research report redd and poverty 09.2009

8/14/2019 Research Report REDD and Poverty 09.2009

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Cobenefits or collateral damage?The potential impacts on the wellbeing of forest-dependent people under different

shades of REDD (Country case studies)

Karin Svadlenak-Gomez

Research report submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MSc inBiodiversity Conservation and Management for Distance Learning Students of the

University of London, Centre for Development, Environment and Policy (CeDEP), Schoolof Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)

25 September 2009

Word count: 9986


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Table of Contents

Research Report Declaration Form.................................................................................1Table of Contents............................................................................................................2

List of Figures and Tables ...............................................................................................3

Abstract...........................................................................................................................4

Acknowledgements.........................................................................................................51 Introduction ..............................................................................................................62 Methodology ............................................................................................................8

2.1 Research questions .....................................................................................82.2 Data collection & analysis ............................................................................82.2.1 Analytical framework....................................................................................92.2.2 Country cases............................................................................................10

3 Climate change, deforestation, biodiversity, and human wellbeing.........................123.1 Deforestation as a driver of global climate change and biodiversity loss ....123.2 The flip side: climate change impacts on forests and associated

biodiversity.................................................................................................143.3

The human aspect: Impacts on the wellbeing of forest-dependent people .15

3.4 Multiple benefits from REDD......................................................................153.5 Poverty, equity, governance, and REDD....................................................17

4 Country case studies..............................................................................................204.1 Africa .............................................................................................................20

4.1.1 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)..................................................204.2 South and Central America............................................................................25

4.2.1 Bolivia ........................................................................................................254.2.2 Guatemala .................................................................................................30

4.3 Southeast Asia...............................................................................................354.3.1 Cambodia ..................................................................................................35

5 Discussion..............................................................................................................416

Conclusions and Recommendations ......................................................................46

Appendix 1: The evolution of REDD......................................................................... A.1-1Appendix 2: Sample Questionnaire .......................................................................... A.2-1Appendix 3: Notes on Indicators and Country Data Comparison.............................. A.3-1Appendix 4: Expanded Country Case Studies.......................................................... A.4-1

A.4.1 Africa ................................................................................................... A.4-1A.4.1.1 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ......................................... A.4-1A.4.2 South and Central America ................................................................ A.4-17A.4.2.1 Bolivia ............................................................................................. A.4-17A.4.2.2 Guatemala ...................................................................................... A.4-27A.4.3 Southeast Asia region........................................................................ A.4-38

References..................................................................................................................R-1Bibliography ................................................................................................................ B-1


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List of Figures and Tables

Figure 3-1: Global Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emissions.....................................13Figure 4-1: DRC Land Cover Map .................................................................................20

Figure 4-2: North-Eastern DRC .....................................................................................20Figure 4-3: Bolivia Land Cover Map ..............................................................................26Figure 4-4: Satellite image of Bolivia .............................................................................27Figure 4-5: Guatemala land cover map .........................................................................31Figure 4-6: Satellite image of fires from biomass burning in Guatemala ........................32Figure 4-7: Cambodia Land Cover Map.........................................................................36Figure 4-8: Satellite image of South East Asia...............................................................37Figure 5-1: Comparison of two key governance indicators ............................................41Figure A.4-1: DRC Land Cover Map......................................................................... A.4-2Figure A.4-2: North-Eastern DRC............................................................................. A.4-2

Figure A.4-3: DRC logging concessions and protected areas................................... A.4-4Figure A.4-4: The Eastern Afromontane Hotspot...................................................... A.4-4

Figure A.4-5: Bolivia land cover map...................................................................... A.4-18Figure A.4-6: Satellite image of Bolivia................................................................... A.4-19Figure A.4-7: The Tropical Andes Hotspot.............................................................. A.4-19Figure A.4-9: Guatemala land cover map............................................................... A.4-28Figure A.4-10: Satellite image of fires from biomass burning in Guatemala............ A.4-29Figure A.4-11: Political map of the MBR in Guatemala........................................... A.4-37Figure A.4-12: Land use in the Guatemalan Maya Biosphere Reserve................... A.4-37Figure A.4-13: Cambodia land cover map .............................................................. A.4-39Figure A.4-14: Satellite image of South East Asia (2001) ....................................... A.4-40Figure A.4-15: Protected areas and protected forests ............................................ A.4-41

Figure A.4-16: Forested and sparsely populated provinces in Cambodia ............... A.4-42Figure A.4-17: Forest classification, administration and concessions ..................... A.4-44

Figure A.4-18: The Oddar Meanchey Carbon Forestry Project Area ...................... A.4-49Figure A.4-19: The Seima Biodiversity Conservation Area ..................................... A.4-50

Table 2-1: Analytical framework ....................................................................................10Table 4-1: Key data and indicators (DRC).....................................................................21Table 4-2: Key data and indicators (Bolivia) ..................................................................25Table 4-3: Key data and indicators (Guatemala) ...........................................................30Table 4-4: Key data and indicators (Cambodia).............................................................35Table A.3-1: Country data comparison..................................................................... A.3-5

Table A.4-1: Key data and indicators (DRC)............................................................. A.4-1

Table A.4-2: Key data and indicators (Bolivia)........................................................ A.4-17Table A.4-3: Environmental threat changes as a result of the project ..................... A.4-25Table A.4-4: Key data and indicators (Guatemala)................................................. A.4-27Table A.4-5: Key data and indicators (Cambodia) .................................................. A.4-38


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Abstract

Tropical deforestation and forest degradation are important drivers of both climatechange and loss of biodiversity, while forests and the ecological services they provide

are also being affected by climate change. The new mechanism Reducing Emissionsfrom Deforestation and Degradation (REDD), which is being considered as onecomponent of a successor arrangement to the Kyoto Protocol, offers a promising newavenue for financing forest conservation. Under REDD, developing countries would bepaid by developed countries for avoided deforestation and degradation. REDD couldoffer benefits for climate change mitigation, biodiversity, and poverty reduction indeveloping countries.

This research report presents an analysis of governance issues related to pro-poorREDD implementation. Section 2 presents the methodology used. Section 3 discussesrelevant background in a global context based on a literature review of the links betweenclimate change, deforestation, biodiversity loss, and poverty, and relevant governance

issues. Section 4 presents four country-specific case analyses (Democratic Republic ofCongo, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Cambodia) of the impact different governance contexts,and in particular forest governance, is likely to have on REDD co-benefits for forest-dependent people. Findings from the analysis are used to discuss, in section 5, theimplications of national governance indicators for forest-dependent people.

To achieve pro-poor REDD outcomes, governance institutions need reform andstrengthening in the countries analyzed. It is also argued that where political will islacking or pressures from powerful groups are too strong, chances are slim thatmarginalized communities will experience real improvements in wellbeing.


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"What we are doing to the forests of the world is but a mirrorreflection of what we are doing to ourselves and to one another."Mahatma Gandhi

1 Introduction

The global environment today is faced with the dual crises of climate change and drastic

biodiversity decline, driven primarily by anthropogenic forces. Some estimates warn that

between 20 and 30% of all plant and animal species will probably be threatened with

extinction if global average temperatures exceed 1.5 to 2.5C over 1980-1999 levels

(IPCC, 2007b).

Tropical deforestation and forest degradation are important drivers of both climatechange and loss of biodiversity. In turn, forests and the ecological services they provide

are also being affected by climate change. There has long been a large gap between

funding needed and funds available for effective biodiversity conservation in tropical

forests, and innovative approaches to generate additional funding are increasingly being

explored (Emerton et al., 2006; Olander et al., 2009; Richards & Jenkins, 2007; White &

Hatcher, 2009). Because forest services have been undervalued, users and owners

often do not have sufficient motivation to leave forests standing1.

The emergence of carbon markets (both the voluntary market and the new mechanism

called Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD), which is being

considered as one component of a successor arrangement to the Kyoto Protocol of the

UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) after 2012, appear to offer a

promising new avenue for financing forest conservation (Angelsen, 2008). Under the

Kyoto Protocol, countries can obtain carbon credits only for afforestation/reforestation

activities. In the EU Emissions Trading Scheme forest carbon is also marginalized

(Richards & Jenkins, 2007).2

Under REDD, developing countries would be paid bydeveloped countries for the service of avoided deforestation and degradation (Ebeling

& Yasu, 2008).

