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DE91 008133

ReportNo. 11DOcOmbw1990

ReexaminingNuclearPolicyina ChangingWorld

LeonSkNM

LA-11998

UC-900 MASTER

CenterforNationalSecurit StudieaLLosAlamosNational La ratory ..

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THE CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES

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ReexamlnbgNuclearPolicyIna ChangingWorld

LeonS!oss

1. INTRODIJLTM)N

My purposein writing ihi~ reportis 10de-velopa Aonak (ora ncu mtclcarcmploymcnlfmlicyandforceMruclurcadaplcdlodtccondi”lionsthatmigh[prevailal !hcbeginningof kIwcnly-firs[ccrmny.Of Cotnc. noonccanbcsurewhatIhoscconditionswill bc,butwccanbcquitcconfidcnlIhaIIhcywill diffcrhnthcpawandIhcprcwu.

Bccauscnuclearpolicyshouldbca rcflccticmof broadernationalsIraIcgy,I shallexaminesomebroadersccurilyissuesfirs!. The ex-trcmclyrapidchangesIhaIale wcurringinIhcinlcmali(malcnvironmcnlwill require● lhor-~oughrevisioninU.S.nationalsccuri[yrnlratcgyandforceposIurc.Thiswill bcacomplcstaskkcausc Ihcrc is rrmrcunccrmintyaboutIhcfumrcIhanwc havefacedforwwnctime. f{ i%WCIIkyoml dw scopeof thispaper10oudinca broadnalionaisccurilypolicy, bul I shalltouchonwnc of IhcbroaderiswcsandtrcrtdsthatseemIikclym affectnuclearcmployrnmpolicyandwcapomrcquircmcnlso

The undcdyingthesisof this rcpwt i%thatnuclcurweaponswill hcrequiredfm Ihc fore.sccablcfulurc,and thuswc muslcontinuetoihinkabou~howIhcymigh;hccmploycd.Therolesof nuclearweaponswill change,how-ever, and it will k posrniblcto accomplishhow roleswithfarfewernuckarwca~msthanwc haveIoday, Bothournu~lcarposmrcandnuclcwcrnploymcntpolicymu~tchangerodi-callytoaccommoda(c10chimgingconditions,

While Ihc predominantroleof nuclearwcaponswill con!inucto bc focuwdon hc SoviC;UnionforIhcforcsccaMcfuturcoWCwill bcIcMconcernedwilhdclcrrcnccof overtaggressionandrncwcconcc-ncdwithk rok thatnucicarwcapcm can play in shapinga ncw .sccurilyrclatiomhipwith tk Sovic{Union andothernations,

I will brtcflydc.scrikchanginginlcmationalcondilioma%Ihcyaffectnuclearcmp!ojrrtcmpolicy. Then a pwposcdrcstatcrncntof thegoalsandrolesof nucicarweaponsthatmightbc appropfia~ 10 Ihcscchangingconditionswill bc offered. % rcporlalsopostulatesafulurc slmlcgicfofcc psturc and illustrateshowsuchforcesmightbccmldoycdinsupportof rcviscurolcsandgoais.I \ Iillcoacludcwithsomesuggestionsfor furtheranalysis,

11. CHANGING INTERNATIONALCONDITIONS

PolitJcalChang~

‘?’kdramaticchangesin Em[cmF.uropcover!hc pastyear have, in cffccl, dcmnlidwdtheWarsaw%CI, and Ihc CIOSCticsktwccr. theSoviet Union and ils forma salclli[eshavehccn scvcrcd. The War-w PiIctno Iongcrexistsm a viablemilitaryalliance.Within theSovietUnion itself,@J.mosfandpcrtwmikahave ahcrcd %wic! pritni!ics. Thc %vic!lcudcr~hipis focusedon achievingcccmornic

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reformandcontainingMondist wpwafisrn,leavingiiuie roomfor icwcigntidvcnturcsandgivingncwcmphasis10achicvmgcamomiesindcfcnsc.

Gcrnwn unificationhasprofoundlyaiuxc(lthe poiiticai-milltnr~mapof Europe. A ncweconomicandpoiiticaipower in CcntraiEu-ropehasbeencrciitcdthatwiil overshadowi!sneighbors,and this prospectI>creatingnewtensionsinIhcWest.Furthermore,withdrawalof Sovietpowerfrom EasIcrnEuropeis reo-peningoidnvalricsandcreatingncwinstabili-lic~ in the nationsformerly aiiicd with theSoviclUnion.

The centralrationaicfor theNonh AtianticTreatyOrganization(NATO) hasbeendetcr-rcnccof Sovietaggressionin Europe.Today.a dcciiningsenseof threatisca:,tingdoubtonIhri[ratiortalcand weakeningIhccoimior, ofNATO. causingmany to qucs[ionits wic-vance. In particular,therearcgrowingprcs-surcson bothsidesof Ihc Atlanticto sharplyrcduccU.S. forcesand nuclearwca~ponsinEurope. The dcciiningsenseof lhrc.utis aisocausingWCStcmnationstoshiftprioritiesfromdcfcnscmotherissues(e.g.,economicgrowthandthecnvimrmwnt).

As securityconccmsdecline,U.S. miii;arypnwcrwiii inevitablybecomeicssrclc$an[inour rcialionswith other nations. Economicissuesarcassuminginctwing importance,butthe United Statesis no Ionficrthe dominameconomicpowerthatitwasinpastdecades.Asa rcwi! of Ihcsetrendsth.cUnltcd Statesisdestined10piaya icssdominantroic in wcwidaffairsthanwchavebeenaccustomedto. Still,the United Stateswill bc an importantandinfiucntiaipovtcr,and our nucicarweapon%wiii continueto piay II roic in protectingU.S.wxurity interestsandpromotingintcmtilionaistabiiity.

Militury Changa

“I”hc!hvict ihrca!IOrmtinnson itsperipheryhat dccimedmurkediy.buI the SovietUnionrcrmtinsu powrrftd miiilary power, Face,orscontrlhu[ingI(Ja rcducc(ithrewinciudc:

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Rcductiomin!$ovictform inEurope(and,I ) nmuchicsscrextcnt,intheFatEast]andthe prospectof further rcdu:tionsus arcsui! of urrm-confroincgc,[iutionsanduniimcraiaclions.The (lcmiseof Ihe Wursa9#Pac!and thechar,gcsin themiiitarygeographyof Ccn-traiEurope,TheSot”ict:.wiii nohmgcrixable10mountashort-warningattackfromIIICncwpositionsto whichtheyurcwith-drawing.Sovietprcoccupatifmwith intcmaiprob-icnw. making forsign adventuresmuchicssiikely in the;lcarterm.Changesin !+o~~iclviews about nuclcmweapons.

Thesechanges!kgan in the iatc 1970sanducccicratcdin thv 1980s. Soviclicadcrs,whoonceargued[hutnucicarweaponswouid bcdccisivcin an! futurewar,nowappear10seeicssmiiitary utility in nucicarweapons.ThedisasteratChernobylhashada majorimpactonSoviet[hmking,ca..[ingfurthcrdoubtontheu[iiitv of Imclcar weaponsand raisingncwcunccmsaboutthe ccmscqucnccsof a majorwar. The Sovic[icadcrshipappms wiiiing10makeslhstantiaircductirmsin bothstra[cgicand thcalcrnuclearforces,huI there i%iitliccvider.ccthat they arc preparedw ciiminatcthcirtmclcarweapons,despitewnc rhetorictothe contrary, Furthermore,Sovicl miiitarypiar,ncrscontinuetodevelopandrefinepiansfor fightingwith nuclearwcapormandmajorprogramsformndcmizingIheirnucicwforcc~arcproceeding.

