realities of u.s. military doctrine development during the iraq war · 2020. 12. 9. · hidetoshi...

Hidetoshi Shinohara

110

Realities of U.S. Military Doctrine Development

During the Iraq War

－FM 3-24 COIN (2006)・AFDD 2-3 IW (2007)－

Hidetoshi Shinohara

Introduction

The U.S. forces that intervened in Iraq in 2003 were struggling to stabilize the

country after bringing down the regime of President Saddam Hussein. Under

these circumstances, the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps decided to revise an

operational doctrine. That doctrine was the Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps

Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency‖ (herein after referred to as

―FM 3-24 (2006)‖), issued in December 2006. Counterinsurgency is defined as

―military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken

by a government to defeat insurgency…aimed at the overthrow of a constituted

government through the use of subversion,‖ and is sometimes called ―COIN‖ for

short.1 In the United States where calls were growing for a change in strategy

amid the rough going in Iraq, the issuance of FM 3-24 (2006) grabbed much

attention with wide coverage in media. A month later, President George W. Bush

announced the dispatching of an additional 20,000 American troops to Iraq and a

shift to the strategy that focused on counterinsurgency.

Meanwhile, in August 2008, eight months after the issuance of FM 3-24

(2006), the U.S. Air Force issued the Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3 Irregular

Warfare (hereinafter referred to as ―AFDD 2-3 (2007).‖ Irregular warfare is

Realities of U.S. Doctrine Development during the Iraq War

111

defined as ―a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and

influence over the relevant populations,‖ and is sometimes called ―IW‖ for short2.

Counterinsurgency is regarded as one of operations in irregular warfare. FM 3-24

(2006) lied behind the development of AFDD 2-3 (2007). The U.S. Air Force set

out to formulate its own doctrine as it thought that the description of the use of air

power in counterinsurgency in FM 3-24 (2006) is not sufficient. The U.S. Air

Force developed and issued AFDD 2-3 (2007) only half a year after it

commenced the work on the doctrine.

Why did the U.S. Air Force choose to develop a doctrine for irregular

warfare rather than for counterinsurgency as did the U.S. Army and the Marine

Corps? This paper attempts to find the answer to this question by making a

comparative analysis of the backgrounds, the processes, the details of the

discussions that took place, and the doctrines as the ultimate products. And this

paper then sheds light on the actual conditions of how the armed forces of the

United States, an advance nation in terms of military doctrines, are developing

and making use of them. By examining these things, this paper can hopefully

provide a catalyst to ponder on how the military doctrine should be formulated.

1. The Iraq War for the United States

The U.S. administration of President George W. Bush, suspecting that Iraq has

weapons of mass destruction, formed the Coalition of the Willing with countries

going along with the United States, and launched a military intervention in Iraq,

the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), on March 19, 2003. Its objectives were to

drive the Saddam Hussein regime out of Iraq and establish a stable democratic

state under a new elected government. The multinational forces with the

overwhelming military power made inroads into the central part of the Iraqi

capital of Baghdad on April 9, 21 days after the opening of hostilities, and on

May 1, aboard the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, which had been

deployed to the Persian Gulf, President Bush declared the end of major combat

Hidetoshi Shinohara

112

operations in Iraq in his ―Mission Accomplished‖ speech. However, the United

States was forced to struggle in its subsequent endeavor to rebuild Iraq.

In proceeding with the work to reconstruct and stabilize Iraq following the

declaration of the end of combat operations, then Secretary of Defense Donald H.

Rumsfeld had in mind the intervention by the U.S. forces under the Afghanistan

formula. His intention was to withdraw the U.S. troops sent to Iraq within a short

period of time by deploying the special operations forces on the minimum

required scale in Iraq under cover of air power, promptly fostering the Iraqi

government and the Iraqi security forces and turning over the power to them.

Actually, however, things did not work out that way. Over time, the number of

casualties increased not only among Iraqi people but also American soldiers sent

to Iraq. Casualties increased year after year among both Iraqis and American

soldiers dispatch and in 2006, the number of casualties more than doubled from

the level in the initial phase of the U.S. intervention in Iraq3. With the sectarian

conflict between Shiites and Sunnis also beginning to become conspicuous,

concerns mounted that Iraq might slip into a civil war if the situation was

allowed to go on.

The deterioration of the situation reinforced public opinion in the United

States calling for a review of the intervention strategy, including an early

withdrawal of American soldiers, compelling the Bush administration to review

its strategy. Under these circumstances, the change in the administration‘s

strategy by President Bush is said to have been influenced by then Lt. Gen.

David H. Petraeus who played a predominant role in the formulation of FM 3-24

(2006) and retired Army Gen. Jack M. Keane who personally recommended

Petraeus to President Bush. Attributing the deterioration in the Iraqi situation to

the insurgency against the new Iraqi government and the Coalition of the Willing

in Iraq supporting it (hereinafter referred to as the ―Multinational Force-Iraq‖),

the Bush administration announced the shift in its strategy to COIN to quell it.

2. Revision of the Field Manual


113

The Combined Arms Center (CAC) commanded by Petraeus, who is said to

have influenced President Bush‘s strategy review, is the unit that draws up the

Army‘s doctrines, and issued FM 3-24 (2006) in December 2006, a month

before President Bush indicated the change in the strategy. The announcement of

FM 3-24 (2006) drew keen interest in the United States where voices calling

for the change in the strategy were growing strong and was widely covered by

media. The background leading to the issuance of the doctrine, the characters of

team members involved in the doctrine‘s revision and details of the revision are

described below.

(1) The Background to the Revision

The doctrine concerning counterinsurgency was revised as FM 3-24 (2006) for

the first time in 20 years by the Army, and in 25 years by the Marine Corps.

Under the John F. Kennedy administration just before the intensification of the

Vietnam War, there was the period when interest in counterinsurgency

heightened and the doctrine for it was developed, but it was repealed in the

mid-1970s. Counterinsurgency came under the spotlight again in the 1980s due

to the spread of conflict in Nicaragua, El Salvador and other countries Central

and South America. After the Special Operations Command was created in 1987,

however, interest in counterinsurgency waned again in regular operating forces.

In 2003, when the United States launched the OIF, the reference to

counterinsurgency was made only in just one page in the operations doctrine,

FM 3-0 Operations, saying that the bare minimum support should be provided to

allow a recipient country to solve its problems on its own4.

