reforming natos military structures the long-term study and its implications for land forces pub141

8/7/2019 REFORMING NATO S MILITARY STRUCTURES THE LONG-TERM STUDY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR LAND FORCES pub

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REFORMINGNATOSMILITARYSTRUCTURES:

THELONG-TERMSTUDY

ANDITSIMPLICATIONSFORLANDFORCES

Thomas-DurellYoung

May15,1998


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*****

The author would like to express his sincere gratitude to Dr.William T. Johnsen, Mr. Jon Whitford, HQ USAREUR, COLJeffrey McCausland, USA, Colonel Michael Gonzales, USANG,CDR Steven Nota, USN, CDR Mark Arnold, USN, LTC Fred L.Schwien, USA, and LTC David Ahrens, USA, for their insightfulcomments made on an earlier draft of this essay. Considerableassistance has been provided to the author over the years fromMr. John Borawski, Esquire, of the North Atlantic Assembly, Mr.Diego Ruiz Palmer, NATO HQ, and various offices andcommands in NATO: SHAPE, AFSOUTH, LANDSOUTHEAST,the IMS, the U.S. Delegation to NATO, and the U.S. Mission toNATO. Without the assistance of these individuals and

commands, it would have been impossible to prepare this essay.

*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the author anddo not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of theDepartment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.Government. This report is cleared for public release;distributionisunlimited.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should beforwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. ArmyWar College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.Comments also may be conveyed directly to the author by callingcommercial (717) 245-4058 or DSN 242-4058 or via the Internetat [email protected]. Copies of this report may beobtained from the Publications and Production Office by callingcommercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820,[email protected]

*****

Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available onthe Strategic Studies Institute Homepage for electronicdissemination. SSIs Homepage address is: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm

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FOREWORD

The contemporary debate over the expansion of NATO toinclude Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary haslargely overshadowed an important effort on the part of the

Alliance to achieve internal adaptation through the workof the Long-Term Study. Part of this process has been atortuous attempt to reform and reorganize the Alliancesintegrated command structure. Often taken for granted,this structure provides the basis for NATOs collectivedefense, and increasingly, as seen in Bosnia, its ability to

undertake peace support operations. However, the veryvalue by which nations hold the structure has resulted in adifficult and time-consuming reorganization process whichhasproducedonlylimitedreforms.

It is indeed surprising that the reorganization of thebedrock of the Alliances military structure has garneredonly limited attention outside of NATO cognoscenti. Thiscan be explained, in part, by the fact that until recently theLong-Term Study has been cloaked in secrecy. Most keyaspects of the reform process are now out in the public andrequire debate: a task in which the Strategic Studies

Institute is keen to assist. And, let there be no mistake thatthe proposed reforms outlined by Long-Term Study havemajor implications for land forces in the Alliance. As arguedin this essay, there are a number of proposed reforms whichcould have fundamental negative implications for commandoftheseforces.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer thiscontribution to the ongoing debate to reform NATOsintegratedcommandstructure.

EARLH.TILFORD,JR.ActingDirectorStrategicStudiesInstitute

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BIOGRAPHICALSKETCHOFTHEAUTHOR

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG, Research Professor, NationalSecurity Affairs, has been with the Strategic StudiesInstituteoftheU.S.ArmyWarCollegesince1988.

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REFORMINGNATOS

MILITARYSTRUCTURES:THELONG-TERMSTUDY ANDITS

IMPLICATIONSFORLANDFORCES

At the NATO Madrid Summit of July 1997, heads ofstate and government irreversibly cast the die to expand the

Alliance to encompass three former adversaries: the CzechRepublic, Poland, and Hungary.1 Accession negotiationshave commenced with the objective of those countries

becoming members of the Alliance in 1999, the 50th anni-versary of the Alliances founding.2 There are, of course,many important issues which have yet to be decided by the

Alliance, to include how the new members are to beintegrated into NATOs command structure. While theintegrated command structure has sometimes beenperceived as being over-sold as constituting the mostimportant element of the Alliance,3 i t h a s b e e n o f immeasurable value. In addition to providing for the unifiedcommand of allied efforts to defend members sovereignty,the command structure has also acted as an important

means to achieve transparency among allied nationsmilitaries.

As to the question of exactly into which NATOcommands the new members will fall casts light on whathas heretofore been a largely ignored effort by the Allianceto reform its command structure. Since Fall 1994, animportant element of the NATO Adaption Long-TermStudy (LTS) has been finding solutions to the challenges ofreducing the size of the integrated command structure tosave resources and enabling it to respond to future securityrisks.4 While not a stated mission of the study, the issue of

expansion cannot have been far from the minds of many ofthe officials attempting to achieve consensus to reform theintegrated command structure. Yet, it has been the veryissue of reaching consensus to reform the command

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structure that has frustrated officials in their attempt to

find a compromise acceptable to all. Notwithstandingpredictions by officials that the LTS would produceagreement by the Madrid Summit (and thereby contributeto internal adaption), consensus to reorganize thecommandstructurehasbeenslowincoming.5

The inability of the Alliance to find agreement within itsmembership, and indeed, among its senior militarycommands, to reorganize the integrated commandstructure offers insight into the civil-military decision-making process of NATO. What one can observe from areview of the LTS and, specifically, NATOs efforts to

change its command structure is how national politicalinterests and sensitivities can impede needed militaryreforms. Indeed, for what can only be categorized asseemingly petty political rationales, the concerted effort ofthe Alliance to reform its military structures has producedonly modest results. Yet it would be a mistake to concludethat the Alliance is suffering from a profound state of stasisat this critical juncture in its history. Rather, what the LTSdemonstrates is that Alliance politics, especially concerningmilitary issues, have always been hard fought, and even theimperative for change necessitated to respond to the

changed security environment has had only a limitedimpactoneffortstoreorganize.

This essay will argue that the effort to reform commandstructures in NATO (i.e., an element of internal adaption) isproving to be one of the most contentious issues the Alliancehas confronted since 1991, perhaps even more thanmembership expansion. As a result, current proposals inthe LTS could produce structures which would inhibit themanner in which land forces are integrated into multi-national formations and impede their effective command inwartime by multinational commanders. In short, reform

efforts have pitted military rationales against nationalpolitical agenda, the latter of which are based largely on theissues of prestige, historic animosities, and maintaining/improvinganationsstandingintheAlliance.

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This essay will be organized in the following manner.

The essay begins with a prcis of the LTS and what appearsto be emerging as the reformed command structure (i.e.,number, type, and location of headquarters) as agreed at theDefence Planning Committee (DPC) meeting in December1997.6 Next, three case studies will illustrate how thereform process has been stymied by inflexible nationalpolitical agenda: (1) the Danish position regarding AlliedForces Baltic Approaches (BALTAP), (2) Portugal and itsc o m ma n d o f A l l ie d F o r ce s I b e ri a n A t l an t ic A r e a(IBERLANT), and (3) Frances claim that the Commander-in-Chief Southern Region should be a European, vice an

American, flag officer. The purpose behind reviewing thesecontroversies is to illustrate the difficulties that confront Alliance officials in reorganizing the command structureand explain why militarily imperfect command arrange-ments have been adopted. Then, a critical analysis of thereformed command as it appears to be developing willexamine the implications, particularly for land forces.Finally,solutionstoidentifiedproblemswillbeproffered.

ReformingNATOsMilitaryStructure.

