THE EU & THE ARAB AWAKENING Lord Hannay

Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles

Hagai M. Segal

Ian Black

iCES Occasional Paper 09

Institute of Contemporary European Studies

iCES OCCASIONAL PAPER 09

First published in 2012 by The Institute of Contemporary European Studies

www.ebslondon.ac.uk/ices

iCES Occasional Paper 09

© Institute of Contemporary European Studies,

Lord Hannay, Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, Hagai M. Segal, Ian Black.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form

or by any means without the permission of the publishers.

ISSN 2040-6495 (online)

First published in Great Britain in 2012 by the Institute of Contemporary European

Studies (iCES), Regent’s College London, Regent’s Park, London, NW1 4NS

CONTENTSForeword

Sir Michael Butler and Professor John Drew 1

Seminar Contributions

Lord Hannay of Chiswick 4

Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles 8

Hagai M. Segal 14

Ian Black 29

Comments and Questions 36

Background Paper

The EU & the “Arab Awakening” 42

Senior European Experts

FOREWORDThe Senior European Experts and the Institute of Contemporary European

Studies of Regent’s College continued their collaboration of jointly offering

seminars with what turned out to be a highly relevant gathering to discuss

the Arab Awakening. The seminar attracted a considerable invited audience

of specialists and those particularly interested in the subject from a number

of different countries. There were also a number of students from Regent’s

College who are beginning to appreciate the opportunity of hearing high level

speakers on subjects relevant to their studies without even leaving the campus!

On this occasion as on others, the Senior European Experts researched and

developed a paper entitled: “Europe and the Arab Awakening” which was

made available to participants and circulated widely to opinion formers in

government, parliament and think tanks around the UK, thus contributing

to and widening the debate. The title the “Arab Awakening” seemed more

relevant that the “Arab spring.” We are pleased to notice a number of

organisations are beginning to use the former which we first suggested and

became the title of our paper.

Europe and the Arab Awakening Seminar

The events of the Arab Awakening may not yet have run their course,

yet we cannot understate the significance of these developments for the

European Union.

The dramatic events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya this year have transformed

the political landscape in the Middle East. Commentators have likened these

events to the collapse of Communism in Europe at the end of the 1980s.

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The turmoil in countries on the EU's southern border will have important

economic, political and social implications within the EU itself. The seminar

explored the important economic, political and social implications for Europe.

The contributors of the seminar were: Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles KCMG,

Former British Ambassador to Israel, Saudi Arabia & Afghanistan; Ian Black,

Middle East Editor, Guardian; and Hagai M. Segal, Academic, analyst and

consultant on Middle-Eastern Affairs, Terrorism and Political Risk.

We were most grateful to them, and to Lord Hannay who chaired the Seminar.

Sir Michael Butler

Chairman

Senior European Experts

&

John Drew

Jean Monnet Professor of European Business and Management

Director of the Institute of Contemporary European Studies

Regent’s College London

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PREVIOUS SEMINARS IN THIS SERIES: Towards a European Foreign Policy:

The European External Action Service and the Role of the EU High

Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

With: Lord Hannay; Mr Graham Avery; Dr Martin Bond; Sir Brian Crowe

Twenty Years On: The EU since the Fall of the Berlin Wall

With: Lord Brittan; Lord Hannay; Jan Zielonka

Where will the EU’s Final Frontiers Lie?

With: Graham Avery; Sir Michael Butler; Nicholas Kent

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LORD HANNAY OF CHISWICKI’m chairing this event, which is an occasion to look at the European Union’s

relationship with the Arab World. We called it, I suppose slightly daringly,

the “Arab Awakening”, not the “Arab Spring” which I think is a somewhat

over-journalistic phrase; and having been initiated into the small amount of

knowledge that I have of the Arab world by a wonderful book called The Arab

Awakening, which introduced me to the birth of Arab nationalism, I felt it an

appropriate title to give it.

I am just introducing this to try to frame the discussion which is going to be

contributed by the three members of the panel you see before you whom I

will introduce when I have said a little bit of background.

The fact that this seminar is being held today to discuss this important aspect

of Europe’s external relations on the same day that the European Council

meets in Brussels for a session which is widely considered to be of central

importance to the future of the whole European project, reflects a truth not

always recognised as such, namely that the European Union of today is just

too significant an element in the global economy and the global body politic

for it to be able to focus exclusively on its own internal affairs and not to have

a profound impact on the wider world. So, even if the European Union were

to let its external relations go by default, which it is not doing, that act of

abdication would have important consequences, most of them negative, and

particularly negative for its own members.

No aspect of these external relations, since the time when Europe played

such a key role in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet

empire, is of greater significance I would suggest than the role it is called

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upon to play in the aftermath of the Arab Awakening which began almost

exactly a year ago and which still has much of its course to run.

Why should that be so? Well I would suggest to you because wherever you

look – whether you consider the issues of security, of immigration, of energy

supply, of markets, of investment, of the environment, and I could go on

longer, the relationship between Europe and the Arab world is intimate and

it cannot be ducked. We are each other’s neighbours, and what each of us

does affects the other for better or for worse. The background paper which

has been circulated ahead of the seminar seeks to identify and to describe

the present state of these links.

The picture one sees is a mixed one. In some respects Europe already

is playing an important and positive role in the region. A whole string of

agreements link almost all of the countries of the Middle East to the European

Union, giving them privileged market access and considerable sums of

aid, and providing for co-operation over investment and immigration and a

whole of string of other things. The EU has for years been providing the lion’s

share of finance to support and to modernise the Palestinian Authority, and

the European Union is a member of the Quartet which is struggling to keep

alive the prospect of a two state solution. EU sanctions against the Syrian

regime and against Iran’s nuclear aspirations are an important part of the

international pressure which is designed to bring about major policy change

without outside military intervention which would probably prove in either of

those cases to be counter-productive.

But set against those positive indicators we see a whole string of instances

where Europe has failed to present a united front or has performed well

below its potential. The division in the Security Council over exercising the

international community’s Responsibility to Protect in Libya; the three-way

splits over the handling of the Goldstone Report on human rights abuses in

Gaza; and the failure to give a lead in the counsels of the Quartet. So there

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clearly is a long way to go if we believe, as I do, that the European Union

acting together in the Middle East has a far greater capacity for positive

influence than have its individual member states acting separately, and all too

likely on past form acting in rivalry with each other.

If the Arab Awakening was itself a surprise to all of us – and of course it

was – then we should be prepared for some more surprises, and not all of

them will be pleasant ones. As we have seen in Libya, and are still seeing

in Syria, the awakening has led to horrific acts of repressive violence. The

emergence of democratic institutions will not always be smooth – though it

can be, as Tunisia seems to be demonstrating. The steps required to generate

economic growth and jobs for the huge cohorts of young unemployed have

hardly started and they will not be easy to achieve. Sectarian tensions are

everywhere close beneath, and sometimes above, the surface of events. So

Europe will need strategic patience and strong nerves - and it will have to

make hard and sometimes costly choices.

None of those choices will be harder than charting a course towards a

resolution of the dispute between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The idea

that that problem has somehow become marginal, or alternatively has

become completely insoluble, will not survive the onrush of events for very

long and Europe will need to play a more consistent and a more active role if

those events are not to spiral out of control and to lead to more episodes of

regional mayhem.

To discuss these challenges and these opportunities we have brought

together three speakers each of whom starts from a different point of

departure and will no doubt have a different perspective.

Sherard Cowper-Coles, has been Britain’s Ambassador and Special

Representative in Afghanistan most recently but who had a long involvement

in the Middle East as ambassador both to Israel and to Saudi Arabia.

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Hagai Segal is an academic who lectures in Near and Middle Eastern politics

at universities across the world and at New York University’s London campus

in particular.

Ian Black, the Middle East editor of The Guardian who’s been reporting on the

region for a number of years and before that worked in Brussels reporting on

the EU and its emergence as a foreign policy player.

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SIR SHERARD COWPER-COLESFormer British Ambassador to Israel, Saudi Arabia & Afghanistan

I am reminded slightly of what King George V said to Douglas Hurd’s

predecessor Sir Samuel Hoare when he handed in his seals of office having

spent a great deal of time travelling to and from Paris to negotiate the Hoare-

Laval Pact. The old King said to Sir Samuel as he handed in his seals of office

“well at least Sir Samuel as you are no longer Foreign Secretary there will be no

more coals to Newcastle and no more Hoares to Paris!”

I slightly feel in front of an audience such as this with Sir Michael Palliser,

Douglas Hurd, David Hannay, James Adams, Tony Brenton, who was in the

Embassy with me in Cairo nearly thirty years ago, Brian Crowe, Michael Burton

- I am bringing coals to Newcastle.

The outlook is gloomy in both senses of the word. Gloomy in the sense of it being

opaque and gloomy in the sense of, I think, things across the Middle East are going

to get worse before they get better. What in my view we are seeing, and I stress

that everything I say is personal, it’s based on my time in the Middle East but also

in my present job (I am now travelling back there again almost every week) - in my

personal view, as David Hannay implied, the suggestion that this is an Arab Spring

or awakening is more to do with the time of year at which it began than the real

place of these events in the great sweep of history.

I think we are seeing the beginnings of a long period of change in which in

certain but not all Arab countries – in the secular republics but not so much

the monarchies - we are seeing the overthrow or the removal of the tyranny of

individuals. But the Arab world is still suffering from, if you like, the tyranny of

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ideas, the tyranny of ultra-conservative Islam and the tyranny of centuries of

under education and under investment.

