reviews and commentary

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Reviews and commentaryDavid E. Murphy a , Rose Mary Sheldon b & Hayden B. Peake ca Former chief of CIA's Berlin Operation ,b Associate Professor, Department of History and Politics , VirginiaMilitary Institute (VMI) ,c Adjunct Professor of Intelligence History and the Historyof Counterintelligence , Joint Military Intelligence College ,Washington, D. C.Published online: 09 Jan 2008.

To cite this article: David E. Murphy , Rose Mary Sheldon & Hayden B. Peake (1998) Reviews andcommentary, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 11:1, 93-118, DOI:10.1080/08850609808435366

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REVIEWS AND COMMENTARY

They Called Him "Misha"

DAVID E. MURPHY

Marcus Wolf with Anne McElvoy: Man Without a Face: TheAutobiography of Communism's Greatest Spymaster, New York: TimesBooks, 1997, 367 p. , $25.00

Markus Wolf bases the title of his bookon his claim that until 1979 no Westernintelligence service had ever identifiedhis photograph. A good story butuntrue. In 1950 the Central IntelligenceAgency's Berlin Operations Base(BOB) recruited an East German bankofficial who, in November 1951, wastransferred to Wolfs newly-formed EastGerman intelligence service. BecauseCIA knew that Wolf had been ajournalist at the Nuremberg trials, itassembled over 1,000 photographstaken there. Then, using a detailedphysical description of Wolf providedby the Berlin Base agent as a guide, aCIA graphics analyst painstakinglyscreened the photographs and selected16 which were shown to the agent. Heimmediately identified Wolf as his new

chief. This identification was confirmedby another BOB source in the Wolforganization. Thus, Wolf's claim tohaving been an invisible man, like someother aspects of his story, is less thanaccurate.

Many reviewers have emphasizedMarkus Wolfs professed motivation forhaving served the East German policestate and his claims of ignoranceconcerning its worst excesses. Othershave complained that virtually all ofWolf's spy stories had already appearedin the West German press when theirprotagonists were arrested or went totrial. In my view, as a former CIAoperations officer, it is exceedinglynaive to expect Wolf to reveal the namesof those agents who have so far escapeddetection. Neither his putative

David E. Murphy, co-author of Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the ColdWar, (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1997) is a retired CIA official andformer chief of CIA's Berlin Operation Base.

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94 REVIEWS AND COMMENTARY

motivation nor his understandablereluctance to identify his most successfulagents come as a surprise. Missing fromhis memoir are the insights Wolf couldhave given us into Soviet-East Germanrelations, particularly in the fields ofintelligence and state security, by virtueof his Soviet background.

A SOVIET UPBRINGING

Markus Wolf was taken to the USSR atage eleven by his Communist parentsafter Adolf Hitler came to power inGermany. He lived there continuouslyfrom 1934 until 1945, was educated inMoscow, lived through Joseph Stalin'spurges, became a Soviet citizen, andserved as a propagandist during the war.He spoke Russian with complete fluencyand was accepted as one of them byhis Soviet contemporaries. Theseexperiences obviously played animportant role in shaping his characterand future. Wolf himself makes clearthat "the patronage of the Russians wasan essential element" in his postwarcareer. For example, after arriving inBerlin at World War II's end, he wastrusted enough to live and work in WestBerlin, where as a Soviet officer heserved in the Soviet-controlled radiostation in the British Sector (with timeout to cover the Nuremberg trials). InNovember 1949, he was appointed firstcounselor in the newly established EastGerman embassy in Moscow.

Given this background, Wolf mighthave been expected to describe theSoviet relationship with the East German

regime and its security and intelligenceservices with considerable authority andinsight. But in his portrayal of thisrelationship in Man Without a Face, wesee only faint reflections of the Sovietside of what became a constant strugglebetween Soviet and East Germanleaders over how to contend with theinternal and external pressures whichultimately led to the collapse of theentire system. At times Wolf seemsunaware of, or perhaps indifferent to,the extent to which some aspects of hisstory were shaped by events andpersonality conflicts originating inMoscow. What references he does maketo his Soviet colleagues and to his rolein working with them are often vagueand lacking in depth. Many detailsconcerning the Soviet environment inBerlin, with which Wolf wascontinuously associated, are eitherabsent or factually inaccurate. This isparticularly true of the period from theearly 1950s through the late 1960s whenthe Cold War was at its height andpositions which would last until thecollapse of Moscow's East Germanclient state hardened. Wolfs descriptionof the Soviet factor in East Germangovernance in this period does little toexplain how the collapse eventuallycame about.

STRANGE MISTAKES

Some of the book's errors areincomprehensible. Why does Wolf referto Ivan Serov as the one whoimmediately after the war established a

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF

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REVIEWS AND COMMENTARY 95

"huge Department of MilitaryIntelligence in Potsdam?" He mustcertainly have known better. As Stalin'sspecial representative for all securitymatters in the Soviet Zone, Serov wasnot much concerned with "militaryintelligence."

The Potsdam unit, an element of thewartime "Smersh," later became theDirectorate of Counterintelligence ofthe Group of Soviet Forces whichremained in Potsdam until thesummer of 1994. In May 1946 militarycounterintelligence became part of theSoviet Ministry of State Security (MGB)under its new head, Viktor Abakumov,whose feuding with Serov resulted inthe latter's removal in 1947. AlthoughWolf deplores the harsh methods of theEast German police state, he must haveknown that the foundations for this statewere laid by the thousands of Soviet"Chekists," the practitioners of thesesame methods under Stalin, whoremained in East Germany at war's end.They staffed the MGB's BerlinOperational Sector and those in theprovinces down to the kreis level, wherethey supplied the muscle that madepossible such actions as the forcedmerger of the German Communist Partyand the German Social DemocraticParty, and the transformation of keyEast German industries into Soviet stockcompanies. Their senseless Chekistbrutality, insistence on applying whollyinappropriate Soviet methods, and totalindifference to the effect this had on thepopulation, set in motion the refugeephenomenon which, although halted

temporarily by the Berlin Wall, wouldeventually cause the collapse of theregime. We know that the East GermanSocialist Unity Party's leaders tried invain to moderate Soviet behavior. Whatwas the impact on Wolf and his Russianand German colleagues as they, at theirlevel, saw these events unfold ?

The MGB's Abakumov himself fellvictim to Stalin's paranoia, was arrestedin 1951 and remained imprisoned untilNikita Khrushchev, winner of the post-Stalin leadership struggle, ordered histrial and immediate execution inDecember 1954. Wolf, in describingthe handsome apartments ofAbakumov's town house in centralMoscow, goes on to say that"Abakumov was shot after Beria'sdeath in 1953." Could Wolf have reallybeen this unaware of the impact on hisown service of these power struggles?Was he unaware that it was Khrushchevwho personally ordered Abakumov'sexecution not in 1953 but in December1954 (a full eighteen months afterBeria's arrest), having decided thatAbakumov knew too much about him?The same Khrushchev then appointedIvan Serov, a long time rival ofAbakumov, chairman of the newlyconstituted Soviet KGB.

