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Title: “Pluralism and social stratification.” Author(s): M.G. Smith Published by: In Social and Occupational Stratification in Contemporary Trinidad and Tobago. Selwyn Ryan, ed. St. Augustine, Trinidad: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies. p. 3-35.

In: SelWX~ Ryan (ed.), ~al and OcCU~atiOnalStrati1'lcattan 111 Ca.1Itemp<QlY Trini ad & Tab aISER, UWI, St.AugustiJle, Trinidad, 1991. Ii·

Pluralism and SocialStratification

M. G. Smith

3

As tllis confercllce to honollr nlY forIner colleague !)ro[essorI.Joycl Braitllwaite will foells 011 challges ill tile. socialstratification of Caribbean countries, a11d as various qllestionsabollt the nature and relationships of pluralism and socialstratification remain open, tllough central to CaribbeanSOCiology over the past thirty-odd years, I shall review certainissues in that controversy and try to clarify or resolve them in theligllt of recent developments in the theory of pluralism. 1'0 thatend and to honour L,loyd Braithwaite "who advocated thesuperiority of stratification as a frame of reference for the studyof Caribbean and other societies instead of pluralism,l asconceived by J. S. Furnivall or myself, I shall discuss thedifferences and relations of pluralisITI and social stratification.2

As regards pluralism, Leo Kuper showed long ago that theterm has two competing and opposite meanings, each with itsown distinct agenda for study and action. 3 Derived from Alexis deTocqueville the older and bette·r known usage identifiespluralism with situations in which competing views andprograms are canvassed freely on issues and subjects of publicinterest, be they religious, political, educational, economic orother: that Is, with those social processes and conditions thatare the goal and measure of liberal democratic societies. 4 Theotller concept of pluralism which derives from J. S. Furnivallconcentrates rather on those situations and social conditions inwhich people, often the numerical majority in their society, aredenied the chance to participate in such liberal democraticprocesses and contexts. In terminology I shall clarify below,pluralism in the liberal, Tocquevillean sense presupposes the

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universalistic incorporation of all citizen, whereas for Furnivallplurallsll1 involves the d~fJereTlUal incOrIJOration of those whoparticipate freely as citizens in the Juridical, civic and politicalinstitutions of their society, and others who do not. Thecontinuing struggles of non-whites in the USA, South Africa, andelsewhere for equal political and legal rights illustrate thesignificance and implications of this difference. To thedisinherited and their masters alike, the contrasts betweenpluralism based on differential incorporation and regimes basedon universalistic incorporation ar sufficiently deep and stark tosustain intense and violent conflict for generations, since rulinggroups rarely surrender privilege except under pressure. In thisessay I shall therefore try to identify the necessary conditionsfor pluralism of the kind noted by Furnivall, and show how itrelates to class and socIal stratification.

To that end, I shall review the controversy about their natureand relationships to clarify its central issues, and correct certaInfeatures of my early account of pluralisnl;5 but wish first toacknowledge nlY debt to Lloyd Braithwaite, Vera Rubin, RaymondSmith and others whose critical data and arguments have forcedme to rethink lllany points in Iny understanding of pluralism andplural societies.

I

Though it is convenient to begin this review with the seminar onpluralism in the Caribbean that Vera Rubin6 organised, thedebate really began some years before with publications byLloyd Braithwaite7 and myselfS then both at the ISER inJamaica. The opposing posItions in that debate had initiallybeen staked out by Fernando Henriques9 and Leonard Broom:iobut were redefined and amplified by Lloyd Braithwaite andmyself within the competing theoretical frameworks of TalcottParsons11 and J. S. Furnivall. 12 For Parsons, ·

social stratYlCation is a generalised aspect of the structure of ailsocial systems: and Stratification in its valuational aspect . .. is theranking of units in a social system in accordance with the standardsof the value system13

Unfortunately, as far as I know, until 1963 neither Parsons,his colleagues, nor his students ever considered socialstratification except in its "valuational aspect," and it is of coursepure tautology to say that any order of ranking or evaluationpresupposes some agreed scale of values. Nonetheless, despiteits roots in the writings of Durkheim and Weber, this basicpostulate of Parsonian theory, namely, that human society isimpossible without normative consensus, made too many

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contemporary societies and developments unintelligible for meto accept. 14

Since neither Lloyd Braithwaite, myself, nor Raymond Smith,\vho later joined the debate 15 set much store on Marxistdoctrine, and since Talcott Parsons' theory of social action wasthen predominant, it was appropriate and perhaps inevitablethat we disputed the nature of Caribbean societies and theirstratification within that framework.

After World War II, Lloyd Braithwaite read socIology at theLondon School of Economics under Edward Shils, TalcottParsons' distinguished colleague, and studied with him thetheories of Durkheim, Max Weber, Pareto, Simmel, and otherfounding fathers of the disciplIne. In socIal anthropology, whIchI studied at UnIversIty College London. the rival functionalismsof MalinowskI and Radcliffe-Brown domInated theoretIcaldiscussion. However. before returning to Jamaica In 1952 to jointhe ISER, I spent nearly two years in Northern NIgerIa among thepagan Kadara and Kagoro and their neighbours the MuslimHausa, whose language served as the linguajranca. and whosesociety was larger, nlore complex. and stratified. Despite theirgreat differences those tribal societies-the Muslim Hausa, andEIlglisll society-all differed so sharply from JamaIca Instructure and character16 that I slowly came to see how differentJamaica was from any society I knew or had read of inanthropology. Accordingly. I "groped about" for some alternativesocietal model17 until Daryll Forde advised me to read Furnlvall.after I had compared Jamaica to South Africa as a "compoundsociety" following Radcliffe-Brown. IS

Fumivall's sketch of plural socIetIes in the colonial Far Eastcannot be faulted. He described them as medleys of people, since

Each is in the strictest sense a medley, _for they mix but do notcombine. Each Iwlds by its own culture cind language, its own ideasand ways. As individuals they meet, but only the market-place, inbuying and seUing. There is a plural society, with dUJerent sectionsof the community living side by side, but separately, within the samepolitical unit. Even in the ecorwmic sphere, there is a division oflabour along racial lines. 19

Without a wasted word. that passage Indicates the invalidity ofconsensual prereqUisites and Inadequacy of structural­functional models as universal paradigms of societY.

Reflecting further on the characteristics of plural societies.and recalling World War II developments In Malaysia. Singapore,Indonesia. New GuInea and Borneo. Furnivall stressed that suchsocieties had been established as units by external force andlacked a common will:

In each sectio~ the sectional common wUl is feeble, and in. thesociety as a wlwle ther~ is rw common wal . . . Few recognise th.t::Lt in

6 / M.G. Smith

fact all tfle TTlernbers of all sections have material interests inCOTTlnlO~ but nlost see tllat on many points t/leir material interestsare opposed. 20

{In SUC11 circuTTlStances,j All wants that all men want in common arethose they s/lare in common with animal creatiorL21

Furnivall's thesis was thus the diametrical opposite ofl"'alcott I)arSOI1S: which, though based on the teachings ofDllrkheim and Weber, was corltradicted by Ibn Khaldum, KarlMarx and Herbert Spencer, among others. To any committedParsonian, such flamboyant heresy as pluralism a la Furnivallwas like a red rag to a bull. Accordingly, at Vera Rubin's seminarin 1959, in a splendid paper Lloyd Braithwaite argued withconviction and elegance for the universality of common valueseven in those Caribbean societies like Trinidad that mostresembled the colonial Far East.22

Despite the utter indifference shown by natives of FarEastern European colonies to their seizure by Japanese in WorldWar II, followillg !)arsons, Braithwaite insisted that "no societycan exist without a minimum sharing of common values. withouta certain alnount of 'social will'."23 He accordingly criticisedFurnivall for stressing too heavily the economic aspects ofcolonialism, "and too little . . . the necessary existence ofsentin1ents favourable to the metropolitan power"24 i.e., theimperial state. However. colonial struggles for independenceduring and after World War II in Palestine. India, Indonesia,Indochina, Kenya. Algeria, RhodeSia/Zimbabwe, ~amibia,

Guinea-Bissau, Zaire, Angola and Mozambique, scarcelydemonstrated their "favourable sentiments." Neither did thesubsequent struggles by subject peoples against local rulinggroups in Ruanda, Burundi, Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia andZanzibar display such sentiments for those rulers. Nor morerecently do the protests against Russian rule in Azerbaijan,Armenia. Georgia. Moldavia. Lithuania and other parts of theU.S.S.R

As one result of the argument between Lloyd Braithwaite.Raymond Smith and myself over the issue of normativeconsensus In BrItish West IndIan colonIal societIes, perhapsonly in the Caribbean was that fundamental axiom of Parsoniantheory ever operationalised and tested in a detailed study ofsocial stratification25 designed explicitly to investigate theopposing theses of Parsons and Furnivall.

On the issue of common values, I had argued that, given theIrinstitutional diverSity, in plural societies:

l'1-1e distribution oj status within each cultural section rests oncomTnon values quite specific to the group, and this "medley ojsectional values systems rules out the value consensus that isprerequisite Jor any status continuum. Thus the plurality is a

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discontinuous order, ... w/lile its cOTnponerlt sections are genuinestatus contiTlua, distinguished by t.heir differing systems oj value,action., ann. social relation.s.2G

My study of stratification among the Grenadian elitecOl1finned these remarks, and demonstrated:

a substantial divergence oj" values among the Grenadian elite. Thestrata that hold dUferent values differ also in institutional prQLticesand commitments. ... These tlVO value-sets challenge and clash witheach other. Tl1eir co-existence at different levels of the elitehierarchy represents dissensus rather than the prevalence oj acommon system of values27

To trivialise the finding that institutionally distinct sectionsof the Grenadian elite held different values, Burton Benedictchose to ignore the concordant divergence of values andinstitutIons among those elite sections, and claimed that on myanalysis, "all stratified societies are plural, ,,28 which is clearly notthe case. Moreover, though most plural societies are alsostratified, some are not. 29 Stratification and pluralism differ intheir nature and bases,30 and vary independently, as we shallsee.

Since we can never observe values directly, we can only infertheir existence from observable events that we assume expressthem. Hence, as explanations of social action or structure, valueinterpretations proceed teleologically post hoc proper hoc, butattributing whatever values the analyst prefers as determinantor action. Demonstration of common or dissimilar values in anysocial context or proces.s is therefore unreliable and beset withuncertainty, as the inherently indeterminate variables, coupledwith the unsatisfactory procedures used to demonstrate themclearly open the way to conflicting interpretations of socialsituations and events, as our law courts illustrate daily.

In a rare attempt to clarify the concept and reduce theseproblems Parsons and Shils identified "common values" asfollows:

A person is said to have 'common values' with another when either(1) he wants the group in which he and the other belong to QLhieve acertain goal which the other also wants, or (2) he intrinsicallyvalues coriformity with the requirements and goals laid down by theother.31

Unfortunately, without decisive independent data, we cannever show that subordinates intrinsically value confonnity withthe wishes of their superiors, however convenient the postulate.