I have always thought that the key document to understanding the Middle

East today is the Arab Human Development Report, particularly the one of

2002 which describes the extent to which the part of the world which passed

the torch of learning from Athens and Rome through Cairo and Baghdad

on to Cordoba to Paris and then to certain universities in this country, the

extent to which through the centuries that part of the world fell behind in

terms of intellectual advancement, intellectual creativity. While we will see the

departures of autocrats like Hosni Mubarak, and I imagine in due course the

Assad family and the Alawites out of power probably in Syria, we are in for a

long period of painful change.

For the youth of the Arab world these political changes may address their

yearnings for more representative and accountable government but they won’t

address the central need for jobs and worthwhile education and a fulfilling

life. The prospect for the young people of the teeming suburbs of Cairo, the

unemployed peasants in the Egyptian delta, for the masses in the suburbs of

Damascus and in Aleppo, is not an encouraging one. We are unlikely to see the

flow of investment that is needed, we see economies contracting and of course

in America and in Britain and in Europe we see us wrestling with economic

problems that will make it difficult for us to provide the support and the political

and economic engagement which is necessary. I think we are at the start of

a long, dark winter and a lot of suffering for the Arab people, similar to the

periods of suffering and uncertainty that followed, for example, the French

Revolution. It will be some time before these countries stabilise.

In accompanying them on this journey we need to hold certain truths in our

minds. One is that we will have to live with Islamist governments. These

are not necessarily the evil that Mr Netanyahu described in his speech in

the Knesset the other day. For Arab countries that have been subject to

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autocracy for many years, Islam, Islamism, offers a form of identity, offers a

way of giving meaning to the world. If we try to push against that, to negate

it, to overcome it, to support programmes to undermine the hold of moderate

Islam and Islamic ideas as they evolve, we will be pushing back against

the tide of history. Much better to go with the flow of history, to allow these

countries to pass through a period of Islamic rule, to do what we can to

encourage that Islamic rule be as moderate and connected as possible but

to start showering abuse down on their heads is a great mistake and to be

conjuring up the fear of Islam is I think very irresponsible.

Two countries David didn’t mention in his introduction, at least not in my

hearing, were first Turkey and second the United States. For many Arabs

the model they will be striving towards is that of Turkey. That is Turkey

today, a country that has rediscovered pride, is enjoying levels of economic

growth that would be the envy of most Arab countries and certainly most

European countries and has found an Islamic identity which in many ways is

probably more rhetoric than substance but it has given Turkey a sense of its

place in the world. Unfortunately, a sense of place that is drifting away from

Europe, based on, I think, the illusion of a new kind of Ottoman hegemony

or leadership across the Middle East but that is the model I think many

moderate Arabs will be looking towards as a country that’s come through

dark times and has found in Mr Erdogan’s model of Islamic leadership, of

what is called freedom and justice, a template which they would like to apply

to their own countries.

The other country is the United States. Elizabeth Monroe wrote her book

about Britain’s moment in the Middle East. What we are seeing now, I

think, is the end of America’s moment, rather longer than ours, rather more

extensive than ours, in the Middle East. This is linked intimately to the fate

of the Jewish state. I say this as a Hebrew-speaking former Ambassador to

Israel, whose great uncle was shot by the Germans for hiding Jewish children

on his estate in Holland before the war, and my father as an undergraduate

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at Cambridge worked with the Kindertransport. I see what is happening to

Israel as essentially a case of extended, assisted suicide. Any true friend

of the Jewish state would want to compel the Jewish state to be making a

reasonable peace. Not necessarily in the interests of the Palestinians, not

even in the interests of the United States, or the European Union but in the

interests of the Jewish people. The delusion which Mr Netanyahu repeated

in the Knesset this week that somehow the change in the Arab world was for

the worse, that the alibi in the past was that Israel could not make peace with

these dictatorships and now the tide of representative but not yet democratic

government is flowing in the other direction, the alibi for the Jewish state is

that it is too dangerous to make peace. In my view it is all the more important

that the Jewish state makes peace.

Our responsibility as friends of Israel, as people who want the Jewish state to

survive, who want to lower the temperature across the region, who want the

Jewish people to resume the contribution which once made to the economic

and cultural life of the Middle East should be applying quiet but not public

pressure to the Jewish state to do what is necessary in its own interest.

As I travel round the Middle East I think one of the worst bits of damage

done by the decision to concentrate all the Jews in the Middle East in

a single colony on the coastal plain of Palestine, with some in the hills

around Jerusalem and the hills of Galilee, has been to take the Jews out

of Alexandria, out of Baghdad, out of Damascus, out of Aleppo. Just as

in London or New York, the Jews are the cultural and intellectual and

commercial yeast of those cities, so in Baghdad in the thirties, in Cairo, in

Alexandria, the Jewish people provided some of that yeast of creativity which

I think is not essential but highly desirable for a successful Middle East.

This is the vision we should be aiming for: an Israel at peace with its

neighbours, playing its part in the region, lowering the temperature.

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I am reminded of what Winston Churchill said at the end of the First World

War, that when the tides of the great conflict receded, the dreary steeples of

Fermanagh and Tyrone would emerge from the receding flood waters. My fear

is that as the Middle East, the Arab Middle East, changes, unless Israel starts

to address these existential questions about itself it will be the dreary, not

minarets, but the towers of Jerusalem emerging from the receding flood waters.

America working with Europe has a very big part to play in that. One of the

sadnesses for me is the way in which President Obama having said on this as

so many issues the right things when he came in, has found himself forced by

domestic political pressures to do things and say things which are manifestly

not in America’s interest. It cannot be right that President Obama was forced

to go to the United Nations and make a speech about Israel which the Israeli

Foreign Minister, a man who uses that chilling Hebrew word “transfer”, which

is actually the Hebrew for ethnic cleansing, said that he was so pleased with

President Obama’s speech to the UN he felt he could sign it with both hands.

If you love Israel, if you want the Middle East to survive, if you want an

America that retains its moral authority, that retains its ability to broker a

peace because having grown up on the Venice Declaration and the European

peace plan promoted by Lord Carrington amongst others, having always

believed that there is a European role in promoting peace in the Middle East,

we have to remember that even with an America in relative decline, America

for all sorts of reasons will remain the key to stabilising the Middle East. As

well as looking towards the Middle East, as Europeans and Britons we should

be looking towards America if we want to help stabilise the Middle East and

encourage the growth of jobs, economies and representative government. It’s

only by working with the Americans that we are going to make a difference

in the Middle East, it’s not by following an entirely separate European policy

although there can of course be all sorts of distinctions.

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I think we are at a very difficult moment. I think all sorts of unexpected and

unforeseeable changes are on the way. I always remember probably the

greatest British Arabist of the postwar generation in the British Foreign Office,

Sir Anthony Parsons, writing his response to the Foreign Office report on

the Iranian Revolution. Nicholas Browne, who had written that report, had

described our failure properly to understand what was happening in the

bazaars of south Tehran. In his response Sir Anthony said something which

Lord Hannay I think alluded to in his opening remarks that our failure with

the Iranian Revolution was not so much a failure of information as a failure of

imagination. The unimaginable happened.

Whether it’s Sadat going to Jerusalem or the spectacle of Hosni Mubarak,

who my Ambassador in Cairo in 1981 said was likely to last only six months

as Egyptian President (this was in a telegram sent from Cairo in October

or November 1981), the spectacle of the Egyptian President in a bed, in

a hospital bed in a cage in an Egyptian court. Who six months ago would

have foreseen that reversal of fortune? There will be more events like that –

unimaginable events – in the Levant, in the peninsula and elsewhere. All we

can do is to hold to those central tenets that I tried to set out at the beginning

as we accompany the Arabs on what is likely to be the most different and

dangerous stage of their long journey back to the place they should have

once had in the world and in doing so helping Israel to establish a sustainable

and secure basis for itself as the home of the Jewish people.

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HAGAI M. SEGALAcademic, analyst and consultant on Middle-Eastern Affairs,

Terrorism and Political Risk

So many fascinating comments there and perspectives that I would love to

react to. I am though specifically going to be focusing on aspects of some of

the academics around the political, economic and strategic context and its

implications for Europe, as I was asked to do. I am not going to talk about

the Israel question, not because of its lack of relevance but due to this and

because I have only 15 minutes!

I wanted to start by setting into context something which many in this room are

fully aware of but which has not received the level of attention it should have in

the media and elsewhere when analysing the Arab Spring/Awakening - that is the

fundamental socio-economic context in which these events are taking place.

We all know that there is a direct relationship between political risk and

economics but what is fascinating is that since the 1970s that nexus has

fundamentally reversed. If we take the classic oil crisis in 1973, it was political

events in the Middle East that drove the oil price. Today I don’t think there

is any doubt at all that that nexus has reversed. In fact relatively – and I

emphasise relatively – low and high oil price is today the most fundamental

cause of most elements of geo-political risk we have seen in the world and

in particular in the Middle East of late. Tracking the relationship between the

economic fundamentals and the political fundamentals is essential in both

understanding but also crystal-balling these issues as they develop.

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I simply give you the cases very briefly of Iran, Russia and Venezuela. When have

these oil-rich states – who take issue with America’s dominance of the world –

been pretty forthright, if not aggressive, in their diplomacy in recent years? When

the oil prices are high. As it was put in the Daily Telegraph in 2008:

“When oil prices are high, the world's anti-western regimes can afford to rub

their hands with glee. Like a global whirlwind, the price of crude scoops up

the pattern of wealth and power between nations and throws it back to earth

in a wholly different order” (Daily Telegraph, August 28 2008).

We are talking about when Russia invaded Georgia; we are talking about

Venezuela when it started offering itself as an economic alternative in aid in its

region. And in regards to the Middle East it is worth looking at what happened

in 2006 and what didn’t happen in 2008-2009.