Closer to home, in describing theestablishment of East Germany's firstforeign intelligence organization, ofwhich he would soon become the chief,Wolf is silent on its parenthood. He musthave known it to be the SovietCommittee of Information, or "KI"from its Russian initials. Created in a

INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 11, NUMBER 1

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power play by Soviet Foreign MinisterVyacheslav Molotov in 1947, the KJabsorbed the MGB's foreignintelligence components, leaving to theMGB responsibilities for foreigncounterintelligence and related tasksabroad. This awkward situation led toconstant bickering between the twoorganizations. In response to pressurefor improved intelligence on WestGermany, the KI decreed in thesummer of 1951 the creation of an EastGerman service which was to beindependent of East Germany's ownMinistry for State Security. Wolfignores the KI involvement in hisservice's beginnings. For example, herefers to Soviet adviser Andrei Grauras a "senior NKVD man." Senior hewas, but before his Berlin assignment,Graur had headed the KI'sdisinformation department. Wolfrecalls his decision, soon after takingover the new service, to drop contactwith the old German Communistintelligence networks in West Germanybecause they had been penetrated byWestern counterintelligence. Was Wolfunaware that these same nets had beenthe mainstay of the Soviet KI's Berlin'sintelligence collection on WestGermany until the KI was ordered todesist as a result of Moscow's order tostop exploiting foreign communistparties for espionage purposes?

The KI reverted to USSR MGBcontrol in November 1951, and by1953 its East German creation was alsosubordinated to the East German StateSecurity Ministry (MfS). Wolf could

not have been unaware of the tensionbetween Soviet foreign intelligence andcounterintelligence because he wouldencounter it in his own servicethroughout his career. Furthermore,Wolf's unit would continue to haveSoviet advisers (later called liaisonofficers) until the national collapse in1989. Some of them, now retired ordeceased, were among the KGB's topexperts in German affairs, yet after hisreference to Graur in 1951, Wolf makesno further mention of Soviet advisers.A regrettable omission, because it wasfrom these advisers in KGB Berlin andtheir contacts in the East Germanservices that Moscow regularly soughtto acquire information on the state ofaffairs in East Germany. Moscow wasmisinformed at critical times but Wolfis silent on this aspect.

CLASHING WITH MIELKE

Another aspect of these early dayswhich Wolf inexplicably glosses overis the fact that CIA Berlin had an agentinside his service. When familypressures finally caused the agent toleave East Berlin in April 1953, CIAfurnished extensive details to WestGerman counterintelligence on Wolf'sburgeoning networks in the FederalRepublic and many arrests ensued.Wolf, apparently unaware that a CIAagent had been in his organization fromits very beginnings, attributes this first"bombshell" of his career to debriefingsof a defector by the West Germans.This was a flap that did not, however,endear him to Erich Mielke, then


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deputy for counterintelligence in theEast German Ministry for State Security(MfS). Mielke, a long time GermanCommunist and street fighter from thepre-Hitler period, later rose to minister,remaining in charge until the collapseof 1989. It is against Mielke that Wolfdirects his fire throughout Man Withouta Face, making it clear that there wasno love lost between these two, verydissimilar men. In Wolf's view,"Mielke was a warped personality evenby the peculiar standards of moralitythat apply in the espionage world." Thiswas not, however, an ordinary clash ofpersonalities. It reflected, rather, crucialdifferences within the Soviet leadershipand the KGB over how to deal with theEast Germans and the role of EastGermany in Moscow's Cold War withthe West.

Wolf introduces Mielke as"Number Two at the Ministry for StateSecurity" at its founding in early 1950.Left unmentioned are Soviet actions tocreate the East German secret police asearly as August 1947 with the so-calledK-5 sections (about whose brutalactivities Wolf claims to be unaware).Work on this new service hadaccelerated in May 1949, and byJanuary 1950 it became necessary toagree on the candidate for minister.Walter Ulbricht, East Germany'sstubborn leader, strongly backed hisprotege, Erich Mielke. The Soviets,objected, however, pointing to securityquestions in Mielke's past, includinginternment in France after the SpanishCivil War until the camp was seized by

the Germans, and subsequent servicein Organization Todt, the Naziconstruction firm. In truth, the Sovietswanted their own man in the job. Acompromise was reached in the personof Wilhelm Zaisser, whose loyalty tothe Soviet Union was beyond question.Wolf asserts that he preferred Zaisserto Mielke but does not comment onthe deeper significance of the Sovietrole in this appointment.

Stalin died in March 1953.Strangely, Wolf's brief description ofthe power struggle which followedavoids any mention of Lavrenti Beria'sactions in crippling the Sovietintelligence and security apparatus inEast Berlin just as the events of June1953 began to develop, thus impairingits ability to respond at this crucial time.Determined to reassert control overthese services, Beria brought back toMoscow hundreds of the MVD's topforeign intelligence specialists,ostensibly to test their fitness, but inreality to ascertain their loyalty to him.MVD units in East Germany weredeprived of many of their best officers.

Wolf claims that, as populardissatisfaction with Ulbricht's policiesgrew, Minister of State SecurityZaisser urged him to go on holiday.This Wolf did, returning only on 17June, by which time Soviet troops hadthe situation in hand. His absence atthis critical time has been interpretedby some as an attempt by Wolf to getout of harm's way, in what he and theSoviets could see was a threateningsituation. In the event, Ivan


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Anisimovich Fadeikin, the actingSoviet intelligence chief in EastBerlin, and those MVD officers whoremained in Berlin were scathingin their criticism of the performanceof the East German ministryduring the riots, particularly itscounterintelligence chief ErichMielke. Both the East Germans andthe MVD had been taken completelyby surprise. According to Wolf,Soviet and East German claims that"external forces" were involved in theJune 1953 uprising were a "bit of agame intended to provide excuses forthe leadership." Still, Wolf cannotresist repeating the old canard that"CIA chief, Allen Dulles, and hissister, Eleanor Lansing Dulles, a StateDepartment official, had been in WestBerlin the week before the uprising."Eleanor yes, Allen, no. Berlin Basewas just as surprised as the MVD.

The 17 June uprising led toZaisser's removal and the eliminationof the separate State SecurityMinistry. Its components weresubordinated to the East GermanInterior Ministry under its new chief,Ernst Wollweber, another oldCommunist with a long record ofservice to the Soviets. Both the EastGerman service and the Sovietadvisory system underwent a majorshakeup when Moscow sent a new,top-ranking MVD official to EastBerlin in the person of YevgenyPitovranov. Nevertheless, in a bowto Ulbricht, Mielke was retained as a

deputy for counterintelligence. Incommenting on these shakeups, Wolfignores Pitovranov's hands-on role inrestoring stability in East Germany andadjudicating conflicts between Sovietadvisers and the East German services.

In a curious passage, Wolf laterdiscusses the case of the West Germancounterintelligence chief, Otto John, whoapparently defected to the Soviets in July1954. Wolf described the incident as theresult of a drunken escapade in whichJohn and his companion, one Dr.Wolfgang Wohlgemuth, turned up at"Soviet barracks" in East Berlin at whichtime KGB chief Pitovranov was "calledin." Wolf's version is nonsense. Theaction to lure John into East Berlin andrecruit or defect him was a deliberatelyplanned KGB operation. When it becameapparent John could not, or would not,reveal to the KGB details of West Germanagents, and when the Soviet decision toestablish diplomatic relations with WestGermany made John's use in propagandasuperfluous, they fobbed him off on theEast Germans. In this regard, Wolf doescomment that "the Soviets as usualdumped the damaged goods on us."

GERMAN-SOVIET COLLABORATION

With Wollweber at the helm, EastGerman State Security, along with Wolfsforeign intelligence service, grew andmatured. After the creation of its NationalPeoples Army in January 1956, EastGermany entered the Warsaw Pact andrepresentatives of East German statesecurity began to attend the annual


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Moscow conferences of the WarsawPact security services. One suchconference, held on 7-11 March 1956,had as its main theme the need to uniteagainst "the principal aggressorgovernments of the United States andEngland." KGB Chairman Serovaddressed the plenary sessions, whilemeetings with individual delegationson foreign intelligence andcounterintelligence problems werehandled by the chief of the KGB's FirstChief (foreign intelligence) Directorate,Maj. Gen. Aleksandr Panyushkin. Forthe East Germans, a key achievement,on paper at least, was agreement thatother bloc services could not operateon East German soil without approvalfrom the East German service. Wolfdescribes what was probably the samemeeting (although he puts it in March1955 ) including the Serov speech "onthe need for all of us to combine ourefforts against the common enemy, theUnited States." Wolf mentions"Alexander" Panyushkin, his "guardianangel" during the conference, butidentifies him only as a formerambassador to the United States. Wolffails to note that Panyushkin was thenactually chief of the KGB's First ChiefDirectorate and that under the KI, asambassador in Washington, he was alsoresponsible for intelligence operationsin the United States. These interblocsecurity service conferences continuedthroughout the period leading up to the1989 collapse and reflected seriousproblems among Warsaw Pact

members, yet Wolf has provided littleinformation on them.