On adopting Furnivall's concept of plural societies, I hadendorsed his claim that they lacked common will and commonvalues that that presumed. Jamaica's long record of slave revoltsand post-emancipation upheavals, like Grenada's history from

8 / M.G. Smiili

Fedon's revolt to 1951 32 and since illustrate Furnivall's thesis. Inthose respects Grenada arid Jamaica do not differ radically fromother West Indian colonies. When I adapted Furnivall's theory toCaribbean societies33 that recension rested mainly on myknowledge of Grenada and Jamaica, and challenged theassunlption that Caribbean societies shared common valuesderived from colonial rule. At Vera Rubin's seminar in 1959, Itherefore addressed issues of social stratification and commonvalues directly34 and warned against the "common sociologicalerrors" of reducing "cultural and social pluralism to socialstratification"35 of supposing that "the persistence of plural unitsdue to the predominance of COInmon values between theircultural sections."36 Against such assumptions I stressed that

Social quiescence and cohesion durer sharply, and so do regulationand. integration but, if we begin by assuming that integrationprevails, it is virtua~~u impossible to distinguish these conditions. ... It is especially dUJicult to isolate the positive effect oj commonvalues in culturally split societies that owe their form andTTlaintenance to a special concentration ·oJ regulative power withinthe dominant group.37

III response, Lloyd Braithwaite also discussed the problemsof social order and comlllon values in Trinidad and otherCaribbean societies.38 Following Parsons, he insisted that"there must be a certain minimum of common, shared values ifthe unity of the society is to be maintained"39 and claimed that"analysis in terms of social stratification serves the usefulpurpose of stressing the common values of the society."40Nonetheless, he noted:

1'hefact that values are shared does not mean that they are commonin the sense of being widespread; there may be COTT11r.lOn acceptanceof a particular scale of values and a particular type oj action.,altlwugh the social groups that Iwld these values may not aspire tothem41

As if to illustrate that situation, he said that in 1)-:lnidcld,

the main common value element has been the sharing of the value ofethnic superiority and inferiority. ... The Jact that tltere was onlyone common value held by the whole society, oj a type inherentlyproductive oj tensions, created a certain tendency to 'disintegration'within the social system, particularly when this m.ain corrunonvalue was challenged.42

How and why, if Widespread, that "coffilllon v~ue" was sodivisive, granted the colonial acceptance of British superioritythat Braithwaite claimed,43 is neither self-evident nor discussed,thougll he adInlts that, "with the breakdown of the system ofintegrative values that holds the subordinate community in

Pluralism and Social Stratification / 9

position, there are no other systems. of integrative values to taketheir place."44 Others, such as Rubin45 and Ryan46 writing onTrinidad, present different views of the society. If its salecommon value of rac.ial or "ethnic" inequality generatestendencies to "disintegration" or conflict, it is difficult to see howthat value by itself maintained the social unity of Trinidad.However widely shared, such a value as racial or ethnicinequality can only be held in common by diverse racial or ethnicstocks in a genuine caste system consensually based on thosecritics, which was neither the case in Trinidad nor anyCaribbean colonial plurality.

To explain the consensual predominance in Trinidad of suchascriptive racial or ethnic values, Braithwaite claimed thatTrinidadians accepted "the superiority, as such, of thesuperordinate system"47 that is, British SOCiety, of which theoverwhelming majority knew little or nothing. On that point heargued,

this process of acculturation implies the introduction and partialacceptance oj universal and achievement values in spheres in whichparticularistic and ascriptive values were previously domlnant.48

However, since "the colonial system, far from placingeconomic considerations first, is in fact dominantly based onascriptive ones"49 instead of "universal and achievement values,"the British imposed ascriptive criteria of race and ethnicity onTrinidad, and apparently established them as its "sole commonvalue." If so, then local regard for universalistic-achievementvalues above particularistic-ascriptive ones was perhapsneither as Widespread nor as deep as Braithwaite optimisticallysupposed. Nonetheless, to account for the "intrinsic" acceptanceof those values, following Parsons and Shilsso he claimed that:

A ,naJor need oj the individual in a subordinate social system whoseparticularistic-ascriptive values have been tom asunder wouldappear to be acceetance oj another such set Qf values. Hence it comesabout that the jirst reaction oj many colonials is towards theacceptance oj the superiority oj the scale oj values of thesuperordinate social system.51

On that point Braithwaite differs from American Parsonianswho, with conquest states and colonial societies in mind, onlysay that the "rank order must be legitimized and accepted bymost of the members-at least by the important ones, If stabilityis to be maintained . . . Coercive sanctions and initiative must bevested in specific status positlons."52 Such arrangements clearlyillustrate the role "of common values in culturally spllt societiesthat owe their fonn and maintenance to a special concentrationof regulative power within the dominant group."S3 IndeedBraithwaite's teacher, Edward Shils, later attributed compliance

""~ ..,.. I' '

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in such societies generically and tersely to "consensus" that is"coerced. ,,54 However, despite the dissensus revealed bynumerous revolts, Lloyd Braithwaite apparently felt that colonialsubmission was more willing and widespread than his fellow­Parsonians in the U.S.A

Nonetheless, while rejecting the major thrust ofBraithwaite's essay, his claim that "the theory of the pluralsociety is logically unacceptable"55 and much else that he saidthen, I think he was basically correct in dismissing my accountof pluralism at tllat date as fueoretically inadequate. Howeverchallenging it filay have seemed in 1959, my conception of pluralsociety could not bear compar.ison with the action theory ofTalcott Parsons, Edward Shils and their colleagues for severalreasons. First, while Parsons had begun to lay the basis of actiontheory over twenty years before,56 plural society concepts firstenlerged when Furnival157 and Morris58 discussed colonialsocieties. Second, wIllIe !)arsons, a social theorist by inclinationand traiIling, based tlis social theory on the work of his greatpredecessors, Ioolting at tIle irnpact of colonialisrTI on subjectnative societies, Furnivallllad little relevant theory as guide, and,though acutely perceptive, was neither theoretically inclined, norconcerned to generate social theory. As economist andadministrator, Furnivall's preoccupations with the colonial FarEast were intensely practical and structured his observations.

For my part, although convinced by the contrast betweenCaribbean societies and others I then knew of the relevance ofFurnivall's concepts for Caribbean sociology, in 1959 I lackedboth the necessary knowledge and experience to construct anadequate theory. For example, to explain the profound social andcultural cleavages that split Furnivall's plural societies, eventhough I had earlier documented their pivotal role in Caribbeanslave societies,59 only in 1959, follOWing Marion Levy,60 Nadel61

and Linton,62 did I try to derive their social and culturaldivisions systematically from their institutional diversity.63 Thuswhile Braithwaite erred i~ dismissing my institutional analysisas biologically and culturally reductionist,64 I agree that, as thenformulated, my model needed independent structural criteria todistingUish clearly between heterogeneous and plural societies,a point that Vera Rubin made cogently by asking, "When is aculturally heterogeneous society also pluralistic?"65

Adapting the ideas of Nadal and Linton, in 1959 I contrasteda "society having one basic institutional system and a number ofstyles, or one basic system and a number of institutionalalternatives and specialties" as "culturally and sociallyheterogeneous,"66 with plural societies in which there is "formaldiversity in the basic system of compulsory institutions"67 suchas "kinship, education, religion, property and economy,recreations and certain soclalities"68 to which we should add

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lallgllage. 69 I-Iowcver, Ilaving distinguisIled pluralism from classclilTerellces "witllin a sillgle hlstitutional framework, "70 followingFllrnivall,71 as before72 I disll1issed differences among Americanwllites as ethnic variations on common institutional forms\Vllich, "like class styles, may produce cultural and social11eterogeneity, but do not involve pluralisnl. "73

At that tinle I had read little on the cultural and social life ofsuch white Amelican "minorities" as the Irish, Portuguese, Jews,!)oles, or Italians, and only knew the United States superficially.Even so, I should have recognised that on my own criteria atleast sonle of tIle cultural differences among U.S. whites were not111ere "stylistic variations"74 but "incompatible" institutions75

\vllich precluded the role equivalences prerequisite of freeexchange of persons among such groups, even in suchtraditional roles as spouse, parent, neighbour or fellow­c}lllrcllIl1url. If so, then tll0l1gl1 sInooth role excllanges arefeasible between Inell1bers of certain white American ethnic andrcligiolls grolll)s, tIley are llot belweerl otllers. Even withoutclelailed et.hll0graphies, simply by comparing such roles aspriest, layman, spollse, parent are aflIne alnong white AmericanIJ rotestallts, Catholics, Jews, Muslilns, and cognate ethnicgrollps, I could have seen that.

1""0 illustrate, while Protestant priests may wed, and many intIle U.S.A. are appointed by their congregations, Catholic priestsare prescriptively celibate and appointed by bishops. While layCatholics confess individually to priests who may than absolvetheir sins, Protestants do neither; and while Protestants mayfreely marry those of other faiths, practise birth control, divorceand remarry without pastoral permission, CatholiCS may not.Since some of these religious differences affect relationsbetween spouses, they also affect co-parenthood, parentalrelations with children, domestic roles, affinal relations, theextended family, godparenthood and kinship. Thus at least somematerial and familial roles differ more deeply among Americanwhites across congregational and ethnic borders than Iperceived in 1959. Moreover, such institutional differences asfirst language or "Inother tongue," religion, marriage and family,and perhaps also roles in such ethnic sodalities as the KKK,Mafia, and the Freemasons, are institutionally incompatible. Weshould therefore neither deny the. cultural pluralism of whiteAInericans as I did in 195976 nor evade the issues it raises byrestricting the category of plural societies to those in which "thedOlninant cultural section constitutes a small minority wieldingpo\ver over the unit as a whole"77 on the ground that ft ••• It is thislatter group that should be distinguished as plural socieUes."78Both points were promptly questioned by Charles Wagley79 andVera Rubin.80

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I..,ike other sllortcornings in tllat essay, thoseIl1isillterpretatioilS of tile U.S.A illustrate tIle clegree to which, in1959, Caribbean preoccupations determilled Iny concerJtion ofpluralisIll and classification of societies as plural and/orheterogeneous, and so confirm Lloyd Braithwaite's reservationsabout my proposals. Nonetheless, even though I discussedGrenada's social crisis arId the region's political prospects81 in1961, as tlle record Sllows82 for years my thought on these issuesdid not advance.

Before proceeding, I wish to correct and clarify certain otherpoints in IllY early statelnents on the nature of pluralism andplural societies. First, since some writers have raised thequestion, nothing I have written should be seen as prescriptive.While the first half of my 1959 paper tried to demonstrate theinstitutional bases of social and cultural pluralism, theremainder discussed the conditions and characteristics ofpluralism and plural societies.83 However erroneous, that essaywas intentionally analyt.lc and theoretical, not prograrl1matic.

