reaking the rules and hanging the game · today, modern warfare is often described as ^information...

Breaking the Rules and Changing the Game:

When Cyberspace Meets International Law

Sharon Afek1

“We breached the wall, and opened up the defenses of the city. All prepare themselves for the work and they set up wheels allowing movement under its feet, and stretch hemp ropes round its neck. That engine of fate mounts our walls pregnant with armed men. Around it boys, and virgin girls, sing sacred songs, and delight in touching their hands to the ropes: Up it glides and rolls threateningly into the midst of the city.”

Vergil, The Aeneid, Book II, translated by Tony Kline

Introduction: Cyberspace and International Law The history of war is a story that moves between dimensions. Warfare began on land, pushed off into the seas, soared into the skies, and has even launched into outer space. There is no dimension or realm ignored by states and leaders in their ambition to achieve political, economic, and military power.

War is also a story of technological developments. The story progresses from the age of tools (the invention of the wheel), through the age of machines (such as artillery), to the age of systems (radar and aircraft), and up to the age of automation and information (sophisticated computers and communications systems).2

1 Colonel Sharon Afek serves as the commander of the IDF staff command course “Afek” at the Command and Staff College. 2 William Owens, Lifting the Fog of War (2001). Regarding the parallel between the development of cyberspace, and the development of air power, and the need in both instances to develop a suitable military doctrine. Brett T. Williams, "The Joint Forces Commander’s Guide to Cyberspace Operations," Joint Forces Quarterly 12 (2nd Quarter 2014).

48 Breaking the Rules and Changing the GameAfek

As war moves to new dimensions and is waged by new means, the laws of war struggle to keep pace. They must be revisited and updated in order to ensure they are relevant for the way war is fought in a given period.

Today, modern warfare is often described as “information warfare,” due to the significant role played by computer technology.3 In the twenty-first century, communications and computer networks play a central role in the state’s national security. While they increase the power of and open new horizons for the state, the dependence on computers accentuates the state’s vulnerability and sensitivity to attacks in the domain known as cyberspace.4

Cyberspace, the expansive and fast-growing dimension created by mankind, is not easily defined. The US Department of Defense defines cyberspace as:

“A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications, networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.”5

This definition encompasses a wide world including but not limited to the internet- communications networks, hardware, software, computers, mobile telephones, satellites, radio waves, etc.

The heart of cyberspace is the internet network. The internet began in the 1960s as ARPANET, a software designed to link US Defense Department computers, military contractors and a number of universities.6 The network, which initially relied on a handful of telephone lines, quickly grew to link most of humanity across the globe. 7 Today, cyberspace plays a significant role in almost every aspect of human life, and its importance is only expected to increase.

3 Martin C. Libicki, "What is information warfare?", ACIS3 (August 1995): http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/ndu/infowar/a003cont.html 4 Rex Hughes, "Towards a Global Regime for Cyber Warfare,"in: Christian Czosseck and Kenneth Geers, The Virtual Battlefield: perspectives on cyber-warfare (2009): 528-529. 5 Clifford S. Magee, "Awaiting Cyber 9/11", Joint Forces 76 (3rd Quarter 2013). 6 George K. Walker, "Information Warfare and Neutrality," Vand. J. Transnat’l L 1079 (2000): 1094-1095. 7 Vida M. Antolin-Jenkins, "Defining the Parameters of Cyberwar Operations: Looking for Law in all the Wrong Places," Naval Law Review 132 (2005): 135-136.

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The emergence of the internet heralded a new global, borderless era.8 Designed to be open, minimalistic, and neutral, a user sitting at a computer can, with the push of one button, perform an action that will have instant consequences thousands of miles away.9 Through the internet, the user may contribute to the growth of knowledge, medicine, the economy, and society. But she also might have harmful effects. Alongside the unlimited possibilities of its use for good, the internet serves as a fertile ground for spying, restricting civil rights, crime, vandalism and terror.10

As cyberspace developed, some described it as the ‘wild west,’ devoid of law and order.11 The subversive and open nature of cyberspace is in fact one of its main attractions. As cyberspace has become central to the human experience, policymakers now seriously discuss developing norms, principles, and rules to govern this domain. The creation of a regime12 to regulate the borderless realm of cyberspace will necessitate the involvement and cooperation of many international players.

Creating a cyber regime involves, among others, the formation of rules within international law, defining what is right and wrong among international players, and resolving questions concerning offensive activities in cyberspace.

‘Attack’ in Cyberspace: A Definition One of the foremost challenges in formulating legal principles for cyberspace is the need to bridge the language gap between cyber jargon and legal concepts. This difficulty is most prominent in

8 Although in practice the Internet is occasionally restricted by states, national laws, and various technologies. Tim Maurer, "Cyber Norm Emergence at the United Nations - An Analysis of the UN’s Activities Regarding Cyber-security", Discussion Paper 2011-11, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School (September 2011), 8. 99 Joseph S. Nye, "Cyber Power," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School (May 2010): 3. 10 Ibid., 16. 11 Ibid., 14. 12 Ibid., 9. A regime in the sense of a set of direct and indirect principles, norms, decision making laws and procedures, around which converge the expectations of International Relations players. See, Krasner’s famous definition from 1983.


relation to the term which will likely stand at the center of any new legal regulation: “attack”.13

While cyber attacks have already become routine, there is no agreement on its definition in the international arena. This is not entirely surprising, as other significant concepts, such as ‘terror,’ have not yet been granted an internationally agreed-upon definition.14 The attempts to define a cyber attack highlight the fundamental differences and strategic conflicts between the cyber powers. In particular, there is a significant divide and mutual suspicion between the United States and Western nations on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other.

The United States, NATO and Western nations began to publish definitions of cyber attacks following the establishment of the US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) in 2010.15 These definitions of a cyber attack include three components: means of aggression (an act by means of computers and networks); causing damage; and the infrastructure attacked (computers, data, and network of the attacked party).