1This is not the only underlying cause, but it is a significant one.2 The evolution of REDD is briefly outlined in Appendix 1.


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While the principal aim of REDD schemes is to maintain carbon stocks to reduce

greenhouse gas emissions, such a mechanism could offer benefits for biodiversity and

other ecosystem services, and for poverty reduction in developing countries (Peskett et

al., 2008).


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2 Methodology

Due to the broad scope of this topic, this report concentrates on the impacts of REDD on

the wellbeing and rights of forest-dependent people.

Peskett et al. (2008) have looked at general policy options for designing pro-poor REDD

initiatives. They argue that more research is needed, inter alia, on poverty implications

of demonstration REDD activities and of REDD systems in different national contexts.

This research report is an attempt to contribute to these areas.

2.1 Research questions

This research report investigates the following questions:

1. What is the likely consequence of REDD for the rights and livelihoods of poor

forest-dependent people in different country contexts?

1.1 What processes are jeopardizing local livelihoods and rights?1.2 Who wins and who loses in different governance and land tenure contexts?

2. What policies exist or would have to be put into place to ensure equitable benefit-

sharing within countries and avoid harmful REDD impacts on forest-dependent

people?

2.2 Data collection & analysis

Data collection was primarily accomplished through a thorough literature review

including follow-up with some of the authors. Secondarily, interviews or written answers

to questionnaires with country-based informants provided additional insights. An open-

ended questionnaire/interview guide was devised for this purpose and is attached as

Appendix 2


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The data collected were primarily qualitative in nature, except for existing statistics and

indicators. Information on countries was compiled and synthesized into brief case

studies (see Section 4). Although generalization from the case studies is not possible,

as the main challenges involved are national governance issues, it is likely that thegeneral analysis and conclusions could be applicable in similar contexts elsewhere.

2.2.1 Analytical framework

The analytical framework for REDD implications for the poor used by Peskett et al.

(2008) provided a starting point. It is based on three poverty dimensions (income and

growth; equity; and voice and choice) and four spatial scales: individual, community,national, and international.

For this research, some representative indicators for the above poverty dimensions

(relating to human wellbeing and governance issues) were selected (see Table 2-1) and

statistics collected for each case country. These primarily national level data, and,

where they exist, studies of relevant project experiences, were reviewed and used to

analyse REDD/wellbeing implications and to infer the likelihood of benefits reaching the

individual/community level

3

. Selected indicators, as well as forest,- and biodiversity data,are further explained and presented in summary form (see Table A.3-1) in Appendix 3.

3Although Peskett et al. rightly distinguish between individual and community levels, for purposesof this report, due to data limitations, these are here lumped together as one category.


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Table 2-1: Analytical framework

Dimensions of wellbeing Related governance issues4 Indicators

(national level)Livelihoods/income National development status

Income distribution Poverty Reduction Strategies

National Human DevelopmentIndex (HDI) NationalMillennium Development

Goal (MDG) reports Poverty Reduction Strategy

Papers (PRSP) or similarstrategy documents prepared

Timber & non-timber forestproduct (NTFP) use

Equity (intra-country/intra-community)

Benefit-sharing mechanisms(Who owns forest carbon?)

Land tenure/resource access(Who may use forestresources?)

Status of indigenous/ forest-dependent people

National income-distribution(GINI)

Forest ownership/tenure Forest laws ILO 169, UNDRIP, national

legislation

Voice & Choice

(participation)

Transparency in governance

Participatory forestmanagement Institutional capacity

Corruption perception index

(CPI) Voice & accountability index Government effectiveness

index Extent of community-

management FSC certification Community participation in

national REDD processdevelopment

2.2.2 Country cases

The topic was illustrated through four country cases: Democratic Republic of the Congo

(DRC), Bolivia, Guatemala, and Cambodia. These were selected on the basis of

location (aiming for a broad geographical spread) and existence of forests of high

conservation importance, such as the Global 200 priority areas (NGS & WWF, n.d.).

Countries were classified into one of four potential categories based on forest cover and

recent deforestation rates following Da Fonseca et al. (2007): 1. Low Forest Cover/High

Deforestation (LFHD), 2. Low Forest Cover/Low Deforestation (LFLD), 3. High ForestCover/High Deforestation (HFHD), and 4. High Forest Cover/Low Deforestation (HFLD).

The cut-off point for HF/LF is 50% forest-cover, and for HD/LD a 0.22% annual

deforestation rate. Under some REDD scenarios, HD countries would have greater

4 Governance issues are crosscutting and do not usually apply to only one of the dimensions ofwellbeing. The separation here is merely for convenience.


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potential for earning REDD credits than LD countries, since REDD would only pay for

avoiding additionaldeforestation.

This report does not provide a complete analysis of this issue. Rather, it is assumed that

the countries analyzed will be able to receive substantial earnings from REDD that couldbe distributed to stakeholders at national and local levels. The specific focus of analysis

is the likelihood of REDD benefits reaching the forest-dependent poor, which is

essentially a governance matter. The F/D classification was adopted merely for

illustrative purposes, as it provides a rough idea of a countrys forest situation. The

classification for each country is shown in data tables in Section 4 of the report.


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3 Climate change, deforestation, biodiversity, and

human wellbeing

3.1 Deforestation as a driver of global climate change and

biodiversity loss

Climate change due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is now widely

considered a very urgent threat to the global environment and continued human

wellbeing. The concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2), the principal anthropogenicgreenhouse gas, in the atmosphere had risen from a pre-industrial value of about 280

ppm to 379 ppm in 2005, and the average annual rate of increase in concentration over

the decade 1995-2005 (1.9 ppm p.a.) surpassed by far the average since the beginning

of atmospheric measurements. The bulk of the increased concentration is attributable to

fossil fuel use, while land-use change also contributes about 30%. Within the land-use

change category, deforestation and forest degradation is most important, accounting for

17.4% of overall CO2 emissions (IPCC, 2007b). This is more than the share of the

transport sector (Stern, 2006), as can be seen in Figure 3-1.

In 2005 about 30% of the Earths land mass (4 billion hectares) was forested, but global

forest area continues to decrease. In the period 2000-2005, about 13 million hectares

per year were lost, mainly due to land use change (FAO, 2005). Global average

deforestation figures hide large differences among regions and countries. The rates of

deforestation in tropical regions were highest. Over the past few decades, the direct

causes of deforestation have largely shifted from being driven by land conversion for

subsistence farming to large-scale exploitation of forest areas for commercial use, suchas oil and mineral extraction, logging, and conversion to plantations (Butler & Laurance,

2008).


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Figure 3-1: Global Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emissions

a) Global annual emissions (1970 to 2004), b) Share of different anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (CO2-eq.) in 2004, c) Emissions share of different sectors (forestry includes deforestation).

Source: IPCC (2007a, p.36)

Many disappearing forests are of high biodiversity value and home to threatened, often

unique, species. There is widespread scientific consensus that protected area coverage

of important biodiversity areas is insufficient (Schmitt et al., 2009). Furthermore, many

protected forests suffer considerably from illegal deforestation and degradation, though

at lower rates than unprotected forests (Campbell et al., 2008).

Estimates of carbon stored in different types of forest vary. Most global estimates are

rough approximations based on biome-average datasets that use representative values

of forest carbon per unit area for broad forest categories (Gibbs et al., 2007). Tropical

forests probably store more than 320 billion tonnes of carbon globally (Campbell et al.,

2008). Whether mature forests are net sinks or emitters has been contentious, but

recent research has strengthened the case for the important role old-growth forest plays

in carbon sequestration (Lewis et al., 2009). Even the cautious assessment of forests

and emissions undertaken for the Eliasch Review confirms that, overall, intact tropicalforests are expected to remain net carbon sinks (Betts et al., 2008).