Noting that I then defined societies as "territorially distinctunits having their own governmental institutions, ,,84 SidneyMintz85 and Burton Benedict86 dismissed the concep..t of pluralsocieties as definitional and vacuous. Others claim' that, thatdefinition identifies all societies as states, forgetting thatacephalous or stateless societies are also "territoriall)' distinct"and have their own "governmental institutions." Like nation-states, they also illustrate Nadel's87 functional criterion ofdistinct societies as "the relatively widest effective groups. ,,88Though I now distingUish societies by discontinuities of theircorporate organisations,89 that criterion simultaneouslydelimits the "widest effective groups" as aggregates that sharecommon kinds of "governmental institutions," whether thesocieties are acephalous and stateless like the precolonial Tiv,Tallensi, Ibo and Nuer or, like the Hausa, Ngonde, T~wana orYoruba, consist of structurally and culturally similar chiefdoms.In 1959 however, persuaded by the divergent institutionalcultures of the colonists and colonised, and by Fumivall's stresson conquest and colonialism as the bases of plural societies,90 Iargued that in plural societies "the monopoly of power by onecultural section is the essential precondition 'for themaintenance of the total society in its current form"91 andclaimed that "the dominant social section of these culturallysplit societies Is simply the section that controls the apparatusof power and force. 92 That was still my position in 1967 w'hen, asrelated below, I wrote three essays for a seminar on plur<uism inAfrica tllat Leo Kuper and I later co-edited.93

In my second essay for that seminar94 I reviewed theevidence of pluralism in pre-colonial Africa and identify severalacephalous pluralities which rested "on the consensus of their

Pluralislll and Social Stratification / 13

constituents"95 thus delnonstrating that plural societies are not"always and everywhere characterised by dissensus andcoercion"96 even though that is most often the case. Switzerland,the Hausa kingdom of Maradi in Niger,97 which I had cited in195998 the Terik-Teriki society of Kavirondo in Uganda,99Bwamba1OO, AlurIOI and the Kagoro of Northern Nigeria about ahundred and fifty years ago102 are plural societies based onconsensus rather than conquest.

As noted above, on demographic grounds I had tried torestrict the category of plural societies to those conquest statesor "colonies of exploitation" in which the rulers were smallminorities, thus excluding such former "colonies of settlement"as the U.S.A and Brazil. 103 However, as related below in 1967 Irejected those demographic criteria. Thus, neither do I now holdthat all plural societies presuppose sectional domination,though that is empirically the norm, nor that the dominantsections in such societies are always numerical minorities.Neither, in my current view, are all plural societies characterisedby nonnative dissensus, nor are they all maintained by force andfear. The U.S.A nicely illustrates a consensual plurality in whichthe dominant political and cultural tradition is that of anoverwhelming majority, .which, despite deViations, is committedto the rule of law rather than domination by the rule of force.When a society incorporates most of all of its membersuniversalistically or uniformly in its common public domain withequal Juridical and political rights, then, whatever theirinstitutional differences in other spheres, that society will havecorrespondingly broad consensual commitments to its publicinstitutions and their defence.

Together those are the main points of my initialformulation 104 that I tried to correct in 1967. 105 Otherdevelopments are cited below.

II

From 1961 at the University of California in Los Angeles,over several years I gradually developed a framework ofcorporation theory.I06 In 1966, when Leo Kuper asked me toorganise with him a university seminar on pluralism in Mricathat produced the book we co-edited, I applied the corporationtheory I had developed in three essays I wrote for that volume,each of which advanced my understanding of corporations andpluralism. Together those essays provided the structuralframework that my account of pluralism had lacked in 1959. Inthis section I shall therefore summaries those advances and tryto cany them a little further.

That set of essays began by declaring that

14 / M.G. Smith

Pluralism is a condition in W/lich members Qf a common society areinternally distinguished by fundamental differences in theirinstitutional practice ... (as) ... distinct aggregates or groups . . ·Pluralism simultaneously connotes a social structure characterisedby Jundamental discontinuities and cleavages, and a culturalcomplex based on systematic institutional diversity. · ·

Pluralism may be defined with equal cogency in institutional or inpolitical terms . .. Specific political features of pluralism centre inthe corporate constitution oj the total society. Under theseconditions the basic corporate divisions in the society usuallycoincide with the lines oj institutional cleavage 107

By corporat~ons I tnean any social units that are unique,flnnly bounded, presumptively perpetual, and have detenninatemember-ship. lOB While some corporations, such as kingships,presidencies, chiefships and other offices, can have only onemember at any time, others must· always have more. Some, suchas ecclesia and modern nation-states, number many mUlions.Among such corporations aggregate, the most importantdifference is that between corporate categories such asacephalous societies, women, slaves, serfs and other closedcollectivities which, because they lack the necessaryorganisation, are structurally incapable of united action, andthose that can and do act JOintly en bloc or through theirrepresentatives. such as states, churches. multinational firms,political parties, trade unions, universities, age-groups, lineages,associations, bands and many local communities. Corporationsaggregate that lack the organisation reqUisite for coordinatedaction are corporate categories, while others that have theorganisation needed to act as units are corporate groups. Thus,while states and centralised societies are corporate groups, suchcollectiVities within them as women, racial stocks, and allwithout the vote, being each' unique, closed presumptivelyperpetual, inert and with determinate membership, arecorporate categories, like moieties or clans, whose status andboundaries are marked by disabilities.

When collectivities in a common society have the samerights and disabilities, that indicates their incorporation asformal equals, whether they are categories or groups. In somesocieties, however, collective Incorporation is radically unequal,so that while some groups or categories suffer disabilities,others do not. In such societies, the differential incorporation ofcollectiVities establishes a hierarchic order based on theirsystematic inequality in the society's public domain, that is, inits law, government, economy, education and other publicinstitutions that regulate behaviour l 09. By virtue of theirdiffering relation to the common public domain, differentiallyIncorporated social sections differ radically in their status,rights, opportunities, endowments and political institutions. Insuch milieux, to perpetuate its dominance the ruling section,

Pluralism and Social Stratification / 15

organised as a corporate group, acts collectively to ensure thatits subordinates, who are generally inert categories, cannoteffectively challenge its rule.

l'he egalitarian opposite of societies based Ofl differentialincorporation is one that treats all adults as citizens directly andequally, in fact as well as law, by their universalistic or uniformincorporation and guarantees their civil rights. Now thecommonly accepted ideal and basis of liberal democraticSOCiety, if valid de facto, this mode of incorporation, withoutwhich pluralism a la Tocqueville cannot occur, excludesperduring collective inequalities in law, politics and othersectors of the public domain, by investing all citizens withidentical rights and duties. Being strictly formal, SUC}lprescriptive equality does not exclude substantive differences ofability, wealth, power, class, education, occupation or incomewithIn the population, so long as all are equally free within thelaw to pursue their interests. Universalistic or uniformincorporation is therefore compatible with these and otherinstitutional differences among those incorporated, providedthat such differences do not affect their parity the public domain.

The main problem with universalistic incorporation is itspractical validity. In nlarlY societies the de facto or actualdistribution of legal and political rights diverges Widely from thatproclailned by constitutional law for some social categories suchas women, party members, the nomenklatura, the military,citizens, lleathen, non-wilites, and those of differing language. AsWeber advised, whenever the conditions in which people livediffer from the de Jure conditions proclainled by law or theconstitution, while studying the nat.ure and extent of thatdivergence, we should always give priority to the de facto oractual state of affairs, rather than the jural proclanlations. 110

l'he third and final mode of incorporation unitescollectivities as eqUivalent segments of an inclusive society orconsoclation, and may therefore be described as segmental,eqUivalent or consociational. Unlike universalistic incorpora­tion, this segrnental mode assumes the prior identification ofindividuals with the collectivities it incorporates, be they bands,clans, lineages, religions, cantons, chiefdoms or states; arid un­like differential incorporation, which prescribes the political,jural and civic inequality of collectivities, segmental incorpora­tion prescribes their formal eqUivalence, even though, as inLebanon c. 1970 or Nigeria, 1961-66, they differ substantially innumbers, wealth, extend or power~ Finally, unlike universalisticincorporation which formally proscribes differential incorpora­tion within the population, under segmental incorporation,segments can incorporate their members differentially orotllerwise at will, without thereby altering their own status.

To show how these diverse modes of incorporation structureempirical societies, let us look briefly at South Mrlca,

16 / M.G. Smith

Switzerland and the U.S.A. By law South African apartheiddifferentially incorporates \\Thites, Indians, Coloureds andBlacks, while reserving political power and rights to whites. Italso divides South African blacks segmentally by tribe, language,ethnicity and homeland, and allows tribes to incorporate theirmerrlbers differentially as royals, commoners, unfree people, orby ethnic status. South Africa's ruling whites also incorporatetllemselves segInentally, de facto though not in law, being splitbetween Britons and Boers, each with tllelr owner language,religion, organisations and institutional cultures. By contrast, asa confederation the Swiss state rests on the segmental incorpo­ration of its 21 cantons as units of equivalent status and rights.Until 1987, while Swiss women were differentially incorporatedand denied political rigllts in some cantons, they could vote andcontest elections in others. The cantons incorporated Swiss menuniversalistically and differentially incorporated all 'guestworkers' or gastarbeiter. I I I In the U.S.A., which incorporateswilites both sexes llniversalistically in fact as well as law, evenaft.er tIle civil righ ts legislation of 1965, Blacks Chicanos andAmerindians were differentially incorporated de facto in manystates, AInerinciiaI1S being also incorporated segmentally deJure011 tribal reservations. 112

At the structural level, U.5. political and social history can bemost easily summarised and interpreted by reviewing the waysin which its corporate structure changed to accommodate orexclude differing social groups and categories. Unfortunately,though several scholars criticise my account of pluralism asessentially classificatory, static and useless for the study ofchange, space does not allow file to demonstrate the opposite byoutlining that history here. Interested readers must thereforework it out for themselves.

The corporations in which a society organises its rnembersand the relations between them constitute the corporateorganisation or macro-stru.cture that demarcates its bOlundariesand structures the public domain through which it!, peopleregulate their common affairs and activities of its people. Sincethose primary corporations control the society's resources andprOVide its regulative machinery and collective structure, theirrecruitment and membership rules and procedures are mattersof great concern to all. So too are their interrelations, sincecorporations continuously compete for relative autonomy,resources, scope and range to preseIVe or extend tt,.elr unItrights. Thus by their interrelations in all societies ttle majorcorporate units structure the public domain and regulate itsprocesses.

In modern societies the public domain Is that ~;ector ofsocial life, the test of structures and processes, throu~!h whichthe society regulates and transacts such matters of 'commonconcern as defence, external relations, legislation. policy,

Pluralisrn and Social Stratification / 17

property rights. social cOl1trol, dispute settlernent aIld justice,exchange. commerce, education. trailling, administration, and, Incertain cultures. religion. Being of no great common interest, allelse belongs to that sector of social life which, adapting aconcept of Fortes, 113 I call the private domain, where individualsare free willIin the limits of law to choose and pursue alternativegoals and courses of action. 1 14 In ruodern societies such optionsgenerally include religion, occupation, residence, movement,association, recreation, marriage, divorce, domestic languageand much else.