Russia and China’s interpretation of cyber attack places more emphasis on certain prohibited acts in cyberspace. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s (SCO) approach exemplifies the Russian and Chinese understanding.16 SCO prohibits the dissemination of information that is designed to undermine political stability and harm social, political and economic systems. Needless to say, this

13 Michael N. Schmitt, "'Attack' as a Term of Art in International Law: The Cyber Operations Context", in: Czosseck Christian, Ottis Ryan & Ziolkowski Katharina eds., Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict 283 (2012). 14 The term “terror” was first coined at the end of the eighteenth century, during the French revolution, but today there is no accepted definition, which has earned a universal consensus. See: Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 15 The command was established in May 2010 in order to coordinate the activities of the military services in cyberspace. Its purpose is to preserve the US ability to act freely in cyberspace and promote national security interests. In Israel, a cyber command has yet to be established. Sean Watts, "Low Intensity Computer Network Attack and Self-Defense," 83 International Law Studies Series, U.S. Naval War College 59 (2011):59. 16 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), or Shanghai Pact, is a Eurasian political, economic, and military organization which was founded in 2001 in Shanghai.


approach does not fit in with Western values like freedom of expression and the right to receive and exchange information in real-time, which are perceived as the foundations of cyberspace.17

In general, the legal literature identifies three categories of cyber attacks:18

The first and most common type of attack is the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). With DDoS, an attacker inserts a virus into thousands of computers in order to ‘kidnap’ them and use them as an attacking force, known as a ‘Botnets.’ The Botnets – the thousands of kidnapped computers – disrupt the target server by simultaneously attempting to get entry into certain web sites. The attack continues until the site collapses under the load, creating a denial of service. By using thousands of innocent computers around the world, this method helps the attacker preserve anonymity. Today, DDoS attacks can be purchased from criminal groups.

The second type of attack is the insertion of false data into a computer system. The attacker inserts code to disrupt the proper functioning of a target system, while the target system appears to continue to operate normally.19 For example, in 1999, the United States allegedly fed false data into the Serbian air defense system in order to neutralize Serbia’s ability to strike NATO aircraft.20

The third type of attack is infiltrating computer networks and

performing actions through them. In this type of attack, attackers may disrupt and gain control over sensitive computer systems. These types of systems control large factories and infrastructure plants

17 For more on the efforts of China and Russia to operate supervision and control systems: Tom Gjelten, "Seeing the Internet as an ‘Information Weapon’," NRG, September 23, 2010: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130052701 18 Oona A. Hathaway, Crootof Rebecca, Levitz Philip, Nix Haley, Nowlan Aileen, Perdue William and Spiegel Julia, "The Law of Cyberattack", California Law Review 100 (2012); Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 453; Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 258: http://www.californialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/100-4/02-Hathaway.pdf 19 Libicki, 1995; 77 20 Arkin M. William, "The Cyber Bomb in Yugoslavia", Washington Post (Oct. 25, 1999): http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/dotmil/arkin.html


such as SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems for electricity and water utilities.

Cyber attacks on the Global Stage Cyber war, a technological Armageddon, was once considered science fiction. In recent years, cyber attacks headlined newspapers all over the world,21such as the recent exchange of cyber blows between North Korea and USA following the release of an American movie about North Korea’s leader. Analysts fear disturbing consequences from cyber attacks: train derailments, city-wide blackouts, oil pipeline sabotage, and paralyzed airports.22Strategists believe that current and future conflicts will involve cyber warfare that targets infrastructure, data, the economy and social morale.23 It is no surprise that the UN pointed to cyber security as one of the most significant challenges of the twenty-first century.24

Cyberspace has yet to witness groundbreaking events, such as a cyber 9/11 that dramatically changes our political and military perceptions. Still, recent cyberattacks sufficiently demonstrate their devastating potential. Well-known instances of recent cyber attacks are presented below. The Attack on Estonia, 2007 In April and May 2007, Estonia suffered massive attacks on its computer networks following the announcement of a government plan to move the WWII memorial of the city of Tallinn, the capital, to a military cemetery in the city’s suburbs.25 The attacks, which lasted a month, targeted public and economic internet infrastructure, including the networks supporting the president, the prime minister, parliament, political parties, banks, communications

21 William Banks, "The Role of Counterterrorism Law in Shaping Ad Bellum Norms for Cyber War", 89 Int’l L. Stud 157 (2013): 157-158. 22 Richard A. Clarke & Knake Robert K., Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It (2010): 64-68. 23 Waxman, 2011; 423. Citing the 2010 report of the British Institute, IISS. 24 Ibid, p. 424. Citing the UN report: Rep. of the Grp. of Governmental Experts on Dev. in the Field of Info. & Telecomm in the Context of Int’l Sec., 65th Sess., 1, UN Doc. A/65/201 (July, 2010). 25 Eneken Tikk, Kaska Kadri & Vihul Liis, International Cyber Incidents: Legal Consideration (2010): 14-33.


companies and internet suppliers.26 The campaign included a variety of cyber attacks, including DDoS, vandalizing web sites, destruction of computerized data, and the collapse of servers and internet sites.

The Internet is central to life in Estonia, rendering it especially vulnerable to cyber attacks.27 In 2007, half the population used the internet to receive government services; the government operated in a ‘paperless’ manner; 95% of banking activity was carried out digitally, and 98% of the state’s territory was cyber-networked.28 Accordingly, the cyber attacks had substantial impact. The country’s two major banks were effectively paralyzed for several days. Half of the major news agencies faced operational difficulties.29Tax collection was affected. The country’s emergency telephone lines were cut off for an entire hour, public and private communications were damaged, and no less important, trust in the country’s economy was undermined. The economic damage caused by the attacks was estimated between US$27.5 to US$40 million.