The Long-Term Study.7 During the early 1990s, a

number of important developments made defense andforeign ministers aware of the need to reform the integratedcommand structure. First, although heads of state andgovernment approved the Alliances New StrategicConcept8 and its military implementation (contained indocument MC 400)9 in 1991, these documents were quicklybeingovertakenbyevents:

(1) By the decision by Ministers in June 1992 to engageinpeacesupportoperations.10

(2) By a growing consensus that traditional collective

defense was being recognized as constituting regionalcollective defense (i.e., a need for nations to be capable ofdeploying forces outside of their own immediate sub-region). These events had two important implications: a

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blurring of distinctions between traditional Article V

collective defense and non-Article V missions, and awidening in the mission spectrum well beyond traditionalcollectivedefenseformanyalliedforces.

Second, the 1992 Four Powers reorganizationagreement which transformed Allied Forces NorthernEurope (AFNORTH) into Allied Forces Northwest Europe(AFNORTHWEST) raised doubts in the minds of manyNATO officials about the suitability of the commandstructuretocarryoutthesenewmissions.

Third, the approval in principle of the Combined Joint

Task Force (CJTF) concept at the January 1994 NATOsummit11 led to questions being raised as to the ability of theexisting command structure to support such ad hocdeployments.12

On the initiative of the Chiefs of Defense, the Long-TermStudy was launched with two general objectives. First, MC400 required revision to bring military guidance into linewith the important changes outlined above, a politically-delicate task, to be sure, since the military inadequacies ofthe New Strategic Concept could be made patently obvious.Ministerial Guidance 1995 recognized the need for the

Alliance to be directed at the whole spectrum of tasks forboth Article V and non-Article V missions. As a result, thedocument was successfully revised (becoming MC 400/1) inNovember 1995. Second, with the completion of the revisionof MC 400/1, attention was changed to focus on reformingthe command structure, the better to support this newguidance.

The Proposed LTS Command Structure (see Figure 1).As a general observation, the NATO effort to develop anacceptable new command organization has been hamperedby pressures from political officials who have pressed for the

Alliance to demonstrate that it has abandoned its Cold Warstructures (and appearances), and from military authorities(specifically Allied Command Europe [see Figure 2] and

Allied Command Atlantic [see Figure 3]) who have argued

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for reformed structures based upon military requirements(recommendations which were not necessarily in agree-ment).13 This is, of course, an old tension in the Alliance, as astudy of the early creation of the integrated commandstructure demonstrates.14 The results of these almostimmutable tensions can be seen in the following four areasofreform.

5

Italy

France

Spain

Belgium

Netherlands

Denmark

UnitedKingdom

Norway

Turkey

Greece

RC NORTH

FRANCE

RC SOUTH

EUROPE

Each nation (except FR)is depicted in onlyoneregion,but mayparticipatein multiple regions.

RC EastNorthwood

CC Nav NorthNorthwood

JSRC NorthWestKarup

SC EuropeMons

RC NorthBrunssum

CC Air NorthRamstein

JSRC CenterHeidelberg

RC SouthNaples

JSRC SouthEastIzmir

JSRC SouthWestMadrid

JSRC SouthCenterLarissa

JSRC NorthStavanger

CC NAVNaples 1

CC AIRNaples 1

JSRC SouthVerona

RC SouthEastLisbon

SC AtlanticNorfolk

STRIKFLTLANDNorfolk

SUBACLANTNorfolk

RC WestNorthwood

Germany

SC:

RC:

CC:

JSRC:

Strategic Commander

Regional Commander

Component Commander

Joint Sub-Regional Commander

NAVSOUTH and/or AIRSOUTHcould be relocated.

(1)

Figure1.NATOsNewCommandStructure.


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It is important to note that while the reformed commandstructure has been accepted by defense ministers, manydetails remain to be determined. It is intended to have adetailed reorganization plan for consideration by ministersb y a u tu mn 1 9 98 . I n t he i n te r im , f or m al t it le s o f headquarters have yet to be determined. When this imple-mentation plan has been approved by ministers, anamended MC 324, The NATO Military Command

Structure will be issued. While perhaps optimistic, newcommand arrangements are envisaged to be activatedaroundApril1999:the50thanniversaryoftheAlliance.15

6

= Allied Forces Northwest Europe (AFNORTHWEST)

= Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT)

= AFCENT & AFNORTHWEST Maritime

= AFSOUTH

= United Kingdom NATO Air Defense Region

= Portuguese Air Defense Sector

UKADR

POADS

ACLANT

AREA

IC

UKADR

NO

DA

UK

SP

FR

PO

POADS

BEGE

NE

LU

GR

Figure2.AlliedCommandEurope.


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1) The levels of command will have new names (seeFigure 4), to demonstrate, perhaps, the Alliances trans-formation. Note that until the LTS is finalized, new and oldnomenclaturecontinuestobeused.

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Western

Atlantic

Area

Eastern

Atlantic

Area

Iberian

Atlantic

Area

Figure3.AlliedCommandAtlantic.

Old New

MajorNATOCommander(MNC) StrategicCommander(SC)

MajorSubordinateCommander(MSC)

RegionalCommander(RC)

PrincipalSubordinateCommander(PSC)

Sub-RegionalCommander:

JointSub-RegionalCommander(JSRC)

ComponentCommanders(CC)

Sub-PrincipalSubordinateCommander(Sub-PSC)

(AbolishedasrecognizedNATOheadquarters)

Figure4.NewNATOCommandStructureNomenclature.


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2) The number of NATO headquarters will diminish,

from 65 to 20 (see Appendix).16

This achievement is lesssignificant than one might think. Although the newstructure abolishes the fourth level of command, i.e.,Sub-Principal Subordinate Commanders (Sub-PSCs),many of these headquarters are essentially nationalheadquarters; therefore, very few of them will actuallyclose.

3) Just as the number of Major NATO Commanders(MNCs) fell from three to two in 1994, so, too, in ACE, thenumber of Major Subordinate Commanders (MSC) will bereduced from three to two. AFNORTHWEST, High

Wycombe, will be disbanded, and the two remaining, butrenamed, regional commanders (Region North, Brunssumand Region South, Naples) will report to StrategicCommander Europe. It is interesting to note that thisr a ti o na l iz a ti o n h a s b e en a c ce p te d d e sp i te t h erecommendations of the Supreme Allied CommanderEurope (SACEUR) for the continued need for three RegionalCommanders.17

4) Sub-Regional Commanders will replace PrincipalSubordinate Commanders (PSCs) and will either bespecified component or joint commanders. This move willhave less significance for Regional Commander Northwhere there already exist two important componentcommanders: Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe(AIRCENT), Ramstein, and Commander Allied LandForces Central Europe (LANDCENT), Heidelberg. On theother hand, Regional Commander South will see thecreation of two new Joint Sub-Regional Commanders(JSRC) (SouthWest and SouthCenter, in Madrid andLarissa, respectively) and the transformation of twoexisting land component commanders, Commander AlliedLand Forces Southern Europe in Italy and Commander

Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe in Turkey intoJSRCs (South and SouthEast, respectively), along withthe continued existence of separate air and navalcomponentcommanders.18

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The above, in sum, represents the principal changes

which the Alliance thus far has been able to find consensusto support. At first blush, one might be forgiven for con-cluding that the new command structure appears to consti-tute old wine in a new bottle. Indeed, respected Germandefense correspondent Karl Feldmeyer argued that the LTSreorganization efforts simply have been an exercise in theredistribution of political influence among key allies, viceeffecting greater efficiency in the structure.19 Yet, Feld-meyers views may arguably be an understatement. Thestructure endorsed by the DPC contains a number ofpotentially destructive trends, which, while perhaps

politically palatable, could have negative long-termimplications for the Alliance in the manner by which itcommands military operations. However, before the essayturns to identify these problems, it would be instructive toexamine a number of specific cases which have stymiedreform.

