1

Resource Regionalism: The Role of Regional Electricity and Development in Africa1

Kathleen J. Hancock

Colorado School of Mines, khancock@mines.edu

Agathe C. Maupin South African Institute of International Affairs, agathe.maupin@wits.ac.za

While regionalism has become of increasing interest in the scholarly community as well as among political leaders and international organizations, little attention has been given to regionalism as it relates to energy generally and more specifically electricity. In this paper, we examine two related regional energy issues in sub-Saharan Africa: (1) regional electricity grids and (2) the infrastructure associated with electricity production (major hydropower plants, transmission lines used to transport electricity across international borders and interconnectors). We conclude with suggestions for future research on the resources nexus, energy security, issue-area spill over, third-party players, and overlapping regions. We note that there are numerous opportunities for IPE scholars to contribute to this literature, particularly working in multidisciplinary teams with economists and engineers as well as other social scientists.

Keywords: Sub-Saharan Africa, energy, development, electricity, infrastructure, power

pool

Producing a projected 44,000 MW of power, the Grand Inga Dam Project, if fully

developed, will set a record for the most important hydropower project in the world,

dwarfing even the Three Gorges Dam in China. While the dam will be built in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and is thus a national decision, it has major

regional ramifications. Largely funded by regional and international organizations (the

European Investment Bank, African Development Bank, and World Bank’s International

Finance Corporation, among others), it is expected to feed electricity into a regional power

grid, the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), with South Africa as the most important

international purchaser. The dam is thus an example of both a state and regional energy

project. With financing from international and regional development banks as well as

1 Prepared for the FLACSO-ISA, Toronto, Canada; July 23-25, 2014. Research for this paper was supported in part by funding from the Colorado School of Mines.

2

states and private companies, institutions required to develop and manage the power pools,

and potential environmental and social ramifications, the project is a natural case for

international political economy (IPE) analysis. Yet, to date, there have been negligible

publications from IPE scholars, particularly using advanced theoretical frameworks.

Furthermore, while IPE of energy is a re-emerging field,2 only a few researchers have

linked their findings to the regionalism literature. Despite its importance in Europe, the

former Soviet Union, and Africa, even less attention has been paid to regional electricity

grids, which link together two or more states.

To explore how regionalism and electricity intersect, we explore two key and

related issues in sub-Saharan Africa: (1) the four regional electricity grids and (2) the

infrastructures associated with electricity production (major hydropower plants,

transmission lines used to transport electricity across international borders and

interconnectors). These two research areas all link with energy issues and in some ways

intersect with other resources, such as water when rivers are dammed for hydroelectricity,

which is then transported through grids that cut across states. We begin with a brief

overview of regionalism (Section I), followed by a discussion on the linkages between

energy and regional integration (Section II). Sections III and IV explore the issues

surrounding electricity grids and related infrastructure in Africa. We conclude with a

number of suggestions for future research.

I. Defining regionalism

In broad terms, regionalism refers to states coming together for a variety of purposes and

issue areas.3 More specifically, regionalism includes “purposive interaction, formal or

informal, among state and non-state actors of a given area in pursuit of shared external,

domestic, and transnational goals.”4 The “new regionalism/regionalisms approach” moves

2 Kathleen J. Hancock and Vlado Vivoda, "International Political Economy: A Field Born of the OPEC Crisis Returns to Its Energy Roots," Energy Research and Social Science 1, no. 1 (2014). 3 The type of regionalism evaluated in this paper does not include sub-state regions, such as provinces, as discussed by scholars who study comparative federalism. 4 Amitav Acharya, "Comparative Regionalism: A Field Whose Time Has Come?," The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 47, no. 1 (2012): 3, fn 1.

3

beyond formal structures and the role of the state to evaluate the ideas, policies and goals

that transform a geographic area into an identifiable social space.5

The vast majority of the regionalism literature covers economic (trade and

monetary) integration, with security issues being a secondary focus, particularly in Asia.

Over the last two decades, several factors have ignited economic regionalism around the

world. First, the European Union has deepened its integration and broadened its

membership, features that have increased its global power and its concomitant interest in

encouraging other states to organize in regional groups. Second, as the global GATT

negotiations stalled, regional economic agreements have been widely embraced by

numerous states that had previously opposed them, including the U.S. and China. Notably,

the US negotiated its first major regional agreement (the North American Free Trade

Agreement) in 1993 and the EU expanded membership from 15 to 28 countries between

2004 and 2013. The most recent major player is China, which signed the Asia-Pacific

Trade Agreement in 2001, after which it signed accords with Hong Kong (2003), Macau

(2003), ASEAN (2004), Chile (2005), Pakistan (2006, goods; 2009, services), New

Zealand (2008), Singapore (2008), Peru (2009), Costa Rica (2010), and Switzerland

(2013). Finally, a customs union in South America (MERCOSUR) and in Eurasia (the

Eurasian Customs Union) expanded the number of regions with deeper economic

integration efforts.6 In addition, particularly in Asia, security and regionalism have been

linked.7

Even as regionalism is enjoying a renaissance in the academy, scholars of Africa

note that the continent is often ignored in the scholarship and debate on regionalism.8 This

is also true in IPE textbooks, most of which now have dedicated sections to regionalism,

but continue to omit African cases. This is surprising since Africa has a large number of

economic integration agreements. In southern Africa alone, there are seven regional

economic agreements to which states belong: African Union, Common Market for Eastern

5 Daniel C. Bach, "New Regionalism as an Alias: Regionalization through Trans-State Networks," in The New Regionalism in Africa, ed. J. Andrew Grant and Fredrik Söderbaum (Aldershot [England]; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 22. 6 Kathleen J. Hancock, Regional Integration: Choosing Plutocracy (New York: Palgrave, 2009), Ch. 2. 7 Mely Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the Asean Way (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005). 8 J. Andrew Grant and Fredrik Söderbaum, "Introduction: The New Regionalism in Africa," in The New Regionalism in Africa, ed. J. Andrew Grant and Fredrik Söderbaum (Aldershot [England]; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003).

