report for the year 2016v5 -...

Reportfortheyear2016

Reportfortheyear2016

ChaireFinanceDurableetInvestissementResponsable Reportfortheyear2016

2

TheresearchprojectsoftheChaireFDIRarerunbytheIDEI-ToulouseSchoolofEconomicsandtheEconomicsdepartmentatEcolePolytechnique.AttheinitiativeoftheAFG,theChaireFDIRismadepossiblefor2016thankstothefinancialsupportofthefollowing10members:

ABNAmroInvestmentSolutions

AllianzGlobalInvestorsFrance

AmundiAM

Caissedesdépôts

CandriamFrance

EdmonddeRothschildAM

FondsdeRéservepourlesRetraites(FRR)

GroupamaAM

HSBCGlobalAM(France)

LaBanquePostaleAM


3

TableofcontentsAgendaforthemeetingoftheScientificCommitteeoftheChaire p.4

Researchteam p.6

Mainresearchachievements p.7Thefivehighpriorityresearchprojects’achievements p.8Otherresearchprojects’achievements p.18

Mainresearchprojects’scorecard p.25

Publicationsandworkingpapers p.26

CommunicationoftheChaireFDIRachievementsandawards p.28

EducationandtrainingrelatedtotheChaireFDIR p.33


4

Agendaforthemeetingofthe

ScientificCommitteeoftheChaireFDIR

March1st,20171.Approbationofthe2016annualreport2.Researchachievementsandprojects3.Miscellaneous

******

Ordredujourdelaréunion

DuComitéScientifiquedelaChaireFDIR

1ermars20171.Approbationdurapportannuel20162.Réalisationsetprogrammederecherche3.Divers


5


6

ResearchteamPatriciaCrifo,EcolePolytechnique&U.ParisWest(Chairco-director)SébastienPouget,IDEI&ToulouseSchoolofEconomics(Chairco-director)StefanAmbec,IDEI&ToulouseSchoolofEconomicsMarianneAndries,IDEI&ToulouseSchoolofEconomicsBrunoBiais,IDEI&ToulouseSchoolofEconomicsMiloBianchi,IDEI&ToulouseSchoolofEconomicsCatherineCasamatta,IDEI&ToulouseSchoolofEconomicsEdouardChalle,CNRS&EcolePolytechniqueVaninaForget,EcolePolytechnique&MinistèreAgricultureChristianGollier,IDEI&ToulouseSchoolofEconomicsEricGiraud-Heraud,INRA&EcolePolytechniqueAugustinLandier,IDEI&ToulouseSchoolofEconomicsThomasMariotti,IDEI&ToulouseSchoolofEconomicsNicolasMottis,EcolePolytechniqueGuyMeunier,INRAParis&EcolePolytechniqueJean-PierrePonssard,CNRS&EcolePolytechniqueSylvainePoret,INRAParis&EcolePolytechniqueJean-CharlesRochet,IDEI&ToulouseSchoolofEconomicsSilviaRossetto,IDEI&&ToulouseSchoolofEconomicsGwenaelRoudaut,EcolePolytechnique&MinistèreEnergieDDetecologieSimoneSepe,IDEI&ToulouseSchoolofEconomicsBernardSinclairDesgagné,HECMontréal&EcolePolytechniqueJeanTirole,IDEI&ToulouseSchoolofEconomicsNicolasTreich,IDEI&ToulouseSchoolofEconomics

Doctoralandpost-doctoralstudentsThomasAndré,SchneiderElectric&EcolePolytechniqueLiviuAndronic,IDEI&ToulouseSchoolofEconomicsAurélienBigo,EcolePolytechniqueElenaEscrigOlmedo,UniversiteJaumeI&EcolePolytechniqueMadalenaFerrana,IDEI&ToulouseSchoolofEconomicsAymericGuidoux,EcolePolytechniqueYannKervinio,IDEI&ToulouseSchoolofEconomicsYvesLeYaouanq,IDEI&ToulouseSchoolofEconomicsRimOueghlissi,U.Evry&EcolePolytechniqueMaximimeWavasseur,IDEI&ToujlouseSchoolofEconomicsYutingYang,IDEI&ToulouseSchoolofEconomics


7

Mainresearchachievements

The research chair on Sustainable Finance and Responsible Investment («ChaireFinanceDurableet InvestissementResponsable»,orChaireFDIR)was launchedin2007,atthe initiative of the French AssetManagement Association AFG, by ChristianGollier fromToulouseSchoolofEconomics-IDEIandJean-PierrePonssardfromEcolePolytechnique.TheinaugurallecturewasgivenbyJeanTirole,the2014recipientoftheSverigesRiksbankPrizein Economic Sciences inMemory of Alfred Nobel and a prolific contributor to the Chairesinceitsinception.

Nowco-directedby SébastienPouget fromToulouse School of Economics-IDEI andPatricia Crifo from Ecole Polytechnique, Chaire FDIR has been running for ten years withabout twenty internationally renowned scholars and has produced numerous scientificcontributionstoourunderstandingofresponsiblefinance.Thetablebelowsummarizesthemain figures about Chaire FDIR, andmore detailed information about its achievements isprovidedthereafter.

TheChaireFDIRinafewnumbers

TheChaire ->Startedin2007->20+researchers-> 2 academic institutions: Toulouse School of Economics-IDEI and EcolePolytechnique->10+partners:ABNAmroInvestmentSolutions,AssociationFrançaisedelaGestionFinancière (AFG), Allianz Global Investors France, Amundi AM, Caisse des dépôts,Candriam France, Edmond de Rothschild AM, Fonds de Réserve pour les Retraites,GroupamaAM,HSBCGlobalAM(France),LaBanquePostaleAM

Research ->4fieldsofpracticalimplications(moreinformationofferedisbelow):• Long-termriskvaluation• DesignandmarketingofSRIfunds• Governance,CSRandfinancialperformance• Engagementanddialogue

->25+academicworkshopswithpartners->10+bilateralscientificmeetingswithpartners->100+scientificstudiespublished->100+presentationsinscientificconferences->3booksonresponsiblefinance->7scientificconferencesorganized

Teaching ->15+PhDstudents->10+courseseveryyearonresponsiblefinancetopics(MasterLevel)

Visibility ->18+articlesinpopularpress(LeMonde,LesEchos,LaTribune,Libération,FinancialTimes,L’opinion)->5BestPhDThesisawardsfromFIR-PRI->1NobelprizeinEconomicScienceforJeanTirole->1PeaceNobelprizeforChristianGollierasamemberoftheIPCC->2BestYoungEconomistnominationsforPatriciaCrifoandEdouardChalle->1nominationasChevalierdel’OrdreNationalduMériteforPatriciaCrifo->1nominationasChevalierdel’OrdredesPalmesAcadémiquesforS.Pouget->1BestPaperawardforSébastienPougetfromEIF->3Cahiersdel’InstitutLouisBachelierdedicatedtotheChaireFDIR


8

ThemainobjectivesoftheChaireFDIRareto:

• Contribute to objectivizing the arguments to show that the development ofsustainable finance and responsible investment is – in today’s world – not onlynecessarybutalsopossible;

• Develop research methodologies allowing to better identify and integrate non-financialcriteriaintotheanalysisofvaluecreation;

• Formaworld-classscientificteamonSRI.

Toachievetheseobjectives,theChaireFDIRcarriesoutresearcharoundthreemaintopics:• Long-termESGperformanceandriskevaluation,• CorporateGovernance,• Shareholderengagement.

For the period 2016-2018, the general assembly meeting of the Association FDIR, theresearchers of the Chaire FDIR, in conjunctionwith the sponsors, have defined five high-priority research projects that pertain the three main topics of the Chaire FDIR. Theachievementsonthesefivehigh-priorityprojectsfortheyear2016aredetailedbelow.A)Thefivehighpriorityresearchprojects’achievementsThe following sectionpresents themain resultsandstateofdevelopmentof the fivehighpriorityprojectsdefinedfortheperiod2016-2018.Someprojectsareatanearlierstageofcompletionthanothers:

- Project1(“howgovernanceaffectsfirmvalue”)iswelladvanced:workingpapersareavailable, some are submitted, and others are published. The main insights havebeenpresentedatseveralconferencesandworkshopswithsponsors.

- Project2(“InstitutionalInvestorsasActiveOwner”)isstillinthedatacollectionandpreliminaryanalysesphase:thereisnoworkingpaperavailableyet,andtheprojecthasnotbeenpresentedsofar.

- Project 3 (“ESG factors and the performance of small andmid cap companies”) ismaturing. The first empirical analyseshavebeen carriedout, leading to interestingfirst results.Aworkingpaper isnotavailableyet,but the first resultshavealreadybeenpresentedatvariousconferences.

- Project 4 (“The measurement of ESG performance and risk: qualitative ratings orquantitativemetrics?”) isatanadvancedstage:workingpapersareavailable,somehavebeenpublished,andseveralresultshavebeenpresentedatworkshops.Furtherempiricalanalysesarestilltobecarriedoutinthefuture.

- Project5(“Sovereigncreditratingsandinterestrates”) ismaturing:workingpapersareavailable,someresultshavealreadybeenpresented,butadditionalstudiesarestilltobecarriedout.


