenas, ‘China and Japan in ASEAN’s Strategic Perceptions’,Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1990), pp. 198–224.

11 Yan Xuetong and Sun Xuefeng, Guoji guanxi yanjiu shiyong fangfa (Practical Methods of International Studies), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2001), pp. 55–60.

376 Lai Foon Wong


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to promoting East Asian integration. Japan, however, has been relatively

inactive as regards East Asian cooperation and integration. At this point in

the 21st century, ASEAN is still hesitant in the face of Japan’s Japan–

ASEAN FTA proposal and expression of support for East Asian

integration. It is, accordingly, this author’s belief that the differences in

Chinese and Japanese regional integration policies constitute primary

reasons for the disparity in extent of development of each country’s political

relations with ASEAN. A detailed analysis of the research approach to the

article appears in Figure 1.

China–ASEAN Relations During thePost-Cold War Period

China and ASEAN did not establish official relations before the 1990s,

although China did establish diplomatic relations with three of ASEAN’s six

members: Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. China began establishing

formal relations with other members at the beginning of the 1990s.

It resumed official relations with Indonesia and established diplomatic

relations with Singapore and Brunei between 1990 and 1991, the year China

first participated in an ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting, as an observer.

Figure 2 illustrates the marked increase in high-level exchanges during this

period. The impact of the ‘China threat theory’ on ASEAN nations,

however, was substantial. Numerous ASEAN nations were uneasy at the

thought of China’s becoming the new hegemon of Southeast Asia, ultimately

destabilizing the region. Southeast Asian nations were further disquieted

when China, in February 1992, signified its interests in the South China

Sea by issuing a law on China’s territorial waters, and publishing a map

China

Intensifying China–US Tension

‘Good Neighborliness’ Policy

ASEANASEAN Expansion

Economic Integration

Japan

Strengthening Japan–US Alliance

Seeking to become a major

political power

1997 East

AsianFinancial

Crisis

Greater support for

regionalization

policies

Pays lipservice to

regionalization

policies

China–ASEA

N relations

outpaceJapan–ASEA

N relations

Greater support for

regionalization

policies

Fig. 1 Research Framework.



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in 1993.12 China did nothing to allay such fears when it displayed an air of

non-chalance during a series of unofficial meetings sponsored by Indonesia

regarding disputes in the South China Sea.

The playing up of the ‘China threat theory’ and intensification of South

China Sea territorial disputes from 1994 to 1996 had negative impact on

the development of China–ASEAN political relations. China and the

Philippines clashed for the first time over the South China Sea issue

between 1994 and 1995. It was actually suspicion of China that made

ASEAN eager to promote China’s accession to the ASEAN Regional

Forum (ARF), a move primarily designed to regulate Chinese behavior.13

China did not actively participate in such multilateral regional organization

as it wished to avoid the possible restraints of multilateral diplomacy

emanating from Western and other countries. During this period, however,

China and ASEAN began establishing mechanisms for lower-level dialogue

that enhanced trust and understanding, and dispelled tensions. The twoentities held the first vice ministerial level meeting, also known as China–

ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (China–ASEAN SOM), in April 1995. Its

purpose was to strengthen bilateral trust and understanding in both the

political and security spheres. During the meeting, ASEAN put the South

China Sea dispute on the agenda in an attempt to negotiate a common

solution to the issue. As regards economic matters, China and ASEAN

founded two joint commissions in 1995 to promote economic cooperation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

No. of Exchanges

Year

Fig. 2 China–ASEAN Leadership Exchanges (1990–2005).

12 Ang Cheng Guan, ‘The South China Sea Dispute Re-visited,’ IDSS Working Paper, No. 4,1999, pp. 9–11.

13 Rosemary Foot, ‘China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organisational Processes andDomestic Modes of Thought’, Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 5 (1998), p. 426.

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in trade, investment, and technology. China officially became a full dialogue

partner of ASEAN in 1996.

Multilateral dialogue and mechanisms for cooperation between China and

ASEAN increased and entered a phase of systemic development (Figure 3)

from 1997 to 2000. China and ASEAN convened the annual ASEAN

‘10þ 1’ leadership summit in 1997, and in addition to the ARF in 1996, the

ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (ASEAN FMM) also convened. Besidesthrough ASEAN SOM and ASEAN FMM, China and ASEAN also

conducted high-level political dialogue and exchange through the ASEAN

‘10þ 1’ and ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ leadership meetings. The practical purpose of

the China–ASEAN Joint Cooperation Committee (ACJCC), created in

1997, was to strengthen policy cooperation and information sharing. This

level of work coordination promoted concrete cooperation in various fields,

particularly human resource development and personnel and cultural

exchanges.14 The ACJCC is responsible for dialogue and cooperation

mechanisms on four main levels, including ASEAN SOM, China–ASEANJoint Committee on Economic and Trade Cooperation, China–ASEAN

China–ASEAN Leadership Summit

(launched in 1997)

China–ASEAN

Foreign Ministers

Meetings

(launched in 1991)

China–ASEAN Joint

Cooperation Committee(launched in 1997)

China–ASEAN

Economic Ministers

Meetings

(launched in 1998)

China–ASEAN

Transportation

Ministers Meetings

(launched in 2001)

China–ASEAN

Finance Ministers

Meetings

(launched in 1997)

China–ASEAN Joint

Economic

Committee

(launched in 1995)

China–ASEAN Joint

Science and

Technology

Committee

(launched in 1995)

China–ASEAN

Senior Officials

Consultations

(launched in 1995)

ASEAN–Beijing

Committee

(launched in 1996)

Fig. 3 Major Mechanisms for China–ASEAN Dialogue and Cooperation.

14 ‘Joint Press Release: The First ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting,Beijing, 26–28 February 1997’, http://www.aseansec.org/5880.htm.



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Joint Science and Technology Committee, and the ASEAN–Beijing

Committee (formed in 1996).15 The Second Meeting of the ACJCC in

March 1999 led to four proposals: first, strengthen personnel exchanges;

second, convene a research seminar to help [familiarize] young ASEAN

officials [with] contemporary China; third, hold an ASEAN–China

economic and trade cooperation seminar; fourth, convene an ASEAN–

China work conference on scientific cooperation and exchange. China, in

1997, contributed US$700,000 toward establishment of the China–ASEAN

cooperation fund, its purpose being to assist the ACJCC in promoting

cooperation programs. China contributed a further US$500 million toward

assistance and cooperation with ASEAN on human resource development

in 2000.

Establishing mutual trust is the foundation of strengthened China–

ASEAN relations. China adopted a series of measures in the security sphere

at the beginning of the 21st century designed to enhance mutual trust, dispel

ASEAN misgivings about China, and promote further advancement of

China–ASEAN relations. The two parties signed the ‘Declaration on the

Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’ in November 2002,

and China signed the ‘Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia’

in October 2003. China also indicated its intention to join the ‘Southeast

Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty’. The Code of Conduct was never

regarded as a solution to the dispute, but it was an important confidence-building measure. The Declaration states: ‘The parties undertake to exercise

self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate

disputes and affect peace and stability. . .’16 China and ASEAN also

established a working group to discuss the South China Sea issue. In March

2005, China signed a tripartite agreement on oil and gas exploration work

with Vietnam and the Philippines—countries which China had previously

had run-ins with over the South China Sea issue.

China’s joining of the ‘Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast

Asia’ also enhanced trust in it among Southeast Asian nations, ASEANþ3summits having provided a platform from which to implement security

cooperation. The Fifth ASEANþ3 Summit proposed that the body focus

not only on economic cooperation, but also on developing dialogue and

cooperation in the political and security spheres—a process that began with

the matter of non-traditional security threats.17 China and ASEAN signed

the ‘Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of

Non-traditional Security Issues’ in 2002, and two years later signed a

memorandum of understanding regarding its implementation.