Changesin theSovietposturealrcaaj haveincrcascdwarningtime, Addilionaiprospec-tive changesrcsuitingfrom k Convcnti[malForcesin Europe(CFE) ncgotiatiomwiii fur-therincrcascwarninglime andconfidenceinwarning, This wiii make it possibicfor theWestm rcduccactiveforcesand10rely morehcaviiy on force potcntiaiand mohiiizationcapabiiitics, However. Ihc West ha%ycI 10wlapl ils pianningor il$ postureto (kc ncwrcaiilict. 13ccau.scdcfcnscpiunningtoday isdominatedbyshort”tcrrntxmsidcrations,nota-biybudge!prcssurcwit wiii bcverydifficui[toudjutiform ild pitimtoIhcncwcwndnionsinUruli(tniti fi{~hit~ll.

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‘h prospectof u morecqtudconvcnlionidforcebalanceinCcmrrlEuropeshouldmtikcitpossiblefor NATO 10 rely kw on nuclearwcqxms.S!il!,therewill remainarequirement10offsetSovietnuclearpower so thtitthereisno ternpmtionto uscit eitherpolilicidly(e.g.,forcocrcion)ormilitarily.For[hefore.seeablefuturetheUnitedStateswil) betheonlycoun-try in theworldwithanabilitytooffwt Sovietmilita~ power.

Proliferationof nuclearwetiponsandolheradvancedmilitarysystemsis a growingcon-cernfor IWOreasons.First,mphisiicatcdandhighly lethalweaponsareproliferatingto na-tionsthw neverbeforehadthcm, This raisesthe prospectthtn futureconflictsin the thirdworld could involve modcm wcqpons,con-vertingwhat in the pastmight have been aminoropertilionfortheUnitedStatesintoonewithmajorrisks.Second,thedcclincof bipmIarhymaycausenationsthatonce.sougtnsecu-rity in tin alliance frameworkto seek theirsecurityindependently. if nationssuch asGmnany or Japan lost conficicncein U.S.securityguaranteesandbegantodeveloptheirown nuclearcapabilities,this would be pro-foundlydcsttibilir.ing,

flL k:i.II:MENTS OfI’ A STRATEGYF(NZ THE 1990sA! VI)BEYOND

objectives

h the tircumstanccsdcscrihedabuvcoursccurit)sIruIcgyshouldhavethrccmainobjcc.ti~cs. !;i~s!.it ~houldcontributetobalancingSotict miiilory power and dissuading!hcmfrc~mreconstitutingthatpowerin \hcchtmgcdthreatctmditionsalreadydcw”tibed.Sccmd,itshouldcontributeIUslahililyin Europe andtorcwmrancc 01’uur idlics lhcrc, Finally, itshouldprotca vitalU.S. interestsclscwhcreintheworld ‘I”hcrcshouldbcncwopportunities10rcduccthe risksnf military confrontationandtocmctheburdenof onus.Therewill alsobc new securityprohlcmsto confront. TheUnited !$ta[csneedsto shapeitsstrategyandforce~,.stmcto ttike:Idviintitgcof opportuni.

tics to controland reducearms,but also tohedgeagainstnewthreats.

Changesin NATO

Being preparedto defendagainsta large,Potentiallynuc\earwar in Europehasbeenamajordriverof our:;trategyandforceposture.Sucha threathasbecomemoreremote,andifa threatdoesrecmcrgewcwill haveconsider-ablewarning, Ilus. wc canbeginto reshapeourstrategyandrestructureourforceswiththisin mind.

We mustnowassumethatsubstantialforcesandnuchar weaponswill bewith&awn fromEurope it wouldno tberealistictoresistthesetrendsif wewantedto,butthereshouldbetwoconditions. First,withdrawalshouldbe mu-tual. Wc shouldtakeadvantageof apparentSoviet desiresto rcducctheir forcesandtonegotiatea betterbtdancein Europe,ensuregreaterwarningtime,andestablisha verifica-tionregimethatwouldprovideampleandcle.arwarningof any violationsof thenew regime.Second,wc shouldstruclureour own forces(andcncourageouralliestostructuretheirs)tothat we can respondeffectively to warningunderthenewconditions.Aocordingtosortvcestimates,theamountof warningtimethatwccan expect in Europealreadyhas increasedfromtcntofourtecndaystoatleastthirtydays.[[n the future, warning times may be evengretttcr. I“o ndjustthe U,S,and allied forceposturestothisnewconditionimpliescreatingrcswvL*forcesthatcanbemobilizedwithinthewarningtimeIikcly to beavttiluh!eandcslab-Iishing it mohiliz;tti(mbaw that can be ex-pandedasquicklya~estimatesofwarningtimedcmand. Tttcsesafeguardmeasureswill no;onlypermitusto respond{oum-ning,butwillal~ohclptodctcrrcconstitu[ionof forcesbytheSoviets.

Wc shouldplan to keepforcesandnuclearweaponsinEuropeatreducedIcvclsaslongMthey arc welcome. Wr prc.scnccnot onlycontributesto dc[crrcnccbut also providesreassurancetoalliesandgivesusavoiceinthecmcrging,ch:mgcdEurope.However,wcmust

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be preparedIO miikc chnngcsin our forcedeployments,includingrltrclcitrwcqxms(k-ploymcnts,whenit isclcalthutourpresencei~more 01 d POli!iculIiabiiily thim ir miiitwyusset.Citwly. Prc.\i&nl Bushcwnsidcrctithenew strategicand politictilconditionsin Eu.rtrj~beforethettwent(JulyIWO)NAIU summitin London, where he proposedrdmndoningearlynuclearfirsluseandcidlcdfor theeven.tuaiwithdrawalof nuclearartiliery.

W: wiil needtomaintainpltinsandcapabili-tiestoreturnforces,includingnuclearforces,toEuro~ if thethreatchanges,butit isneitherrcaiislicnor necessaryto planon returningaiargenumberof heavydivisionsrapidly(e.g.,tendivisionsintcn&Js). We will needtowmkout ncw plans, consistentwith prospectivechangesin theU.S. forceposture.in cmjunc-tion with ourailies,

Therewill bea needtomaintainsomegruund,air,andnavaiforcesatahighstateof rcadirwssto dealwith contingenciesouisideof Europe,but thebuik of the forcesneednot beat highIeveisof aiert. Many canbein thereservesornationalguard. liowevcr, thoseforcesthatdoenterconflictin areasoutsideof Europemustincreasinglybe trainedandequippedto dealwith sophisticatedweaponry.