Amid the deterioration of the domestic situation in Iraq with insurgency

increasingly taking on serious proportions, moves began to emerge to proceed

with the review of the strategy within the Department of Defense. In November

2005, the Defense Department Directive 3000.055 was issued to seek efforts

toward the review, including the doctrine, organization and training, for the

stabilization operations. Then in February 2006, the Quadrennial Defense

Hidetoshi Shinohara

114

Review (QDR)6 that emphasized irregular warfare was announced. Petraeus,

who became commandant of the CAC in October 2005 after completing his

duties in Iraq twice, proactively followed up on these move. Petraeus regarded

the assumption of the post of CAC commandant as an opportunity, because at

the time, Petraeus was already told to take the post of commander of the

Multinational Force-Iraq as successor to Gen. George W. Casey and before

assuming that post, he wanted to reform the U.S. Army into a military force that

could handle irregular warfare and counterinsurgency. The CAC commandant

doubles as vice commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,

which controls all combat schools, the National Training Center and the Joint

Readiness Training Center that provide simulation and live-ammunition training

to soldiers before they are sent overseas, the Battle Command Training Program

where troops make final preparations just before their dispatch overseas, and the

Center for Army Lessons Learned where history researchers in the military

analyze all combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan7. The CAC and all these

organizations constitute the organizational framework that can form the feedback

loop capable of educating and training soldiers on the doctrines developed by the

CAC and evaluating the results in actual combats for improvements, and was

called ―An Engine of Change‖ in the U.S. Army8 Petraeus thought that the

formulation of the new counterinsurgency doctrine by the CAC was the best way

to reform the U.S. Army as an organization that can respond to irregular warfare

and counterinsurgency. And after the revision of the counterinsurgency doctrine,

Petraeus actually became commander of the Multinational Force-Iraq to replace

Gen. Casey and assumed command of the counterinsurgency operations in Iraq

by leading the troops that learned the new doctrine and received training in

accordance with it.

Meanwhile, the work to develop the counterinsurgency doctrine by Petraeus

got under way in February 2014. CAC commandant Lt. Gen. William Scott,

Petraeus‘s predecessor, saw differences between training undertaken at the Battle


115

Command Training Program and operations actually conducted in Iraq as

problematic and ordered the doctrine division to develop a new

counterinsurgency doctrine within six months9. The development work was led

by a lieutenant colonel in the doctrine division, but he had never been sent to Iraq

or learned about counterinsurgency10

. This doctrine was developed before the

deadline and issued as an interim doctrine (FMI 3-07.2211

) in October 2004, but

its contents were far from satisfactory. New CAC commandant Petraeus,

recognizing the need to call together extensively experienced and

highly-educated officers for the work to revise the new doctrine, leveraged his

network of contracts to organize the counterinsurgency doctrine revision team.

(2) The Counterinsurgency Doctrine Revision Team

The counterinsurgency doctrine revision team comprised over 10 principal

authors and support authors. The principal authors included researchers in the

U.S. Army as well as the Marine Corps and U.S. universities. Among them were

several officers with doctoral degrees called ―Warrior Scholar‖12

, including

Petraeus. The participation of the Marine Corps in the revision team was realized

with approval of Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis13

, who commanded the First Marine

Division in Iraq during the same period as Petraeus and later assumed the post of

commandant of the USMC Combat Development Command that develops

doctrines for the Marine Corps. As commander of the First Marine Division,

Mattis carried out operations fitted for counterinsurgency and succeeded in

separating residents from insurgents. This case example was introduced in FM

3-24 (2006) as a case of success14

. Going along with Petraeus, Mattis sent the

best people in the Marine Corps to the revision team and he also proactively

provided advance to contribute to the formulation of FM 3-24 (2006).

In order to assemble broad-based knowledge, the revision team created a

multitude of opportunities to hear opinions of people from a wide range of fields.

The team heard opinions of not only Army soldiers who experienced fighting in

Iraq and/or Afghanistan and senior officers but also doctrine authors in the

Hidetoshi Shinohara

116

British Army as well as officials of government agencies, such as the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA), the U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID) and the Department of State, and prominent think tanks, media and

human rights groups and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

There were several key persons in the revision team who led and guided the

work. The first of them was CAC commandant Petraeus who exercised control

over the revision team. He reflected his knowledge and thoughts about

counterinsurgency in the major points of the revision work. Petraeus who

graduated from the Military Academy at West Point immediately after the

withdrawal of the U.S. forces from the Vietnam War took strong interest in

counterinsurgency from around this time, which eventually became his lifework.

In his doctoral dissertation at Princeton University in 1987, Petraeus studied

lessons for the U.S. forces learned from the Vietnam War and discussed the need

for the U.S. forces in the post-Vietnam War to prepare for counterinsurgency15

.

In the Iraq War, he occupied Mosul in northern Iraq as commander of the 101st

Airborne Division, drawing attention as a case of success of governance based

on the counterinsurgency principles. Petraeus advocated the need to introduce the

counterinsurgency principles since before the intervention in Iraq and he

practiced them per se as commander. Soon after assuming the post of CAC

commandant, Petraeus wrote ―Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from

Soldiering in Iraq16

‖ on the basis of his commanding experience in Mosul, and

this became the guideline for the revision team. This guideline was ultimately

incorporated in Chapter 1 of FM 3-24 (2006).

Another key person who provided leadership to the revision team was

Conrad C. Crane, who played a coordinating role in the revision team. Crane was

seminar historian at the Army War College, and was involved in the

reconstruction plan for Iraq after the collapse of the Hussein regime17

. Crane,

a retired veteran, knew Petraeus very well as they were in the same class at

the Amy War College, and was highly trusted by Prof. Eliot Cohen, who had


117

a significant influence over the revision of the counterinsurgency doctrine.

Cohen was with the strategic studies program at the Paul H. Nitze School of

Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University. During

this period, Cohen quite frequently sponsored study meetings on

counterinsurgency and made proactive presentations at symposiums on the

theme of counterinsurgency18

. After hearing Crane‘s presentation at one of these

symposiums, Cohen felt that Crane should lead the revision team and

recommended him to Petraeus19

. While acting as the coordinator of the overall

work, Crane also served as a liaison to tactfully reflect the intentions of Petraeus

in the revision work. The most difficult task in the hearings of opinions about the

rough draft of the counterinsurgency doctrine was how to handle opinions of

senior officers in the ranks of generals. While consulting with Petraeus, Crane

proficiently disposed of them and contributed to the formulation of the doctrine

in a short period of time20

.