Approximately one million computers were used in the attacks on Estonia. A small fraction of those computers was used directly, while the majority were infected by malicious software and acted as ‘zombies.’ Many attacks were carried out from Russia, but traces of the attacks led to at least 177 countries.30 Most of the attacks were carried out from computers with private addresses (IP), but computers under the control of Russian government institutions were also discovered.

26 Michael N. Schmitt, "Cyber Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum Revisited," Villanova Law Review 56 (2011): 569. 27 Li Sheng, "When Does Internet Denial trigger the Right of Armed Self-Defense?" Yale Journal of International Law 38 (November, 2012): 200. 28 Tikk, 2010; 17. The Skype computer application and online elections are just two examples of Estonia’s technological progress. 29 Katharine C. Hinkle, "Countermeasures in the Cyber Context: One More Thing to Worry About", Yale Journal of International Law Online, 37 (2011): http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-37-hinkle-countermeasures-in-the-cyber-context.pdf. 30 Charles Glover, "Kremlin-Backed Group behind Estonian Cyber Blitz", Financial Times, (March 11, 2009).


Picture 1: WWII Victory Memorial in Tallinn (AP)

Not surprisingly, Russia was suspected of perpetrating the

attacks. Some argue that Russia recruited organized crime groups for this purpose. However, no strong or clear-cut proof was presented that the Russian government carried out the attacks or stood behind them. Estonia itself stated that the attacks were carried out by patriotic groups of Russian hackers, without linking them directly to the Russian government.31 Estonia reacted in the main with actions like broadening lines of communication, and with joint diplomatic efforts with NATO member states.

The attacks on Estonia were a wake-up call to states around the world. For the first time, a country faced a broad, significant and state-sponsored attack in cyberspace

. The Attack on Georgia, 2008 In the summer, armed conflict broke out between Georgia and

Russia following the incursion of Georgian forces into the territory of South Ossetia. Russia won the relatively short war. Legally, this conflict was considered an international armed conflict, a conflict between states to which the international laws of war apply.

31 Tikk. 2010, 23.


Even before the Russian troops began to move, widespread cyber attacks were carried out against Georgia.32 Most of these attacks were DDoS attacks on government and the destruction of data through cyberspace. The cyber attacks lasted for about one month and continued even after a ceasefire was reached on the physical battlefield.

Georgia is not as advanced in cyberspace as Estonia, and as a result the damage Georgia suffered was less serious. Nevertheless, government services, banks and the credibility of the nation’s computer systems were harmed.33 The cyber attacks aimed to not only cause physical disruption but to place psychological pressure on the Georgian population.34

In Georgia, no clear evidence pointed to those responsible or involved in the attacks, including Russia. Most accept that Russia, at the very least, stood aside while Russian hackers attacked Georgia.35

The cyber attacks on Georgia demonstrated, for the first time, how actions in cyberspace are intertwined with modern warfare. The 2008 conflict highlighted that in the modern era, military campaigns will be accompanied by actions in cyberspace.

The Stuxnet Attack on Iran, 2010 In 2010, a virus known as Stuxnet disrupted operations at Iran’s Natanz Uranium enrichment facility. Stuxnet, a computer ‘worm,’ penetrated Natanz’s systems and caused the facility’s centrifuges to spin beyond their desired speeds leading to their destruction, all while hiding the faulty operation from the facility’s control systems.36

Stuxnet set a significant precedent in the legal literature, it changed the rules of the game. Stuxnet is the first known computer virus of the SCADA type designed to attack a specific industrial

32 Ibid. pp. 66-90. 33 Michael N. Schmitt, "Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues," Naval War College International Law Studies (2011): 113. 34 Richard M. Crowell, War in the Information Age: A Primer for Cyberspace Operations in 21st Century Warfare, (2012): 14. 35 Hathaway, 2012, 819. 36 Marco Roscini, "Cyber Operations as Nuclear Counter proliferation Measures," Journal of Conflict and Security Law 19 (2014):137.


system and cause large-scale damage.37 Until Stuxnet, cyber attacks paralyzed computers and destroyed data. Now, a cyber attack led to the physical damage to property.38 It clarified the potential of cyber attacks as a means of producing a destructive effect on the enemy.

`Parties in Iran and other countries attributed the attack to the United States and Israel,39 but no evidence was presented to prove the involvement of any state in the development or distribution of the virus.

The Stuxnet virus was complex and highly sophisticated. In the years following its discovery, additional sophisticated viruses spread, such as the “Flame,” DuQu, and Gauss viruses. There is no clear evidence, however, that these viruses caused direct damage to infrastructure.

Chinese attacks in the USA In recent years, indications have accumulated pointing to the existence of a widespread program of cyber attacks sponsored by the Chinese government.40 American computer security companies have repeatedly reported that a “national player” -referring to China- has been carrying out attacks on government and economic entities in the United States for years. An attack, known as ‘Titan Rain,’ was a carried out as early as 2005.41

In an apparently significant disclosure, the security firm Mandiant divulged in 2012 that a Chinese army unit, numbered 61398, had broken into the computer systems of three major American companies (Coca Cola, the computer security giant RSA, and Lockheed Martin – the largest fighter aircraft manufacturer in the West). In addition, substantial Chinese attacks were carried against

37 Hathaway, 2012; 819. 38 Banks, 2013, 157-158. Kenneth Geers, "Pandemonium: Nation States, National Security, and the Internet," The Tallinn Papers 1 (2014): https://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/TP_Vol1No1_Geers.pdf. 39 For example: "Iran blames U.S., Israel for Stuxnet malware," CBS News ( April 16, 2011): http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-20054574.html. 40 A DDoS attack by the Chinese military, against a site belonging to the Falun Gong movement in the USA, was even televised online. Ellen Nakashima & Wan William, "China’s Denials about Cyberattacks Undermined by Video Clip," Washington Post (Aug 24, 2011). 41 Crowell, 2012, 16.


other American and Western companies, including those operating critical energy and water infrastructure.42

The Chinese cyber attacks show the important component that the cyber realm plays in a superpower’s national security strategy. While some publications say that economic motivations stand at heart of these cyber activities, they certainly hold military implications.