9

Eachproject’spresentationmentionswhatfutureresearchwillbecarriedout,andincludesabriefsummaryoftheproject’sstateofachievement.AMainResearchProjects’Scorecardsummarizestheinformationpage25.1.Howgovernanceaffectsfirmvalue–CoordinatedbySimoneSepe(IDEI-TSE)ObjectiveOverthepast20years,empiricalstudieshavegainedtremendousimportanceincorporategovernance discussions. These studies have largely supported the view that governancearrangementsprotectingdirectorsandmanagersfromremovalincreasetheroomformoralhazard by insulating insiders from beneficial disciplinary forces, reducing shareholder andfirm value. On this view, “good” (i.e., value-increasing) corporate governance is largelyunderstood today as being about stronger shareholder rights. Instead, managerialprotectionfromshareholderremoval,commonlyreferredtoas“entrenchment”,epitomizes“bad”(i.e.,value-decreasing)corporategovernance.Theobjectiveoftheprojectistogathernewempiricalevidenceonwhatmattersincorporategovernance.Inparticulartheprojectaims at understandingwhether corporate governancemeasures traditionally identified asprotective, therefore inducingmanagers and directors entrenchment, have a detrimentaleffectonfirmvalue.MethodologyForthisproject,auniquedatasetthatcoversthirtyyearsofcorporategovernanceintheUS,from1978to2008,hasbeengathered.Thesedataenabletodistinguishbetweentwotypesof corporate governance arrangements, which were previously uniquely identified asprotectivearrangements,andthereforeconsideredasbadgovernancemechanisms.Precisely, our new data separates those protective arrangements that require theagreement of shareholders (i.e., “bilateral protection arrangements”) from the protectivearrangements that do not require shareholder approval (i.e., “unilateral protectionarrangements”). The first category covers staggered boards and supermajorityrequirements.Thesecondcategorycoversfor instancepoisonpillsandgoldenparachutes.Theprojectinvestigateswhetherbilateralorunilateralarrangementshaveanimpactonfirmvalue.Thelogicunderlyingthesetestsisthatunilateralprotectionarrangementsareindicativeofbad governancebecause their “dictatorial” naturemakes itmore likely thatmoral hazardmotivates their adoption, to the detriment of shareholders. Bilateral protectionarrangementsinsteadcanbeconsistentwithbestgovernancepracticesbecauseitmaybeintheshareholders’interesttolimittheirownrights,ifdoingsoinvolvesabeneficialbilateralcommitmentbyboardsandshareholderstocorporatestabilityandlonger-terminvestmentstrategies.ResultsWefirstinvestigatethelong-termassociationoffirmvaluewithchangesinboardstructure(that is, the decision to adopt or remove a staggered board).We find no evidence thatstaggered boards have a strong or persistently negative association with firm value.Rather, inmore innovative firms,or in firms inwhichstakeholder investmentsaremore


10

relevant (e.g., with a large customer or in a strategic alliance), adopting (removing) astaggered board is associated with an increase (decrease) in long-term firm value. Forexample, the adoption (removal) of a staggered board is associated with an increase(decrease)infirmvalue,asproxiedbyTobin’sQ,of5.3%forfirmswithalargecustomer,andhasan insignificantassociationfor firmswithouta largecustomer.Further,ourresultsaredrivenbythesecondhalfofourtimeperiod(i.e.,the1996-2015sub-period)andgenerallyinsignificant in the firsthalf (i.e., the1978-1995sub-period).Overall, these results suggestthat staggered boards have heterogeneous effects across firms and time, providing nosupportfortheentrenchmentviewbutalsomaking itdifficulttodrawanyone-size-fits-allinferenceabouttherelationbetweenstaggeredboardsandfirmvalue.A primary challenge in interpreting the empirical relation between changes in boardstructure and long-term firm value is that staggered boards, like other corporatearrangements,arenotrandomlyassigned.Wetrytomitigatetheseendogeneityconcernsindifferent ways. For instance, we conduct a long-term event study exploiting exogenousvariation in board structure due to changes in Massachusetts’ corporate law. In 1990,Massachusettsmadestaggeredboards“quasi-mandatory”byrequiringfirmsincorporatedinthe state to adopt a staggered board by default andmaking it difficult to opt out of thisrequirement.We compare the value ofMassachusetts firms in the few years before andafter this legal change in a matched sample of firms, where the control firms areincorporatedoutsideofMassachusettsbuthaveasimilarsize,areinthesameindustry,andhavethesameboardstructureastheMassachusettsfirms.Afterthelegalchange,thevalueoftheMassachusettsfirmsincreasedmorethanthevalueoftheircontrolfirms,butwithnodifference betweenMassachusetts firmswith andwithout a staggered board prior to thelawchange.Therefore,whiletheseresultsdonotprovidedirectevidencethatmandatingtheadoptionofastaggeredboardincreasesfirmvalue,theyarealsoclearlyinconsistentwiththehypothesisthathavingastaggeredboardinplacelowersfirmvalue.Ourresultssuggestthattheroleofstaggeredboardsdiffersacrossfirms.Wefindthattheadoption(removal)ofastaggeredboardhasapositive(negative)associationwithfirmvalueamong firmswith stronger stakeholder relationships, such as firmswith large customers,productive employees and in strategic alliances. We similarly find that the adoption(removal)ofstaggeredboardsmorepositively(negatively)impactsfirmvalueamongfirmswhoseprojectsrequirelonger-terminvestmentsandarelikelyhardertovaluebyoutsideinvestors,suchasfirmswithmoreinvestmentsininnovationandintangibles.Wenext investigatewhetherbilateralprotectivearrangementshaveadifferent impactonfirm value than unilateral protective arrangements. To do so, we divide the standardCorporateGovernance“Entrenchment”Index(theso-calledE-Index)intotwoseparatesub-indices: a commitment index (or, more briefly, C-Index), that only includes the E-Index’sthree bilateral provisions, and an incumbent index (or, I-Index), that only includes the E-Index’sthreeunilateralprovisions.WedocumentthatincreasedscoresontheC-Index(i.e.,more commitment) are associated with increases in firm value. That is, adoptinggovernance measures aiming at protecting directorswith the approval of shareholdersincreasesfirm’svalue.Conversely, increasedscoresontheI-Index(i.e.,moreincumbent-drivenentrenchment)areassociatedwithdecreases in firmvalue.Asa furtherempiricaltest,weexaminewhethertheuseofbilateralprotectionarrangementsismorevaluableto


11

certaincategoriesoffirmsforwhichtheshareholders’limitedcommitmentproblemappearsto bemore severe.We find that the positive association between bilateral arrangementsandfirmvalueisstrongerfor:(1)firmswithmorelong-terminnovation,(2)firmsforwhichstronger firm-specific investments by non-financial stakeholders, such as employees andcustomers,arelikelytobemoreimportant,and(3)firmswithmorepotentialforexcessivefuturerisktakingtothedetrimentoffinancialstakeholderssuchascreditors.ImplicationsforpracticeTheresultsfoundinthisprojectbearmajorimplicationsforthedebateonboththemeansand ends of corporate governance. We show that pursuing firm value maximizationrequires enhanced board protection in the short-term without eliminating exposure toshareholderdiscipline in the longer-term. Increasedprotectionfromremoval isnecessaryatthebeginningofadirector’stenure,whendirectorsaremorelikelytohavecompetitiveprivate information that the market lacks on the actions that contribute to longer-termvalue.Protectionthenefficientlyenablesdirectorstotakeactionsthatcanleadtolowshorttermearnings,without the fearof dismissal. Conversely, over time, as adirector’s tenurematures and market prices are more likely to catch up with directors’ informationaladvantage, shareholdersbecomebetterpositionedtodisciplinedirectorialandmanagerialactions.Empoweringboardstoresistshort-termmarketpressurewiththeprioragreementof shareholders achieves the above mechanism. Such a model adds value that a direct«shareholderdemocracy»cannotprovidebyensuringthatshareholderdisciplineoperatesinthelong-term,ratherthantheshort-term.Theseresultsdirectlyspeaktothedebateonwhatdefinesgoodgovernancepractices.Project’s stateofachievement: so far, theprojecthasgiven rise to twoworkingpapers,oneofwhichhasbeenpublishedintheNorthwesternUniversityLawReview(2016).2.InstitutionalInvestorsasActiveOwner–CoordinatedbySébastienPouget(IDEI-TSE)Theobjectiveofthisprojectistoempiricallystudywhyandhowinstitutionalinvestors,assetowners andmanagers, vote during shareholdermeetings. Separation between ownershipand control is one of the fundamental characteristics of modern companies (Berle andMeans,1932).This separationopens the roomforpotential conflictsof interestsbetweeninvestorsandcorporateexecutives(JensenandMeckling,1976):managersmaynotalwaysfavorthestrategiesthatarebestforinvestors.Tomitigatethenegativeeffectsoftheseconflicts,investorscaninduceexecutivestofollowtheirguidancebyengagingcompanies, i.e.,discussingwithexecutivemanagersandboardmembers, filing shareholder proposals and obviously voting during shareholder generalmeetings.Apriori,managersknowbestwhatistherightcourseofbusinessforfirms.Butcompaniesmay generate externalities on society, and investors may care more about theseexternalities thanmanagers. Two basic arguments thenwarrant investors to be active inengagement. The first argument rests on the universal owner logic (Mattison, Trevitt andVan Ast, 2011). Large institutional investors own a significant share in virtually all listedcompaniesandhavealonghorizon.Thesituationisverydifferentforcorporateexecutives