Forest cover also produces an indirect climate impact by modifying some physical

properties of the land surface, such as its albedo. The feedback mechanisms are

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agreement that further deforestation would cause the land surface temperature to warm

because of reduced transpiration, and that large scale deforestation may alter

atmospheric circulation, thereby further modifying climates (Betts et al., 2008).

3.2 The flip side: climate change impacts on forests and

associated biodiversity5

Climate change is expected to increasingly drive biodiversity loss, but the process is

complex, as current and projected impacts on biodiversity are subject to the multiple and

non-linear feedback loops and lag-times within ecological systems (Ehrlich & Ehrlich

2008). The impacts on forests are as yet uncertain. While some forest areas may

become more productive, others may eventually change into different ecosystems

altogether (Betts et al., 2008). Rosenzweig et al. (2007) report that physical and

biological systems on all continents are already being affected, particularly by regional

temperature increases that initiate alterations in hydrological systems, water resources,

coastal zones, and oceans. Shifts in species distributions, local abundance, and

phenology have by now been documented (e.g., Adams et al., 2009; Battisti et al., 2005;

Chen et al., 2009; Dale et al., 2001; Danby & Hik, 2007; Ehrlich & Pringle, 2008; Evans,

2006; Myers et al., 2009; Reid et al., 2004; Seppl et al., 2009; Van Mantgem et al.,

2009; Williams & Liebhold, 2002).

While the severity of the impacts and the extent of future biodiversity losses due to

climate change and forest degradation or deforestation are difficult to predict (Laurance,

2007; Wright & Muller-Landau, 2006; Dirzo & Raven, 2003), without decisive action, the

decline will be unstoppable (Ehrlich & Pringle, 2008).

5 Several drivers of biodiversity loss tend to reinforce one another (MEA 2005). This report limitsthe discussion to climate change impacts on forest-based biodiversity.


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3.3 The human aspect: Impacts on the wellbeing of forest-

dependent people

While human actions are driving biodiversity loss and climate change, reciprocal

consequences are also diminishing human wellbeing. Poor people, especially those

living in remote rural areas, are expected to be most severely impacted.

About 1.6 billion people rely on forest resources for food and cash income (FAO, 2008;

UN-DESA, 2009), and over 800 million people live inside tropical forests and woodlands

and in mosaiclands, outnumbering people dwelling on purely agricultural lands (Chomitz,

2006). In areas of high forest and very low population densities forest-dependence is

likely highest (Chomitz, 2006). It is, however, fruitless to seek simplistic connections

between forests and poverty. Empirically, the links are weak. Some people derive

wealth from forests, others from converting forests to agriculture (Chomitz, 2006, p. 81).

Deforestation results in the decline of many species that are essential to forest peoples

livelihoods, with negative consequences for subsistence use and local trade. It has

been estimated that by the 2080s between 50 and 200 million people (mostly from

developing countries) will be displaced by climate-induced changes to crop yields,

ecosystem boundaries and species ranges (Anderson, 2005). Under the rightgovernance systems, the millions of people who depend on forests for their livelihoods

are likely to benefit from climate change mitigation and forest conservation.

3.4 Multiple benefits from REDD

Given the synergies between protecting forests, biodiversity conservation, and mitigating

greenhouse gas emissions, governments could simultaneously meet multipleenvironmental obligations, including those under the UNFCCC, the Convention on

Biological Diversity, and other conventions and agreements. In addition, REDD could

advance poverty reductionefforts at national and local levels and provide other social

benefits.


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There are, however, also risks to biodiversity6 and local communities that could arise

from REDD. Concerning poverty reduction, there are two distinct issues:

First, there is the question of how much overall funding a particular country is likely to

gain from a REDD scheme, and whether this would be sufficient to counteractdeforestation pressures. What type of reference level is used is critical7 (Ebeling &

Yasu, 2008). In addition, the opportunity costs of avoided deforestation are highly

variable, depending on location (type of land-use, soil, climate, production scale,

technology and inputs used, market access and infrastructure quality), and are

complicated by factors such as commodity market prices, costs of the factors of

production, and the discount rate applied (Grieg-Gran, 2008). It is not surprising, given

this complexity, that estimates of opportunity costs per hectare vary widely (see, e.g.,

analyses by Butler et al. (2009), Venter et al. (2009), Wise et al. (2009)).

Second, there is the issue of the distribution of benefits to stakeholders within the

country. This report does not address the first issue in detail8, focusing more specifically

on the second one.

In the absence of pro-poor policies, co-benefits from REDD may not reach the rural poor.

There are concerns that rural communities will not be adequately compensated for

conservation efforts (Richards & Jenkins, 2007; Luttrell et al., 2007; Ebeling & Yasu,2008), or that indigenous people living inside forests may be displaced or their rights

infringed upon in other ways (Anchorage Declaration, 2009; Butler, 2009;

Climatefrontlines.org, 2009; Griffiths, 2007; Palmer, 2009; Roe et al., 2007). One of the

major challenges will be to balance equity and efficiency considerations.

There are human wellbeing implications for different REDD options chosen for a global

instrument, but regardless of the global design, at national level pro-poor policies would

6 Risks to biodiversity are not elaborated here. For discussions of these see, e.g., ATBC & GT,2009; Ebeling & Yasu, 2008; Miles, 2007; Miles & Kapos, 2008; Sasaki & Putz, 2009.7E.g. whether to use a static (e.g. historical) or a dynamic (either declining or improving) baseline,determines how many carbon credits a country can receive for avoided deforestation activities, butthe details of this are beyond the scope of this report. An excellent summary of this and generalchallenges for PES can be found in Wunder (2007; 2005) and a useful discussion of possibleperverse incentives depending on reference levels used can be found in Miles (2007).8 Refer, e.g., to da Fonseca et al., 2007; Dutschke et al., 2008; Griscom et al., 2009.


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be needed to avoid harmful impacts and encourage positive effects on the rights and

livelihoods of forest-dependent poor communities (Peskett et al. 2008).

3.5 Poverty, equity, governance, and REDD

Poverty can be defined in many ways, but clearly people who cannot meet their basic

needs fall within the category of the poor. Income alone is not a sufficient indicator for

human wellbeing, although it is often used as a convenient proxy. Indicators such as the

HDI and those outlined in the MDGs offer better descriptors of the multiple dimensions of

human wellbeing.

Regarding global equity, there are concerns about justice and power differentials amongrich and poor nations, such as the global distribution of obligations of climate change

mitigation vs. the right to development in poorer countries. Much of the REDD

discussion related to equity issues focuses on the distribution of benefits among different

developing countries. This does not automatically address important intra-country

justice issues. These are determined by the types of governance and benefit sharing

mechanisms that exist or are put in place within countries. Several groups are also

lobbying for global pro-poor REDD design standards. Various organizations are

developing relevant standards that could be helpful not only at the project level, but alsofor governments seeking to meet poverty reduction goals. The already existing Climate,

Community and Biodiversity (CCB) Project Design Standards (Victurine, 2008; CCBA,

2008) and the social and environmental standards for REDD, which are currently being

developed by the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) (CCBA, n.d.),

explicitly address poverty and rights issues. At the time of writing it seems likely that a

global REDD instrument will at least include language requiring that the rights of

indigenous peoples and local communities are not negatively affected by REDD

(UNFCCC, 2009).

Concerning indigenous peoples rights, there are a number of international instruments

that a majority of countries have committed to. These include (Lawlor & Huberman,

2009) the 1989 International Labour Organizations Convention Concerning Indigenous

and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 169), which covers special rights


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concerning their customary lands; and the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous

Peoples (UNDRIP), which was voted for by 143 countries. It requires, inter alia, the free

prior informed consent (FPIC) of indigenous people on any activity on their traditional

lands. More general human rights instruments also contain relevant provisions,

including the right to property in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.Governments thus have both moral and legal duties to uphold the rights of forest-

dependent and indigenous people. Not doing so may not only be inequitable and in

contravention of laws, but may also lead to failures of REDD programmes.