A Glance into the Future: The Attraction of Cyber attacks Attacks in cyberspace challenge the current rules of the game and common perceptions. They are, in a sense, reminiscent of a different type of attack that found the international community unprepared: global terror, especially since 2001. Not surprisingly, terror organizations have already found cyberspace ripe for activity against both government entities and the private sector.43

Regrettably, terror has been adopted as a preferred mode of action by many groups and individuals, and its influence on the regional and global stage is great. Similarly, cyber attacks will continue to be perceived as attractive to nations, organizations and individuals. Consequently, their scope and intensity is liable to grow. There are many attractions to cyber attacks as a mode of operation.44 Five of these attractions are briefly presented here.45

The first attraction is the ability to hide cyber attacks. A sophisticated player can hide the identity of the attacking entity and its geographic origin; and sometimes even its timing, its means and its impact. Cyber attacks can also be carried out in a fragmentary

42 David E. Sanger, David Barboza and Nicole Perloth,” Chinese Army Unit Is Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S.” The New York Times, February, 18, 2013: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 43 Banks, 2013, 159. 44 Watts, 2011; 72. 45 See also: Isaac Ben-Israel and Lior Tabanski, “An inter-disciplinary review of security challenges in the age of Information,” Army and Strategy )2011):19.

https://www.nytimes.com/by/david-e-sanger

https://www.nytimes.com/by/david-barboza

https://www.nytimes.com/by/nicole-perlroth


manner as a web of independent actions that appear disconnected and leave the victim unaware of the “big picture.46”

In addition, private cyber experts, from profit-focused criminals to patriotic citizens, can be employed to carry out a cyber attack by a party that wishes to remain concealed. Thus, actions that appear like vandalism or piracy may be actually be initiated by a state. Moreover, even if the cyber attack victim discovers the true source of the attack, the damage inflicted by a single attack does not always merit the price involved in a state-level response, especially a response using traditional military force.47

The second attraction is the relatively low cost required to mount a cyber attack. Technologies are readily available and the personnel needs are small. Furthermore, cyber attacks are not limited by considerations of time and distance, or national, physical borders. From a technological point of view, cyber attacks also have a relatively high chance of success as the perfect cyber-defense has yet to be invented.48

Third, a cyber attack may be a powerful weapon against an enemy with more technological and military might. The technological advantage of the superpowers may turn into a double-edged sword, as the reliance on computerized infrastructure also makes the power more vulnerable to cyber attack. In this way, cyberspace may act as an equalizer on the battlefield.

Fourth, cyber attacks may harm the industrial, technological, economic and social development of the enemy. The ability to steal from or disrupt these domains, often considered ‘out of bounds’ to conventional or kinetic damage, could provide an important economic and military advantage.49

46 Antoine Lemay, Fernandeza José M. & Knight Scott, "Pinprick Attacks, a Lesser Included Case?" in: Czosseck Christian & Podins Karlis, Conference on Cyber Conflict, Proceedings 183 (2010): 191. 47 The attacker tries more than once to operate below the reaction threshold of states, thus gaining a “cybernetic immunity.” Watts, 2011, 72-75. John N.T. Shanahan, "Achieving Accountability in Cyberspace - Revolution or Evolution", Joint Forces Quarterly 73, no. 20 (2nd Quarter 2014): 25. See also: Isaac Ben-Israel and Lior Tabanski, 2011. 49 Lemay, 2010, 190.


This concern has not escaped the notice of policymakers and conceptual designers in countries like China. The Chinese even use national security terminology when talking about cyberspace and refer to China as a “cyber power.”50 In their view, military activity is only one part of a multi-disciplinary strategic competition, which includes information warfare, commerce, currency and the media.51 Nations that seek to compete with rivals in these dimensions without crossing the line necessitating a military response will find cyberspace an appealing playground to further their goals.52

Lastly, the absence of both effective international rule of law and the fear of punishment encourage actors to choose cyber attacks. Just as the international law concerning the struggle against terror has not yet sufficiently developed, so too the legal regime governing cyberspace has not yet been settled. Without stronger and clearer legal frameworks, cyber attacks and the instability that they may cause are likely to grow. In what follows, this paper will explore the implementation of the rule of law on cyber warfare and its challenges.

Formulating the Rules of the Game Understanding its importance to security, the economy, and society, states are focusing more attention and resources on cyberspace. This growing attention is driven by the growing centrality of the internet in everyday life, economic interests, the desire to increase supervision over internet content and concerns about cyber attacks.

The next few years will be a formative period for the development of the regimes that will govern cyberspace. While it is not in the scope of this paper to discuss all of the forces shaping this debate, it is important to shed light on state cyber policies, the cyber security discourse at the UN, and efforts to write new international laws, all of which will influence the new rules for cyberspace.

Formulating State-Level Cyber Policy

50 Li Zhang, "A Chinese Perspective on Cyber War", International Review of the Red Cross 94, (2012). 51 A conspicuous book written in China in the late 20th century: Liang Qiao & Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (1999). 52 Watts, 2011, 74.


The rapid development of cyberspace caught states all over the world ill-prepared to cope with its plethora of challenges. On very short notice, states, mainly in the West, were forced to develop new foreign and defense policies in the context of cyberspace. States had to form new doctrines, allocate resources, build new agencies, hire staff, write new laws, and build enforcement mechanisms.53

The country leading the work in the field, the United States, published a National Security Strategy paper in May 2010, which stated that, “Cyber security threats represent one of the most serious national security, public safety, and economic challenges we face as a nation.”54 The United States is well aware that the nation’s reliance on modern technology and cyberspace may be its Achilles heel.55 Consequently, a need was identified to restrain the use of the internet from being used in ways that might endanger America’s economic and military superiority.

