Rapid Port Opening Element (RPOE)

In 2007, the Department of the Army approved the design for a new Transportation unit to

deploy with the Air Mobility Command (AMC) Contingency Response Group (CGR) as the

Joint Port Opening Element. The new unit was the 55-person Transportation Detachment

designated the Rapid Port Opening Element (RPOE). The RPOE would be ready to load within a

12-hour notice for deployment to an existing airfield. The mission of the RPOEs were to deploy

to any crises or contingency to support USTRANSCOM’s Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-

PO) in opening up the airport or seaport of debarkation to establish military cargo/passenger

receipt capabilities in support of humanitarian relief or combat operations. The first RPOE would

activate at Fort Eustis, Virginia, on 16 March 2008.1

Although the RPOEs would eventually fall under the control of the 597th Transportation Group

(SDDC) at Fort Eustis, the 597th did not have the organizational structure to train up the new

detachments. So the RPOEs initially fell under the 10th Transportation Battalion, 7th Sustainment

Brigade engaged for activation and training. The next two RPOEs would activated on 16 October

2008 and 16 October 2009. Each would be commanded by a major.2

The 832nd Transportation Battalion at Jacksonville, Florida developed the proof of principle

exercise for the JTF-PO, which would become the template for SDDC. This exercise validated

the 688th RPOE. Upon completion of the exercise, the 832nd organized a Distribution

Deployment Support Team (DDST) to create the first JTF-PO.

On 16 October 2008. CPT Amanda R. Lam unfurled the colors of the 689th RPOE and assumed

command of the new activated detachment at Third Port. LTC William T. Draper, the 10th

Transportation Battalion Commander, was the reviewing officer for the activation ceremony. It

then underwent training to validate its ability to operate airports and seaports of debarkation.3

In April 2009, the 597th Transportation Group finally received command and control of the 688th

and 689th RPOEs. The 10th Transportation Battalion was still standing up the 690th RPOE.

Although the 597th Transportation Group had four subordinate transportation battalions, none

were stationed at Fort Eustis, so the RPOEs answered directly to the group headquarters.

The 688th RPOE teamed up with the 833rd Transportation Battalion and conducted a Joint Task

Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO) airport of debarkation (APOD) and seaport of debarkation

(SPDO) exercise in May 2009. The 689th RPOE conducted its first deployment exercise at the

Port of Tacoma with the JTF-PO to download the equipment of the download the equipment of

the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and upload the Strykers and equipment of the 5th Stryker

Brigade Combat Team and for deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2009. This validated

its ability to conduct port opening operations. MAJ William Costice commanded the 689th RPOE

during the exercise.4 1 Chief of Transportation’s (COT) Quarterly Significant Activities Report (SIGACTS) - October 2007. 2 7th Sustainment Brigade (Rear) (Prov) Update 21 Sep – 27 Sep 08. 3 Beverly Joyner, “689th Trans. De. (RPOE) activates at Eustis,” The Wheel. October 23, 2008. 4 Mike W. Peterson, SDDC Command Affairs, “Rapid Port Opening Element: Logistics first responders,” Army.mil,

November 16, 2009,

https://www.army.mil/article/30486/Rapid_Port_Opening_Element__Logistics_first_responders/

The 690th RPOE, commanded by MAJ Armando R. Kuppinger, was finally activated on 16

October 2009. With three RPOEs, they could rotate the alert status. One RPOE would remain on

a two-hour recall, while the other two conducted port opening training exercises.

Operation Unified Response, Haiti

On 12 January 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake wreaked havoc throughout Port-au-Prince,

Haiti devastating the transportation infrastructure to include the seaport as well as the rest of the

city. As the shockwaves rippled across the globe, it set in motion a flow of humanitarian

assistance and disaster relief back into Haiti. In a cry for help, Haitian President René Préval

requested international assistance immediately. The US Ambassador, Ken Merten, likewise

related the magnitude of the disaster to the State Department in Washington, DC. As a result,

President Barrack Obama then directed the US Agency of International Development (USAID)

and the Department of Defense to assist the government of Haiti in both humanitarian assistance

and disaster relief. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates relayed this directive verbally to US

Southern Command, and coincidently LTG Purl K. “Ken” Keen, the SOUTHCOM Deputy

Commander, was in Haiti during the earthquake. Although successful, this operation revealed

how much the Army had forgotten about conducting no notice deployments into austere

environments. It also occurred during the time the US Army was adjusting to modularity, and the

emergence of the Surface Distribution Deployment Center’s responsibility for deployment from

point of origin to final destination.