Land tenure regimes and other property rights are generally an important aspect of

forest governance. Vast areas of forest in the tropics are communally held and

managed, but historically there has been friction between customary and statutory

tenure and the latter is used as the basis for defining property rights, adjudicating claims,and establishing contracts (RRI & ITTO, 2009). REDD could, given political will, lead to

or reinforce recognition of traditional forest use rights and to clarification of tenure and

recognition of ancestral claims. But tenure is not the only issue. The human, civil and

political rights of forest-dependent people are often denied or insecure, especially when

competing with the interests of more powerful groups or individuals. Equitable forest

governance therefore requires a broader spectrum of rights recognitions, such as

systems of representation, and social, cultural, and economic rights for indigenous and

other forest-dependent people (Colchester, 2008). Good governance also demandsrights that are enforceable, and access to an impartial justice system for all citizens

(Stockbridge, 2006).

Variation in the bargaining power of different organizations is important in determining

how rules are defined and which interests they favour (Stockbridge, 2006). For example,

despite the increasing trend towards various types of co-management schemes of

forests, while these have tended to improve access rights of the rural poor to forest

resources, they have not always significantly improved their livelihoods, as forestryagencies interests in timber production or environmental conservation may ride

roughshod over local peoples interests or favour local elites (Wollenberg et al., 2004).

Another problem that applies to forest governance in general and will certainly also

affect REDD is that in many tropical countries with large forest resources, governments


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have only limited control over what is happening in forests (Legge et al., 2008). The

implication is that, even when laws and policies exist for conservation and SFM,

implementation may be deficient. Furthermore, because deforestation is not exclusively

a forest sector issue, coordination is needed among many institutions working in different

sectors, and broad-based information sharing and participation are required, from thegrassroots to the national government level. In this regard, another potential co-benefit

that could emerge from the process of getting countries ready for REDD implementation,

may be improved governance institutions.

It is only through well developed and fully functional institutions at the national, sub-

national and community levels that co-benefits of REDD for local communities have a

chance to deliver what they promise: real benefits for livelihoods and general wellbeing.

It also seems important, so as to avoid creating a class of rent recipients (Schipulle,2009, pers.comm.) among the target population, that benefits if they do reach forest-

dependent people are not perceived as charity, but are in fact clearly linked to specific

actions, such as SFM, conservation work, or alternative livelihood schemes.

In practice it seems that many target countries for REDD are not well prepared to ensure

that local people benefit (Cotula & Mayers, 2009). A phased approach to REDD design

and implementation is therefore finding increasing support among negotiators. In such

an approach, tropical forest countries would first develop a national strategy andimplement some pilot projects, then receive donor funding for reform of tenure and forest

laws, and finally get large amounts of funding from carbon markets for actual emissions

reductions (Block, 2009; Meridian, 2009). Some programmes to help countries plan for

and test REDD activities already exist, among them the World Banks Forest Carbon

Partnership Facility (FCPF) (FCPF, 2009) and the multi-agency UN-REDD Programme

(UN-REDD, 2009b).


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4 Country case studies

The cases in this report examine what implications local context and existing relevantpolicies and governance systems could have for REDD impacts on forest-dependent

communities in these countries. These cases are presented with more detail in

Appendix 4.

4.1 Africa

4.1.1 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

DRC is among the poorest countries in the world, with the lowest human development

and governance scores. At the same time, the Congo Basin still has vast extensions of

relatively intact tropical forest. Some key statistics relating to human wellbeing and

forests are shown in Table 4-1-and additional statistics can be found in Appendix 3.

Figure 4-1 shows the vast extent of still existing tropical forest, while Figure 4-2 is a

satellite photograph of the dense rainforest cover surrounding the Congo river and its

tributary Aruwimi in north-eastern DRC..

Figure 4-1: DRC Land Cover Map Figure 4-2: North-Eastern DRC

Source: Vancutsem et al. (2009, p.67) Source: ESA (2008)


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Table 4-1: Key data and indicators (DRC)

H U M A N W E L L B E I N G &G O V E R N A N C E F O R E S T

Population 62,399,224Total forest area(1000 ha) 133,610

GDP/capita (PPPUS$) 714 Forest as % of totalland area (FAO) 58.9%

Life expectancy 45.8

Deforestation rate(Change in forestarea in %) 2000-2005(FAO) -0.2%

HDI (2007/2008Report) 0.411 Trend Down

GDP per capita (PPPUS$) rank HDI rank(2007/08) 7

Original forest areaas % of total landarea (WRI) 83.0%

HPI (2007/2008Report) 39.30%

Classificationfollowing Fonseca etal. (2009) HFLD

GINI 55

Carbon stock inforest 2005 (milliontonnes) 32,152

WB GovernanceScore Voice &Accountability (2009)(-2.5 to +2.5) -1.48 Forest ownership public 100%

WB GovernanceScore GovernmentEffectiveness (2009)(-2.5 to +2.5) -1.89 FSC certification -CPI (2008) 1.7EPI Overall score 47.3ILO 169signed/ratified NUNDRIP supported? Y

Source: Author, drawing on various sources (see Appendix 3)

Despite relatively low levels of deforestation so far, there is concern about the increasing

number of logging concessions and potential land conversion for commercial agriculture

in the country (Kidd & Kenrick, 2009). By 2008, 33.5 million ha of forest lands were

under some type of concession for timber or mining (Sunderlin et al., 2008), none of

which was following international SFM standards (Lescuyer & Delvingt, 2007), although

the government has expressed its intent to move towards SFM (BTC, 2007).


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Forest livelihoods

About 70% of the population are forest-dependent for their livelihoods (Counsell, 2006),

but only a small percentage of people are indigenous forest-dwellers, collectively

referred to as pygmy. More than two thirds of the country are occupied by the majorityBantu peoples, who also depend on forest-resources, albeit to a different degree, and

have overlapping customary rights to forest resources with the pygmies (IP, 2007). It is,

however, the pygmies who have the most trouble gaining formal rights to lands and

resources, due to systemic discrimination (Lewis et al., 2008). The 2005 Constitution

guarantees the protection of fundamental rights to all citizens of DRC, but no special

status is given to pygmy groups (ibid.).

Governance

DRC is in a severe economic and governance crisis, after emerging from a long internal

conflict between the central government and various rebel groups that has caused the

deaths and displacement of millions of people (WB, 2008a). Despite the decade-long

presence of UN Peacekeepers, conflict is still taking lives and causing many human

rights abuses in some areas of the country (HRW, 2009; OHCHR, 2009). Governance

scores are low and corruption levels are very high. The government prepared its first full

PRSP in July 2006, which aims, inter alia, to strengthen public institutions and improvegovernance (WB, 2008b).

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become increasingly organized over the

past few years, many of which are grouped under the umbrella organization Natural

Resources Network (RRN), as have pygmy groups.

Forest governance

Forestry is governed by the Ministry of Environment (MECNT). A Thematic Group on

Forests brings together relevant MECNT Directorates, the Planning Ministry, and

representatives from international agencies that support DRCs forest sector (UN-REDD,

2009a). A decentralization and reorganization programme is in progress.


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The 2002 Forest Code zoned 40% of the forest for commercial exploitation, 15% for

conservation, and the remainder for concessions. Zoning does not reflect traditional

land tenure systems, but it imposes a duty on logging companies to provide socio-

economic benefits and allows communities to participate in setting concession limits

(Sakata, 2007). Communities have also been given the right to receive forestconcessions and manage forests, but by 2008 none had been awarded (Sunderlin et al.,

2008).

An independent World Bank Investigation Panel states that while a solid legal framework

is important, an almost overwhelming problem in the forest sector in DRC is the lack of

institutional capacity to implement and enforce the laws and regulations, especially at

the provincial and local levels (IP, 2007, p.132), and that one can therefore not count on

the law to guarantee sustainable development or benefits for local people in the forestsector.

REDD Potential

DRC is a member of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations (like Bolivia and Guatemala),

which has expressed formal interest in REDD to the UNFCCC. Based on a highly

simplified model, Butler (2006) estimated that DRC could earn anywhere between

US$179 million and US$1.28 billion per year for avoided deforestation, depending on thecarbon price and actual emissions reductions, which would be a significant income boon.