4

and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community

of Central African States (ECCAS), Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), Southern African

Customs Union (SACU), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In

addition, the 100+ years old SACU is the oldest customs union, going back to the

founding of South Africa.9 Both the European Union and the World Trade Organization

have played a significant role in encouraging and developing economic regionalism on the

African continent.10

Furthermore, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

(UNCTAD) argues for broadening regional integration by incorporating a development-

based approach, as opposed to focusing exclusively on increased trade.11 UNCTAD’s

2013 report on intra-African trade defines developmental regionalism as involving

regional cooperation in a wide range of areas, including research, policies, and

investments aimed at accelerating regional industrial development, and providing

infrastructure to develop and enhance vibrant regional markets. In its five chapter report,

a full chapter is dedicated to this concept. UNCTAD identifies four drivers for fostering

developmental regionalism: (1) developing a regional industry policy incorporated in the

Regional Economic Communities, which correlate to the major regional economic

agreements,12 (2) strengthening development corridors, (3) establishing special economic

zones, and (4) promoting regional value chains by investing in infrastructure.13

Interestingly, UNCTAD focuses on the Greater Mekong sub-region as a useful

comparative case. In light of this recent redefinition, regionalism, at least in Africa, is

perhaps shifting away from the traditional focus of removing trade barriers to include

9 Kathleen J. Hancock, "African Regionalism: The Complex Role of Regional Trade," in The International Political Economy of Trade, ed. David A. Deese (U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014); Regional Integration; Gerhard Erasmus, "New SACU Institutions: Prospects for Regional Integration," (TRALAC: Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa, 2004). 10 James J. Hentz, South Africa and the Logic of Regional Cooperation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005); J. Andrew Grant and Fredrik Söderbaum, eds., The New Regionalism in Africa (Aldershot [England]; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003). 11 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, "Economic Development in Africa Report 2013, Intra-African Trade: Unlocking Private Sector Dynamism," (Geneva: United Nations, 2013). 12 For example, the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have negotiated a regional industrial development policy of the EAC and the industrial development pillar of the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement. 13 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, "Economic Development in Africa," 107.

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broader socio-economic development.

Just as few integration studies focus on Africa or incorporate it into comparative

studies, few regionalism studies, for any world region, focus on energy resources, leaving

African regionalism and resources as a vast lacuna in the literature. The primary exception

to this gap is water, which has received some sustained scholarly attention.14 Of course,

Africa’s abundant oil, natural gas, and minerals have been well studied as part of the

“resource curse” but regionalism has not played a role in these analyses.15

II. Linking Energy and Development

In its 2010 report, the United Nations Advisory Group on Energy and Climate Change

(AGECC) argues that access to electricity is a major barrier to development. Worldwide,

about 1.5 billion people have no access to electricity. Around one billion more have only

unreliable access. As shown in Figure 1, energy needs can be broken into three levels:

basic human needs, productive uses, and modern society needs. The International Energy

Agency estimates that meeting only basic human needs will require $35-40 billion/year to

achieve access to electricity for all by 2030.16

14 On water regionalism, see Larry A. Swatuk, "The New Water Architecture in Southern Africa: Reflections on Current Trends in Light of Rio +10," International Affairs 78 (2002); "A Political Economy of Water in Southern Africa," Water Alternatives 1, no. 1 (2008). 15 For reviews of this literature, see Michael L. Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Donato De Rosa and Mariana Iootty, "Are Natural Resources Cursed?: An Investigation of the Dynamic Effects of Resource Dependence on Institutional Quality, Working Paper 6151," (Washington, DC: World Bank, Europe and Central Asia Region, 2012); Dan Haglund, "Blessing or Curse?: The Rise of Mineral Dependence among Low- and Middle-Income Countries," (Oxford: Oxford Policy Management, 2011). 16 United Nations Advisory Group on Energy and Climate Change, "Energy for a Sustainable Future," (New York: United Nations, 2010), 10.

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Figure 1: Levels of Energy Use (based on AGECC, 2010, p. 13 Exhibit 1)

Although developing states are grouped together as “energy poor,” access varies

significantly between and within regions and between rural and urban areas within states.

Among world regions, sub-Saharan Africa stands out as having the lowest average

electrification access rate, at 34.6% overall (excluding South Africa); rural electricity

access is a mere 8%. Despite global growth of 70% in electricity generation in the period

1998- 2008, 85% of the sub-Saharan population relies on traditional biomass (mostly

wood).17 Table 1, which shows electricity access for members for the Southern African

Development Community (SADC), illustrates the variation between countries in one

region, as well as the growth in electricity access since 1995. Note that the range for 1995

was between 2.0% (Lesotho) and 45.0% (South Africa). By 2011, the numbers had

improved, ranging from 9.0% (Malawi) to 75.0% (South Africa), with the average rising

from 11.1% to 29.9%. Higher access to electricity generally coincides with higher

GDP/capita, but not in all cases. For example, in the region, South Africa and Botswana

have the highest access rates and GDPs/capita, demonstrating this correlation. On the

other hand, Zimbabwe has the third highest access rate but is ranked eighth in terms of

GDP/capita.18

17 UNEP, "Financing Renewable Energy in Developing Countries," (Geneva, Switzerland: United National Environment Program, 2012); Anton Eberhard et al., Africa's Power Infrastructure (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2011); World Bank, "WDI Online: World Development Indicators," http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. 18 The lower GDP/capita may be explained by Zimbabwe’s 2000-2001 political and socio-economic crisis.

Level  1:  BASIC  HUMAN  NEEDS  Electricity  for  lighting,  health,  education,  communication,  community  services  

Modern  fuels  and  technologies  for  heating  and  cooking    

Level  2:  PRODUCTIVE  USES    Electricity  and  modern  fuels  to  improve  productivity  

E.g.  in  agriculture,  water  pumping  for  irrigation;  mechanized  tilling  

Level  3:  MODERN  SOCIETY  NEEDS  Modern  energy  services  for  more  domestic  appliances,  increased  requirements  

for  cooling  and  heating,  private  transportation  

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Table 1: Access to Electricity, Members of the Southern African Development Community Access to Electricity (%) Population

(2011) GDP/capita

(2011) 1995 2011 Millions USD

Angola NA 26.2 19.62 $5,318 Botswana 3.0 45.4 2.03 8,533

DRC NA 37.1 67.76 231 Lesotho 2.0 16.0 2.19 1,106 Malawi 2.5 9.0 15.38 365

Mozambique 2.7 11.7 23.93 535 Namibia NA 34.0 2.32 5,301

South Africa 45.0 75.0 50.59 8,070 Swaziland 8.5 NA 1.06 3,725

Tanzania 13.0 13.9 46.22 532 Zambia 7.5 18.8 13.47 1,425

Zimbabwe 16.0 41.5 12.75 757 AVERAGE 11.1 29.9 $2,992

Sources: World Bank. "Energy Access." http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS, 2012; Southern African Development through Electricity, and Minerals and Energy Policy Centre (South Africa). Electricity in Southern Africa: Investment Opportunities in an Emerging Regional Market. London: Financial Times Energy Publishing, 1996.