US President Barack Obama referred to the issue in July 2012: “It doesn't take much to imagine the consequences of a

successful cyber attack. In a future conflict, an adversary unable to match our military supremacy on the battlefield might seek to exploit our computer vulnerabilities here at home. Taking down vital banking systems could trigger a financial crisis. The lack of clean water or functioning hospitals could spark a public health emergency. And as we've seen in past blackouts, the loss of electricity can bring

53 Thus, for example, in February 2013, it was published that a legal review was carried in USA to assess the enforcement of authority in a cyber attack, including an attempt to define the authority of the President. See: "Broad Powers Seen for Obama in Cyber strikes," NY Times, February 3, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/us/broad-powers-seen-for-obama-in-cyberstrikes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 54 The White House, National Security Strategy 27 (2010): www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf 55Andrew F. Krepinevich, 7 Deadly Scenarios: A military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century (2009): 194.


businesses, cities and entire regions to a standstill. This is the future we have to avoid.”56

Richard Clarke, former Special Advisor to the President on cyber

security, further clarified American interests. “Having some effective limits on what nations actually do with their cyber war knowledge might, given our asymmetrical vulnerabilities, be in the US national interest,” he said.57

Aligning policy with the new reality, the US Department of Defense published a paper entitled “Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace” in 2011 that defines cyberspace as an operational dimension, just like the traditional dimensions of land, sea, air, and space.58 Moreover, the United States established the first Cyber Command, which is responsible for activities in that dimension. The new command is a significant step toward concentrating American capabilities and authority into one organization that can lead a wide spectrum of operational activities in cyberspace.59

The United States is home to a particularly lively debate concerning the norms that should be applied in cyberspace. The complexity of the debate emanates, among others, from the tension of cyberspace being both a field for the promotion of American interests as well as its soft underbelly.60

In a similar manner to the US, the subject raises a great interest in Britain, NATO, and even in non-Western nations, such as China and

56 President Barack Obama, Taking the Cyberattack Threat Seriously, Wall Street Journal, July 20, 2012: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/07/20/taking-cyberattack-threat-seriously?utm_source=related. 57 Richard D. Clarke, quoted in Maurer, 2011; 5. 58 Department of Defense, Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, 2011. 59 See the publications of the U.S. Department of Defense at the time of the establishment of the new command: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=59295 60 Maurer, 2011; 5.


Russia.61In an uncharacteristic move, Russia published a conceptual paper in 2011 that directs its armed forces' activities in cyberspace.62 UN Activity The growth of cyberspace, the emergence of cyber attacks, and a pseudo cyber arms race led, expectedly, to a call for debate at the UN.63 Issues of cyberspace have emerged both in political and military debates (usually around arms control), and in economic debates involving cyber-crime.64 In the political-military context, states are concerned with how cyberspace tools may serve purposes that do not align with the preservation of international stability and security.

The UN provides an excellent window into the cyber arms race and the competing interests involved. Ironically, Russia leads the international call for arms control in cyberspace, while the United States often blocks these proposals.65 It is too early to predict what new regimes may emerge from these UN debates, and whether they will take on any force in international law.

Establishing the Rule of Law The international legal regime to govern cyberspace is presently

at the stage international law scholars call ‘norm emergence.’66 At this stage, various parties and entities initiate proposals for the emerging regime and recruit support among states and international organizations. Some of the initiatives proposed the development of a “soft law” legal regime, a non-obligatory and unenforceable

61 See also: Vladislav P. Sherstyuk, "Summit must play a part in creating a safer global information space", BRICS New Delhi Summit 86 (2012). Assistant secretary of the Russian National Security Council, referring, inter alia, to the Russian concept of sovereignty in cyberspace. For the Chinese position, see: Zhang, 2012. Russian Federation, Conceptual Views Regarding the Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Information Space (2011). http://www.ccdcoe.org/strategies/Russian_Federation_unofficial_translation.pdf. 63 Waxman, 2011, 425. The author proposes to learn from the lessons of history, and from discussions held on similar subjects at the UN, in particular from debates on the use of force, held during the Cold War. 64 Maurer, 2011, 45. The author expands on the description of the debates at UN, and on the association between the debates and global developments. 65 Clarke & Knake, 2010,218 – 219. It should be noted that the relations between super powers are not always in opposition, there are also signs of cooperation, such as a cybernetic “Hot Line” Between the USA and Russia. See: Geers, 2014; 13. 66 A model developed by Finnemore & Sikkink, which will not be discussed here.


system of norms and principles whose purpose is to influence states’ conduct.67 This legal path, which combines public diplomacy and academic argument, seeks to shape “softer” versions of a future legal regime in order to encourage legal debates. This is often seen as the first stage of a multi-stage process.68

Picture 2: The Tallinn Manual

An important step in this process was the release of the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare in 2012.69 In 2009, NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Center for Excellence (CCDCOE), based in Tallinn, Estonia, invited an independent group of legal, academic, and technical experts to produce a guide to the laws governing cyber warfare. Led by Professor Michael Schmitt of the United States, the group published

67 Alan E. Boyle, "Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law," The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 48.4 (1999): 901-902. 68 Maurer, 2011; 14. 69 Tallinn Manual, International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, (Cambridge University Press 2013).


its work electronically in the summer of 2012 and a print version in March 2013.70

Cyberspace and International Law – Together or Alone ? The most important legal discussion concerns the fundamental question whether the existing accepted international laws regulate cyberspace in any way. The answer is ambiguous.

The reason for this ambiguity, first and foremost, is that the international charters, the backbone of international law, were formulated in an age when cyberspace was the science of the future. Moreover, states do not have clear cyber policies from which one may infer the legal rules that direct the states in practice.71 It is also important to note that the various approaches to the topic do not express ‘pure’ legal considerations, but also strategic and ideological considerations. Thus, the response to the question will change depending on who is asked, whether in Beijing, Moscow, or Washington. In light of the above, modesty and critical thinking are required from anyone pretending to present the legal situation in cyberspace with a high level of certainty.