As the 10th or 832nd Transportation Battalions prepared to see which battalion would deploy to

Haiti before the other, someone first had to open the airport. This deployment, coincidently,

would validate the role of a new Transportation organization - the Rapid Port Opening Element

(RPOE). The Army had created three RPOEs: 688th, 689th and 690th, under the 597th

Transportation Group at Fort Eustis, which were Surface Deployment Distribution Command

assets. By design, the RPOEs deploy early with an Air Force Contingency Response Group

(CRG) to open up the airport of debarkation (APOD), and also have the capability to open up the

sea port of debarkation (SPOD). In addition, the current war had extended Surface Deployment

Distribution Command’s focus beyond the port of embarkation to the port of debarkation in

Kuwait and eventually into Iraq. Surface Deployment Distribution Command, the only

Transportation Command left in the Army, now had responsibility for deployment from end to

end including the final destination.

After the Army reorganized and reflagged the 7th Transportation Group as a sustainment brigade,

the loss of that brigade-level theater port opening capability and the creation of the RPOEs

inspired Surface Deployment Distribution Command to relocate the 597th Transportation

Terminal Group to Fort Eustis and possibly migrate other port opening assets and watercraft

under it, essentially recreating the 7th Transportation Group capability. Surface Deployment

Distribution Command wanted the LOTS capability and Haiti would validate both the RPOE and

Surface Deployment Distribution Command’s capability to conduct a LOTS Operation. The fact

that several key personnel in both SDDC and 7th Sustainment Brigade had extensive 7th

Transportation Group experience and had even deployed with it to Haiti in 1994 would

contribute heavily to the success of this operation.

The 688th RPOE was on alert status and scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan. Its commander,

MAJ Victoria L. “Vicki” Snow and her Mobility Warrant Officer, WO1 Caleb Camp, were in

Mazar E Sharif, Afghanistan conducting the pre-deployment site survey when the earthquake in

Haiti struck. She had just assumed command of the 688th Rapid Port Opening Element (RPOE)

at Fort Eustis, Virginia on 18 August 2009. An RPOE was divided into three platoons:

headquarters, clearance platoon and forward node platoon. The 688th RPOE had recently

conducted an airport of debarkation (APOD) exercise in Indianapolis the fall of 2009, so they

were trained up to run an APOD.5

The morning after the earthquake, MAJ Armando Kuppinger heard about it on the radio driving

into physical training at Fort Eustis. At the PT formation he told his soldiers about the

significance of what had just happened. His 690th RPOE had just stood up and was in the training

phase so it would be deploying as a unit. So they urged everyone to make sure they had their

shots and paperwork completed for deployment. 6

At 0900 hours on 13 January, COL Jeffrey Helmick’s 597th Transportation Group called the

RPOE commanders and first sergeants together for a meeting. LTC John Redinger, S-3 of the

597th Transportation Group, and Mr. Gene Sullivan informed the RPOE leaders that this

emergency would validate their mission and USTRANSCOM was trying to determine if

USSOUTHCOM needed this kind of support. Since the Contingency Response Wing was

involved in a training exercise at Fort Polk, USTRANSCOM was trying to determine how to get

them to assess the airfield in Haiti. The staff warned the RPOEs to be ready to deploy.

By 1300 hours, the 597th Transportation Group identified the members of the Joint Assessment

Team (JAT) to determine the requirements in Haiti. LTC Redinger would lead the team: MAJ

Armando Kuppinger, 690th RPOE; 1LT Eric Wrinkle and SPC Kevin Kelly, 688th RPOE; 1SG

David W. Pollard and SPC Martinez, 689th RPOE; CPT Bill Reasoner and Carlos Benudiz, 832nd

Transportation Battalion. Kuppinger would deploy as the acting commander of the 688th because

MAJ Snow was in Afghanistan. The RPOEs then had to determine the other members of the

JAT. The 688th chose 1LT Eric Wrinkle, the Clearance Platoon Leader, their communications

sergeant and SPC Kevin Kelly.