ImpedimentstoReform.

At the outset, three very important truisms concerningthe integrated command structure need to be recognized.First, the structure that the Long-Term Study has

attempted to reform was not created in one single act.Rather, the structure has continued to evolve since itsestablishment in 1951.20 Little wonder, therefore, that the

Alliances approach to reforming this structure in a single,concertedfashionhasproventobedifficult.

Second, in NATO (as in any coalition or alliance) there isan informal political matrix which must balance eachnations tangibles (military capabilities) and intangibles(political ambitions) in order to produce consensus. Thus,any effort to reform something as politically sensitive and

important as which nation will host a headquarters, whowill provide its commander and senior staff positions, etc.,must be acceptable to affected nations. (Note, as well, thatkey allies have interests and participate in several

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commands which add additional complications to this

matrix.) And in an evolutionary manner, agreements andarrangements have been worked out to placate nations whohavefeltslightedorunder-represented.

Third, and related to the above two points, this matrixthat seeks to balance nations ambitions is perceivedwithout doubt as a zero-sum game. As a result, as witnessedin the Long-Term Study, nothing is truly agreed on untilsuch time that everything has been accepted by all. Despitethe DPC communique language, therefore, that . . . agree-ment as been reached on a new command structure as awhole, and in particular on the type, number and location of

headquarters,21 in reality, immense challenges remain tobe overcome before a final agreement reforming the totalcommand structure can be achieved. Specifically, nationalagenda of 14 nations (15, should France decide to play)must now be balanced; recalling that there are now feweralliedheadquartersforwhichcountriescancompete.

With these realities in mind, the essay now examinesthree brief, but representative, case studies which showhow national political agenda have impeded not onlyreforming the integrated command structure, but couldinhibit the effective allied command of a future campaign.The case studies should leave few readers in doubt of theaccuracy of the adage that command is inherently apolitical act and this is even more so the case when appliedtoalliances.

Case 1: Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (BALTAP). UntilOctober 1, 1993, allied command arrangements for theBaltic fell under the responsibility of Commander-in-Chief

AFNORTH whose responsibilities extended from northernNorway south to the Elbe River. The command arrange-ment divided the territory of the Federal Republic of

Germany between two MSCs. Shortly after Germanunification, Bonn argued that this singularization wasintolerable and insisted that its territory should fall underthe responsibility of one MSC (who is, coincidentally, a

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German general, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces

Central EuropeCINCENT). The ensuing negotiationsamong the Four Powers that were directly affected(Britain, Denmark, Germany, and Norway) resulted inBALTAP, a PSC of AFNORTH being transferred to AlliedForces Central Europe (AFCENT), and thereby becomingthe only geographically-defined PSC in that command (theotherPSCsbeingcomponentcommanders).

This seemingly innocuous reorganization in realityunderscores how national objectives can have a negativeimpact upon the integrated command structure.22 In effect,the Four Powers agreement resulted in a convoluted

command arrangement concerning peacetime coordinatingauthorities between CINCENT and Commander BALTAP(see below). Moreover, three of the countries involved in thisreorganization lost in terms of achieving their nationalobjectives. Britain retained command of the newly formed

AFNORTHWEST, but at the expense of losing Com-mander-in-Chief Channel (an MNC), and Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Eastern Atlantic (who becamedual-hatted as Commander Allied Naval Forces NorthwestEurope), as well as UK Air (an MSC). Germany achieved theobjective of removing the MSC boundary from the Elbe

River, but at the cost of leaving aPSC boundary at the Elbe,a s w e ll a s c o nt in ui n g t o t ra n sf er i n w ar ti me t he

Bundesmarine to Commander BALTAP. As AFNORTH-WEST no longer extends to the Elbe River, Norway lost itslong-valuedpieddeterretotheCentralRegion.23

The winner in this reorganization was clearlyDenmark, which speaks legions t o t hat count rysunderstanding of NATOs staff culture and influencing itseventual agreements.24 Copenhagen was able to maintainnot only the continued existence of BALTAP (recall, it is ageographically-defined PSC, as well as possessing the

important cachet of being joint), which was transferred toAFCENT, but also retain leadership of this command. As tothe former point, while Danish officials claim there is needfor a joint commander for their unique archipelagic

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environment,25 this does not necessarily establish the

requirement for the continued existence of a PSC/JSRCcommander. As to the latter issue, Commander BALTAP isalways a Danish three-star, who is also, coincidentally,dual-hattedasnationalCommanderofDanishForces.

Not surprisingly, Danish officials have endeavored toensure that BALTAP continued to exist in the currentreform process. Efforts to rationalize command structuresin AFCENT and contribute to the trend toward developingcomponent commands of forces (the better, for example, tocontribute integrated forces to a CJTF) under a RegionalCommander have been opposed by Copenhagen as a threat

to BALTAP. And, indeed, in the present DPC-approvedcommand structure reorganization plan, CommanderBALTAP will continue in existence as Commander JointSub-Regional Command NorthEast Karup. Yet to bedetermined is whether Commander BALTAPs currentcomponents will fall under him in wartime or becomecomponent commanders under Regional CommanderNorth.

This is not an unimportant consideration. For example,under existing peacetime coordination arrangements, oneof Commander BALTAPs land components, Commander

Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (CorpsLANDJUT) does not fall under the peacetime or wartimecommand of Commander LANDCENT.26 This has resultedin a convoluted peacetime planning relationship betweenCorps LANDJUT (and its assigned divisions) and its landcounterparts in the Central Region. This corps will take onadded importance when Corps LANDJUT becomesMultinational Corps Northeast and moves to Szczecinfollowing the admittance of Poland to the Alliance in 1999.Continuation of this current command arrangement wouldact to obstruct the creation of a close relationship between

Polish army forces declared to this JSRC (12th PolishMechanized Division) and their land counterparts in theCentralRegion.27

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C a se 2 : A ll i ed F o rc e s I b er i an A t la n ti c A r ea

(IBERLANT). An interesting and little appreciatedanomaly in the integrated command structure is thatPortugal does not fall within ACE, but rather, in ACLANT.Why a nation on the European continent and one of theearly members of the Alliance enjoys this unique distinctionis a result, in large part, of Portuguese politics andattitudes. Portugal has traditionally considered itself amaritime nation, and, whenever it has ventured to engagein European power politics, it has emerged as the loser forits efforts (e.g., the First World War). In consequence, itstraditional alliances have been maritime. It enjoys the

worlds longest defense treaty (with Great Britain since1373) and, since the end of the Second World War, has usedits membership in NATO to effect a close bilateral defenserelationship with the United States through access to LajesairbaseontheAzores.28

Two important implications for NATO become apparentfrom the IBERLANT arrangement. First, as Lisbon hostsHeadquarters IBERLANT, anMSC, and provides the Com-mander-in-Chief IBERLANT, it provides Portugal asignificant degree of influence in the Alliance. In fact, giventhe small size and modest capabilities of its armed forces,

one could argue that this command influence exceeds itscontributions to NATOs collective defense. Indeed,according to press reports, Portugal was able to increase thec om ma nd s ta tu s o f C om ma nd er I BE RL AN T t oCommander-in-Chief IBERLANT (from a PSC to an MSC)as a quid pro quo for allowing Spain to enter the Alliance.29

This is another excellent example of how smaller nationscanexertinfluenceintheAlliance.