Overall, sub-Saharan Africa’s electricity comes from a variety of resources, with

coal dominating (see Figure 2). However, potential energy sources vary significantly

throughout the continent and are mostly untapped. North Africa, Sudan, Ethiopia, Chad,

Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and the states on the Gulf of Guinea (such as Gabon)

have significant oil and gas reserves. Central and eastern Africa have enormous

hydropower potential, with the greatest rivers in the DRC, Ethiopia, and Cameroon. South

Africa is rich with coal deposits. In east Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti are leaders

in geothermal energy, while Egypt, Morocco and southern African states, such as Namibia,

have substantial winds that could be harnessed for energy.19

19 For energy profiles of all states, see "IRENA Renewable Energy Country Profiles," IRENA–International Renewable Energy Agency, http://www.irena.org.

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Figure 2: Sources of Electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa, developing states only, 2011

Source: World Development Indicators, 2013

The United Nations Energy/Africa initiative, developed in 2004 in collaboration

with the International Atomic Energy Agency, formulated several policy options, which

were presented at the 15th Commission on Sustainable Development in 2007. An entire

chapter is dedicated to regional initiatives to scale-up energy access for economic and

human development, with the examples of EAC and ECOWAS. The report also covers

investments in electricity for development; sustainable energy; regulations and policies for

energy services; links between environmental concerns, cities and energy; reforms in the

power sector; and prospects for nuclear energy.20

Regionally, the objective is to integrate energy into national and regional

development strategies in support of economic development, poverty reduction and

achievement of sustainable development. The Regional Economic Communities,

consisting of eight regional organizations recognized by the African Union, appear to have

a strategic role to play, along with the New Partnership for African Development

(NEPAD), the technical arm of the African Union. NEPAD’s six themes include regional

integration and infrastructure, the focus of this paper.21 There are also initiatives at the

national and global levels. For example, the Renewable Energy Independent Power

20 UN-Energy/Africa, "Energy for Sustainable Development: Policy Options for Africa," http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/Pess/assets/un-energy_africa_pub.pdf. 21 African Union, "The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)," (Abuja, Nigeria: African Union, 2001); New Partnership for African Development, http://www.nepad.org.

Coal  62%  

Natural  gas  7%  

Oil  4%  

Hydropower  23%  

Renewable    (non  hydro)  

1%  

Nuclear  3%  

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Producer Procurement Program (REI4P), launched in 2011 by South Africa, illustrates

how private producers and operators are now working on renewable energy projects in the

South African energy market.22 Globally, the UN’s Sustainable Energy For All initiative

(SE4ALL), also launched in 2011, reinforces the importance of energy access, efficiency

and renewable energy for development.23

We next evaluate two major issues in which energy and development intersect and

for which there are major regional implications: the regional electricity grids, and the

infrastructure associated with electricity production (major hydropower plants,

transmission lines used to transport electricity across international borders and

interconnectors).

III. Issue One: Regionalism and African Power Pools

Beginning in 1995, with substantial funding from the World Bank, the EU, and other

international organizations and states, the sub-Saharan African states created four regional

“power pools” which are regional electricity grids that allow electricity sharing: Southern

African Power Pool (SAPP), East Africa Power Pool (EAPP), West African Power Pool

(WAPP), and Central Africa Power Pool (CAPP); see Table 2 for a list of the members

and ongoing projects. These power pools were developed over a decade, starting with

SAPP, which was created in 1995, one year after the end of apartheid, and ending with the

East African pool, created in 2005. North Africa also has a power pool, started in 1989,

called the Comité Maghrébin de l'Electricité (COMELEC). DRC and Tanzania, both

members of SADC, may eventually link the different power pools, leading to a continent-

wide grid. DRC’s national power utility, SNEL (Société nationale d'électricité), is already

an active member of three of the four power pools in sub-Saharan Africa (SAPP, EAPP

and CAPP). These power pools are the primary institutions facilitating cross-border

power trade for their respective regional economic communities (SADC for SAPP,

COMESA for EAPP and ECCAS for CAPP). The power pools are at different stages in

implementing interconnection projects, adopting regional market rules and concluding

bilateral contracts for regional trade. Figure 3 shows the grids as of 2013. The regional

22 More information on the REI4P is available on a dedicated South African Department of Energy website http://www.ipprenewables.co.za 23 Sustainable Energy for All, http://www.se4all.org.

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grids, able to be supplied by a variety of energy sources, are the backbone of all regional

electricity trade.24

Table 2: African Power Pools Regional Group Year

Founded Linked Economic

Agreement Members

Status Generation and Transmission Projects

Comité Maghrébin de l'Electricité (COMELEC)

1989 Arab Maghreb Union: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia

Energy independent, this power pool exports extra electricity to Europe.

Development of wind farms and solar central in Egypt and Mauritania. Strengthening of the transmission line Maroc-Espagne, building of three new lines Turkey-Libya

Southern African Power Pool (SAPP)

1995 SADC: Southern African Development Community: Angola, Botswana, Dem. Rep. of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, S. Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe

As of 2013, Angola, Malawi, and Tanzania not connected to the grid; Several dam projects such as Grand Inga, Mphanda Nkuwa, etc.

SAPP generation priority projects in 2013: Batoka, Kafur, Mphanda Nkuwa, Inga 3, Baynes SAPP transmission priority projects in 2013: interconnector ZIZABONA, Kafue-Livingstone, Central Transmission Corridor (CTC)

West African Power Pool (WAPP)

1999 ECOWAS: Economic Community of Western African States: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo

Key components include projects (1) linking Benin/Togo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria; (2) developing a 2nd generation hydropower project and to interconnect Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Gambia and Senegal and (3) connecting Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire and Mali.