12

who, for the sake of incentives, in general own concentrated stakes in their companies.Thesedifferentholdingprofilesgenerateconflictsof interests:executivesarenotgoing tointernalize the effects that their companies have on the payoffs and value of othercompanies.Forexample,theymaynottakeintoaccountthenegativeeconomicimpactthatthe polluting activities of their firm have on other companies. On the other hand,institutional investors that own verydiversifiedportfolioswould like the firm to take intoaccountthesenegativeeffectstoavoiddeterioratingtheoverallvalueoftheirportfolios.Asecondargumentthatcallsforinstitutionalinvestorstobeactiveinengagementisrelatedtothedelegatedphilanthropylogic(BenabouandTirole,2010).Institutionalinvestorssuchas pension funds, sovereign funds andmutual funds invest on behalf of clientswhomayhavepreferencesregardingexternalitiesthatdifferfromtheonesofexecutivemanagers.Asaresult, investorsmightwanttopromotetheirvaluesandpreferencestowardsexecutivesso that they choose theappropriate courseofaction.Onecan forexample think that thelevelofglobal risk inducedbya firm(relatedtoclimatechange,nuclearactivities…)mightnotbevaluedinthesamemannerbymanagersandbytheinvestorswhorepresentclients.Investorsmaythuswanttocommunicatecorporateexecutiveswhatistheirpreferredlevelofprecaution.Thiscanonlybeachievedviaengagement.Thisprojectplanstocollectdataonvotingpoliciesofvariousinstitutionalinvestorsinordertostudyhowtheirengagement/votingpolicy is implemented inpractice.Recentempiricalevidencesuggeststhatuniversalownersdohaveanimpactonthefirmsintheirportfolios(Dimson,Karakas,andLi,2015,Azar,Schmalz,andTecu,2015,Kempf,Manconi,andSpalt,2014, and He and Huang, 2014). However, the precise mechanism through which theyexercise their influence has not yet been empirically identified. Our idea is thus to testwhether institutional investorsaremoreactivelyengagingfirminareasthataresubjecttoexternalities, and to testwhether various investors have different preferences over theseissues.Project’s stateofachievement: Theproject is still in thedata collectionandpreliminaryanalysisphase.Empiricalanalyseswillbeperformedduringtheyear2017.3. ESG factors and the performance of small andmid cap companies – Coordinated bySébastienPouget(IDEI-TSE)ObjectiveThisprojectproposesanempirical investigationofsmallandmidcapcompanies’strategicbehaviorregardingEnvironmental,SocialandGovernance(ESG)factors,andaimsattestinghowitaffectstheirrisk-returnprofileonthestockmarket.There are several reasons tobelieve that small andmid cap companies are verydifferentfrompublicly traded largecaps in termsofbusinessstrategies, inparticular regardingESGfactors. First, small andmidcapcompaniesaremore likely than larger firms tobeownedand/oroperatedbytheirfounderorbythefounder’sfamilymembers(Adams,Almeida,andFerreira, 2005, and Fahlenbrach, 2009). This provides themwith a long-term view and inturn a commitment power that can have valuable business consequences. For example,


13

commitment power of executives and shareholders might enable small and mid capcompaniestoimplementinnovativehumanresourcesstrategies,i.e.providinginsurancetotheir employees in case of downturns or failures in order to increase their level ofimplicationorcreativity(SraerandThesmar,2007).Also,along-termhorizonmightenablethefirmtodevelopinnovativeenvironmentalstrategiesthatnecessitateeffortsintheshortrunbutarebeneficial in the long run (BenabouandTirole,2010).Second,evensmallandmid cap companies that are not owned andmanaged by founders or their families couldenjoy a high level of economic performance: the relative illiquidity of small andmid capequitymarkets provides stronger incentives for shareholders tomonitor and engagewithmanagement(Maug,1998).Methodology

This project focuses on French small andmid caps (SMC). Amajor constraint is toobtaindataontheextrafinancialperformanceofthesefirms.WeobtainedsuchdatafromEthifinance,thatcovers241SMCovertheperiod2009-2013.74%ofthefirmsinoursamplebelong to the CACMid & Small Index.We complemented these data with the followingsources:AccountingdatacomefromInfinancialsDatabase;FactSetincludesdetaileddataoninstitutional investors’ shareholdings; Financial and market data are obtained fromDatastream; Finally, directors’ identity and founder’s family shareownership have beenhand-collected.

With thesedata,weperformeda seriesofmultiple regressions to investigatehowthereturnonasset,thereturnonequity,themarketcap(scaledbyassetsize)aswellasthelevelofsocialresponsibilityarecorrelatedwithvariousvariables:whetherthefounderorhisheirsownalargefractionofthefirm’sequity,whethertheCEOisthefounderoroneofhisheirs,thelevelofemployeeownership,thelevelofinstitutionalshareownership.

FollowingSraerandThesmar(2007),wedefineafamilyfirmasonewhosefoundingfamilyoranyother familyownsmore than20%of itsequity.Basedon thiscriterion,ourdataset includes 163 family firms, and 78 nonfamily firms. The descriptive statistics showthat52%offamilyfirmsarestillrunbytheirfounder,andthatanadditional25%arerunbyafounder’sheir.Also,thereturnonequityoffamilyfirmsappearslarger.Last,familyfirmsaresmallerandolderthannonfamilySMC.Results

Afirstanalysisrelyingontwo-stepsregressionswithinstrumentalvariablesprovidesthefollowing(preliminary)results.

First, family firms still owned by their founder or one of his heirs exhibit a largereconomicperformance,asmeasuredbythereturnonasset,orbythereturnonequity.Also,theirdailystockreturnvolatilityissmaller.

Next, the larger economic performance of family firms is in general integrated inmarketprices.However,themarketcap(measuredbyTobin’sq)offamilyfirmsrunbytheirfounderissmallerthanthatofnonfamilyfirms,whiletheirfinancialperformanceislarger.

In line with our hypothesis that employees’ long-term commitment has a positiveimpactonfirmvalue,wefindthatfirmswithalargerfractionofemployees’stockownershiphaveabettereconomicperformance,aswellasa lowervolatilityof returns.Thissuperiorperformanceseemshowevernottobereflectedintheirmarketcap.

Last, family-controlled firms, whether run by their founder or by an external CEOexhibit a greater extra financial performance. A similar result is found for firms with a


14

greater proportion of employees’ stockownership and for firms with more employeesseatingattheboard.

Overall, these preliminary results suggest that firms with a long-term orientation,either thanks to family stockownership, or to employees’ stockownership, exhibit a largerfinancialaswellasextrafinancialperformance.

Project’sstateofachievement:Theprojectisintheempiricalanalysisphase,andwillbeinvestigatedfurtherduringtheyear2017.4. The measurement of ESG performance and risk: qualitative ratings or quantitativemetrics?–CoordinatedbyPatriciaCrifo(EcolePolytechnique)ObjectiveIntheCSR-financialperformanceliterature,manyscholarsstillconsiderthatmuchresearchneedstobeconductedbeforethisrelationshipcanbefullyunderstood(seee.g.Delmasetal.,2011;GriffinandMahon,1997;RowleyandBerman,2000;Surrocaetal.,2010). Fromthisperspective,thisprojectproposestoexaminehowdifferentcombinationsofCorporateSocialResponsibility(CSR)dimensionsaffectcorporateeconomicperformancewithdataonCSR performance, that is based on quantitative metrics of CSR-related managementpractices rather than qualitative extra-financial evaluation through scores or ratings. AsemphasizedbyChatterjietal. (2009),extra-financial ratingsare rarelyevaluatedandhavebeencriticizedfortheirownlackoftransparency.Inthisproject,weproposetoanalyzehowdifferentcombinationsofCSRdimensionsaffectfirmperformancebyrelyingonquantitativemeasuresofCSR-relatedmanagementpracticesimplementedbythefirms,ratherthanevaluations(scoresorratings)basedonpastand/orexpectedfutureCSRbehaviors.MethodologyTo measure CSR-related practices, this project uses variables extracted from two Frenchstatisticalsurveysconsisting in largescaledatabases includingmorethan10,000smallandmidcaps(firmswithmorethan10and500employees)in2006and2011.The first database relies on the 2006Organizational Changes and Computerization surveyadministered by the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), theMinistryofLabor,andtheCenterforLaborStudies.Thesampleextractedfromthissurveyincludes10,293firms.The seconddatabase relieson the2011SustainableDevelopment survey (Enquête sur leDéveloppementDurableetlaresponsabilitésociétaledesentreprises),administeredbytheNational Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies and the Ministry of Ecology,Sustainable Development and Energy. This survey gives very detailed information on CSRimplementation and intensity, as well as firm motivation for CSR commitment, for arepresentative sample of business units with at least 10 employees, including all thebusiness groups withmore than 500 employees. The sample extracted from this surveyincludes8,775firms.Results


15

Threedifferentprojectshavebeenconductedinthisresearchprogram.Thefirstprojectinvestigatesthequality-quantitytrade-offinthedesignofresponsibleESGstrategies,and its relationshipwithprofitperemployee,an indicatorof laborproductivitythatcapturesfirm'sabilitytocontrolcostsand,atthesametime,retainanadequatelevelofprovidedservices.Theresultsshowthatenvironmental,humanresources,andcustomers& suppliers practices affect positively and significantly profitability when they areimplementedbothin isolationandaspartofacoherentmanagementdevicesbundle.Yet,the customer & supplier dimension exerts a weaker effect compared to the other twodimensions.Moreover,thestudyshowsthatinordertoimprovebusinessperformanceviaCSR investments firms need to implement a particular “mix” of CSR practices. In otherwords,someESGcombinationsarebetterforprofitabilitythanothers.IntheFrenchcase,combiningresponsiblegreenandcustomer&supplierstrategiesimprovefirmperformancemorethancombiningresponsiblesocialandcustomer&supplierstrategies.The second project analyzes the links between CSR motivations(strategic/altruistic/defensive) and CSR commitment intensity (awareness) and practices.TheobjectiveistodeterminewhichtypeofCSRmetricsbestcorrespondtodeclaredversusimplemented CSR practices and risks. The study shows first that CSR disclosure is notassociatedwithstrongergreenwashing in thesensethatCSRpracticesareassociatedwithCSR awareness. Second, the firm’s motivation for CSR investment affects the type ofpractices implemented.While defensive CSR is associatedwith lowCSR awareness on allESG issues; pro-social CSR is associated with environmental management through softpractices;andstrategicCSR isassociatedwiththethreeESGpillars throughhardpractices(labelsandmonitoringtools).Thethirdprojectidentifiesthefactorsthatcanfavourtheadoptionofresponsiblepracticesand their impact on firm competitiveness. Two main sets of results are obtained. First,regardlessoftheCSRdimension,sizeandactivitysectorarekeycriteria.IfsizemattersforCSR practices (especially because of economies of scale affecting introduction costs), CSRpracticesarealsomorewidespreadinsomesectorsliketheagri-foodindustry,intermediategoods,andenergy.ThestudyalsoshowsthatCSRismoreprevalentincompaniesthatfocustheir strategy onquality anddifferentiation (novelty andpersonalisation) of products andservices.Thissuggestthatifabusinesscanidentifyconsumerswhowishtopurchaseethicalgoods,andifitcanprotecttheresultingnichefrompotentialimitators,its“CSRstrategy”isbasedonprofitabledifferentiation.Belongingtoagroupandabusinessnetwork,companyreorganisations(outsourcingpartoftheeconomicactivityorfinancialrestructuring),orevenopeninguptointernationalmarkets(includingtheEuropeanUnion)arealsofactorsthat,onaverage,encouragetheembeddingofresponsibleapproaches.Asecondsetofresultsshowsthatwhateverthemeasureofeconomicperformanceretained(profitperhead,grossoperatingsurplus,oraddedvalueperhead)andtheCSRdimension(environmental, ethical, human resources, client relationships, and supplier relationships),anaverageperformancegapof13%isobservedbetweenbusinessesthatputCSRpracticesinplaceand those thatdonot.Thoseaveragegaps inperformancevaryaccordingtothedimensions observed: they range from5% for client relationships to 20% for the “humanresources” dimension. Businesses that put CSR practices in place thus seem to reconcileresponsible management (towards clients, suppliers, and employees), respect for theenvironment,andtherequirementforcompetitiveness.