Although in each society the public and private domairlsdefine one another, their boundaries and contents vary as effectsof culture aIId the struggle between those who advocate andthose who oppose reductions in the scope arld range of thepublic domain, that is, in the nature and extent of publicresponsibilities, resources and power. In such institutionallyhomogeneolls acephalous or stateless societies as the l'iv,Plateau TOflga, Trobriands, Nuer or Gusil, there was no discreteperduring public domain. Since, as effects of their organisation,those societies lacked the prerequisite central corporationshaving authority and power to regulate t.heir populations, theirprirnary corporations pursued their interests independently orJointly in ad hoc groupings that varied with the issue andsituatioIl. Yet even in those conditions, as Fortesl15 showed,everyone distinguishes clearly those affairs, relations andactivities that are properly dOIllestic or private, being of nogeneral concern, from others of a public kind that requirepolitico-Jural regulation and sanction. To reduce thoseoccasions and coordinate its com'ponents, though acephalous,such an institutionally diverse consociation as the Terik-Terikiof the Kavirondo gulf in Uganda created a discrete andpermanent regulative structure by incorporating men of bothtribes in the same age-sets as segments. 1 16

In African lineage societies alld such modern states asIreland and Iran, marriage and religion are central politico-juralconcerns of the public domain. In the U.S.S.R. today, Christianworship, once suppressed, is allowed as an actiVity in whichindividuals may engage freely without compromising their publicstatus as citizens; that is, as a private matter of little interest tothe state. In the U.S.A. and other countries, by contrast, mattersof faith and worship, like family, marriage and descent, have longbeen treated de Jure and de facto as. private, open to Individualchoice, and, withip +J1e limits of law, free from public interference.

In consequence, since all who enjoy direct and equal accessto a common public domain by virtue of their universalisticincorporation share the same political culture, status and set ofpublic institutions, they can differ institutionally only in suchrelations and activities of the private domain as marriage andfamily. descent, home language, residence patterns, educatIon,

18 / M.G. Smilli

religion, occupational choice and similar matters. For exanlple.while the people of Denmark. Portugal, and Tonga areincorporated universalistically and institutiollallyhomogeneous, such societies as France and Hollalld. likeAmerican whites, include collectivities that differ in their privatedomains. If those differences involve such basic institutions askinship, marriage, family, religion, language or property, then,despite universalistic incorporation, like the society tllosecollectivities display their cultural pluralism by diverse privateinstitutions. If, on the other hand, its population practises thesame set of basic institutions, a society cannot be institutionallyplural. If its population has a single set of basic institutions andother institutional alternatives the society is institutionallyheterogeneous. 117 In neither case, prOVided their members areuniversalisticallyincorporated de facto, do they constitute pluralsocieties, even though their collectivities differ in basic privateinstitutions. Thus cultural pluralism only occurs outside pluralsocieties when collectivities incorporated universalistically in acommon society differ in their basic private institutions. Inplural societies such differences always involve institutions ofthe public domain. Societies that differentially incorporate oneor more collectivities are thereby constituted as plural, as arethose consociations whose segments differ institutionally or inthe public status of their members.

Populations incorporated segmentally in common societymayor may not differ institl1tionally. While such segmentalsocieties as the Nuer, Tiv or Plateau Tonga are institutionallyhomogeneous, Malaysia, Nigeria,' and the early U.S.A.incorporated collectivities that differed in their basicinstitutions. In such segmental pluralities as Cyprus, theLebanon 1944-75, or Switzerland, each segment also has its ownpublic domain which differed in form, scope or content fromothers, despite formal parity. as effects of their institutionaldifferences. By incorporating such institutionally diversesegments as coordinates. those societies demonstrate theirsocial pluralism. IIB

Differentially incorporated populations are always institu­tionally plural, if only because, while one or more sectionsadminister their societal public domains, the rest are excluded,and so lack the political institutions and culture of their rulers.Differentially incorporated social sections accordingly differ intheir corporate organisation and political institutions; but theyalso generally differ institutionally in other ways, as India, Ulsterand South Africa illustrate. It:! organisation, scope, resources andautonOITly, the sections that control and direct the public domainof those societies differ structurally from those excluded, beingalways constituted as corporate groups, whereas theirsubordinate sections are often constituted as categoriesincapable of united action. Since corporations are most

Plllralisrn aI1d Social Stratification / 19

elaborate and l'leavily iIlstitlltionalised social units, differencesin tIle corporate organisations of collectivities indicatecorrespondillg differerlces in tlleir public institutions. Wllether,as often happens, such collectivities also differ in their privateiI1StitlltloIlS, S}lOl11cl be sttJdiecl with care.

rro llltlstrate, ill Victorian England, like women, most rnen\vere clifferentially illcorporatecl and lacl~ecl political rights. Manywere also probably illiterate, and suffered Juridical and civilabllses of various kinds. In consequence, they created suchinstittltions as friendly societies, dame schools, chapels, tradellnioI1S alld working Inen's clubs for their own lIse, while theirrtIlers controlled tile Judiciary, parliament, the political parties,ll11iversities, establisllecl clltlrcll, Inns of Court, Stock Exchange,public scllools, chalnbers of commerce, annies, police, prisons,anel apparatus of state. In consequence, as Disraeli, Dickerls andMaylle\V record, tIntil World War I England remained astrllctllrally plural society, though the differences between itssocial SCCtiOI1S steaclily clhllhlisllecl. Only with tile creation of the\velfare state after Worlcl War II, as '1'.11. Marshall s}lowed, weretile civtc clisalJilities of tIle rnaJ()rity finally eliminated, to berCI1C\Vecl de jaclo sllortly after for non-wllite COll1Inonwealtllill1Illigrants. 119

By contrast, even when collect.ivities incorporated uniformlycltffer ill such illstitlltions as marriage, family, first language andrcligiorl, sillce tilCY all sllare tile COIIlInon public donlairl, thollghthe societies tlley constitute display cultural pluralism, they arellot pillral socieies, whicll never incorporate institutionallydiverse collectivities universalistically de facto.

It often happens that institutions differentially incorporateindividllals, categories or groups in the social units theyCOIlstitute. That has been the Virtually universal experience ofWOll1en in marriage, family, economy, polity and religion,irrespect.ive of differences between industrial and tribalsocieties, whetller pastoral or agrarian, and between suchreligions as ancestor worship., Buddhism, Christianity,Hinduism, Shinto or Islam. While women now claim access to thepriestll00d despite strong opposition in Roman Catholic,Anglican, OrthocIox and other Christian congregations, it Issignificant that they rarely try to do so in Judaism or Islam.

Likewise, in India Hinduism enjoins caste for all, includinguntouchables; yet though caste incorporates Hindus dIfferentlyin tile scale of purity and pollution that orders its hierarchy,deSIJite Braithwaite,120 Berreman,121 and others who regardHillClu caste as an instance of pluralism, like Hutton 122 I hold itis not so, primarily because

Caste is an essential dinlension and organisational Jrwn.ework ojthe religion and culture all l-lindus share. It identifies and unitesthese flindu communities by dividing them on sacred bases. Thisdifferentiation is prescribed by a religious framework, common to

20 / M.G. Smith

aU castes . .. The various castes accordingly share several con-anoninstitutions in their common public domain. 123

Pluralism in India has bases other than caste, such asdifferences between Hinduism, Islam, tribal and other religions,and regional differences of language, institutional culture andethnicity. In consequence, despite Hindu allegiance to caste,Indians dispute issues of religion, language, institutional cultureand ethnic interests segmentally with one another.

Like Hindus who uphold caste while resenting their places inits regime, for millenia women have accepted their institutionalroles as kin, wife, affine and mother with little collective protest,even when locked into lifelong marriages arranged against theirwill, and resenting their husband's superior authority and rightsin public and private spheres. Nonetheless iliough differentiallyincorporated thereby, since women share and uphold thoseinstitutions with their menfolk, their situation excludespluralislll. Since pluralism presupposes dil1erences in the basicinstitutions that people hold in common differentiallyincorporate them, as caste does for Hindus, and marriage,religion and government have always done for men and women,being shared and common, whose institutions do not involvepluralisrn.

In the same way, though universities differentiallyincorporate students as undergraduates or postgraduates, byttleir voluntary enrolment and participation those studentslegitimise their differential incorporation in those institutions,which are clearly shared and common, despite the differentialincorporation of their meml)ers. Other associations such as the!)oro of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Gllinea, the Yorubas Ogl>oni,the Freemasons, Cllinese 'friads, Mafia and Camorra alsoincorporate theIr meIllbers differentIally. Nonetheless, sincethey all participate in the same institution and share its culture,those units are neither structurally nor Sllbstantively plural.

By contrast, on and off their plantations, Caribbean slavestates differentially incorporated masters and slaves as socialsections, each separate and institutionally distinct. Lilre tlleirplantations, those societies were hierarchic pluralities pexvadedby structural pluralism. After the abolition of slavery, when theyimported indentured East IndIans as labour, the essentialhierarchic structure and plural constitution persisted at societaland plantation levels, together with the social alignment ofmanagement and labour as tnstittlttonally distinct anddifferentially incorporated sections.

On the other hand, when men who otherwise share the samebasic institutions are differentially incorporated, as in VictorianEngland, that condition automatically creates a plural society bydenying one category access to the political, legal and civicstructures of the public dOInain while reserving them for the

!)luralisIn aIlc) Social Stratification / 21

otller. Since in all societies public instituti()tlS and affairs, civic,political, ecoIlolnic, religious and legal, have been Inanagecl byInell, tllose denied access to SUCll activities are irlstittJtlonallydistinguished froln tllose WllO rnanage them in ways withoutparallel among wornen, since as a category wornen rarely tookpart in tlle public dOIl1ain. Moreover, as we llave seerl, wilen menWllO otherwise share tile saIne basic institlltional CllltlJre aretlllIS differeIltially iIlcorporated, 01at coriclition generates furtherinstitutional differences among them, since the disenfranchisedstill have to manage tlleir personal and cornmon affairs, local,occupational and collective, to secure tile sllelter, subsistencealld reSOllrces they need for theIllselves and tlleir falnilies, toeducate their children, to worsllip and settle clisplltes amongthemselves, and to regulate their lLJations with outsiders,especially tlleir nlasters. rro tllosc ends ttley must adapt tllcirlocal, rellgiolls, work ane} kin relations, commission their leac)ersarld organise factions, illforrnal councils or other associatIons.Since wornen llave always been and remain marginal to publicinstltlltiollS aIld affairs, wllctller attacllecI to tile nJlers or rlJlcc] inhierarcllic pluralities, rleitller does differential incorporationdtscrill1inate siInilarly between theIn, nor does it leacl tllCITl tocreat.e new illstitutions. As second class citizens of tile state, oftheir local communities and religious congregations, by theirhistoric compliance women }lave positively endorsed theprescriptive disabilities they suffer in marriage, family, religion,ecoIlomy, law and publIc afTairs.