The Rolesof Nuclear Forces

I%enuckarfomeswiil beafkctedbychangedcircumstimccs,Two broadissueswill shapefuturenucicarstrittcgy.Tlc firstiswc hastodowiththeroleof nuclearforces.Therearesomewho wouid narrowthe rok of suchforcesmdeterringnucicarattackon theUnitedStates.abandoningthe conceptof cxtcndcddctcr-rcncc,whichtheytxlicvc isnohmgcrnccdcdor is no hmgercrcdibic.~

The view rcflcctcdin thisrcprmis thatnu-ckar weapons~tiii havean m]porttintroic mpiayindekrringwar,nutjustnucicarwar,cwnif the convcntioniilbaianccis improved. Anumberof factorshaveprcvcntcdamujorwuraffectingtheintcrcslsof thegreatpowersandtheiraliicsformorethanfortyyews,Aithough[111:~1IICfllilyl!(.1 1)} llUclcilr WCilpMISisdt!billUl,

if is itpptircntto mc and many othm [htilnuciciuwc;:pmshavepliI}cdtinimportantrolein detcrrmm ot’ war. and wc should lw verycautioustihmt tdxmhmingthiltroleevenif thethreatnow tippcarsicssimminent, NuclearweaponshuvcUISOplu@ iI role in rcmsuringourai!im of ourLXJIWThlCntto theirdcfcnsc;suchreassurirncccunhelpcurbpressuresforprolifcrali[m. The need for rctiwmmce isparticularlyimportwuwhentheworldfacessomuchuncertaintyimdchimgc.Fimdiy.nuclearweapons,byprovidingasenseof securily,canfacilitatetheproccwofdcvclopingancwsecu-rity reititionshipbctwccnEastandWest. Thisisancwrole,noIyetwcilundcrsmod,butil wiiibeof growingimportance.

A secondissueishowtomaintaindeterrencein new conditions. Deterrenceconsislsofposingpenaltiesand risks to a prospxtivcaggressorsothathcwiii judgetheIJ.seof forceto be unrewarding.Nuclearforcescan~aslamenacingshadow,creatingdoubtsabouttherisksthat would confrontan attttckcr, Thepowibiiity thatnuciearweaponscouldbe in-voked,nomatterhowm*moIc,introducesincid-culablcrisksandthuscorrtributcstodctcmenccof war titany icvcl.

It iscmri;dtobackupthethreatofescalationwith thecapabilityt:)carryit out. Fornuciearweapons10pliIytheirroicindetcrnmccandwartcrmini.ition,wc must be able to prcscnlanadvcrsurywithIhcmxlildc prospectofnuclearescaltitionshouldU.S. tcmitoryor interests,orthoseofour aiiics,bethrcatcncd.Ifthc pennl-ticsml risksthtitwc posearcto hecrcdihle,theremustbesomeprobabi!ity thattheywili kirwokcd, Ilcrcforc. the responsemust bepropofliontiitothciwucsinvolvcrl.lfthcrvarcnooptionsfor foruccmploymtntotherthanamaksivc.generalatttick(m c.ilics.the thrctitbccorncsscifdcwrring,Thus,wchmld ton.tinuctohitt’~~iIvtirictyof nuclcuroption~iit’tiil.irblc 10 rqxmd tn tiggrtssion. rimgingfromveryIimitcdi\lta~k\to Iargc-wwicresponses,

As iongm theSoviclUnionrcluinsnuckarwciqxms,thcwwcufxmswii! rcmuinPiiflolthcdctcmnccpicture.Inourfuturethinkingirhwtpotctltiiil hostilitic~withtheSovietUnion.wcmustfitkcit~cotlntof ~hiltl~ing !+wict \’ICW\

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andconditions. 1havesuggestedabovethat!$ovictviewsofnuclc:wweaponsnrcchanging.The Soviet political leadership appearsto bcappropriatelyawedby theprospecI.of nuclciirwar, This does not make such a conflictinconccivdde,butit doesmeanthaitheSovietsarclikelytoapproachanycrisisthatcouldIetidto u major war with caution,as indeedtheyhavein thepast,

!$loonecanbece~ainwhatdeterstheSovietUnion. Becauseof thisuncertainty,we httvemaintaineda capabilityto attacka varietyoftargetsundera varietyof circumstances,andwe shouldcontinue 10 do so. But if nuclearforcesaresharplyrcduccdinthefuture,wewillnotbeabletocoverasbroadarangeof targets;it will bencccssarytomakechoices,I suggestin See:.ionV thtit in thesecircumstancestheUnitedStatesshouldreducetheprioritygivento counter-nucleartargetingandadopta newcm~hasisontargetingprojectionforces.

With theemergenceof a newconventionalbalanceinEurope,it shouldbepossibktodeteraggression(nowanevenmoreretie possibil-ity)withreducedrelianceonnuclearweapons.1haveno[edidxwcthat[heriskof a surpriseattackisreceding.The emphasisin ourplan-ning shouldbe on a possibleconflict thatfollows mobilizationof Soviet forces. Theobjectiveof ourstrategyunderthisscenarioisto conveyto the Sovietsthe notion[hutpro-ceedingwithmobilizationwouldinvolverisksincommcnsumtewith their objectives. Ourfirstlineof defenset~ouldbcouro~n mobili-zationcapabilities,butif thesefail todeicr,(~if apurely~on~cnlionaldcfcnwprovesinlldc-quate,nuclearweapons\houldbein thebilck-ground.

As longashostilitiesremainontheconven-tionalIevcl,wcwanttheideaof nuclearusetobecrcdiblcbutdistant. Resortingto massiverctaliutionoverincreasedmobilizxi[ionactivitywould be unbelievable;it would also h: anoveficactiononourparto11isimpoflanttogearthe threatwc prcscnrto thesi[ua[iontithwtd.Consequently,employmentof nuclearweap-ons shouldbe a last rcsofi; if they arc cm-ploycd,thereshouldbeplansandcapabilitiesthatwould permitusto swikcschxtivcly. The.se

plnnsshouldfocuson conventionalmilitaryforws (e.g., tucticaluir biistx, nawd bases,troop concentrations, and logistics centers).SuchtargetingshouldalsobedesignedtoIimilcivilitmctisuulticsandothcrcollateraldamage.

The Nth Country Problem

In !ightof theever-growingmembershipinthenucletirclub,theprospectofhostilitieswithsmallerpowersPossessingnuclearandotheradvancedwcaponsmustalsobeconsidered,In[hiscasethe Unit:d Statesshouldbe able topresentanaggressorwiththeriskof losinghisadvancedmiliuwy capability.whether it bechemical,biological,or nuclear. isradi raidsagainstEgypt’s missilefacilitiesduring the1%7 YomKippurwarandagainstImq’sOsimknuciearreactorin !98 1 are examplesof thekinds of tacticsthat the United Statesmayemploy. Nonnuclearmeanscan be usedinthc~e instances,as the lsracli example hasshown.

However,the‘U.S.nuclearposturealsowillbean importantfactor. 11will bedesirtddefortheUnitedStatestoretaina nuclearctipabilhythat is significantlylargerandmoreMI~)ldBli-catcd than thal of any Nth country, Suchsuperioritywili serveto rid the IcuticrshipoftheMh countryof thedelusiontha[{heirnu-ciear mpabiiity wiii act as an equ~iiz.crindcaiingwith the UnitedStates. Strategicde-fcnwscanaiw be importantinconveyingsucha mcs~,~c. The limitednu:nbcrsof missiiesthat an Nth countryis iikeiy to possesswiiimake it cxtrcmciydifficult for [hemto over-whelm even Iimilcd dcfen.sesand launchasuccessfulstrike.