15 Ibid .16 ‘Declaration on the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’, http://

www.aseansec.org/13163.htm.17 ‘Press Statement of the Chairman of the 7th ASEAN Summit and the 5th ASEANþ3

Summit, November, 2001, Bandar Seri Begawan’, http://www.aseansec.org/5317.htm.

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China has also adopted economic measures aimed at countering anxiety

about a ‘China threat’. At the Fourth China–ASEAN Summit in 2000,

Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji proposed creating a committee of experts that

would explore the possibility of a China–ASEAN Free Trade Area; it was a

gesture intended to ameliorate worry about China’s entrance into the WTO.

Plans for such an FTA were unveiled at the Fifth China–ASEAN Summit in

November 2001, which raised three recommendations: first, identify key

areas of bilateral cooperation, particularly in agriculture, information and

communications technology, human resource development, bilateral invest-

ment, and the development of the Mekong River Basin; second, create a

China–ASEAN FTA within a 10-year period; third, strengthen political

trust and support, constantly expand bilateral dialogue and cooperation,

and enhance mutual understanding and trust.18 China issued its ‘Country

Report on Participation in Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic

Cooperation’ the same year, announcing that, in support of the ASEAN

integration process, it would grant the least developed countries (Laos,

Myanmar, and Cambodia) preferential tariff treatment. China’s objective in

creating an FTA with ASEAN and participating in its regional integration

was to convince ASEAN nations that China’s opening, greater competi-

tiveness and growth since WTO membership presented not challenges, but

new opportunities for ASEAN. China also expressed a willingness to open

its markets ahead of ASEAN, provide financial assistance for infrastructureprojects and narrow the development gap between old and new ASEAN

members to help in promoting ASEAN integration. All these measures are

aimed at alleviating any economic worries in the ASEAN region that have

been engendered by China’s rise. The creation of a China–ASEAN FTA ties

the economic fortunes of the two together, heralding a gradual deepening of

economic cooperation. China and ASEAN signed the ‘Joint Declaration on

the China–ASEAN Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’ in

October 2003, thereby formally establishing a strategic partnership. The

following year, China and ASEAN formulated an implementation plan fortheir strategic partnership.

Greater political and economic trust has also had a positive effect on

military relations between China and ASEAN nations. China has signed

memorandums of understanding regarding national defense and coopera-

tion with six ASEAN members since 2003. Military exchanges have also

expanded steadily in recent years. China sent 46 defense delegations to nine

ASEAN nations between 2003 and 2005, during which time 45 defense

delegations from 10 ASEAN nations came to China (Table 1). More

noteworthy still, a mechanism for bilateral defense dialogue, of deputysecretary level, with Vietnam and the Philippines commenced in 2005.

18 ‘Press Statement by the Chairman of the 7th ASEAN Summit and the Three ASEANþ1Summits, Brunei Darussalam, 6 November 2001’, http://www.aseansec.org/5316.htm.



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Post-Cold War Japan–ASEAN Relations

Of the six Japanese Prime Ministers appointed between 1990 and 2005, three

traveled to ASEAN nations (Table 2), the remaining three’s time in office

having been too short. Japanese prime ministers who traveled to ASEAN

countries had also chosen to delineate new directions in Japan’s policy

toward ASEAN, which included most notably the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’ of

1977, the ‘Takeshita Doctrine’ of 1987, the ‘Hashimoto Doctrine’ of 1997

and the Koizumi speech of 2002. Yet, the relationship between Japan and

ASEAN leadership had remained at arm’s length, owing to flux in domestic

Japanese politics during the 1990s, which saw a rapid succession of six prime

ministers within 10 years (Figure 2). Although Prime Ministers Kaifu

Toshiki, Miyazawa Kiichi, and Tomiichi Murayama traveled to ASEAN

countries during the period 1990–1996, and raised several propositions, they

were all verbal declarations rather than specific policies.Japan–ASEAN relations were further institutionalized at the end of the

1990s. Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s speech19 during his visit to

Table 1 China–ASEAN Military to Military Visits (2003–2005)

2003 2004 2005

Indonesia to China 1 3 0

China to Indonesia 0 1 0

Malaysia to China 0 0 1

China to Malaysia 2 3 5

Philippines to China 2 3 1

China to Philippines 1 1 1

Thailand to China 3 3 3

China to Thailand 1 4 3

Singapore to China 0 1 1

China to Singapore 1 1 2

Brunei to China 0 1 1

China to Brunei 3 1 1

Vietnam to China 2 3 6

China to Vietnam 0 3 1

Myanmar to China 1 1 1

China to Myanmar 1 3 1

Laos to China 1 1 1

China to Laos 0 1 1

Cambodia to China 1 1 1

China to Cambodia 0 0 0

Source: Xinhua News Agency Statistics, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website data statistics.

19 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9701/policy.html.

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ASEAN countries in January 1997 proposed expansion and deepening of

exchanges, as well as promotion of dialogue at all levels.20 The previously

unscheduled meetings between Japan and ASEAN leaders became an

annual summit in 1997. Although Japan and ASEAN had convened their

first leadership meeting in 1977, a full 10 years elapsed between the second

and third (the second was in 1987 and the third in 1997). In 1998, Japan

also initiated cabinet-level Japan-ASEAN Consultative Group Meetings.

The same year, an economic and industrial cooperation committee was set

up under the AEM-MITI Economic Ministers Meeting to enhance Japan–

ASEAN industrial cooperation in order to help ASEAN countries be more

competitive and provide development assistance to new ASEAN members.21

Japan, according to Hashimoto’s proposal, would also establish a series of

new mechanisms for cooperation, such as the Japan–ASEAN Roundtable

on Development, plans for comprehensive Japan–ASEAN human resource

development, the ‘Japan–ASEAN South-South Cooperation Program’, and

a conference on counter-terrorism22 —all of which were to be implemented

during Hashimoto’s tenure. Figure 4 shows that there were frequent high-

level visits between Japan and ASEAN from 1998 to 2000. (See Figure 5 and

Table 2 Former Japanese Prime Ministers’ Visits to ASEAN Nations (1990–2005)

Time in Office Prime Minister Destinations

1989–1991 (1 year, 7 months) Toshiki Kaifu 1991: Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines,

Singapore, and Thailand

1991–1993 (1 year, 9 months) Kiichi Miyazawa 1993: Indonesia, Malaysia,

Thailand, and Brunei

1993–1994 (8 months) Morihiro Hosokawa

1994 (59 days) Tsutomu Hata

1994–1996 (1 year, 6 months) Tomiichi Murayama 1994: Malaysia, Singapore,

Philippines, and Vietnam

1996–1998 (2 years, 6 months) Ryutaro Hashimoto 1997: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia,

Vietnam, and Singapore

1998–2000 (1 year, 8 months) Keizo Obuchi 2000: Cambodia, Laos, and

Thailand

2000–2001 (1 year, 1 month) Yoshiro Mori

2001–2005 (Koizumi stepped

down in September 2006)

Junichiro Koizumi 2002: Philippines, Malaysia,

Thailand, Indonesia, and

Singapore

20 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9701/policy.html.21 ‘Relationship between Japan and ASEAN’, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/

asean/pmv9812/relation.html.22 Sueo Sudo, The International Relations of Japan and Southeast Asia: Forging a New

Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 45.



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Table 3 for a list of major Japan and ASEAN mechanisms for dialogue and

cooperation, and of meetings held.)