Energy Project including the realization of the 240 MW Kaleta Hydropower Plant, the development of the 128 MW Sambangalou hydropower dam and the 225 kV The Gambia – Guinea – Guinea Bissau – Senegal Interconnection Project Domunli (Ghana) and Maria Gléta (Benin) Regional Power Generation Facilities (gas), Tiboto (Côte d’Ivoire – Liberia) Hydropower Project Souapiti (Guinea) Hydropower Facility Ghana-BF-Mali interconnection project, Birnin Kebbi (Nigeria) – Malanville (Benin) – Niamey (Niger) – Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) Interconnection Project

Central African Power Pool (CAPP)

2003 ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Rep. of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon

Smallest, least integrated pool. Mini-power pool with eastern DRC, Rwanda and Burundi

Interconnector Inga-Cabinda-Pointe Noire Chollet hydropower plant (Cameroun, RC)

East African Power Pool (EAPP)

2005 COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa: Burundi, DRC, Djibouti, Eritrea, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

Electricity trade through Kenya-Uganda, Burundi-DRC-Rwanda. Overall, lack of infrastructure, institutions, and technical capacity.

Generation projects with anticipated regional benefits: Mandaya, Border and Karadobi in Ethiopia, Ruzizi 3 and 4 in DRC, Stieglers Gorge in Tanzania (3 dams) Lines associated to the Rusumo Falls HPP connecting the project with the grids of Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. Transmission lines Tanzania-Kenya, Ethiopia-Kenya and Ethiopia-Sudan, Uganda-Kenya and Uganda-Rwanda, Rwanda-DRC, Egypt-Sudan

24 Agathe Maupin, "Building a Regional Electricity Market: Sapp Challenges (PERISA Case Study 4: Public Goods)," (Johannesburg, Maastricht: SAIIA, ECDPM, 2013).

11

The regional power pools are designed to lower electricity prices and expand access, by

encouraging trade and investment in electricity. The SAPP followed from analysis

demonstrating that southern Africa would see significant advantages from regional

electricity integration and improved trade.25 These calculations were admittedly based on

optimistic assumptions, but they were persuasive enough to move the political leaders of

the 12 SADC members and their national power utilities to create and sign the legal

framework for the SAPP. From 1997 to 2000, USAID’s EAGER (Equity and Growth

through Economic Research) program funded a partnership between Purdue University

and SAPP, to create models for electricity trade among the SAPP members. Purdue also

analyzed the feasibility of WAPP, which resulted in the formation of that power pool.26

25 Anton Eberhard and C. Van Horen, Poverty  and  Power,  Energy  and  the  South  African  State  (East Haven, CT; London: UCT Press and Pluto Press, 1995); W.P. Lewis, "Issues and options for interconnection in Southern Africa," Journal  of  Energy  in  Southern  Africa  5, no. 3 (1994); P.B. Robinson, "Energy," in Economic  Integration  in  Southern  Africa  (Abidjan: African Development Bank, 1993); P.J.E. Rubbers, "Advantages of interconnections and the creation of a power pool in Southern Africa," Journal  of  Energy  in  Southern  Africa  5, no. 3 (1994). 26 Brian H. Bowen, F.T. Sparrow, and Zuwei Yu, "Modeling electricity trade policy for the twelve nations of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP)," Utilities  Policy  8(1999): 184.

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Figure 3: African Power Pools (2013)

Source: SNEL (2013) Document de Travail, Kinshasa.

As of 2011, the power pools have been implementing a number of regional

interconnection and generation projects. The power pools have a range of installed

capacities, with SAPP dominating at nearly 50,000 MW, and relying on varying energy

sources, with CAPP notably overwhelmingly fueled by hydropower and the others by

thermal power (see Table 3). The percentage of electricity traded is still low, at less than

1% for CAPP and EAPP, and slightly higher (approx. 7%) for COMELEC, SAPP and

WAPP.27 SAPP is in a more advanced stage of development than the others, with an

operational Short Term Electricity Market, for trades up to about one week, and a Day

Ahead Market, where market participants purchase and sell energy at financially binding

prices for the next day. Institutional set up and market rules and regulations have already

27 Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, "Regional Power Status in African Power Pools," (Tunis, Tunisia: African Development Bank, 2011).

SOCIETE NATIONALE D’ELECTRICITE sarl

MINISTERE RHE

Interconnexions Electriques d’Afrique (horizon 2035)

ALGERIE

GAMBIE

LESOTHO

SWAZILAND

R.

B.

DJIBOUTI

COMORES

SAO TOME & PRINCIPE

LIBYE

NIGER MALI

BURKINA FASO

GUINEE EQU.

TCHAD SOUDAN

RCA

NIGERIA

ANGOLA

BOTSWANA

GABON

EGYPTE

AFRIQUE DU SUD

GHAN

A

BEN

IN

TOGO

KENYA

TANZANIE

NAMIBIE

RD CONGO

GUINEE-BISSAU

ZIMBABWE

CAMEROUN

ETHIOPIE

MAURITANIE

COTE D’IVOIRE

GUINEE

SIERRA LEONE

TANZANIE

ETHIOPIE

GHAN

A

BEN

IN

TOGO

COTE D’IVOIRE

EGYPTE

KENYA

B.

SAO TOME & PRINCIPE

GUINEE EQU.

TCHAD

RCA

ANGOLA

GABON

LESOTHO

SWAZILAND

BOTSWANA

AFRIQUE DU SUD

NAMIBIE ZIMBABWE

ALGERIE LIBYE

MAURITANIE

GAMBIE

NIGER MALI

BURKINA FASO

NIGERIA COTE

D’IVOIRE

RWANDA

COTE D’IVOIRE

MAURITANIE

PEAC

COMELEC

WAPP

EAPP (+ RDC et Burundi)

SAPP (+ RDC, Angola et Tanzanie)

Pools Energétiques

ETHIOPIE 260 TWh/an

Pôle à fort potentiel hydroélectrique

NAMIBIE

GABON

ZIMBABWE

BURUNDI

KENYA

TANZANIE

Proche Orient

Europe

GUINEE 19 TWh/an

MOZAMBIQUE 38 TWh/an

RD CONGO 774 TWh/an

CAMEROUN 115 TWh/an

Inga

GHAN

A

TOGO

BE

NIN

GUINEE-BISSAU

SIERRA LEONE

EGYPTE

ETHIOPIE 260 TWh/an

SOUDAN

13

been implemented in SAPP, are being implemented in WAPP and under design in EAPP.