This growing concern with Nth counuymiiitaryarscnaiscouidieadtoadefactofloorundersuperpowerarmsreductions. As Nthcoun(ries developiargcrnuclearcapabilities,thesuperpowerswiii need10considerlimitingreductionsin theirarstmais,therebypossiblydefininghowfarcutscangoin anyfoliow-ontotheStmtcgicArmsReductionTalks(START)agrecmcnl,

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IV. A NUCLEAR FORCE STRUC”WREIN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

What kind of force structure is required tosupporttheextendeddctcmmcc/rciissurancc/enablementrolesdescribedabove’?MiuIy wil!nrgue [hu! the delnils of the nuclear posture—WJtiIIkinds of wcitpons,where !hey are de-ployed.imdhow theymightbeemployed—arcrelativelyunimportantsolongassomenucicarwcitponsexist, I hirvcreferred(o thisview Mthe glob theory: ir more sophisticatedIcrm isexistential detmrcnce. If wc adopt existentialdctcmmce.(hcdetailsof [henuclearposturearerelativelyunimportant.This rcpon proercdsfrom theawumption thatcfctnilstireimportwr[.thtrtnotjustanyglobof nuclearweaponswillmeetthegoalsandrolesdescribednbovc. Asuggcslcdnuclearposture,whichisdesigned10nwinminextendeddeterrence.isdescribedbelow?, Ob\’iously, there itr~ ii number ofpossiblenuclear posturesthatcould beconsis-tcm with !htit goal: 1postulateii specific po:;.turuIwe to lendconcretenesstothediscu:.sion.

I%is postureassumesthat both public iitti-tudcsandarms-controlnegotiationsarcIikclyto result in significamreductionsin nuclearforcesinthenextdecade.Weshouldwelcomercduutiimsii theyrcsuhincqui[tihleandstableoutcomes. As the Icvel of nuclear forces isreduced.theforce}.thatrcmiiin mustmeetveryhighstandardsof survivabilityandsafety.Wcwill no longer be idde to rely us much onnumherstoensuresurvivnbili!yaswehuveinthepaM. Instriitcgicmwts-conlroinegotiationswcshoulductitc!ypIomotcgreaterIirst-strikestability’,nwn\@ moreSUWIViit)lC postures.Ifwcnrckuu~”c$sfulin[his~oi{!.the rcsuhW“i]lbeiincrosi(vlofcounterforccciipabili[icsonbothsides.‘!’hi~will irwviiablyhovetinimpactoncmploymcrrtpoliq, whichwcdiscussfwthcrin the nextsectionof thisreport. In the newthreatenvironmenttherecanalsoh changesinthereadinessof nuclearforcesthwmaypermitsubstantialsirvings.i will discussthisfurtherin connectionwith the postulatedforcepos-ture.

In ttlirrkingabout the future nuclearJbrccPoxture.Ihcrearetwo reasonsfor looking\ev-

crit! dccndesin[o Ihc future. First, nuulcwfuwccshuvclong lead time:;itnd long usefulIivcs. Mimy strategic systcrnshcing phmncdtodiIy urc likely to be in the force posturethree

orevenJ’ourdeciidesfromnow, Second,whilesubstantialreductionsin nuclearforcesseemlikely. for rcwms noted iibovc, it would beneitherprudentnor prticticalto make suchrcduction~inafewyears,If weword10ensurethatfuturuforcepostureswi IIbebidanccdandsttihlc,wcwanttoncgotiiitcthetcnnsofreduc-tioncarefully,andSUC!Inegotiirtionswill taketime.

“J”hcprojcclcdnuclearforceposturesshownin Tahlcs A-1 (swiitegicforceS)andA-hi(thei+tcr nuclearforces)in $hcAppendixcovertheperiodJ995t02005 infive-yeiirimm.ncn[s.Itis assumedthat a START iq:recmcntwiJlbenegotiatedsoonand wiJl take effect around1995, A furtherassumptionis thatbudgetaryconstraintsandpubJicpressuresare JikcJytoforceiidditk)nidremwtions in strategic forcesand thitt suchreductionswouId be desirabJe,providingpolitical rcialionswith the SovietUnioncontinueto improve. In thesecircum-stancesit seemsrcasonabJeto assumethatstrategicnuclearwarheadsWIJJbe rcduccdtoabout5,000 (that is a real 5.(S)0,not STARTcountingrules) in thenext (Iccildc,itndperhaps

to 3$(X1by theyear2005.”TIN fiwccthatisIcftshouldt~ configuredto

rncc!threecriteria: mtiximurnsafetyandsur-viwtbility,improvedcitpiihilitiestoa~ck Sovietgeneralpqow forcesdeployt’dm the field,tmdrcduccdcollatcrirldtuniigc.In addition,thefurccwilJhiwcIOhcdevelopedirndmaintai:ledath]wcrbudgctICVCIS,I“hcrciisonsforseekinglimeswithimprovedcnpabiliticsqyiinstSovietpwjcctiunforceswc dcscrihedinthefoJlowingsectionon cmpJoymcntpolicy.

Living with lowerforceIcvcisdtmandsthatahigherprioriiybephwcdonthesurviviIbi!ityof the rcmtiiningforcesin order to preservetirst-s!rikest;tbility.However,thisforcedoesnothaveto beconfiguredto withsttmda “boltfromthcbJuc’’attack.SuchimiittiickhasncvcrbeenverylikcJy:il islessJikciynow.Giventhechimgingpolit.calrcJationshipandthechimg-ing convcntirmiilhaJiincc(tiscuwcdiibovc,it rs

7

rwwonitbletoassumethatwcwouldhaveamplestrategicwarning. Even if Soviet policiesundergoa sharpreversalin theshortrun,wewill almostce,tainlyhavewarningof that;itwill not happenovernight. In the projectedenvironrntwtit ismomimportantthatthefonxswe havebeableto sustainalert!’orsometimleafterreceivingstrategicwarning,fortherecanbenoguaranteeof tacticalwarning. It alsoisimportantthattheposturepermitresponsestowarningthat would not furtherexacerbateacrisis.

The followingguidelinesaresuggestedforthe nuclearforce posttueand relatedwms-ccmtrolsrdtcgyinthecomingdecade(thefonxlevelsaresummarizedinTable A-l).

Submurine-kuuwhed ballistic missiles(SLBMS)mnainourmoststtrvivablcfou.Thus,in thearms-controlnegotiationsweshouldseektoprotectasmanySLBMSonasmanyboatsaspossibleaswegotolowerlevels. The force psture in Table A-1containssixteenTridentboatsin2(1(10withanequalmixofC-4and D-5 warheads.Tomeet arms-controllimits of 5,(100war-headsand maintaintheseboatswith 24missileseach,thenumberof warheadspermissilewill needto bereducedto 8 in theyear2000 and4-5 in the2005 projection.Giventhatasurpriseattackseemsincreas-ingly unlikely, not as muchof the forceneedstobeatseainday-to-dayalert. Weshouldaimto keepone-thirdof thisforceat sea. This would permit reductionofc:ewstooneperboat,effectingsubstantialsavings.However,mosiof thesubmarineforceshouldbeable~osurgerapidly.