The atmosphere of trust reflectedin these descriptions of blocinterservice cooperation was shakenby Khrushchev's secret speech ofFebruary 1956, about which Wolfstates he learned soon thereafterfrom his privileged reading of theWestern press. This is doubtful sinceThe New York Times edition with thefirst full coverage of the speech did notappear until June 1956. The speechproduced shock waves which laterreverberated in Poland and Hungarybut, as Wolf recalls, the "discovery"of the Berlin Tunnel in April liftedeveryone's spirits in East Berlin. Thetunnel was an Anglo-American projectto tap Soviet cable lines. But GeorgeBlake, a KGB agent in Britishintelligence, had reported on plans forthe tunnel. To protect his security, KGBforeign intelligence allowed theeavesdropping to go forward withoutregard for its threat to the security ofother KGB components, the GRU(Soviet military intelligence), the Sovietarmed forces, and the entire EastGerman government and its securityservices. Krushchev later decided tomake the "discovery" of the tunnel amajor propaganda event to coincidewith his first visit to London in April1956. Wolf asserts that when he arrivedat the newly-excavated tunnel, he sawpersons he "knew to be the top brassof Moscow's military intelligence inBerlin." KGB chief Pitovranov was


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indeed at the tunnel site with hisdeputies (all of whom Wolf knew, ofcourse) but the GRU most certainlynever received an invitation! Wolfdescribed the tunnel as a "technicalmarvel" but complained that the KGBhad left the East Germans "unguardedand exposed."

THE ADVENT OF KOROTKOV

Khrushchev's secret speech also kindledhope among East Germans opposed toWalter Ulbricht that this relic ofStalinism in East Germany might bereplaced. Even Ernst Wollweber, theState Security Minister, sympathizedwith the opposition. Ulbricht stillenjoyed Soviet support, however,because Khrushchev knew that as muchas Ulbricht occasionally infuriated him,he was the only East German the Sovietstrusted to keep the lid on this vitallyimportant fiefdom. Wolf describesUlbricht's encounters with KGB chiefPitovranov, wherein he insisted thatWollweber be replaced by Mielke.Pitovranov objected, saying that he didnot trust Mielke, but Ulbricht got hisway. This put the man Wolf hated mostover him as head of the ministry.

Missing from Wolf's account,however, is the real reason behindMielke's appointment, one which wouldalso affect KGB performance during thecrucial Berlin crisis of 1958-1961. Theman who, with KGB Chairman Serov'ssupport, strongly backed Ulbricht'schoice of Mielke was "the grand oldman" of the KGB's German operations,

Aleksandr Mikhailovich Korotkov.With Mielke's appointment as ministeraccomplished, Korotkov replacedPitovranov as chief in East Berlin in1957.

Surprisingly, Wolf makes only thebriefest reference to Korotkov as "theKGB resident in Berlin" who, beforethe war, had worked with the resistancegroup "Rote Kapelle" (true) and hadparticipated with KGB Chairman Serovin "putting down the Hungarian revolt"(also true). Thus, Wolf disposes of theKGB officer who had been deputyforeign intelligence resident in Berlinbefore the war, played a major role inwartime double agent operations,became the first postwar resident inBerlin,1 and was extremely close toWalter Ulbricht. As chief of the KGB'sapparat in East Berlin from 1957 untilhis sudden death in 1961, Korotkov wasresponsible for not only the KGB's ownoperations but for liaison with the EastGerman services. Korotkov believedfirmly that the KGB had to rely heavilyon the East Germans for collection ofinformation on West Germany, but healso was fully supportive of ErichMielke. In addition, Korotkov was aleading KGB specialist in illegalsoperations, the practice of sendingintelligence officers abroad documentedas foreign citizens, and over the yearsturned KGB Berlin into a major centerfor illegals documentation and support.Wolf relied heavily on illegals for hisforeign operations, yet here, too, hemakes no mention of Korotkov. Nordoes Wolf mention two of Korotkov's


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successors, Aleksei Krokhin andAnatoly Lazarev, both of whom hadheaded KGB illegals operations butwere also known for their past serviceas KGB residents in Paris, the sourceof much of the KGB's best informationon German affairs.

It seems unlikely that in yearsleading up to the building of the Wall,Wolf would not have had numerousencounters with Korotkov, anextremely assertive officer, who, as theRussians say, "never had to reach inhis pocket for a word." The likelihoodthat Wolf would have had more vividrecollections of Korotkov increasedwhen Khrushchev appointed AleksandrShelepin as Serov's replacement.Shelepin did not share Serov's view ofthe KGB's need to rely on the EastGermans, reflecting therebyKhrushchev's growing impatience withUlbricht's headstrong approach toproblems such as the disastrous flowof refugees through Berlin to the West.Shelepin saw in Korotkov a Serovholdover and "pro-German" who hadto go or get in line. Thus, during thecritical years leading up to constructionof the Berlin Wall in August 1961,Shelepin engaged in a "no holdsbarred" bureaucratic battle withKorotkov which must have reduced theeffectiveness of KGB Berlin andresonated in the offices of the EastGerman ministry. On 27 June 1961,Korotkov died of a heart attack inMoscow. Mielke and his deputiesattended the funeral; because of hisfluency in Russian, Wolf was chosen

to speak on behalf of the East Germanservices. He neglects to mention this.

ISOLATING WOLF

When the Berlin sector borders wereclosed and the Wall went up, Mielkehad his revenge. As Wolf tells it, Mielkekept him in the dark about plans for theWall, with the result that Wolfs servicehad serious problems in communicatingwith its agent networks. KGB Berlinfared no better. Not until they couldcontact a KGB source within the EastGerman ministry did they learn how theWall operation was carried out. Wolfdescribes other examples of hisproblems with Mielke as the yearswent by, and the latter's difficulties withthe KGB opposite numbers. Forexample, he notes Mielke's "obsessionwith the German Social Democrats,"and the apparent unhappiness of Mielkeand the new East German leader ErichHonecker with the decision by KGBChairman Yuri VladimirovichAndropov to open the channels to WestGerman Chancellor Willy Brandtwhich led to ostpolitik and recognitionof the GDR by the Western powers in1972. Wolf treats this important issuein generalities, however, avoidingspecifics. On one occasion, forexample, the East Berlin KGB chief,the same Ivan Anisimovich Fadeikinwho had been highly critical of Mielke'sperformance during the June 1953uprising, warned Andropov's contactman that he was under constantsurveillance by Mielke's East German


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service. Wolf makes no mention of theseproblems, nor of Fadeikin himself, eventhough the latter would have been wellknown to Wolf. Between his tours inKarlshorst, Fadeikin, one of the KGB'sbetter German specialists, also served aschief of the KGB's notorious 13thDepartment, responsible for special tasks,including sabotage and assassinations.2

Had Wolf divulged something of hisrelationship with Fadeikin, himself anexpert in "terrorist" operations, hisassertions that his service, the HVA, hadnothing to do with East German supportof Third World terrorism, to which hedevotes an entire chapter, might havereceived significant support. Aware of thecompartmentation that existed within theKGB relating to "special tasks," Fadeikincould have certainly confirmed Wolfsclaim that similar compartmentationmight have kept him from becomingaware of MfS Department XXII'sextensive involvement with internationalterrorism. There is, however, a curiousomission in this chapter. It relates to theextensive MfS support during 1964 of theGhanaian dictator Kwame N'krumah's"Bureau of African Affairs," whichtrained citizens of the then-friendlyAfrican states to carry out secretoperations on N'krumah's behalf in theirhomelands. Posing as a trade mission,East German officers provided theweapons and special equipment requiredby these agents, as well instructions intheir use. This lasted until N'Krumah'soverthrow in February 1965 and theextent of East German involvementbecame public. Wolf makes no mention

of this episode, choosing instead todevote several pages to his experiencesin Zanzibar in 1964.