Hashimoto proposed joint efforts with ASEAN to tackle terrorism, drug

trafficking, environmental degradation and other global problems in 1997.By this time Japan–ASEAN dialogue had already developed beyond trade

and investment to discussions of political and security issues. Agendas at the

Japan–ASEAN Leadership Meeting

(launched in 1977)

Japan–ASEAN Foreign

Ministers Meeting

(launched in 1978)

Japan–ASEAN Forum

(launched in 1977)

Japan–ASEAN Economic Ministers

Meeting

(launched in 1992)

Japan–ASEAN Finance

Ministers Meeting

(launched in 1997)

Japan–ASEAN Consultative

Group Meetings

(launched in 1998)

Japan–ASEAN Roundtable on

Development

(launched in 1997)

Economic and Industrial

Cooperation Committee

(launched in 1998)

Fig. 5 Major Mechanisms for Japan–ASEAN Dialogue and Cooperation.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Year

No. of Exchanges

Fig. 4 Japan–ASEAN Leadership Exchanges (1990–2005).23

23 For original source, see Appendix.

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Japan–ASEAN forum at the upgraded vice-ministerial level began, in 1993,

to feature regular policy dialogue on political and security problems.

The annual Japan–ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting was also upgraded,

in 1995, to become a platform for Japan–ASEAN policy dialogue on global

and regional issues. Japan and ASEAN began efforts to resolve regional and

global security issues in 1999, when Prime Minister Obuchi proposed

convening the first international conference on anti-piracy. The conferencewas held in April 2000 and was attended by 10 of the 16 ASEAN members.

Koizumi restated, in 2001, Japan’s hopes of cooperation with ASEAN on

anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, the environment, the prevention of infectious

diseases, and other global issues.

Japan and ASEAN issued a joint statement on combating international

terrorism in 2004, and in 2005, Koizumi pledged US$100 million towards

the prevention of infectious diseases. Japan’s signing of the ‘Treaty of Amity

and Cooperation in Southeast Asia’ marked a big step forward in its security

relationship with ASEAN, as it is generally tentative about entering into

treaties because of its alliance relations with the United States. Japan’s key

reason for signing the treaty, was in order not to fall too far behind China,

which had signed the treaty in 2003.

Table 3 Japan–ASEAN Summits (1990–2005)

Year Japan–ASEAN

Foreign

Ministers

Meeting

Japan–ASEAN

Forum

Japan–ASEAN

Economic

Ministers

Meeting

Japan–ASEAN

Finance

Ministers

Meeting

Japan–ASEAN

Leadership

SummitÃ

1990 13th 12th

1991 14th 13th

1992 15th 1st

1993 16th 2nd

1994 17th 3rd

1995 18th 14th 4th

1996 19th 5th

1997 20th 15th 6th 1st 3rd

1998 21st 16th 2nd 4th1999 22nd 3rd 5th

2000 23rd 7th 4th 6th

2001 24th 17th 8th 5th 7th

2002 25th 18th 9th 6th

2003 26th 19th 10th 7th

2004 27th 20th 11th 8th 8th

2005 28th 21st 12th 9th 9th

Source: http://www.mofa.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9812/relation.html*The first summit was held in 1997 and the second in 1987



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China, Japan, and ASEAN Regional IntegrationPolicies and China–ASEAN andJapan–ASEAN relations

The Process of East Asian Regionalisation

The 1997 Asian financial crisis was a turning point as regards closer East

Asian regional cooperation and regionalisation. The ASEAN ‘10þ 3’

cooperation mechanism evolved as regional countries sought to cope with

the crisis. Owing to certain East Asian nations’ (such as Japan) maintaining

a rather passive attitude toward East Asian cooperation, however, ASEAN

‘10þ 3’ meetings during the initial two years of meetings tended to be low-

key, and did not produce any joint declaration.24 The accent within ASEAN

‘10þ 3’ economic cooperation from 1997 to 1999 was on finance, withparticular focus on strengthening economic appraisal and policy dialogue.

For example, an early warning system and mechanisms to monitor short-

term capital flows were developed to enhance regional financial and

currency stability. The willingness of East Asian nations to strengthen

regional cooperation steadily grew after the Asian financial crisis. The third

informal ASEAN leadership meeting with China, Japan, and South Korea

in November 1999 produced the ‘Joint Statement on East Asian

Cooperation’, which called for wide-ranging expansion of cooperation

among numerous East Asian nations. Cooperation continued to expandunder the ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ framework in 2000, each day more diversified

and multi-layered, by virtue of mechanisms for multilateral cooperation,

than the last (Table 4). Under the annual ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ summit

framework, East Asian nations also created a series of ministerial and

senior-level meetings, which multiplied and diversified mechanisms for

consultation and cooperation. For example, these nations began holding

annual ‘10þ 3’ Economic and Finance Ministers’ Meetings and other

‘10þ 3’ senior officials’ meetings in 2000, in addition to the ‘10þ 3’ Foreign

Ministers’ Meeting.East Asian nations gradually began to promote further regionalisation

after the turn of the new century. The Fifth ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ Summit in

November 2001 decided that the East Asia Study Group should further

examine the report, ‘Towards an East Asian Community’, prepared by the

East Asia Vision Group (EAVG). It was recommended that governments

make East Asian integration their ultimate objective as regards regional

cooperation. Many forms of integration were proposed, including an East

Asia Free Trade Area.25 The final report of the EAVG was discussed at the

Sixth ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ Summit in 2002, when it was agreed to carry outresearch on and delineate specific methods of creation of a regional FTA.

24 Sueo Sudo, Evolution of ASEAN–Japan Relations (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), p. 53.25 Report of the East Asian Vision Group, http://www.aseansec.org/pdf/east_asia_vision.pdf.

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Leaders at the Seventh ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ Summit in 2003 agreed to make the

East Asia FTA a long-term objective. At the Eighth Summit a year later,

leaders also agreed to make ‘East Asian Community’ a long-term objective,

and held the first East Asia Summit (EAS) in December 2005.

Chinese, Japanese, and ASEAN Regional Integration Policies

Chinese Regional Integration Policy

China has traditionally operated via bilateral relationships rather than a

regional approach as regards relations with its periphery.26 It, however,

began participating in international organizations and strengthening

international interaction and exchanges in the 1980s. Since the beginning

of the 1990s, multilateral diplomacy as well as the concept of regional and

sub-regional relations appeared in Chinese foreign policy, which was

manifested in China’s new diplomacy. As it enters the 21st century, along

with its growing economic power and rising international standing, China’s

new diplomacy became even more prominent and it became more proactive

in the promotion of East Asian cooperation and integration.

China actively developed multilateral cooperation with ASEAN from

1990 to 1993, with the aim of achieving strategic partnership status.

Although the influence of ideology on China’s foreign policy had declined in

the 1980s, the degree of trust in China’s bilateral contacts with ASEAN

remained low, which impeded the development of multilateral cooperation

with ASEAN. China–ASEAN relations experienced a deep transformation

after the end of the Cold War. During the early 1990s China successively

resumed and established diplomatic relations with ASEAN nations. This

helped China build trust with ASEAN nations and created the conditions

for multilateral cooperation.

Table 4 Expanding the Scope of ASEAN ‘‘10þ3’’ Cooperation

Year Area of Cooperation

2000 Political and Security, Economic, Trade and Investment

2001 Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry, Human Resources, Science and Technology

2002 Environment, Travel

2003 Art and Culture

2004 Energy, Health, Information and Communications Technology, Social Welfare,

Transnational Crime and Counter-terrorism

Source: http://www.aseansec.org/AR05/PR-partnership.pdf

26 Men Honghua, ‘Canyu, chuangshe yu zhudao: yi guoji zhidu jianshe wei zhongxin tuidongdongya yitihua’ (‘Participation, Creation and Leadership: International Institutions Buildthe Core of East Asian Integration’) http://www.irchina.org/news/view.asp?id¼841.