With these limitations in mind it still useful to review the positions taken by various states to the fundamental question. China recognizes the need to impose international regulations in cyberspace to prevent the militarization of cyberspace, to encourage peaceful solution of disputes, and to forbid the use of force.72 China emphasizes that it has been a victim of cyber attacks, in particular from the United States, Japan and South Korea,73and denounces

70 The rules appearing in the manual were formulated on the basis of a consensus among the experts. The wish to reach a consensus among all experts sometimes involved compromises and the creation of a broad common denominator. The manual’s authors do not propose, for example, a new paradigm for the legal settlement of cyberspace, such as a new treaty, or a selective enforcement of the existing laws, but rather seek to provide answers to the challenges of cyberspace through the interpretation of the existing laws. 71 The Tallinn Manual, 5. 72 Zhang, 2012. 73 The Chinese are bothered by the war waged against them in cyberspace, claiming that as of 2012, 80,000 such attacks are carried monthly. Zhang, 2012; 805.


what it sees as Western attempts to prevent it from developing cyber capabilities.

Russia recognizes existing international laws as a starting point for a debate on cyberspace, but interprets the laws differently than the West’s interpretation. Russia also calls for new legal principles to govern cyberspace.74

China and Russia favor a legal strategy that will create a cyberspace suitable to their interests. As they see it, the West’s dominance over information is an element of the West strategy for hegemony. The Western norms prevalent on the internet are a threat to their regimes, and information is a weapon that must be controlled and monitored.75

Western states hold a wide spectrum of approaches for regulation of cyberspace. Some favor total application of international law in cyberspace. Others argue that the application international law to cyber space requires adaptations and revisions. Still others object to the application of international law in cyberspace.76

The position most widely held by government officials in the United States, as well as leading writers in Israel, is that international law regulations should apply to cyberspace.77 This position is expressed in a 2011 White House international strategy paper on cyberspace, which states,

74 The matter arises, for instance, in Russia’s draft convention on international

information security, September 2011, presented by Nicolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council of Russia. Article 7 of the draft proposes that during an information war, international, humanitarian law should be observed. http://www.conflictstudies.org.uk/files/20120426_CSRC_IISI_Commentary.pdf. 75 James A. Lewis, ”In Defense of Stuxnet,” Strategic Assessment 17, no. 14 (January, 2015): http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/MASA4-3_Lewis.pdf 76 The Tallinn Manual, p. 3. The manual quotes, inter alia, the International Red Cross position in favor of the application of the international law to cyberspace. For an interesting opinion, according to which the international law should develop to regulate cyberspace, and that cyber wars should be encouraged as a substitute to conventional ones, see: Jeffrey T.G. Kelsey, "Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare", Michigan Law Review 1427 (2008). 77 The Tallinn Manual, 5. See also: Charles Dunlap, "Perspectives for Cyber Strategists on Law for Cyber war," Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring, 2011).


“[t]he development of norms for state conduct in

cyberspace does not require a reinvention of customary international law, nor does it render existing international norms obsolete. Long-standing international norms guiding state behavior - in times of peace and conflict - also apply in cyberspace.”78

Similar sentiments were expressed in an important speech by

Professor Harold Hongju Koh, former Legal Adviser to the US Department of State, in September 2012.79

While the United States and Western states hold that the fundamentals of international law must apply in cyberspace, there is a range of opinions as to how suitable and applicable these laws are in cyberspace. The White House strategy statement mentioned above also states that legal work and will be required to determine how best to apply these regulations in cyberspace. The writers emphasize that it is not yet clear how international law should apply in relation to cyber attacks,80and that a significant analysis of international law is required due to the flourishing of cyberspace.81

The Challenge of Applying International Law in Cyberspace Even the strongest believers in the widespread application of international law agree that the application and implementation of international law in cyberspace is, at the very least, challenging.82 Cyberspace undermines the traditional paradigms of international law.

78 The White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security and Openness in a Networked World 9 (2011). http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdfpace.pdf. 79 Harold Hongju Koh, "Legal Advisor of the Dep’t of State, International Law in Cyberspace Address to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference," (September 18, 2012) : http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm. James A. Lewis, "Multilateral Agreement to Constrain Cyberconflict", Arms Control Today (June 2010):16. 81 Duncan B. Hollis, "Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations", 11 Lewis & Clark L. Rev (2007): 1027-1028. 82 Hathaway, 2012, 840.


International law developed as a means of regulating relations between states that have borders, territory, and sovereignty. Major players in cyberspace, however, are not states. The largest players include commercial giants such as Google and Facebook; and other organizations such as the group known as “Anonymous,” terror organizations, hackers, and unofficial state-sponsored entities. Moreover, it is difficult to apply terms such as “territory,” “violation of sovereignty,” “observation of geographical borders,” and “state activity” in cyberspace.83 These terms, so central to international law, are almost foreign to the open, borderless, and global cyberspace.

One of the most important developments in international law in recent decades is the attribution of responsibility to states and individuals, for example in instances of war crimes. Attributing legal responsibility necessitates identification of the state or the party that carried out an action, and attributing the action to it based on evidence. Cyberspace was not designed to enable the easy identification of those acting therein. Sophisticated players will leave no trace of their actions, find ways to prevent substantiated attribution,84 and will even work to incriminate innocent parties. Major attacks in cyberspace were accompanied by a wealth of speculations as to the responsible parties, but those theories were not supported by substantial evidence or proof.