MAJ Kuppinger went home to assemble together his TA-50 military field gear. He had just

received his household goods from his permanent change of station (PCS) move from Germany

and dug through 15 boxes to locate all this gear. He had just become married a few weeks prior

and his wife, also a Transportation Corps officer, helped them in palletizing their equipment for

the deployment. They built pallets throughout the evening. They made sure they had plenty of

food, water, ammunition, and toilet paper. Knowing fuel would be an issue on the ground they

filled up as many cans with diesel and mogas as they could fit on the pallet. Their

communications equipment consisted of the new AN/PRC-148 Multiband Inter/intra Team

Radios (MBITR) made by Thales Communications, Academic scheduling computer (ARC) for

5 MAJ Victoria L. Snow, 1LT Eric Wrinkle, and WO1 Caleb Camp interview by Richard Killblane at Port au Prince,

Haiti on 14 February 2010. 6 MAJ Armando Kuppinger interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, VA, 30 March 2010.

reconnoitering routes for the forward node, and BGAN terminal. They were ready to deploy on

schedule by 2300 hours.7

Since MAJ Snow’s 688th RPOE was first in the door to deploy and MAJ William A. Costice’s

689th RPOE was next. After the meeting, Costice returned to the barracks and told his soldiers to

pack their bags and be ready to fly out the next day. The 689th would deploy with all its 10K

forklifts, rolling stock, tents and communication equipment. They had a small portable

operations communications kit (SPOCK), which gave them NIPR, SIPR internet and video

teleconference (VTC) capability. They also had 15 NIPR computers and two SIPR computers,

and 44 inverted radios that functioned similar to SINCGARS, but could be carried on one’s belt

while walking around. They had two tracking kits for RFID tags, two portable deployment kits

(PDK) and five early entry deployment support (EEDS) kits. They used the PDK for short term

operations that last 30 days or less and the EEDS for missions lasting up to three months.8

Around 1600 hours, USTRANSCOM designated LTC Riddle as the Joint Task Force-Port

Opening (PO)-SPOD in the Warning Order. Reasoner and Benudiz then flew up from

Jacksonville and arrived at Newport News around midnight where they linked up with the other

members of the JAT from Fort Eustis.9

At 0400 hours on 14 January, the JAT flew out of Langley and circled over Port-au-Prince four

hours later. Because the airport was so crowded their plane had to wait for room to land.

Kuppinger described it as a madhouse with media and military running around. He quickly

realized they were among the first on the ground. Aside from Special Operation Forces and

SOUTHCOM personnel already in country at the time of the earthquake, the Transportation

Corps deployed the first Army unit on the ground in Haiti.10 With no functioning air terminal, a

handful of airmen directed traffic with a radio on top of a small rise. The tiny airport was chaos

with aircraft landing and taking off constantly, parking anywhere there was space and people

driving up to unload directly from the planes. Air Force special operations personnel on dirt

bikes guided in planes.

Wrinkle only remembered then deploying with one HMMWV, but the 688th RPOE timeline

listed nine passengers and two HMMWVs. Pallets were stacked at the west end of the airfield

without any order. There was one forklift on the airfield and it was unloading pallets off the

aircraft and loading them on awaiting humanitarian assistance (HA) trucks.11

The RPOE found an empty warehouse on the west end of the airfield, busted the locks and

cleared it out as best as they could. They set up some tables and communications equipment. The

RPOE set up their BGAN and had satellite communications within 30 minutes. This was the

main means of communication until the Air Force Contingency Response Group arrived and had

their SPICE operating. Their Air Force counterpart was training at Fort Polk to get on the

7 Kuppinger interview. 8 MAJ William A. Costice interview by Richard Killblane at Port au Prince, Haiti on 13 February 2010 9 LTC John Redinger interview, 24 March 2010; 1LT Eric Wrinkle interview; and 1SG David Pollard interview for

list. LTC Redinger wrote a time line. Riddle, “Joint Task Force.” 10 Redinger interview; and Helmick email, January 22, 2010. 11 Wrinkle interview.

ground. By being one of the first units on the ground gave them a seat in what would become the

SOUTHCOM Joint Operations Center (JOC).12

The RPOE had the mission of conducting a joint assessment of the airport of debarkation

(APOD) and taking a look at the port. Kuppinger was responsible for the APOD. They

immediately made deals with the Special Forces team for any kind of transportation or lift to get

eyes on the ports. At first the others did not consider the RPOE a priority but as they continued to

interface, the Special Forces personnel realized the RPOE had an important role there.13

1LT Wrinkle, 1SG Pollard, SPC Martinez, their driver, and a civilian interpreter, Carlos

Benudez, loaded up in one HMMWV to conduct a route reconnaissance to locate a place to

establish as the forward node. By doctrine they could search as far as ten kilometers out from the

airport so they started looking for a suitable area that far out. Keeping in mind that most of the

military personnel had multiple deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan, they had an uneasy feeling

about riding outside the compound in soft-skinned vehicles. Kuppinger was concerned about the

possibility of criminal activity or mad chaos. The Haitians were walking around in a daze but

grateful to see the American military there.