The government views REDD as a potential input to the national development agenda

(Kasulu et al., 2008), and has formally stated that REDD activities should support local

communities and indigenous peoples social, environmental and economic development

(UNFCCC, 2008, p.5).

Yet corruption is reportedly systemic, and transparency and accountability at all levels

are low. Particularly for pygmies, it is hard to see how they will be able to benefit fromREDD income, given their historic social exclusion, except perhaps through targeted

projects. Neither may poor Bantu farming communities see many income benefits from

REDD, due to unresolved issues around legislating for community land tenure and

creating implementing bodies, which makes it difficult for policy makers to assign carbon

rights, especially where there are overlapping land claims (Rogers, 2008).


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More positively, however, DRC has one of the strongest civil society networks in central

Africa (Potter, 2009, pers.comm.), and it will not be that easy for the government to

completely centralize (i.e. appropriate) REDD credits. NGOs and the government are

trying to raise awareness on REDD among the population so that affected people canmake informed decisions (Potter, 2009, pers.comm.). Hope also springs from continued

international pressure and support for governance reform.

DRC will receive assistance from the FCPF (FCPF, 2008b), which will help to create the

necessary legal and institutional frameworks to facilitate REDD implementation. It will

also receive assistance from the UN-REDD Programme. Many other international and

national agencies are involved in strengthening forest governance in DRC. The UN-

REDD (2009) proposal argues that despite a heritage of distrust between governmentand civil society, the REDD process in DRC has so far been a cooperative effort and that

the prospects for REDD advancing through a government/civil society dialogue are solid.


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4.2 South and Central America

4.2.1 Bolivia

Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin America, and considered biologically

megadiverse. It has the sixth largest tropical forest area in the world (UDAPE, 2006).

Table 4-2: Key data and indicators (Bolivia)


Population 9,517,537

Total forest area

(1000 ha) 58,740

GDP/capita (PPP US$) 2,819Forest as % of totalland area (FAO) 54.2%


Deforestation rate(Change in forest areain %) 2000-2005 (FAO) -0.5%

HDI (2007/2008Report) 0.695 Trend Up

GDP per capita (PPPUS$) rank HDI rank(2007/08) 7

Original forest area as% of total land area(WRI) 54.0%

HPI (2007/2008Report) 13.6%

Classificationfollowing Fonseca etal. (2009) HFHD

GINI 60


WB Governance ScoreVoice & Accountability(2009)(-2.5 to +2.5) -0.01 Forest ownership

public 85%,private 10%,

other 5%

WB Governance Score

GovernmentEffectiveness (2009)(-2.5 to +2.5) -0.81

FSC certification(June 2009) (1000 ha) 1,819

CPI (2008) 3EPI Overall score 64.7ILO 169 signed/ratified YUNDRIP supported? Y



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Some key statistics relating to human wellbeing and forests are shown in Table 4-2, and

additional statistics can be found in Appendix 3.

Despite relatively low levels of deforestation so far, there is concern about an increasing

rate of forest loss, mostly because of the expansion of industrial agriculture, logging, andincursion of colonists from the degraded highlands (Robertson & Wunder, 2005).

Figure 4-3: Bolivia Land Cover Map

Source: (FAO, 2009a)

Legend

Administration

Land Cover

Developed

Dry Cropland & Pasture

Irrigated Cropland

Cropland/Grassland

Cropland/Woodland

Grassland

Shrubland

Shrubland/Grassland

Savanna

Deciduous Broadleaf Forest

Deciduous Needleleaf Forest

Evegreen Broadleaf Forest

Evergreen Needleleaf Forest

Mixed Forest

Water

Herbaceous Wetland

Wooded Wetland

Barren

Herbaceous Tundra

Wooded Tundra

Mixed T undra

Bare Tundra

Snowor Ice

Partly Developed

Unclassified

Figures 4-3 and Figure 4-4 show how agricultural land use is spreading into forest areas.

Forest livelihoods

Some 1.4 million people live in or near forested areas, including 180,000 indigenous

people with a claim on 42% of Bolivias forest lands, and 30,000 peasant farmers whouse NTFPs. There are about 500 registered small-scale timber producers. Conflicts

exist especially with poor colonists from the highlands, and with large-scale forest

concessions. (Colchester, 2004)


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Governance

As a medium human development country, Bolivia has some general governance

challenges. Corruption is somewhat of an issue, as is the highly skewed income

distribution.

The fourth national MDG report and the National Development Plan of 2006 (PND)

include broad, integrated social goals, reflecting political will to work against social

exclusion and reduce socio-economic inequalities (Loza Tellera, 2006). Indigenous

people9 on average score lower on human development indicators than non-indigenous

people (UDAPE, 2006).

Bolivia ratified ILO 169 in 1991 (ILO, 2006), and UNDRIP became national Law 3760 in2007 (Sunderlin et al., 2008). The election of Bolivias first indigenous president allowed

the incorporation of indigenous social movements into the national political arena

(UDAPE et al., 2006).

Forest governance

The extent of large-scale illegal logging has

decreased substantially since the institutionof the independent Forest Superintendence

(Colchester, 2004). The PND also includes

SFM as a goal (UDAPE, 2006).

Bolivia is undergoing a process of forest

land reform to recognize or transfer formal

rights to local communities and

smallholders based on ancestral claimsand cultural identity. Land tenure in Bolivia

is still skewed towards large-scale

landholders, despite earlier land reforms.

9 The majority (66%) of the population above age 15 self-identify as indigenous, among the highestproportions in Latin America, and almost 50% speak indigenous languages (UDAPE et al., 2006).

Figure 4-4: Satellite image of Bolivia

Source: NASA (2008a)


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The Forest Law (1996) includes indigenous and campesino interests, including

community forestry for commercial purposes (Colchester, 2004; Pacheco et al., 2008).

The current reforms are intended to reconcile conservation, livelihoods and rights-based

concerns (Pacheco et al., 2008). They are among the most progressive in community

and indigenous land tenure and resource access reform, and also regarding safeguardsfor equal land access for women and men (Taylor, 2006). There are, however,

incidences of conflicts over forest tenure, for example where customary use rights clash

with awarded timber or other concessions (Asquith et al., 2002), and unintended

instances of elite capture have arisen locally (Taylor, 2006).

As part of a broader decentralization programme, Bolivia is also moving forest

management authority from central to local government (Chomitz, 2006). Municipal

governments in Bolivia retain 25% of forest revenues, which could be invested into localpro-poor development (OECD, 2009). Officially 85% of forests are publicly owned, while

10% are privately owned, and the remainder is either community-owned or of undefined

tenure status (Chomitz, 2006). Local communities and indigenous groups own relatively

large tracts of forest (ibid.). Community forest management is somewhat hampered by

cumbersome standards, bureaucracy and high transaction costs for smallholders

(Pacheco et al., 2008). Overall, the decentralization of forest land administration has

had a positive impact on the conservation of forests (Taylor, 2006).

According to Ebeling and Yasu (2008), corruption in the forestry agency has been

much reduced due to policy and institutional reform, which has translated into much

better forest management. By 2009, 16 forestry operators had achieved FSC

certification, including one indigenous communal concession (FSC, 2006; FSC, 2009).

REDD Potential

Bolivia is a member of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations (like DRC and Guatemala),which has expressed formal interest in REDD to the UNFCCC.

Based on a highly simplified model, Butler (Butler, 2006a) estimated that Bolivia could

earn anywhere between US$72 million and US$1.08 billion per year for avoided


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deforestation, depending on the carbon price and actual emissions reductions. This

would make a significant contribution to national earnings.

In practice, Bolivias supportive legislative framework and pro-poor policies are often

hampered by institutional weaknesses, lack of financial resources, and lack of technicalcapacity (May et al., 2004). Bolivia will receive assistance for REDD preparations from

the FCPF, which will help to ameliorate governance challenges.