CAPP and COMELEC must still design and develop their power market institutions and

rules. Multilateral and bilateral agencies (World Bank, African Development Bank, EU,

etc.) have played a key role in establishing institutions for the power pools and in funding

initial investments.28

Table 3: Installed Capacity by Power Pool

CAPP (2009)

COMELEC (2009)

EAPP (2008)

SAPP (2010)

WAPP (2010)

Installed capacity (MW)

6,073 27,347 28,374 49,877 14,091

Hydropower Share (%) 86% 8% 24% 17% 30% Thermal Share (%) 14% 91% 73% 83% 70% Population (millions) 123.9 85.6 385.6 160.5 260.6 kW/1000 inhabitants 49 319 74 311 54 Source: Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, Regional Power Pools, 2011, Table 1. Notes: (1) Years represent the last year with data for all power pool members (2) CAPP: Central African Power Pool, COMELEC: Comité Maghrébin de l'Electricité (in north Africa), EAPP: East African Power Pool, SAPP: Southern African Power Pool, WAPP: West African Power Pool

The power pools demonstrate how electricity can create interlocking regions and

the role of regional institutions. As shown in Figure 4, the North Africa power pool is now

linked to Europe and has plans to link to other pools, creating the potential for new or

further developed regions (North Africa-southern Europe) and mega-regions (pan Africa).

When the regions are large or overlap at the continental level, what does it mean to be

regional? As for institutions, applied to the African energy context and with the

specificities of each region and countries in mind, specific energy measures should be

carried out by the best geographical/administrative/social entity possible, however that is

measured. This might be a regional structure, sub-national entities (provinces) or national

organizations. In the case of the African Power Pools, it appears that regional electricity

markets are crucial to achieve sustainable development goals. However, these markets

require strong regional economic institutions; guidelines; and short, medium and long-

term infrastructure investments and building designs. The funding for developing states

28 SNC-Lavalin and Parsons Brinckerhoff, "Final Master Plan Report, Regional Power System Master Plan and Grid Code Study, Volume 1," (2011), 79; CEEAC-Central African Power Pool, "Code Du Marché De L’eléctricité De L’afrique Centrale," (Kinshasa2009); Southern African Power Pool, "Operating Guidelines," (Harare, Zimbabwe2011); "Agreement between Operating Members, Revised Document," (Harare2008); "Notes on Differences in Revised Inter-Government Memorandum of Understanding," (Harare2006); " Inter-Government Memorandum, Inter-Utility Memorandum and Operating Guidelines," (Windhoek1995).

14

will likely need to come from a variety of international and regional sources, both private

and public. This leads us to our next section: energy infrastructure and development.

Figure 4. North Africa’s Energy Links

Source: African Development Bank Group. "Unlocking North Africa’s Potential through Regional Integration: Challenges and Opportunities." edited by Emanuele Santi, Saoussen Ben Romdhane and William Shaw. Tunisia: African Development Bank, 2012.

IV. Issue Two: Energy Infrastructure and Development

Although scant research has been conducted on the energy infrastructure role in

development, a few essential elements have been highlighted: infrastructure has been

critical in Africa’s recent improved economic growth; however, the continent’s

infrastructure lags behind those of other developing regions; and Africa continues to suffer

from missing regional links and stagnant lack of access. 29 Moreover, the infrastructure

challenges vary greatly by country and sub-region. For example, a large share of South

Africa’s infrastructure is domestically financed, often by the central government, while in

DRC, international donors are the main financial supporters.30 These differences are

29 For a comprehensive approach of the Infrastructures’ roles in Africa, see the report produced by the African Development Bank and the World Bank (2010), Africa’s Infrastructure, a time for transformation, Washington 30 Southern African Power Pool, " Inter-Government Memorandum, Inter-Utility Memorandum and Operating Guidelines."; "Operating Guidelines."; "Agreement between Operating Members, Revised Document."; "Notes on Differences in Revised Inter-Government Memorandum of Understanding."; " Inter-

Hancock–African Resources and Regionalism

8

Figure 2: North Africa’s Energy Links

Source: African Development Bank Group. "Unlocking North Africa’s Potential through Regional Integration: Challenges and Opportunities." edited by Emanuele Santi, Saoussen Ben Romdhane and William Shaw. Tunisia: African Development Bank, 2012. IV Issue Two: Regionalism and Water The African regional power pools link directly to regional water issues. The SAPP enables South Africa, which relies on coal for 95% of its electricity, to buy hydroelectricity from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zambia, and Mozambique.21 Proponents expect the proposed $80 billion Grand Inga dam (see Figure 3) to generate double the capacity of China’s Three Gorges dam, providing even more energy for the SAPP. The Congo river, which widens to about three miles in some areas, empties into the Atlantic Ocean near the equator, creating a massive plume that accounts for 40-80% of total carbon productivity and making it one of the largest carbon sinks on the planet. This raises issues of how the dam will affect other states in the region. Critics have raised concerns about the DRC’s massive debt and high levels of corruption (CDR is ranked 160 out of 176 on the Corruption Index22), and questioned whether the Congolese people will really get any of the electricity, as opposed to others on the SAPP and in central Africa, and even Europeans.23 Figure 4 shows the very low population density in much of the DRC. People in low density areas are usually not connected to the grid, and therefore would not benefit from the additional electricity.

21 In March 2013, South Africa announced it would buy 2,500 MW from the DRC Inga dam. Franz Wild, "South Africa Secures Energy Promise From Congo's Inga Dam," Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-08/south-africa-secures-energy-promise-from-congo-s-inga-dam.html. 22 Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/country#COD. 23 International Rivers, http://www.internationalrivers.org.

U n l o c k i n g N o r t h A f r i c a ’ s P o t e n t i a l t h r o u g h R e g i o n a l I n t e g r a t i o n- C h a l l e n g e s a n d O p p o r t u n i t i e s -

7 The project with 200 MW capacity (was completed in 2003 at the cost of around $243 million which was shared by Mali:35.3 percent, Mauritania 22.6 percent and Senegal 42.1 percent. The power output was agreed to be allocated as follows:Mali 52 percent, Mauritania 15 percent, and Senegal 33 percent. Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Sénégal(OMVS) was the regional entity created to own and operate the facilities in the Senegal River basin by the three countries.The project included about 1,300 km of 225 kV lines to transmit power to key load centers in Mali, Senegal and Mauritaniaand interconnecting the grids in the three countries. The transmission system includes 900 km of 225 kV line from the Ma-nantali hydro power plant in Mali to Nouakchott and a 186 km long 90 kV spur from this line from Matam to Boghe via Kaedi.Four towns—Nouakchott, Rosso, Boghe and Kaedi -- are thus interconnected to the OMVS grid which connects the systemsof Mali, Senegal and Mauritania.