CONTEMPORARY SOVIET LEADERS

As for his opinion of long time KGBChairman and later General Secretaryof the CPSU, Yuri Andropov, Wolf'sviews resemble those of many formerand serving senior Russian intelligenceofficers. In comparing Andropov tohis predecessors, Wolf waxes lyricalin praise of the man, but is critical ofhis rigid views on threats to the systemfrom dissidents among the minorities,especially Jews. In Wolf s view, neitherViktor Chebrikov, who replacedAndropov as KGB Chairman in 1982,nor Vladimir Kryuchkov, whomAndropov had installed as chief of theKGB's foreign intelligence and whohimself became chairman in 1988, wereon the same level. Wolf speculates thathad Andropov lived he would not haveacted as rashly as Mikhail S. Gorbachevin trying to reform the Soviet model ofsocialism. Certainly true. WhileAndropov sounded a call for greaterdiscipline, he had no intention ofchanging the regime's basic structure,knowing full well from the KGB's ownreporting, how fragile the entire systemwas.

BIDDING FAREWELL

By November 1986 Markus Wolf hadresigned, weary of feuding with ErichMielke and disenchanted with the stateof Soviet-East German relations. It was

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clear from Gorbachev's unsatisfactoryApril 1986 visit to Berlin (about whichWolf says nothing) that he and ErichHonecker got on no better than didKhrushchev and Ulbricht. East Germanleaders would persist in viewing theCold War through the prism of theirpower position, ignoring the dynamicsof the Soviet Union's relationship withthe West, above all the United States.Wolf also had marital problems; hisplans for a divorce and remarriageincreased the tension between him andMielke. Wolf claims, however, thatfrom the time of his resignation untilthe collapse, he had no contact withKGB Moscow or the chiefs of the KGBapparatus in East Berlin. But not untilthe summer of 1990 did Wolf, facedwith a reunified Germany and possiblearrest, seek out KGB Berlin chiefAnatoly Novikov who told him hewould be welcomed in Moscow if hewished to leave Germany (Novikovhimself, along with his entire apparat,would disappear from East Berlin in1992, fully two years ahead of theformal withdrawal of Soviet forces inSeptember 1994). Wolf arrived inMoscow in November 1990 where hisreception was correct but cool (KGBChairman Kryuchkov would not seehim). He remained until the ill-fatedAugust 1991 putsch, saw Kryuchkovarrested, and found his KGB friends"dazed and strained under the pressureof events." Wolf then decided to returnto Germany to await his fate.

BLANKS NEED FILLING

How are we to interpret the portrayalof Wolf's relationship with the Sovietservices contained in Man Without aFace? Without question, Wolf ispotentially a unique witness. With hisintimate knowledge of Soviet reality andnative fluency in Russian, it would seeminconceivable that he could not havefilled in many blanks and provided amuch better understanding of theinteraction between the KGB and theEast German services as they respondedto the events of the Cold War inGermany. Had he done this, futurehistorians would have a far firmerunderstanding of the inner workings ofthe Soviet and East Germanrelationship. Wolfs reasons for havingkept silent on matters Soviet are opento question but there appears to be nojustification for continuing reticence onthis score. His problems with Germancourts are apparently resolved (albeitnot to his entire satisfaction) and heevidently has no intention of leaving hisnative Germany for Russia again.Perhaps he might let us hear his viewson these unresolved issues.

REFERENCES1Photograph 12.11 on page 170 of thecatalogue of the Museum Berlin-Karlshorst,Erinnerung an einen Krieg, JovisverlagsBuero, Berlin, Germany, taken during theGerman capitulation at Karlshorst in May1945, depicts Aleksandr Korotkov inanimated conversation with Ivan Serov.2The 13th Department was formerly the


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Ninth Department, successor to the FirstSpecial Bureau created in 1946 to conductspecial tasks including assassinations.Fadeikin's deputy in the 13th Departmentwas Khachik Gevorkovich Oganesian, whoalso served as an advisor to MfS in EastGermany from 1953 until 1959. The 13thDepartment suffered serious reversesduring 1961-1962, one of which was thedefection in Berlin of Bogdan Stashinskiy,the killer of Ukrainian emigre leader StepanBandera. Less well known was the reported

failure of an attempt to murder the Shah ofIran in Teheran in February 1962.According to KGB defector VladimirKuzichkin, Fadeikin was sent to Teheranin 1961 under alias to supervise theoperation. See Vladimir Kuzichkin, Insidethe KGB: My Life in Soviet Espionage, NewYork, Pantheon Books, 1990 pp. 216-219.Interestingly, Fadeikin's deputy,Oganesian, was also on temporary duty inTeheran from February through August1960.

Intelligence and The Historians

ROSE MARY SHELDON

N.J.E. Austin and N.B. Rankov: Exploratio: Military and PoliticalIntelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battleof Adrianople, Routledge, New York1995, 292 p. , $85.00

Exploratio is the collaborative effortof two authors whose previous workshave touched upon the subject of Romanintelligence gathering. Norman Austinpublished a study in 1979 on the militaryaspects (including intelligence) of thefourth century Roman writer AmmianusMarcellinus.1 Boris Rankov wrote hisOxford D.Phil, thesis on the beneficiariiconsularis — members of the Roman

provincial governor's staff often usedto carry intelligence.2 Together theyhave produced a work which discussesintelligence as it was linked to theadministration of the Roman empire.They attempt to explain how intelligencewas collected and analyzed, whatcontribution it made to Romanoperations in the field, and how it waslinked to the formation of frontier

Dr. Rose Mary Sheldon is Associate Professor, Department of History and Politicsat the Virginia Military Institute (VMI).


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policies. Their claim that these questionshave never been asked or that there hasbeen no systematic examination of thesubject in the last fifty years, is notentirely accurate,3 but their descriptionof intelligence gathering along thefrontiers of the empire is indeed the mostdetailed study to date. The collection ofintelligence from the frontiers of theempire was brought in by two mainsystems: the office of the provincialgovernor, and the military staffs of thefrontier forts.