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China gradually accepted the regional concept between 1994 and 1996.

Entry into the ARF in 1994 finally dispelled China’s wariness of multilateral

organizations and mechanisms, born of the assumption that they would be

US dominated, that had caused China to keep its distance during the ARF’s

formation and early operation. After a couple of years’ observation and

adaptation, China acknowledged that the ARF would not evolve into a

US-dominated multilateral security mechanism.

China became more steadfast in its trust and participation in multilateral

diplomacy from 1997 to 2000, actively encouraging regionalism and sub-

regional cooperation. China not only participated in existing regional

multilateral coordination and cooperation mechanisms, but also initiated

and promoted efforts to create new ones. In 1997, it worked with ASEAN to

advance regional economic cooperation by creating the ASEAN ‘10þ 1’ and

‘10þ 3’ summits. At the same time, China also actively advanced East Asian

cooperation under the ‘10þ 3’ framework. For instance, it proposed the

convening of meetings of deputy finance ministers and deputy heads of

central banks to discuss the restructuring of international financial

institutions.

China realizes that North America, Europe, and East Asia are the

international economic powerhouses of the 21st century, which makes East

Asian integration an important strategic objective and worthy of vigorous

advancement. China actively participated in East Asian multilateralcooperation between 2001 and 2005, and also guided the construction of

an institutional framework for regional multilateral cooperation. China

proposed, in November 2001, strengthening economic cooperation with

ASEAN by creating a China–ASEAN FTA. The two entities formed a trade

negotiation committee in May 2005 to consider the question and begin

consultations on implementation.27 China and ASEAN signed the

‘Framework Agreement on China-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic

Cooperation’ in November of the same year. It included cooperation in

investment and the trading of goods and services, an ‘Early Harvest Plan’and other measures to strengthen economic cooperation.28 The Framework

Agreement also identified 2010 and 2015 as respective FTA implementation

dates for the six original and new ASEAN members.29 China began the

‘Early Harvest Program’ to further the establishment of the FTA in January

2004, by granting ASEAN nations, particularly new members, preferential

tariff treatment.30 The ‘Agreement on Trade in Goods’ was signed in

November 2004 and took effect in July 2005, when negotiations on

investment and trade in services also began.

27 ASEAN Annual Report 2002-2003, http://www.aseansec.org/viewpdf.asp?file¼/ar03/pdf/Chapter5.pdf.

28Ibid .

29 Ibid .30 Ibid .

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In addition to its work with the FTA, China proposed, in November 2002,

cooperation with ASEAN in five major spheres: agriculture, information

and communications technology, human resources development, two-way

investment and development in the Mekong River Basin.31 China has been

active in its development of the Mekong Basin, having announcing that it

would narrow development gaps among ASEAN nations by means of its

participation in ASEAN sub-regional development. China utilized the

‘China–ASEAN Cooperation Fund’, a program under the ‘Initiative for

ASEAN Integration’ (IAI), to promote ASEAN internal integration, and

also improved funding for inland rivers and waterway projects in new

ASEAN member countries. China decided to expand its participation in the

IAI in 2003, through various sub-regional cooperation projects in the East

ASEAN Growth Area (EAGA). China officially became a development

partner of the EAGA in December 2005.

While Japan appears to prefer to forge bilateral FTAs with specific

ASEAN countries individually, China has concentrated its efforts on the

creation of a region-wide China–ASEAN FTA. China’s concern is that

bilateral FTAs might split the ASEAN market and undermine ASEAN

‘10þ 3’ cooperation, ultimately hindering the emergence of an East Asian

Community. Since the creation of an East Asian ‘10þ 3’ mechanism, China

has put forth numerous recommendations and programs to expand and

deepen multilateral cooperation under the ‘10þ

3’ framework. For instance,China recommended the ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ Agriculture and Forestry

Ministers meeting in 2001, and sponsored the Forum on Agricultural

Technology and Cooperation in East Asia. China also promoted the

exploration of theories and policies on East Asia cooperation and

integration. In November 2002, it proactively offered to implement one of

the recommendations made in the EAVG Report, i.e. the setting up of the

‘Network of East Asian Think-tanks’ (NEAT) under the ASEAN ‘10þ 3’

framework.32 The NEAT, which was speedily established in 2003, conducts

research on major issues relating to East Asian integration and produces anannual report that is submitted to the ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ informal leadership

summit.33

Japanese Regional Integration Policy

Japan has never been a proponent of regional economic integration and has

evinced anxiety about the rise of regionalism. Japan’s worry is that

heightened trade protectionism and regional economic groupings will have

negative impact on international free trade. Japan’s foreign economic policy

has always promoted global multilateral free trade, as manifest in its support

of the WTO and other international economic and trade mechanisms. It is a

31Ibid .

32 http://www.neat.org.cn/chinese/gywm/index.php?topic_id¼001004.33 Ibid .



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policy in which bilateral economic and trade cooperation are viewed as a

secondary avenue through which to expand world trade. Japan indeed lacks

a clear strategy at the regional level. As the sense of regionalism grew and

the trend of regional integration deepened in various parts of the world in

the 1990s, the overall approach of Japan’s foreign economic policy also

underwent some changes.

Japan maintained a combative and critical attitude toward regional

integration from 1990 to 1993, and appeared generally disinclined towards

promoting regional cooperation. Its response, for example, to further

integration within the European Community was that the European market

should not become protectionist or a ‘closed region’ but be open to the

world. Japan also offered firm support for the strengthening and

improvement of international free trade institutions.34 It was unwilling to

support East Asian integration or institutionalized cooperation because of

its adherence to policies in line with those of the United States. Japan

consequently opposed a strong economic bloc from which the United States

would be excluded and actively supported the role of APEC, primarily

because it is an Asia-Pacific multilateral institution with the capacity for

discussion and consultation. It lacks, however, the power to adopt joint

action, which limits the body’s potential. Mahathir, then Prime Minister of

Malaysia, proposed in 1991 the creation of an East Asian economic

organization, with Japan playing the key leadership role. But Japan refusedto lead such a move, emphasizing that East Asia should, on the contrary,

open to the outside, and not become an EU—or North American-style

economic bloc. Japan’s passive attitude is attributable to strong US

opposition to an East Asian economic organization. This was evident at

the APEC foreign ministers meeting in 1991, when Japan publicly expressed

its firm support of APEC in favor of an East Asian economic organization

that risked embodying a ‘closed regionalism’.

Japan realized during the period 1994 to 1996 that East Asian cooperation

and regionalism was strengthening to the extent of becoming inevitable, asincreased intra-East Asian economic activity became more apparent.

It began reluctant participation in East Asian group activity, but was still

doubtful about East Asia integration and cooperation. Japan first acknowl-

edged that it should adopt a three-level framework—international, regional,

and bilateral— 35 approach to its cooperation abroad in its 1996 Diplomatic

Bluebook. The Bluebook first proposed a regional-level policy, emphasizing

Japan’s strengthened cooperation with other East Asian nations.

It nevertheless actively supported the US presence in East Asia and its

role in regional affairs, and continued to promote APEC as the model for

34 See the Conclusions of Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebooks, 1990–1993, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook.