One pilot experience with carbon forestry, the carbon project in Noel Kempff Mercado

National Park (see Appendix 3), on the whole, resulted in net positive protection and

livelihood effects on participating service-sellers and positive community-wide social

effects. Based on Bolivias efforts to uphold indigenous rights and to improve forest

governance so far, chances are good that REDD in Bolivia will have a positive impact on

local forest-dependent communities.


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4.2.2 Guatemala

Guatemala is a medium human development country in Central America, with one of the

highest levels of biodiversity and endemism combined in Latin America. Some keystatistics relating to human wellbeing and forests are shown in Table 4-3, and additional

statistics can be found in Appendix 3.

Table 4-3: Key data and indicators (Guatemala)


Population 13,348,222Total forest area

(1000 ha) 3,938



Deforestation rate(Change in forest areain %) 2000-2005 (FAO) -1.3%


GDP per capita (PPPUS$) rank HDI rank(2007/08) -11

Original forest area as% of total land area(WRI) 99.0%

HPI (2007/2008Report) 22.5%

Classificationfollowing Fonseca etal. (2009) LFHD

GINI 55

Carbon stock inforest 2005 (milliontonnes) 572

WB Governance ScoreVoice & Accountability(2009)(-2.5 to +2.5) -0.26 Forest ownership

public 42.2%,private 52.5%,

other 5.3%

WB Governance ScoreGovernment

Effectiveness (2009)(-2.5 to +2.5) -0.49

FSC certification(June 2009) (1000 ha) 457.6

CPI (2008) 3.1EPI Overall score 76.7ILO 169 signed/ratified YUNDRIP supported? Y



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Within Guatemala, there is great variation in forest loss rates among departments

(Ferrate et al., 2009). The highest loss in terms of area was experienced in the remote

Petn region, although this is where most protected areas are located. Conversion to

farmland, fuelwood consumption, illegal industrial logging, fires, and pests drive

Guatemalas deforestation. (Ferrate et al., 2009). Figure 4-5 maps different types ofland cover, and Figure 4-6 shows smoke from forest fires in 2002.

Forest livelihoods

Many peoples livelihoods are connected

to communal and industrial timber

concessions and use of forest products.Fuelwood use is increasing (about 60%

of the population depend on it for

energy), but there is little control and

much more appears to be harvested than

is authorized (Ferrate et al., 2009).

Governance

Guatemala has many governance

challenges. The country was embroiled

in a long civil war, during which extreme

human rights violations by the State were

committed. Numerous violent massacres of entire Mayan communities took place.

(CEH, 2005)

Peace came in 1996, but the society bears deep scars. Violence and organized crimeare widespread. Income distribution remains very unequal. Formally, the government

today is committed to indigenous rights, reflected in its ratification of international

indigenous-rights related legal instruments and in the new national Constitution. There

are now indigenous peoples offices in some public institutions (Ferrate et al., 2009), but

budgets are insufficient to address indigenous issues efficiently (MRGI, 2008). Crimes

Figure 4-5: Guatemala land cover map

Source: FAO (2000)


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against human rights defenders by illegal armed groups are frequently committed with

almost complete impunity (UN, 2008b).

Forest governance

Forestry and conservation is the

legal purview of a number of

ministries and agencies, mainly the

National Forestry Institute (INAB),

the National Council of Protected

Areas (CONAP), the Ministry of

Environment and Natural Resources

(MARN) and the System for Controland Prevention of Forest Fires

(SIPECIF). Municipalities are

autonomous and responsible for

managing natural resources in their

jurisdiction and for undertaking their own land use planning. (Ferrate et al., 2009) Co-

management arrangements with NGOs exist for some of the National Parks (ELI, 2003).

A process of forest land reform is ongoing, with a move towards decentralizedmanagement of forest resources. Ownership of forests is 42.2% public, 37.8% private

and 14.7% communal (Ferrate et al., 2009). SFM is increasing: At the time of writing,

there were 10 FSC-certified forestry operations in Guatemala, totaling 457,625 ha (FSC,

2009).

Co-management of forests with communities is common. In the Petn region, almost

500,000 ha were put under 13 co-managed community concessions in the 1990s

(Junkin, 2007). This constitutes the largest expanse of community-managed forest inthe world, and almost 70% of this is FSC-certified (Cronkleton et al., 2008). Chomitz

(2006) reports that, despite problematic corruption and lack of organizational capacity,

the extraction of valuable hardwoods has made these concessions mostly profitable, and

that deforestation inside them appears substantially lower than outside them.

Figure 4-6: Satellite image of fires from biomass

burning in Guatemala

Source: NASA (2008b)


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Guatemala thus has an appropriate legal framework and policies for SFM, but

inadequate national budget allocations for forests and conservation appear to reflect the

low political priority given to environmental issues vis--vis other areas (EPIQ, 2003).

Furthermore, more powerful actors often succeed in getting their interests represented

(Larson, 2008), whether at the national level, or at municipal and indigenous authoritylevels.

REDD Potential

Guatemala is a member of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations (like DRC and Bolivia),

which has expressed formal interest in REDD.

Based on a highly simplified model, Butler (2006a) estimated that Guatemala could earnanywhere between US$21-216 million per year for avoided deforestation, depending on

the carbon price and actual emissions reductions. A national agenda for REDD projects

with coordination among the various government agencies is under preparation,

supported by several NGOs. Guatemala will also receive funding from the FCPF for

REDD readiness activities.

According to McNab (2009, pers.comm.) the government maintains that carbon rights

are held by the state, but there is no specific law governing carbon, and the details fordistribution of REDD benefits are still under discussion.

Municipalities in Guatemala may retain a substantial portion of forestry revenue (50%,

double the figure of Bolivia), which can be utilized for pro-poor development (OECD,

2009). The government has expressed interest in maximizing the potential income of

indigenous people from REDD, and potentially, REDD incentives could lead to greater

internal support within communities for SFM activities and might lead to new livelihood-

enhancing opportunities (McNab, 2009, pers.comm.). Which agencies should receiveREDD resources, or what the share for each should be is not yet clear, and it is likely

that greater centralization of REDD income will be sought ( ibid.).

The first REDD demonstration project will launch in the Maya Biosphere Reserve (MBR)

in the Petn with support from international NGOs, but is still in the design stage. The


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groups proposed for participation have legal standing through forest concessions, so it is

expected that local groups would be affected positively (McNab, 2009, pers.comm.).

Overall, it seems that there is good potential for forest-dependent people to derive

benefits from REDD in Guatemala. The Petn region offers an interesting example ofthe complex relations underlying negotiations in contested areas. Most observers agree

that the Petn has become, over the past several years, a territory governed to the

benefit of both communities and forests, enabled through collective action and a shift in

several rights bundles from the state and individual (industrial) concessions to the

communities involved (Monterroso & Barry, 2008).


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4.3 Southeast Asia

4.3.1 Cambodia

Cambodia is a medium human development country with a very high deforestation rate.

It has high numbers of endangered or critically endangered species (Clements & Evans,

2008).

Table 4-4: Key data and indicators (Cambodia)


Population 14,446,056Total forest area(1000 ha) 10,447


Life expectancy 58

Deforestation rate(Change in forestarea in %) 2000-2005(FAO) -2.0%


GDP per capita (PPPUS$) rank HDI rank(2007/08) -6

Original forest areaas % of total landarea (WRI) 100.0%

HPI (2007/2008Report) 38.6%

Classificationfollowing Fonseca etal. (2009) HFHD

GINI 41.7


WB Governance ScoreVoice & Accountability(2009)(-2.5 to +2.5) -0.94 Forest ownership public 100%

WB Governance ScoreGovernmentEffectiveness (2009)(-2.5 to +2.5) -0.81 FSC certification -CPI (2008) 1.8EPI Overall score 53.8ILO 169 signed/ratified NUNDRIP supported? Y



37/138


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people were estimated to be forest-dependent in the year 2000 (Poffenberger, 2006).

Fuelwood provides energy for 84% of the population.