The individual who wielded a significant influence over what was written in

the doctrine in the revision team was Lt. Col. John A. Nagl, who joined the team

when he was special military adviser to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Even

before joining the revision team, Nagl was known as one of those who advocated

the introduction of the counterinsurgency strategy within the U.S. Army along

with Petraeus. He became known after his book, ―Learning to Eat Soup with a

Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam21

,‖ came under the

spotlight. In this book, Nagl made research into counterinsurgency and military

organizations that would execute it through the comparison between the Malaya

crisis for Britain and the Vietnam War for the United States by relying on five

―Basic Principles of Counter-Insurgency‖22

of Robert Thompson, famous for his

organizational theory and classic counterinsurgency principles. While noting the

success of Britain that made use of lessons learned in stabilizing post-crisis

Malaya (currently Malaysia), Nagl pointed to problems in the organization of the

U.S. forces that failed to make good use of the lessons. Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker,

Hidetoshi Shinohara

118

then chief of staff of the U.S. Army, recommended Nagl‘s book as a must-read

book, presenting the book to every senior officer who came to visit his room23

.

The book drew keen attention of the U.S. forces as they had a hard time fighting

in Iraq. Nagl advised members of the revision team to read ―Counterinsurgency

Warfare: Theory and Practice24

‖ by David Galula, and its contents were reflected

in FM 3-24 (2006). Nagl also wrote the introduction of FM 3-24 (2006), in

which he emphasized the importance of ―learning‖ and ―adaptation‖ to win in

counterinsurgency operations.

Other than the above, knowledge of a wide variety of individuals was

reflected in FM 3-24(2006). They included David Kilcullen25

, an Australian

serviceman on temporary assignment to the U.S. Department of State, who, like

Nagl, strongly recommended the introduction of counterinsurgency in Iraq and

advised the U.S. administration and the military, and Sarah Sewall, director of

the Kennedy School of Government‘s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy,

Harvard University, who studied incidental damage among ordinary citizens and

frequently held study meetings and consultative meetings concerning

counterinsurgency from the perspective of human rights. Literature on

counterinsurgency Kilcullen published in the Military Review was quoted as ―A

Guide for Action‖ as an appendix at the end of FM 3-24 (2006)26

. Cohen,

Petraeus and Nagl participated in consultative meetings sponsored by Sewall

even before the formation of the revision team, and many of members of human

rights groups and NGOs came to have support relationships with the revision

team through these consultative meetings.

(3) Characteristics FM 3-24(2006)

The counterinsurgency doctrine developed on the basis of a wide range of

knowledge of the military, other governmental agencies, NGOs and media as

well as the revision team was organized into eight chapters and five appendixes

at the end, resulting in a great piece of writing with 282 pages in total27

.

The introduction emphasized that the U.S. military failed to learn about


119

insurgency and counterinsurgency. Recognizing that there was the perceived

notion within the military that large-scale armed forces trained for conventional

wars would not lose in small-scale, irregular warfare, the revised

counterinsurgency doctrine advised, ―In COIN, the side that learns faster and

adapts more rapidly—the better learning organization—usually wins28

.‖ Then, in

Chapter 1, reflecting the principles derived by Thompson and Galula from the

past experiences in counterinsurgency as the classical counterinsurgency

principles and recognizing that wars today are the ―wars among the people,‖ the

doctrine sets the primary objective as fostering the development of effective

governance by a legitimate government and focuses on residents instead of

enemies29

. As the noteworthy content, this chapter states the rough required ratio

of troops to execute counterinsurgency (the number of counterinsurgents for

every 1,000 residents in an area of operation). This was written into the doctrine

partly because Petraeus anticipated questions about the number of troops

required for a surge as it was necessary for him to personally appear before the

Senate Defense Committee to be confirmed as the commander of the

Multinational Force-Iraq30

. At the end of this chapter, ―Paradoxes of

Counterinsurgency Operations‖ are stated to show the difficulty of

counterinsurgency operations. They are the nine paradoxes in conducting

counterinsurgency operations, including ―Sometimes, the More You Protect Your

Force, the Less Secure You May Be,‖ ―Sometimes, the More Force Used, the

Less Effective It Is,‖ and ―Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do

Not Shoot‖31

. The description of these paradoxes drew many objections from

senior officers of the Army and the Air Force, which in part drove the subsequent

development of AFDD 2-3 (2007).

Chapter 2 emphasizes the ―Unity of Effort‖ to highlight the integration of

civilian and military activities as essential for a victory in counterinsurgency

operations. The unity of efforts is the matter that is particularly emphasized in the

classical counterinsurgency principles. As its importance was well recognized

Hidetoshi Shinohara

120

from the initial phase of authoring the doctrine, it apparently was stated in an

earlier chapter.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are the particularly important chapters that pertain to the

planning and execution of counterinsurgency operations, covering in detail such

conception matters as information activities and the designing of

counterinsurgency campaigns as well as assessment of operations and how to

determine targets of attacks. In particular, Chapter 4 ―Designing

Counterinsurgency Campaigns and Operations‖ incorporated the

recommendations by Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Mattis, and Crane noted that this

section reflected the thinking the U.S. Army did not have before32

. In Chapter 6

and later chapters, the doctrine discussed the development and supervision of

host-nation security forces, ethics33

and logistic considerations.

Matters that are not worth describing in separate chapters but still need to be

recognized were included in appendixes at the end of the main text of the

doctrine. Including a Guide for Action, these five appendixes cover the methods

to evaluate operations and threats, linguist support for interpretation in areas of

operations, legal considerations, and the use of airpower in counterinsurgency. Of

these appendixes, the most controversial was what was stated about airpower.

The use of airpower in counterinsurgency was discussed in six pages of

Appendix 6. The author of this appendix was Prof. James S. Corum, who taught

military history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He also

authored the doctrine‘s Chapter 6 ―Developing Host-Nation Security Forces.‖

Corum co-authored Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgent and Terrorists34

‖

in 2003. In writing the appendix, Corum solicited comments from senior contact

instructors of the Air Force and the Navy who were with the CAC and also used

written opinions of the Air Force as reference.

The appendix on airpower discussed the importance of airpower as the

means of support for land power. Main matters discussed included air strikes,

intelligence collection, the roles played by high-technology and low-technology


121

assets, airlift, airpower command structure and building of host-nation airpower

capability. Regarding airpower in the strike role, the appendix noted that while

air attacks can be of enormous value in counterinsurgency, commanders exercise

exceptional care when using airpower in the strike role because bombing, even

with the most precise weapons, can cause unintended civilian casualties. This

had to do with the concern, taken up in ―Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency

Operations‖ in Chapter 1, that an air strike can cause collateral damage that turns

people against the host-nation government and provides insurgents with a major

propaganda victory. The appendix notes that even when justified under the law

of war, video images of collateral damage of bombings to residents spread via

media could bring the immeasurable benefit to insurgents35

.