THE PROVINCIALGOVERNOR'S OFFICIA

A provincial governor's staff or officiumwas a hive of activity of all sorts. Thisstaff assembled whatever informationthe governor needed, and it was filedthere to consult at any time. Theseofficia existed in all frontier provinces;they eventually became very large, andconsisted entirely of trained andexperienced soldiers, normallylegionaries. An incoming governorcould draw upon this "bureaucracy"with its intelligence "file cabinets" tobring himself up to speed on the militaryand strategic information he would needto perform his office. Scholars haverightly questioned whether the wordbureaucracy should even be used in anancient context; at best it imposes amodern Weberian notion into a contextwhere it is clearly an anachronism. Itcertainly does not belong in the earlyempire where the authors have placedit (p. 155). The growth of the centralizedprovincial staffs was a corollary to the

development of static frontiers in thesecond century A.D. I have no doubtthat whatever provincial filing systemexisted functioned in pretty much theway the authors describe it, but I doquestion its magnitude. How does anancient society with no pulp paper,carbon copies or xerox machinesproduce "mountains of paperwork." (p.155) then file it for efficient future use?And where did this mountain disappearto? Perhaps the authors think theevidence has been shredded? As anexample, they cite the "2,000 fragmentsof wooden tablets, most of them withat least some writing on them, dumpedfrom the [Vindolanda] fort archives andcovering the period from c. A.D. 90 to115/20." Two thousand documents overa period of thirty years does not amountto all that much. Since these weredumped, one can assume others werekept because the information was still"live." The "mountain" of paperworkthus included wooden documents whichwere much bulkier to store. How muchof the fort was given up to storage ofthis "mountain," and how many peoplewere required to produce and maintainit? How much was actually kept? TheRoman army begins to sound a bit likethe Department of Commerce. One issurprised the Romans had any time tofight, with all this filing to do!

INTELLIGENCE FROM THEPROVINCIAL FORTS

The second source of intelligenceactivity after the governor's officiumwere the staffs developed in the military


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forts themselves. The Roman armydeveloped a host of them in theprovinces. There were several withineach legion — one for each tribune, onefor the camp prefect and one for thelegate. All these could be added asfeeders to the governor's staff. Includedin these staffs were specialist troops —speculatores (messengers), frumentarii(imperial spies), quaestionarii(interrogators and torturers), interpretes(interpreters) and various recorders andsecretaries. Their significance lies in theinformation which could be processedand stored by such a staff, and whichcould therefore be available for the useof each camp commander or could beforwarded to the provincial governor.But again, how do we know any of itwas intelligence activity? Austin andRankov claim that the amount ofpaperwork generated by the army wasvast, yet even they themselves admit thatmost, if not all, of the surviving materialhas nothing to do with intelligence. Itseems curious indeed that if all thatpaperwork existed, not a singleintelligence document has survived tosupport their thesis. The vast majorityof documents kept were monthlysummaries, records of pay, promotions,casualties, assignment of new recruits,and animals allotted to specific units.The best we can glean from suchevidence is the presence of knownintelligence gatherers, i.e., frumentarii,speculator es, beneficiarii, etc. and thento extrapolate about the obvious needsof the commanders themselves whichwould have generated intelligence

activity. But none of this has left anytrace. If we could track the activities ofthe known collectors we might get anidea of how the system worked, butavailable evidence simply does not gointo that kind of detail.

What we may conclude from theevidence is that there was certainly anarray of sources from which anincoming governor might choose —his initial tour of inspection, the clientprinces within and beyond his frontiers,the intelligence reports in his archives,and the military personnel on his staffor the staffs of the provincial fortresses,who had years of experience in theprovince and with the army. Thesewould allow a new governor to bebrought up to speed very quickly, andbe far better informed about the currentstate of his province than the emperoror anyone else in Rome.This alsosuggests that the governor was his ownchief of intelligence. If there wassomebody else with this title, we areunaware of him. With no chief ofintelligence, it would be difficult topostulate a centralized, professionalintelligence service. Once they havewaded through the evidence from thisentire 'bureaucratic' network, Austinand Rakov still have to conclude thatthere was "no evidence that in any stageof Rome's history was [there] thecreation of a specialized militaryintelligence staff either at Rome or theprovinces." (p. 169) — a conclusionarrived at eight years earlier by aprevious study which the authors list intheir bibliography but do not quote.5


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The chapters on "The Acquisitionof Tactical Intelligence" (pp. 40ff)which discuss military installationsare among the best and mostcomprehensive in the book. Theirargument is convincing: The Romansassembled a huge empire which had tobe watched and whose borders had tobe protected. As the borders of thisempire became ossified, "Eachfort....became in itself a centre wherelocal intelligence could be gathered,filed in the unit archives and thenpassed on to provincial headquarters. "6

The establishment of outpost forts andthe development of scouting forces wascertainly Rome's best means ofdiscovering what was happening in theoutposts of the empire. Yet the authorsnote that reconnaissance of more thana day's journey would start to beproblematical (p. 179). There is noevidence from the first century and ahalf of the Principate that the Romanssystematically attempted to maintain awatch beyond their own frontiers (p.184). Only from the late second centuryonwards do we see the employment oflocal scouts, who were then operatingonly immediately beyond the frontiers,(p. 189). There is no evidence for theexistence of standing units ofexploratores in the Roman army untilthe early second century A.D. And theconcentration of exploratores units isunique to Upper Germany.7 No otherprovince can show a similar distributionalong the full length of its frontier.

That Austin and Rakov wish tomodify the concept of the frontier as

an "information barrier" is wise.8 Theyask the three most important questions:1). What is the evidence for the flowof information?; 2). What sort ofinformation could the forts havesupplied and what could the governordo with it?; and 3). How far beyondthe immediate frontier zone did thesurveillance of the forts extend?Mechanisms were added to improve theefficiency of the movement of thecollected intelligence. The network ofposts (stationes) manned by thebeneficiarii consularis are just oneexample. And yet, here too the authorsmust admit that the passage of militaryintelligence between forts and theprovincial headquarters in fact isnowhere (p. 171) (italics mine). Onemight even ask whether very sensitiveintelligence ever gets put into writing.The possibility that competitionbetween commanders and governorsmight keep them from sharinginformation with each other cannot beeliminated. The authors admit that suchbureaucratic jealousy would "mitigateagainst any close collaboration betweenneighboring governors whilearistocratic rivalries might wreck italtogether." (p. 24). The conclusionsonce again disappoint. There is noevidence in this period (the first centuryand a half of the Principate) for anysystematic attempt by the Romans tomaintain a watch beyond the frontiers.Only from the second century onwarddo we begin to see the employment oflocal scouts to operate immediatelybeyond the frontiers, (p. 189) Spying


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108

at foreign courts seems beyond theircapabilities or interests.

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE

Potential readers should be warned thatExplorations subtitle, Military andPolitical Intelligence in the RomanWorld is misleading. This is a work onexternal intelligence gathering. Thereis no systematic coverage of politicalintelligence gathering domestically orof internal security. Considering thatseventy-five percent of Romanemperors were either assassinated, orkilled when defeated by usurpers, itshould come as no surprise that theyspent more of their intelligenceresources on political enemies than onpotential threats from across the border.A thorough discussion of internalsecurity in the empire would require aseparate book, one which the authorshave not chosen to write. Had they doneso, they would have been obliged toinvestigate what role intelligencegathering played in the detection ofsedition.9 Did the Roman governmentinfiltrate subversive groups? Howsuccessful were they in preventinginsurrections? If one is to discusspolitical intelligence in all its facets, thisavenue must be explored.

Nor are the few references toRome's internal security organssufficient to give an idea of the breadthof the subject or the range of scholarlyopinions that have appeared in print.Austin and Rankov discuss them onlyto the point of dismissing the organs assources for carrying political and


military intelligence from the frontierto the capital. Only one reference ismade in the bibliography to the worksof William G. Sinnigen10 who, alongwith other scholars,11 have noticedthe growth of internal securityorganizations in the late empire thatwere used to control groups consideredsubversive (like the Christians), andeven used by the emperor to check onthe loyalty of his own employees. Ifthe authors wish to disagree with theseinterpretations, they are free to do so,but they cannot ignore such a body ofevidence and still make the claim ofproducing a work that thoroughlydiscusses Roman political intelligencegathering.