Governance

Cambodias recent history was marred by war in the 1970s and the brutal regime of the

Khmer Rouge from 1975-1979, followed by years of renewed occupation by Vietnam. A

Peace Agreement finally brought new hope in 1991, although it did not mark the end of

violence. Cambodia emerged heavily scarred and, despite an elected government,

serious deficiencies in governance and justice administration remain. (Sharp, 1997)

Cambodia has made substantial

progress in reducing poverty over thepast decade, reducing the proportion

of poor people by about 1% annually

on average. Nevertheless, reducing

inequality is a major challenge,

though not as large as in some of the

other countries presented.

The PRSP of 2002 (RGC, 2002)planned for national poverty

reduction for the years 2003-2005.

In 2003 Cambodia prepared its first

national MDG report and elaborated strategies for achieving the targets in a number of

policy documents, including the Rectangular Strategy (2004) and the National

Development Plan 2006-2010, which integrated the earlier Socio-Economic

Development Plan, the National Poverty Reduction Strategy and the MDGs. (UNDP,

2008)

Although Cambodia voted for UNDRIP, according to OHCHR (OHCHR, 2008, p.15),

indigenous people have suffered greatly from illegal evictions from their traditional

lands. Unlike in other countries, there is no national-level indigenous representative

organization, although there are some provincial-level associations, but there is a

Figure 4-8: Satellite image of South East Asia

Source: NASA (2008c)


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thriving umbrella NGO Forum that brings together social and environmental NGOs,

mainly for networking and advocacy (Evans, 2009).

Forest governance

All forest lands are state-owned (FAO, 2005), and the proportion of community-managed

forests is low (Chomitz, 2006). The Forestry Administration (FA), a semi-autonomous

unit governed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), is

responsible for the management of production forests, whereas the Ministry for the

Environment (MOE) oversees protection forests (Sunderlin, 2006).

Commercial forestry concessions contributed much to deforestation before the

moratorium on logging that was introduced in 2002. Concession management nowrequires mandatory Strategic Forest Management Plans, and Environmental and Social

Impact Assessments. Illegal logging has continued despite the logging ban (Sunderlin,

2006). At the time of writing, none of the logging operations in Cambodia are FSC-

certified (FSC, 2009). Global Witness reports illegal logging even in protected areas due

to lack of political will and institutionalized corruption at the highest levels of government,

which tends to enforce the law selectively against community forest users, but not

against large operators (GW, 2004a).

The government has formally recognized the importance of forest-based livelihoods and

the need to maximize the forestry sectors contribution to poverty reduction, food

security, and equitable development in a 2002 Statement on National Forest Sector

Policy (van Beukering et al., 2009). The Statement also explicitly mentioned the need to

legally recognize and protect the traditional rights of local populations. As of 2008 only

about 2% of forest lands were community forests, but the FA intends to increase the

area to about 20%, and there is now a National Community Forestry Coordination

Committee (Sokhun et al., 2009).

Unlike in Bolivia and Guatemala, logging is not allowed in community forests, so the

extraction and sale of NTFPs is the only way participants can earn income from these

forests (Sunderlin, 2006). Furthermore, most community forestry projects are situated

on already deforested or degraded lands, as the original intent was not poverty-reduction


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per se, but the rehabilitation of such lands and the conservation of what forest remains

(ibid.).

In addition to conflicts with loggers, the illegal appropriation of land, encroachment by

agricultural settlers, and economic land concessions present a problem for ethnicminority forest-dependent communities, whose status in Cambodian society is low, and

who are unable to defend their land or forest use rights (ARD, 2004; ARD, 2006;

Poffenberger, 2006).

There are several ongoing efforts to improve forest governance in Cambodia, such as

donor-funded independent monitors of forest law enforcement. Efforts are also being

made at inter-sectoral coordination.

REDD Potential

As an HFHD country, Cambodia is likely to be able to count on sizeable REDD

investments to avoid further deforestation. Based on a highly simplified model, Butler

(2006a; 2006b) estimated that Cambodia could earn between US$80-875 million from

REDD, depending on the carbon price and actual emissions reductions.

According to a 2008 Council of Ministers decision, the FA now has the right to negotiatedeals and sell REDD credits, but as yet there is no mechanism to disperse funds in such

a way that the maximum revenue reaches the local level (Clements & Evans, 2008).

Like all countries studied, Cambodia will receive assistance from the FCPF for REDD-

readiness.

However, in a situation where [laws] may be made under pressures from donors, but

there is no intention to enforce laws inconvenient to the ruling group (OHCHR, 2008,

p.16), it is not very likely that local forest-dependent communities will receive a fair shareof benefits from REDD, except where NGOs or donors are directly monitoring

performance.

There are at least two international NGO-sponsored forest carbon pilot initiatives under

preparation or recently launched in Cambodia, which are specifically designed with


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community benefits in mind. On a national scale, however, the extent of benefits forest-

dependent people can derive may be limited by lack of political will and generally weak

institutions. The demonstration projects will provide lessons to take into account when

developing further REDD initiatives, and they do appear to have the potential to build

institutional capacities at both national and local levels and demonstrate how suchprojects can work transparently and bring the expected benefits to local communities.


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5 Discussion

Most important for making REDD work for forest-dependent people are, in all country

cases, the existing governance and institutional capacities as well as political will. It is

clear that their starting points are different. All countries have governance challenges,

including institutional deficiencies and issues around corruption and law enforcement

capacity, but it is a matter of degree. As far as governance and human wellbeing

indicators are concerned, Bolivia and Guatemala have been doing much better lately

than Cambodia, which in turn does better than DRC.

Two key governance indicators, voice & accountability, and the CPI, are shown in Figure

5-1 to illustrate this (countries are ranked from worst to best performance). None of the

countries have a stellar performance on either indicator, but DRC and Cambodia are

clearly the worst in terms of accountability and have the highest reported corruption.

Figure 5-1: Comparison of two key governance indicators

CPI

1.7 1.8

3 3.13.4

DR Con go Camb odia Bol ivia Gu atema la Ma dag asca r

S

cale

0-10

Source: Author, drawing on World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2009) and TI (2008)

Going back to the research questions posed in the beginning, it can be said that, while

specific impacts are uncertain and some will depend on the way the global mechanism is

designed, some general answers are emerging.

Q1. What is the likely consequence of REDD for the rights and livelihoods of

poor forest-dependent people in different country contexts?

Voice & Accountability

-1.48

-0.94

-0.26

-0.01

DRC Cambodia Guatemala Bolivia

Scale

-2.5

to

+2.5


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1.1 What processes are jeopardizing local livelihoods and rights?

The situation for forest-dependent people differs markedly in the countries examined, but

also has some similarities in the underlying causes that affect livelihoods and rights.

Appropriation of lands for commercial exploitation, such as mining, logging, or large-scale agriculture, has affected many smallholder farmers in the past, especially in

Bolivia, Guatemala, and Cambodia. This has so far been less of an issue in DRC. In

Cambodia upland indigenous communities have been evicted from their lands, either to

make room for commercial concessions or because other poor farming groups have

moved in. In-migration into indigenous territories to convert forest to farmland has been

a problem in all countries, though in DRC many pygmy groups have themselves become

semi-sedentary farmers and others have become displaced from their lands. In all

countries, if REDD initiatives concentrate mainly on large-scale state-, or private-sector-managed SFM operations, this could potentially lead to negative impacts on smallholder

forest owners or even displace indigenous forest dwellers if areas they inhabit are zoned

for conservation without human habitation.

Social injustices are making indigenous communities particularly vulnerable to loss of

livelihoods. All countries studied have high levels of inequality, with biases against rural

people. Forest-dependent indigenous groups invariably find themselves at the bottom of

the wellbeing scale, but there are clear differences. Bolivia and Guatemala haverecently made strides towards solidifying indigenous rights and have integrated legal

protection for indigenous and local communities into their forest laws. In DRC, like

elsewhere in Africa, the term indigenous itself is controversial, and pygmy people have

traditionally been discriminated against. In Cambodia, highland peoples are also

marginalized and suffer incursion from lowland agricultural migrants. Nevertheless, all

these countries have supported UNDRIP and have at least made statements to the

effect that local and indigenous communities should receive the maximum possible

benefit from REDD.