In 2006 Israel launched an attack against Hamas in Gaza – a relatively limited

one after the Hamas operation that had taken Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit

hostage. In response to the Israeli operation Hezbollah, in the name of both

coming to the aid of their Palestinian brothers but also to deliberately try and

highlight the fact that the Arab world was doing nothing about the situation,

launches an attack across the Israeli border which results in a major conflict in

the Middle East. In large part that attack came because Iran and others of their

backers indicated that this was affordable, it was something that they would

help pay for and as importantly that they would help pay to rearm Hezbollah

afterwards. Jump to 2008-2009 and a massively larger attack is launched by

Israel against Gaza, against which the 2006 event pales into insignificance, yet

this time Hezbollah does absolutely nothing. Why? Because this time, after the

fall in oil price and associated revenues, their backer Iran this time says ‘we

can’t afford this, we are not willing to fund it’. The dynamic of course it is a lot

more complicated than that but I am highlighting this vital aspect because it

has often been unnoticed or lost in the analysis.

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But this factor also is fundamental I would suggest in understanding both the

events we saw in Iran in 2009 and the events we have seen in the last year

in North Africa and the Arab world. These are not events that were sparked

purely because of a need for democracy – as we have discussed there

has never been in most of these countries a history of democracy in these

countries. The issue came when people realised that their socio-economics

had collapsed to a point where democracy was a potential panacea, a

mechanism through which to achieve their aims and objectives, then

suddenly you had the perfect storm that led to these realities.

It is my contention that if the Iranian election had been stolen, even in the manner

that it was, during a time of relative economic stability that we would not have

seen the events we have. It came because of months of power cuts, massive

increase in inflation, massive increase in youth unemployment in a country where

the average age is in the twenties. It is only with the socio-economic interacting

with the political that we have these events developing as they did and I think the

consequences of that today (in the Arab world) are significant.

We have to accept, and I agree entirely with Sir Sherard on this point, that

we are going to have Islamism in government to some extent at least in the

Arab world. Attempting to rub that out, to nullify it, to tell the Arab world that

it’s not the way it is supposed to be, serves no objective purpose. But I think

that nevertheless there needs to be fundamental recognition in the foreign

policy of the UK, and that of other individual European states and of the

European Union itself, of the necessity to decide where the ceilings and floors

are in our policy and how there can be an effective engagement in regard to

these dynamics as and when they develop.

What is most concerning of course in what happened in Egypt is not

necessarily that the Brotherhood did well. As we know, quick elections in a

country where there is only one established political force is likely to ensure

that that force does very well. As has been articulated in previous comments,

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the Brotherhood has been very clever in projecting itself as a freedom and

justice party, very deliberately taking the same terminology as we have in

Turkey. They have been falling over backwards to stress - as we have seen

in Tunisia - that it will be more Islamic influence than complete Islamism.

But I think with the Salafists – with only a third of the votes cast thus far

but some suggest that they are going to even better in some of the rounds

to come – winning 25 per cent of the vote, groups overtly publicly stating

that they wish to bring back the cutting off of hands for certain crimes,

their perception of Sharia justice, and also having huge issues with any

concept of a peace treaty with the state of Israel. There needs to be a

fundamental assessment of how those elements are engaged with.

This is not just purely an issue to do with the relations of the European

Union or individual European states and Egypt. That dynamic, particularly

for the reasons described in terms of the Israeli government that we

currently have, is likely to cause a significant rise in tensions not just in

the Israeli-Egyptian dynamic and the Israeli-Hamas dynamic in Gaza but

of course almost a triumvirate of the three which I am afraid that, without

assistance and intervention, could very quickly lead to the kind of 2006 or

2008-09 scenarios I articulated earlier. Is Egypt going to be the your new

post-Suharto Indonesia or is going to be a new Kemalist Turkey as ‘we’

hope it will be, or is this merely wishful Western thinking?

One of the most fascinating aspects from an academic and analytical

perspective regarding what is going on in the Middle East is the reaction

of those countries who haven’t been “Arab springed” yet. I agree entirely

about the fact that the Arab Spring terminology is unhelpful but I think it

is worth remembering that it in part emerged because Westerners looking

at it wanted to compare it with the Prague Spring or at least those kind of

movements. We immediately had to understand it from our own frame of

reference, from our own history. This is one audience that I don’t need to

tell this to probably but it is a fundamental mistake to view the Arab world

and the Middle East through a western prism. And yet what is fascinating

is what I would suggest we have currently got is a battle in the Arab world

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between those who want ‘Europe 1989’ and those who want ‘Europe 1848’.

The protestors want the overthrow of the regimes, the single holistic move

from one set of systems to another, but the governments of course want what

happened in 1848. In response to revolutions all over the European continent

you had minor political corrections but within two or three years all the old

orders had reasserted themselves and things had pretty much gone back to

the way they were. Whether it’s going to be 1848 or whether it’s going to 1989 -

or almost certainly of course something in between! - will be very interesting.

I always wonder when giving such an address whether I am going to be

perceived as being optimistic or pessimistic in my presentation. I am always

mindful of the quote that the optimistic believes he lives in the best of

possible worlds... and the pessimist fears he might be right! I think one has to

view the Middle East through that prism.

Saudi Arabia, where despite soaring oil revenues, has actually seen an

inflation-adjusted significant decline in average wealth, responds to the Arab

spring not just with a massive fiscal package in February and March ($133

billion internal fiscal package), which by the way according to some estimates

has raised their break-even price, in other words the oil price at which their

exchequer needs to function, to around the $90 mark which has some very

significant potential long term economic implications, but as importantly

together with other Gulf states launched in April, a very significant pan-Gulf

development assistance fund in which the Western-orientated relatively

moderate Sunni states in the Gulf who haven’t yet been “Arab Springed”

are in effect trying to buy their way back to stability. You will notice that the

countries that haven’t yet been affected but might - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,

the Emirates, Qatar – are paying for the Yemens, the Jordans, the Syrias and

the Egypts to hope that somehow they can use the economics to address as

I mentioned the sociological and socio-economics underpinnings to almost

buy the region back in to play.

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This also explains why we have suddenly seen the Arab League, to use a

rather clumsy metaphor, grow a set of teeth. Why is it that we are suddenly

seeing remarkable levels of proactivity and direct involvement in dynamics

like Libya and now in Syria? It is in part because the Gulf States realise

that if their people are not going to “Arab Spring” them it is imperative that

they are publicly seen as backing the protests elsewhere. This is having a

very interesting effect, not only on internal political and economic domestic

policies, but is also fundamentally changing the way the Arab world is

operating and a sense of proactivity.

Going back to the point Sir Sherard made about the absolute necessity for

peace in the Middle East and the increasing urgency, which I don’t think

anybody in this room could possible dispute, I think maybe there is some

grounds for optimism in the sense that a united Arab world recognising the

essential need to change the current Middle Eastern dynamic for self-interest

not for altruistic interest can potentially reengage in regards to issues like the

Arab peace plan but also potentially creates a collective engagement with

the United States, with Europe, even the Israelis which hopefully even in the

current pessimistic scenario can potentially create opportunities for dialogue

if not for some kind of agreement.

I also wanted to briefly talk about some of the security implications. I advise

a number of actors, public and private, on terrorism and related issues and

one of the short-term concerns, if not medium and long-term, is the security

implications of what we have seen. It is inevitable of course when you have

dictatorships of such length falling over night to democracies that we are

going to have elements of this kind of instability and security instability.

The situation in Sinai is particularly pressing, we have had attacks into

Israel, numerous attacks on oil and gas pipelines etcetera, but also we are

seeing the increasing reports of the munitions, large and small, which have

disappeared from Libya and its emergence in other parts of the regions. This

of course plays a wider strategic issue in terms of its ability to fall into the

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hands of nefarious actors, including those linked with al-Qaeda in the region,

considering what is already going in regards to piracy, Islamism, extreme

militant Islamism and militancy in that region.

Europe recognising the long-term, but most importantly just in the short-term,

the strategic and security implications of the Arab Spring are paramount.

But again as I have hopefully accurately described with the economics, the

security situation is also creating interesting and new relationships, dynamics

and alliances which need to be considered and integrated into a future

European policy - individual and collective.

Take for example the deal that has just been signed by Israel and Kenya

specifically for the Israelis to provide assistance in regards to al-Shabab, with

Netanyahu saying at the time that it was part of a commitment to help create

“a coalition against fundamentalism” across East Africa - and he specifically

mentioned publicly that it would hopefully involve Kenya, Ethiopia, South

Sudan and Tanzania. It is very interesting to see how these realities are

changing relationships and dynamics and creating alternate coalitions that

did not exist in the pre-Arab Spring dynamic.

The Syrian situation, which we will address further in questions, is also

important to look at in regard to its likely security implications, locally and re/

the Israeli-Palestinian dynamic. There is increasing evidence that as Syria and

its allies Iran are feeling under pressure that there is an interest in turning the

spotlight away, of creating issues elsewhere that are likely to grab the attention

of the world. I say this very carefully when I am speaking on a panel with a

journalist about to speak after me, that there is a perception – right or not - that

the minute anything happens in the Israeli- Palestinian context immediately

attention is drawn away from any other dynamic. Remember the TV interview

where a senior US news editor was asked why the massacre in Hama, Syria

(in 1982) had not been covered while the Lebanon War had been given such

attention and his answer was “well it’s simple, we didn’t have cameras there”.

20

This context is one which I am afraid we are already seeing in regards to

Hezbollah. For those who haven’t read it, I suggest that you read Hassan

Nasrallah’s, the Hezbollah’s leader’s, speech yesterday, in which for the first

time in years he spoke in public and to very publicly stand behind the Syrian

regime. It is a clear indicator that Hezbollah have now reached the point

where they believe that their key allies are at the point of potential collapse

and they may feel the need to take action to change and alter that dynamic.