International laws of war are based on a number of principles including the principle of distinction. The principle of distinction requires that attacking forces differentiate between enemy combatants and military targets, and civilians and civilian property, while aiming to prevent harm to civilians and civilian property. In general, complying with the requirement of distinction is challenging

83 Luciano Floridy, "The Ethics of Cyber-Conflicts in Hyper historical Societies", in: Ludovica Glorioso & Anna-Maria Osula, 1st Workshop on Ethics of Cyber Conflict 3 (2014): 4. 84 Larry Greenemeier, "Seeking Address: Why Cyber Attacks Are So Difficult to Trace Back to Hackers", SCI. AM( June 11, 2011): http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=tracking-cyber-hackers. In some DDoS attacks, it is possible to present circumstantial evidence about the responsible party, but these are far from being legally satisfying. See: Sheng, 2012, 202-203.


on the modern battlefield, and is even more challenging to apply in cyberspace.

In cyberspace, the line between civilian and combatant is completely blurred (cyber ‘combatants’ are likely to be civilians, in civilian clothing, in civilian offices, whose weapons are computers and keyboards).85 Civilian and military communications infrastructures are often intertwined, and it is often impossible to differentiate between military and civilian networks, facilities and institutions.86 The application of terms such as “combatant,” “military target,” “proportionality,” and “collateral damage” to cyberspace demand, at the very least, new and creative thinking.

Broadly speaking, international law is traditionally based on distinction and differentiation - between states and non-state entities, military and civilian infrastructure, attack and defense, and so on. Cyberspace, on the other hand, is not an area of clear classification and dichotomy. It is an area of deep and intentional ambiguity that is dynamic, changing and open to all. The blending of military and civilian, national and private, interests and motivations, will only become more pronounced over time.

Cyberspace threatens to break, or perhaps is already breaking, traditional legal distinctions. It undermines the rationale on which the traditional legal and military ways of thinking are based.87

An additional characteristic of cyberspace, on top of breaking all the rules, is the fact that everyone is playing. At a time when few states, if any, can realistically threaten a kinetic attack on Western states, new technology enables states and non-state actors to attack

85 For more about the confusion surrounding the term “combatant” in cyberspace: Maurizio D’urso, "The Cyber-Combatant: A New Status for a New Warrior", in: Glorioso & Osula ( 2014). 86 Matthew Crosston, “Duqu’s Dilemma: The Ambiguity Assertion and the Futility of Sanitized Cyberwar,” Military and Strategic Affairs ,5 , No. 1 , May 2013: http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/MASA5-1Eng4_Crosston.pdf. The writer emphasizes the impossibility of distinguishing between military and civilian by analyzing the DuQu virus and argues that there is no “pure” civilian infrastructure in cyberspace. 87 Indeed, some, like Crosston, (2013) deny the very possibility of creating a proper legal regime in cyberspace, preferring to put his trust in deterrence.


in new ways. In cyberspace, even small players may wield influence, far greater than their relative size,88 on states’ national security.

Moreover, in the past, Western states were the dominant world powers that were privileged to lead the drafting of most of international law. A future legal arrangement for cyberspace is not expected to be the privilege of the West because the other world powers would not be passive and act as a rubber stamp. China and Russia, for example, are cyber powers, with their own interests and who wield a lot of weight in the international community. It can be assumed that other states, also active in cyberspace (such as India and Iran), will seek to exert their own influence.

International law has already been forced to adapt itself to warfare in new dimensions (sea, air and space) and to cope with significant new phenomena (such as nuclear weapons and terror). Yet, cyberspace, with its particular characteristics and infinite possibilities, is liable to prove an unprecedented challenge to the application of the existing rules. In order to elucidate this point, it is helpful to explore one important context – the right to the use of force in self-defense as a response to an armed attack. The Right to the Use of Force in Self-Defense as a Response to an Armed Attack One of the important principles in international law is the prohibition of the use of force. It is anchored in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and is considered, as ruled by the International Court in The Hague, one of the Charter’s cornerstones.89 Article 2(4) states, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

If force is used against a state, there are liable to be far-reaching consequences. When the use of force is sufficiently grave, and considered an ‘armed attack,’ the attacked state has the right to

88 Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon L. Cardash, and George C. Salmoiraghi, A Blueprint for Cyber Deterrence: Building Stability through Strength, Military and Strategic Affairs 4, No. 3 (December 2012). 89 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda 2005 I.C.J.): 168, 223.


make counter-use of force in self-defense.90 From here, the distance to an all-out war may be very short, and painful. Do these principles and rules, which came into being with regard to the use of conventional, kinetic, weapons, also apply to the use of ‘weapons’ such as computers and communications networks? The common opinion is yes.

The International Court in The Hague ruled that the prohibition on the use of force applies to any and every use of force no matter what type of weapon is used. The Legal Advisor to the US State Department declared that the United States will exercise its right to self-defense even if attacked by cyber means if the activity escalates to an armed attack.91

The question that then arises is which cyber activities amount to an armed attack? The dominant position in the West is that a cyberattack will amount to an armed attack if its characteristics and consequences resemble a kinetic armed attack,92 principal among them by causing death or injury, or damaging property.

This approach was adopted by the experts at Tallinn and expressed in Rule 13 of the Tallinn Manual. The experts who gathered Tallinn unanimously agreed that a cyber action could be so serious that it would be justifiable to define it as an armed attack. They added that not all use of force should be deemed an armed attack and that certain scale and effects93 would be required for the use of force to amount to an armed attack.

The official American approach was presented in Professor Koh’s 2012 speech. According to this position, the physical consequences of a cyber action determine its definition: if the consequences are death, injury or significant damage to property, the attack may be considered an armed attack, and thus justify forceful self-defense.

90 Article 51 of the UN charter states that: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” 91 Koh, p.4. 92 Sheng, 2012; 188. 93 A term taken from the verdict of The International Court of Justice in The Hague in the Nicaragua affair.


So, for example, self-defense through force is justifiable if the physical consequences of a cyber attack are similar to the consequences of a bomb or rocket. Koh gave scenarios of cyber sabotage that would be considered an armed attack, including the meltdown of a nuclear facility, bursting a dam in a populated area, and neutralizing air traffic control.