The employmentpolicy that is de-scribedin the next sectionof this reportdoes not dcmand as much hard-targetcapabilityas now is plarined. Thus, wesuggestthatone-halfof the sixteenboatsbeequippwiwiththeD-5 andone-halfwiththeC-4. Over the longerrun it wouldbedesimbleto deployevenloweryieldwat-headsintheSLBM force,betteradaptedtoattackingprojectionforceswithminimumcollateral damage. Another long-tern]

modificationthat would add to stabilitywouldbe thedeploymentof a numberofsmallerballistic-missilesubmarines,per-hapswith as few as six missiles. Whilecurrentbudgetpressuresand the costofsuchaprogramdoesnotmakedeploymentfeasible in the near term, researchanddevelopmentshouldbeconsidertxf~intercontinentalballistic missiles(ICBMS)haveprovenmoredifficulttomakesurviv-ablethanSLBMS,but havesomeuniquecharacteristicsthat wc shouldattempttopreseme. For example, they are moreflexibleiu limitedoptionsthanSLBMS. Itis only realistic,however,to plan for areducedICBM force. Suchaforccshouldbe highly survivablefor a prolongedpe-riodafterbeingalertedratherthanimmunetoa boltfromtheblueattack.BothMidg-etmataandM-X couldbedeployedtomeetthiscriierion. Ideally,thesingle-warheadMidgetmanwouldbetheprefermxlchoice,sincede-MIRVing of ICBMS woulden-hancestability. As suggestedabove,amuchhigherpriorityshouldbeplacedonstuvivability,ascompamdtowuntaforce.The small ICBM, however,will be anexpensiveoption. In the presentbudgetenvironment,costconsiderationsarelikelyto govern,sowe projectthe smallICBMphasinginslowly. h 2000 wehavea mixof M-X and single-warheadmissiles;however,by the year 2005 we showtheICBM force composedsolely of small,single-warheadmissiles.Bombers will remainan imporlantstrate-gicassetif wefocusontargetingprojectionforcesbecausethey have someinherentcapabilitiesagainst impreciselylocatedtargetsthat missilesdo not have,andre-sponsetimesfor thistargetsetaremeas-uredin hours,notminutes.Thissuggeststhe needto retaina substantial,modemhomberforcebeyondtheiife of theB-52.The B-1 programwill be completedin afewyears,andthecostsofthisprogramarelargelysunk. We shouldseekto retainasmanyB-1sas:mrvivepeacetimeattrition.BecausetheB-1 hasimitationsasapene-

8

tratingbomber,theB-2programshouldbecontinuedbut,givenitshighcostandthechangingthreat,a smallernumbershouldbe purchasedandratesof productionre-duced. A forceof fortyB-2 for2000 and2005ispostulated.If wekeepasubstantialbomberforce,bomberbasingneedsto beimprovedbecausebombersmustbeabletogoon ahighstateof alertandsustainit forsometime if thereis a crisis. As notedabove, the warningtime is likely to behoursor evendays,ratherthanminutes;therefore,bombemcouldbe operatedbyreserveforces‘itithsomebudgetsavings.Theater mwlearforces (TNF) havetradi-tionallybeengovernedprimaril;~bypoliti-calconsiderations.Thiswill betmeinthefutureasin thepast.The changingpoliti-cal atmospherein Europe,particularlyin~emmy, alreadyhasleftitsmarkonTNFemployment policy. In May 1990 theNATO Nuclear PlanningGroup (NlY3)statedthat“thereisadiminishingneedfornuclearsystemsof the shoflestrange.’”Politicalconsiderationsalsohavedictatedthe point at which short-rangenuclearweaponswouldbeused,asNATO’s recentadoptionofa’’noearlyfirstuse’’policyandtheproposedwithdrawalof nuclearwtil-lerydemonstrates.

It seemsclearthatU.S. theaternuclearforcesin Europewill be reducedsignifi-~tiy duringthe(mmingdecade.lfgmund-basedsystemsarewithdrawn,theprospectof retaininganyTNF in Europewill dimfurther.Publicantinuclearsentimentsarelikely to grow now that East and WestGermanyareunifiedandSovietforceswillbe leavingEasternEuropeand the CFEagreementwill bringconventionalforcesinto“parity.” However,the shapeof thefutureEuropeansecuritysystemis mostunclearat thisjuncture. UnitedKingdom~“laFrenchnuclearforcesmaywellplayalargerrole, buttheycannotsubstituteforU.S. nuclearforcesin deterringtheSovi-ets, It remainshighlydesirable,therefore,to retain a reducedU.S. theaternuclearposturein Europeaslongasthatispoliti-cally feasiblebecauseTNF continuesto

providean importantlink in thedeterrentchain.Thisfactseemstoberecognized,atleastby NATO defenseministers.A re-centcommuniqueof theF!PGemphasizedthisassumption:“For the foreseeablefu-ture, delemmceof wearwih continuetorequire...anappropriatemixof ...conven-tionalandnuclearforces,’%

The mostlikelycandidatefor~tentionisanair-de~iveredm]ssilewithastand-offcapability.If Getmanyultimatelydeddestoeliminatenuc!earweapmsfromitster-ritory (and this is hy no meanscertain),thesesystemscouJ.dbebasedintheUnitedKingdomandPelhaps~lsewhere.lfpres-suresincreasetoremoveall nuclearweap-ons from Europe,about 1,()()()tiir-deliv-eredweaponsshouldbe retainedin U.S.inventoriesfor redeploymentfor usewithdual-capableaircraft.Submarine-launchedcruisemissilescouldbe very usefulagainstprojectionforcesand in maintainingthe linkage betweenlongcrrangeforcesandtheEuropeanthea.terasTNF deployedinEuropearereduced.For thisreason,and becauseof thegreatdifficul~.yin verifyingthe distinctionbe-tween nuclear and converttionalcruisemissiles,they shouldbe protectedfromarms-controllimitations.However,waysmustbe foundto makethissystemmoreresponsiveto the needsof the theatercommanderif it istoplayanimportantrolein theaterdeterrence..Wrutegicdejense deploymentsshould bedeferred, hut a vigorous resem-h anddevelopment (R&D) program continued.A limiteddefenseagainstballisticmissilesnow appearsto be feasible,and suchadefensecould limit damagefrom smallattacksbytheSovietUnionand/Vthcoun-tries. Such a defensewould be costly.Furthermore,thereis a fundamentalcon-flictbetweenextendeddeterrenceatlowerforceIevelsandstrategicdefenses.Ontheone hand, strategicdefensescan be farmoreeffectiveif strategicoffensiveforcesare reduced. On the otherhand,compa-rableSovietdefenseswill workwellagainslour limited optionsand thuscomplicate

9—. —— .—. .—,.—. . .—

the problem of muking cxtm!ed dcter-rvncecredi, :. !Wtcgic A2fmc &ploy-mentsseem wry unlikely to obttiin politi-cal support in the currentunvironmcnt;therefore,on balancewe woulddeferde-ploymentof activemissiledefenses.Fur-therR&D couldremovemanyuncemiin-tiesabou[costandeffectivenessthatstillpersist.andcouldhelptodetemew Sovielstrutegicprograms.We wou!dcontinueasubstunlialR&D programandprotecttheoptiontoconductnecessarytesting.Thismayrequiremodificationsto theAntibal-lis[i~Missiletreaty. We alsowouldpressfor dcvclopmcctof deployable theaterdefensesthatcoulddealwithNth countrythreats,iindwouldsupportdeploymentofsuchdefensesif theyprovecost-effective.