I would also suggest in relation to Europe that we have underestimated

significantly already the impact that the Arab Spring has had on the European

socio-economic dynamic. With a potentially worsening of the economic

realities if not a potential significant crisis in the coming months, it is essential

that European policymakers begin to consider these interactions.

It was very telling that in Greece in recent months a lot of the placards, but

also in media interviews, the protesters have been using terminology like

“this is our Arab Spring”. I also think personally – and some of you may

dispute this - that to understand what happened here in London with the

riots we have to consider at least in part the significant role that the Arab

Spring played within this. People in this country who felt economically

disenfranchised were watching on television as people in another part of

the world who were expressing anger for similar reasons – remember those

original images from Egypt of people holding a Tunisian flag in one hand

and a loaf of bread in the other – they were watching as the media told them

that people were not just protesting but rioting and using violence in the

Middle East were positive, nuanced political actors. There was an element

to which, and I have spoken to police officers who have interviewed some

of those who have been prosecuted about this, that it created a sense in

which there were some who believed that the actions in London would

be recognised as equally legitimate, nuanced political acts, instead of

course as how we have viewed them – as senseless violence. It created a

certain space in which the use of violence against a government had been

21

legitimised by the wide enthusiasm and appreciation of what had been

going on in the Middle East.

We have seen this reflected elsewhere - the occupy movement etcetera as well.

To wrap up, I would argue Europe needs to recognise how these issues

should be addressed in terms of long-term policy – not just in regards the

Israeli-Palestinian dynamic, but specifically in regard to these emerging

dynamics in Egypt and elsewhere. There is a belief still in all too many circles

in the West and in Europe, in political and policy circles, that democracy, even

first elections in fledgling democracies, is some kind of political cure-all that

will inevitably lead to the promotion and election of progressive forces. We

have seen time and time again the utter fallacy of such a viewpoint.

Even if there were a million people in Tahrir Square who subscribe to that

perspective they are at most one fiftieth of those who cast a vote in the

Egyptian elections. If the results we have seen now are replicated in the long-

term we will have a result in which the minority who brought the revolution on

a particular idea may end up getting a government that is very different from

the one they wished to bring about. Going back to the Iranian Revolution this

is in part what occurred in 1979 – many of those involved were not trying to

bring about an Islamist government, they just wanted to get rid of the Shah.

People get together in the Middle East not over a shared positivity but over a

shared negativity. The problem always is that once they have got rid of that

negativity their differences instantaneously come to the fore. The minority of

activists will not decide the future of where things go.

I hope that Sir Sherard is right when he said that they are just ‘passing through’

a period of Islamist rule. I have written about this at length - that the hope is that

we have to accept Islamic or Islamist influenced governments in the first two

or three elections in the hope that this builds democracy and civil society that

allows other elements to come to the fore. But of course if we have a government

22

in Egypt which is Islamist in orientation and that passes an Islamist constitution

the situation gets a lot more complicated. We still have not learnt from the

lessons of Algeria in 1992, we have not learnt from the lessons of the Hamas

election in 1996 and its consequences since. The emphasis on democracy has

resulted in almost a victory of the form over the content: Democracy, and many

of those in Tahrir Square would happily agree with this, is not the goal it’s the

mechanism. The goal is to live in a society where you have certain rights, you

have certain obligations, where there is a sense of accountability, where when

governments don’t address their issues you have an engagement with it and you

can change that. I am afraid that we have fallen into – I would suggest in certain

quarters anyway – a mindset in which the entire goal has become the election

and democracy full stop, as opposed to recognising that that is the mechanism

for the goal and not the goal itself. I therefore worry whether that rather pop

analogy adage that “democracies never go to war with democracies” may not be

something we will not be able to talk about in the years to come.

This therefore suggests profound short and long-term policy implications

for the UK, individual European states and the European Union. How can

and should EU and Western democracies assist/mould new ones? It is not,

and agreeing entirely with the points made earlier, for Europe to dictate what

democracy is, or tell voters abroad whom to elect, but I ask the question

should we accept all democratic outcomes, should they all be embraced

and validated? How will the EU and individual European states respond if an

Islamist government is elected in Egypt that institutes a strict interpretation

of Sharia law? We insist those who join the European Union subscribe to

European views and principles of democracy and human rights. Is there a

sense to which that should also be demanded, suggested, or encouraged

within our foreign policy and our external engagement? Of course if you do

that too much you are not at the table and to quote Lord Hannay’s comment

earlier it becomes an act of abdication; that of course must not occur. But we

have to find a balance between those two positions.

23

I think there are massive opportunities here. Europe is probably better placed

than any international actor, particularly with waning US influence in the

region, and with the established mechanisms that are already there in regard

to the Euro-Med Barcelona Process/ Union for the Mediterranean to be there

to assist, to provide economic, cultural, political assistance in that regard. I

for one remain utterly unconvinced whether that policy conversation though

is anything beyond embryonic both in the UK and Europe at large. If Europe

is to have influence we need to begin to ask and to find collective answers to

these questions sooner rather than later.

COPIES OF SLIDES:

Geo-Strategy/Price Nexus

High oil price gives key actors like Iran, Russia and Venezuela huge clout.

“When oil prices are high, the world's anti-western regimes can afford

to rub their hands with glee. Like a global whirlwind, the price of crude

scoops up the pattern of wealth and power between nations and throws it

back to earth in a wholly different order” (Daily Telegraph, August 28 2008).

July 2008 – Venezuela sweetened Petrocaribe, selling oil to Caribbean member

nations at highly preferential terms; US$480m p.a. ‘PetroFood’ food aid prog.

2006 Israel-Hezbollah war – Direct result of Iranian liquidity?

2008: Iran - $120bn. oil revenue, double ‘07. (Budget presumed on $40pb price).

Then oil price plummeted: power cuts, inflation + youth unemployment soured.

Economic realities ‘table-setter’ for 2009 political crisis? Undoubtedly.

Egypt

The Muslim Brotherhood’s showing should not be a surprise..

But the levels of Salafist support is a different story.

Implications for Egypt-Israel peace treaty, and likely consequences for

Israel-Hamas / Gaza dynamic.

Is Egypt going to be the new post-Suharto Indonesia or a new Kemalist

Turkey ‘we’ hoped it would be, or is this merely wishful Western thinking?

What is/will be Europe’s role, individually + collectively? Potential quandary.

24

The Gulf/Saudi Arabia Next?

Saudi Arabia – ¼ of world’s oil reserves, revenues around 90% of

export earnings.

Revenues soar, income plummets: 2010 real per-capita income (inflation

adjusted) $8,550, par with 1991 and well below 1980 level of $14,773

(Banque Saudi Franci).

Surge in Saudi Arabia’s break-even price (now $85/$90 a barrel according

to some estimates) due to 500 bill. Saudi riyals (USD$133b.) fiscal

packages in Feb/March.

Bahrain rather focused (Sunni Arab) Gulf minds!

With other Gulf nations Saudi Arabia have established a pan-Gulf

development fund to assist Yemen, Jordan, Syria + Egypt. Also funded by

Kuwait, UAE + Qatar.

Europe 1989 or Europe 1848?! This is certainly what Gulf monarchies hope!

Central to the Arab League suddenly growing a set of teeth

(i.e. re. Libya + Syria).

Arab Spring Instability?

Long-term hopes of stable democracy; Short-term challenges to be overcome.

Inevitable instability – always occurs when authoritarian regimes speedily fall.

Obvious concern that criminals and terrorists will take advantage.

Breakdown of law and order already a reality, especially in Egypt: e.g.

Egypt gas pipeline attacks etc, attacks into Israel, etc, etc.

Ease of movement for terrorists/nefarious actors also a major issue now.

Libya arms concerns (one reason behind NTC asking NATO to extend mission).

Key factors in recent Israel-Kenya security deal, and Netanyahu associated

commitment to help build “coalition against fundamentalism” in East

Africa, incorporating Kenya, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Tanzania.

25

Security Implications – e.g. Syria

Major regional implications

Lebanon; Israeli-Palestinian context; Iran and the Gulf.

Iran cut Hamas funding for their refusal to publicly back Assad regime.

Desperate to ‘change the conversation’/have the spotlight pointed elsewhere.

Islamists/militants they support (Hamas, Hezbollah) carrying out attacks?

Nasrallah speech this week evocative of current dynamic and its dangers.

Europe – Arab Spring Mood?

Arab Spring to European Winter?

Policy makers underestimated inspiration/copycat effects in West/Europe.

Greece – “This is our Arab Spring”

London riots

Occupy movement/St Pauls/etc.

The socio-economic catalyst for radical political action potentially as

relevant and prevalent in Europe as in North Africa and M-E.

With possible impending economic crisis, increase in austerity measures

etc, this is ignored at our peril.

Democracy As Panacea

Belief in all too many Western political and policy circles that democracy –

even first elections in fledgling democracies – is a political cure-all that will

inevitably lead to the promotion and election of progressive forces.

Fallacy? Even if 1 million in Tahrir Square, that is 1/50th of Egyptian electorate.

We seem to have learned little from Algeria 1992. Or Hamas in the 1996 PA

elections, and the reality in Gaza etc since.

Democracy the mechanism, not the goal.

Time to reassess the “Democracies don’t go to war with democracies” adage?

Profound short- and long-term policy implications for UK/Europe/the EU.

How can and should EU/Western democracies help assist (mould?) new ones?

It is not for Europe to dictate what democracy is, nor tell voter abroad whom

26

to elect, but should all democratic outcomes be embraced and validated?