Can damage to data be considered damage to property? The common interpretation is that the collection of cyber data, theft of data, and even the destruction or modification of data, are not, on their own, an armed attack.94

The American and Western approach reflects the traditional perception of war. Throughout history, states disrupted world order by harming people and damaging property. The physical consequences were considered destructive to world stability and to the security of nations. Thus, the international community agreed to adopt rules preventing their occurrence.95

Cyberspace challenges the traditional perception because a cyber attack may not cause direct physical harm to persons or property. Imagine, for example, a cyber attack on the New York Stock Exchange that impedes the flow of data, causes investors to lose trust in the market, and leads to the collapse of the stock exchange. The damage resulting from such an attack to the American and world economies would be extraordinarily severe. While seemingly, the only damage caused would be economic, without the characteristics of direct physical damage, the activity may not be considered armed attack.

With cyberspace, it is possible to undermine the stability of states using non-kinetic actions: through strokes on a computer keyboard or touches on a screen. Cyber tools and capabilities, which no one

94 Some argue that otherwise, nearly all actions in cyberspace would be considered “armed attack” – an unreasonable interpretation with dire consequences. Others add an exception, in cases where the damaged data is about to become tangible, such as the erasure of a bank account which is considered the same as cash. According to this interpretation, in such an event, a damage to data may amount to damage to property. See: Schmitt, 2011; 589. 95 Schmitt, 2011(1); 603.


thought of prohibiting, are likely to cause severe consequences and be perceived by states as casus belli.96

In more general terms, cyberspace disconnects the rule of law from the outcomes that the law seeks to prevent. International law is supposed to allow states to defend themselves and prevent dire consequences.97 In the modern world, international law of war must address more than just physical damage. States will not tolerate losing access to the internet, the undermining of trust in the banking system, paralysis in the stock markets, or disruption of the government’s computerized services. The state will consider such cyber attacks just as serious as a military or kinetic attack, and it will look to respond, justifiably, in kind. The legal system will also have to respond to these types of cyber attacks.98 Even if the legal system stays quiet, states’ conduct will dictate new rules of the game.

The difficulty in accepting the current legal situation has already been expressed in the academic literature. Many writers believe that it is not the physical nature of the consequences of an attack (bodily harm or damage to property only) that should determine whether an attack justifies a forceful response. Rather, a wider analysis of the economic and social consequences of an attack should be made to determine whether a cyber action is considered an armed attack.99 In this view, for example, a cyberattack that severely disrupts communications networks and financial records justifies a retaliatory use of force in self-defense.

Thus, an interesting analogy rose in the legal literature that compares the blocking of access to digital data to the blocking of sea routes, which is forbidden in international law.100This interpretation appreciates that the modern dependence on digital infrastructure is no less than the dependence on physical infrastructure, such as sea

96 The issue was also raised by President Obama, who pointed out that “taking down vital banking systems could trigger a financial crisis. The lack of clean water or functioning hospitals could spark a public health emergency.” Barack Obama, "Taking the Cyber attack Threat Seriously", Wall Street Journal (July 19, 2012). 97 Schmitt, 2012; 287. 98 Ibid, pp. 288-289. 99 The Tallinn Manuel, p.56. 100 Shang, 2012.


lanes. For both types of international infrastructure, damage should be prohibited.

The complexity in applying legal regulations to the right to use force in self-defense in response to an armed attack in cyberspace is just one of many examples of the widespread difficulty presented by cyberspace. Attempts to apply other legal principles in cyberspace will produce similar shortcomings and question marks.

Conclusion The security of cyberspace has been defined by the United Nations and by many states as one of the most significant challenges of this century. The Prime Minister of Israel considers it one of the four major threats facing Israel.101

These perceptions have been forged in light of past and ongoing attacks in cyberspace, the realization that cyber attacks will increase, and the awareness that cyber attacks may potentially cause great damage. Cyber attacks are an attractive means for states, organizations and individuals. They can be concealed with relative ease, they are cheap and available, and it is hard to defend against them. Cyber attacks provide the ability to nullify an enemy’s technological and economic advantages. Moreover, as the legal norms governing cyberspace have yet to take shape shaped, an attacker does not risk acting outside the rules of the game.

The coming years will be a momentous period in shaping the legal regime that will regulate cyberspace. Currently, there is already a broad-based agreement (both in the West, and in China and Russia) that international law must apply in cyberspace.

At the same time, there is a consensus that application of the law will, at the very least, be challenging, at the very least, because cyberspace undermines traditional paradigms of international law. The terminology of international law (borders, territory, states, combatants, etc.) is alien to cyberspace. It is hard to ascribe legal responsibility for cyber activity. International law relies on

101 Barak Ravid, “Who will protect Israel from cyber attacks? Netanyahu preferred the cyber-stuff over the General Security Services,” Haaretz, (September 2014): http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/.premium-1.2439777


distinguishing the civilian and military, whereas cyberspace is characterized by deep, intentional ambiguity.

Cyberspace threatens to break, or perhaps is already breaking, traditional legal distinctions. It undermines the rationale on which the traditional legal and military ways of thinking are based. The challenge of using force in self-defense to a cyber attack was presented as just one example of the enormous challenge posed to international law by the growth of cyberspace.

In addition, everyone can be a player in cyberspace. New technology enables states and non-state actors to threaten the national security of larger and more powerful states. Western states will also not enjoy the unique privilege of drafting the new international legal rules.

International law will have to change and develop in order to provide answers to today’s new reality. If that does not happen, states will feel restricted by the existing law and will lack an effective response to the threats against them.102 Preserving the traditional rules of international law may contradict their national security interests and raise difficult dilemmas when forming policy. As technology progresses and cyber attacks become more frequent, states will be required to make increasingly frequent decisions on whether to respond on whether or not to respond by force, cyber or physical. International law must be reinvented to supply rules that will help preserve stability and security in the age of cyberspace. Time will tell whether the law has successfully met this great challenge.

102 Watts, 2001; 76.


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