Concerning the descriptions of airpower in the doctrine, the Marine Corps

thought that they are ―not necessary because everyone knows the role of

airpower plays in counterinsurgency as an integrated operation.‖ However, the

Army side wanted them included in the doctrine because it ―wants to emphasize

the characteristics of airpower in operations other than air strikes in

counterinsurgency operations.‖ Behind the Army‘s assertion were the wishes of

Petraeus and Crane to help enhance the interest in counterinsurgency within the

Air Force and facilitate discussions by including them in the doctrine. At the

stage of the rough draft of the doctrine, the Air Force, as an organization, showed

no interest in appendixes36

. Regarding the use of airpower, Petraeus and Crane

were concerned about examples in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, efforts to cover

ground forces with airpower capabilities caused collateral damage of air strikes

to civilians, giving rise to vocal criticisms by Afghan people in the country and

also deteriorating the public image of campaigns by the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) forces in the international community37

, while the Air

Force was of the strong view that the use of airpower like that in Afghanistan is

suitable in counterinsurgency operations.

The issuance of FM 3-24 (2006) subsequently led to the development of not

Hidetoshi Shinohara

122

only AFDD 2-3 (2007) but also the Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency

(2009) and the Allied Joint Publication3.4.4 Allied Joint Doctrine for

Counterinsurgency (2011), NATO‘s counterinsurgency doctrine38

. The British

Army also revised the counterinsurgency doctrine originally issued in 1995 for

the first time in 14 years.

3. Establishment of the Doctrine by the U.S. Air Force

In August 2007, eight months after the issuance of FM 3-24 (2006), the U.S. Air

Force issued AFDD 2-3 (2007). But the title of the document was not

―Counterinsurgency‖ but ―Irregular Warfare‖ with wider meanings, including

counterinsurgency. The formulation of the new doctrine within a short period of

time, in a sense, indicated that the rising interest in counterinsurgency and

animated discussions within the Air Force, just as Petraeus and Crane had hoped

for. The background to the issuance of the new doctrine, discussions at an Air

Force symposium on counterinsurgency, which had a significant influence on

AFDD 2-3 (2007), and the characteristics of the doctrine developed for irregular

warfare are discussed below.

(1) The Background to the Development

The issuance of AFDD 2-3 (2007) represented the establishment of the new

doctrine, instead of a revision to the existing one. The U.S. Air Force has never

before had an independent doctrine carrying the title of irregular warfare or

counterinsurgency. The Air Force doctrines were commonly called ―Military

Operations Other Than War: MOOTW.‖ But this does not mean that the term

―counterinsurgency‖ has never been used in the Air Force doctrines. Examining

the Air Force Basic Doctrine in the past, the Basic Doctrine issued in March

1964 had ―Chapter 5 Use of Air Power in Counterinsurgency.‖39

The year of

1964 was close to the period when the Kennedy administration was considering

counterinsurgency amid the deteriorating situation of the Vietnam War40

.

However, the term of ―counterinsurgency‖ disappeared from the Basic Doctrine


123

thereafter, replaced by such items as special operations in low-intensity conflict41

and MOOTW.

Irregular warfare came under the spotlight within the U.S. armed forces after

the February 2006 announcement of the QDR in which the term irregular

warfare was used. This overlapped the timing when the Air Force began the

development of the doctrine for irregular warfare.

However, unlike a sense of stagnation in ground operations, operations by the

Air Force have never fell into a serious predicament where the casualties of the

U.S. forces would increase. While media occasionally took up collateral damage

of air raids to the civilian population, the number of casualties of air strikes

among civilians was on the continuous decline in 2005 and 200642

. During this

period, cases where military airplanes on airborne alert for close air support

(CAS) actually dropped bombs after being told of attack targets declined

significantly and air operations remained stable as a whole. Given such

circumstances, the Air Force had no urgent necessity to quickly develop its

doctrine for irregular warfare like the Army or the Marine Corps from the

perspective of its operational situation.

Judging from discussions at a symposium on counterinsurgency held by the

Air Force in the course of developing AFDD 2-3 (2007) and statements by Air

Force generals, the Air Force embarked on the development of the doctrine for

irregular warfare apparently because it was unhappy with what was written in the

appendix of FM 3-24 (2006). The Air Force‘s commander of the Air Combat

Command voiced, before Crane and Nagl at the symposium on

counterinsurgency, his dissatisfaction that the role of airpower was taken up only

in the appendix of FM 3-24 (2006)43

. The Air Force also complained that FM

3-24 (2006) paid no regard to opinions of the Air Force in the course of its

development and its contents were not satisfactory. Such views of the Air Force

reflected its concern that the insufficient doctrine formulated by a particular

branch of the military spread like wildfire with little understanding about the

Hidetoshi Shinohara

124

inherent capabilities of airpower in counterinsurgency44

. There were some senior

officers of the Air Force with the views that the capabilities of airpower can and

should be used more widely and more effectively, without being limited only to

support ground forces in counterinsurgency operations45

.

The Air Force inaugurated a group of authors for the doctrine in February

2007 and issued AFDD2-3 (2007) in August of the same year. The Air Force

completed the work to develop the doctrine, which usually takes about one year,

only in six months46

. Unlike the revision team of FM 3-24 (2006), no documents

and materials such as memoirs that specifically explained the background to the

doctrine development and the development work are readily available, but we

can still check what was discussed at the symposium on counterinsurgency

sponsored by the Air Force in April 2007 from relevant documents.

(2) The Air Force’ s Counterinsurgency Symposium

The Air Force held the symposium on the theme of ―counterinsurgency‖ at the

Air University for three days from April 24, 2007. The symposium was jointly

sponsored by the U.S. Air Force Headquarters, the Air Combat Command

(ACC) and the Air Force Special Operation Command (AFSOC), with over 170

participants from other branches of the U.S. military, government organizations

and international institutions as well as civilians, scholars and other experts. The

symposium was held with the purpose of collecting and reflecting knowledge

about counterinsurgency and airpower from a wide variety of experts in AFDD

2-3 (2007) under development.

The symposium discussed how the Air Force should interpret irregular

warfare and counterinsurgency operations and how the Air Force should

contribute to them. Nagl and Crane, who participated in it to represent the Army,

explained what had been discussed for the development of FM 3-24 (2006) and

voiced the view that what is important in counterinsurgency operations are not

military actions per se but the establishment of a government with legitimacy47

.

The symposium‘s discussions covered four areas of policy/strategy/necessity


125

of cooperation in doctrine, the building of troops, strategic communication and

the building of host-nation capabilities. Opinions voiced in the course of

discussions included that the execution of counterinsurgency per se and

instructions on counterinsurgency require different strategies and doctrines and

that the U.S. armed forces cannot always intervene proactively in irregular

warfare that could happen in every corner of the world. Among other views and

questions expressed at the symposium were about the requirement of political

decisions on how to get involved in irregular warfare, how to structure the chain

of command, how to go about public relations activities and information

activities in counterinsurgency operations that would be a long-drawn-out affair,

how to handle psychological warfare, and what would be required of the U.S.

armed forces to implement the capacity building of host nations.