A scant two pages are dedicated toconsideration of the agentes in rebus— the civilian successors of thefrumentarii. This organizationaccounted for a large chunk of theinternal security functions of theempire, yet the authors describe theirduties as merely "carrying messages."Some scholars, notably A.H.M.Jones,12 followed by W. Liebschuetz,13

have tried to de-emphasize the moreinsidious side of these groups,emphasizing that what they did wasneither secret nor involved espionage.For instance, Jones says:

The agentes in rebus haveachieved a rather sinisterreputation as a kind of secretpolice. It is based on theactivities of a certain number ofthe corps who made themselvesnotorious in Constantine H's


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reign by ferreting out anddenouncing treasonable plots,real and alleged. But theywere by no means alone inexploiting the emperor 'ssuspicious temper — severalnotaries gained as sinister areputation — and there is noreason to believe that theagentes in rebus in normaltimes had any police functionsas inspectors of the post.

There is no reference forexample, to the relationship betweenthe notarii and the agentes in rebus.The loss of political independence andfreedom of the average citizen hasbeen elegantly described in ChesterG. Starr's Civilization and theCaesars. The role that internalsecurity organs played in played intaking away that freedom has not goneunnoticed. The fact that the agentessurvived into Byzantium, and evenOstrogothic Italy, suggests that theyplayed an important part in thecentralization of the government.

Yet some scholars persist intreating the notarii and agentes in rebusas simply bureaucrats. This ignoresthe fact that their effectiveness asagents of counterespionage andcontrol came not from their officialtitles or duties, but from theadministrative relationships thesemen had to the court, and theirposition in the bureaucratic chain ofcommand. Any position can be usedas a cover for covert activities thatleave little trace. The fact that we have

historical evidence for their spying onofficials, or arresting and assassinatingthem, should suggest that these men weremore than couriers or secretaries. It alsoignores the ad hoc nature of Romanintelligence gathering. The Romanemperor could use any number of groupsto effect his wishes, be they driven bypolicy concerns or paranoia. And theRomans had not such clear cut distinctionsbetween civilian and military functionsthat would have prevented the use ofeither as the emperor wished. Evidencefrom the eastern empire in the fifth andsixth centuries shows protectores anddomestici being assigned to militaryofficia and being used as agents ofintelligence — to inspect and report onprovincial authorities.14 These groupswere used collectively as political policefor arrests and executions carried out onthe authority of the emperor. They werefrequently used in connection withecclesiastical affairs.15 They were alsoemployed as inspectors of the state'sarmaments industry.16 Rankov himselfnotes that no single explanation of thefunction of the beneficiarii consularis fitsall recorded cases, and it is probably amistake to seek one. (p. 196) Should wenot, therefore, apply the same standardsto all the other Roman functionaries whowere sometimes seconded for intelligenceduties?

No single organization acted as animperial police force, or as a secretservice. Nor do any of these groups fitthe description of a modern intelligenceservice. But that is just the point. TheRoman way of collecting intelligence was


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put together from many differentagencies. The government usedwhoever it had at the moment forwhatever it needed done. A patternof diplomatic, undercover, andenforcement activities is clear, and notjust in the reign of Constantius II.Granted that abuses were worse undermore suspicious emperors, but the useof these corps as information gatherers,regardless of what their primaryfunctions may have been, cannot beentirely overlooked. To neglect theirmore insidious functions would be toignore entirely the political and militaryclimate at court during the late Empire.Whether they were efficient asintelligence gatherers or whether theycorrespond to any modern intelligenceorganization, is irrelevant. Theseimperial organizations truly deserve thetitle of secret service because theyperformed duties related to the politicalsafety of the state. They formed anintegral part of a bureaucracy rootedin the military establishment, and theyrepresented imperial power in spheresthat could affect adversely the lives ofpeople all over the empire. Their powereventually earned them the hatred ofthe empire's population. The authorsare correct in pointing out that there isno evidence for either the frumentariior the agentes in rebus (p. 220) beingused as intelligence gatherers beyondthe borders of the Roman empire, butthen, this is understood in the very term"internal security forces," which is theonly claim historians have made forthem. As guardians of the Roman

communications system, the cursuspublicus, they were in charge of themain network by which political andmilitary intelligence was carried.

THE ROLE OF THEINTELLIGENCE HISTORIAN

A word must be said about the authors'choice of evidence and how they useit. Austin and Rankov share a prejudicecommon among classical scholars: thatthere is no modern intelligenceliterature relevant (or scholarly enough)to be considered useful to a study onancient intelligence. Their bibliographycontains no references to any works thatmight have given them a perspectiveon such things as definitions. Referringto Roman intelligence as "good" or"bad" on page one already warnsreaders that they are dealing withamateurs. "Negative intelligence" (p.36) is surely an obsolete term denotingsecurity control measures. Most glaringis their basic definition of militaryintelligence as: "that which is acceptedas fact, based on all availableinformation about an actual or potentialenemy or area of operation." That apiece of intelligence is absolutelycorrect can never be taken as a "given."In attempting to corroborate significantintelligence items, there generallyremains the possibility that (a) theintelligence is bad; (b) the corroborationis false; (c) the situation was true atthe time, but is not true now; (d) that itmay be true but is only an informedestimate and (e) that it only clouds thosereal issues which matter in a tactical or


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strategic sense. The official intelligencecommunity definition is: "Basic,current, or estimative intelligence of anyforeign military or military-relatedsituation or activity." The authors'definition leaves out the important"estimative aspect" and implies toomuch certainty to the rest of it

As classical scholars, the authorsapply certain stringent standards toancient evidence which they consideracceptable. For example, they chooseto begin their history at the SecondPunic War. While the sources for earlyRome are, admittedly, scanty and notof the best quality, can we really affordthe luxury of disposing of them entirelysimply because they are not as reliableas we would like? In the best of allpossible worlds, all writers on militaryhistory would have first-hand militaryexperience and be unfailingly accurate.No such world exists. If these were theonly sources to be relied upon, therewould be much less work for ancienthistorians. Very little could be saidabout economic history, andintelligence historians would be out ofa job. Ancient historians andintelligence professionals have oneimportant thing in common. Bothmust gather data from incomplete,unreliable, and contradictory sourcesand make a coherent, and hopefullyaccurate picture out of it. They bothwork from fragmentary sources seenthrough a glass darkly. They often findthemselves in a position of having toguess. Therefore, although Austin andRankov choose to start their work at

the Second Punic War, where they feeltheir sources become accurate, onemight legitimately ask what theythought the Romans were doing in theFirst Punic War? During the warsagainst the Samnites? Against theGauls? Or the Greeks? Where there arewars, there are intelligence needs.Roman techniques during the earlyRepublic might have been simple andprimitive, but they still amounted tointelligence activity. Intelligencecollection remained as important toearly Roman military commanders asit did to later ones. Ignoring orunderestimating the importance ofintelligence could be fatal in any age.No matter how poor the sources, it isthe duty of historians on antiquity toguess, to extrapolate, and to fill in thegaps by suggesting a model.Archaeologists and anthropologists havehad to use this method with fewersources than Austin and Rankov had attheir disposal. On the other hand, evenwhen using information they considerreliable, the authors noticeably identifythemes (such as exploratores) thenproceed to draw evidence from isolatedexamples taken from historical worksthat encompassed four or five centuriesof Roman history. These examples areoften out of context and used to implya standard method of operation that didnot exist over such a great time period.

Austin and Rankov also seem tobestow privilege on information whichcomes from army officers.Theiringrained bias is that only militarypersonnel (i.e., professionals) can


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perform intelligence functions.Civilians like the notarii are treated asamateurs because they are civilians:"Despite their quasi-military activities,the notarii were, of course, civilservants apparently without any militarybackground." (p. 225) Actually, thesame could be said of most employeesof today's Central Intelligence Agency.This ignores the fact that: (a) emperorsused whoever was at hand whether theywere military or not — this mightinclude even the lowliest of privateinformers (the delatores); (b) theagentes in rebus were used for internalsecurity throughout the late empire andthey were entirely civilian; (c) not allintelligence is military; and (d) theRomans used civilian personnel to spyon soldiers.