Figure 2. North Africa Energy Links

However, Mauritania’s power trade has been already established with Mali and Senegal.

Mauritania has been a beneficiary of the Manantali hydropower project which is located in Mali,

and owned and operated jointly by the governments of Mali, Senegal and Mauritania.7 There are

also two other hydro power projects under construction on Senegal River. The Felou hydropower

project with a capacity of 60 MW is under construction about 200 km downstream of Manantali

which is expected to complete by 2013. The Gouina hydro power project is further upstream of

Felou and will have an installed capacity of 69 MW and is also planned for commissioning in 2014.

37

Source: Authors.

15

worth considering as we advance our IPE understanding of the linkages between

electricity and development.

At the regional level, the power pools illustrate how essential the association of

transmission lines with hydropower projects is when it comes to the electricity distribution.

In addition, transmission lines used to transport electricity often come across international

borders and require interconnectors. In the SAPP case, the ZIZABONA (Zimbabwe-

Zambia-Botswana-Namibia) interconnector project is one of the priority projects within

the SADC.31

Three of the power pools–the Southern, East, and Central African Power Pools–are

related to the highly-anticipated Grand Inga Dam project, which has been touted as being

able to create enough electricity to light up half of Africa. According to early 2014

reports, the Grand Inga project is likely to be constructed in several development phases,

starting with an upgrade of Inga 1 and 2, and then building Inga 3, which would itself be

constructed in two steps: the first phase is expected to include the building of a dam with a

height of 100 meters (Basse Chute) and then an elevation phase (Haute Chute). There

would be no closure of the Congo River and no tunnels, just an open channel. When

completed, the third phase of Inga 3 would produce 4,800MW of electricity. Further

phases would necessitate the flooding of the Bundi Valley, to form a 22,000 hectares

reservoir and drowning of the Inga 3 channel. According to recent studies and various

documents from the DRC and international donors (African Development Bank and

World Bank’s International Finance Corporation), the latest design of Grand Inga into

phases will result in medium- and long-term gains in electricity to DRC and the southern

African region. (For an analysis of the tradeoffs between regional and domestic energy

security gains and the uncertainties of the project, see Green, Sovacool, and Hancock.32)

In addition, the project will be developed and run by private-public partnerships. Three

consortia—China's Sinohydro and Three Gorges Corporation; Spain's Actividades de

Construccion y Servicios, Eurofinsa and AEE; and a South Korean-Canadian consortium

consisting of Daewoo-Posco-SNC Lavalin—are currently bidding for the contract. As of

January 2014, the US Agency for International Development was reportedly considering Government Memorandum, Inter-Utility Memorandum and Operating Guidelines."; CEEAC-Central African Power Pool, "Code Du Marché De L’eléctricité De L’afrique Centrale." 31 Personal interview (by Agathe Maupin) with SAPP representative at the SAPP Coordination Centre, Harare, Zimbabwe in May 2013. 32 Nathaniel Green, Benjamin K. Sovacool, and Kathleen J. Hancock, "Grand Designs: Assessing the African Energy Security Implications of the Grand Inga Dam," (under review).

16

joining one of the consortia.33 The African Development Bank, World Bank’s

International Finance Corporation, French Development Agency, European Investment

Bank and the Development Bank of South Africa have all expressed interest in financing

parts of the project, and South Africa has committed to purchasing 2,500MW of Inga 3’s

capacity, making it the primary purchaser.34 Figure 5 depicts the differing aspects of the

project, as of January 2014.

33Toh Han Shih, "US Mulling Partnership with China in Congo Inga 3 Dam Project," South China Morning Post, January 20 2014; Michael J. Kavanagh, "U.S. Considers Funding Part of Congo’s $12 Billion Inga Dam," Washington Post, Dec. 16 2013. 34 Democratic Republic of the Congo, "Press Release: The Democratic Republic of the Congo Fixes October 2015 as the Date for the Launch of the First Phase of the Largest Hydroelectric Plant in the World," (2013).

17

Figure 5. The Grand Inga project evolution into phases

Source: Nathaniel Green, Benjamin K. Sovacool, Kathleen J. Hancock, “Grand Designs: Assessing the African Energy Security Implications of the Grand Inga Dam.” African Review Studies, forthcoming. Originally modified from Maud Jullien, “Can DR Congo's Inga dam project power Africa?” BBC World News Africa, 14 November 2013.

Another important point is that the African regional power pools link directly to

both national and regional development, a point illustrated by the proposed Grand Inga

Dam. The SAPP enables South Africa, which relies on coal for 95% of its electricity, to

buy hydroelectricity from the DRC, Zambia, and Mozambique.35

35 In March 2013, South Africa announced it would buy 2,500 MW from the DRC Inga dam. Franz Wild, "South Africa Secures Energy Promise from Congo's Inga Dam," Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-08/south-africa-secures-energy-promise-from-congo-s-inga-dam.html.

18

The DRC anticipates the energy sector will contribute to economic development.36

For example, two of the six main objectives introduced in the government’s most recent

five-year plan (2012-2016) refer to the strategic dimension of the energy sector to

consolidate macroeconomic stability and boost growth and job creation and to improve

Congolese living conditions.37 The chapter on the Electric Power Sector acknowledges the

inadequate energy supply in DRC as one of the biggest constraints to the country’s

economic and industrial development. Predictably, the most important envisaged

hydropower infrastructures are the Inga dams and the associated high-voltage transmission

lines. The DRC’s plans call for renovating and extending Kinshasa’s electrical network to

increase household access to electricity from the current 9% to 19% in 2016.38 Returning

again to the regional focus, compared to the 2007-2011 plan, which focused on

rehabilitating the Inga 1 and 2, the current plan stresses the export potential of the country

to its fellow SAPP members, including by building new transmission lines and

interconnectors.39 Figure 6 shows the SAPP grid in detail, including the thermal, nuclear

and hydro stations.