35 Japan’s 1996 Diplomatic Bluebook, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1996.

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regional cooperation. When ASEAN requested Japan’s participation in

convening the East Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1995, Japan demurred;

it did not approve of the creation of ASEM, initially because the United

States, Australia, and Singapore were excluded. Japan’s attitude shifted only

when East Asian regionalism eventually gained EU approval. Japanparticipated in the first ASEM meeting in March 1996, in order to avoid

being excluded from the initiation of cooperation between the EU and

East Asia.

The Asian financial crisis of 1997 made clear to Japan the importance of

regional finance and currency cooperation, as financial instability in

ASEAN and East Asian nations could affect Japan’s economy. Japan

proposed in July of that year the Asian Monetary Fund to offer emergency

financial assistance to Thailand and other ASEAN countries affected by the

crisis. The ASEAN warmly received and supported this proposal, but it

sparked off strong American opposition that ultimately forced Japan to

abandon its vision of regional financial cooperation, and rendered it

incapable of performing an active function in East Asian regional

cooperation. Japan declared in October 1998 the ‘New Miyazawa

Initiative’, whereby it would distribute financial aid through the traditional

bilateral channels. At the ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ Finance Ministers’ meeting,

Japan also put forward the ‘Chiang Mai Initiative’, which provided financial

resources through bilateral currency convertibility arrangements. Yet, Japan

was still not overly active at the ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ leadership meeting; it was

unwilling to use the venue as a means to advancing the regional integration

process. Japan was still underscoring the need for East Asian nations to

promote ‘open regionalism’ at the first ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ Foreign Ministers

meeting in 2000.

East Asian cooperation experienced rapid expansion and deepening in the

early 21st century under the ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ framework, which caused

Japan to take a more active approach to regional cooperation. Japan

recognized that China’s powerful economic development was exertingincreasingly strong influence in the region, and that ASEAN was honing

competitiveness by accelerating regional integration and expanding its

scope. Japan had to conform to the regional trend in order to maintain and

strengthen its bilateral relationships in East Asia. The topic was raised in

Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook of 2001, which pointed out that regional

cooperation was an important characteristic of the Asia-Pacific, and that

Japan must promote regional dialogue in order to strengthen its bilateral

relationships.36 Japan had altered its opposition to FTAs in 2000, when it

opened economic partnership talks with Singapore. The Bluebook statedthat a Japan–Singapore economic partnership agreement would perform

an auxiliary function within the multilateral trade system with the WTO

36 Japan’s 2001 Diplomatic Bluebook, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2001.



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at the center.37 Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook of 2002 reiterated the

importance of Japan’s promotion of multi-level regional cooperation in

the Asia-Pacific.38 At a policy speech in Singapore, Koizumi proposed an

FTA with ASEAN in order to strengthen economic cooperation with

ASEAN countries on multiple levels.39

Japan’s attitude toward FTAs and Economic Partnership Agreements

(EPA) had become increasingly clear by the end of 2002. The Economic

Affairs Bureau at Japan’s Foreign Ministry issued the first Japanese FTA

strategy in October 2002. Soon afterwards, FTA and EPA affairs

departments were added to the Bureau to ensure integrated policy-making

and implementation. After Japan and Singapore signed the JSEPA and

declared it a model in November 2002, Japan actively promoted FTA

negotiations with other ASEAN members and Mexico. (See Table 4 for ahistory of Japan efforts to forge EPAs with ASEAN and ASEAN nations.)

Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook of 2004 was the first to add new sections on

the promotion of FTAs and EPAs, citing the rapid development of EPAs

and FTAs around the world and the stalled WTO negotiations as requiring

Japan to seek other avenues such as FTAs and EPAs to promote and

expand economic relations with other countries as well as economic

cooperation outside the scope of WTO.40 In addition, Japan would need

to utilize FTAs and EPAs to consolidate its partnership relations with

countries and regions that it regarded as important.41

At the same time, Japan gradually transitioned away from its stance

against East Asian integration, and began openly to disseminate the concept

of regionalization. But Japan’s attitude toward an ‘East Asian Community’

was nonetheless indecisive and lukewarm. Koizumi first raised the notion of

an East Asian Community during January 2002, with a proposal to create

a ‘Enlarged East Asian Community’ incorporating Australia and New

Zealand into the ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ framework.42 Koizumi again proposed,

at a Japan–ASEAN special leadership meeting during December 2003,

that Japan and ASEAN become the central axis of a Japan–ASEAN þ 2

37 Ibid .38 Japan’s 2002 Diplomatic Bluebook, see http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/

2002.39 Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi gave a speech entitled, ‘Japan and ASEAN in East Asia:

a Sincere and Open Partnership’. Koizumi stated that Japan and ASEAN wouldstrengthen future cooperation in five spheres: first, education and human resourcedevelopment; second, strengthen economic cooperation by establishing a comprehensiveeconomic partnership; third, launch an East Asia development initiative and discuss thedevelopment of the cooperation; fourth, make 2003 a year of exchanges between Japan and

ASEAN; fifth, strengthen security cooperation, including on transnational issues. Seehttp://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/01/14speech-e.html.

40 Japan’s 2004 Diplomatic Bluebook, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/01/14speech_e.html.

41 Ibid .42 See http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/01/14speech_e.html.

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http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/

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http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/01/14speech_e.html

http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/

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(China and South Korea) þ 2 (Australia and New Zealand) East Asian

community. Koizumi elaborated further on Japan’s plan in December 2005

when addressing the media. He expressed hope that Japan could contribute

to East Asian development through the framework provided by the East

Asia Summit, which should include three pillars: ‘open regionalism’, ‘respect

[the] common values of democracy, human rights, and global rules of the

WTO’, as well as ‘promote international cooperation in social and economic

affairs and the realm of non-traditional security’43 (the author uses the exact

English language used by the Japanese government as it is a direct citation).

Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso delivered a speech the same year,

emphasizing that ‘First and foremost, Japan is, for the countries of Asia, a

‘‘thought leader,’’ . . . With regard to the establishment of both democracy

and a market economy, Japan has amassed a wealth of experience withoutcomparison anywhere else in the countries of Asia. . .’44 Foreign Minister

Taro Aso also reiterated that India, Australia and New Zealand must join

the ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ structure, and that ‘internally, ASEAN should have

common democratic values’.45

The Japanese government’s policy on East Asian integration in 2002 is

generally considered as ill-considered, under-researched, and insufficiently

formulated, its main goal being to limit China’s expanding influence.

Japan’s proposal of an FTA with ASEAN in 2002 was motivated primarily

by a desire not to fall behind China. Japan’s attitudes and positionsregarding East Asian integration are still unclear. Japan energetically

pursued EPAs with the six original ASEAN members, but remains

uncommitted to the East Asian integration process as regards support of

a regional FTA. It is clear that Japan desires to strengthen economic

relations with ASEAN nations by means of bilateral EPAs as a strategic

means of preventing China and ASEAN from growing too close.

In 2003, Japan began conducting broader research into an East Asian

community, prompted by concern that China might lead the regional

cooperation and integration process through shaping the theoretical andpolicy research of NEAT on regional cooperation and integration. Former

Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone became Chairman of the

Japanese-sponsored Council on East Asia Community (CEAC) in May

2004. It held a series of seminars on how Japan should assess East Asia’s

strengthening regional integration, and discussions as to appropriate policy

responses. The Council released its first report,46 advocating three principles

that should accompany East Asian integration in August 2005. First,

it should promote regional peace, progress and prosperity. Second, the East

43 http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0512.html.44

Ibid.45 Ibid.46 http://www.ceac.jp/e/pdf/policy_report_e.pdf.