Furthermore, through these discussions, the merits and demerits of the use of

existing airpower in counterinsurgency operations became apparent. As the

advantages, some participants argued that the use of precision guided munitions

through the integration operation under the centralized command and under the

assessment of the situation based on accurate information can be expected to

produce the effects of limiting collateral damage to civilians and damage to

ground forces dispatched, while others said the superiority of the overwhelming

airpower already commanded by the Air Force can threat insurgents from air on

continually. On the other hand, participants who anticipated the demerits argued

the main mission of the Air Force is to acquire air superiority over an adversary

and achieve a crushing victory in interstate war and has hence developed the

effective and efficient airpower to serve that purpose, but the proactive execution

of counterinsurgency operations would require the procurement of equipment

and training suitable to that and could undermine the Air Force‘s ability to

achieve a victory in interstate war, its principal mission.

The results of the discussions were broadly summarized into the two

problems. One was that while the Air Force can function smoothly in the initial

Hidetoshi Shinohara

126

counterinsurgency environment but fails to function well in a subsequent

transition period or withdrawal period. Another was that the Air Force idea of

executing counterinsurgency operations per se needs to be transformed into an

idea of enabling a host-nation to conduct counterinsurgency operations on its

own. These problems stemmed from the recognition that in order to achieve a

victory under the U.S. defense strategy requiring global engagement, cooperation

of a host nation is essential as it is impossible for the U.S. armed forces to do

everything and that there is no case example in global history that a country that

intervened in a civil war in another country came out a winner singlehandedly48

.

The ultimate conclusions coming out of the symposium included the need to

determine what irregular warfare and counterinsurgency mean for the U.S. forces

and the need to present strategies in a hierarchical manner. On this basis, irregular

warfare and counterinsurgency were judged to be not something the Air Force

should handle comprehensively with all its might but fall within the range of

missions of special operations forces. Another conclusion was that if irregular

warfare or counterinsurgency is to be considered in the context of the capacity

building of a host nation, the Air Force does not need to develop its own doctrine

for counterinsurgency operations or to procure equipment specifically for

counterinsurgency operations49

. The symposium received the presentations of as

many as 220 proposals and recommendations like them, which the Air Force

pledged to reflect in the final version of AFDD 2-3 (2007)50

.

The criticisms of FM 3-24 (2006) voiced at the Air Force symposium

remained vocal even after the issuance of AFDD 2-3 (2007). To cite typical ones,

Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap and Philip S. Meilinger, known as Air

Force strategist, asserted that the Army or the Marine Corps fail to accurately

understand the technological excellence of airpower that can replace ―boots on

the ground‖51

. These criticisms remain unabated even after 2009, when JP 3-24

Counterinsurgency was issued52

.

(3) Characteristics of AFDD 2-3 (2007)


127

In AFDD 2-3 (2007), the U.S. Air Force explained that the reason for the

development of its doctrine for irregular warfare is to ―establishes

operational-level doctrinal guidance for irregular warfare…where the nature and

characteristics are significantly different from traditional war53

‖. Like FM 3-24

(2006), the doctrine was not developed by bearing the fighting in Iraq and

Afghanistan in mind and it was formulated for the purpose of demonstrating the

concept that is applicable from the broad perspective and for many years to

come.

AFDD 2-3 (2007) has a total of 103 pages and consist of five chapters and

appendixes. Chapter One covers the definitions related to irregular warfare and

counterinsurgency and also describes major activities in irregular warfare and

capabilities required for them54

. Chapter Two explains the value of Air Force

capabilities in irregular warfare and how to use them, while Chapter Three

indicates specific missions of airpower. Chapter Four describes the strategy for

irregular warfare and how to develop its operational plans, and Chapter Five sets

forth the command and control and the environment for executing it as well as

considerations in the execution of the strategy. Appendixes cover insurgent

motivations, organization and strategies used by insurgents in order to deepen the

understanding about insurgency.

The contents of the doctrine did not level criticisms against FM 3-24 (2006),

like those heard at the Air Force symposium. The main text starts with the

remarks of Gen. Curtis E. Lemay on the lessons from the Vietnam War55

. As a

whole, the doctrine emphasizes that unlike traditional war, a victory in irregular

warfare cannot be achieved with military power alone. It also emphasizes that

irregular warfare is a struggle for legitimacy and influence over the relevant

populations and the center of gravity is often the population. For this reason, the

doctrine advises that it is necessary to recognize that the achievements required at

the operational and strategical levels in irregular warfare, even when using the

same air equipment as in regular warfare, are entirely different from those in

Hidetoshi Shinohara

128

regular warfare. The most distinctive feature of AFDD 2-3 (2007) is that matters

related to building partnership capacity, the main agenda at the symposium on

counterinsurgency, are stated at the outset of ―Chapter Three Air Force

Capabilities in IW.‖ Building partnership capacity comes ahead of explanations

about combat support and precision engagement, indicating the doctrine‘s focus

on the support for the capacity development to host nations as at the symposium.

In addition, such matters as information and strategic communication, the main

themes for discussions at the symposium, were addressed as top items after the

building of partnership capacity in Chapter Three. Furthermore, the explanations

provided include the description of support for insurgents. This is because

support for anti-government forces engaged in insurgency, as well as

counterinsurgency, can be assumed56

. This is one of the reasons behind the

development of the Air Force doctrine with the wider definition of ―irregular

warfare‖ than counterinsurgency. This indicates that the Air Force wanted to

develop the doctrine that can flexibly respond to policy decisions by the U.S.

administration. As the applications of airpower in irregular warfare, AFDD 2-3

(2007) emphasizes small-scale interventions and rapid response by making use

of the characteristics of airpower (speed, range, flexibility, versatility and

destructive power) and situational awareness supported by the continuous

collection of information at the strategic, operational and tactical levels57

. They

make it possible for American aircraft to fly from outside the host nation to fulfill

its missions and may reduce the total number of forces visible to local

populations, thereby reducing their potential resentment.

AFDD 2-3 (2007) does not deny the use of lethal airpower, and says that it

may be possible to use armed attacks if strategically necessary to destroy an

adversary‘s will to fight and capabilities. However, repeatedly emphasizing that

the purpose of irregular warfare is the securing of a legitimate government‘s

influence over residents, it says that military actions should be taken only within

the scope consistent with this purpose. In addition, as does FM 3-24 (2006), the


129

doctrine emphasizes that not attacking the enemy rather than attacking the enemy

may lead to the attainment of strategic purposes58

.