16

Project’s state of achievement: So far, the project has given rise to three publishedstudies. The first one has been published in the International Journal of ProductionEconomics(2016),thesecondonehasbeenpublishedaschapterofaPhDdefendedindec2015, and the third one has been published as a research report for France Strategie(2016).1FutureresearchwillpursuetheexaminationofthevariousESGindicatorsthatarethemostimportanttocaptureCSRbehaviors,inparticularbyconsideringtwoelements.First,wewillinvestigatewhichindicatorsarethebestmeasured,arethemostusedorhavethestrongestimpact.SecondwewillfocusonthegovernancedimensionandexaminehowESGindicatorsrelatetoexecutivebehaviorsandcompensations.5. Sovereign credit ratings and interest rates – Coordinated by Patricia Crifo& EdouardChalle(EcolePolytechnique)ObjectiveThe use of a large number of variables (quantitative and qualitative) as determinants ofsovereigncreditratingsreflectssomehowtheambiguitysurroundingthecriteriaunderlyingsovereignratings.Theobjectiveofthisprojectistohelpbetterunderstandvariablesusedinthedeterminationofsovereigncreditratings.Ouranalysisbuildsonthepreviousliteraturebyexploring theuseofenvironmental, socialandgovernance (ESG) factorsasexplanatoryvariables.Themainquestionraised(andhypothesistested)isthefollowing:howmuchofanimpactdoESGquantitativeindicatorshaveonsovereigncreditratingsandinterestrates?Relatedtothis,ourprincipalchallengeishowtoquantifygovernmentESGperformance.TheESGperformanceofgovernmentsisdifficulttoassessforatleasttworeasons.Accordingtomanyobservers,itisoftenhardtoknowwhetherthegovernmentshouldbeevaluatedasageographicalentity(indicatorsbasedonitsESGfactors,i.e.forestresources,accesstowaterorCO2emissions),asademographicentity(indicatorsbasedonresultsthatdependonthepublic authority’s resources and therefore the nation’s wealth and development, e.g.illiteracy rate, life expectancy) or as a political institution (this raises the questionof howpolicy is judgedbasedon levelofdevelopment). Inaddition,there isnocleardefinitionofthemethodologyandthevalueappliedtoassesstheESGperformanceofgovernments.Thereality is that rating agencies and investment managers use a wide array of data fromdifferentofficialandrecognizedsources.MethodologyToexaminetherelationshipbetweenESGperformanceandsovereignborrowingcosts,wehavebuiltadataset includingobservationsof23OECDcountriesfrom2007to2012fromfour sources. The first one is the Vigeo Sustainability Country Rating database, providinginformation on ESG qualitative performance. The second source is the Thomson-Reuters

1France Stratégie, also called TheCommissariatGénéral for Strategy and Foresight, is an institutiondirectlydependentonthePrimeminister,inchargeofevaluatingpublicpolicies;anticipatingfuturechangesinFrenchsocietyregardingeconomy,sustainabledevelopmenttopreparetheconditionsforpoliticaldecision;fosteringa dialogue between the social partners, civil society, business, the community of experts and academia;proposingpoliciesandreformsandprovidingorientationtothegovernment,highlightingpossibletrade-offs,andforeignexperiences.


17

Datastream database, providing the yield on sovereign bonds aswell as S&P ratings. Thethird source of variables is the World Bank database providing information onmacroeconomicvariables(GDPgrowthrate,inflationrate,grossdebttoGDPratio,countryfiscal balance to imports, reserves to imports ratio, and trade openness ratio defined byimportsandexportstoGDP),aswellasESGquantitativeperformancevariables(Electricitygeneration, CO2 emissions, Forest rents per GDP, Protected areas as a percentage ofnational land area, Social expenditure per GDP, Female tomale labor force participationrate,HealthexpenditureperGDP,R&DexpenditureperGDP,HumanDevelopment Index,Regulatory quality, Rule of law, Government effectiveness, Political stability, Voice andaccountability, and Corruption control). And the fourth source of variables is the ISOdatabasegivingthenumberofISO14001certifiedfirmsineachofour23countries.Intermsofeconometricsstrategy,weuseaninstrumentalvariablespanelregressionmodel.ResultsOur results show a negative correlation between the countries’ socially responsibleperformanceandthesovereignborrowingcost(definedbythegovernmentbondsspread).It seems therefore that countries displaying higher ESG indicators are rewarded by lowersovereignborrowingcosts.TheresultssuggestthatESGratingscouldplayaroleinassessingcountry risk and its location and distribution in the financial system. By facilitatinginvestmentdecisions,ESGassessmentscanhelpinvestorsinachievingabalanceintheriskreturnprofileandatthesametimeassistcountriesinaccessingcapitalatalowcost(Kohutand Beeching, 2013; Drut, 2010; Connolly, 2007).Moreover, the effect of ESG ratings onsovereignborrowingcostisabouthoweverthreetimesweaker(inabsolutevalue)thantheeffectoffinancialratingsonsovereignborrowingcost.Thissuggeststhatinvestorsmayuseextra-financialratingsasasupplementtofinancialratings.Togodeeper intotheanalysisofcountryESGperformanceandborrowingcosts,asecondproject aims at explicitly identifying the quantitative criteria to be incorporated in ESGperformance, not only the qualitative (ratings) ones. For this purpose we constructintermediate ESG indexes aswell as a global ESG index and examine their impact on thepriceofsovereignrisk.Theanalysis isalsoextendedtotheperiodfromDecember1996toDecember 2010 across 35 advanced economies (AEs) and emerging market economies(EMEs).PreliminaryresultsshowthatcountrieswithgoodESGperformancetendtohavelessdefaultriskandlowerbondspreads.Theeconomicimpactisalsostrongerinthelong-run; it is especially governancewhich appears to have an impact, in particular during theGlobalFinancialCrisisperiod.Another project related to the theme of sovereign credit ratings and interest rate is thatpursuedonthetopicofcountrygovernanceanddebt.Thislineofworkexaminesempiricallyandtheoreticallythelinksbetweentheamountofexternaldebt(bothpublicorprivate)ofacountry and the quality of its governance, that is, its “institutions” (broadly defined,followingDouglasNorth,as“thesetofrulesandconstraintsthatshapeeconomicbehaviorandincentives”).Thisquestionisempirically investigatedinaspecificcontext,namelythatof the run up to, and then accession of, southern European countries into the EMU. Thequality of governance is measured bymeans of theWorld Governance Indicators, whichsummarise in a handful of indexes (“Control of Curruption”, “Rule of Law”, “PoliticalStability”…) the various relevant dimensions of country governance (those indexes are


18

constructed by aggregating the information contained in hundreds of time series ongovernance quality). The project establishes that country governance has significantlydeclinedinsouthernEurope(Spain,Portugal,ItalyandGreece)overthedecadegoingfromthe mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. This phenomenon is specific to those countries, occursnowhereelseamongdevelopedeconomies,andhappenswellbeforetheGreatRecessionof2008-2009. It then shows that, bothwithin Europe andwithin a broad set of countriesworldwide, the decline in institutional quality is systematically preceededby protractedcapital inflows (in southernEurope, these inflows followed the runup to theeuro,whichallowedcountriestoborrowmuchmoreeasilyandatmuchcheaperrates).Theprojectthendevelopsatheoreticalmodelaimedtoexplainthisstylizedfact.Morespecifically,itshowsthat inflows of cheap capital naturally cause governance to deteriorate when twoplausible market frictions interact: credit constraints and a “soft budget constraint”syndromewherebesociallyinefficientprojectsmayneverthelessberefinanceddutotheinabilityofthegovernmenttocommitnotto.Lowinterestratesandeasyexternalfinancingthenlowerthesocialcostofrefinancinggoodprojectsandhencetheneedtomaintaingoodinstitutions.Project’sstateofachievement:Sofar,theprojecthasgivenrisetothreeworkingpapersandvariouspresentationsinconferencesandseminars.FutureresearchwillpursuetheanalysisofthequantitativeESGfactorsandtheirimpactonsovereignbondsmarkets.B)Otherresearchprojects’achievementsResearchers have carried out other projects related to the general topics of the Chaire.Theseprojects havebeenpresented at severalworkshopswith sponsors and aredetailedbelow.1.Theimpactofownershipconcentrationonfirmrisk(SilviaRossetto–IDEI-TSE)ObjectiveTheobjectiveofthisproject istounderstandhowtheownershipstructureoffirmsaffectstheirstrategiesandunderlyingriskcharacteristics.Firmsacrosscountriesandsectorsdisplaya rangeof complexownership structuresandoftencannotbeeasily categorizedaseitherwidely held or controlled by one large investor. For example, ownership structures withmore than one large investor are themost common type of ownership structure. In theUnited States, 74% of the publicly listed firms have more than one blockholder, with ablockholderdefinedasan investorwitha stakegreater than5%.Only18%haveonlyoneblockholderand8%arewidelyheld.Europeanfirmshavesimilarfeatures.Morethan34%haveatleasttwoinvestorsand12%havemorethantwoinvestorswithastakegreaterthan10%(LaevenandLevine,2008).The starting point for many studies on ownership structure is the idea that a largeblockholderhelpstoovercomethefreeriderprobleminmonitoringafirmmanager(ShleiferandVishny, 1986). Since a larger blockholder tends to bemore exposed to firm risk, one