Second, given historic Portuguese suspicions of Spain,the inclusion of Madrid in a militarily logical manner intothe integrated command structure has been hampered by

Portugals unique status. Notwithstanding the Portuguese Armys desire to transfer the country to ACE andparticipate in a stronger manner in ACE planning,30

suspicions of Spain and the countrys tradition of relying on

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maritime alliances have proven too strong. During the LTS

negot iations, Lisbon opposed proposals t o reduceIBERLANTs status to a third level headquarters (JSRC)and transfer it to ACE.31 Rather, Lisbon insisted uponstaying in Strategic Command Atlantic (IBERLANT willbecome Regional Command SouthEast) which eliminatesthe possibility of creating a unified Iberian command within

ACE.32 Indeed, the current command proposal has theSpanish Canary Islands ensconced within a nationalSpanish command bubble which lays within JSRCSouthWest Madrid and Strategic Command Europes areaof responsibility.33 Given that the risks to the Alliance have

clearly shifted from eastern Europe to the Southern Region,Portuguese intransigence over IBERLANT could compli-cate NATOs ability to respond effectively to crises in thegreaterIberian/southernMediterraneanregion.

Case 3: France and Commander-in-Chief Allied ForcesSouthern Region. Since 1966, France has publicly excludeditself from the integrated command structure whilemaintaining close ties with MNCs, MSCs and PSCs forwartime contingencies.34 Since the early 1990s, Frenchpolicy toward NATO underwent a sea change as Parisstruggled to come to terms with a situation where its distant

relationship to NATO, which suited its national objectivesnicely from 1967 to 1989, was no longer relevant.35 A keypart of French policy toward reassessing its relationshiptoward the Alliance has been its stated desire to rejoin theintegrated command structure, but only if certain keyreforms were implemented.36 The most important changesupon which France has insisted are that the Allianceprovides the military wherewithal to support the EuropeanSecurity and Defense Identity, as well as arrange forgreaterEuropeanleadershipintheAlliance.37

While discussions and negotiations have been ongoing

between France and NATO since the early 1990s, Frenchpolicy took a significant turn in Fall 1996, when PresidentJacques Chirac wrote to President William Clinton arguingthat the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern

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Region (CINCSOUTH) should be a European as part of the

effort to reorganize the integrated command structure. AEuropean officer quickly became a French generalofficer38 and an all but full blown diplomatic contretempsensued, with Americans (and many Europeans) arguingthat the United States was the only NATO power that hadthe ability to bring together what has been the mostdisparate and least integrated MSC in NATO.39 The issuecontinued to simmer until just prior to the Madrid Summitwhen Paris claimed that the failure of the Alliance (read: lesamricains) to accept this concession would preclude Francefromrejoiningtheintegratedcommandstructure.40

The CINCSOUTH controversy underscores t woimportant realities of the politics of command in NATO.First, for a variety of reasons, France has yet to adopt,indeed, perhaps even understand, the importance of theNATO staff culture. By this, an issue tends to becoordinated and worked by field grade officers at the stafflevel in NATO, national commands, and defense ministriesin order to achieve a degree of consensus long before it iselevated to the level of Chiefs of Defense and ambassadors,let alone heads of state/government. Because France doesnot belong to NATOs integrated military structure and the

fact that NATO issues are strongly influenced by domesticpolitical forces in France, junior French officials often havelittle or no ability to work NATO issues with their alliedcounterparts.41 As a result, once an issue is forwarded to aFrench official in the Ministry of Defense for coordination,there is a strong possibility that the matter will be seizedimmediately by the Elyse and raised to the seniorgovernment level, to wit: Chiracs letter to Clinton over thenationality of an MSC. The result of this French style ofconducting NATO business often results in Francesinability to contribute constructively to Alliance affairs.

That President Chirac would propose such a dramaticchange in command arrangements as a precondition toreentering the integrated command structure is outside of

Alliance norms. Notwithstanding some early support for

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the French position by some European nations, that the

proposal came from a nation that has yet formally to declareforces to the Alliance42 ensured that it would have littlechanceofbeingadopted.

Second, command billets in the integrated commandstructure are important, irrespective of status, to manyNATO nations and are hotly contested. Even a seeminglyinnocuous one- or two-star flag position in a third levelheadquarters could be a non-negotiable issue for a nationwhich sees that position as essential. Indeed, as the Alliancemoves in the LTS process to align command billets (in afewer number of Alliance headquarters) to forces declared to

NATO, negotiations can be expected to become even morecontentiousthentheyhavebeentodate.

TheProposedNewCommandStructure:ACritique.

Despite the difficulties confronting the reorganization ofthe Alliances integrated command structure, a review ofcurrent trends in command reorganization, as announced atthe December 1997 DPC, demonstrates that nations havemade some difficult decisions which could have a lastingimpact on how the Alliance conducts military operations.

While the Alliance and officials associated with the LTSshould be complimented for the mere fact that consensuswas found to make some changes, two decisions could havelong-term negative implications for the Alliance: the moveto reduce the number of headquarters, and the move tocreateJointSub-RegionalCommanders.

Allied Headquarters: Are Fewer Better than More? It hasbecome almost a paean in NATO in recent years that asmaller number of Alliance headquarters is unquestionablybetter. After all, given smaller defense budgets and theend of the Cold War, the Alliance should, realistically, move

to create a smaller, more efficient integrated commandstructure. And, from the perspectives of defense ministers,if they are unable to effect such reforms, many countries

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finance ministers would be quite willing to perform this task

forthem.The problem with the truism that fewer NATO

headquarters is better is the simple fact that this may notbe the case once you get beyond the budget issue. Perhapsmost obvious is that finding political consensus to create asmaller command structure becomes more difficult with thefewer headquarters available, since this results in evenmore tenacious fighting among nations for the remainingheadquarters and command positions. Moreover, thecounting of NATO headquarters is not as clear cut as onemight t hink. The congrat ulatory t one of t he DPC

communiqu noting that the Alliance will reduce thenumber of its headquarters from 65 to 20 is much lesssignificant than it appears, both from the perspective ofwhat real savings will be realized and the importantfunctions provided by these headquarters. As to the formerpoint, most of the headquarters to be disbanded areSub-PSCs and therefore already do not receive NATOinfrastructure funding.43 Moreover, as stated above, most ofthese headquarters are all but national ones which conductimportant national business, and therefore will not closeand thereby result in economies for nations, let alone for

NATO.

As to the important missions of these headquarters, twobroader issues need to be assessed. First, since 1991 the

Alliance has created a large number of multinational landformations (corps and divisions) to compensate forreductions in national land forces.44 Thus, in lieu of havingnational corps integrated at the Army Group level, as wasthe case during the Cold War and thereby avoiding theintegration of armies, the Alliance now enjoys a number ofbi-/multi-national corps and divisions. Complicating themove to effect multinationality at this new lower level is

that NATO must now prepare land forces for challengingnew missions: peace support operations and Article Vcollective defense missions which are outside of traditionalareasofoperation.