$/. T~~;N~CJ IN Nu(’’~AR

EMPLOYMENT POLICY

Over the next severalyearsit will be bothnecessaryanddesirabletoreshapenucleartar-getingpolicy. Muchgreateremphasisshouldbegivento largetingSoviclnonnuclearmili-tary forces,particularlythoseforcesthat theSovietUnionemploystoprojectpowerabroad.Changeswill benecessaryforseveralreasons.

First,theoverallU.S. strategicstockpileislikely to declinesubstantiallyas a resultofpublic attitudes towardsnuclearweapons,budget pressures,andarms-controlnegotia-tions. The targetset to be coveredwill notdeclineasrapidly,andthiswill forcea recon-siderationof targetingpriorities. For manyyearsstrategicforceshavebeentargetedagainstfourbroadclassesof targets:counterforce(i.e.,counter-nuclear);leadership(this includescommandcentersandrelatedcommunications);so-calledother military targets(i.e., nonnu-clearforces);andurban-industrialtargels.Overtheyearspri,vitiesfortargetinghavechanged,but in recentyears the first two classesoftargetshavereceivedthehighestpriority,basedon theassumptionthat threatsto dcswoyen-emy nuclearforcesand national Icadcrshiphavea highdctmrcntvalue. Theseprioritic~influcnccwctiponsystemrcquircmc”nl~(f”g.,

increawddemandsfor wxwracy/yieldcombi-ntilionstha[candcsirt)yhiml!argcts).In recentyearstheyhavealsobeenan importantdriverof command,control,communications,andin-tclligcncc(C’1) requiwmcnts(e.g., for rapidtargetacquisitionimd retargeting). As ourstockpileof weaponsdeclines,it will nti bepossible[ocovcriillof thesetargetclasseswiththesameprioritythatwedo Ioday.

Second,sometargetshavebecomeincrewingly difficult to destroy. BecausenuclearforcesimdIeadershiparewctsthiit theSovietsvalue highly. they have taken very effectivemeasurestoproteciIheirforcesandcommandandcontrol. ‘llwirniiiionalcommandauthor-itycandeployrdpidiytoprotectedtiimshehersor mobile facilities, Their strategicforces,mostnotablytherail-mobileSS-24andtheroad-mobileSS-25.arcbecomingincreas-ingly survivable. Our capacityto find thesetargetsis declining and, thus, the threat toseverelydamagethemisbecominglesscred-ibleasa deterrent.While theUnitedStatesisattemptingto compensatefor the defensivemeasuresIhiII theSovietshaveundertaken—forexample,by improvingtheyieldandaccu-racyofourweaponsandthecapacitytoacquirctargetsand retarget rapidly-the measuresrequiredwill beveryexpensive,andinaperiodof increasingbudgetstringency,it lookslikealosingbatdc.

Third, sometargetsthatwe havetraditiort-allycoveredaredecliningin importance.TheSovietshaveextensiveplansto dispersetheirforcesprior to war initiation. Thus. manymilitarybasesthatweretraditionallytargetedinourplanswouldhav~Iiulevalueoncea warbeganbecausethe facilities will have beenv~”atti, (Ontheotherhand,therewill bcmytargetswith continuingmilitary value, andthesearc theoneswe shouldfocuson.) Bc-CWJSCthe Sovietshave maintainedIargcre-servestocksof equipmentin dispersedandprotcc[cdfacilities,attackson war-supportingindustrieswill haveIittlcmilitaryeffecton theoutcomeof a shortwur.

f%unh. the theater nuclear forces. whichhitv~hccnUMXIIrtiditionallyto cwvcrSovietprojeclion l“orccs,will dcclinc bolh in numhrsNKJL“ilpilbllll)’.‘Ilk!lmxkmwaliuf~(d UN’~lltllld.

\“L A% 1LMIsTRA71$’}: NIM:l,EARTARC;KTIW; A%A1.YSIS

$“11.A1)I)1TIO!SAI. WOHK %}:}:1)}:0

.—. —— .-. —.——

I .: — -- .—

APW:NDIX

A l)t%i(”itl~th 03” ‘I”hiti l’ 4ttt;*:’i”]fW-Pt.AM

miwlf. detcnw”s.‘f’twamountttf tht~ CWMS

farpctingis lcw Ihan N pmcmxl in cuncnlsIIA4ffwpiannlng,hul lht~Monc01iihepenal=}~s of rct!uccdform icvclL.particularlypro.rwn A maw 3. Theirnputfof rckcdcrwwIargclmgcanhcminimimdh) usingweaponswith high~ingito-shotkill prohabiihcsandhyimprovctf(“’i [hat coultJ[rack vvcu~ 40wgcts d pcrmilreplacingonl) [how wcapOIJ~whichwc knowfai9{Orem-htheirtargets.

It isMsumedthat:dlgrmmd.bauxlTNFhavehccnrcmovcdfr(m Eurnpcby lhc year2MNI.Al~dciiwrcd wenpomremainin200Wbulwctlimmatedby 2[MJ5.l.ivcn if wow tiirdeliv.crcdnuclearciqxihiiil)rcmainmiinIlk.!hcalcr,ii wouidnolhcpmdcnltocoumonIhcwviva-hili~yo[manyot rhcha.sesandIhenircraftffnmw)nch hew wcuponswould he dciivewd.Suhnuuinc~immchcdcrui.scmiksiks aiu~ rc-main, hut VVChave assumed[hat Ihcit rolewouldbem thesccurcrcwvc force. Thus.incases2ml 3 {We isprovisionfrwacqwhiiilyIorActive cmpioymcnlintheNralcgiuforcmso thtit they can, in cffcc[, cxccufcscicctivcwployment pitm.

h di wcs 200”250 leadershipMtgcisMCcovered. fivcn [hnughii is very difficui[ m[argcihe nutitmtdktutmhip with highmnfi.tknccof succcssundcvcnthoughwcptohahiyvhuuidnotWIUCLihosciargciswhik ihctcisachanceto ncgo~iatc,1hclievcihcy ~huuldhecovcrcdhecuuvethethrcalto destroyleader.+iphmu veryhighdctcrrcntvaiue. In iightofrcccmchangesin the S(wlet polilicuisystcmwc nccliIU rccomitkr what icwhmhip IurgcIsshuui~ receive priority (i.e., party or adminis.

tralive Icudcrship).In ail caves5M!”6Wurhan”industritiitargets

arc covcrcd, “Ihc thrcutto urhamindustriailurgcl~ rcprcveo[~lhc uitimutc dclcrrcnt.Ilovvcvcr.cmployingihi~ttirca[wouitialmoslcertainlyhringcompmhlc rctuiia[ionon theIJnilcd SMICS. f;or thi~ rctiwm I trcal [he

1

15

(:aM”J Caw 2

‘lh.;tsstl[s~ptit~llktlt) whi~h~i~~ I ish~wlurcgi}cn hclow.