19

would expect such firms to take less risk, the larger is the block (Admati, Pfleiderer, andZechner, 1994). The presence of a large shareholder triggers a conflict of interest amongshareholders regarding risk choices: the largeblockholderprefers low risk/returnprojects,whilesmallshareholderspreferhighrisk/returnprojects.Mid-sizedblockholdersmayhavethe incentive to emerge and mitigate this conflict of interest (see Dhillon and Rossetto,2015).Hence,whenmid-sizedblockholdersemerge,thelargestshareholdermaynolongerdeterminetheriskchoices,butratherthevotingpowerofallshareholdershasanimpact.Insuchasetting,thisoftenmeansthatthehigherthenumberofblockholders,theriskiertheinvestmentswillbe.Building on these ideas, we carry out an empirical study to test whether mid-sizedblockholdersplaya role indetermining firmpolicies,orwhether thepowerof the largestblockholderistheonlydriveroffirmriskchoices.MethodologyTotestourhypothesis,weuseapubliclyavailabledatabaseontheownershipstructureof1913 US listed firms over 6 years. We measure firm risk by (daily) share price volatilitycomputedannually.Thisisanobviouschoiceasthisvariableaffectsshareholders'portfoliovolatilitywhenundiversified.Inaddition,wealsocollectedinformationonsharepricesandfirmcharacteristics.Wecarryoutbothacross-sectionalanalysisandafixed-effectpanelregression.Toaddressconcernsrelatedtosimultaneousdeterminationofriskandownershipstructure,weuseaninstrumentalvariablethatdecoupledtheexogenousvariationinownershipstructure.Inthetheoretical model of Dhillon and Rossetto (2015), sector characteristics determineownershipstructure,whichinturndeterminesfirm-specificcharacteristics,suchasvolatility.Hence, we choose the sector average of the proxy of ownership structure as ourinstrumentalvariable.Toaddressthepotentialissueofomittedvariables,webothcarryoutapaneldataanalysisandintroduceselectedcontrolvariablesthatmightaffectvolatilitybutwouldnotbeaffectedbyit.ResultsWefirsttrytoreplicatethefindingsoftheexistingliteraturebylookingattherelationshipbetweenthesizeofthelargestblockholder'sstakeandfirmrisk.Inlinewiththesestudies,we finda (weak)negative relationshipbetween the sizeof the largestblockholder's stakeand volatility. We then split the sample into one subsample of firms with only oneblockholderanda second subsamplewithmore thanoneblockholder.We show that thenegative relationship between the size of the largest blockholder's stake and firm riskdisappearswhen thereare severalblockholders.Thisconfirmsthenotionthatownershipstructuremattersforrisktaking,butthattherelationshipismorecomplexthanpreviouslythought.We follow up on these findings to seewhich aspects of ownership structure affect sharepricevolatility.Wecomputethenumberofblockholders,andtestwhetherithasanimpacton firm risk. The data confirm the hypothesis that the number of blockholders positivelyaffectssharepricevolatility.Hence,sharepricevolatilityisaconcernforshareholders(notonly for firms with one blockholder) and mid-sized blockholders do play a role in


20

determining a firm risk. This result has economic relevance. When a firm has oneblockholder,thearrivalofanotherblockholderincreasesvolatilitybybetween5%and6%.Overall,we conclude that ownership structure, in all its complexity, has an effect on firmrisk.Thisisanindicationthatstudiesoftherelationshipsbetweenownershipstructureandfirm risk should not be limited to the distinction between firms with and withoutblockholders, or to the relationship between the fraction of shares held by the largestblockholder.Mid-sizedblockholdersareimportantandplayanactiveroleinfirmpolicy.Thisnewapproachoffersthepossibilityofre-examiningandreinterpretingmanyaspectsoffirmpoliciesrelatedtocorporategovernance.2.Pricinglong-termrisk(MarianneAndries–IDEI-TSE)ObjectiveThe finance literature has been successful in explaining many features of observedequilibriumasset prices and their dynamics (Cochrane, 2016).However, elusivepuzzles intheinteractionsbetweenthetimingandthepricingofuncertaintyremain.Forexample, inthe longrunrisk framework,which iscentral totheassetpricing literature,calibratingthemodeltomatchassetpricingmomentsimpliesanunrealisticallystrongpreferenceforearlyversuslateresolutionsofuncertainty.Also,recentempiricalevidenceshowsriskpricesarehigher forshort-termrisks than for long-termrisks (seevanBinsbergenandKoijen,2016).Thesefindingsposeafundamentalchallengebecausetheyareinconsistentwithtraditionalassetpricingmodelsinwhichthetermstructureofriskpremiaisgenerallyupward-sloping.Yet,understandingthepricingofriskatdifferenthorizonsis importantforvariousfieldsineconomicsandhasimmediatepolicyimplications,fromclimatechangetopublicpolicy(see,e.g.Gollier,2013;Giglioetal.,2015).Theobjectiveofthisproject is toproposeamodel forthepricingofassetsthataddressesbothsetsofchallenges.MethodologyInspired by ample experimental evidence,we construct preferences inwhich subjects aremoreriskaversetoimmediatethantodelayedrisks,anovelformoftimeinconsistency.Wetherefore consider a model that relaxes the assumption, universal to the economicsliterature,thatriskaversionisconstantacrossmaturities.Thatis,weconsideranagentwithanhorizon-dependent riskaversion.We investigatewhether the standard toolboxofassetpricing can be generalized to accommodate risk preferences that differ across temporalhorizons, and if such a generalization can explain the puzzling patterns in the timing andpricingofrisk.To derive equilibrium asset prices, we assume that our agents are perfectly rational andawareof theirhorizon-dependent riskaversionpreferences.Weconsidera representativeagentwhotradesandclears themarketeveryperiod,and,assuch,cannotpre-commit toanyspecificstrategy:unabletocommittofuturebehaviorbutawareofherpreferencesandperfectlyrational,theagentoptimizesinthecurrentperiod,fullyanticipatingreoptimizationinfutureperiods.


21

ResultsAt first glance, obtaining a decreasing term-structure of risk premia from amodelwith adecreasing term-structure of risk aversion seems very intuitive or even tautological.However,theagent'schoices,andthusequilibriumprices,aredetermineddynamicallyfromoneperiodtothenext.Attimet,theagentchooseshowtoallocateherwealthbetweentandt+1,atimeframeoverwhichonlyherimmediateriskaversionmatters:inthiscontext,whyandhowhorizon-dependentriskaversionshouldaffectpricing isacomplexquestion.Indeedwefinditsimpacttobesubtle:weformallyderivethestochasticdiscountfactorofour model, and shows it nests the standard Epstein and Zin (1989) case, with a newmultiplicative term arising from the preferences' dynamic inconsistency. The new termreflectsthewedgebetweenthecontinuationvalueusedforoptimizationatanyperiodtandtheactualvaluationatt+1.Weinvestigatetheimplicationsofourmodelbothonthelevelandontheslopeofthetermstructure of risk premia in a Lucas-tree endowment economy. Horizon-dependent riskaversiondoesnotconcern inter-temporaldecisions.Assuch,we formally show thatboththerisk-freerateandthepricingofshocksthatimpactconsumptionlevelsareunchangedfrom the standardmodel. If risk is constant in theeconomy, equilibriumasset prices areunaffectedbyourtimeinconsistentmodelofpreferences.Bycontrast,thepricingofshocksthatimpactconsumptionrisk,orvolatility,aremodifiedbyhorizon-dependentriskaversion.Our model can simultaneously match the average level of risk prices and generate adownward-slopingtermstructureofequitypremia.Thatis,ourmodelcanrationalizeboththe"earlyversus lateresolutionofuncertainty"puzzleandtheobservedterm-structureofriskpremia,as longasriskvariesthroughtime.Suchsuccessatsolvingthesetworecentlyemergedpuzzlesonthetimingandpricingofuncertaintyisachievedwithoutcompromisingthemodel'sabilitytomatchtheusualassetpricingmoments,and inanomorerestrictiveframeworkthanthestandardEpsteinandZin(1989).3.WagesandCorporate SocialResponsibility: Entrenchmentor Ethics? (Patricia Crifo -EcolePolytechnique,withMarcArthurDiaye–UEvryvald’Essonne&SanjaPekovic–UParisDauphine)ObjectiveDespite the considerable attention given to the CSR-performance relationship in theliterature, little is known on one important driver of CSR, namely motivation-enhancinghuman resources practices in the form of wages and rewards. As a signal for corporateculture,CSRcanattractgoodemployees,orat leasthighlyqualified.Green firmscanalsorecruit motivated employees with teamwork values and thereby reduce costly employeeturnover or secure firm survival and long-termperformance. In addition, CSR is positivelyrelatedtofirmidentification,trustintheemployer,organizationalcommitment,intentiontostay,jobsatisfaction,workingconditionsandorganizationalcitizenshipbehaviors(Brammeretal.,2007;Kimetal.,2010;NyborgandZhang,2013,BrekkeandNyborg,2008).Althoughthesestudiesareinformative,theyonlyindicateapartofthestoryastheyignorethe direct impact on employees’ wages, which can have two conflicting outcomes. If