In short, only if collectivities incorporated together in aCOIIllllon society differ In such basic institutions as language,kinship. family, marriage, education, property, economy andreligion, and their corporate organisation, will the societymanifest pluralism. If the collectiv~ties so differ but are de factoincorporated universalistically. the society will display culturalpillralisln without corresponding disjunctions in the corporateorganisation of its public dorllain. 124 If tile collectivities sharecommon basic institutions, whether segmentally oruniversalistically incorporated, their society lacks pluralism ofany kind. If the collectivities differ institutionally and areincorporated segmentally, such Illutual exclusion transformstheir cultural boundaries into social pluralism. If incorporateddifferentially, the institutionally diverse sections form ahierarchic plurality characterised by structural pluralism:

Structural pluralism subsumes social pluralisnl, tlwug/l the latterdoes not entaU it ... Structural and soci~J!luralismboth assumeWld express cultural ~luralism. but in differing forms and. withdUferlng intensities. 12 ,-

If differentially incorporated without further segIllentation,the society Is a hierarchic plurality; but if de facto it incorporatescollectivities dlffererltially and segmentally at OIlce, the plurality

22 / M.G. Smiili

is complex. In short, without differences in the basic institutionsof its collectivities, a society lacks cultural pluralism; and everl ifthose collectivities differ institutionally in the private don1ain,without differences of collective access and participation in thepublic domain, it is not ~ plural SOCiety. In neither of thesesituations are the plural characteristics and structure of thesociety in any way influenced by its social stratification,whatever its form and content. Instead, by their modes ofincorporation, the structural alignments and institutionalcultures of its plural divisions together motivate and irlfluellcethe responses, both individual and collective, that generate andsustain the evolution and character of the social stratificatioll.

III

From the preceding it should be clear that pluralism in any Il10dedenotes contexts in which institutionally distinct collectivitiesare incorporated together to. form societies. Culttlral pluralisnlobtains when universalistically incorporated collectivities clifferin basic InstitutIons, of the private domain, withollt affectingtheir members' status In the societal public domain. Socialplliralism obtains when institutionally distinct collectivities areincorporated consociationally as c'oordinate segments in thepublic domain of a common society, de facto or de jllre.Structural pluralism involves the differential incorporation ofinstitutionally distinct collectivities with radically unequalstatus and rights in the common public domain. While cultllralpluralism occurs outside of plural societies, social andstructural pluralism constitute pluralities of diverse types, tilesegmental and the hierarchic; and their Illodes of incorporatioll,jf cornbined, prodllce such complex pillralities as Colollial'T\rillidad and Guyarla, or COflteIllporary SC)utll Africa alld tIleU.S.S.R. With these criteria and models in mind, we an 110W

consider the relation of piuraiisI11 to social stratificatioll,however that is defined.

Borrowed from geology and archaeology, tIle concept ofsocial stratification denotes the hierarchic arrangement ofmembers of a society in strata of classes aligned empirically assuperior and inferior. The categories so ranked may bedistinguished by sex, age, race, ethnicity, religion, language,occupation or other conditions; but as currently used, conceptsof social stratification or class strl.lcture usually denot.e socialdifferentiation and ranking based on such criteria as wealth,income, occupation, descent., property or prestige, the criteriaused and their relative weights varying Widely bet\veenauthors. 126 Whichever criteria are chosen, the distrtbution thatresults, being societal in span and artifactual construct of anobserver's will differ sharply from those the people theIl1selves

!)IuralisIll and Social Stratification / 23

mal\.e of tlleir society as a wiloIe, and of their own groups andstrata.

As rnentioned alJove, when contrasting pluralism andstratification in 1959, desl)ite "tlleir formal reselllblance"127 Istressed that "pluralist11 is quite distinct from other forms ofsocial l1eterogeneity SUCll as class stratification in that itconsists in the coexist.ence of incompatible institutionalSyStCIllS."128 rro ilillstrate, I cited the complex plurality ofCo}ollial Surillalne wllere

Javanese, C/Iinese, Indiarl arId Negro sectiorlS ... have parallelsocial status, ... (and) cultural difference and social stratlfteationvary independently. 1"'hus they can neither be reduced to OTleanotller, nor can they be equated. 130

III reply, Lloyd Braithwaite criticised the concept ofplllralisIll as leadillg to views of

the social syst.cnl ]Jurely iTl t.ernL<J of cultural irlstit.utions and q{ tll.eadherence of tile cl([fercl1t. grOU]JS to different institutions. T'/leconfusiorl irl T1leaTIirlgs lv/lic/l surrounds the ternl 'ulstilution is tlluSintroduced irlto the confusiorl th.at surrounds the term 'plurals(x"':iely' 129

As an alternative, he stlggested a sociological analysis t11atclassified illstitlltions as "core'" or "peripheral" on such"structural-functional" criteria 131 as Raynlond SIuith 132 laterused when he classified the occupational "system" of Caribbeansocieties as their "prirnary" structures of stratification, andracial, ethnic and political conditions as "secondary structuralalld Cllltllral aspects of tile stratification systenls."133

In a curious non sequitur Braithwaite also argued thatalthough we usually "regard social classes as quasi-organizedgroups"134 whose roles are defined by their "place in a hierarchy",since each "class" is in a sense, a category created by theresearch worker"135 "differences in social class must depend on adifference in the spread of certain values among differentgroups."136 As exalnples he clailned that in Trinidad, whilecertain values "were shared only by the middle and the upperclasses, (and) yet others by the whole society except the upperclass, and so on ... , there was orlly one common value stronglyheld by the whole society"137 namely, "ethnic superiority andinferiority." ,.'

In thus distinguishing social classes by the values they held,and stressing that "certain of these values are central and othersperipheral to the social system,"138 Braithwaite rested his caseon tile validity of Parsonian theories of social system and theirstratification. 139 However, Parsons' definition of socialstratification as "the ranking of units in a social system inaccordance with the standards of the value system,"140 though

24 / M.G. Smith

virtually unchallenged at that tinle, merely ilillstrates llisidealistic, conservative view of societies as cOllsellsl1alnormative systems. and has since been abanclollecl. rroappreciate the nature of social stratification we Illl1st tllcreforclook at other conceptions, including tlIose of Marx WllO, follo\\'illgl~ollsseau, first drew attention to tllis clilnension of society.

According to Marx, "the history of all existing society is tilehistory of class struggle"141 classes beillg clistirlgLlisllCcl l)y tlleirrelations to the means of production. 142 I)rodllctioll itself d~1111eel

as the process by which nlen rnake goocls or COI11Il10clities, tllatis, material things for use or exchange. 14~3 By that clel111itioll,n10st menl})erS of any society l)elong to 110 class, sil1ce Ill0st arenot directly involved in production, whether as workers, OWllersor as entrepreneurs. In Marx's day, besides most wornerl, tllat"unproductive" category of service workers included all Illerlernployed as professionals. teachers police. solcliers sailors,railwaynlen, research workers, tecllnicians, nllfses, pllysiciaIls,clerks, entertainers, civil servants, priests, la\vyers, jllclges,artists, etc., that Is, perhaps one 11alf of tile Illale labollr force ofthe irld ustrial societies in whicll 11e lived.

Marx's class model of society also errs in presllll1il1g asrlccessary a closer concorclance of execlltive [lOWer arIcl \vealtll illthe direction of social affairs than the historic~ll alldethnographic data support. By such econon1ic criteria, illindustrial societies he clistirlguishecl bourgeois or capitalists,large landowners, proletarians, petty bourgeois anel peasallts,analysed their conflictual relations, and theorised revoilltionalytransformations of society through class conflicts generatecl bycontraditions in t.he nl0des of procluclioll lilat "deteIll1ined" tllcirf0 rIlla t i0 IIs.

rro avoid these and otller defects of Marx's tlleolY, l\l~LX

Weber, 144 redefined classes l)y tlleir relatiorlS witll tlle Il1arlcetrather tllan tile means of productioIl, thllS iIllplicitly restrictillgclass structures to societies with Illarltets alld all-pllrposemoney. He then distinguished class, status or "110nour, '" andpower, or party, as analytically independent bases for tIleeITlpirical ordering of individuals and grollps in htllllan societies,and stressed their variable relations. Overlapping, cross-cuttillg,or coinciding with that of econolnic class, Weber identified other

, scales of power and social honollr in which poplliations are alsodistributed, and showed why it is essential to study tlleirdistributions on all three scales in order to formulate alladequate model of the social stratification:

Econorrtic power may be the consequence of power existing on othergrounds. Man does not strive for power only iTl order to enrichhirrlself economically. Power, including economic power, may bevalued for its own sake. Very frequently this striving for pOLver isalso conditioned by the social honour it entails. Not all pOlver,Iwwever, entails social horlOur; the typical Anlerican boss, as l.vell

Pluralism and Social Stratification / 25

as tIle typical big speculator, delibera.tely relinquishes socialIlonour ... Mere 'econonlic' power, and especially 'naked' nlOneypOlver, is by no TTlean.s a recogTlised basis of social honour. Nor ispOlver the only basis of social IloTlour. Indeed, social Ilonour, orprestige, nlay even be tIle basis of economic ]Jower, and veryfrequerltly 11as been. 145

Following Lloyd Warner's pioneer studies of Americanstratification in Yankee City,146 Western sociologIsts havetreatec} occupation as the basis of status placements inillclustrial and preindustrial societies and equated theiroccupational rank orders with social stratification. 147 Sincemost equations of occupational ranking and social stratificationassume some value consensus that underlies those occupationalrankings, and treats that as their basis, there was little protest in1953 when Talcott Parsons Virtually identified stratification astIle ranking of individuals and social categories in accordancewith "the common value system" of the society, thus divertingattention from the objective data on stratification to the natureand evidence of those "common values."

Parsons' thesis provided the basic axiom of functionalisttheories of stratification and society I48 as well as LloydBraithwaite's account of Trinidad,149 and his critique ofFurnivall's thesis and my recension. ISO However, whereas Marxdistinguish classes by their objective relations to the means ofproduction, and Weber identified 'stratification with objectivedistributions of power, social honour and market position,Parsons' view was essentially subjective, idealist, normative, andindifferent to objective conditions. By contrast, having identifiedplural societies as multiracial medleys that live "side by side, butseparately, within the same political unit" Furnivall describedthe social basis of economic order in the colonial Far Easttersely as follows: "Even in the economic sphere, there is adivision of labour along raciallines,,,I51 much as there was in theWest Indies before independence, and still is substantially.152Urllike R.T. Smith,153 we cannot therefore regard sucharrangements as "secondary," since they were fundamental to thecolonial regime, "race differences" being "stressed in context ofsocial arId cultural pluralism." 154

In criticising my 1950 essay, Vera Rubin claimed that"difference in the family complex, education and occupation and.· . social class organization in the United States seem to parallel(M.G. Smith's) model for a pluralistic fratnework, point forpoint." 155 She also cited "differences in material culture,associations, recreational patterns, types of crime, years ofschooling and even apparently, the epidemiology of mentaldisorders"I56 as illustrating "correlations between social classaffiliations and cultural forms in t.he iristitutions"157 I had usedto indicate pluralism. It hardly needs saying that neither

26 / M.G. SInith

material culture, types of crinle, nor mental disorders are socialinstitutions; nor are aver~ge years of schooling, recreationalpatterns or class organisation. Although Rubin did not say whatshe meant by social class, she probably had in mind suchfalniliar bourgeois concepts as the "upper, middle and lower orworking cI3sses," categories which, wllatever their folk appeal,have little analytic value since, unlike Marxist notions, theyconnate such criteria as occupation, wealth, income, education,residence, orIgin, descent, family, prestige and style of lIfe invariable combinations.