36 République Démocratique du Congo, "Document De Stratégie Pour La Réduction De La Pauvreté 2006-2010 (DSRP 1)," (Kinsasha2006); "Document De La Stratégie De Croissance Et De Réduction De La Pauvreté 2011-2015 (Dscrp 2)," (Kinshasa2011). 37 "Programme D’action Du Gouvernement 2012-2016," (Kinshasa2012). [Check sources; WDI shows higher access rates now. Do we mean rural rates?] 38 Ministère de l’Energie République Démocratique du Congo, "Plan Quinquennal De Croissance Et De L’emploi 2011-2015, Province-Ville De Kinshasa," (Kinshasa2011). 39 République Démocratique du Congo, "Programme D’action Du Gouvernement 2012-2016."

19

Figure 6. Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) Regional Electricity Grid

Source: SAPP website (March 14, 2014) http://www.sapp.co.zw/sappgrid.html

The Congo River and its Inga dams are just one case of the intersection of water

resources and energy on a regional level. In the West African Power Pool, several

hydropower projects are under construction on the Senegal River and in the East African

Power Pool, the future Millennium Dam in Ethiopia is now envisaged as a regional project.

Furthermore, hydroelectric plants require that water reservoir or river levels be maintained,

which requires the inclusion of climate change simulation.40 Large-scale hydro has to be

considered along small-scale hydro and other renewable energy sources. As Figure 7

illustrates, Africa has a significant hydropower potential, with only about 7% of this

potential tapped.41 Note that Africa is almost entirely water scarce or water stressed (see

Figure 8). Dams for hydropower will raise issues about water use, including whether 40 Amanda Sauer and Piet Klop, "Over Heating: Financial Risks from Water Constraints on Power Generation in Asia: India, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam," (London: World Resources Institute, 2010), 11. 41 World Energy Council, "World Energy Issues Monitor," (London: World Energy Council, 2013), 9.

20

states can afford new forms of electricity generation, the drain that some resource

exploration (mining, e.g.) might put on countries, and the conflicts between using water

for energy, agriculture, and drinking.

Figure 7. Africa’s Hydropower Potential

Source: International Rivers (2010) World Rivers Review, n°3, vol. 25. Note: “Hydropower hotspot” refers to places where new dams and hydropower stations could or have created tensions with the local population, per International Rivers, an NGO that opposes building large dams.

21

Figure 8. Thermal Power and Hydropower Plants and Water Stress Levels

Source: Amanda Sauer and Piet Klop, World Resources Institute, 201042

African power pools and related infrastructures such as dams and transmission

lines contribute to create a resource-based region, which might lead to greater cooperation

and governance. Moreover, states that already have a productive regional relationship

before water and energy becomes an issue will be better able to navigate the challenges

that damming may bring. According to Libiszewski, the critical factors that determine how

well states handle these potential resources-related conflicts includes the “degree of

dependency on exogenous sources of water, the distribution of power between adjacent

states, and the relationship of an antagonistic versus cooperative tradition in inter-state

relations.” States are most likely to resolve favorably issues when there is an existing

institutional and legal framework.43

V. Energy Research Future Areas of Interest

The above discussion of two key areas where energy resources, regionalism and

development intersect in Africa suggests a number of areas for future research, much of

42 Sauer and Klop, "Over Heating: Financial Risks from Water Constraints on Power Generation in Asia: India, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam," 4. 43 Stephan Libiszewski, "International Conflicts over Freshwater Resources," in Ecology, Politics, and Violent Conflict, ed. Mohamed Suliman (New York: Zed Books, 1999), 128.

22

which has yet to be tapped into. In addition, these issues can be extended to comparative

analysis with other world regions.

• Resources nexus Many resource issues link with other resources, creating “the

resource nexus.”44 As noted in the discussion above, energy overlaps with drinking

water and agriculture, which in turn affects food and land use. While this is most

obviously the case for hydro, there is overlap for other types of energy as well. For

example, the DESERTEC initiative is a massive solar energy project meant to

bring energy from North Africa to the EU. However, the sponsors argue that it can

help solve water scarcity issues in the Middle East and North Africa: “In desert

regions near the coast, solar-thermal power plants can be combined with seawater

desalination so that they not only produce electricity, but also drinking water.”

This suggests a research agenda into how these different resources intersect with

regionalism issues. For example, if you solve one regional issue (energy), do you

create another resource problem (lack of accessible drinking water)? If so, how

might we address this new challenge? If the challenge is not addressed, the project

may face significant political risks.

• Energy security Scholars should explore the connection between these regional

resources and the energy security literature, which has become extensive in the last

five years.45 Several energy-related security issues come to mind in the nexus

context.46 Bearing in mind the linkages between water, energy and food resources,

it is interesting to note that several regional policy documents address security as a

44 Philip Andrews-Speed et al., "The Global Resource Nexus: The Struggles for Land, Energy, Food, Water, and Minerals," (Washington, D.C.: Transatlantic Academy, 2012). 45 These books and articles illustrate the vast and varied literature on energy security: Luca Anceschi and Jonathan Symons, eds., Energy  security  in  the  era  of  climate  change  the  Asia-­‐Pacific  experience, Energy, climate and the environment series (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Sylvia Gaylord and Kathleen J. Hancock, "Developing World: National Energy Strategies," in The  International  Handbook  of  Energy  Security, ed. Hugh Dyer and Maria Julia Trombetta (Cheltenham, UK /Northampton, Massachusetts USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013); Mely Caballero Anthony, Youngho Chang, and Nur Azha Putra, eds., Rethinking  energy  security  in  Asia  a  non-­‐traditional  view  of  human  security, SpringerBriefs in environment, security, development and peace, (Berlin ; New York: Springer,, 2012); APEC, A  Quest  for  Energy  Security  in  the  21st  Century:  Resources  and  Constraints  (Tokyo: Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre, 2007); Gawdat Bahgat, Energy  Security:  An  Interdisciplinary  Approach  (West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2011); Malavika Jain Bambawale and Benjamin K., "China’s energy security: The perspective of energy users," Applied  Energy  88, no. 5 (2011); James T. Bartis et al., Promoting  international  energy  security, Technical report (Santa Monica, 46 Andrews-Speed et al., "The Global Resource Nexus," 3.