How will the EU and individual European states for e.g. respond if Islamist

government were to be elected in Egypt and institute strict Sharia law?

European position/policy in such scenarios currently embryonic at best.

Wider impactions - e.g. re. Turkey EU bid?

Threat but also opportunity – Euro-Med etc a mechanism for influence?

Libya

UN sanctioned air campaign thanks in no small part to Arab League support.

Post-Gaddafi reality anything but certain.

Tribal divides; Geographic divides; Huge economic, political/institutional,

social challenges; No democracy of any sort since the 1950s.

Islamists?

Tripoli military commander, Abdel Hakim Belhaj, is the former head of the

(AQ affiliated?) Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

Former rebel army commander, (and before that Gaddafi ally) Abdel

Fattah Younes, killed in July by his own side, with accusations that

Islamists were responsible.

Bahrain

Sunni monarchy in Shia majority State. Limited democracy.

First Gulf state to discover oil – today oil and gas 60% of budget revenues.

Limited oil reserves resulted in significant diversification of economy.

Cooperative agreement with US, base in Juffair. Headquarters for regional

US Commander + 1500 US/coalition personnel. Key naval area for US/the

West.

Huge quandary for the West – policy inconsistencies clear.

Growing issue in Saudi-Iran tensions.

27

Yemen

Major instability in 2011. UN Civil War warning.

Yemen to be watched carefully – key area of potential threat in coming

months.

AQ (AQAP) regroup/resurgence?

Piracy issues etc?

Potential base for attacks across Gulf/M-E.

Key shipping lane + strategic position: over 3 m. bpd pass through Bab al

Mandab strait, to and from Suez Canal.

28

IAN BLACKMiddle East editor, The Guardian

It is the fate of the final speaker on a panel to have to adjust and make swift

changes to his response to things that have just been said.

I was struck by the overall very sober, very geo-strategic approach of

Sherard and Hagai. So I am going to try to convey something of the sense of

excitement, opportunity and change that I have experienced in my own contact

with the Arab spring or whatever we are calling the events of the last year.

Just a thought about Europe first; I can’t resist this. I wrote something

the other day about the decision of the Arab League to suspend Syria’s

membership because of the repression that was going on. I was then slightly

surprised to get a message from a Member of the European Parliament who

I had known when I was in Brussels some years ago. I hadn’t realised that

he was particularly interested in the Arab world so I was amused to see that

what had attracted his attention was the fact that the Arab League decision

(the Arab League has 22 members compared to the EU’s 27 and let’s be

honest it’s not exactly a giant on the world stage) had been taken on the

basis of a simple majority. He lamented the fact that that wasn’t an option

available to the European Council; how much simpler life would be!

There is huge interest in Europe about the Middle East. I would like to

make the case that this year has been an extraordinary one if only because

the traditional preoccupation with the Israel-Palestinian issue has been

completely overshadowed by something far bigger. It is important to get a

sense of the sheer scale of a phenomenon which has convulsed the Arab

world from the Gulf to the Atlantic and an entire region of 350 million people.

And one final Brussels point: the European Commission already has a

programme called SPRING, a wonderful acronym that stands for “support for

partnership, reform and inclusive growth”; that’s the Commission on the ball.

29

It doesn’t seem to me that it matters very much whether you call this a “spring”

or an “awakening” (David Hannay pointed out the famous phrase popularised

by George Antonius) or whether we play with seasonal metaphors like autumn

or winter or talk about uprisings or revolutions – all these terms have been

used. Whatever language you use I think it is important to get a sense of the

power, the excitement of this. Anybody who watched what happened in Tahrir

Square in January and February would have had to have a heart of stone

not to be moved. Mubarak, who became president in 1981 was still there 30

years later looking arrogant, haughty and peeved that his people had had the

temerity to demand that he go. I confess that I was and remain moved by what

happened. Plenty of hard-headed and well-informed people have succumbed

to this. I was looking at an article by Rashid Khalidi, the renowned Palestinian-

American historian who wrote an excellent piece in March when all of this was

very new. He actually quoted Wordsworth when he talked about the “blissful

experience” to try to convey the way in which millions of ordinary Arabs for

the first time able to take their fate or at least have the illusion that they were

doing so. The excitement is still there — although we all know that eight or nine

months on it’s a complicated story.

I would like to whiz through a tour d’horizon of how things look.

Egypt: the most important of all the Arab countries, the largest, the one that

has traditionally been the beacon for the region whether through its cinema

or its politics, is in a state of extraordinary flux. We do not know how it’s

going to come out. It is not over. The latest from the generals who took over

from Mubarak suggests that they haven’t quite grasped the idea that their

continued dominance, the permanent position of control, having almost

an extra-territorial status within the country, is compatible with a genuine

transition to democracy. The potential for trouble in this most important of

Arab countries is very much there.

30

Tunisia – how much did anybody ever talk or think about Tunisia before this

year? It was a Francophone preoccupation entirely. Tunisia is a place where

Europeans go on holiday to enjoy its wonderful beaches and benefit from a

very secular and welcoming culture. It is homogenous, with a highly educated

population, relatively advanced rights for women and of course when it came to

the crunch, an army which did the right thing and got rid of a dictator who was

widely loathed though very much a friend of the West. Let’s not forget that the

French talked about sending in the CRS to help Ben Ali to deal with the riots -

not a great response to the first drama of this Arab spring.

I have been fascinated by Libya, where I have spent quite a lot of time

this year. Call me naïve, call me emotional, I found it profoundly moving

to watch a people who had suffered this tyrannical clown for forty years

finally liberating themselves. I went shortly after the collapse of the regime

in September to the University of Tripoli where the staff, like academics

everywhere, were complaining about budgets and students but above all

were delighted that for the first time in living memory they could actually

teach their students properly. It’s hard not to be moved by the sense of

liberation and of opportunity in places like that.

I don’t think we have mentioned Bahrain at all. Why would anyone be

interested in this small Gulf island state? It is worth a mention because of

where it is on the sectarian fault line between the Sunni world of the Gulf and

the Shia world to the east. The Pearl Revolution, as it is called, was defeated,

I think quite comprehensively, largely thanks to the Saudi intervention, but

I don’t think that’s over. I think that the underlying causes in this small but

particularly fragile place in a very volatile region have not been dealt with.

Syria is a terrible and riveting drama which has already cost a lot in blood and

will go on for a long time before it ends. So there is tremendous variety in this

picture under the general heading of the Arab spring.

31

There was a moment last month on Al Jazeera, which is very important

because not only has it reported on this amazing year but it has been a

cheerleader for the uprisings. The government of Qatar has in itself been

playing an important role, taking the lead particularly on Libya and also

on Syria. On this one day you could see on one side of the TV screen the

formal opening of the new constituent assembly in Tunisia, full of parties

that less than a year ago were banned, whose leaders were either in prison

or in exile; and on the other side you could see the latest scenes from Tahrir

Square where there was a new bout of tear gas and shooting as the Egyptian

generals resisted the latest demand that they go - a replay of what we had

seen in February. So again the Egyptian revolution is not over.

There are many extraordinary juxtapositions that underline how dynamic

and varied this story is. Many of you will have seen these awful images

from Syria of people weeping over corpses of loved ones who have been

killed, of shooting by the security forces at peaceful demonstrators but on

the other hand mass rallies for President Assad in Damascus. The Bahraini

Government has organised a sophisticated and expensive public relations

campaign to try to convince the world that it is committed to reform and to

reconciliation. But every night in the Shia villages around Manama there are

riots which often end in death and injury.

So the story goes on; it isn’t over. The narrative of the Arab spring was written

in defiance by people in the streets but the fightback by the regimes, which

some call a counter-revolution, is still going on. If President Assad gives a

television interview in which he claims bizarrely that what’s happening in his

country and what his armed forces are doing is nothing to do with him then

you might well conclude that he is delusional but you would also conclude

that he hasn’t given up.

So there are significant differences between individual countries but there

are also common themes. Security solutions don’t work, don’t succeed

32

in keeping people off the streets. The barrier of fear that existed before in

the face of ruthless and cruel regimes has been broken. There is a sense

of mutual solidarity and sympathy, from Tunisia to Egypt, Egypt to Bahrain,

Yemen, Libya, Syria and so it goes on. And that spirit, I would contend, is still

very much there.

There is also a commonality of language about what people are looking for.

Parliamentary democracy, derided sometimes in countries which have it,

remains the ideal. People are angry and humiliated because they have been

treated as subjects with few rights but they want to become citizens who

have rights. They want an end to corruption, and the establishment of the rule

of law. Dignity is a word that appears a lot; so does the idea of social justice

– things we take for granted in the West. Two of the most moving of the

slogans from Tahrir Square went: “Our weapons are our dreams” and “Raise

your head you are an Egyptian”. These may sound trite, even slightly silly

to our jaded ears but they resonate to people who felt something really was

changing after so long.

Rashid Khalidi put it very well. “Arab youth at the end of the day have been

shown to have hopes and ideals no different from the young people who

helped to bring about democratic transitions in Eastern Europe, in Latin

America, and so on. These voices have been a revelation only to those

who deluded by the propaganda of the Arab regimes themselves, or by the

western media’s obsessive focus on Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism

whenever it deals with the Middle East. This is thus a supremely important

moment not only in the Arab world but also for how Arabs are perceived

by others; a people that has been systematically maligned in the West for

decades is for the first time being shown in a positive light”.

The role of Islamists is a very important topic. They were suppressed for

decades. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt predictably became the biggest

winner in the first round of the parliamentary elections because they had the

skills and the experience to survive and to organise in a way that the Mubarak

33

regime never allowed anybody else to do. There was the ruling party, then

there was the semi-tolerated Brotherhood and very little else. But having

survived for so long in that authoritarian environment it will have to behave

differently in one that is becoming more pluralistic.