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It has been among land, vice air or naval, forces that the

Alliance has experienced its greatest difficulty effectingmultinationality. The reason for this state of affairs is thatland forces are not discrete independent units which canbe easily employed tactically in combined operations (likeships and aircraft), but rather are comprised of combinedarms teams made up of various subset formations, each ofwhich may have different mission-essential tasks assignedto them. Land forces are more costly and difficult to deploy,manifest greater national commitment and are likely toexperience the greatest potential for casualties. Notsurprisingly, nations have been unwilling to grant foreign

multinational land commanders critical commandauthorities over what have traditionally been sovereignnational prerogatives (e.g., task organization of forces,logistics redistribution, establishment of trainingstandards), thereby impeding a commanders abilityeffectively to plan operations in peacetime, let alone conductthem in wartime. In consequence, one now has a tension inNATO where nations have established bi-/multi-nationalland formations, while placing severe caveats upon theability of their wartime commanders to command them.45

This situation is a relatively new one in the Alliance, and

to its credit, efforts have been made, for instance, by theCentral Region Chiefs of Army Staff to ascertain whichreforms are needed to enable multinational land forcecommanders to carry out effectively their stated missions.46

However, under the proposed LTS reorganization, the thirdlevel of Alliance command will be comprised of Naval, Air,and Joint Sub-Regional Commanders.47 In other words, atthat critical nexus where national armies are integratedinto the command structure in wartime and where inpeacetime essential planning takes place, there apparentlywill be noexclusively allied land commander to oversee what

has traditionally been a very vexatious task: the peacetimecoordination and wartime command of multinational landforces.

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Equally disconcerting now that the fourth level of

command is to lose its Alliance designation and adopt thenebulous appellation, headquarters and forces, the Alliance could be impeded in establishing tasks,conditions, and standards for existing bi-/multi-nationalland headquarters. This would have exactly the oppositeeffect one should expect that the Alliance would havedesired. Given that multinational land headquarters willtake on greater importance than they do currently in thearea of providing the necessary link between national landforces and the integrated command structure, the Allianceshould be striving to ensure that these headquarters form

part of the integrated command structure at the fourthlevel. Costs are certainly not a factor since participatingnations are responsible for the cost of operations of theseheadquarters,nottheAlliance.48

Second, it is indeed unusual to stress the importance ofreducing the number of headquarters precisely when the

Alliance will be adding a number of new allied nations overthe next few years. If one limits this analysis to Poland, theCzech Republic, and Hungary, will the new structuresupport their inclusion as currently proposed? To be sure,political, military and financial realities would likely

preclude the establishment of a second level commandspecifically for this region. Component commanders withsufficient peacetime authority are needed to work with thearmed forces of the new members to bring them to a level ofproficiency so that they can be integrated into allied efforts,to include contributing forces to support CJTFs. However,what could very likely develop is that these new membersmight insist upon creating JSRCs, as have been proposedfor the Southern and Nordic regions, whose existence islikely to impede the effective operation of componentcommands.

Joint Sub-Regional Commanders: Nationalizing Defense Postures? Heretofore NATO has suffered thepractice of funding a number of commands which, in largepart, conducted national business and were essentially

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national in manning. In recent years, NATO has responded

to this situation by insisting that PSCs have a trulyinternational character and possess an international staff,or lose Alliance infrastructure funding. Nonetheless, theseall but national commands were essentially winked atduring the Cold War due to their relative insignificance tothegreaterimmediacypresentedbytheSovietthreat.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance, almost to afault, has endeavored to mitigate against nationsre-nationalizing their defense policies and forces. Any moveto renationalize defense policies and structures is perceivedas being inimical to the collective defense orientation of the

Alliance (and at odds with basic political goals). Thus,integrated defense planning continues apace as do efforts toretain the integrated command structure. These twomanifestations of Alliance solidarity are important to theability of NATO to respond to Article V collective defensemissions, as well as providing a rather subtle means bywhich nations can ascertain the defense planning objectivesof their neighbors (i.e, transparency). Thus, these alliedactivities and structures continue to serve as effective de

facto confidence-andsecurity-buildingmeasures.

With this point in mind, it is indeed remarkable that the Alliance has apparently decided to implement a type ofheadquarters at the third command level that has thepotential of undermining the collective defense capabilitiesand mutual reassurance benefits of the command structure.JSRCs have existed in the Alliance but under differentnomenclature. For example, under the pre-LTS commandstructure Commander BALTAP and Commander AlliedForces Northern Europe could be accurately described as

joint sub-regional commanders. It is understandable thatcountries already possessing these commands would blockattempts either to disband them or efforts to undermine

their positions of leadership in them. However, what isdisturbing is that the LTS has proposed and the DPC hasaccepted that JSRC templates should be employed in

AFSOUTH/Regional Command South: a region which has

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long-suffered from having the least degree of multinational

integrationintheAlliance.The JSRC proposal is fraught with a number of

implications which are likely to have a negative effect on theoperation of these headquarters within the integratedcommand structure. First, from a planning perspective, thereduction of the integrated command to three levels is likelyto complicate and impede effective deliberate planning forboth Article V collective defense missions and peace supportoperations. In Strategic Command Europe, the twoRegional Commanders must coordinate all planning tasksfor immense geographic areas with disparate threats, risks,

and operational conditions. Because of these increasedresponsibilities given to Regional Commanders, one canexpect them to delegate deliberative planning responsi-bilities to JSRCs, responsibilities which they may or maynot be capable of carrying out. One must recall that many ofthese proposed JSRCs are essentially national head-quarters which may result in institutionalizing strongnational biases in what should be collective allied plans.Moreover, in effect, the Alliance will be expecting thesenational commands partially to operate at the strategiccommand level, an area in which some of them have little

experience.

Second, what will be the peacetime and wartimerelat ionships between JSRCs and t he ComponentCommanders in their respective regions? As both joint andcomponent commanders will be of equal allied status,developing complementary terms of reference which specifytheir responsibilities and relationships should prove to bechallenging, particularly given that JSRCs will effectivelybe senior national commanders in their own right. Forexample, will component commanders in peacetime haveCoordinating Authority regarding training standards for

their respective components, or will the JSRCs claim thisresponsibility? In other words, will component commandersbe hindered or assisted by JSRCs in preparing forces for

Alliance missions? Perhaps even more worrisome is the fact

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that under Regional Commander North, there is no

clearly-defined land component commander (will JSRCHeidelberg have land force component responsibilities forRegional Commander North?),4 9 while in RegionalCommand South there are currently no plans to create sucha headquarters. Clearly, the current LTS structure does notimmediately demonstrate how it will support the objectiveof improving the Alliances ability the better to integrateland forces, particularly in the potentially volatile SouthernRegion.

Third, a criticism privately raised by some NATOofficials is that the LTS has been conducted without close

coordination with the Alliances development of the CJTFconcept. While the current writer may be guilty of beingdeterministic, given that JSRCs are essentially nationalcommands, one could expect their governments to press fortheir designation as CJTF headquarters. The CJTFproposal has evolved into one that enjoys a prestigiouscachet and one could expect arguments being made thatJSRCs would be ideal commanders for CJTFs. JSRCs, oneshould recall, are not strategically mobile in orientation, butrather are operational commanders with limited geographicfocus, which should obviate against their being given this

designation or mission. Rather, Regional Commanders,acting as CJTF commanders, should have the authority todirect their Component Commanders to organize theirforces to support a CJTF operation. Note, once again, thelack of an unambiguous Component Commander Land inRegional Command North and no such commander inRegional Command South to support a Regional Com-manderinthisrole.

Fourth and last, the important question of the manningof JSRC headquarters has yet to be addressed in detail. Inan attempt to moderate strong national tendencies in

JSRCs, it has been reported that the LTS has proposed thateach of these headquarters should have at least 50 percentinternational manning.50 While clearly a noteworthyinitiative, the reality of the manning of these headquarters

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could prove to be problematic. Nations have only a finite

number of qualified staff officers available for internationalassignments. Specifically, nations will be required toprovide manning for the following new (i.e., additional)NATO commands: JSRC SouthWest Madrid, and JSRCSouthCenter Larissa, in addition to the existing commandswhich do not meet the 50 percent objectives: JSRCSouthEast Izmir, JSRC South Verona, and JSRC NorthStavanger.51 One could also question whether the 50percent rule will apply to Regional Commands, given thatsome them might not meet this requirement (e.g., RegionalCommandSouthEastLisbon).