4. Realities of U.S. Military Doctrine Development

Comparison of the backgrounds to the development of the two doctrines, details

of discussions about them and the ultimate products helps shed light on the three

realities of the doctrine development by the U.S. armed forces.

(1) System for Gathering Wisdom

The development of the two doctrines was undertaken by respective divisions

specializing the doctrine development of the Army, the Marine Corps and the Air

Force. But the development work was not accomplished by the specialized

divisions alone. At the U.S. Army, just one self-educated lieutenant colonel was

assigned to develop the counterinsurgency doctrine and the document was issued

on a provisional basis. But his doctrine was never accepted by people who know

the real conditions of counterinsurgency operations. Then, FM 3-24 (2006),

which came to be known throughout the world, was developed by the special

team that comprised several ―Warrior Scholars‖ and university professionals

with an input from a wide variety of intellectuals in and out of the military. The

Air Force also inaugurated its group of doctrine authors and developed its

doctrine for irregular warfare by soliciting advice from a wide variety of

intellectuals through the symposium.

The latest doctrines of the U.S. armed forces were not a mere collection of

theories, principles and lessons. They are the ripe fruit of a serious of discussions

by diverse range of intellectuals, born from a draft doctrine comprising theories,

principles and lessons. Despite the differences in the points of view between the

Army and the Marine Corps on one hand and the Air Force on the other, there

was a system where gathering wisdom was possible, by transforming conflict

into debate, so that the doctrines were further evolved.

(2) The Perfect Doctrine Does Not Exist

Hidetoshi Shinohara

130

When the respective discussions of the Army/Marine Corps and the Air Force

were closely examined, the description of airpower in FM 3-24 (2006) cannot be

necessarily termed as insufficient. As the forms of warfare are classified into

traditional warfare and irregular warfare, what was required of the Air Force was

the doctrine about how it should get engaged with war that is different from

traditional war. The doctrine dedicated to counterinsurgency was not required of

the Air Force.

On the other hand, the Army and the Marine Corps that were actually

involved in counterinsurgency in Iraq needed the doctrine that let them learn how

to execute counterinsurgency operations on the ground. FM 3-24 (2006) was

indeed the doctrine that made them aware of it. The description in the appendix

represented the role of airpower that should be known by soldiers of operational

units on the ground who are most likely to make use of FM 3-24 (2006), while

the role of airpower the Air Force should know was found in AFDD 2-3 (2007).

Thus, it can be said that both the Army/Marine Corps and the Air Force have

developed the doctrines required by their respective organizations at the time.

The confrontation between the Army/Marine Corps and the Air Force may be

described as the confrontation ascribable to the absence of the integrated doctrine

for counterinsurgency operations for which the joint operation is essential.

The two doctrines do not necessarily show the doctrines designed for

particular irregular warfare or counterinsurgency operations (Iraq and

Afghanistan, for example, in this case), but have been developed to show the

doctrines that are universal and may be widely applicable to all

counterinsurgency operations. However, even for the doctrines formulated only

after amassing wisdoms and holding so many sessions of discussions, objections

to and advice on the doctrine issued have never halted, coming from within the

same military service and also more from the different branches of the military as

well as from outsiders.

The doctrines required may change due to various factors, including the


131

stance of a particular division of the military, times, surrounding conditions and

technological advances. Even for a moment, or by amassing wisdoms of all sorts,

it is practically impossible to produce a doctrine that can satisfy everyone. The

important thing is not to try to develop a perfect doctrine that can satisfy

everyone but to come up with the best doctrine for people in that position at the

time and seek further progress through the next lessons and discussions. It means

the establishment of the feedback loop as ―An Engine of Change‖ in the words

of Petraeus59

.

(3) The Layered Structure of Doctrines

The common flow of military actions calls for the development of a national

defense policy based on a national strategy and then the objective and goal of

each operation and the operation itself are presented upon the presentation of a

military strategy based on the national defense policy. From this perspective,

given that the integrated operation is the order of the day, the development of a

doctrine for each service of the military upon the presentation of the joint

doctrine may be the best course of action. The latest confrontation between the

Army/Marine Corps and the Air Force over the description in the

counterinsurgency doctrine may be called the confrontation that emerged due to

the absence of the presentation of any joint doctrine.

However, it is difficult to create a doctrine for each layer from the beginning.

What is important is to shape the doctrine, not to discuss ―the chicken or the egg.‖

As was the case with the doctrines for counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, a

branch of the military develops a doctrine required for its organization out of

necessity and this triggers discussions as it spreads to other military services and

the joint doctrine, ultimately creating the feedback loop for discussions that help

develop the layered doctrines.

Within the U.S. armed forces, the issuance of FM 3-24 (2006) and AFDD

2-3 (2007) was followed by the issuance of the joint doctrine for

counterinsurgency (JP 3-24 COIN) in 2009, and in 2013, this joint doctrine and

Hidetoshi Shinohara

132

the Air Force doctrine for irregular warfare were revised. In the following year,

FM 3-24 for the Army and the Marine Corps was revised. Furthermore, with the

progress in computerization of doctrines, doctrines of each military service have

been linked on the Internet and a click on a term used in the doctrine of the Air

Force takes you to the joint doctrine. The doctrine system of the U.S. forces is

moving toward strengthening the layered structure along with the evolution of

doctrines for each military service.

Conclusion

Why did the U.S. Air Force choose to develop the doctrine for irregular warfare

instead of the doctrine for counterinsurgency as did the U.S. Army and the

Marine Corps? In order to find an answer to that question, this article made an

analysis of the doctrine development processes of the Army/Marine Corps and

the Air Force, the discussions they held in the course of doctrine development

and their ultimate products. The result of this analysis showed that what the

Army and the Marine Corps needed was the doctrine that presents the principles

for counterinsurgency their ground forces actually engaged in counterinsurgency

operations should urgently know. Meanwhile, the Air Force, after considering the

characteristics of airpower, reached the conclusion that the development of a

doctrine for irregular warfare that has a broader meaning instead of the particular

category of counterinsurgency allows it to more flexibly respond to operational

requirements. While the discussions within the Air Force commenced with the

notion that the descriptions of FM 3-24 (2006) were insufficient, it is apparent

that the important thing is whether the doctrine required for each military service

is developed as a doctrine that takes into account the characteristics of the means

that service has rather than whether the descriptions of a doctrine of another

military service are sufficient or not.

Considering the layered structure of doctrines, it may be ideal if the joint

doctrine is established first, and then each military service develops its own, so


133

that there is a consistency among the doctrines of each service. However, even

within the U.S. armed forces, which are an advanced organization in terms of the

utilization of doctrines, the realities are that each service develops its doctrine

separately to suits its particular demand, not a layered doctrine with consistency.