It is worrying that the Salafi groups – rumoured to be financed by the Saudis

and others – have done so very well because if there is a more extreme

religious-based actor in Egyptian politics that does raise questions about

whether the mainstream Islamist movement can stay in the mainstream. You

could imagine a situation where Egyptian politics becomes polarised between

the military who refuse to go and the dominant Islamists on the other - which

would make the outcome of the Egyptian revolution look quite different from

the vision of the young people who began it all in Tahrir.

This seminar is about Europeans; it is not only Europeans who are going to

be affected by these changes. I noticed that the American Embassy in Cairo

had put out a notice giving an account of a meeting between the Ambassador

and the new Freedom & Justice Party, the political party of the Muslim

Brotherhood. This is something that’s worth relishing because the Americans,

the British and others for so many years refused to have anything to do with

these people simply because they were unpalatable to the regime; nothing

could be done that would annoy the Mubarak government. Times have

changed and they have changed in my view in very significant ways.

We talked a little about Israel and the impasse in the conflict with the

Palestinians. I think that is a subject for almost for a separate discussion. As

far as Europe and the outside world are concerned it doesn’t matter in this

year of the Arab awakening if Islamists do come to power. I don’t believe that

there is a danger of a Khomeini-type Islamic republic of Egypt or anywhere

else. What matters to the countries themselves is whether the expectations

that have been created for bread as well as dignity can be met. That means

economic growth that will provide jobs for vast numbers of young people,

34

decent housing and infrastructure. In Mubarak’s final decade in power the

number of Egyptians living on less than two dollars a day grew from 39 to

43 per cent. That’s a challenge for anybody, whatever the role of religion

in public life. So I don’t think the Islamist question should be a particular

preoccupation for outsiders.

At the end of this extraordinary year there is no doubt that the euphoria of the

beginning has faded. The scale of the problems and the complications of the

transitions is much clearer. But I do believe that the genie of people power

that has come out of the bottle across the Arab world is not going to go back

in anytime soon.

35

AMONG THE COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

From a senior former FCO official:

Proposition 1: Any free, reasonably free and fair election in an Arab country

is very likely to produce a very strong if not predominant showing by parties

representing political Islam. Proposition two: Political Islam is essentially

inimical to the ideas of Western democracy, pluralist democracy in many,

many ways not least the role of women. So conclusion: we would be deluding

ourselves if we imagined that certainly in any short timescale anything that

we would really recognise as a Western-style democracy is going to emerge

in any of these countries; it is not. I therefore think that Europe is not very

likely to have much influence one way or the other. I have to say also that

having sat through many meetings of the Middle East working group of the

EU in Brussels during my time in that job I am not very confident that they

would come up with any decisive actions. There we are I don’t think we can

be very influential except at the margins – a bit of help there, a bit of aid there,

that’s just about it. I am attracted by Sherard’s prescription that we should be

going with the flow of history.

From a student:

Being from Iran, during the election and fraud issues we had in 2009, there

was very little support for people in Iran. Many people in Iran felt that there

was not enough support shown by Obama or the UK Government. What I

wanted to ask your opinion for is that many people in Iran think that this word

of military action in Iran is feeding the people’s minds in Iran that the West

is hostile which is what the government want them to believe. It started of

36

with the US, then Israel saying military action is not off the table and it seems

like the UK and some of the European nations are suggesting this could be

an option. From my point of view and many Iranians – some of them even in

exile – they think that this would basically feed the Iranian regime even more

because it’s feeding people to think that they have to defend their country

whether they like it or not there is going to be military intervention in the

country. I want to hear your opinions what you think the views of the Iranian

people is something that needs to be addressed as well.

From a member of the House of Lords:

I was struck by the determined pessimism of Sherard and I have rather more

sympathy with what Ian Black was saying. Surely the striking thing about

so much of the Arab awakening up to now has been that they are quite

specifically and openly asking for what we have got. Ian Black made in effect

that point - of course it’s all in different forms. They are actually asking for

the right to choose, the right to the rule of law and to choose their own rulers

and so on. We haven’t yet disproved, despite of our pessimistic approach to

most things to do with the Middle East, we haven’t yet disproved the thesis

that this is actually different. They haven’t gone off to al-Qaeda, they haven’t

indulged in anti-Western feelings, they haven’t even concentrated on Israel,

although that clearly remains hugely important. They have actually asked

for something which we take for granted. Surely it would be wise actually to

give them a chance, to give some of them a chance, to give the Egyptians a

chance, to show whether or not this is a real ambition or whether it’s a cloak

for something which is much more disagreeable from our point of view. It

doesn’t seem to me it’s a proven verdict of guilty up to now.

Responses:

Sherard Cowper-Coles: I agree with what I think you were implying. I am

sorry if I sounded negative; I am gloomy but not negative. I think these

developments are to be welcomed and encouraged. I hope I said that we

37

should accompany the Arabs on their journey. I also said that there are

going to be difficulties along the way - there will be economic problems,

there will be counter-revolutions, there will be repression as a result of these

movements. We should help and encourage them to develop three things:

education above all, jobs and representative and accountable government,

not necessarily the full model of an over-elaborate Western-style liberal

democracy but if that is what they choose and if that is what they manage to

achieve it has to be welcomed. But I think we must also accept if they choose

a government with a strong Islamist flavour we must accept that as well and

not decry it and not say that it is necessarily a bad thing if that is the will of

the people, the majority of the people. I am sorry to sound negative it is just

that I fear that there will be disappointment for the young people of Shubra

and the young people of the suburbs of Damascus and there will be more

bloodshed on the way. I am sorry to say that. I am sorry also that the ability

of Europe and the United States both morally, and politically and resources

to help them on this journey is constrained. And I am afraid that I think our

authority is constrained by the continuing failure not to solve the problem of

Palestine but to show that we are serious in saying in addressing it.

Picking up the point from our Iranian friend, I see all that. My personal view

is that a military attack on Iran would be a catastrophe for everyone, a far

greater evil than the evil of Iran acquiring one primitive nuclear warhead

or two. Curiously I think the one state in the Middle East that Iran is most

unlikely to attack is Israel. Ahmadinejad may be mad but not so mad as to

attack Israel. He is much more likely to cause problems for states across the

Gulf, he may encourage Hezbollah or Hamas but the real threat is across

the Arabian or the Persian Gulf. We are feeding a perception among ordinary

Iranian people that the West in general and America in particular is anti-

Iranian and I’m afraid that there is a lot of truth in that. There is a lot of dislike

of Islam, dislike of Iran in America and there is a lot of fundamentalism there

as well which mirrors some of the fundamentalism in the Middle East.

38

On the two Propositions:

I am afraid I rather agree with you. I fear that we will see governments with an

Islamist flavour but I think we must work with them and welcome them and

go with the flow and help them where we can at the margins. I felt ashamed

really because Ian I think painted a wonderful picture, hopeful and optimistic,

relatively optimistic picture. I am sorry to sound negative because it is a net

good thing what has happened, of course it is but it is just that I fear we are

only at the beginning of the journey.

Ian Black: On the question of political Islam I hold no brief for Islamist

politicians, I believe that politics and religion are really best kept far apart. I

observe however that in recent years there has been an advertised evolution

of thinking amongst some of the Islamist parties. If you take Rashid Al-

Ghannushi in Tunisia, if you take what he says at face value I think it raises

the question as to what extent a party of that kind can actually be considered,

accurately be labelled as an Islamist party so committed – ostensibly at least

- it is to pluralism, to women’s rights, to coalition politics. Some people have

started to talk of the Muslim Brotherhood. There are people in the Muslim

Brotherhood, take somebody like Arian, who talk about its aspirations for the

future in a way that has a come a very long way from the ideological routes

of that party. I don’t know whether I entirely believe it. I know that there are

plenty of secular and liberal Egyptians and Tunisians who don’t trust people

who come from an Islamist school and claim to have moderated their views.

But people are starting to talk about a sort of post-Islamist phenomenon of

parties which have travelled a long way – you could say the same in Morocco.

A questioner mentioned I think usefully - none of us I think had thought of this in

our presentations and it was remiss - that one of the most important events in

this amazing years was the death, the killing of bin Laden another blow, possibly,

perhaps, a terminal blow to the al-Qaeda bogeyman that has so dominated our

lives for a decade or more. Is there not a sense in which the Islamist spectrum is

moving along? I pose these as questions not to refute your observations but to

39

say perhaps there is a need for new thinking about the reality of Islamist parties

which after all are coming to power in very different circumstances from which

they existed before. They are no longer underground, not being tortured or

imprisoned. The Tunisian Prime Minister I believe is the deputy of a leader who

previously served a 15-year prison sentence under Ben Ali. He says the right sort

of things. We need to keep an open mind abut the possible evolution and not to

insist perhaps too emphatically that this is all utterly incompatible with Western

democracy; it may be changing.

On Iran I agree with both the question and Sherard’s answer that by

threatening to attack Iran we are in the West, we are reinforcing the worst

elements of the Iranian system and playing into their hands. I don’t myself

believe that there will be any attack on Iran any time soon.

Hagai Segal: The term Islamist of course is in some ways utterly unhelpful.

We have to decide which ones they are. After all we had an al-Qaeda attack

on Turkey when the current Islamist Government was in play; they don’t think

they are Islamists! Hamas have been fighting an internal conflict, a direct

military conflict with Salafists in Gaza because they decided Hamas weren’t

Islamist enough because they hadn’t declared Sharia law. Sometimes what

are for us extremists, are the moderates to the real extremists. We have to be

very clear within that paradigm what we are talking about.