In such institutionally plural societies as Trinidad, Jamaicaand the U.S.A. separately or in diverse combinations, thosecriteria of class place some people who share commoninstitutions in the same class or stratum with others who differinstitutionally from them, and distribute members of eachinstitutionally distinct collectivity in diverse classes or strata ofthe social hierarchy. For example, in Trinidad, despite tlleirpolitical and institutional differences and mutual exclusioIlS,East Indians and Afro-Creoles are both pronlinent in tile nliddleand working classes. Likewise in the U.S.A before and after thecivil rights legislation of 1965-8, despite tlleir institutioIlaldifferences and de facto differential incorporation, which tileFederal Government tried to reduce by political reforms andaffirmative action. blacks and whites of differing ethnic statuswere distributed. tholIgh unequally, in almost all social strata orclasses based on the familiar bourgeois criteria. III South Afncaalso, despite their differential incorporation and institutionaldifferences. Whites, Cape Coloureds, Indians, and Africans ofdiverse tribal background appear, however unequally, in allclasses or strata defined by stIch criteria. Most notably, althOllghheterogeneous. tile criteria by WIlich Western sociologistsdistinguisll social strat.a and classes ignore such variables aslanguage, institlltional culture, race, sex, etllIlicity, religion andjuridical and political statllS. However, as my description ofJamaica in 1955 indicates,158 tllose criteria are absolutelycentral to the analysis of pluralism in societies of differingstructure and type.

Despite his contrary view, Benedict's account of thedevelopment of Mauritius since World War II illustrates thesepoints nicely. Having found that in Inultiracial Mauritius thesanle "class strata appeared within each ethnic section" 159namely, among Indians of Hindll and Muslim faith, ChiIlese,Europeans of Frellch and Britisl1 origin, and Afro-European orAfro-Indian Creoles, Benedict obseIVed that, wIliIe 'This did notat first necessarily diminish the pluralism of Maurttius, ... itproduced paralled strata within each ethnic section"160some ofwhom found that despite their racial and cultural differences,tlley shared common political and economic interests alldcollaborated to pursue them. How closely the criteria that

I)lllralisIn anel Social StratificatioIl / 27

BCllcclict llsed aIle) tile social stratifIcation hc fOllllCI irl MalJritillScorresponded with those of its institutionally elistinct socialsections, we cannot say, since he says little about thosesectional criteria of status placement and nl0dels of Mauritiansociety.

AltllOllgll Belleclict161 seell1S to llold tllat tllose cross-cuttillgstratifications of racial or etllnic segments in colonial MallritiLlSdernonstrate the inadequacy of pluralism as a cultural ratllerthan structural framework, 162 that is not so, since, besides theirinstitutional dimensions, the three varieties of pluralism differ intheir modes of incorporation and political structure. Benedict's(lata on the political evolution and changing stratification ofcolonial Mauritius 163 illustrate this point nicely, since both setsof changes correlated and involved the progressiveerlfranchiselnent of non-white Mauritians on propertyfrallcllises fronl 1831 until 1963, when ad~lt suffrage took effect.l"llose IJrocesses reclefinccl <lncI realignecl tile racial ane] clllturalcategories of Mallritiall society ill(lcpendcntly of its cllaIlglrlgs tra t ifica tion by rCCllJ Cillg arId finally elirnilla ting tllcirclifferelltial incorporation. clespite their persisting differeIlces ofillstittltiollaI culture, language, religion, race and socialorgallisation.

In 1963 'ralcott !)arsons' [orIner student and colleague, NeilSl11clser, in association with S.M. IJpset, redefined socialstratification as the empirical distribution of advantages,reSOllrces, opportunities and sanctions within society,164 thusstlbstitutillg objective criteria for tIle SUbjective valuat.ions of'falcott !)arsoIls" and SiITIultaneotlsly sheclding t.he presumptiontllat normative consellSUS legitiIIIised the status order, howevertra11sparently oppressive it was. Though the strata that Smelseralld Lipset dlstlngulslled broadly as upper, middle and lowerocctlPY differing social situations and have different life chances,tlleir omnibus concept of stratification as the distribution ofaclvantages and sal1ctions conllates economic and politicalcriteria with others that are biological, social and cultural, thusbluIlting its ability to discrilninate between conditions ofpltlralism and social stratification or class.

1'0 illustrate, though the U.S.A. still incorporates most non­whites de facto differentially, it incorporates white Americanstlniversalistically and prescribes their formal equality in thecommon public domain, despite differences of ethnicity, religion,marriage, family, language and other institutional practices.Even if, as conceived by MeIser and Lipset, U.S. socialstratification includes some members of all collectivities in everystratuln, howsoever incorporated and whatever their race,ethllicity. religion and institutional culture, and even if itsimultaneously distributes members of each plural division Inseveral strata. since the disabilities and negative sanctions thatlIon-whites experience as effects of their race, linguistic and

28 / M.G. SIllit}l

cllitural cliffere11ces a11d de Jacto clifferential incorporation are110t COIIII11eIlsurate witll wealth, income, prestige, occupation,ccillcatioll anel otller illclicat.ors of nlaterial advantage and(leprivation, tlley callnot appropriately be included in scalesclcsiglled to collat.e aIle} rank SUCll differentials to yield a singlecl is t rib II t i0 11.

WIletller we COllceive the strata of Atnerican society on~1arxist lines as economic classes, or following Weber, in tennsof t.lleir market positions, power and prestige, they will subdivideits elifferentially incorporated racial blocs as well as the ethnicclivisions of Atnerican whites, however unequally, today as beforeWorld War 11. 165 In South Africa likewise, where Parsonianpostulates of normative consensus and common values can11arclly be proclaimed, despite their differing institutionalcllitures and dejure differential incorporation, whites and blackslaboured together in the mllles, though for different wages, and,lil(e IIlclians and Colollrecls, practised medicine and law, taughtalle1 stlIdied at ulliversities al1d SCll0ols, ministered to theirflocks, owned shops, factories and other premises, and engaged,llowever unequally, in the diverse" economic activities of Marx'sIJOllrgeois, petty bOllrgeoisie, and proletarians. 166 In SouthAfricaIl apartheid, as in tIle hierarchic plurality of colonialJaIllaica,167 classes 'defined by economic criteria cross-cutracial and cultural divisions, and differentially incorporatedcollectivities togetller, despite their differing ideologies andpolitical institutions.

In SWitzerland, Lebanon, Nigeria, and Cyprus, as in 1Tinidad,Gllyana, Belize ancl Suriname, institutionally distinct socialsegrnents are cross-cut by economic and other social criteriatllat identify social strata without reference to their institutionalor corporate status, much as Benedict168 found to Ills surprise InMallritius. Such divergence is inevitable since classes and socialstrata are distinguished within the institutionally diversepOplllations of plural societies, as well as the ethnic segments ofllniversalistically incorporated wllites in the U.S.A., withoutreferellce to institutional practices or modes of incorporation.Even in stIch hierarchic pluralities as contemporary Jamaica orGrenacla, despite the de facto differential incorporation of theirelite and folk sections and its apparent congruence withst.ratificatioll by economic or social class, study will show thattllose criteria assign SOIne members of all differentiallyillcorporated and institutionally diverse social sections thesallIe class status, and set them apart from others in theirscctions. 169 In New Haven, Connecticut likewise, Italian andIrisll AIllericans, the largest white ethnic groups, beingillcorporated ttnifomlly, contest political dominance and officialillfltlence as de facto seglnents at elections under ethniccallcliclates of superior status, each chosen to mobilise the111axilllllll1 vote allC} Will c)fficc, f()))owing wIlle}}. ~lS opportunIty

I)lllraJislIl arlcl Social Stratification / 29

allows. bCllefits are (list.ribut.ed to SlJIJporters in their etllnicgroups. AlllloSt always in COlltexts of segmental ethnic, racial orCllltllral C()llf"lict all(l rivalty, tile atJtll()I-itativc lca(]crs ()f cae})section or segrnellt are Illerl of lligll social status in tllatcollectivity. llowever widely its status criteria may diverge froIIInational norms.

WIlile itsde facto rnode of incorporation prescribes the sameJural and political status for all in each section, irrespective oftheir institutional unifonnity or differences, such identical juro­political rights and disabilities do not exclude differences ofoccupation, education, prestige, economic or social resource,opportunity, advantage or sanctions among them. It is thereforenecessary to rid ourselves of the idea that we should studysocieties exclusively, either for their plural aspects and features,or for their stratification, since by itself neither analysis canprOVide an adequate or comprehensive account of the socialsituation in all its complexity, whether its pluralism is merelycultural, or, like contcInporary SWitzerland, l..ebanon, Guyana or1rinidad, segnlental dejw·e or de facto, or like Grenada, de factohierarchic, or, like South Mrica, the U.S.S.R and the U.S.A.,complex, and so simultaneously segmental and hierarchic,though in differing spheres and ways.

The stark contrasts between categorical differences ofinstitutional culture' and juridical status on the one hand, and thedissimilar distributions of individuals by wealth, occupation,prestige, income, descent or education on the other, confirm theconclusion of Marie Hat.lg that "Pluralism is not simply anotherform of stratification which can be subsumed under thatvariable, but constitutes a special condition of diversity whichvaries widely across societies."170 That conclusion lloidswllether the institutionally diverse collectivities areincorporated differentially, segmentally or universalistically, andwhether the associated pluralism is structural, social or merelyctlltural. It follows from the fact that, though all varieties ofpluralism presume collective differences of basic institutionsand differ as effects of the conditions of collective incorporation,whether defined by Marxists, Weberians or others, concepts ofclass and social stratification always ignore collectivedifferences of institutional culture and mode of incorporation infavour of criteria that differentiate and rank persons by othervariables, such as wealth, income, education, occupation, power,descent, prestige and style of life, or by their relations with themarlt.et or means of production.

