responding to terrorism
TRANSCRIPT
London: Hazards, Threats, Preparedness
and ResilienceResponding to Terrorism (Kings College
London)
07 Nov 2013
Matthew Hogan | London Resilience Team @London_Prepared
Risks in LondonR
ela
tive I
mp
act
Conventional Attacks on Locations
Maritime Incidents
Industrial Accident
Transport Accident
Structural Collapse
Emerging Infectious Disease
Industrial Action
Pandemic Human Disease
Flooding
Other Local Flooding
Telecoms failure
Animal Disease
Heatwave
Relative Likelihood
1973 1665 1666 1800sPost War
Jacobean Terrorism
How different was it to modern day terrorism?
a fringe group of religiously motivated fanatics
planning to detonate explosives in an underground area
beneath a well-known location
in an attempt to change the government to one favouring their religion
1605 War
@Anon_UK
1973 1665 1666 1800sPost War
Plague
Risk relatively unchanged but much reduced vulnerability
• Border Biosecurity
• Containment
• Surveillance
• Medical Treatments
• Protection
• General Health
1605 War
Museum of London
Paul Furst BeeThomas
1973 1665 1666 1800sPost War
Fire
Risk remains but vulnerability much lower
• Land Use
• Building Codes
• Fire Suppression Systems
• Fire Fighting techniques and equipment
• Fire safety
1605 War
RadioTimes/Museum of London/Rightmove
1973 1665 1666 1800sPost War
Industrialisation
The advancement of industry lead to a whole range of new risks
• Health & Safety Practices
1605 War
Rail Accidents
The advancement of industry lead to a whole range of new risks
• Transport Safety Improvements
PA
Illustrated London News
1973 1665 1666 1800s Post War
Lessons from War
• Formalisation of Ambulance Services
• Battlefield medicine
• Advances in technology
• Target hardening
• Remote sensing
• Intelligence advances
• Public messaging 1605 War
BombSite/GoogleMaps
1973 1665 1666 1800sPost War
Trains and Planes
• Impact of technological advances and demographic change on risk
• The first Decade of Disasters
1605 War
Pathe
NationalArchives
1973Pre 2002
2005 2010Post 2012
London Emergency Services Liaison Panel
• Shared Major Incident Definition
• Roles and Responsibilities of organisations
• Initial response actions
• Command and Control structures
• Specialist response information
1973 2012Pre 2002
2005 2010 2012Post 2012
19831984
19851986
19871988
19891990
19911992
19931994
19951996
19971998
19992000
20012002
20032004
20052006
20072008
20092010
-2
3
8
13
18
23
Tidal ClosureFluvial ClosuresTotal Closures
Response Capabiliti
es
Mass Casualtie
sMass
Fatalities
Mass Evacuati
on
Flooding
Mass Shelter
Structural Collapse
Recovery
Business Continuit
y
Communicating
with the Public
Command and
Control
GOLD (STRATEGIC)
SILVER (TACTICAL)
BRONZE(OPERATIONAL)
Sca
le o
f In
cident
SCG
Partnership Meeting
Coordination and Information Sharing Protocol
Joint Emergency Services
Coordination CellLESLP Manual
Tripartite
Discussion
Single Agency Command &
Control
Multi Agency Coordination
Doctrine
Response : Coordination
Health Sector
Local Authorities and Busines
ses
Climate and Environment
Sector
Transport
Sector
Emergency
Services Sector
Utilities Sector
Trains Stop (5 mins)
Loss of Passenger Info Systems
Emergency Generator Systems kick in
Likely changes in demand profile
Emergency
Generator
Systems kick in
Acute
Primary &
Community
Impact on
Community
Water
Electricity
TelecomsHealth and
Safety issues
Revert manual systems
Safety issues for nursing
and residential
care
Comms difficulties with fleet
Variability in mortuary business
continuity plans
Monitoring equipment
affected
Loss of electronic
transactions and ability to obtain cash from ATMs
Distress for MH
patients
H&S issues for schools
Failure of automatic
flood protection systems
Continuity of cold
chain drug storage Potential
rise in admissions (vulnerable
)
Retail fuel
stops
Rise in food safety
incidents
Impact to water pumping (mains)
Potential water pumping issues in buildings
Potential water quality issues
Security barriers and theft prevention systems fail
Staff H&S issues
Challenges communicating with oncoming staff
Cessation of
elective and non-emergency cases
Challenges to some
diagnostic services
VOIP, DECT and Internet likely to fail
Mobile base stations fail (hours)
Increased fixed line demand
Implementation of demand management
Unable to recharge mobile phones and Airwave terminals
Electricity
Failure
Relocation to
alternative sites
Additional problems may be
caused by limitations of
working during natural light
Unable to send Flood
Alert notification
s
Trapped passenger
s
Reduced ability to heat/cool
home
Dependencies on equipment
at home
Impacts on
national transport
Airport diversion possible
Likely changes in
demand profile
Limited train
service resumes
Potential for public disorder incidents
Possibly unable to retrieve electronic data
Impacts to manufacturing, banking and leisure
Difficulties in communicatin
g between schools and
parents
Large scale evacuation or
shelter may be required
Mutual aid to provide alternative supply
Challenges in communicatin
g with residents and
businesses
Reading List
• London Risk Register• Civil Contingencies Act – Short Guide • National Risk Register• Hyogo Framework for Action • Report of the 7th July Review Committee•
Coroners Inquest into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005
• CONTEST – UK Counter Terrorist Strategy• LESLP Manual Version 8• London Command and Control Protocol Ver
sion 5
London: Hazards, Threats, Preparedness and Resilience
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