recent developments in the slovak pension...
TRANSCRIPT
Recent developments in the Slovak pension system
Peter PenzesWorld Bank International Insurance Symposium
15 – 16 October 2012
Overview
1. General characteristics of the Slovak pension system
2. Major changes in the design3. Underlying reasons4. Challenges and lessons
2
Slovak pension system
1st pillarsince 1907
coverage: 100%
public PAYG
mandatory
DB
Social Insurance Agency
Supervision: Ministry of Labour
Repl.rate: 45% average salary
2nd pillar(1st pillar bis)
since 2005
coverage: 62%
Private, individual accounts
voluntary
DC
Private managers
Supervision: NBS
Supervision: NBS
3rd pillarsince 1996
coverage: 35%
Private, individual accounts
voluntary
DC
Private managers
Supervision: NBS
Supervision: NBS
3
Pension reform in the CEE region
4
Hungary 1998
Poland 1999
Latvia 2001
Estonia 2002
Lithuania 2004
Slovakia 2005
Romania 2007
Overview
1. General characteristics of the Slovak pensionsystem
2. Major changes in the design3. Underlying reasons4. Challenges and lessons
5
Fees in 20051. administration fee (for Social Insurance Agency, central collection
system) 0,5%
2. entry fee (for PAMC) 1%
3. management fee (for PAMC) 0,78% p.a. NAV
6
7
Changes in feesMajor fee alterations
as of July 2009 /April 2012
Success fee (2009)- calculated every month (about 5,6% of average return)+ deduction of other expenses (costs of transactions, taxes, etc.) from pension
funds assets
Management fee (2012)- decreased from 0,78% p.a. to 0,3% p.a. of NAV-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Reasons2009 – positive incentive - reward good performance (tool: success fee)2012 – expensive system with low performance
Portfolios2005 – 31/3/2012 conservative pension fund (no equity)balanced pension fund (max. 50% of equity)growth pension fund (max. 80% of equity)
1/4/2012added index fund – passively managed
Since 1/9/2012Bonds fundShares fundOther funds designed by providers
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2005: Guarantees• Internal benchmarks (relative
guarantee): comparison of yields of the same type portfolios with an obligation of the management company to pay money to the fund fromits own pockets
• Market response• Herding• Low-risk portfolios
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-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
conservative balanced growth
Structure of portfolios (as of March 2008 )
bank deposits bonds+T-bills shares other assets liabilities
Reg. limits 0% 50% 70%
Reality 0% 14% 20%
10
2009: changes of the guaranteesExternal benchmarks:a) conservative portfolio
Average yield to remain stable over 6 months period Underperfomance: Management company to transfer money
from its own pockets to the pension fund Sanctions
b) balanced and growth portfolio The asset structure to match the benchmark compiled by
management companies and disclosed in prospectus No sanctions
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Structure of assets in retirement pension savings (2009)
0
200
400
600
800
1 000
1 200
1 400
1 600
31.12
.2008
31.1.
2009
28.2.
2009
31.3.
2009
30.4.
2009
31.5.
2009
30.6.
2009
31.7.
2009
31.8.
2009
30.9.
2009
31.10
.2009
30.11
.2009
31.12
.2009
mil. o
f €
bank accounts bonds treasury bills shares other
2009 guarantees – market response
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2009 Guarantees - Market response
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
conservative balanced growth
Structure of portfolios (as of June 2011 )
bank deposits bonds treasury bills
shares other assets liabilities
• Market response
• Sale of shares
• Duration of portfolio<1 y
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2012: further changes of theguarantees
• Guarentees to remain only in bonds portfolios• Comparing the average yields over the 5 years period• Underporformance: Management company to transfer
money from its own pockets to the pension fund
Contribution rate1/1/2005 – 31/8/2012 - 9%
Since 31/8/2012• Mandatory contribution rate 4%• Voluntary add-on contribution 2%• Since 2017 onward yearly increase of 0,25 pp until 6% (2024)
Country perspectiveEstonia - 2% -> 0% (2009,2010) -> 2% (2011) -> 4% (2012)Latvia - 8% -> 2%(2009)Lithuania - 5.5% -> 2%(2009)Poland 7.3% -> 2.3% (2011)Hungary – nationalisation (2010-2011)Romania – 2% - 6% (2016) frozen in 2009 at 2%
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Entry&ExitOpt-in and opt-out window (01/09/2012 – 31/1/2013)Opt- in for first time labour market entrants (until 35 years of age)
Previous arrangements• Automatic enrollment for the first time labour market entrants
1/1/2005 – 15/11/2008 1/4/2012 – 31/08/2012
• Opt- in for the first time labour market entrants (6 months) 16/11/2008 – 31/3/2012
• Opt-in 1/1/2005 – 30/6/2006 1/1/2008 – 30/6/2008 (23 000 entered) 15/11/2008 – 30/6/2009 (14 500 entered)
• Opt-out 1/1/2008 – 30/6/2008 (106 000 exited) 15/11/2008 – 30/6/2009 (66 000 exited)
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Overview
1. General characteristics of the Slovak pensionsystem
2. Major changes in the design3. Underlying reasons4. Challenges and lessons
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Reasons: First pillar financing gap
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Source: Égert, B. (2012), “The Impact of Changes in Second Pension Pillars on Public Finances in Central and EasternEurope”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 942, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k9fltdtxbr6-en
Reasons: Underestimations
• Expected No of 2nd pillar entrants: around800.000
• Real No of 2nd pillar entrants: 1,5 mil.
• No upper age limit for entry
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Reasons: Adverse macroeconomicdevelopment
• Conditions for entryand stay in theeurozone:– General government
debt < 60% GDP– Budget deficit < 3%
• Fiscal Stability Treaty– Budget deficit < 3%
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0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Real GDP growth rate Budget deficit
General government gross debt
Reasons: Poor performance of 2nd pillar funds
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-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
01/01/2006
01/07/2006
01/01/2007
01/07/2007
01/01/2008
01/07/2008
01/01/2009
01/07/2009
01/01/2010
01/07/2010
01/01/2011
01/07/2011
01/01/2012
Growth Balanced Conservative Inflation
Growth funds 1,21 % p.a
Balanced funds 1,52 % p.a
Conservative funds 2,60 % p.a.
Inflation 2,8 % p.a.
Overview
1. General characteristics of the Slovak pensionsystem
2. Major changes in the design3. Underlying reasons4. Challenges and lessons
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Challenges in the design
• Low returns • Financing gaps in public pension pillar (pressure
on fiscal deficits) – fiscal affordability needed in the short run
• Huge inception costs (agents)• No economy of scale (dedicated pension
managers too costly)• Public and political consensus needed• Not immune from political influence
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Lessons
Not easy to completely reverse the reform• Bilateral investment treaties (protection of
foreign pension providers)• Ownership rights of savers• Endowment
Further alternatives for pension saving
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Thank you for your attention
Peter PenzesSenior Regulatory ExpertSecurities Market and Pension Savings Regulation SectionNational Bank of Slovakia
t: +421 2 5787 3374e: [email protected]