They drove to the United Nations compound and considered it too small and far away from the

airfield for their needs, so they drove around the airport and found an open field only a kilometer

from the east end of the runway. It had easy access from the road where trucks could come in

and out and it was within the security of the airport. It was the right size for their needs.

The JAT did not have any concertina wire or even 5-50 cord to rope off the area. The problem

was that a number of civilian search and rescue teams were arriving and were commandeering

space for their camps.

Switching to an international service on their Black Berries provided Short Message Service

(SMS) text messaging would allow them to talk to the non-government organizations and

USAID.14

The Air Force’s 621st Contingency Response Group (CRG) arrived around noon.

The 688th RPOE main body was supposed to follow shortly thereafter by air but no aircraft was

allocated to deploy it. Consequently, MAJ Kuppinger, 1LT Wrinkle and SPC Kelley would run

the APOD operations with the Contingency Response Group. The Contingency Response Group

only had equipment to move cargo from aircraft to the clearance yard, but the RPOE needed its

equipment to move it from the clearance yard to the forward node. So Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) and the non-government organizations (NGO) picked up cargo

directly from the clearance yard.15 In the meantime, the JAT found an open field on the east end

of the airfield ideal for the forward node only a few hundred meters away.16 For a handful of key

12 Kuppinger interview. 13 Kuppinger interview. 14 Kuppinger interview. 15 Redinger interview; and Helmick email, January 22, 2010. 16 Redinger interview, and Pollard interview.

people, the next week raced by in a fury of activity to get the proper port opening package in; for

the rest, it was a long boring wait.17

The JAT forgot to pack tentage and a generator. Some tents arrived later with the rest of the

Contingency Response Group.

Cargo was normally offloaded from the aircraft and moved to a clearance yard to the side of the

runway as a joint venture between the US Air Force and RPOE. The JAT arrived with five days

of supply and the US Air Force had responsibility for their life support, so the 621st Contingency

Response Group to set up at the east end of the concrete apron.18

The timeline listed the next two chalks from the 688th as arriving on 17 January, three days later.

With the forklifts, they began moving cargo to the clearance yard and forward node. Wrinkle

described the clearance yard as chaos at best with forklifts coming and going. They were

supposed to issue cargo directly from the forward node, but customers were coming straight to

the airport and due to the urgency, the RPOE was loading humanitarian assistance cargo pallets

from both ends, the clearance yard and forward node. They would show up and say, “I’m here,

got any food and water?” Wrinkle appointed SGT Richard Makuski the yard boss.19

In the sequence of flow, the initial task was to open the airport and then the seaport. This

required transportation units first. Coinciding with the deployment of the RPOE was the

deployment of US Army medical personnel in anticipation of the humanitarian disaster caused

by the earthquake.

On the morning of 15 January when the JAT woke up, they found a Mexican Rescue Team

occupying their forward node. All the new arrivals were scrambling for any vacant land as close

to the terminal as possible and “squatter’s rights” ruled, so the JAT had SPC Kelley camp there

to keep “squatters” away. The 688th RPOE took Kelley along because he was the kind of soldier

who could get things done without the need for supervision. They could not find any airport

authority to give them permission to use the land, so they camped SPC Kelley on the site with a

civilian tent for three to four days to keep people from moving into it. There were a number of

non-government organizations (NGO) that wanted it and if Kelley could not chase them off, he

called the JAT and they came up to drive off the non-government organizations. Essentially,

Kelley squatted on the land until the RPOE could start moving cargo to it.20

The timeline listed the next two chalks from the 688th RPOE as arriving on 17 January. An hour

after the first chalk arrived, the first commercial airplane arrived. With the forklifts, they began

moving cargo to the clearance yard and forward node. Wrinkle described the clearance yard as

chaos at best with forklifts coming in and out. They were supposed to issue cargo directly from

the forward node, but customers were coming straight to the airport and due to the urgency, the

RPOE was loading humanitarian assistance cargo pallets from both ends, the clearance yard and

17 Wrinkle interview. 18 Wrinkle interview. 19 Wrinkle interview. 20 Redinger interview; 1LT Wrinkle interview.

forward node. They would show up and say, “I’m here, got any food and water?” Wrinkle

appointed SGT Richard Makuski as the yard boss.21

Maximum on the ground (MOG) was ten aircraft and working MOG was five. The Contingency

Response Group brought additional capability. They were averaging from 120 to 150 aircraft and

at times up to 180 per day. So the Joint Logistics Command tried to allocate slot times when they

could come in, download and leave. The Special Operations Command had visibility of air

frames coming in both military and civilian to deliver humanitarian assistance. The Air Force

component of the Special Operations Command had sent in an element to manage the airfield.22

While this was going on, MAJ Vicki Snow and WO1 Caleb Camp were in Afghanistan

conducting a pre-deployment site survey for their deployment. This was not a doctrinal role for

the RPOE, but the US Army had a fear that if it did not use a unit then it would lose it. So her

RPOE was scheduled as a Transportation plug for the next rotation. BG Michael Lally, the

TRANSCOM J3, asked her what she was doing there when her RPOE had deployed to Haiti.

