Reference and Reference and DescriptionDescription

LanguageLanguage

IntentionalityIntentionality Words are Words are aboutabout things things

Brentano pointed out this characteristic was Brentano pointed out this characteristic was mysteriousmysterious

How is that even possible?How is that even possible?

MillMill

The meaning of a name is just the thing that it names The meaning of ‘Everest’ is the

mountain itself The meaning of ‘Fido’ is that dog

Puzzles of ReferencePuzzles of Reference

Identity statements

Hesperus is VenusPhosphorus is Venus

Should mean the same thing if 1. The meaning of a sentence is compositionally

determined by the meaning of its parts, &2. The meanings of the terms are the objects

they name

Puzzles of ReferencePuzzles of Reference

Talking about non-existents

Pegasus lives on Mount Helicon

Should mean nothing if there is no object for ‘Pegasus’ to mean

Puzzles of ReferencePuzzles of Reference

Denying existence

Pegasus doesn’t exist

Should mean nothing if there is no object for ‘Pegasus’ to meanBut it’s true!

Frege’s TheoryFrege’s Theory

Meanings are what are grasped when terms are understood Consider

Hesperus is VenusPhosphorus is Venus

Something other than objects must be ‘grasped’

Call that sense, and the objects reference

Frege’s TheoryFrege’s Theory

Sense A ‘mode of presentation’ for the

referent Determines the reference of a term

Senses are to referents as routes to a destination

Many routes are possible to each destination The route to Venus was via Roman mythology,

classic teachers, etc. The route to the Evening Star was via walks at

night, talks with friends, etc.

Frege’s TheoryFrege’s Theory

Sense: Problems? Is there any unique sense? (is there a

unique route to every destination?) Everyone here may have a different mode of

presentation of ‘Brisbane’ Is there a difference between a sense and the

set of all things that we know about a thing? If not then senses can’t give us objective

meanings Only personal/subjective meanings

Frege’s TheoryFrege’s Theory

Sense: Problems? Is sense necessary for reference?

I can talk about Moses even though everything I know about Moses is wrong

I can talk to Bob about Moses even though our sets of knowledge about Moses don’t overlap

Bob: Moses received the Ten Commandments Me: Moses delivered his people from Egypt

Frege’s TheoryFrege’s Theory

Sense: Talking about non-existents Sense is the mode of presentation

‘Pegasus’ is presented by a description ‘the winged horse’

‘wing’ and ‘horse’ have senses (and they exist)

So ‘Pegasus’ has a derived sense – but no referent

Frege’s TheoryFrege’s Theory

Sense: Talking about existence

‘Pegasus doesn’t exist’ Same solution

Russell’s TheoryRussell’s Theory

Frege’s solution ok, but what are senses? They need to be part of the recognisable

world

The sense of a term is the definite description that the term satisfies This solves the puzzles of reference in

the same way as Frege’s senses

Russell’s ProblemsRussell’s Problems

Indeterminacy of descriptions What description do I have in mind when I talk

of Walter Scott? Depends on purpose

Only Russell’s theory would make me claim that I always have the same idea of Scott in mind

Maybe names are just ‘placeholders’ for content

There may be no fact of the matter about what description conveys what I mean by ‘Scott’ in any use

Russell’s ProblemsRussell’s Problems

Diversity of descriptions Do all users of ‘Scott’ have the same

description in mind? For me ‘Scott’ is ‘A & B & author of

Waverley’ For you ‘Scott’ is ‘A & B & soldier of

Orange’ Then you and I mean different things when

we say ‘Scott’

Russell’s ProblemsRussell’s Problems

Diversity of descriptions It’s possible that our descriptions don’t

even overlap For me ‘Moses’ is ‘He who received Law

from God’ For you ‘Moses’ is ‘He who led the Exodus’ If I say ‘Moses wore sandals’ and you say

‘Moses did not wear sandals,’ we are not contradicting each other

Searle’s TheorySearle’s Theory

The sense of a term is a cluster of definitions The referent must satisfy some number

of these descriptions Solves the two previous problems easily

But wait, there’s more

More ProblemsMore Problems

The Modal Argument ‘Nixon could have lost the 1968 election’

True? Suppose ‘Nixon’ abbreviates ‘He who won

the 1968 election’ Then ‘He who won the 1968 election could

have lost the 1968 election True?

This is a problem for both Russell and Searle

More ProblemsMore Problems

False Descriptions Descriptions can refer even when they

are false Pythagoras means ‘The man who proved the

P. T.’ But if Schmidt actually did it then ‘the man

who proved the P. T.’ is only satisfied by Schmidt

But ‘Pythagoras’ still refers to Pythagoras and not to Schmidt