Assuming that official intelligenceis carried only by official couriers inthe official pursuit on their jobs doesnot permit a true understanding of thenature of intelligence work, Roman orotherwise. Besides official channelsthere will always be a wide spectrumof unofficial sources, collected inunofficial (and usually illegal) ways bysome of the most unsavory peopleimaginable. This is the dark undersideof intelligence work that scholars oftenignore, but which yields some of themost important pieces of information.As a drowning man does not look tosee if a hand being offered to him isclean, so intelligence agents are knownto accept information from humanbeings who are much less than saints.The entire subject of delation, i.e.,

private informing, cannot be left out ofany discussion of internal security.17

Much of the information on internalsecurity in the Roman empire, from thereign of Augustus right through to itsfall in the fifth century, was collectedfrom such unofficial sources. Theauthors notice that the beneficiariistationed on the frontier were "in anideal position to actively listen to localgossip from arrivals across thefrontiers." (p. 203) But then, so waseveryone else. It does not require aprofessional to collect gossip. The factof the matter is that intelligenceactivities sometimes get performed byamateurs and are written about bysecond-rate writers. But these are thesources we must use.

SHORTCOMINGS

Finally, Exploratio is a book aimed atclassicists. The classical scholar is yetto be found who considers writing foran audience of intelligent, non-classicists or intelligence professionalsa worthwhile effort. The authors' textwill be incomprehensible to anyone notintimately familiar with the workingsof the Roman empire, the Latinlanguage, and Roman history. At onepoint the authors switch back and forthbetween Caesar's Gallic campaigns,Varus's defeat by Arminius, Tiberiandiplomacy against Maroboduus,Julian's Persian expedition, the reignof Constantius II and back to Trajan inone paragraph (pp. 24-25). This wouldconfuse any reader not having a firm


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grasp of Roman chronology. There alsoseems to be no attempt to show as aprocess the development in Romanintelligence gathering skills from theperiod of the Republic through theempire. Roman intelligence capabilitiesseem to emerge full-blown from thehead of Zeus in chapter one. Was itmore surprising to see the Romansambushed by Germans in A.D.6 thansurprised by the Gauls in 390 B.c? Ifnot, why not? Did the Romans learnany intelligence skills from theirenemies? From Hannibal? From themonarchies of the East?

The subject of Roman intelligencegathering cannot be treated in just onevolume. The relationship betweenspying, diplomacy, and strategicintelligence in the Roman world wouldconstitute a book by itself. Another full-length study might treat the Romans'knowledge of geography, and how theirworld view affected their collection ofintelligence.18 Internal security and theprotection of the emperor have yet tobe systematically treated, not to mentionspying against subversive groups,Roman tradecraft, or covertoperations.19 How many topicsshould be included in this list all dependsupon the definition of intelligence. TheRomans did not have today'scomprehensive view of intelligenceactivities. They lacked ourcontemporary definitions, globaloutlook, technology, and bureaucracy.And yet, they instinctively understood,as all governments do, that in order to

preserve internal order, and to keeptheir borders safe, that intelligencewould have.to be collected in some wayand by somebody. Emperors learnedthe hard way that intelligence failureslike the disaster in the Teutoburg Forestare costly, and some, like the battle ofAdrianople, can be fatal. This is theimportance of examining the Romanmodel through the eyes of the modernintelligence historian. For, as theFrench historian Jules Michelet oncesaid: "History is useless if one does notlook at it in the light of currentmisfortunes."20

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

*Dr. Sheldon wishes to thank several peoplewithout whose help this review could nothave been completed: Mark Zapatka ofthe Byzantine Library at Dumbarton Oaks;Ms. Victoria Erhart; the staff of theHumanities Collection at CatholicUniversity; Professors Elizabeth Fisherand Robert Hadley of George WashingtonUniversity; and Professor John P. Karras,Department of History, The College ofNew Jersey.

REFERENCES1N.J.E. Austin, Ammianus on Warfare(Brussels, Collection Latomus, 165,1979).

2N.B. Rankov, The Beneficiarii Consularisin the Western Provinces of the RomanEmpire, (unpublished D. Phil, thesis,Oxford, 1986).

3See R.M. Sheldon, Tinker, Tailor, Caesar,

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Spy: Espionage in Ancient Rome,University of Michigan Ph.D. dissertation,published by University MicrofilmsInternational, 1987.

4R.M. Sheldon, Tinker, Tailor, op. cit.5Exploratio, p. 168.6M.P. Speidel, "Exploratores: Mobile EliteUnits of Roman Germany," EpigraphischeStudien 13 (1983), pp. 63-78.

7A similar observation was made by A.D.Lee in Information and Frontiers: RomanForeign Relations in Antiquity(Cambridge, 1993); also reviewed inInternational Journal of Intelligence andCounterintelligence, Vol. 9, No. 2(Summer, 1996), pp. 241-248.

8Not cited, for example, is T. Pekáry,"Seditio. Unruhen und Revolten imrömischen Reich von Augustus bisCommodus," Ancient Society 18 (1987),pp. 133-150.

9They list W.G. Sinnigen, "The Origins ofthe Frumentarii ," Memoirs of theAmerican Academy in Rome, 1962, pp.211-224, but not "The Roman SecretService," Classical Journal (1965), pp. 65-72; "Two Branches of the Late RomanSecret Service," American Journal ofPhilology 80 (1959), pp. 238-254;"Administrative Shifts of CompetenceUnder Theodoric," Traditio 21 (1965) pp.456-467; The Officium of the UrbanPrefecture in the Later Roman Empire,(Rome: American Academy in Rome),Papers and Monographs, Vol 17; "Tironesand Supernumeraii," Classical Philology62 (1967), pp. 108-112; "The Chiefs ofStaff of the Later Roman Secret Service,"Byzantinische Zeitschrift 57 (1964), pp. 78-105, or "Three Administrative ChangesAscribed to Constantius II" American

Journal of Philology 83 (1962), pp. 369-382.

10W. Blum, Curiosi und Regendarii,(Munich, 1969); J.A. Arias Bonet, "Losagentes in rebus. Contribucion al estudiode la policia en al Bajo Imperio Romano,"Anuario Hist. Derecho Espan, 27-28(1957-58), pp. 197-219; M. Clauss, DerMagister Officiorum in der Spatantike(Munich, 1980); Otto Hirschfeld, Dieagentes in rebus. Sitzunsberichte derKönglisch Preussischen Akademie derWissenschaften, Berlin, Phil, histor. klasseSitzunsberichte (1893), pp. 421-441; A.Lopuzanski, "La police romaine et lesChretiens," Antiquité Classique 20 (1951),pp. 5-46; G. Purpura, "I curiosi e la scholaagentum in rebus," ASGP 34 (1973), pp.165-275.

11A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire,vol. II, p. 581.

12See W. Liebschuetz's review of WilhelmBlum's Curiosi und Regendarii (Munich,1969), in JRS 1970, pp. 229-230. Blumholds that detective work was a primaryfunction of the curiosi sent to the provincesin connection with the cursus publicus.Even Liebschuetz admits that curiosi canbe legitimately translated as "spies."

13See R. I. Frank, Scholae Palatinae, p.97. Cf. M. Clauss, Der MagisterOfficiorum, pp. 40-44 on the scholaepalatinae.

14R.I. Frank, Scholae Palatinae, p.112ff.15R. I. Frank, Scholae Palatinae, p. 120with references.