But I agree with you and it goes to one of the questioners - which is that,

there is no doubt at all and again I apologise Ian in the sense that I had gone

almost beyond your optimism when I started my comments, not for a second

are we disputing what hopefully would be the brilliant things around this and

the moment. I was more for this audience trying to deal with the nuances

around that. The concern is whether the minority who brought about these

ideas who 100 per cent utterly espouse a rejection of al-Qaeda, a rejection of

the kind of ideologies and systems that it had been demanded to subscribe to.

This was undoubtedly them taking to the streets and demanding something

40

different. As you mentioned the fact that in Cairo there was so little mention of

Israel whatsoever in the process was a sign that this was an internal Egyptian

process- it is about us alright but we will worry about that other stuff later. But

then in the election thus far 10 million people have voted, 25 per cent of them

have voted for Salafists who stand in absolute open and direct opposition

to the very ideas to which the protestors took to the fore. It is where we find

ourselves between these two positions. The minority who undoubtedly want

to be - and they said it openly, Egypt used to be a dominant power, we used

to be a progressive force, the only reason why we are not is not because we

are Muslim or Arab, is because our governments held us back, we can be

progressive again, we can lead, not because you’ll tell us how to do it but

because we will take our place there. The question is whether the majority of

the population supports that. I think that what we may have missed in Egypt is

the sense to which the much quieter forces of a more austere interpretation of

Islam have taken hold because it happened under the hidden realm, because it

was repressed under Mubarak. A million people in Tahrir Square, even if it was

that many, that’s 1/84th of the Egyptian population and the rest of them will

decide where we are going to go.

41

BACKGROUND PAPER: THE EU & THE “ARAB AWAKENING”Senior European Experts

Introduction

When a 26 year-old Tunisian street vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi, set himself

on fire on 17 December 2010 in protest at his treatment by local officials, he

cannot have imagined the enormity of the consequences. President Zine El

Abidine Ben Ali, who had ruled Tunisia since 1987, was forced from office

on 14 January 2011; major protests erupted in 12 countries with minor

incidents in others. The most dramatic were in Egypt, where President Hosni

Mubarak was forced from office after 30 years, and in Libya where a large-

scale rebellion against the rule of Colonel Gaddafi evolved into a civil war

with intervention by the international community and ended with Gaddafi’s

overthrow and death. Serious protests continue in Syria and Yemen and there

is on-going turbulence in a number of other countries, including Bahrain and

Iran. It is clear that the Arab revolutions have not yet run their course.

The events of 2011 have been called the “Arab Spring” or the “Arab

awakening” by many commentators and likened to the collapse of

Communism in Europe after 1989.

The scale of these events caught politicians and diplomats unawares and

the response of the international community has often been criticised as

inadequate. This paper looks at the events of the Arab Awakening and

assesses the EU’s response.

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Background in the Arab World

Each country is different but certain themes and problems can be seen

as threads that bind the separate national protests. These include rapid

population growth, economic stagnation with high levels of unemployment,

an absence of democracy and the rule of law, corruption and disparities of

wealth and power, repressive governments and political instability. Over all

this hangs the place of Islam in Arab politics.

The population of the 22 Arab countries has almost trebled since 1970

– from 128 million to 359 million, compared to a 12 per cent increase in

Europe over the same period and 52 per cent in the USA – making it the

fastest growing region in the world.1 In some countries, such as Egypt,

Tunisia, Syria and Saudi Arabia, the increase has been particularly large.

One aspect of this demographic change has been the increase in the

number of young people; 60 per cent of the Arab countries’ population is

under 25.2

An International Labour Organisation survey in 2006 found that

unemployment in the Middle East and North Africa was the highest in

any region of the world at 12.2 per cent. Participation in the workforce

was the lowest in the world, largely because only one in three women

is in employment. This high level of unemployment prompted Carnegie

economic expert Sufyan Alissa to argue in 2007 that “the repeated failure

of Arab government to find radical solutions to this problem could lead to

public pressure to topple these governments”.3 That view was shared by

other commentators who also noted the failure of Arab governments to

address poor educational systems.

This unemployment problem reflects not only population growth but also

economic stagnation in many countries. The vast wealth of the Persian Gulf

states contrasts markedly with the plight of Yemen – the poorest of the Arab

states – where 40 per cent of the population live on under £1.25 a day. Even

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1 ‘Bulging youth populations in the Mideast,’ Joseph Charmie (Yale), The Jakarta Post, 04.01.11.2 Cited in Arab Human Development Report 2009, UNDP, p.36.3 http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19056

in Saudi Arabia, 40 per cent of young people have no job and of those that

do, nearly half earn less than £500 a month.

Democracy and the rule of law exist only partially in most Arab countries. Of

the countries where major protests took place, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and

Yemen all had elected presidents, but protestors challenged the legitimacy

of the government because of the absence of free and fair elections, open

media and because of corruption amongst the ruling elite. The absence of

democracy and the rule of law in most Arab countries meant there was no

safety valve through which public concern about the state of the economy

could be vented. Violent repression of protests only made the situation worse.

Political instability is a notable feature of the region. In addition to the long-

standing Israel/Palestinian dispute (see below), there are considerable

problems arising from the dominance of ethnic or religious minorities in

several countries. In Bahrain, Lebanon and Syria (and in Iraq until recently),

religious or tribal minorities rule. In other states, such as Yemen, there

has been political violence associated with regional or territorial disputes.

Terrorism has been a factor too – and one which has complicated the Arab

world’s relationship with the West.

One of the consequences of political instability, including that the region

is home to half the world’s refugees, has been a rise in illegal migration as

people have understandably tried to find better prospects in Europe and

elsewhere. This has caused considerable tension between North African

countries and EU countries.

Given this background, it is hardly surprising that tensions in some Arab

countries spilled on to the streets. The financial crisis of recent years, and

the global economic down-turn that followed, put additional pressure on

unpopular governments with high food prices contributing to the mood of

anger in several countries.

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The communications revolution played a part in the Arab Spring too – the

wide availability of satellite television enabled Arabs to follow developments

in other countries, particularly Tunisia, and respond. The younger Arabs used

social networking sites on the internet as way of communicating with one

another and the wider world when the mainstream media in their countries

was often under state control.

The Wider Context

The wider picture is dominated by the Israel/Palestine dispute and the lack

of progress in the peace process. This dispute has had a poisoning effect

on relationships between the Arab world and much of the West and within

the Arab world itself, as Arab countries take different approaches to the

issue, although the Palestinian application to the UN for membership as a

nation state has provided an issue around which all Arab states can rally. The

continuing influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the threat this poses to

neighbouring Israel, as well as the de-stabilising impact in Lebanon itself, only

makes the situation more complicated and more dangerous.

Hezbollah derives much of its funding and arms supplies from Iran, which

also provides money and weapons to Hamas in the Gaza strip. Iranian

influence is feared by many Arab states and Iran’s continuing search for

a nuclear weapons capability, in defiance of the international community,

makes it a wider cause for concern. The EU is involved in both the diplomatic

initiatives to deal with Iran’s nuclear programme and in the Middle East

Quartet, that is the EU, US, Russia and the UN.

Global dependence on the oil and gas reserves of many Arab countries

has made energy a potent factor in the relationship between these

countries and the rest of the world. Many commentators have seen the

reluctance of Western countries to confront the rulers of Arab countries

over their poor human rights and democratic records as being because

of the influence of energy over decision-makers. But Western action on

45

Libya undermines the claim that the West always acts in the Middle East

to protect its energy sources.

The US and UK invasion of Iraq in 2003 had many negative consequences

in the region, not least in exacerbating anti-US and anti-Western sentiment.

The overhang from invasion of Iraq has become a constraining factor

in US foreign policy, as the Obama administration has sought to avoid

confrontation with Muslim countries. In addition, they feel that the US policy

of unconditional support for Israel has caused a stalemate in the dispute over

Palestine. But the Arab Spring was not driven by anti-US or anti-Western

sentiments nor indeed the Islamist agenda or the Palestinian issue.

The EU’s Relationship with the Region

From the early 1960s the EC developed a series of bilateral cooperation

agreements with its Mediterranean neighbours, essentially offering trade

benefits and aid.

At present, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian

Authority and Tunisia have association agreements with the EU. The treaties

that allow for trade liberalisation, enable the third country to be part of EU

aid programmes but also require action on the part of the third country, such

as measures to establish the rule of law in business or to improve human

rights. Syria negotiated an association agreement with the EU but it has not

been formally agreed because the Council required Syria to co-operate with

the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, set up to prosecute those suspected of the

assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, before

it could be adopted. Negotiations with Libya began in 2008 but they had not

been completed at the time of the Libyan uprising.

In EU policy terms the region forms part of the European Neighbourhood

Policy (ENP). This policy is intended to enable countries on the edge of the

46

EU to enjoy a close association with the EU without necessarily joining it in

the future (only European countries can join the EU; there is a separate Senior

European Experts paper on the ENP).

The Barcelona Process was the framework for a more ambitious programme for

re-negotiated association agreements between the EU and its Mediterranean

partners, with improved trade and economic cooperation, more political content

(bedevilled however by the Arab-Israel dispute), dealing also with migration

(including the EU’s right to return illegal economic migrants) and including

a human rights, aspirations to good governance and the rule of law. The

agreements have sometimes been difficult to negotiate because of the resistance

of some partners to the human rights and linked suspension clauses.

The EU’s relationship with the countries of the Southern and Eastern

Mediterranean is also dealt with in the forum of the Union for the

Mediterranean (UfM); a body established in 2008 to replace the Barcelona

Process.4 A range of co-operative ventures have been launched, including

economic development projects, measures to tackle pollution in the

Mediterranean sea and an energy project aimed at harnessing solar power.