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Asian Community should be open, transparent and compatible. Third, the

community should focus on functional cooperation rather than institutional

development. The report also suggested that the Japanese government

arrange a ministerial level conference for the specific purpose of considering

East Asia policy.

Japanese official and academic circles recognized that, regardless of

whether or not Japan supported East Asian integration, the region’s

interdependence was increasing day by day and a new type of regional order

was taking shape. To this day, however, the Japanese government speaks

prolifically while acting minimally as regards East Asian integration. The

Japanese Foreign Ministry official for Asian affairs released a document47 in

the autumn of 2005 that raised the notion of East Asian cooperation,

regionalism and integration, but failed to explicate any substantial plan of

action.48 The Japanese government, moreover, is still extremely concerned

about the American view of the East Asian Community as it regards the

United States as an irreplaceable partner in the security and economic affairs

of East Asia. The view from inside Japan is that East Asian cooperation

should be open to the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, and that

an East Asian Community should not influence the Japan–US alliance.

ASEAN Regional Integration policy

Two events had major influence on ASEAN development during the 1990s.ASEAN membership rose from 6 to 10 members between 1995 and 1999,

making it an organization that spanned the entire region. Although ASEAN

expansion maintained regional peace and improved its international status,

development gaps between original and new members were apparent,

creating a duality that hindered ASEAN unity. The second event was the

Asian financial crisis, which ended the economic growth that ASEAN

nations had experienced since 1990, sending some members into political

and social upheaval. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,

Singapore, and Vietnam each sustained different degrees of economic

damage between 1997 and 1998. The entire ASEAN economy fell by 8.4% in

1998. Indonesia, the largest member, was hardest hit, and experienced

unprecedented changes to its political system in May 1998, when Suharto

was forced to step down after more than 30 years in power. These two events

accelerated ASEAN integration and played huge roles in spurring East

Asian cooperation.

47 Yamada Takio, ‘Towards a Principled Integration of East Asia: Concept of an East Asian

Community’, 18 November 2005, http://www.ceac.jp/e/commentary/051118.htm.48 Ibid . The article raises four principles: first, East Asian regional cooperation must be an‘open regionalism’; second, East Asian cooperation and integration must be a functionalcooperation but without pursuing institutionalization as in the EU model; third, the EastAsia Community must rely on democracy and freedom, and respect human rights; fourth,the East Asia Community must strengthen trust and cooperation in the security realm.

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As ASEAN faced the tremendous political and economic changes in the

international environment, it began, between 1990 and 1993, exploring ways

of adjusting its political, economic and foreign policies to strengthen its

cohesion and increase its international standing. The Fourth ASEAN

Summit in 1992 proposed a new policy direction, first and foremost toward

expanding the scope of the organization. After the Cambodian issue had

been resolved, ASEAN began exploring channels of membership within its

body for nations of Indochina, thereby enhancing its international status

and influence. Establishing an FTA was another objective. The ASEAN

recognized that globalization was making economic competition increas-

ingly fierce and engendering the rise of economic blocs such as the EU and

NAFTA. In order to meet the challenges of globalization and regional

integration, ASEAN decided to establish a regional FTA within 15 years,

from January 1, 1993 onwards, whose function was to promote internal free

trade, establish a genuinely integrated market and manufacturing base, and

lure foreign investment.49 The ASEAN also wanted to strengthen relations

with China and Russia, both of whom were invited to an ASEAN foreign

ministers’ meeting in 1991. The ASEAN summit in 1992, moreover, decided

to enhance dialogue on regional security issues; this was the first time

political and security problems appeared on the agenda of a foreign

ministers meeting. The ASEAN also launched the ARF—the only regional

multilateral mechanism for political and security dialogue—in 1993.It could be said that ASEAN nations were focused more on ASEAN

economic integration and strengthening the role of ASEAN in regional

political and security problems during this time, rather than being active in

East Asian regional cooperation and integration issues; they had no unified

vision of how to proceed. Mahathir’s call for the establishment of the ‘East

Asia Economic Community’ (EAEC) in 1991 got a lukewarm reaction from

other ASEAN nations.50 Despite Mahathir’s insistence, ASEAN agreed to

the organization only on condition that it changed its name to the ‘East

Asian Economic Caucus’, and integrated into the APEC framework.51

Although ASEAN agreed to EAEC’s exploration of possible expansion of

ASEAN regional cooperation into East Asia, it had no plan to hold regular

meetings, and emphasized that it would not allow the EAEC to become

institutionalized or a trading bloc.52

The ASEAN was devoted to the creation of an AFTA. At the ASEAN

economic ministers’ meeting in September 1994, it was decided to accelerate

realization of the AFTA by shortening scheduled common tariff treatment

from 15 to 10 years hence, and bringing the implementation date forward to

49 ‘Singapore Declaration of 1992’ http://www.aseansec.org/5120.htm.50 Richard Stubbs, ‘ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?’ Asian Survey,

Vol. 42, No. 3 (2002), pp. 441–2.51 Ibid .52 ASEAN Annual Report 1991–1992, http://www.aseansec.org/11491.htm.



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2003 from 2008.53 The ASEAN proposed, in July 1994, the achievement of

its larger vision. This included economic integration of a larger ASEAN, and

the advancement of economic cooperation and development among

ASEAN nations. This would ultimately promote economic competitiveness

and the ability to resist foreign pressure, as well as ensure the health of the

regional economic bloc. The AFTA schedule was further shortened from

2003 to 2000 at the Fifth ASEAN Summit in December 1995, when it was

agreed that the six original members of ASEAN would reduce tariffs to no

more than 5%.54 At this meeting, ASEAN also made membership

preparations for Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.55 Perceiving future

excessive development gaps among its members, ASEAN decided to

promote development of the Mekong River Basin. The ‘Basic Framework

for ASEAN–Mekong River Basin Developmental Cooperation’ was passedin November 1996 at the First Informal ASEAN Heads of Government

Meeting.56 The ASEAN enhanced its attractiveness to foreign investment

the same year by establishing the ‘ASEAN Investment Area’ and ‘ASEAN

Industrial Cooperation Scheme’.

As the financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 had shaken the confidence of

foreign investors in ASEAN countries, ASEAN realized that the only way to

reverse the downward trend of foreign investment was to prevent economies

from slipping any farther into recession. This required accelerated creation

of an ASEAN FTA. The Second Informal ASEAN Heads of GovernmentMeeting in December 1997 adopted Vision 2020. It outlined ASEAN’s long-

term objectives, namely establishment by 2020 of a stable, prosperous,

highly competitive economic region that allows the free flow of personnel

and goods.57 ASEAN elected to form the ‘ASEAN Investment Area’ by

2010 and liberalize intra-ASEAN investment by 2020. The primary goal of

Vision 2020 is obviously that of boosting the morale of ASEAN nations and

strengthening business and investor confidence in the region. The ‘Hanoi

Plan of Action’, which formulated specific policies for implementation of

Vision 2020, including accelerating ASEAN’s economic integration and

strengthening cooperation in finance, science and technology, infrastructure,

telecommunications, and human resources development, was passed at the

Sixth ASEAN Summit in December 1998. ASEAN also shortened its AFTA

schedule one more year to 2002, at which time the six original members

would eliminate their tariffs.58

53 ASEAN Annual Report 1994–1995, http://www.aseansec.org/9435.htm.54

‘The Fifth ASEAN Summit’, http://www.aseansec.org/9375.htm.55 Ibid .56 ‘Press Statement of The First Informal ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting, Jakarta,

30 November 1996’, http://www.aseansec.org/5206.htm.57 ‘ASEAN Vision 2020,’ http://www.aseansec.org/5228.htm.58 ‘Hanoi Plan of Action,’ http://www.aseansec.org/8754.htm.