16G. Boissiere, L'accusation publique et lesdelateurs chez les Romains (Niort, 1911);J. Gaudemet, "La repression de la delationau bas-empire," in Philias charin.Miscellanea E. Manni, vol. III (Rome,


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1980), pp. 1065-1083; A. Giovannini,"Pline et les délateurs de Domitien," inOpposition et résistances à l'Empired'Auguste à Trajan, Geneva (Entreteinssur l'Antiquité classique 33 (1986) pp. 219-248; William J. O'Neal, "Delation in theEarly Empire," Classical Bulletin 55(1978), pp. 24-28.

17See for example Claude Nicolet's, Space,Geography and Politics in the Early RomanEmpire, (Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan, 1991); R. Moynihan,"Geographical Mythology and Roman

Imperial Ideology," in R. Winkes (ed.) TheAge of Augustus (Providence, RI, 1985),pp. 149-157.

18R. M. Sheldon, "Clandestine Operationsand Covert Action: The AncientImperative," Proceedings of the Militaryand Naval History Forum, 3-4 March1995, Lancaster, Pa., pp. 1-14.

19R. and M. Collison, Dictionary of ForeignQuotations (New York: Everest House,1980), p. 158.

A Naive Obsession

HAYDEN B. PEAKE

Angus Mackenzie: Secrets: The CIA's War At Home, University ofCalifornia Press, Berkeley, California, 1997, 241 p. , $27.50.

The title of this recent contribution tothe literature of discontent aboutintelligence is misleading, though it mayhelp sell the book. To be sure, authorAngus Mackenzie attacks the CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA) throughoutthe book, but his real target is the entireUnited States government. His thesis:no more government secrecy, journalistscan decide what the people shouldknow. To make the point that this degreeof openness is part of the American

heritage, he quotes an old man in hischildhood hometown who, invoking thespirit of the Minute Men, explained thatthe Revolutionary War was fought "sothat Americans can say anything theydamn please." A reader need not getfar into Secrets: The CIA's War At Hometo realize that his aphorism becameMackenzie's guiding principle, withoutqualification. But why?

In part, it was because, with thewisdom of a then teenager, he decided

Hayden B. Peake is Adjunct Professor of Intelligence History and the History ofCounterintelligence at the Joint Military Intelligence College in Washington, D. C.


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in the late 1960s that the domesticopposition to the Vietnam War was notviewed by the federal government aspart of that Minute Man heritage. But amore immediate and compelling reasonwas his 1970 arrest in Beloit, Wisconsin,for selling copies of an anti-warnewspaper, The People's Dreadnaught,he had founded with his brother — aVietnam veteran — and two friends.Since it was not illegal to sellnewspapers, he was charged with sellingobscene materials. The charges wereeventually dropped. Before long,however, he was arrested again. Oncemore the charges were dropped. Thistime he and his brother filed a lawsuitagainst the Beloit authorities. After fiveyears the case came to court. They wona settlement of $2500.00, but by thistime the Dreadnaught had folded. Fromthese experiences, writes Mackenzie, "Ilearned the hard way that suppressionof free speech and the free press didnot end with the defeat of the red-coats."He had also learned about the Freedomof Information Act (FOIA) and acquiredthe motivation for this book.

The primary example Mackenziechose to develop his arguments was theCIA, beginning with what becameOperation MH/CHAOS. But theFederal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)and the National Security Agency(NSA) also share his attention. Most ofthe incidents about which he writes havebeen gone over many many times inother books and articles. Some, forexample, the Unauthorized DisclosureAnalysis Center set up in 1984 have

received little public attention; while itirritated the press, it was not illegal.

SNOOPING THE NEWS

Secrets begins with an examination ofwhat Mackenzie calls CIA and FBIinfiltration of the anti-war press. It endsby saying that these policies remainalive and well today in the Bill Clintonadministration. In between, he reviewsFOIA cases, alleges that governmentsecrecy agreements are censorship —without any attempt at explaining thedifference. He argues passionately theAmerican Civil Liberties Union(ACLU) is in league with the CIA, andcharges that "secrecy pervades everyagency and department of the federalgovernment." Among his heroes arePhilip Agee, Wilbur Eveland, VictorMarchetti, Ralph McGehee, and ErnestFitzgerald. If there be any balance inthe book it is that Mackenzie attacksDemocrat and Republicanadministrations alike. Otherwise, hissingle minded selective bias ispervasive.

Without question the events aboutwhich he writes happened, this is a welldocumented book in that regard. Buttheir analysis and the selectivity oftopics addressed, are different questionsaltogether. Mackenzie finds itconvenient to discuss the impact of theRamparts magazine disclosures aboutCIA contracts with Michigan StateUniversity, without stating the contractsare legal. And, curiously, there is nomention of Ramparts's former editor,


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David Horowitz, whose recent memoirscandidly acknowledge the illegal acts ofthe radical Black Panthers; that "theSDS [Students for a Democratic Society]leaders promoting drugs in order tomake outlaws and then radicals ofmiddle class youth," and Tom Hayden'sdirect suggestions to the VietnameseCommunists on "how to sabotage theAmerican war effort" or his attemptsto get SDS "to publicly support theCommunist line." Horowitz also pointsout that while avoiding "stories aboutKGB operations among theorganizations of the left, or the linksbetween the antiwar movement and theCommunists Forces in Vietnam, theRamparts articles seemed to confirm theNew Left view of the world."' Nor doesMackenzie mention that former KGBofficers have admitted KGB "infiltrationof left-wing and black nationalistmovements" to include the financing of"one Afro-American journal, TheLiberator."2

In short, the U.S. government wasnot obsessed with spying on Americansfor the sake of spying, as Mackenziecontends. Neither is the governmentnow consumed by a desire for secrecyas he would have us believe. QuotingSteven Aftergood's unsubstantiatedcharge that "more information isclassified today than there was when theBerlin Wall was torn down," will notchange reality. In the 1960s and 1970sthere were genuine concerns for thenation's domestic security, under bothDemocratic and Republican presidents.Whether or not some of the corrective

actions they approved were illegal, thethreat they perceived was genuine.Mackenzie just cannot accept this pointof view, and he consistently ignoresfacts that detract from his obsession. Hisis a history viewed from the presentwithout any attempt to consider thecircumstances of the events, from bothsides, at the time they occurred.

SHOWING HOW TO GET IT WRONG

But! Yes, there is a but — there remainssignificant value in the book. It showswhat happens when history is writtento conform to preconceptions. Perhapsmore important, and certainlyunintentionally, Secrets refutes its owncontention that the government still usessecrecy "to keep the American peoplein the dark about its nefariousactivities." One of the examplesMackenzie uses to make this point isthe handling of the Aldrich Ames case,quoting that eminent authority on thesubject, Aldrich Ames. Mackenzienever realizes that is was poorlyimplemented intelligence communitybasic security practices, not pervasivesecrecy, that allowed Ames to continuefor so long. Another part of hisargument — that government secrecyis maintained to "give an advantage toAmerican corporate interests" — goesunsubstantiated, as does his thesis thatonly complete openness and unrestrictedaccess for the press can save thecountry.

Tragically, Angus Mackenzie diedof brain cancer in 1994, before his book


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118

was completed. It was subsequentlypublished through the efforts of hisfriends and family. They write in theepilogue that the "United States is nolonger the nation its citizens oncethought: a place unlike most others inthe world, free of censorship andthought police, where people can saywhat they want, when they want to,about their government." Withoutaggressive defense of the firstamendment, they conclude, "there islittle hope that the march to censorship


will be reversed." The possibility thatthis is a spurious proposition has,obviously, never been considered byMackenzie and his collaborators.

REFERENCES1David Horowitz, Radical Son: AGenerational Odyssey (New York, TheFree Press, 1997), pp. 160, 197-7, 386.

2Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate: MyThirty-Two Years In Intelligence andEspionage Against the West (New York:St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 52-54.


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