Moreover, the abolition of the fourth level of commandwill not necessarily result in the closure or realignment ofnational headquarters. Hence, it would appear that thecreation of JSRCs and the attending requirement to meet a50 percent international manning goal will actually resultin an increased demand upon nations to find qualifiedpersonnel to man these new and transformed headquarters.It also would be naive to assume that countries will secondtheir best English-speaking officers to internationalassignments indiscriminately. Obviously, the priority willlikely go to having a strong presence at Strategic

Commands and at JSRCs for those countries that havethem, while Regional Commands and particularlyComponent Commands (who have important supportingandforceintegrationroles)arelikelytosuffer.

AndShouldtheLTSProposalsFail...

After assessing the proposed LTS command structure,one could conclude that while little has changed (e.g.,nomenclature), some of the changes that have beenproposed could have long-term negative implications for the

Alliance (e.g., JSRCs).

52

Clearly, the method employed bythe Alliance to address command reorganization (i.e, toattempt to reform everything) opened a veritable PandorasBox of national political agenda which have impeded

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progress in the LTS. Yet, for officials to surrender in

frustration will only allow national agenda to prevail in theend.

It bears repeating that the LTS is far from being acompleted agreement. All that has been agreed to date aregeneral organizational guidelines, while many of the detailsof the new structure have yet to find consensus. The LTSManpower Study is currently being conducted which maywell find that the new structure will require greaterseconded manpower, and therefore additional resources.53

As a number of key allies (e.g., the United Kingdom)54 havestated that they will not approve a new command

organization that does not result in other nations equallygiving up commands and positions, let alone resulting ineconomies, the LTS structure might be rejected and itsterms of reference might be revisited. Should this come topass, nations should reexamine the weaknesses in theircollective efforts in the LTS to date. Some key areas whichwarrantreexaminationfollow.

Major NATO Commanders/Strategic Commanders. It isinteresting to note that the reorganization of the integratedcommand structure has almost exclusively addressed AlliedCommand Europe/Strategic Command Europe. Why has

Allied Command Atlantic been all but ignored? With theexception of the shedding the commands fourth and thirdlevels of command, the only changes that will affect thatcommand are those related to nomenclature. Certainly, thesecurity outlook for this commands area of responsibility ismuch more optimistic than the uncertainties and riskswhich confront the Alliance in the Southern Region. Even ifthe mission of SACLANT remains, does this commandcontinue to warrant Strategic Commander status, vicebecoming a Regional Commander, or a second levelcomponent commander supporting strategic commander(s)

in Europe?55 Given the shift in the Alliances riskorientation, surely Commander-in-Chief Southern Europehas greater claim to be a Strategic Commander thanSACLANT.56 A first level Allied Commander status for

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CINCSOUTH would also strengthen the hand of those in

the Alliance who feel this key command billet should remainaU.S.flagofficer.

Major Subordinate Commanders/Regional Command-ers. In the early work of the LTS, one proposal held for ACEto retain three, and perhaps add a fourth, MSC/RC. Forinstance, a Regional Command West was envisaged toinclude Norway, the United Kingdom, Portugal (difficult),and France (even more difficult) falling under one secondlevel allied commander. Both proposals did not findacceptance among nations for a variety of reasons.57 Whilesurely nations are loath to revisit contentious issues, which

only with difficulty have been resolved, they should reflectupon their provisional decision to reduce StrategicCommand Europe from three to two Regional Commanders.Given the problems associated with membership expansionand the massive responsibilities that would be placed upontwo Regional Commanders, consideration should be givento creating a minimum of three such commanders to provideeffectivecoverageforEurope.

Principal Subordinate Commanders/Sub-RegionCommanders. Perhaps the most tenacious problem facingany command restructuring relates to the third level ofcommand. With the exception of IBERLANT (which is anMSC/RC), at this level headquarters are most closely tied toa nations command structure and national territory.58 Notsurprisingly, at this level of command very little in the wayof reform has been achieved in the LTS. Given politicalrealities it is unlikely that nations will entertain abolishingthese headquarters. However, reform-minded officialsshould insist that JSRCs come at a cost. First, the Allianceshould press for the creation of air, sea, and land componentcommanders under Regional Commanders with distinctand mutually supporting terms of reference. This would

enable a more effective means of integrating nations forces.Second, as an effort to encourage the development of flexiblemultinational land headquarters, nations which participatein bi-/multi-national formations should be invited to declare

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them to NATO and have them fall under the integrated

command structure, i.e., thereby maintaining the fourthlevel of command, but only for bi-/multi-national landforces. The objective of this initiative would be to ensurethat these headquarters adhere to NATO standards andenable them to be integrated more efficiently into CJTFs.Concomitantly, their commanders should also be delegatedsufficient peacetime and wartime command authorities toeffect a greater degree of multinationality. Such reformswould not only enable allied commanders to execute Article

V collective defense missions, but would also provideRegional Commanders with trained and integrated forces

whichcouldoperateunderaCJTF.

Conclusion.

The foregoing analysis of the politics of command inNATO and the most recent proposal to reorganize theintegrated command structure has been intentionallywritten in a rather blunt fashion. The lack of a widerunderstanding of the LTS proposals and their oftennuanced characteristics necessitates such a candidassessment. However, two caveats must be kept firmly inmind. First, while critical of some of the solutions proposed

in LTS, the efforts of those officials who have contributed tothe process should not be disparaged. That any agreementwas reached and endorsed by the DPC speaks legions to thededicationandperseveranceofthoseinvolved.

Second, in his excellent recounting of NATOs evolutionsince 1989, Dutch defense official Dr. Rob de Wijk writesthat the lack of real process in the LTS regarding commandstructurereorganizationdemonstrates:

. . . how much NATO had developed from a traditional alliance to

a security organisation within which national considerations

rather than the improvement of military effectiveness oftenweightedheaviestwhenmakingdecisions.

59

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It could very well be that most nations are quite

comfortable with this new orientation, if not indeedfundamentally new characteristic of NATO. Yet onecontinues to hear many senior Alliance officials claim thatthe basis and strength of the Alliance remains its Article Vcollective defense mission and the collective ability torespond to real security challenges.60 In short, nations and

Alliance officials need to recognize the growing dichotomybetween their stated objectives and the evolving structurewhich has served as a basis for allied collective defense. Theimplications of allowing such dissonance to continue couldlead to an undermining of allied solidarity and, eventually,

itscredibility.

Recommendations.

1) In light of the Department of Defenses concurrence onthe LTS proposed reorganization of the integratedcommand structure, it should not reverse its support ofinitiatives thus far accepted in principle by the Alliance. Toraise objections to the arrangements which have alreadyfound acceptance by the Alliance would be politicallyuntenable.

2) However, should the LTS implementation studies ofthe reformed command structure find shortcomings, thenthe Department of Defense should seize the initiative andintroduce proposals to reform the command structure basedonmilitaryrequirements.

3) The following key points should guide the Departmentof Defenses policy toward the reorganization of theintegratedcommandstructure:

(a) Given the historical difficulty of reforming the Alliances command structure, Department of Defense

should press for future reorganization efforts be doneincrementally, vice addressing this contentious issue in onesingle effort. A more modest approach to reorganizationmight afford Washington and other like minded allies

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greater leverage in pressing for reforms based on military,

vicepolitical,rationales.(b) The establishment of Joint Sub-Regional

Commandersper se should be opposed unless accompaniedby the concession that air, sea, and land componentcommanders with sufficient peacetime and wartimecommand authorities are established with the mission ofintegratingandtrainingalliedforces.