But the UfM has not achieved the political importance that was hoped for.

It has not become a significant factor in debates about the future of the

Southern Mediterranean countries, nor a player in political discussions.

This may have reflected a lack of commitment to the project within the EU –

not all Member States were as enthusiastic as President Sarkozy about the

setting up of the UfM. The fact that not all the UfM member countries were

democracies added to doubts inside the EU about the value of the body. The

disparate nature of the Southern Mediterranean members themselves with a

lack of agreement among them on the bigger political questions, as well as

reluctance to involve outsiders, contributed to the perception that the UfM

was a solution proposed by the EU to problems identified by the EU rather

than a partnership established with the Southern Mediterranean countries.

After 2008 two summits of the UfM were proposed and then postponed;

47

4 All EU Member States are included with Albania, Algeria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey

a situation that added credibility to the view that it lacked leadership and

impetus. Both the Barcelona Process and the UfM have suffered from

disagreements over the Arab-Israel dispute leading to Arab countries

declining to attend meetings with Israeli representatives present.

An aim of the UfM is the inclusion of the countries of the Southern Mediterranean

with the EU, EFTA countries and Turkey in a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area.

This in turn would link to the Greater Arab Free Trade Area, which came into

being in 1997, and operates under the auspices of the Arab League. EU countries

do substantial trade with countries of the Southern Mediterranean - €224 billion in

2009 – but there is relatively little intra-regional trade amongst the Arab countries

– just €15 billion in 2009. The potential economic benefits of establishing a large

free trade area covering most of Europe and the Mediterranean could therefore

be significant for Arab countries currently experiencing severe economic

difficulties and which need to create jobs at a faster rate than in the past.

The EU & International Response

The international community’s first response was to call for restraint when force

was used by governments and then to provide emergency assistance to those

caught up in the protests, such as foreign workers who wanted to return home.

Libya

The UN Security Council became involved when Colonel Gaddafi’s forces

used lethal force against protestors. UN Security Council Resolution 1973

agreed on 17 March 2011, crucially following the request of the Arab League

for a no-fly zone, authorised members to use necessary force to protect

civilians from attack by Gaddafi’s forces, including establishing a no-fly zone.

A military operation led by NATO commenced shortly afterwards to implement

the no-fly zone. Germany’s abstention in the UNSC vote highlighted divisions

within the EU over the use of force to deal with Gaddafi.

48

Nevertheless, there was unanimous agreement within the EU that Gaddafi’s

actions were unacceptable. A range of sanctions and travel bans had been

agreed against Gaddafi and his supporters in advance of UNSC decisions

and were strengthened in accordance with resolution 1973. Extensive

measures were taken to support refugees, including providing financial aid

but also involving EU staff on the ground, particularly on Libya’s borders.

Humanitarian aid to people in Libya was also provided and the European

External Action Service helped in support of the operation to rescue EU

citizens trapped in Libya.

The question of who should lead the military force to enforce the no-fly zone was

more contentious. Britain and France were the EU countries most determined on

military action. NATO became the vehicle through which the military operation

was mounted with the US initially in charge but Europeans later took command

because of US reluctance to take the lead in operations affecting a Muslim country.

Immigration

Immigration became a significant problem for the EU as the Arab revolutions

developed. Large numbers of refugees fled from affected areas and sought

entry to Member States. Italy, Spain and Malta were all affected, with 15,000

people arriving on the Italian island of Lampedusa, south of Sicily, in the first

few weeks. A joint EU operation was established in response to the problem,

with 14 Member States putting up the necessary assets to enable forces to

be deployed in response to the migration problem. The Schengen Agreement

has been put under strain by the large flows of migrants and Italy’s decision

to issue travel documentation to refugees arriving in their country.

Syria

The Syrian situation posed particular challenges for the international

community. There was not the same support from the Arab world for

internationalising the Syrian situation that there had been in the case of

49

Libya. With Russia and China particularly loathe to publicly criticise the Syrian

regime, a UN resolution authorising action against Syria was vetoed.

The EU adopted the policy of publicly criticising the violent repression of

Syrians by their own Government, seeking international condemnation at the

UN and introducing targeted sanctions. As the violence in Syria grew in scale

and impact, some Arab and Muslim states began to call publicly on the Assad

government to stop using violence. Turkey, a neighbour and important ally of

Syria, has been particularly sharp in its criticisms of Assad, has set up camps

in Turkey for refugees fleeing the violence in Syria and hosted a conference

of Syrian opposition groups in Ankara. The fact that Iran is Syria’s closest ally

has meant that the difficulties within Syria have become a proxy contest for

the disputes between the Iranians and Arabs.

The EU has now banned imports of Syrian oil into the EU, a significant

development as a quarter of the country’s income comes from oil and 95 per

cent of the oil it exports goes to EU Member States.

The EU’s Proposals for a Long-term Response

The High Representative for the CFSP, Lady Ashton, and the European

Commission proposed an over-arching response by the EU to the Arab

revolutions in March 2011. The paper suggested that the right approach was

one of partnership with Arab states, based on the notion that the faster those

states proceeded towards becoming rule of law democracies, the greater

the EU’s response. This approach, known as “more for more”, is designed to

speed up Arab states’ ability to join the partnership. Free and fair elections

are the basic criteria for entry to the partnership. Clearly in countries (such

as Libya) where there is no recent history of democracy, a capacity-building

programme is required in order to establish relevant institutions and to enable

political parties to develop. The EU intends to support that process – as it has

very effectively in the past in Europe.

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This new partnership will come under the long-standing umbrella of the

ENP – itself re-launched in May 2011 to reflect the changed situation on the

borders of the EU. For the first time, the European Bank for Reconstruction

& Development (EBRD) will be able to lend money to the Southern

Mediterranean countries, providing a key additional source of investment

funds from an institution experienced in this field of lending.

The EU’s financial support is part of a wider international response. At Deauville

in May 2011 the members of the G8 agreed to provide support to help Arab

states in the transition to democracy. It was agreed then that the multilateral

development banks (which include the World Bank and the EBRD) would

provide Egypt and Tunisia with over $20 billion; of this, €3.5 billion would come

from the European Investment Bank (an EU body). Jordon and Morocco joined

later and the total resources available from multilateral institutions for the

period 2011-13 for Egypt, Tunisia, Jordon and Morocco reached $38 billion by

September 2011, with the IMF available to provide resources on top of that.

Libya is expected to become one of the recipient countries in the near future.

EU Member States are also providing bilateral support, such as French aid to

Tunisia to help stabilise the Tunisian economy.

In recognition of the scale of the challenge, the EU High Representative for

CFSP established a Task Force in the early summer of 2011 bringing together

key EU personnel to provide more effective co-ordination. In July 2011

Spanish diplomat Bernardino León Gross was appointed as the EU’s Special

Representative to the Southern Mediterranean with the job of leading the

EU’s work during the period of transition in the region.

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Of course each Arab country is different and the EU will continue to need

to respond accordingly. Association agreements will be the basic format

for agreement between the EU and each country. That will enable existing

agreements to be updated or adapted rather than to begin afresh.

Migration remains an important issue for both the Arab countries and for

the EU. As a result of the large number of refugees and the difficulties

these caused for several EU Member States, the EU is now committed to

working with Arab states to agree on “mobility partnerships”, essentially an

agreement between the EU and a third country for co-operation on the legal

migration of that country’s citizens. Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia are the first

countries with whom the EU is negotiating such partnerships.

The difficulties over refugees and the Schengen area led to a review of the

Schengen rules and proposals for them to be changed. If these rule changes

are adopted there will be a clearer mechanism for reintroducing internal

border controls in an emergency.

Assessment

The events of the Arab awakening have been dramatic and the

consequences will be far-reaching. The decision of the new government

of Egypt to re-open the border between Egypt and Gaza against Israeli

objections is but one example of the many changes that are to come. Egypt

and Israel, while not allies in any formal sense, shared a common approach

to many issues of mutual concern when Egypt was led by Mubarak; that is

not the case under Egypt’s current leadership. And while Tunisia has held

democratic elections, it is not certain that Egypt will so easily move towards

democracy. Some of the old certainties of the Southern Mediterranean have

gone and no one quite knows what will replace them.

Like all international observers, the EU was not expecting the revolutionary

52

upheavals and like others, it has been criticised for an inadequate response.

Is the perception that the EU has failed to rise to the scale of events fair or an

over-estimation of what the EU could achieve?

The EU’s influence in the Southern Mediterranean was (and is) likely to be

different to that it achieved in the past on its European borders because

when it supported the transition to democracy before in southern, central

and Eastern Europe it had the carrot of membership to offer. The proposed

partnership was a good first step but it felt somewhat basic and it was not

a new Marshall Plan on the scale needed to respond to the problems and

opportunities of the region. Since that initial response in March the EU has

been bolder, taking a tougher stance on Syria than others, participating in the

G8’s package of economic support to Arab states and pushing forward the

recognition of the National Transitional Council in Libya.

The EU will have a significant role to play in the region, depending on

events on the ground. The EU has better instruments to respond to the

post-revolutionary phase of political and economic development than any

other body – although it will have to fit its own response with those of the

UN, the Arab League, the African Union and the US (as it has been doing).

Of course it will be up to the peoples of the Arab countries to determine

the direction of their countries and what relationship they should have with

others, including the EU. The reality is that there is likely to be a prolonged

period of uncertainty in the Middle East and North Africa which will generate

considerable challenges for the EU.

If you would like to be on the advance mail list for future occasions please register

your interest on: lectures@regents.ac.uk

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