Snow knew Kuppinger from Garrison and they were friends. She and Camp flew back to Fort

Eustis at 2030 hours on 18 January and then flew to Haiti with Chalk 6 of her 688th RPOE to

replace MAJ Kuppinger on 19 January. She sat with Kuppinger to learn and clarify the reports,

because they were manual and not automated. Two days later, Kuppinger flew back to Fort

Eustis. WO1 Camp would arrive in Haiti with the eighth and last chalk, 22 January.23 With all

their equipment, the RPOE could finally move cargo from the clearance yard and build up the

forward node where organizations could picked it up.24

All the humanitarian assistance cargo came in with no RFID tags for the RPOE interrogators to

read data. Instead they either had the name of the non-government organization to which it

belonged or nothing at all. Often the customers knew when their cargo was arriving and were

waiting at the airport for it to be unloaded. They identified it and the forklifts loaded it on their

awaiting trucks. If they were not there when it arrived, they identified the cargo by its markings

or manifest. If the boxes were marked on the outside with the organization logo, it was easy to

identify. If not they looked at the manifest for who it belonged to. If any pallets of food or water

went unclaimed for three days it became the property of the Haitian Government to distribute as

they saw fit. MAJ Snow said that when it came to humanitarian assistance cargo, “the key is

velocity of cargo.” 25

Most military cargo pallets either did not have RFID tags or they were blank – no contents data

loaded. The Single Mobility System (SMS) was unreliable. Most deploying units did not

properly fill out the Military Shipping List (MSL) on the pallet, so the Air Force could not load

the right data into the GATES, so the inventory never appeared on SMS for the RPOE to track.

This forced the RPOE to track pallets manually – reading the MSL to determine who it belonged

to. Sometimes, the Air Force would find a small box for one unit such as a Special Forces team

and combine it with a pallet or container intended for another unit to conserve space. When the

21 Wrinkle interview. 22 Reeves interview. 23 Snow interview. 24 Snow interview. 25 Snow and Wrinkle interview.

pallet arrived, the RPOE would ship it to the customer on the pallet or container not knowing that

part of the cargo was intended for another unit. The US Air Force was not adjusting the data on

the military shipping labels, radio frequency identification (RFID) tag if it had one, or Single

Mobility System when they combined cargo.26

One problem Wrinkle pointed out while watching the forklifts load humanitarian assistance

cargo on a PLS was that most humanitarian assistance pallets were not strapped down tight or

only had one wrap of plastic. A forklift driver had to drive slowly because one bump or too much

speed would bust the pallet load apart. The platoon had one female who drove her forklift too

fast and bust loads so they call her, “Pallet Killer.”27

The remaining package from the 688th Rapid Port Opening Element (RPOE) left Fort Eustis at

1800 hours and flew out of Langley Air Force Base just after midnight. They had a 45-minute

layover in Florida then flew the rest of the way to Haiti and landed at the airport in Haiti at 0330

hours the next morning, 23 January. Personnel from the 688th RPOE were waiting for them.28

The evening of 26 January, 2LT Nick Setzer flew in with 15 personnel from the 119th Inland

Cargo Transfer Company and married up with their equipment then moved cargo around the

airport. They had four 10K ATLAS forklifts, a HMMWV, two LMTVs, basic load of

ammunition and life support for five days. They fell under the control of MAJ Vicki Snow,

Commander of the 688th RPOE.29 Three days later they were notified to move to an open field

closer to the port that 7th Brigade named Logistical Support Area (LSA) Sustainer.30 For the

Army cargo handlers, this operation provided them valuable experience they did not always get

in Southwest Asia and they competed to see who could move the most containers. Most of the

pieces for the LOTS were in place except for the last RPOE.