23

crosscutting challenge in these sectors. For example, SADC has started to develop

a regional climate change strategy including references to the Energy and Water

sectors. Indeed, dams, pipelines and off-shore drilling raise concerns of

environmental injury that affect regions beyond the state where the project is

located. This includes potentially harming fisheries in rivers and oceans, as well as

damaging drinking water. This type of damage could undermine regional

cooperation, or result in greater cooperation in order to resolve the problem.

• Issue-area spill over As some regional integration scholars argue, regional

agreements can have a spillover effect, moving from one issue area to another.

ECOWAS is a prime example of spillover in Africa. When ECOWAS was created

in 1975, the members were focused on economic cooperation, with no mention of

security and only passing reference to human rights, governance, and political

issues. It seemed a particularly unlikely group to integrate. Of the various African

regions, West Africa’s member states are the most diverse in terms of geographic

size, development levels, and languages inherited from colonialism – in nine states,

the colonial language is French; in five, English; and in two, Portuguese. Despite

these significant differences, ECOWAS is now an organizing center for security

issues and energy issues, including the West African Power Pool and the

ECOWAS Center for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE). This

suggests that further research should be done on how regional organizations

expand into other areas, reinforcing particular regions.

• Role of third parties A variety of regional and global organizations, states and

non-state actors–in addition to the African states themselves and their regional

organizations–often play a key role in energy regionalism. For example, the East

African Power Pool has received technical and financial assistance from the

European Union, USAID, Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN

Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and the African Development Bank.47

The EU has been a critical player in advocating for, or even pushing, African states

to follow the EU’s lead in creating regional organizations. For example, the Africa-

47 Jasper Oduor, "Eastern Africa Power Pool: Presentation to Hydropower for Sustainable Development Conference, March 31 to April 1," (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia2011).

24

EU Energy Partnership (AEEP) is one of eight partnerships organized between the

two continents in 2007.48 NGOs can play critical roles as well. For example,

International Rivers has been active in identifying problems with–and mostly

opposing–large-scale infrastructure projects, notably dams.49 While some states

may opt to continue with these projects, the NGO can provide capacity to the less

developed state in the form of political and economic research and technical and

legal advice. In its 2011 report on regionalism, the World Bank concluded that

“regional integration is critical to accelerate progress in Africa.... For example,

trading power through regional pools can cut US$2 billion off energy costs and

reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 70 million tons every year...Beyond

infrastructure, regional approaches are needed across many sectors to tackle the

challenges of trade, food security, water resource management, climate change,

disease prevention, tertiary education, and governance.”50 Other third parties to

consider include multinational corporations, the various groups within the World

Bank (MIGA, IFC, etc.), and regional development banks. Scholarly research on

how effective these actors are, in absolute and comparative terms, would provide

useful information for both the involved states and the third parties. A database of

who is doing what kind of support work would further this research.

• Overlapping regions Regions sometimes bleed into each other, raising additional

questions about what it means to be in a region. For example, the North African

electricity group also links to Europe and is in the process of linking Mauritania,

which already links to Mali and Senegal, part of the West African Power Pool. In

addition, DESERTEC, which links North Africa to the EU creates a new region.51

Scholars can examine what this means for regional identities and whether these

regions might create new spillovers that affect other economic or security issues.

The power pools also illustrate the issue about overlapping regions. DRC and

48 The other strategic areas are peace and security; democratic governance and human rights; regional economic integration, trade and infrastructure; UN millennium development goals; climate change; migration, mobility, and employment; and science, information, and space. For more on the partnership, see http://www.africa-eu- partnership.org/africa-eu-strategic-partnership 49 Naho Mirumachi and E. Van Wyk, "Cooperation at different scales: challenges for local and international water resource governance in South Africa," The  Geographical  Journal  176, no. 2 (2010). 50 World Bank, "Partnering for Africa’s Regional Integration: Progress Report on the Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa," (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011). 51 DESERTEC, http://www.desertec.org.

25

Tanzania are expected to belong to two grids, linking the illustrate a potential

overlap of interests between regions around the generation and transmission of

electricity and raises the following question: which partnership is going to be

privileged, by who and on what basis? In the Grand Inga project, Egypt was

considered a potential buyer for the electricity before 2011. Furthermore, in the

actual project’s frame into phases, Nigeria is also mentioned as a potential buyer

for the future energy production of the Inga 4 to 8.

VI. Conclusions

In this paper, we discuss the regionalism literature and note that it is generally weak on

energy issues and nearly devoid of analysis of the electricity sector. Yet, academics and

political leaders, as well as development-focused regional and global organizations and

activists increasingly recognize the importance of access to electricity, for basic human

needs such as lighting and cooking as well as for advanced economic development

through industrialization. Electricity initiatives are progressing at every level, from

individual households to villages, local regions, states, multi-state regions, and globally

through, most notably, the UN and the World Bank.

We analyzed here two major issues on the intersection of electricity, regionalism

and development in sub-Saharan Africa. We find that the four African power pools have

created the opportunity for greater electricity access and more efficient markets, yet their

potential has not been fully realized. We also find that related infrastructure is being built

but that in many states that are economically developing infrastructure projects will

require significantly more international investments as well as careful analysis to ensure

that political, social, and environmental issues are addressed. Our example of the Grand

Inga Dam project, which has gone through several iterations, demonstrates how

nationally-based infrastructure projects become regional projects with support from

international donors.

Our final section suggested a number of research areas, including the resources

nexus, energy security, issue-area spill-over, the role of third parties, and overlapping

regions. This list is not meant to be inclusive but rather to illustrate that there is vast

opportunity for IPE scholars to contribute to this research. We employed in our own

analysis a number of key IPE players and concepts: electricity markets, regional and

international agreements and organizations, and states. For the most part, these players

26

have been omitted in scholarly publications on electricity. Nearly all the literature is

written by electrical engineers and economists, who, given their expertise, rightly focus

their attention on the technical and economic aspects of electricity generation. Yet many

of the barriers to higher electricity access are not about technical or economic issues, but

about political and social issues. IPE scholars thus have a major contribution to make in

this area of research. We need more IPE scholars using their theoretically guided research

to better understand the political and social hurdles to these projects, along with providing

research-based policy recommendations. Given the technical and economic aspects of the

African power pools, this research would best be conducted in multidisciplinary teams

with engineers and economists. IPE scholars might focus on the role of the World Bank

and regional development banks, the intersection of public and private partnerships, and

state, regional, and local interests. We plan to take up this challenge ourselves and hope

others will join us.

27

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