22

proactive human resource policy tend to increase firm performance through productivity(seeDelmasandPekovic,2013;Edmans,2011),motivatedemployeesmightalsobelikelytoacceptlowerwagesthanthefairmarketvaluebecausetheyarecompensatedthroughtheknowledgethattheirworksatisfiestheirpersonalvalues(Frank,1996;Gondetal.,2010).AsindicatedbyBurbano(2016),employeesaremotivatedby“purpose” intheworkplaceandare willing to tradeoff monetary benefits for non-monetary benefits. On the contrary, itcouldbe that investment inCSR improvesemployees’ skillsandhumancapital (Lanfranchiand Pekovic, 2014) suggesting that they will receive higher wages (Bailey et al., 2000).Additionally,sinceCSRfirmsareconsideredasmoreprofitable,itcouldbethatpartoftheirgaingoestoemployees.Overall, proactive CSR can enhance employee productivity through various paths. Yet,empirical research on the topic is in its infancy, and many scholars consider that muchresearch needs to be conducted before this relationship between CSR, motivation andwagescanbefullyunderstood. Inthispaperweattempttoevaluatetheevidencerelatingthe“tradeoffhypothesis”indicatingthatemployeesinsociallyresponsiblefirmsarereadytoacceptlowerwages,ortheargumentthatworkinginCSRfirmisassociatedwithhigherlevelofemployeehumancapitalorprofitgainsharingimplyingapositiveeffectonwages.MethodologyTo investigate the effect of CSR on wages, we use three French databases. A matchedemployer-employeedatabasecalledtheAnnualSurveyof theCostofLaborandtheWageStructure(ECMOSS,2006),whichprovidesinformationaboutemployees’wages.Adatabasecalled the Organizational Change and Computerization survey (COI, 2006) which providesinformation about firms’ CSR practices (not ratings) in particular on the social (towardsemployees and customers and suppliers) and environmental dimensions. And the thirddatabasecalled theAnnualBusinessSurvey (EAE,2003)provides informationabout firms’income and export. The final sample resulting from merging the three surveys includes15,365workers.In terms of econometrics strategy, we use a simultaneous equations model (Zellner andTheil, 1962), in which the factors that determine CSR are estimated simultaneously withthosedefiningthewagepolicy.ResultsThe results on thewhole sample indicate that firms adopting CSR practices tend to paylower wage premia (bonuses and employee participation schemes), suggesting thatemployee motivation in responsible companies would rely on non-monetary incentivesrather than on purely monetary incentives. This result finds echoes in the experimentalevidence reportedbyKoppelandRegner (2014)wherebyonaverage,workers reciprocateinvestmentsinCSRwithincreasedeffort.Here,wedocumentthatworkersmightaccepttoreciprocate investments in CSR with lower wage premium. Similarly, Nyborg and Zhang(2013)foundthatmoreresponsiblefirmstendtooffer lowerwages. Interestingly,wealsoshowthatformanagers,theresponsiblefirm’swagepremiumissignificantandpositive.Ourresultssuggestmoregenerallytomovebeyondasimpleexaminationoftherelationshipbetween CSR and wage, to better understand the contextual factors behing such arelationship inparticular regarding thenatureof themonetary incentivesofferedand theemployee’soccupationandskills.


23

FutureresearchwillpursuetheanalysisofCSRbasedcompensationschemes, inparticularforexecutivecompensation.ReferencesmentionedinsectionsAandBAdams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005, Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporateperformance,ReviewofFinancialStudies18,1403-1432Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner, 1994, Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, andFinancialMarketEquilibrium,JournalofPoliticalEconomy102,1097-1130Azar,Schmalz,andTecu,2015,Anti-CompetitiveEffectsOfCommonOwnership,wpBailey,HarteandSugden,2000,Corporatedisclosureandthederegulationofinternationalinvestment,Accounting,AuditingandAccountabilityJournal13,197-218BenabouandTirole,2010,IndividualandCorporateSocialResponsibility,Economica77,1-19BerleandMeans,1932,ThemoderncorporationandprivatepropertyvanBinsbergenandKoijen,2016,Thetermstructureofreturns:factsandtheory,wpBrammerandMillington,2008,Doesitpaytobedifferent?Ananalysisoftherelationshipbetweencorporatesocialandfinancialperformance,StrategicManagementJournal29,1325-1343.BrekkeandNyborg,2008,AttractingResponsibleEmployees:GreenProductionasLaborMarketScreening,ResourceandEnergyEconomics39,509-526.Burbano,2016,Socialresponsibilitymessagesandworkerwagerequirements:Fieldexperimentalevidencefromonlinelabormarketplaces,OrganizationScienceforthcomingChatterji, Levine, and Toffel, 2009,Howwelldosocial ratingsactuallymeasurecorporatesocialresponsibility?JournalofEconomics&ManagementStrategy18,125–169Cochrane,2016,Macro-finance,wpConnolly,2007,Measuringtheeffectofcorruptiononsovereignbondratings,JournalofEconomicPolicyReform10,309-323.Delmas,HoffmannandKuss,2011,Underthetipoftheiceberg:absorptivecapacity,environmentalstrategy,andcompetitiveadvantage,Business&Society50,116–54DelmasandPekovic,2013,EnvironmentalStandardsandLaborProductivity:UnderstandingtheMechanismsthatSustainSustainability,JournalOfOrganizationalBehavior34,230–252DhillonandRossetto,2015,Ownershipstructure,Voting,andRisk,"ReviewofFinancialStudies28,521-560Dimson,Karakas,andLi,2015,Activeownership,ReviewofFinancialStudies28,3225-3268 Drut,2010,Sovereignbondsandsociallyresponsibleinvestment,JournalofBusinessEthics,92,131-145Edmans,2011,Doesthestockmarketfullyvalueintangibles?Employeesatisfactionandequityprices,JournalofFinancialEconomics101,621-640Epstein and Zin, 1989, Substitution, Risk Aversion, and the Temporal Behavior ofConsumptionandAssetReturns:ATheoreticalFramework,Econometrica57,937-969Fahlenbrach, 2009, Founder-CEOs, Investment Decisions, and StockMarket Performance,JournalofFinancialandQuantitativeAnalysis44,439-466Frank,1996,Cansociallyresponsiblefirmssurviveinacompetitivemarket?InCodesofConduct:BehavioralResearchintoBusinessEthics,eds.DavidMessickandAnnTenbrunsel,214–27,NewYork,NY:RussellSageFoundation


24

Giglio,Maggiori and Stroebel, 2015,Very long run discount rates, Quarterly Journal ofEconomics130,1-53Gollier,2013,Atheoryofrationalshort-termismwithuncertainbetas,wp Gond,El-Akremi,IgalensandSwaen,2010,Corporatesocialresponsibilityinfluenceonemployees,InternationalCenterforCorporateSocialResponsibility54GriffinandMahon,1997,TheCorporateSocialPerformanceandCorporateFinancialPerformanceDebate:Twenty-FiveYearsofIncomparableResearch,Business&SocietyHeandHuang,2014,ProductMarketCompetitioninaWorldofCrossOwnership:EvidencefromInstitutionalBlockholdings,wpJensenandMeckling,1976,TheoryoftheFirm:ManagerialBehavior,AgencyCostsandOwnershipStructure,JournalofFinancialEconomics3,305-360Kempf,Manconi,andSpalt,2014,DistractedShareholdersandCorporateActions,wpKim,H,Lee,M.,Lee,H.,andKim,N,2010,CorporateSocialResponsibilityandEmployee–CompanyIdentification,JournalofBusinessEthics95,557-569Kohut and Beeching, 2013, Sovereign bonds: spotlight on ESG risks, Principles forResponsibleInvestmentKoppelandRegner,2014,CorporateSocialResponsibilityintheworkplace:Experimentalevidencefromagift-exchangegame,ExperimentalEconomic17,347–370LaevenandLevine,2008,ComplexOwnershipStructuresandCorporateValuations,ReviewofFinancialStudies21,579-604.LanfranchiandPekovic,2014Mattison,TrevittandVanAst,2011,Universalownership:Whyenvironmentalexternalitiesmattertoinstitutionalinvestors.PrinciplesforResponsibleInvestmentandUNEPFinanceInitiativeMaug,1998,LargeShareholdersasMonitors:IsThereaTrade-OffbetweenLiquidityandControl?JournalofFinance53,65-98NyborgandZhang,2013,IsCorporateSocialResponsibilityAssociatedwithLowerWages?,EnvironmentalandResourceEconomics55,107-117.RowleyandBerman,2000,ABrandNewBrandofCorporateSocialPerformance,Business&Society39,397-418ShleiferandVishny,1986,LargeShareholdersandCorporateControl,JournalofPoliticalEconomy94,461-488SraerandThesmar,2007,Performanceandbehavioroffamilyfirms:evidencefromtheFrenchstockmarket,JournaloftheEuropeanEconomicAssociation5,709-751Surroca,Trib,andWaddock,2010,Corporateresponsibilityandfinancialperformance:Theroleofintangibleresources,StrategicManagementJournal,31,463–490ZellnerandTheil,1962,Three-StageLeastSquares:SimultaneousEstimationofSimultaneousEquations,Econometrica30,54-78


25

Mainresearchprojects’scorecardThemes Projects AdvancementHowgovernanceaffectsfirmvalue

Commitmentandentrenchmentincorporategovernance,MartijnCremers,SauraMasconale,andSimoneSepe StaggeredBoardsAndLong-TermFirmValue,Revisited,MartijnCremers,LubomirLitov,SimoneSepe

2workingpapers,2workshopsand

meetingswithsponsors,presentationsatinternationalconferences,1publication

Institutional InvestorsasActiveOwner

Blackrockvs the Norway Fund inshareholding meetings: Onthedeterminantsofvotingpolicies,Marie Brière, Sébastien Pouget andLoredanaUreche-Rangau

Datacollectionandpreliminaryanalysis

ESGfactorsandtheperformanceofsmallandmidcapcompanies

Governance and performance of small-and mid-cap companies: Jaballah andPouget

2workshopsandmeetingswithsponsors,

presentationsatconferences

ThemeasurementofESGperformanceandrisk:qualitativeratingsorquantitativemetrics?