(c) All bi-/multi-national land headquarters shouldbe declared to NATO and made part of the integratedcommand structure in order to ensure that they can be

employed effectively by the Alliance. Their commandersshould be granted sufficient peacetime Coordinating Authority and wartime command authorities to achievetheirstatedmissions.61

U.S.ArmyIssues.

1) The U.S. Army has a stake in the outcome of the LTS.The Presidents National Security Strategy places greatimportance upon the ability of U.S. armed forces to engagein coalition operations.62 However, achieving a moreeffective degree of multinational land operational

capabilities in NATO will be hindered by the proposed LTSstructure.

2) It should be a key U.S. Army objective to press for thecreation of land component commanders under regionalcommanders and the recognition by the Alliance ofbi-/multi-national land headquarters. These reforms wouldcontribute to improving the ability of allied land forces tooperatetogetheratthecorpsanddivisionlevel.

3) The U.S. Army is almost alone in possessing theprofessional credibility to provide the leadership necessary

in the Alliance to press for greater unity of effort among landforcesinEurope,northand,particularly,south.

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APPENDIX

NEWCOMMANDSTRUCTURE

Old New

MajorNATO StrategicCommandersCommanders

AlliedCommanderEurope StrategicCommanderEurope

AlliedCommanderAtlantic StrategicCommanderAtlantic

AlliedCommanderChannel (disbanded,July1,1994)

MajorSubordinate RegionalCommandersCommanders

StrategicCommanderEurope:

CinCAlliedForces (tobedisbandedandNorthwestEurope mergedintoRegional

CommandNorth)

CinCAlliedForcesCentral RegionalCommander

Europe* North,BrunssumCinCAlliedForcesSouthern RegionalCommanderEurope* South,Naples

StrategicCommandAtlantic:

CinCAlliedForcesWestern RegionalCommander AtlanticArea West,Norfolk

CinCAlliedForcesEastern RegionalCommander AtlanticArea East,Northwood

CinCAlliedForcesIberian RegionalCommander AtlanticArea SouthEast,Lisbon

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RegionalCommanderequivalents:

CommanderStrikingFleet HQStrikingFleet Atlantic* Atlantic

CommanderSubmarines HQAlliedCommand AlliedCommandAtlantic SubmarinesAtlantic

*DesignatedasCJTFheadquartersfortrialsandexercises.

PrincipalSubordinate Sub-RegionalCommanders Commanders(Jointor

Component)

StrategicCommandAtlantic:

All existing Principal Subordinate Commanders in ACLANT areto be dissolved or adopt the status of forces and therefore willfalloutsideoftheformalintegratedcommandstructure.

StrategicCommandEurope:

CommanderAlliedNaval ComponentCommanderForcesNorthwestEurope NavNorth,Northwood

CommanderAlliedForces JointSub-RegionalNorthernEurope CommanderNorth,

Stavanger

CommanderAlliedForces JointSub-RegionalBalticApproaches CommanderNorthEast,

Karup

CommanderAlliedAir ComponentCommanderForcesCentralEurope AirNorth,Ramstein

CommanderAlliedLand JointSub-RegionalForcesCentralEurope CommanderCenter,

Heidelberg

CommanderAlliedLand JointSub-RegionalForcesSouthernEurope CommanderSouth,

Verona

CommanderAlliedNaval ComponentCommanderForcesSouthernEurope NavSouth,Naples(maybe

relocated)

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CommanderAlliedAirForces ComponentCommander

SouthernEurope AirSouth,Naples(mayberelocated)

CommanderAlliedLand JointSub-RegionalForcesSoutheasternEurope CommanderSouthEast,

Izmir

CommanderAlliedLand JointSub-RegionalForcesSouthCentralEurope CommanderSouthCenter,

Larissa(planned,neverestablished)

JointSub-RegionalCommanderSouthWest,

MadridSub-PrincipalSubordinateCommanders:

All fourth level commands in the integrated command structureare to be dissolved or lose their NATO status and revert tonationalcommands.

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ENDNOTES

1. See Madrid Declaration on Europe-Atlantic Security andCooperation Issued by the Heads of State and Government, PressRelease M-1(97)81, Bruxelles, NATO Press Service, July 8, 1997, point6.

2. Note that Protocols of Accession with these three countries weresigned on December 16, 1997. See Final Communiqu, MinisterialMeeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bruxelles, Bruxelles, NATOPress Service, December 16, 1997, point 4. For a brief description of theaccession process, see Gebhardt von Moltke, Accession of NewMembers to the Alliance: What are the Next Steps?,NATO Review,Vol.45,No.4,July-August1997,particularlypp.7-9.

3. For such a skeptical view, see Jenonne Walker, Fact and Fictionabout a European Security Identity and American Interests,Occasional Paper Series, Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, April 1992,p.7.

4. For background on this broad effort to reform NATO, see AnthonyCragg, Internal Adaptation: Reshaping NATO for the Challenges ofTomorrow,NATO Review,Vol. 45, No.4, July-August 1997, pp.30-35.

5. See Neue Zrcher Zeitung, February 16, 1998; and, Inside thePentagon (Washington),July10,1997.

6. See Klaus Naumann, NATOs New Military Command

Structure, NATOReview,Vol.46,No.1,Spring1998,p.10.

7. Many of the details of the LTS have been cloaked in secrecy. Theinformation used in this section is taken from a remarkable work whichdocuments in great detail the Alliances internal evolution since 1990. Itpromises to become a classic. See Rob de Wijk,NATO on the Brink of the

New Millennium: The Battle for Consensus, Brasseys AtlanticCommentaries,London:Brasseys,1997,pp.101-106;128-130.

8. The Alliances New Strategic Concept, Press CommuniquS-1(91)85,Bruxelles,NATOPressService,November7,1991.

9. MC 400, MC Directive for Military Implementation of theAlliancesStrategic Concept, NATO CONFIDENTIAL, June 14, 1996.

10. Final Communiqu, North Atlantic Council Meeting in Oslo,Norway, Press Communiqu M-NAC-1(92)51, Bruxelles, NATO PressService,June4,1992,point11.

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11. NATO Declaration of Heads of State and Government at theNorth Atlantic Council Meeting, Bruxelles, Press CommuniquM-1(94)3,Bruxelles,NATOPressService,January11,1994,point9.

12. For an assessment of the CJTF concept, see Charles L. Barry,The NATO CJTF Command and Control Concept, in Thomas-Durell

Young, ed., Command in NATO after the Cold War: Alliance, National,and Multinational Considerations, Carlisle Barracks, PA: StrategicStudiesInstitute,1997,pp.29-52.

13. See Rafael Estrella, After the Madrid Summit: Reform of theNATO Military Structure, Draft General Report, AP 208 DSC(97)8,Bruxelles, North Atlantic Assembly, September 9, 1997, particularlypoint8.

14. For a superb historical account of these early politicalsensitivities in the creation of the integrated command structure, seeGregory W. Pedlow, The Politics of NATO Command, 1950-1962, inSimon W. Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, eds., U.S. Military Forces in

Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1970, Boulder, CO: Westview Press,1993,pp.15-42.

15. Naumann,p.12.

16. Final Communiqu," Ministerial Meeting of the North AtlanticCouncilinBruxelles,"December16,1997,point17.

17. See Towards a NATO Summit, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol.

2,No.5,November1996.