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The East Asian financial crisis also made ASEAN realize the importance

of broader East Asian cooperation. After the crisis, the gap in economic

strength between ASEAN and Northeast Asia grew, ASEAN’s gross

domestic output dropping from 9.7% to 7.6% of the East Asia total.59

As China has replaced ASEAN nations as the world’s most low-cost

manufacturing center, certain manufacturing chains relocated directly to

China. Recognizing that economic recovery for some of its members and

achieving economic integration would be impossible unless this trend were

reversed, ASEAN sought integration with Northeast Asia and a closely

cooperative relationship with China, Japan, and South Korea. This was to

prevent the economic marginalization of ASEAN, and possibly allow it to

become the heart of East Asian economic cooperation. The ASEAN

launched the ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ mechanism in 1997 to promote dialogue and

cooperation with the three countries. The second such ASEAN ‘10þ 3’

meeting in 1998 led to the decision to institutionalize the ‘10þ 1’ and ‘10þ 3’

frameworks and hold annual meetings. The ASEAN primarily focused on

promoting financial and currency cooperation with Northeast Asia from

1999 to 2000, in order to formulate risk prevention and resistance

capabilities that would effectively prevent financial crisis. The ASEAN

signed the Chiang Mai Initiative with China, Japan, and South Korea in

May 2000, strengthening the cooperative frameworks at the disposal of

monetary officials. The ASEAN proposed the East Asia Summit and theestablishment of an East Asia FTA and Investment Area at the Fourth

ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ Leadership Summit in November 2000.

As it enters the 21st century, ASEAN began actively to promote the East

Asian cooperation and integration process in addition to advancing the

ASEAN FTA and the institutional development of ASEAN. Plans for

completion of the ASEAN Economic Community by 2020 were discussed at

the Eighth ASEAN Summit in December 2002. This marked a significant

change in the ASEAN attitude toward integration. During the 1990s

ASEAN had no intention of letting ASEAN integrate as the EU had done;the ultimate goal of the ‘ASEAN 2020 Vision’ of 1997 was indeed not the

establishment of an ASEAN Community. The 9th ASEAN leadership

summit in October 2003, however, issued the ‘Declaration of ASEAN

Concord II’, which provides a framework for establishing a broader

ASEAN Community.60 The ASEAN Community comprises three compo-

nents: the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN Security Community

and the ASEAN Social and Cultural Community.61 The Tenth ASEAN

59

Pang Zhongying, ‘Dongmeng yu Dongya: weimiao de ‘‘Dongya diqu zhuyi’’ ’ (‘ASEANand East Asia: Subtle ‘‘East Asian Regionalism’’ ’), http://www.neat.org.cn/chinese/xsdt/contentshow.php?content_id=59.

60 ‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)’, http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm.

61 Ibid .



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http://www.aseansec.org/

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Summit developed a work agenda from 2004 through to 2010 which it calls

the ‘Vientiane Action Plan’. It proposes specific policy measures to unify the

ASEAN market and production bases, establish a regional FTA through

dialogue partnerships with ASEAN nations and form EPAs with major

countries outside the region, to consolidate economic and trade relations.62

The first East Asia Summit in December 2005 confirmed ASEAN as the

driver of the East Asian regional cooperation and integration process.

Regional Integration Policies and the Developmentof China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN Relations

Table 5 gives a brief summary of China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN

relations during the post-Cold War era. China–ASEAN relations underwent

major transformation in 1997 and strengthened rapidly from 1997 to 2000,

through institutionalization of the relationship under new mechanisms for

dialogue and cooperation. Although Japan–ASEAN relations have also

made progress, the pace of development has been relatively slow,

particularly in view of Japan–ASEAN relations having begun much earlier.

Japan and ASEAN began multilateral negotiations in 1977, with the

establishment of multilateral dialogue and cooperation mechanisms and

regular leadership exchanges. China and ASEAN did not begin official

contact and exchanges until 1990.Figure 6 and Table 5 suggest that coherence as regards China and the

ASEAN regional integration policies is the result of rapidly developing

China–ASEAN relations since the late 1990s. Figure 6 shows that the

number of exchanges between leaders of China and ASEAN began to

increase in 1999, surpassing visits between Japan and ASEAN leaders in

2000. Moreover, in less than 10 years (1997–2005), China and ASEAN had

established 27 mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation, six at the

ministerial level—only six less than those of Japan and ASEAN, which

have created 33 such mechanisms in 28 years.Table 6 below demonstrates how the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis made

China and ASEAN regional integration policies more congruent.

The table essentially indicates that China, Japan and ASEAN policies of

regional cooperation and integration were intimately related to the pace

of development in their bilateral relations. Malaysia initiated the creation of

the EAEC in 1991. Although Japan did not respond positively, this had no

negative impact on Japan–ASEAN relations as other ASEAN countries

were also tepid in their response. By the end of the 1990s, however, the

situation had changed. After the Asian financial crisis struck, ASEANcountries reached consensus on promoting cooperation in East Asia.

62 ‘Vientiane Action Programme’, http://www.aseansec.org/VAP-10th%20ASEAN%20Summit.pdf.

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China’s and ASEAN’s enthusiastic promotion of regional cooperation and

integration in East Asia naturally pulled them closer at this point. Japan,

on the other hand, was less enthusiastic. After the 1997 crisis, the Japanese

made efforts to build the AMF, but gave up in the face of US opposition.

Meanwhile, China and ASEAN joined together in promoting East Asian

cooperation, by means of the ‘10þ 3’ arrangement. The Japanese did not

begin to exhibit a positive response to the promotion of regional cooperation

in East Asia until the 21st century, but in reality, Japan still lacks sincerity

and does nothing (Table 7).

Table 5 Japan’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with ASEAN and ASEAN

Members

ASEAN Member EPA Histories

Singapore Japan–Singapore EPA (JSEPA): Signed January 2001, effective in

November. This was the first EPA between Japan and an ASEAN

member. Japan later used this model in its EPA negotiation with other

countries.

Malaysia Japan–Malaysia EPA (JMEPA): The two countries published a report in

December 2003, agreeing to begin EPA talks. They issued a joint

agreement in May 2005 that the principle content of an agreement had

been reached. In December 2005, they signed the JMEPA.

Philippines Japan–Philippines EPA (JPEPA): The two countries created the JPEPA

working research committee in August 2002. In December 2003, they

decided that talks would begin in 2004. They issued a joint statement

in November 2004 that agreement had been reached on the maincontent and that they would work to revise and finalize the agreement.

Thailand Japan–Thailand EPA (JTEPA): Thailand’s Prime Minister Thaksin and

Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi agreed in November 2001 to conduct

research on the possibility of a bilateral FTA. They agreed in April 2002

to begin negotiations on an EPA, and talks officially began in February

2004. They issued a joint declaration in September 2005 that they had

reached agreement on the main content.

Indonesia Japan–Indonesia EPA (JIEPA): The two countries announced in June 2003

that they would begin research into the feasibility of an FTA. They

issued a joint statement in June 2005 that talks would begin in

July 2005.Brunei The two countries agreed to begin EPA negotiations in December 2005.

Vietnam After finishing discussions regarding Vietnam’s entrance into the WTO,

in December 2005 the two countries agreed to form a joint research

group in preparation for EPA negotiations.

ASEAN ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP): Japanese

Prime Minister Koizumi proposed a FTA with ASEAN in January 2002.

Japan and ASEAN signed the ‘Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic

Cooperation Agreement’ in November 2002. The Ninth Japan–ASEAN

Summit declared in December 2004 that negotiations would begin

in April 2005, in the hope that agreement could be reached within

two years.