CSR relatedmanagementpractices andFirm Performance: An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Quantity-Quality Trade-off on French Data: Crifo, Diaye &PekovicRSE et compétitivité. Evaluation etapprochestratégique.Benhamou,Diaye&CrifoGovernanceandformperformance:thesustainabilityequation:Roudaut

2workingpapers,1workshopwith

sponsors,1publicworkshop,

presentationsatinternationalconferences,

1publication,2publicreports,1PhD

Sovereigncreditratingsandinterestrates

ESG performance and sovereign bondspreads: an empirical analysis of OECDcountries: Capelle-Blancard, Crifo,Diaye, Oueghlissi & Scholtens et Crifo,Diaye&OueghlissiCountrygovernanceanddebt: thecaseofsouthernEurope1996-2011:EdouardChalle,JoseI.LopezandE.Mengus

3workingpapers,2workshopsand

meetingswithsponsors,presentationsatinternationalconferences


26

PublicationsandworkingpapersResearchersof theChaireFDIRhavewritten someof thesearticleswith researchers fromotherinstitutionslocatedbothinFranceandabroad.- Benabou,RolandandJeanTirole,BonusCulture:CompetitivePay,Screening,and

Multitasking,2016,JournalofPoliticalEconomy124,p305-370.- Benhamou,Salima,Marc-ArthurDiayeandPatriciaCrifo,2016,RSEetcompétitivité:

Evaluationetapprochestratégique,EtudeFranceStratégie,150pages.- Bobtcheff,Catherine,ChristianGollierandThomasChaney,2016,Analysisofsystemicrisk

intheinsuranceindustry,GenevaRiskandInsuranceReview41,73-106.- le Bris, David, William Goetzmann and Sébastien Pouget, 2016, Testing asset pricing

theory on six hundred years of stocks returns: Prices and dividends for the Bazaclecompanyfrom1372to1946»,workingpaper.

- le Bris, David, William Goetzmann and Sébastien Pouget, 2016, The development ofcorporategovernanceinToulouse,workingpaper.

- Capelle-Blancard,Gunther,PatricaCrifo,Marc-ArthurDiaye,RimOueghlissiandBertScholtens,2016,Environmental,SocialandGovernance(ESG)performanceandsovereignbondspreads:anempiricalanalysisofOECDcountries,Workingpaper.

- Cavaco,Sandra,EdouardChalle,PatriciaCrifo,AntoineRéberiouxandGwenaelRoudaut,2016,Boardindependenceandoperatingperformance:Analysison(French)companyandindividualdata,AppliedEconomics,Inpress.

- Chabé-Ferret,Sylvain,LauraDupont-CourtadeandNicolasTreich,2016,Evaluationdespolitiquespubliques:Expérimentationrandomiséeetméthodesquasi-expérimentales,workingpaper.

- Challe,Edouard,FluctuationsetPolitiquesMacroéconomiques,Economica,2016.- Challe,Edouard,JoseI.LopezandEricMengus,2016,SouthernEurope'sinstitutional

decline,WorkingPaper.- Challe,Edouard,JulienMatheron,XavierRagotandJuanRubio-Ramirez,2016,

Precautionarysavingandaggregatedemand,QuantitativeEconomics,forthcoming.- Challe,EdouardandXavierRagot,2016,Precautionarysavingoverthebusinesscycle,

EconomicJournal126,135-164.- Cremers,Martin,SauraMasconale,andSimoneSepe,2016,Commitmentand

EntrenchmentinCorporateGovernance,NorthwesternUniversityLawReview,forthcoming.

- Cremers,MartinandSimoneSepe,2016,TheShareholderValueofEmpoweredBoards,StanfordLawReview67.

- Crifo,Patricia,andNicolasMottis,2016,SociallyResponsibleInvestmentinFrance,Business&Society55(4),576–593.


27

- Crifo,PatriciaandAntoineRebérioux,2016,CorporateGovernanceandCorporateSocialResponsibility:AtypologyofOECDcountries,JournalofGovernanceandRegulation5(2),14-27.

- Crifo,Patricia,Marc-ArthurDiaye,andSanjaPekovic,2016,CSRrelatedmanagementpracticesandFirmPerformance:AnEmpiricalAnalysisoftheQuantity-QualityTrade-offonFrenchData,InternationalJournalofProductionEconomics171(3),405–416.

- Crifo,Patricia,Marc-ArthurDiaye,RimOueghlissiandSanjaPekovic,2016,Whatdrivesfirm’sCorporateSocialResponsibility:Theroleofownershipconcentration,inGlobalPerspectivesofCorporateSocialActionandSocialandFinancialPerformance,Manos&Drorieds.PalgraveMcMillan:NewYork,183-206.

- Crifo,Patricia,Marc-ArthurDiayeandSanjaPekovic,2016,WagesandCorporateSocialResponsibility:EntrenchmentorEthics?WorkingPaper.

- Crifo,Patricia,ElenaEscrig-OlmedoandNicolasMottis,2016,InvestorrelationsandCSR,Workingpaper.

- Dietz, Simon, Christian Gollier, and Louise Kessler, 2016, The climate beta, mimeo,LondonSchoolofEconomics

- Gollier,Christian,2016,Tauxd'actualisationetrémunérationducapital,RevueFrançaised'Economie30.

- Gollier, Christian, 2016, Gamma discounters are short-termist, Journal of PublicEconomics142,83-90.

- Gollier, Christian, 2016, Evaluation of long-dated assets: The role of parameteruncertainty,JournalofMonetaryEconomics84,66-83.

- Gollier, Christian, 2016 Valorisation des investissements ultra-longs et développementdurable,L'ActualitéEconomique,forthcoming.

- Gollier, Christian, 2016,Aversion to risk of regret andpreference for positively skewedrisks,workingpaper.

- Gollier, Christian, 2016, Valuation of natural capital under uncertain substitutability,workingpaper.

- Laurel,Dianela,NicolasMottisandDiane-laureArjalies,2016,ValuingSustainability:TheCaseofResponsibleInvestmentReporting,Workingpaper.

- Rebérioux, Antoine andGwenael Roudaut, 2016, GenderQuota inside the Boardroom:FemaleDirectorsasNewKeyPlayers?HALEcolePolytechniquen°3

- Pouget,Sébastien,JulienSauvagnatandStéphaneVilleneuve,2016,AMindisaTerribleThing to Change: Confirmatory Bias in Financial Markets, Review of Financial Studiesforthcoming.

- Sepe, Simone, Board and Shareholder Power, Revisited, 2016,Minnesota Law Reviewforthcoming.

- Sepe,Simone,2016,StaggeredBoards:Practice,TheoryandEvidence,inResearchHandbookOnMergersAndAcquisition,StevenDavidoffandClaireHill,eds,EdwardElgarforthcoming.


28

CommunicationoftheChaireFDIRachievementsandawards

TheadvancesmadebytheresearchersoftheChaireFDIRhavebeenpresentedtoa

wideaudienceincludingacademicresearchers,financepractitioners,andthegeneralpublic,both in France and abroad. The Chaire FDIR has been instrumental in allowing for thecreationoftheknowledgecommunicatedinthevariouseventsdescribedbelow.

1.CommunicationtofinancepractitionersIn 2016, the Chaire FDIR has organized various events during which researchers havepresentedtheimplicationsoftheirresultsforCSRandSRI. Inparticular,4workshopshavebeenorganizedattheAFGforthesponsors,aswellas2generalaudienceconferences.Workshopswiththesponsors

• Workshop,January25,2016ThomasAndré (SchneiderElectric&EcolePolytechnique):Managingsocietalperformanceofimpactinvesting:Anaction-researchinquirySilvia Rossetto(IDEI and TSE): The Role of Blockholders in the Governance of a Firm. USempiricalEvidence

• Workshop,June16,2016Marc-ArthurDiaye(Universitéd’Evry)&PatriciaCrifo (EcolePolytechnique):Performance,risqueESGetrémunérationLionelAlmeida(UniversitéParisOuestNanterre):Rémunérationdesdirigeantsetnaturedel’actionnariat

• Workshop,June29,2016JulienThéron(UT1Capitole):CodesdeGouvernance:EclairagesJuridiquesSimone Sepe(IAST and TSE): Commitment and Entrenchment in Corporate Governance:ImplicationsforFirmValue

• Workshop,December6,2016Jamil Jaballah(Grenoble Ecole de Management) andSébastien Pouget(IDEI andTSE):FacteursESGetperformancedespetitesetmoyennescapitalisationsMarianneAndries(IDEIandTSE):Pricinglong-termrisk

• Workshop,January13,2017EdouardChalle(EcolePolytechnique):Countrygovernanceanddebt: thecaseof southernEurope1996-2010HidekiTakada(OCDE):Greenfinanceanddevelopmentofgreenbondmarket


29

GeneralaudienceConferences

• Conference atUniversité ParisDauphine, June 13, 2016: La Responsabilité Sociale

desEntreprisesetlaperformanceéconomiquesont-ellescompatibles?

Co-organizedbyPatriciaCrifo(EcolePolytechnique)

• Workshopforthe“Semainede la financeresponsable”,EcoleNormaleSupérieure,

October 6, 2016: La transition énergétique, vecteur d'un nouveau régime de

croissance?