A perfect doctrine that satisfies everyone has never materialized, in spite of

continuous discussions. However, the end result is not necessarily so bad.

Doctrines have continued to evolve and be revised through discussions that

transcended the organizational barriers. The important thing is to make sure not

to break up the feedback loop, in order to ensure the ceaseless evolution of

doctrines using the wisdom that has accumulated, rather than to make a perfect

doctrine.

As the duties and mission of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are becoming

increasingly complex and diversified, to develop our own doctrines comes to be

considered vital, because doctrines are the kind of authoritative documents that

commanders rely on as a solid basis for making a decision. It seems that in Japan,

possibly because of what is known as the Japanese mentality, people consider

doctrines to be something everyone can agree on. And this may be the reason

discussions often go around in circles, thus preventing any further progress.

Therefore, the doctrine discussions with the U.S. armed forces triggered by the

Iraq War and the process of developing their doctrines may become a useful

source, in order to develop the SDF‘s own doctrine development cycle. This

author hopes that this paper somehow stirs up a discussion about how to

establish the feedback loop within the Air Self-Defense Force as ―the Engine of

Change.‖

Hidetoshi Shinohara

134

1 United States Army, FM3-24/MCWP3-33.5:Counterinsurgency.December 2006,p.1-1. 2 United States Air Force, AFDD 2-3: Irregular Warfare, 1 August 2007, p. 5. 3 The number of casualties among Iraqi people rose to 29,517 by 2006 from 12,133 in 2003, according to the database of Iraq Body Counts (IBC). www.iraqbodycount.org/, accessed December 11, 2017; Meanwhile, the

number of casualties among American soldiers increased from 486 in 2003 to 823 in 2006, according to the

database of the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count. icasualties.org/iraq/index.aspx, accessed December 11. 2017. 4 Conrad Carne, ―United States,‖ Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney ed., Understanding Counterinsurgency:

Doctrine, operations, and challenges, Routledge, 2010, p. 59. 5 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, November 28, 2005. 6 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006. 7 Fred Kaplan, The Insurgency: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War, Simon &

Schuster Paperbacks, 2013, pp. 130-131. 8 Lt. Gen. Petraeus was reportedly surprised by the appointment of himself as the CAC commandant, saying

that “the U.S. Army posted the insurgent to the position that controls the engine of change.” Ibid., p. 131. 9 Ibid., p. 133. 10 Lt. Col. Horvath exerted himself in writing the new doctrine as a member of the revision team until around

mid-2006 when he was sent to the Counter-Insurgency Academy in Iraq. Crane, ―United States,‖, p. 61. 11 ―I‖ in FMI means ―Interim.‖ 12 A group of excellent teachers at the Department of Social Sciences of the Military Academy at West Point

was called ―Sosh.‖ This ―Sosh‖ group, called the most outstanding think tank of the U.S. Army, turned out many officers and specialist researchers, including Petraeus, John A. Nagl, and Brig. Gen. Peter Cherry,

deputy commander of the U.S. forces in Iraq. 13 Mattis served as the Secretary of Defense in the Trump administration, but resigned in December 2018. 14 US Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2006, pp. 4-7. 15 David H. Petraeus, The American Military and the Lesson of Vietnam: A Study of Military Influence and

the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Era, Ph. D Dissertation, Princeton University, 1987. 16 Kaplan, The Insurgency: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War, 2013, p.137. These observations became widely known after being published in the Military Review later under the title of

―Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq.‖ Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army, ―Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,‖ Military Review,

January-February 2006. 17 Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario, U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, February

2003. 18 After the Operation Desert Storm of 1991, Cohen conducted research on air power in the Gulf War at the request of the Secretary of the Air Force. Concerned about how the U.S. forces responded in the intervention

in Iraq since 2003, he frequently sponsored study meetings and provided advice to the Bush administration as

well as political leaders and top echelons of the military. He was one of those who recommended Petraeus to President Bush. Kaplan, The Insurgency, pp. 108-110. 19 At the time, Cohen did not know that Petraeus and Crane were in the same class at the Army War College. 20 Crane pointed out that the number of people who got involved in the doctrine revision work reached as many as 600,000, noting that all soldiers of the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps were given opportunities to

voice their opinions about a rough draft of the doctrine. Many senior officers also read this rough draft, and the

revision team had difficulty in responding to some of their opinions. Crane, ―United States,‖ p. 68. 21 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.

University of Chicago Press, 2005.; Nagl conceived this title for the book from the expression that ―to make

war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife,‖ found in ―Seven Pillars of Wisdom‖ written by T.E. Lawrence, known as the Lawrence of Arabia. Kaplan, The Insurgency: David Petraeus and

the Plot to Change the American Way of War, p. 43. 22 Robert. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam, Chatto &


135

Windus, 1966. 23 Schoomaker handed the book written by Nagl to Gen. George W. Casey when he became a candidate for

the commander of the Multinational Force-Iraq. David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army. Three Rivers Press, 2009, p. 168. 24 Galula derived the counterinsurgency principles by studying the struggle for independence in Algeria from

1954 through 1952 to seek independence from France as a counterinsurgency war. David Galula, Foreword by Robert R. Bowie, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. ;

Regarding the struggle for independence in Algeria, Italian movie director Gillo Pontecorvo‘s ―The Battle of

Algiers (La battaglia di Algeri),‖ which won the Gold Lion Award at the Venice International Film Festival in 1966, is quite famous. 25 Kilcullen, who later published his book, ―Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big

One,‖ wrote in the book that local residents who suffered incidental damage harbor ―adverse reactions‖ to foreign forces (countries intervening with counterinsurgency operations like the United States), get acquainted

with militarist groups and ultimately come to have a spirit of revolt against foreign forces as insurgents. He

defines these developments as ―accidental guerrilla.‖ David Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 35-38. 26 David Kilcullen, ―Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,‖ Military

Review, Vol. 86, May/June 2006, pp. 103-108. 27 Concern over an excessive number of pages was discussed within the revision team. But the team

eventually reached a conclusion that they cannot cut the doctrine short as their original intent was to eliminate

the previous gaps that resulted from important matters being made light of in the past. Crane, ―United States,‖ 2010, p. 67. 28 US Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2006, p. ix. 29 Ibid., p. 1-21. Counterinsurgency is a mixture of diverse operations, such as offensive operations focusing on eliminating the insurgent cadre, defensive operations focusing on protecting the populace and

infrastructure from direct attacks, and stability operations, while the killing and detention of insurgent enemies

are also necessary. But the doctrine says that victory is achieved only when counterinsurgency builds up and

maintains the support of residents. Ibid., pp. x, 1-3, 1-19. 30 Crane, ―United States,‖ 2010, p. 66. The ratio of the number of forces required for counterinsurgency is

stated in 1-67, Chapter 1, of US Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2006. 31 US Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2006, pp. 1-26-1-27. 32 Crane, ―United States,‖ 2010, p. 64. 33 Fierce debate arose over ethics issues following an incident at the Abu Ghraib prison. Ibid, p. 66. 34 Through this historical research, Corum came up with 11 lessons concerning airpower in small-scale wars.