Whereas the institutional and political differences thatcOIlstitute pluralIsm aIId iderltify plural units de facto or de Jureare categorical, corporate and collective, the criteria than rankpeople in classes or social strata differentiate individuals andfamilies, irrespective of tlIeir categorial status or institutionalculture. For that reason, aclequate accounts of plural societies

30 / M.G. SmUll

al1cl ot.llers cllaracterised by pluralisrn require detailed studies oftlleir stratifications to complement accounts of their corporateorganisation and institutional divisions. To represent thestratification of such societies adequately and correctly, besidesclistributing tlleir members in strata by the criteria listed above,illose studies should also include detailed accounts of the statuscriteria specific to each of the institutionally distinct corporatesections in the plurality, indicating their relative significanceand the diverse models of each section's stratification and of thetotal society. Only then shall we really be able to see whether andhow closely the models of societal stratification based onobservers' criteria correspond to those the people have of theirown sections, of one another, and of the inclusive society, basedon their diverse sectional cultures and experience.

NOTES

1 Braithwaite, Lloyd, "Social Stratification and CulturalPluralism, "Social and Cultural Pluralism in the Caribbean., ed. VeraRubin, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 83, art 5,816-836,1960.

2 Furnivall, T. S., "Some Problems of Tropical Economy,"Indian Colonial Essays. ed. Rita Hindou, London, Allen and Unwin,1945.

, Colonial Policy and Practice London, CambridgeUniversity Press, 1948.

3 Kumper, Leo, "Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems,"Idem M. G. Smith, 7-16, 1969.

4 de Tocqueville, Alexis , Democracy in Americ~ 2 vols. NewYork, Doubleday Anchor, 1958.

5 Smith, M.G., "Social and Cultural Pluralism,"Social andCultural Pluralism in the Caribbean., 00. Vera Rubin, Annals of the NewYork Academy of Sciences, 83, art 5,763-777, 1960.

--, The Plural Society in the British West Indies, Berkeleyand Los Angeles, University of California Press, 19600.

6 Rubin, Vera (ed), Social and Cultural Pluralism in theCaribbean., Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 23, art, 5, 761­906, 1960.

7 Braithwaite, Lloyd, Social Stratification in Trinidad, Socialand Economic Studies and Economic Studies 3, No.1, 82-96, 1954.

--, The Problem of Cultural Integration in Trinidad, SocialQIld Ecorwnlic Studies 3, No.1, 1954, 82-96.

8 Smith, M.G., Some Aspects of Social Structure In the BritishCaribbcall about 1820. Social and Economic Studies, 1, No.4, 455-480,1953.

--, A Framework for Caribbean Studies, Mona, Jamaica,~:xtm Mum} Department, U.W.!. ,1956.

--, Ethnic and Cultural Pluralism in the British CaribbeanIn Et/ulic and Cultural Pluralism in Inter-tropical Countries, Brussels,Itltcrnational Institute of Differing Civilisations (INCIDI), 1957.

I)hJralisITI and Social Stratification / 31

3533J73839

9 IIenriC}UeS, I~"'crnando, Colour Values in Jarnaican Society.13Titisll Jounlal q Sociology 2, 296-304, 1951.

---, Farnily and Colour iTl Janlaica, London, r:yre andSpottiswoode, 1953.

10 Broom, l"eonard, 'The Social IJiffcrcntiation of Jarnaic<l,AnlErican Sociological l~eview,19, 2, 1954.

11 Parsons, Talcott, The Social SysteTT~ London ,1'avistock 1952.--, and E. Shils

12 ~"'urnival, T. S., op.cit.1948.13 Parsons, 1'alcott, "A revised analytical approach to the theory

of Social Stratification,"Class, Status and Power: A Reader in SocialStratylCatiort. cds. R. 13cndix and S. M. Lipset Glencoe. Free Press, p. 93,1953.

14 Smith, M.G., 01). cit, 48-60, 216-220, 1965.---, Culture, I~ace and Class in the Comnlonwealth

Caribbean, Mona, Jamaica, Extra-Mural Department, U.W.I., 1984b.15 Smith, RJ., Culture and Social Structure: Some Recent Work

on FaInily and Kinship Studies. COTTlparative Studies in Society andIJistory 16, 24-45, 1963.

, "Social Stratification, cultural pluralism andintegration in West Indian societics,"Caribbean Integrat.ion: [Japers OTl

Social, !)oliticCll a'1(l EcorloTnic Integratiorl, cds. Sybil Lewis and'rhoruas G. Matthews, I~jo Piedras, Puerto I~ico, Instilute of CaribbeanStudies. 220-25H, 1967.

-----.-, "Social Slr-ali ficaUon in the Caribbean," [~ssays in.C0111parative SlXialSlralificalioTl, cds. L. Plotnicov, and A. 'Tudou,Pittsburgh, Pa. ,U. r'ittsburgh Press, 1970.

16 Smith, M.G., op. ,cit. , 116-161, 1965a.17 --, Robotham's ideology and pluralism: a reply. Social and

Ec0110rnic Studies 22, 3 1983. 115- 118.18 Radcliffe-Brown A. r~., Social Structure. Journal oj the

AntropoLogical Institute, Vol. 70, 1940.19 Furnivall, T. S., Ope cit., 1948 304.~ -, ibid, 30821 --, ibid, 31022 Braithwaite, Lloyd, op, cit. 196023· Braithwaite, Lloyd, ibid, 819, 1960.2A -, ibid, 819, 1960.25 Smith, M. G. ,Stralificatiorl in Grenada, Berkeley and Los

Angeles, University of California Press, 1965bW --, Ope cit. 769, 1960a.rn -, Ope cit. 253 also 237-246, 1965b.2B Bel1edict, B., "Pluralism and Stratification," Essays In

Comparative Social Stratification, eds. L. PlotnicQv and A. Tudou,I)ittsburgh, Pat ,University of Pittsburgh Press, 29-42, _ 1970.

29 Winter, E.I-I. , Bwanda: A Structural-Functional Analysis of apatrilineal Society, Cambridge, fieBer, 1956.

Le Vine, R A. and W. 1-I. Sangree, The dillusion of age-grouporganisation in .East Africa: a controlled comparison. Africa 32, 1962.

3) Smith, M. G. Ope cit. 18-35, 1984b.31 Parsons, Talcott, Opt cit. 155, 1951.32 Smith, M. G., op. cit 262-303, 1965a

Payne, Anthony, Paul Sutton and T. Thorndike, Grenada,Revolution and Invasion, London and Sydney, Goom Helm, 1984.

33 Smith, M. G., Opt cit 195634 Smith, . G., op. cit. 155, 1951.

--, Opt cit. 1965--, Ope cit 775, 1960a.-, ibid, 775, 1960a.--, ibid, 775-6, 1960aBraithwaite, Lloyd, op.cit. 1960.Braithwaite, Lloyd, ibid, 822 and 827, 1960

32 / M.G. Sn1ith

40 ---, ibiel, 830, 1960.·11 - , il)id, H2H, 1D()O.42 --, ibid, 822, 19(>0.4~3 ---, ibid, 1960.44 --, ibid. 819, 1960.45 I{ubitl Vera, Culture, Politics and Race I{elations. Social and

f-:'conornic Studies 11, 1962. 433-455.46 r~al1, SClwyIl, I~ace and NationalisTTl In Trinidad and Tobago.

"roronto, U l1ivcrsity of 1'0ron to Press, 1972.47 13raithwaile, Lloyd, 0/). cit. 819, 1960.48 --, ibid, 819, 1960.49 --, ibid, 820, 1960.00 Parsol1s aI1d Shils, Ope cit. 1951.51 Braithwaite, Lloyd, op. cit. 1951.52 Aberle, D. F. et al., The functional pre-requisites of a society.

Ethics, 60, No.1, 106, 1950. .53 SUlith, M. G., Ope cit. 776, 1960a54 Sllils. Edwards A., Political Development In the New States.

Gravenhage ,Mouton, 14, 16,35,58,64, 1962 .55 13ra.ithwailc, Lloyd, Ope cit. 817, 1960.E6 ParSOl1S, 1"'alcott, 1"/le Structure oj Social Action, Glcnco, III

I~rce Press, 193757 F'urnival, ". S., op. cit. 1945[)8 Morris, II. S., 111clians ill East Africa: a study in a plural

society. 13ritisl1JouTnal oJ Sociology 7, 194-211, 1946.ff} SIl1.ith, M.G., Ope cit 92-161, 1965a.(I) Levy Jr., Marioll, 1"he Structure oj Society, I>rinceton N. J.,

Princeton Ulliversity Press, 1952.61 Nadel, S. F., 1"'he Foundations oj Social Antropology. London,

COhCIl and West, 1956.62 Linton, Ralph, TIle Study oj Man, New York, Appleton-

Century, 1936.tn Srnith, M.G. Ope cit. 1960a.64 Braithwaite, Lloyd, op. ciL 823, 1960.65 Rubin, Vera (cd) Ope cit. 783, 1960.ffi Smith, M. G., op. cit. 774, 1960af37 --, ibid, 769, 1960a.68 -, ibid, 769, 196·Oa.m --, Ope ciL 1957.70 --, Ope cit 769, 1960a.71 r"'uITlival, T. S. Ope cit. 305, 1948.72 Snlith, M.G., Ope cit. 1956.7J --, Ope cit. 771, 1960a.74 --, ibid, 770, 1960a.75 -, ibid, 769,770, 1960a.76 -, ibid, 770-773, 1960a.

---, Pluralism, Race and Ethnicity in Selected AfricanCOlllltries, Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations. eds. John Rex, andDavid MasoIl, London, Cambridge U. P., 194-97, 1986.

77 --, Ope cit. 773, 1960a.78 --, ibid. 773, 1960a.79 Wagdey, Charles, Discussion of M. G. Smith, Social and

Cultural I>luralism, in Vera Rubin (cd) op. cit. 771-780, 1960.00 Rubin, Vera, Discussion of M. G. Smith, Social and Culttlral

Pltlralistll, ill Vera I~ubin, cd., 01). cit 780-785, 1960.81 SOlit}l, M. G., op. cit. 262-321, 1965a.R2 --, op. cit. 1965b.

--, Ope cit. 1965b.tn --,Ope cit. 1960a.84 --, ibid, 766, 1960a.f£ Mutz, Sidney, I~cvicw of M. G. Smith, 1"'he I>luml Society in the

13ritisll West Indies,AmericanAntropologist 68, 1045-1047.

Pluralism and Social Stratification / 33

ffi 13cncdict, 13urlon, 01). cit 1970.f:Y Nadel, S. {1'., Ope cit. 187, 1956.ffi Srnith, M. G., Ope cit. 764-765, 1960a.00 SInith, M. G., Corporations and Society, London, Duck\vort,

255, 1974a.00 --, ~P: cit 766-72, 1960a.91 --, lbid. 772, 1960a.92 -, ibid 772, 1960a.93 KUIllpcr, Leo, and M. G. SIllit}l. I)luralisnl IT1 AJlica, 13crkclcy

and Los Angeles, University of CaliforIlia l>ress, 1969.94 -, ibid, 91-151, 1969.95 Smith, M. G., TIle nature and variety of plural units, The

Prospects for Plural Societies, ed. David Maybury-Lewis, 1982.Proceedings of the American Ethnological Society, 146-186, 159, 1984a.