• Workshop at University Paris 7 Diderot, October 18, 2016: Gender diversity and

companyleadership


The presentations and programmes are available on the Chaire FDIR website athttp://fdir.idei.fr.2.CommunicationtoacademicresearchersThe researchers of the Chaire FDIR have been invited to share their work and ideas invarious academic conferences and workshops. In their publications or during theirpresentations, the researchers always gratefully acknowledge the support of the ChaireFDIR.Examplesofacademicconferences

• Conference of the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists, Limassol,“Aversiontoriskofregretandpreferenceforpositivelyskewedrisks”(18-19.9.16)

• MIT-CEEPR-EPRG-EDF European Energy Policy Conference, Paris, Session: “NowComestheHardPart”:ClimatePolicyAfterCOP21,“Afterthe2015ParisAgreement:Progressesandperils”(7-8.7.16)

• SED Conference, Toulouse, “Early resolution of uncertainty and asset price”,“Horizon-Dependent Risk Aversion and the Timing and Pricing of Uncertainty”(1.7.16)

• Annual Conference of the European Association of Environmental and ResourcesEconomists,Zurich,“Theclimatebeta”(23-24.6.16)

• Conferenceofthe50thanniversaryofCORE,Louvain-La-Neuve,“Evaluationoflong-datedassets:Theroleofparameteruncertainty”(26.5.16)


30

• CESifoEuropeanNetworkonAppliedMicroeconomics,Munich,“Aversiontoriskofregretandpreferenceforpositivelyskewedrisks”(14.3.16)

• AnnualconferenceoftheRiskTheorySociety,NewYork,“Aversiontoriskofregretandpreferenceforpositivelyskewedrisks”(1.4.16)

• Keynote lecture, Annual conference of the Canadian Economic Association,“Evaluation des actions de développement durable dans unmonde profondémentincertain”(10.5.16)

• ClimateFutureInitiative,PrincetonUniversity,“DoweDoEnoughfortheFuture?ANormativeApproachtotheEvaluationofLong-DatedInvestments”(14.4.16)

• International Conference of Corporate Governance, Montpellier “OwnershipConcentrationandFirmRisk.EvidencefromtheUS”(17-18.5.16)

• 3rd Law and Economic Policy International Workshop–Recent Developments inCorporate Governance, Paris, “Ownership Concentration and Firm Risk. EvidencefromtheUS”(28-29.11.16)

• Global Corporate Governance Colloquia (GCGC) Conference, Stockholm,“CommitmentandEntrenchmentinCorporateGovernance”(10-11.6.16)

• AmericanFinanceAssociation(AFA)2016AnnualMeeting,SanFrancisco,“StaggeredBoardsandFirmValue,Revisited,”(3-5.1.16)

• Paris FinancialManagement conference “independent directors: less informed butbetterselected?”December2016

• Alliance for Research on Corporate Sustainability: Workshop June 2016 “SRI andsystemicchange”

• World Finance Conference, New York, July 2016 “gender quota inside theboardroom”

• European Economic Association, Genève, August 2016 “gender quota inside theboardroom”

• American Economic Association, Chicago, January 2016 “gender quota inside theboardroom”and“Southerneurope’sinstitutionaldecline”

Examplesofworkshopsandseminars

• World Bank,Washington, “Evaluation of long-dated assets: The role of parameteruncertainty”(19.01.16)

• University of Pennsylvania, “Political, Economic and Social Considerations forUniversalCarbonPricing”(2.2.16)

• PERdistinguished lecture,ColumbiaUniversity, “Dowedoenough for the future?”(12.2.16)

• ColumbiaUniversity,“Gammadiscountersareshort-termist”(7.3.16)• 33e Université d’été du gouvernement Andorran, Andorre-la-Vieille. Keynote

lecture“Commentlutterefficacementcontrelechangementclimatique?”(30.8.16)• IMF-OCP-Columbia high level seminar: The energy transition, NDCs, and the Post-

COP21,Marrakesh,“Theclimatebeta”(8.9.16)


31

• Financeseminar,TSE,“Aversiontoriskofregretandpreferenceforpositivelyskewedrisks”(3.10.16)

• Seminar Banquede France, “Horizon-DependentRiskAversion and the Timing andPricingofUncertainty”

• SeminarUniversityofVienna,“Horizon-DependentRiskAversionandtheTimingandPricingofUncertainty”

• AssisesNationalesEtudiantesduDéveloppementDurable,Toulouse,Avril2016• SeminarEcolePolytechnique, “Testingassetpricing theoryon sixhundredyearsof

stocks returns: Prices and dividends for the Bazacle company from 1372 to 1946”(8.11.16)

• ColumbiaUniversity,“Precautionaysavingandaggregatedemand”• Seminar at Oikos Young Scholar Finance Academy, Reading University, “On the

performanceofresponsibleinvestment”(12-14.9.16)• Seminar Notre Dame Law School, “Board and Shareholder Power, Revisited”

(19.9.16)• UniversityofArizona-DepartmentofPhilosophyandUCBerkeleySchoolofLawjoint

conference in Economic Liberties, Human Fulfillment, and Human Rights, Tucson,“CapitalandthePublicCorporation”(18-19.3.16)

3.Generalaudiencereportsandcommunication

Crifo, Patricia, Comment concilier développement économique et environnement, 2016,(withPhilippeAghionetal.),ConseilEconomiquepourleDéveloppementDurablereport.

Crifo Patricia, Et si la performance économique reposait (aussi) sur une politique RSE?InterviewForl’ObservatoireEnergiesd’Entreprise(22.02.2016).

Crifo Patricia, and Sandra Cavaco, RSE et performance, Seminar "économie etenvironnement"Ministryofecology,sustainabledevelopmentandenergy(21.01.2016).

CrifoPatricia,Lesemploisverts,InterviewforRadioclassique,Program"Troisminutespourlaplanète"(12.01.2016).

Gollier, Christian, “A view from Europe”, Conférence AXA/ACPR “The Future of Savings”ConferenceBusinessmodelsandregulatorychangesinthenewenvironment(4.11.16)

Gollier, Christian, “2015 Paris Agreement (COP 21): Progress and Expectations”, TheConsulateGeneralofFrance,NewYork(25.4.16)

Mottis, Nicolas, 4 videos Xerfi/fnege on Socially Responsible Investmenthttp://www.xerficanal.com/invite/Nicolas-Mottis_g341.htmlPouget, Sébastien, “On the performance of responsible investment”, Seminar “ManagingAssetswithConvictionandResponsibility”byCandriam,Londres(18.3.16)


32

Treich,Nicolas, Comment concilier développement économique et environnement, 2016,(withPhilippeAghionetal.),ConseilEconomiquepourleDéveloppementDurablereport.

Treich, Nicolas, L'économie comportementale peut-elle aider à mieux gérerl'environnement?,2016,forthcominginleGuided'EconomieComportementale2016.

4.Awardsandothersactivitiesin2016

Gwenael Roudaut received several prizes and awards for his PhD«Corporate governanceand firm performance: the sustainability equation?» (Ecole Polytechnique, adv: P. Crifo):ANEDD Prize of the jury, Forum pour l’Investissement Responsable – Principle forResponsibleInvestmentFIR-PRIbestPhDaward,InstitutFrançaisdesAdministrateurs(IFA)-bestPhDaward,AssociationFrançaisedeFinance(AFFI)specialmention.

SinceNovember2016PatriciaCrifoisMemberofthecommitteeoftheSociallyResponsibleInvestmentlabelandNicolasMottisismemberoftheScientificCounceloftheCommitteeoftheSociallyResponsibleInvestmentlabelandoftheUNPRI.


33

EducationandtrainingrelatedtotheChaireFDIR

The Chaire FDIR is fostering the diffusion of knowledge on CSR and SRIwithin theyounggenerationsoffinancepractitionersandresearchers.State-of-the-arttechniquesandideasofCSRandSRIhavebeentaught invariouscoursesofferedtomasters inEconomicsand Finance at the Ecole Polytechnique, at the Toulouse School of Economics, and at theInstitutd’AdministrationdesEntreprises(IAE)oftheUniversityofToulouse.Moreover,eightPhDstudentsarecurrentlyworkingontheimportantissuesoftheChaireFDIR.1.Courses

• Economic growth and sustainability, Cours ECO572 Ecole Polytechnique, PAEcoscience,avecBernardSinclairDesgagné(20h)

• StratégiesDéveloppementDurable des Entreprises -Master2 EconomieduDévDurable, de l’environnement et de l’energie, AgroParistech,Univ ParisOuest&EcolePolytechnique(20h)

• Creationdevaleuretgouvernance,3eannéeEcolePolytechnique• Responsabilité Sociale et Environnementale - Master2 DDET, Univ Paris Ouest

(20h)• EntrepriseetSociété-Master2IES,UnivParisOuest(24h)• Laresponsabilitésocialedesentreprises,mastèreALISEE,AgroParisTech(3h)• Valorisation de la performance extra-financière des entreprises, spécialité

économie et gestion d'entreprises, 3ème année du cursus ingénieurd'AgroParisTech(M2)(3h)

• Sustainableperformance,ESSEC(20h)• MasterinFinance,IAE(UniversityofToulouse):AssetManagement(12h)

• MasterinFinance,IAE(UniversityofToulouse):SRI(12h)

• Master in Economics, Toulouse School of Economics: Economics of risk and

insurance:takingintoaccountthelong-termimpactsofinvestments(27h)

• MasterinEconomics,ToulouseSchoolofEconomics:benefit-costanalysis(30h)

• MasterinEconomics,UniversitéParis-Saclay:Macro-finance(24h)

2.PhDStudentsPhDstudentsoftheChaireFDIRin2016included:

• Liviu Andronic: Extra-financial information and financial forecasts, defended onSeptember30,2016(advisor:S.Pouget)


34

• MadalenaFerrana:FairnessinCostBenefitAnalysis:Equity-EnhancedMeanVarianceRules,StartedinSeptember2012(advisor:C.Gollier)

• Aymeric Guidoux: CSR and governance, Ecole Polytechnique, started in 2015(advisor:PatriciaCrifo)

• YannKervinio:Fairnessinnaturalresourcesmanagement,startedinSeptember2011(advisor:S.Ambec)

• Yves Le Yaouanq: Biases in individual and collective decision-making, defended onNovember3,2016(advisor:C.Gollier)

• RimOueghlissiCSRandperformance,Universitéd’EvryVald’Essonne.Defendedon26/02/16(co-advisor:PatriciaCrifo)

• MaximeWavasseur:Onthepricingof long-termassets, started in2014 (advisor:S.Pouget)

• YutingYang:Riskandresponsibility,startedin2015(advisor:N.Treich)

report for the year 2016v5 -...

Documents