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1.2 Who wins and who loses in different governance and land tenure

contexts?

To some extent the answer to this question depends how one defines winners. In

general, carbon credit earnings could flow into central government coffers, from wherethey could be redistributed; or they could go straight to the communities living in target

areas to pay them for environmental services provided. Additionally, new employment or

income earning opportunities may arise from REDD-induced SFM operations or

conservation projects with development components. Communities may also see

wellbeing improvements from indirect effects, such as improved institutional and

governance capacity at all levels.

Who is likely to win or lose with REDD implementation will depend on the generalgovernance and institutional situation, and on the detailed arrangements negotiated

between the parties to specific REDD initiatives. The importance of land tenure issues

has been discussed. Where forest sector decentralization processes are well under

way, such as in Bolivia and Guatemala, the chances of community co-benefits are

greater. In these countries, community forestry is relatively prevalent, and this seems to

predestine communities for active participation in REDD. On the other hand, not all

communities are concessionaires, and not all land claims have been sorted out, and

those who cannot legitimize their claims stand to lose, at least concerning direct carbonincome. In Cambodia and DRC, almost all forests are state-owned, and there are much

fewer co-management agreements to date. Prospects do exist to increase their share,

which may yet make some forest-dependent communities into winners.

Where there are conflicting rights claims, particularly over land or resource use, these

need to be clarified. In DRC and Cambodia, indigenous groups have in the past had

their traditional land rights ignored. It remains to be seen how this will be handled in the

future. All countries studied have issues relating to tenure security, including conflictsamong different local communities, law enforcement, and balancing the interests of

various stakeholders.

In practice, in countries with very high corruption levels, such as DRC and Cambodia,

there is a danger that only a minor share will end up with the communities it is intended


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for, while the bulk is captured by elites. The proportion of rural poor is very large, and so

far there appears to be little voice or representation for them vis--vis more powerful

actors, except where NGOs and donors are intervening directly. In countries like Bolivia

and Guatemala, which have accumulated considerable positive experiences with

community forestry, it seems reasonable to expect that communities will not lose out onREDD benefits.

In all countries, through project-based initiatives, such as the pilot projects under

development or implementation, it may be easier to ensure benefits for local

stakeholders; the details depend on the benefit distribution mechanisms negotiated.

Q2. What policies exist or would have to be put into place to ensure equitablebenefit-sharing within countries and avoid harmful REDD impacts on

forest-dependent people?

At least in theory, all countries studied have acceptable legal frameworks and stated

policies that would pave the way for equitable benefit-sharing. Their Constitutions

guarantee indigenous rights and/or equality for all citizens. Forest laws now require

forest management plans and social responsibility strategies from concessionaires, and

national development plans all talk about decreasing poverty and increasing livelihoodopportunities.

REDD specific policies will still have to be elaborated. These will have to address the

benefit-sharing mechanisms (e.g. the percentage of net income to go to various

departments and organizations). In a pro-poor scenario, the maximum possible share

should probably go to the local level, as is, for example, already the case for forestry-

related taxes in Guatemala, where municipalities may keep 50%, which they can use for

local development. For large scale concessions, social obligations are already beingplaced on logging companies, but are at the moment selectively enforced in those

countries with a poor governance record.

Reconciliation of traditional customs concerning forest management and national law is

also necessary in some instances.


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What emerges from the cases studied is that policies and laws are in place or in the

process of being updated, but that implementation is still lacking.


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6 Conclusions and Recommendations

Clearly, co-benefits for biodiversity and the wellbeing of forest-dependent people will notautomatically emerge from REDD. If REDD is to live up to its promise of social co-

benefits, it will have to be flexible enough to accommodate differences in national

situations, and provide sufficiently specific guidance on equity issues to increase the

likelihood of benefits reaching forest-dependent communities.

Politics and policies play a big role in determining actual outcomes. Including pro-poor

policies in national REDD programmes is an important first step. Reforming national and

sub-national institutions to be able to implement such policies is vital. Trade-offs amongthe interests of different groups are inevitable, and in the negotiation process there is a

need for awareness and attempts at mitigation of power differences to avoid elite

capture of benefits. Oversight by watchdog organizations may be needed to ensure

fairness, especially where corruption is high.

Clearly there should be full participation of local communities (through designated

representatives) and FPIC for those groups whose forest areas may be affected, in all

stages of the REDD process. For this to happen, capacity has to be developed at alllevels, from national government agencies to local community organizations. In some of

the countries examined, such processes are well underway (particularly Bolivia and

Guatemala), in others they have only started (DRC, Cambodia). A phased approach, as

outlined in Section 3.5, would be useful in all countries examined. Rights and

governance issues are the crux of the matter, and it will be well worth investing in

clarifying and improving these, for REDD to have a chance to live up to its promise.

The sub-national pilot REDD type projects that are currently under implementation or inthe planning stages will form a pool of experiences on which governments should draw

when designing national REDD schemes. Those initiatives reviewed for this research

are being designed with a participatory, local community-focus, so they will provide

valuable lessons on ways to ensure co-benefits for forest-dependent people. Much

thought will have to go into how these early REDD initiatives may eventually be


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integrated into national programmes and could count under a national accounting

standard.

The challenges for the case countries and other tropical forest countries are formidable,

but not impossible to achieve. However, where political will is lacking or pressures frompowerful groups are too strong, chances are slim that marginalized communities will

experience real improvements in wellbeing.

The inferences presented here are worth following up on through further research based

on specific REDD scenarios once there is clarity on global and national REDD policies.


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Appendix 1: The evolution of REDD

One of the underlying reasons why standing forests have been subject to continueddeforestation is because of the public good nature of the types of environmental

services they provide, beyond marketable products. Public goods are typicallyundersupplied through market mechanisms, and this has also been true of such forestservices as biodiversity or watershed protection. Furthermore, the costs of damages tonatural capital such as forests are usually not accounted for in markets, they areconsidered externalities, and future benefits from, for example, conserving a tract offorest are often discounted so heavily that the immediate consumption income becomesmore attractive than conservation (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2008). Thus, because forestservices are undervalued, users and owners often do not have sufficient motivation toleave forests standing10.

From the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) emergedthe UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on

Biological Diversity (CBD), and the Forest Principles. However, fiscal and regulatorymeasures introduced to attempt to promote sustainable forest management (SFM) andreduce deforestation in tropical forests, or project-based approaches have generally notbeen very successful at reducing deforestation (Richards & Jenkins, 2007; Ebeling &Yasu, 2009). Similarly, global initiatives to stem deforestation and promote SFM, suchas Tropical Forest Action Plans, ITTO Objective 2000, or the UN Forum on Forestsdeclarations on SFM, have not had a large enough impact (White & Hatcher, 2009).Market-based mechanisms offer the potential to obtain much greater amounts of funding(Miles & Kapos, 2008; Roe et al., 2007) and to directly link conservation action tounderlying causes of deforestation and degradation.

Recent experiences with payment for ecosystem services (PES), including some early

carbon-market related projects, have shown that paying land users for ecosystemservices can be effective (FT, 2008; Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder, 2005). It has alsobeen demonstrated that even very poor people can participate in and benefit from PESschemes (Pagiola et al., 2005).

Already in the late 1970s, the idea of compensating for rising atmospheric CO2concentrations through global scale afforestation was brought up (Dyson, 1977, cited inStuart & Moura-Costa, 1998), and since the beginning of the 1990s a variety of forestry-based carbon offset projects have been initiated. By early 2009, 144 early REDD-typeinitiatives were trading credits on the voluntary carbon market (Cotula & Mayers, 2009).

The UNFCCCs Kyoto Protocol makes only limited reference to forestry activities in its

Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) initiatives. Theonly types of forest carbon initiatives currently eligible under this global mechanism areafforestation and reforestation, and to date only 8 forestry projects have been registeredunder the CDM (UNFCCC, 2009b). In the existing EU Emissions Trading Scheme forestcarbon is also mar

research report redd and poverty 09.2009

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