1. A STARI II ayccnwta[has rcduuxl [hcslriilcgik. ffmm on lwlh wks W 5,(WM)i4clu’d

v wurhcwf~.“f%ct. .S, forceis wcighlcd10MN.

)

basing IWSCTnhk A-l}. The %wic! force iswcighlcd towmh rnot)ilclmxl.ha.sc(~missiles.W“hIlc Ihc fnrccsIIiffcr,hmhnrchighlysurviv-

e

/

able.2. TIwrcurciwt~w.cnwios.In httihsccnur-

ios. ](1pcrcclllo(thc invcnloq isussignctJIoa$ suwrcrcscrtcfor~;c.T?Mlfor~cisnolspcciho

cti]ly li4rgclcd. The first .sccnarioassumc~oini[iiduw hy Ihc linilcd Stmcs.The n!facknfi4hou!3.2(NIwcnponsconccnlruleson Soviclslratcgicforcesandlcwhmhip,butsomegcn.cridpurposeform alsowc ttirgc[cd.AhouIl,30fJ wcqxms nrc withcld for rc!ialia[orystrikes,primitrilyngains[urkm-induslriultar.gets.gcncridpurposeforces,undmobilestrm[cgic ~iwccsihn[ cwmot hc idcntific~ on~ Itw-gctwl in o firslslrilw,

3, In {hcrcfaliti[ion ~.cntirio fhc focusstill ison fnrgcling !$ovic[nuclear forces,M fewerf[vccscnnk tiwgc[cdbccuuwIhc IJni[cdS[afcshasfewerwcitponssurviving.Furhmlorc. iiis~wumc~ thu[the Sovic[s will have lwmchc~theirmoslvulncrublcforcesin thefirststrike,Icttvingfewercountcr”nuclcw[argcts, In theinilial retaliation[hereisnwithhold nnurban=industrialwrgcgsnndnu[ionulIctdcrship,tmdon some ilir dcfcnscstiwociutcdwith the.scliirgtl~, Also, Ihcrc is u withholdon someNcllcrillpUfp4NCfofcc li4rgclslhi41urcno! di.rccll) Invdwd in Ihccurrcn[opm[inn.

4, W~it~~I~~ilrcitll[~~tt~(j~(}lhillthc~[rutcgicf4wcclitrgcls rcccivcpriority, IInwcvcroIhcrcisIcwunnsIiwgdng hm therewouldh* [dayhccwu.scoftheIimitcdinvcn[ory.For[hcwncrcmnn, fewer Inrgctsarc covcrcd.bul ilitl$()h nmumcdf!titfthe nurnhsrof SovietWulcgic forceshilShccn rcduccdin 44ucord

1. The upproachin cit.. 2 isqui[cdiffcrrnlfrom[htil in cimc1. We hcginwilh m ini[ialinventoryof 5,(HN;weapons.hulin[hisciisc2(Jpcrccntis 44110calcdto a4securercwvc f4wcc.Wc awumcthatthemanyuncertaintiesin theslmlcgicsiluulion.includingdlc prcscnccofmany mobile Iargc[sand [hc cxistcnccof anumtwrof smnll nuclctwpowers,diclalcsaIargcrrcscrvcforce. Ftmhwmorc.themrgct”ingprioriks arcchangedw placemuchgrw,crcmphusisonprojcc[iunforces,This isacc~mvplishcdbyMocalingwcapwwmaIargcrrnrnbcrof convcnlionulforceIwgcIsandrcducir~g[h:numhcrof nuclcwf4wccti4rgcls.SIill, severalhundrednuclearforceturgctsarccovcrcd,hutfurfewerthimincase1.

2. In hc first .vccnariothe Uni[cd StatesinitiulcsIimi[cdstrikesagainstSovietgeneralpurposeforces. Initial strikesarc intendedtorcsMrcdclcrrcrwcbychangingIhccalculationsof hc itmtckcr,no!toocfcat[hcoltackas such.However,thisrequires[hatdw amtc’kshaveadramaticmili[ary impacl,Ihusdcmonstmtinghotha capabilityandresolve[o .scvcrclydis-ruptk attacker’sswntcgy.At thesametimewcwantmdcmnnswwcrcswainlinIhcscinitialul[acksand 10Icavca grcaldad still M risk.Thus, inititil strikesarc iimitcd to the mostthrcu[cningground,air, ml navalforces,

3, The inilial alluckisdircc[cdal a Iimitcdnumhcrof facticalairhmcsnuvalhwcsogroumlforce targcls,tmd logisticshascsund chokepointsIhatsupporlthemost[hrcti[cningthruslor[hms~s.Thepmci.scfmcs tohcatxkcd and[hc SUU!Cof the imackwould dependon Ihcsc”cniirio,A kcyqucs[ioniswhc[hcr!oplantottt[it~kgroundforcesin [hcfichf[hatarcdiffi-cuh [o turgc{und thus urc nol irwludcdinlc4day*~phms, I hclicvcan cffoti shouldbcmmlc10tfcvclopcupabililics10ttirgctmaneu-ver unitsin [hc ficlt!, bul even if thisprovesimpmihlc therearcnnumhcrof fixedIargcls

16

that can bc umwkcd with k olycctivc of*vcrely impw.linglhc ohjcclivcs of Soviclprojc&lion~brcc30

4, Anolht!r i$stle is whchcr initial strikeswould Ix in ttrcSoviet Union w in the areawhereSoviet(orccsoretdlacking.Wc ciinnoi

bc sure what wouhl hc required by a given.sccrwio. Thus, wc shouldhave planswithsufficicrufle (ibjtityfopcrmi[cilhcrwithholdsor usc on friendly icrrimry nnd on SovietIcnifory,

S.Theremeprovisionsforafc~low.onswikcin Ihissccntio [hatcoukfirwludcboWrestrikeson {ni[ial mrgc(sor srrikcson ncw mrgcts.Subsmmi:dforcesarc withhclo for intrawardcwrrencr. Theseshouldbc Ik mcn[surviv-ahh: forcts, namely Ihc submariocs. Thus.lxwhxs ~mfICBMSarc usedintheinitialandfollow-or,swikcs.

6. The wcond.sccnarioisa rc[tdiationcmc.h !hisca ic wc awumcthatthe,Sovic[slauncha counlcr!orce strike againsl our Iand+asctf

nuclear forces, which Ictwcs us wilh 3,650slratcgicwcvpons. In rclalialionwc attackabroadrange of mrgcts, but wiihhold againsturkm”induswinl targcls, national commandandcontrol. nnd some general purposeforcesthal arc no! rclcvtmi119Ihccurrcnlscenario.

(kc 3

In cau 3 Ihc i~,ttid invcmoryis3.(KX)weap-onsofwhicb IS pcrccntisplacedinas~ralcgicrcscrvc.Thefocusin targcling isonprojectionforcesand Icadcrship,hul the Iisl covcrcdissubs[im;iallyICM lhan in the first two casesbccauscIhc invcnloryof uvailablcwcapomisrcduccd.In hc rctaliamrycaw wcamfond lorcducc[hcsccurcrcscrvcforceto 10pcrccnttoublain even minimal Iargclcovcrugc,and ahighpcrccntagcof k survivingweaponsarcallocatedtocountcmalucInrgcls.