Besides those two transportation companies the only other logistics units on the ground belonged

to the Army Materiel Command. COL (P) Steven Feldman also arrived that day with a team of

five from the Army Materiel Command (AMC). He was the Deputy Commanding General for

Mobilization at the Army Sustainment Command in Rock Island, Illinois. Because the Army

Materiel Command had 184 personnel involved in Haiti operation, General Ann Dunwoody,

Commander of Army Materiel Command, sent Feldman’s team down to provide command and

control over Army Materiel Command assets and also serve as their liaison to the 3rd

Expeditionary Sustainment Command. Besides the two RPOEs, the Brigade Logistics Support

Team (BLST) was supporting the brigade combat team for Logistic Assistance Representatives

(LAR) and the Field Support Representatives from the Army Strategic Logistics Activity –

Charleston (ASLAC). The Field Support Representatives were contractors sent down from the

factories to make sure soldiers knew how to properly operate the equipment and they could also

order parts and fix it in the field. While the RPOEs fell under SDDC and its parent headquarters,

Army Materiel Command, during peace time, the RPOEs reported directly to the US

Transportation Command when deployed. During this contingency, Army Materiel Command

26 Snow and Wrinkle interview. 27 Snow and Wrinkle interview. 28 Starkenburg interview. 29 CPT James Johnston interview by Richard Killblane and CSM Kevin Newman at Port-au-Prince, Haiti on 22

February 2010. 30 Johnson interview.

issued an order placing them under the operational control (OPCON) of COL Feldman and

tactical control (TACON) of the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command. In effect, COL (P)

Feldman was the Army Materiel Command -Haiti Commander and reported to Major General

Yves J. Fontaine, Commander of Army Sustainment Command, and Major General Kevin A.

Leonard, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations at the Army Materiel Command.31

COL (P) Feldman’s team brought down a Multi-Media Communication System (MMCS) and

immediately set up operations with the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command at the end of

the airport. The fact that Feldman had attended the general officers course with COL (P) Robin

Akin, commander of the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command which was also designated the

Joint Logistics Command for the operation, became friends. Akin wanted a single belly button to

push if she needed something from the airport or the BLST team for equipment, maintenance, as

well as contracting. He sent his situation reports to Major General Stein. Feldman then met with

the leaders of the subordinate Army Materiel Command units to explain the command

relationship and reporting protocol. After a week in Haiti, the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment

Command linked up with the 688th RPOE to track both humanitarian assistance cargo and

military sustainment. Its commander, Vicki Snow, initially had a little difficulty with this and

thought she reported only to TRANSCOM. So she neglected to share her reports of what was

coming into the airport with the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command. When asked, she

explained that the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command could get the numbers from

TRANSCOM. By the time they did that the numbers would be old and the JTF commander

wanted accurate and up to date count on containers coming in. The cargo yard was stacking up

because they Joint Logistics Command did not have a timely count of what was in it. CW3

Edwards attended the Human Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) meeting with non-

government organizations and knew what they wanted. So COL (P) Feldman walked over to her

nearby camp and after a short conversation, she began sharing her counts with COL (P) Akin’s

headquarters. The two RPOEs sent up their data, which the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment

Command consolidated and forwarded to the Joint Task Force.32

Back at Fort Eustis, the 597th Transportation Group came up with a unique solution to deploying

its assets. Because the 2/82nd Brigade Combat Team had priority of flow, MAJ Costice’s 689th

RPOE kept getting bumped to a later flight. His RPOE was supposed to deploy right behind the

688th in order to open up the seaport. So by 24 January, COL Helmick requested the lease of the

Hawaiian Super Ferry Huakai, parked at Norfolk, to transport the RPOE to Haiti. The Huakai

loaded the 689th RPOE and the 7th Sustainment Brigade Early Entry Package and remaining 61

personnel of the 119th Inland Cargo Transfer Company at Third Port.33 It also contained

members of the 49th Quartermaster Group; 82nd and 148th Quartermaster Companies, with no

equipment. 34It was used because it was available. The Huakai served as an interim high-speed

vessel, until the later purchase of the Joint High Speed Vessel. The one limitation to the

catamaran was its draft did not allow it to drop ramp on a shallow beach like an LSV or LCU.

On 26 January, the Huakai was loaded and sailed from Third Port.35 On 30 January, Huakai

31 COL (P) Steven Feldman interview by Richard Killblane at Port-au-Prince, Haiti on February 26, 2010. 32 Feldman interview, and Edwards interview. 33 Costice interview, 13 February 2010. 34 Bessingras interview. 35 Helmick email, January 22, 2010; CPT James Johnson interview.

docked at Verreaux Pier, two miles north of Port-au-Prince, because it was the closest

functioning pier that had enough draft and roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) capability for the vessel. The

Huakai delivered the 689th RPOE complete with its equipment and the unit convoyed to the

seaport where MAJ Costice, the commander, and 1SG Pollard conducted the left-seat/right-seat

ride with the 832nd Transportation Battalion so Riddle could send his contract stevedores home.