19. See FrankfurterAllgemeineZeitung, August5,1996.

20. The NAC agreed to create an integrated NATO defense force inEurope at its December 18, 1950, meeting in Brussels. Allied CommandEurope was established in 1951 in Paris. See Bruce George, ed., Janes

NATO Handbook 1989-90, Coulsdon, Surrey: Janes Defense Data,1989, p. 115; and, Pedlow, The Politics of NATO Command,1950-1962,pp.15-42.


2 2 . D a vi d M i l le r , N ew L o ok f o r E u ro p ea n C o mm a nd , International Defense Review, Vol. 27, No. 5, May 1994, pp. 30-32; and,

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Annex A to Enclosure 1 to MC 324, The NATO Military CommandStructure.

23. The best record and politico-military assessment of thesenegotiations and the subsequent Four Powers agreement is found inMichael H. Clemmesen, Present and Future Command Structure: ADanishView,in CommandinNATOaftertheColdWar, pp.190-194.

24. Evidence to support this observation is found in the fact that(surprise!) a Danish colonel (Colonel Eskil Nielsen) played a key role inthe initial conceptual development of the LTS. See de Wijk,NATO on the

BrinkoftheNewMillennium, p.103.

25. Clemmesen, pp.192-193.

26. Allied Land Forces Zealand is the other land componentcommander under Commander BALTAP. However, this is essentiallyan exclusively national command which, during the Cold War, wouldhavebeenreinforcedbyAlliedlandforces.

27. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 1, 1997; and,Thomas-Durell Young, Multinational Land Formations and NATO:

Reforming Practices and Structures, Carlisle Barracks, PA: StrategicStudiesInstitute,1997,pp.25-26,45-46.

28. See Thomas Bruneau, Portugals Defense Structures andNATO,in CommandinNATOaftertheColdWar, pp.180-184.

29. Ibid., pp.180-181.

30. Ibid., p.179.

31. See the press report of this proposal suggested during a visit toPortugal by the Chairman of the Military Committee, General KlausNaumann, in Diario de Noticias (Lisboa), September 11, 1996, in

ForeignBroadcastInformationService(FBIS)-WEU-96-179.

32. For an official Portuguese view of IBERLANT and Lisbonsvision for the headquarters, see Jaime Gama, Portugal and theTransformed NATO, NATO Review, Vol. 44, No. 4, July 1996,particularlypp.5-6.

33. See the following press report for background on this interestingcompromise. Diario de Noticias (Lisboa), November 12, 1996 in

FBIS-WEU-96-221.

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34. For the best treatment of Frances relationship with NATO, seeFrdric Bozo,La France et lOTAN: de la Guerre froide au nouvel ordre

europen, Travaux et Recherches de lIFRI, Paris: Masson, 1991. Anexcellent (albeit dated) English language study can be found in MichaelHarrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security, Baltimore:TheJohnsHopkinsPress,1981.

35. See William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, French Policy toward NATO: Enhanced Selectively, vice Rapprochement,CarlisleBarracks,PA:StrategicStudiesInstitute,September9,1994.

36. See Diego Ruiz Palmer, Frances Military Command Structuresinthe1990s,in CommandinNATOaftertheColdWar,pp.93-123.

37. See LibreBelgique (Bruxelles),March22,1996.

38. SeeLiberation (Paris), December 20, 1996, which claims that notonly was it French policy that a French officer take the command, but ageneralofficerhadalreadybeenidentifiedforthepost!

39. For an excellent brief synopsis of this controversy, see Thomas L.Friedmansop-edarticlein TheNewYorkTimes, December1,1996.

40. See Neue Zrcher Zeitung, February 16, 1998; and, Estrella,After the Madrid Summit, particularly points 17-19, which are verycriticaloftheFrenchapproachtothisissue.

41. SeeJohnsenandYoung, FrenchPolicytowardNATO,pp.3-8.

42. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 5, 1996; and,Liberation (Paris),December20,1996.

43. Briefing, prepared by Major J.-M. Burzlaff, SO Plans, Areas ofMultinationality and Interoperablity, HQ Allied Land ForcesSchleswig-HolsteinandJutland,Rendsburg,May9,1996.

44. See TheWashingtonPost, July29,1996.

45. For background on the problems associated with commandingland forces in NATO multinational formations, see Jon Whitford andThomas-Durell Young, Command Authorities and Multinationality inNATO: The Response of the Central Regions Armies, Command in

NATOaftertheColdWar, pp.53-73.

46. See, for example, Multinational Force Command AuthoritiesHandbook: Proceedings of the CR-CAST Working Group on Command

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Authorities Required for a Multinational Force Commander, CarlisleBarracks,PA:StrategicStudiesInstitute,September1,1995.

47. See Klaus Naumann, An Evolving NATO in an EvolvingWorldthe Chairmans Perspective, NATOs Sixteen Nations, Vol. 42,No.1,1997,p.14.

48. Young, Multinational Land Formations and NATO: ReformingPracticesandStructures, pp.22-23.

49. In all probability one could expect that Commander JSRCHeidelberg will be for all intents and purposes a land componentcommander. The designation JSRC is being given to the commanderin deference to not embarrassing nations in Regional Command South;however,thisarrangementhasnotbeenmadeformal.

50. See NATO/Military Committee: Agreement on CommandStructure and on SFOR Permanent Presence at its Current Level,

AtlanticNews, No.2970,December3,1997,p.2.

51. Interestingly, BALTAP falls within the 50 percent guidelines: 40percent of the Headquarters is Danish, 40 percent German and theremaining 20 percent consists of other allied officers, e.g., British,Canadian,andAmerican.

52. For an insightful and very critical assessment of the proposedLTS command structure reorganization, see Estrella, After the MadridSummit,particularlypoint7.

53. Ibid., points22and23.

54. See NATO Chiefs Wrestle with Command Posts, April 22,1997,Reuters,ThePointCastNetwork.

55. Points stressed in Estrella, Afterthe MadridSummit,point 8.

56. See William T. Johnsen, Reorganizing NATO Command andControl Structures: More Work in the Augean Stables, in Command in

NATOaftertheColdWar, pp.20-21.

57. See FrankfurterAllgemeineZeitung, August5,1996.

58. SeeEstrella,AftertheMadridSummit,point9.

59. See de Wijk,NATO on theBrink of theNew Millennium, p. 130.

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60. See, for example, Helge Hansen, Foreword, Command in NATO after the Cold War, p . ix. N.B.: General Hansen wasCommander-in-ChiefAlliedForcesCentralEuropeuntil1996.

61. I go into greater detail on this matter in Young, MultinationalLand Formations and NATO: Reforming Practices and Structures, pp.42-43.

62. An important element of our security preparedness depends ondurable relationships with allies and other friendly nations.

Accordingly, a central thrust of our strategy is to strengthen and adaptthe security relationships we have with key nations around the worldand create new structures when necessary. A National SecurityStrategy for a New Century, Washington, DC: U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice,May1997,p.2.

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U.S.ARMYWARCOLLEGE

MajorGeneralRobertH.Scales,Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGICSTUDIESINSTITUTE

Director

ColonelRichardH.Witherspoon

DirectorofResearch

Dr.EarlH.Tilford,Jr.

Author

Dr.Thomas-DurellYoung

DirectorofPublicationsandProduction

Ms.MarianneP.Cowling

PublicationsAssistant

Ms.RitaA.Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs.RitaE.Burgett

Mrs.MaryJaneSemple

CoverArtist

Mr.JamesE.Kistler

reforming natos military structures the long-term study and its implications for land forces pub141

Documents