It is assumed that he used these lessons as a reference in authoring his portion in US Army, FM 3-24/MCWP

3-33.5, 2006. James S. Corum and Wary R. Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgent and Terrorists, University Press of Kansas, 2003, pp. 425-439. 35 US Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2006 p. E-1. 36 At a session to exchange views between the Army and the Air Force, a professor of the Air University who participated in the session personally aired the view that the descriptions of the use of airpower should be

included in the doctrine, but the Air Force as an organization was negative toward the idea. Conrad Crane,

Cassandra in OZ: Counterinsurgency and Future War, Naval Institute Press, 2016, pp. 82, 97. 37 Crane, ―United States,‖ 2010, pp. 67-68. 38 The consultation held in Paris at the end of 2007 marked the commencement of the development of the NATO version of the counterinsurgency doctrine. Crane Cassandra in OZ, 2016, p. 127. 39 Lt Col Johnny R. Jones, USAF, Development of Air Force Basic Doctrine 1947-1992, Air University Press,

1997, p.51. 40 Austin Long, Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine,

1960-1970 and 2003-2006, RAND, 2008, p. vii. 41 The item of counterinsurgency was deleted as the core matters for descriptions in the Basic Doctrines

Hidetoshi Shinohara

136

shifted to nuclear strategies and conventional wars amid the rising threat from the Soviet Union during the

Cold War period. But the item of special operations did exist in order to respond to interventions in civil wars

of other countries, which were often referred to as proxy wars. The item of special operations mainly referred to education and support for training to help build the airpower capabilities of host nations. 42 The number of casualties among Iraqi citizens in air raids by the Multinational Force-Iraq decreased from

1,405 in 2004 to 341 in 200t and further to 255 in 2006. Iraq Body Count, www.iraqbodycount.org/, accessed December 11, 2017. 43 Crane Cassandra in OZ, 2016, p. 133.; Remarks of General Ronald E. Keys, Commander, Air Combat

Command, dinner presentation at Air Force Symposium 2007: Counterinsurgency, April 24, 2007, Maxwell AFB, AL. Crane, ―United States,‖ 2010, p. 71. 44 Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF, Chief, Professional Journals, ―Airpower and Irregular Warfare,‖ Air and

Space Power Journal, Winter 2007, Vol. 41 No. 4 AFRP 10-2, p. 21. 45 Based on remarks of Maj. Gen. Allen Peck, commandant of the Air Force Doctrine Center (AFDC).

Christine Harrison, ―Doctrine Center ‗Jump Starts‘ Irregular Warfare Doctrine,‖ Air University Public Affairs.

March1,2007, www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/127789/doctrine-center-jump-starts-irregular-warfare-doctrine/,

accessed October 19, 2014. 46 Commenting on this doctrine developed by the U.S. Air force, Crane said that ―it is hardly surprising, but frankly speaking, this publication is not a good one. It emphasizes targeting and air strikes.‖ Crane Cassandra

in OZ: Counterinsurgency and Future War, 2016, p. 133. 47 By the time when the symposium was held in April 2007, the difference between conventional warfare and counterinsurgency or irregular warfare was widely understood to a certain extent. Maj. Gen. Richard Y.

Newton III, assistant deputy chief of staff for operations, plans and requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force,

also stated at the symposium that counterinsurgency and irregular warfare involve problems of people, not

fighting and ―It‘s about control of a population, not necessarily control of an adversary’s force or territory.” Carl Bergquist, ―Air University Hosts Counterinsurgency Symposium,‖ Air University Public Affairs, April 30,2007,

www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/127038/air-university-hosts-counterinsurgency-symposium/,

accessed March 2, 2018. 48 Col Robyn Read, USAF, Retired, ―Irregular Warfare and the US Air Force: The Way Ahead,‖ Air and

Space Power Journal, Winter 2007, Vol. XXI, No. 4 AFRP 10-1, pp. 41-42. 49 Ibid., pp. 49-50. 50 Ibid., p. 42. 51 John T. Farquhar, ―Air power and Irregular Warfare: A Battle of Ideas,‖ Byan Burke, Michael Fowler,

Kevin McCaskey, ed., Military Strategy, Joint Operations, and Airpower: An Introduction, Georgetown University Press, pp. 144-145. 52 For Dunlap‘s arguments and details of the discussions about the counterinsurgency doctrine in the United

States, see Tetsuya Yano, Issues and Future Outlook for Counterinsurgency Operations, NIDS Kiyo, Vol. 14, No.1, December 2011, pp. 39-63. 53 USAF, AFDD 2-3, 2007, p. vi. 54 While USAF, AFDD 2-3, 2007, mainly covers counterinsurgency and building partnership capacity of irregular warfare, the revised version of the Air Force doctrine for irregular warfare issued in 2013 sets forth

the five activities of Counterinsurgency (COIN), Counterterrorism (CT), Foreign Internal Defence (FID),

Stability Operations (SO), Unconventional warfare (UW) as activities included in irregular warfare, along with their definitions. USAF, AFDD 2-3, 2013, pp. 5-8. 55 At the outset, USAF, AFDD 2-3, 2007, introduces the remarks of Gen. Lemay that ―In this type of war you

cannot – you must not – measure the effectiveness of the effort by the number of bridges destroyed, buildings damaged, vehicles burned, or any of the other standards that have been used for regular warfare. The task is to

destroy the effectiveness of the insurgent‘s efforts and his ability to use the population for his own ends.‖ Ibid.,

p. vi.


137

56 U.S. support currently provided to anti-government forces in Syria falls under this category. 57 They include surveillance in outer space and cyberspace. 58 USAF, AFDD 2-3, 2007, p. 10. 59 In the following year of the issuance of the counterinsurgency doctrine, Crane paid a visit to the U.S. forces

stationed in Iraq at the invitation of Petraeus, then commander of the Multinational Force-Iraq, to evaluate the

new doctrine on the scenes of actual operations. Crane Cassandra in OZ, 2016, p. 142.

realities of u.s. military doctrine development during the iraq war · 2020. 12. 9. · hidetoshi...

Documents