Riddle and his staff remained to augment the RPOE.36 The Huakai then shuttled back and forth

between Haiti and Jacksonville to haul supplies and equipment. Verreaux Pier was also used to

bring in Class I dry cereal and milk for sustainment.37

Once on the ground, 689th RPOE then managed three container yards at the seaport; the south

yard with all the nonfood items and water, the north yard with humanitarian food, and the break

bulk yard where they managed pallets for sustainment and humanitarian aid as well. The RPOE

assumed responsibility for cargo from when it was taken off the ship to when it left one of the

container yards.38

The DRS Technology deployed Jim Snyder, a contractor from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to

run the communications package for the 689th RPOE. He boasted they had the best

communications in theater.39

Because of the serious breakdown with tracking what was deploying into Haiti, Akin needed

movement control capability. Unit line numbers (ULN) still did not match with arriving units. So

the support plans office transportation (SPO Trans) would track one unit coming in, but the

aircraft arrived it with a different unit and equipment. They could track the short tons on board

but not the passenger count. When a flight took off, the Air Force personnel should have

recorded the actual type of equipment and number of passengers on board into the single

mobility system (SMS), but the support plans office transportation only received generic

information and it would generally record zero passengers. Starkenburg talked with airmen at the

APOD about why the information was not reported and they explained he needed access to

GATES, which the Air Force used. Unfortunately the GATES and SMS were not linked. WO1

Caleb Camp. Mobility Warrant Officer of the 688th RPOE, learned the Air Force was not

inputting the proper data into the GATES because the units were not filling out the Military

Shipping Labels (MSL). Without that data, the SMS would not tell them what was coming in.

For the next five to seven days, Starkenburg would call back to CW3 Moore, the 7th Sustainment

Brigade Mobility Warrant Officer two or three times a day and sent him five or six emails a day

for information from FORSCOM about incoming units. Consequently, Starkenburg did not have

a brigade task organization from LTC Limeaux for the first week.40

COL (P) Akin tasked MAJ Ruth Keith’s 164th Terminal Supervisory Team to replace the 688th

RPOE at the airfield and assume the movement control team mission on 19 February. So a few

days later, the 10th Transportation Battalion began developing a plan to transition the seaport of

36 Costice interview, 13 February 2010. 37 SITREP 29522 302200ZJAN10, 832nd Transportation Battalion to SDDC Operations; and MAJ Costice interview. 38 Costice interview, 13 February 2010. 39 Killblane Haiti Journal. 40 Starkenburg interview, and Killblane Haiti Journal.

debarkation with the 689th RPOE while the 7th Sustainment Brigade developed a plan to

transition the APOD with the 688th RPOE.41

On 18 February, the 164th Terminal Supervisory Team (TST) with an ammunition platoon of the

8th Ordnance Company replaced the 688th RPOE and the 7th Sustainment Brigade assumed

responsibility for the airport of debarkation (APOD). The ammunition platoon provided the

forklifts.42

When the 688th RPOE was getting ready to redeploy, CW3 Edwards asked them if they needed

any help getting out. MAJ Snow said that since they worked for USTRANSCOM, they did not

need any help. The problem was that they had done a lot of training deployments but never

overseas. USTRANSCOM could provide their transportation, but the 688th did not know how to

clear customs. When it came time to load their equipment on the plane on 19 February, the

equipment had not been cleaned and customs would not let them take it. The next day most of

the soldiers of the 688th redeployed back to the United States minus six personnel to remain with

the equipment until it was properly cleaned for inspection. They finally deployed on 20

February.43

On 23 February, the 688th RPOE finally sent its equipment through the entire wash rack and

staging cycle at the seaport. US Department of Agriculture and Border Protection conducted the

inspections. Although a success, the dry run identified some shortfalls that were quickly fixed for

other units to begin redeployment. 44

As part of the plan, the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command and 832nd Transportation

Terminal Battalion (TTB) would be replaced. On 27 February, 377th Theater Sustainment

Command main body arrived. On 28 February, Huakai arrived at Verreaux Pier in the morning

with equipment for the 377th Theater Sustainment Command and 833rd Transportation Terminal

Battalion. It also delivered four containers with wash down equipment for the customs

inspection. The vessel was discharged quickly and immediately was made ready to upload 58

pieces of redeployment cargo from the 688th RPOE and 621st Contingency Response Group then

sailed that evening.45

The 833rd Transportation Terminal Battalion advance party; LTC Robert J. Lehman, Mr.