00 -, ibkL 159, 1984a.97 Smith, M. G., A Hausa Kingdom: Maradi under Dan Baskore,

1954-75. West African Kingdoms and the Nineteenth Century. eds. D.Forde, and P. Kabeny, London, Oxford University Press, 93-122.

98 --, op. ciL 774, 1960a.99 leVine R et aL Ope cit. 1962.100 Winter, E. H., Ope cit 1956.101 Southhall, Aidatl, Alur Society, Catnbridgc, England: lIcltcr

1956.102 Snlith, M.G., Kagoro Political l)cvclopmcnt, l/UrTlan

Organization, 196, 19,3, 137-149, 1960b.103 --, Ope cit 771-773, 1960a.104 --, ibkL 1960a.

--, Ope cit 1965a.105 --, Institutional and po.litical conditions of pluralism.. In

L. Kuper and M. G. Smith, eds. Ope cit., 27-65, 1969a and M. G. Snuth,205-240, 1974.

--, Pluralism in Pre-Colonial Mrican Societies. In L. Kuperand M. G. Smith (cds) Ope clL 91-151, 1969b.

---, Some developments in the analytic franlework ofpluralism. In Kuper, L. and M. G. Smith, eds. Ope cit. 415-459, 1969c.

106 --, Corporations and Society. London, Duckworth, 1974.107 --, Ope cit 27, 1969a.108 -, Ope cit. 91-100,176-180, 1974a.109 -, ibicL 216-217,230-239, 1974a.110 Weber, Max, The Theory oj Social and Economic

Organizations. Translated by A. R. Henderson and Talcott Parsons.London and Edinburgh Hodges and Co. 1974, 137.

III Smith, M. G., Some problems with minority concepts and asolution. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 10,4, .341-362, 1987.

112 -, Ope cit 195-198, 1986.113 Fortes, Meyer, Descent, filiation and affinity: a rejoinder to

Dr. Leach, Man 59, 195-197, 206.:212, 1959.114 Smith, M. G. Ope cit, 216-217, 1974a.115 Fortes, Meyer, Ope cit. 1959.116 leVine, R A et aL Ope cit. 1962.117 Smith, M. G. op. cit. 767-775, 1960a.118 --, Ope cit 444-445, 1969c.

--, op. cit 150-152, 1984a.119 Marshall, T. H., Class Citizensl1ip and Social Deve loprrlent,

New York, Doubleclay Anchor, 1965.120 Braithwaite, Lloyd, Ope cit. 1960121 Berreman, Gerald, "Stratification, pluralism and interaction:

a comparative analysis of caste," Caste and Race ComparativeApproaches, eds. T. de Rueck and T. Knight, London, J. and A. Churchill,.45-73, 1967.

122 lIutton, J. H., Caste In India, London. Cambridge U. P., 1946.123 Smith, M. G., Ope eLL 1969a.

34 / M.G. SIIliili

---, 01). cit 223, 1974a.124 --, Ope cit. 444, 1969c.

--, Ope cit. 157-8, 1984a.125 --, Race and Stratification in the Caribbean. In Idem 1974a

Ope cit., 1974b. 335.126 --, Ope cit. 17-24, 1984b.127 --, Ope cit. 769, 1960.

--, Ope cit. 83, 1965a.128 --, Ope cit. 774, 1960a.

--, Ope cit 88, 1965a.129 --, Ope cit. 770, 1960a.

--, Ope cit. 83, 1965a.130 Braithwaite, Lloyd, Ope cit. 822, 1960.131 --, ibid, 823.132 Smith, R T., Ope cit 46, 53, 1960.133 -, ibid, 53134 Braithwaite, Lloyd, Ope cit. 823, 1960.135 -, ibid, 823.136 -, ibid, 823.137 --, ibid, 822.138 -, ibid, 823.139 Parsons, Talcott, Ope cit. 1952.

-, C?P: cit. ~953.140 --, tbid, 93.141 Marx, Karl,and F. Engles, The Communist Manifesto,

CClltenary Edition, LondoIl COffilllunist Party, 1. 1948.142 --, The German Ideology, Parts 1 and II.143 Marx, Karl, Capital Vol. 1. Translated by Samuel Moore and

Edward Avel1ng, New York, Modern Library. 41-42, 198-201, 1960.144 Weber, Max, Economy and Society, 2 vols. Berkeley and Los

Angeles, University of CalifoITlia Press, 2, 925-928 1978.145 -, ibid, 926-7.146 Warner, W. Lloyd , et al., The Status System oj a Modem

Comnlunity, New l-Iaven, Yale University Press.147 Hatt, Paul. K., Occupations and social stratification. American

JOl1m.a1 ojSociology, LX, 533-543. 1950.Smith, I~ T., Ope cit. 1970.Benedict. B., Stratification in plural societies. American

ArltrO]Jologist, 64, 6, 1962.--, op. cit. 1970.

148 Davis, K. et al., Some Principles of Stratification, AmericanSociological Review, Vol. 10, 1945.

Alberle, D. F. et al, Ope eft 1950149 Braithwaite, lJoyd, op. cit. 1953

-, ibU:L 1954150 Smith, M. G. Ope cit. 1953.151 Furnival, J. S., Ope cit. 304, 1948.152 Smith, M. G., The plural framework of Jamaican Society.

BritishJournalojSociology 12,3,162-175,1961.--, Race and Stratification in the Caribbean. In Idem 1974a.

op. cit. 1974b.153 Smith, R T., op. cit. 52-64, 1970.154 Smith, M. G., Ope cit. 775, 1960a

--, Ope cit. 89, 1965a.--, Ope cit. 142, 1984b.Braithwaite, IJoyd, Ope clt 820, 1960.

155 r~ubin, Vera, Ope cit. 782, 1960.156 -, ibid, 782.157 -, ibid, 782.158 SInith, M. G., Ope cit 1961.

--, op. cit. 162-175, 19600.159 Benedict, B., Ope cit. 38, 1970.

Pluralism and Social Stratification / 35

160 -, ibid, 38.161 -, ibid, 37-40.162 -, ibid. 37.163 Benedict, B., A r~eport on Mauritius Indians in a Plural

Society_ II. M. S.O., 1961.--, Ope cit 1962.--, Ope cit. 1970.

164 Smelser, Neil et at, Social structure, mobility anddevelopn'lent. In idem (eds), Social Structure and Mobility in EcorwmicDevelopnlent, Chicago, AIdine Publishing Co., 6-8, 1966.

165 Myrdal, Gunnar, An American DUemma: The Negro Problemand Modern DenlOCracy. New York Haryers, 1944.

Powdermaker, Hortense, AJter freedonl: A cultural study of theDeep South. New York Viking Press, 1939.

Davis, A. et al, Deep South.: A Social Antropological Study ojCaste and Class. Chicago, Chicago U. P., 141.

Warner, W. Lloyd , et at, Color and Human Nature,Wasllington, D. C., American Council on Education, 1941.

Dollard, John, Caste and Class in a Southern TOWfl, NewlIaven, Yale University Press, 1937.

165 Kuper, Leo, ATl Af1icaTl IJourgeoisie: l~ace, Class and f)olitics inSouth J\r,ica~ New I laven, Yale Ullivcrsily Press, 1965.

van dar Berghe, l)ierre. Soutll Africa: A Study in Conflict.MiddleloWll, Ct. , Wesleyan University Press, 1965.

167 Smith, M. G., Ope cit. 162-175, 1965a.--, op./ cit, 1974b.

168 Benedict, B., op_ cit. 1962.--, Ope cit. 1970.

169 Smith, M. G., op_ cit. 1965b.170 I-Iaug, Marie. R., Social and cultural pluralism as a concept in

social system analysis, American Journal of Sociology, 73, 304, 1967.

M. G. Smith: PluralismandSocialStratification.

ERRATA

p.3J line 3: change 'Caribbean countries' to 'Trinidad & Tobago' .p.5 J line 21: change dashes to commasto read: '... those tribal societies, the Muslim Rausa, and

English societyJ all differed so sharplyfrom Jamaica ... '.. line 33 (quote from Fumivall): insert 'iJl' to read 'but only in the market-place... ·

p.6,line 8: Change 'Ibn Khaldum' to 'Ibn Khaldun'II one linefrom bottom: change'sectional values systems' to 'sectional value-systems'

p. 7,line24: change to read 'by attributing whatevervalues the analystprefers as deterrnioaots of

action. ·II line 28: Replace omitted line to read: '... uncertainty. As the theoreticallypostulated bases of

socialorderandintegration, suchinberentlyindeterminatevariables. coupledwitbtbeunsatisfactoryprocedures used to IIdemonstrate" them ... '

p.8,line 11: Insertcommaafter'stratification"~' t change 'of to 'or' and insert 'is' to read to

socia1stratification"~ J or supposing that "the persistence ofplural units is due to f

p.l0. 8lines from bottom: Spell 'Nadel' con-eetly.bottom line: change 'socialities' to 'sodalities'

p.l1,line20: change 'are l to land' to read '..parentand affine among white America.n... ·p.12, 9 lines from bottom: Insertcomma after 'initsCU1Tentform."

II 6 lines from bottom: Close quotes after' ... ofpower and force. u.

tI one line from bottom: change 'identify' to 'identified'p. 13, line 5: insert commaafter '...cited in 1959. '

II 3 lines from bottom: change to read '... I shall therefore summarise' not 'summaries'

p.14, line 14: delete dash to read' ... membership' not 'member-sbip'p.16. third line from bottom: change 'test' to 'set' to read '... the set of structures sad processes.. 'p.18. line 25: insert 'a' to read: '... segmentally ina common society ... f

bottom line: insert 'the l to read: '... corporations are the most elaborate ... f

p.20 t line 29: delete's' in 'Yorubas' to read '... Yoruba Ogboni•... 'p.22, last2 lines: change to read '... inspan and an observer's artifaetua1 co.nstruet. will differ ... 'p.24, line 9: insert I Marx' to read 'Production itself Marx defined as ... '

.. line 44: correct spelling of 'contradictions'p.25 t 9lines from bottom: change 'difference' to 'differences'p.26 t line 12: insert comma after 'U.S.A. I

p.2? J ?lines from bottom: Change 'MeIser' to 'Smelser'p.28, line 24: Remove commaafter '... racial and cultural divisions'p.29, line 7: separate 'its' from' de facto' (probablythe effect ofthe Italic style)

.. 4 lines from bottom: change 'than' to 'that' to read 'the criteria that rant ... f

p.30 t note 3: Change IKumper' to 'Kuper'p.31, note 15: Correct 'Smith. R.T.'

note 29: Change 'Bwanda' to 'Bwamba'note 29: Correct to 'The diffusion of age-group organisation... f

p.32, note 57: Correct spelling of tFumivall'note 19: Con-eet spelling of I Wagley'note 85: COlTeet spelling of 'Mintz'

p.33. note 93: Con-eetspelling of 'Kuper'p.35, note 165: Correct spelling of 'van den Berghe'