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Conclusion

There are various explanations for the relative pace of development in

China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN relations during the post-Cold War era.

Structural factors, such as the disappearance of the bipolar world order,explain why China–ASEAN relations caught up with Japan–ASEAN

relations in 1996. But they do not explain the acceleration in China–

ASEAN relations since the late 1990s, or why Japan–ASEAN relations have

lacked similar vigor. This article holds that the uniformity of China’s and

ASEAN’s regional integration policies and the inconsistencies of Japan’s

and ASEAN’s regional integration policies are significant factors in the

contrasting pace of development in their bilateral relations.

Closer China and ASEAN regional integration policies since 1997 have

caused China–ASEAN relations to broaden and deepen. China’s decision to

pursue regional integration with ASEAN was based largely on strategic

considerations; it did not want to stand by and watch ASEAN continue to

weaken after the financial crisis. China’s concern was that once ASEAN lost

its capacity for independent action, it would turn to the United States. The

American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 highlighted

fissures in the US–China relationship, making China believe more firmly still

in the need for multi-polarization in order to prevent the United States from

working with other countries toward containing China. China’s positive

response to the ASEAN policy of promoting regional cooperation and

integration in East Asia has enhanced mutual trust. Other countries

questioned the importance of, or lost confidence and interest in ASEAN

while China cast ASEAN as a faithful partner. It had proposed a free trade

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Year

ExchangesChina–ASEAN

Japan–ASEAN

Fig. 6 Comparing China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN Leadership Exchanges

(1990–2005).

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Table 6 Development of China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN relations (1990–2005)

1990–1993 1994–1996 1997–2000

China–ASEAN

relations

Weak bilateral relations,

nonexistent multilateral

relations

Lacked mutual trust, ‘China

threat theory’ and the

South China Sea dispute

have a far-reaching

impact; ASEAN wants

help from multilateral

institutions to control

China’s behavior

Bilateral relation

ened as mult

logue and co

was institutio

more levels a

fields

Japan–ASEAN

relations

Japan sought to become a

major political power,

and hoped to expand the

scope of Japan–ASEAN

relations from the

previous accent on

economic relations

to political and

security issues

Japan proposed several

ideas for strengthening

cooperation with ASEAN,

but they were just verbal

declarations

Multilateral dial

cooperation

and deepene

cooperation

more levels a

fields (especi

Hashimoto’s

C h i n e s e

J o ur n

a l of I n t e r n a t i on a l P ol i t i c s ,V ol .1 ,

2 0 0 7 , 3 7 3 –4 0 4

a t U n i v e r s i t y o f M a d r a s o n D e c e m b e r 2 3 , 2 0 1 0 c j i p . o x f o r d j o u r n a l s . o r g f r o m




























Table 7 The Evolution of China, Japan, and ASEAN Regional Integration Policies

1990–1993 1994–1996 1997–2000

China Actively strove to establish diplo-

matic relations with ASEAN

countries in order to participate

in regional multilateral activities

Began participating in ASEAN-led

multilateral organizations,

through which it gained experi-

ence and shed suspicion of

multilateral organizations

Actively responded to AS

efforts to create the A

‘10þ3’ mechanism

Japan Opposed regional integration;

lukewarm reaction to regional

cooperation

Realized the inevitability of regional

cooperation; participated in

limited regional activities like

ASEM in 1996

Still passive attitude tow

mechanisms like ASEA

‘10þ3’, primarily con

with monetary and cucooperation

ASEAN Promoted economic integration;

inactive on EA integration, no

unified view

Accelerated the ASEAN FTA and

ASEAN integration, as well as

promoted the enlargement of

ASEAN

Again accelerated ASEA

tion; actively promote

tion with NE Asia, stre

cooperation with NE

a number of fields

C h i n e s e

J o ur n a l of I n t e r n a t i on a l P ol i t i c s ,V ol .1

,2 0 0 7 , 3 7 3 –4 0 4

a t U n i v e r s i t y o f M a d r a s o n D e c e m b e r 2 3 , 2 0 1 0 c j i p . o x f o r d j o u r n a l s . o r g f r o m




























area with ASEAN in order to reduce the impact of China’s accession to the

WTO. China’s policies have indicated to ASEAN that its development will

spur that in Southeast Asia.

Japan’s regional integration policies are inconsistent with those of

ASEAN, primarily because the United States is at the core of its foreign

policy. This leaves Japan no choice but to abide by the United States rather

than East Asia (or Asia) policies. Japan has actively promoted regional

cooperation in the broader Asia-Pacific because it does not support regional

cooperation that excludes the United States. Japanese leaders, particularly

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, have strongly advocated ‘open

regionalism’ and ‘soft regionalism’, because Japan is unwilling to sanction

[what they see as] the closure of East Asia into a highly institutionalized

community like the European Union. Japan persists in following theUnited States, thereby depriving itself of the ability to unite with and

promote regional cooperation and integration. Japan can participate in the

integration of East Asia only by returning its focus to Asia. The US factor

aside, Japan’s financial and economic difficulties have impeded it from

playing a larger economic role in the region. Domestic political turmoil is

a contributing factor to Japan’s regionalization policy remaining in a state

of paralysis; the rapid succession of prime ministers in the 1990s also

inhibited necessary adjustments to it. During the time that Koizumi took

office in 1990 to 2001, Japan had six prime ministers. Three so-called ‘majorpolicy statements’ promoting political relations with ASEAN and regional

cooperation were issued, but the overall impression ASEAN countries have

of Japan is that it talks much and does very little. China has displayed

enthusiasm and flexibility since the late 1990s, as ASEAN countries

have become increasingly dissatisfied with Japan. Japan’s efforts towards

building better relations with ASEAN and promoting regional cooperation

in East Asia are largely perceived as lacking sincerity. One example is

that of Koizumi’s search for ways to broaden participation in the

East Asia Summit, his main objective obviously being to balance the‘10þ 3’ cooperation in order to prevent China and ASEAN from growing

too close.

ASEAN’s active promotion of regional cooperation and integration with

Northeast Asia is a means to prevent its own marginalization. After the

Asian financial crisis, the economic gap between ASEAN and Northeast

Asia widened. China’s economic development also put the ASEAN

economies under increasingly strong competitive pressure. China has

responded positively to the idea of cooperation and integration in East

Asia and is a source of support and reassurance to ASEAN. The ASEAN,

therefore, seeks China’s economic strength in order to promote its economic

recovery and development. The ASEAN’s long-term goal, of course, is to

become the main link to outside countries, acting as East Asia’s center of



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cooperation and integration, thereby solidifying and enhancing ASEAN’s

international status.

Appendix

China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN Leadership Exchanges(1990–2005)

Year China–ASEAN ASEAN–China TOTAL Japan–ASEAN ASEAN–Japan TOTAL

1990 9 5 14 4 10 14

1991 9 7 16 11 5 15

1992 25 10 35 9 10 19

1993 18 13 31 10 9 191994 9 11 20 6 6 12

1995 10 13 23 11 11 22

1996 9 13 22 9 8 17

1997 14 12 26 10 13 23

1998 8 11 19 15 16 31

1999 11 25 36 14 16 30

2000 17 18 35 17 25 42

2001 28 28 56 13 13 26

2002 21 15 36 10 10 20

2003 17 20 37 8 17 25

2004 18 18 36 13 3 16

2005 22 25 47 11 12 23

Leaders include Minister-level personnel and higher.Source: Xinhua News Agency, Japan Times and Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs websites.

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rise of china 6

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