17

TabtoA-L Pro@tad ?luckmrForw PosWraa: 199$2005Stralagk F~

mlWnGhm8WhMia LalmGbMWrbQMk LWfklM5~

MmuternanIIMinulemanWPeacekeaper(M-X)Mdgalman

Subtotal

..

40050

. .

1200

..

20050

100350

..

200

100

900

. . ......

300300

..

99070a172s

..

300300

..

450

..

1700

PosaidonC3K4TridentC4Tridant05

subtotal

9619212040s

7681536

..

1921923s4

..

1921923s4

..

134415302990

694TotalMts@ks 85s 7.34

B.52(Ml (Non.ALCM)B.52G(ALCM)B-S2H(ALCM)B*1BB.2

Subtotat,bombafs

.. .. . .....

9040

130

..

..

..

.. ......

Soo

1000

. ...

939710

200

..

19601940100

3900

..

6040

1004001300

1059 964 7s4TOTAL. StralagicForom

Tabk A-&. Projaotad Nudoaf ForoaPoaturaa: 199S-2005‘fhOaW NuclaarFo-

lautmmYY8dlWs launtam~ LauDGbmMd3QadsEurope

INFJ/Wiles o 0. ..Lance/Follow-On!0 La- 0 0 ..

Artillery 500 0 ..

Aircraft/GravitySombs !Ooo 500 0Short”RangeAttack

Missllesll’actical o 0 0MaritimeAircratUWeapons IOoo 200 200TomahawkLandAttack

IMissileslNuclearSubtotal Ilm 600

OtherThanEuropeLance 35 0 0Artilhy 750 500, 0Aircraft/Gravi!ySomba low 750 mShort-RangeAttack

Misslle#lactkal o 0 0MaritimeAmxaWVVeqmns 1500 500 200TomahawkLandAt@ok

MissilesfNuclear 3s0 350 350Sublolai 2100 1050

TOTALlhealer NuclearFcwces 6535 1s50

—.

19

Tabb A-IL Caaa1 -Targatlng 5,000 Stratagk Wmhaads- Countetlorca Emphasis

InitialUseReserveForceOf10%= 50~Satanoato target: 4,500

Target: Total Weapon TotalTarget Atkcation Weaponssat Ratio Allocated

TactkatAirBasasNaval-SC3rOUndforce TargetsLinesd ~ommunkationStrategicMissilesStrategicSombarBasesStrategktimmand-ControlNuckarSupportLeaderahlPAhandMiask?DafenseIndustry

Total

11015

25025075035020035025085

318Q

1.21,21.21.22.01,21.21.21,51.21.2

13218

330

150042024042037578

720

4503

Weam nsEmdowcl

Initial New

S!rike lleatrlke Targets.— —

110 ~~15

250250

12504m22!5400250600

3210

Retaliation:SufvivimWwpons 3,650Reserveforce of 10Yo = 365SalancetoTarget:3,285

Total Weapon TotalTarget AllocationWeapons RetaliatorySal Ratio Allocatad Strike Withhold——— —

TacticalAirBasesNavalBasesGroundForoaTargetsLinesof CommunkationStrategicMissHasStratagicSomberSaaeaStrategkCommar@ControlNucJearSupportLeadershipAirandMissileDefenseIndustry

100 1.215 1.2

125 1.2125 1.2450 2.0300 1.2200 1.2250 1.2250 1.580 1,2

500 1.2

120 9018 15

160 120150 120800900360360240 240300300375 25072 60

800 0

303

30300000

1?512

600

223

5060

250201520

I@18

720

1283

Total 2375 3285 2455 830

20

7abf.gA411.WO 2- T8rg6tlng 5,000 Stmtegk Wmiteack - Emphasison PrO~lOn Fofam

InitialUaeResave Forceof 20%= 1,000Batanceto Target: 4,000

Target:

TacticalAhBasesNavalBasesGroundForceTargetsLinesof CommunkationStrategicMissllasStrategicBomberBasesStrategkCommand-ControlNuclearSupportLeadershipAirandMissileDefenseIndustry

Totaf

Retaliation:Wvivlng Weapons3,650ReserveForceof 20%= 730Balanceto Target: 2,920

TacticalAir9asesNavalBasesGroundForceTargetsLinesof CommunkationStrategicMissilesStrategicBomber13a9esStrategicCommand-ControlNucJearSupportLeadershipAir andMissilehfenseIndustry

Total

Weapons EmployedTotal Weapon TotalTarget Atkcation Weapms Initial Newset Ratio Alkcattxl Strike Restrike Targets— —. .

250 1.225 1.2

550 1.2553 1.2lm 2.0200 1.2150 1.2350 1.2250 2.065 1.2

m 1.2

300 12 1235 2 2

660 12 12660 12 12200 -“ -.240 ““ -“160 -“ -“420 -. .-500 “- --65 10 10

720 .- ““

122

2424..... .

10

40004646 72

TotatTargetset

15016

35035010020010030025050

500

Weapon TctalAlkcatkn Weapons Rata!,,twy

Allocated Sffi‘.%— — . ...

1.2 160 tto1,2 20 :51.2 420 3(01.2 420 *O1,5 150 1501.2 240 2421,2 120 12J1.2 360 :.A1.4 350 2501.2 60 601.2 600 0

am 2045

Withhokt

505

60600000

1000

600

875

Wtflhdd

26429

61261220024016042050055

720

,. #

21

labia A-IV. Caaa 3- Targatlng3,000 StraWglcWatlmads

InitialUseReserveForceof 15%=45UBalarxato Targel: 2,S00

Target:

TacticalAirBasesNavalBasesGroundFor- TargetsLinesofCommunicationStrategicMissilesStrategicBomberBasesStrategicCommano”ControlNuclearSupportLeadershipAhandMissileDefenseIndustry

Total

RetaliatoryS!rlke:SuArivingWeapons2,250ResetveForceof 1WO=225BalanoetoTarget:2,025

TotalTargetset

15015

400400

00

5020025060

2125’

Weapon TotalAllocationWeapons

Ratio Allocated—.

1.2 1601.2 161,2 4801.21,2 01.2 01.2 601.2 2401.21.2 721.2 720

1! 2548

Total Weapon TotalTarget AllocationWeaponsset Ratio Allocated

TacticalAirBasesNavalBasesGroundForceTargetsLinesof CommunicationStrategicMissilesStrategicBomberBasesStrategicCommand-ControlNuclearSupportLeadershipAirandMkdfe DefenseIndustry

Total

150 1.2 16015 1.2 18

300 1.2 360300 1.2

0 .. 00 .. 0

24 1.2 28160 1.2 192200 1.2 24040 1.2 48

500 1.2

1689 2026

WeaDonsEmdoved

Initial NewStrike Restrike Targets——

12 12 122 2 2

12 12 2412 12 24.. .. . ... .. . ... .. .... .. .... .. -.

10 10 1P.. .. ..

4646 72

RetaliatoryStrike

16515

340340

..

..

28192160400

1300

Withhold.—

153

20200000

608

600

726

14410

432432

00

6024030042

720