Jimenez, and Mr. Seaton, arrived on 1 March. The 377th Theater Sustainment Command staff

began their right seat/left seat ride with the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command on 1

March. The 377th Theater Sustainment Command G-1 and G-4 each brought eight people to

replace three in the J-1 and two in the J-4. All the J-1 seemed focused on was PERSTATs and

joint awards. It was not going to take eight soldiers to do that. The 377th Theater Sustainment

Command came in with too many people.46

41 Joint Logistics Command-Haiti SITREP 081700FEB10. 42 MAJ Keith interview; and 688th RPOE time Line. 43 Edwards interview. 44 Joint Logistics Command-Haiti SITREP 231700FEB10. 45 Waage email; and SITREP 29821 282200ZFEB10, 689th Detachment Haiti to 597th Transportation Group. 46 Killblane Haiti Journal.

On 2 March, the 833rd Transportation Battalion main body arrived to conduct relief in place with

the remainder of the 832nd Battalion and on 3 March, LTC Riddle, SSG Alvarenga, and Chris

Goss returned to Jacksonville - the seaport of embarkation for this operation. The 833rd assumed

command and control of port operations along with the 689th RPOE, and 7th Sustainment Brigade

and the 689th RPOE departed on 15 March.47 The main body of the 10th Transportation Battalion

redeployed 17 through 19 March and the remainder on 29 March. CPT Theresa Giorno remained

with a small team from the 10th Battalion to coordinate the redeployment of other units until 1

May. She had arrived with the first element of the 10th Battalion and was the last to leave.48

LTC Riddle, SSG Alvarenga, and Chris Goss returned to Jackson and the 833rd Transportation

Terminal Battalion assumed command and control of SPOE/SPOD operations along with the

689th RPOE and 7th Sustainment Brigade.49

The 7th Sustainment Brigade and the 689th RPOE departed Haiti on 15 March. The 10th

Transportation Battalion completed its relief in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA) with the

JTF-PO on 15 March and the main body flew out 17 through 19 March.50 On 30 April, 833rd

Transportation Terminal Battalion finally departed Haiti.

Operation Unified Response validated the creation of the RPOEs and their ability to rapidly

deploy into a theater to open both the airport and seaport. Everyone learned some valuable

lessons that required training and organizational changes.

Meanwhile

While Operation Unified Response validated the mission of the RPOEs, the 690th RPOE still had

to participate in a training exercise to validate its training. Key leaders of the 690th participated in

command post exercise with the 570th and 571st Contingency Response Group at Travis Air

Force Base, Texas from 15-19 February 2010.51

On 9 March 2010, 597th Transportation Group was redesignated the 597th Transportation

Brigade.

From 12-21 April 2010, the 690th RPOE flew to McGuire Air Force Base to participate in

Exercise Eagle Flag. They joined up with the Air Force to form the JTF-PO to conduct a

humanitarian relief operation at Lakehurst Airfield, New Jersey. This success set the stage for the

APOD validation exercise. From 16-25 June, the 690th RPOE deployed with the 818th

Contingency Response Group to Fort Bragg, NC to establish an airport of debarkation (APOD).

This exercise validated its ability to conduct APOD operations. It participated in two other

47 SITREP 29821 282200ZFEB10. 48 Giorno interview, 4 October 2010. 49 SITREP 29821 282200ZFEB10. 50 Giorno interview, 4 October 2010; and Cory Nealon, “100 Fort Eustis troops come back from Haiti, Daily Press,

March 25, 2010, http://articles.dailypress.com/2010-03-25/news/dp-local_eustis-soldiers_0326mar26_1_7th-

sustainment-brigade-fort-story-fort-eustis. 51 2LT Sarayah Smith, 690th Rapid Port Opening Element Fort Eustis, VA (SDFE-RPC) Fiscal Year 2010 Annual

Historical Review, October 2009-September 2010.

training exercises at Sierra Army Deport 12-23 July and the Newport, Rhode Island also in July.

From 23-26 August, the 690th RPOE participated in a Mission Readiness Exercise (MRX) at Fort

Eustis along with the other two RPOEs, and six battalions of the 597th Transportation Brigade to

train on the rolls and responsibilities for conducting JTF-PO seaport of debarkation (SPOD)

operations. This exercise prepared the 690th RPOE for its SPOD validation exercise, which took

place at Cape Canaveral, Florida from 19-23 September. The exercise scenario simulated a

category 5 hurricane hitting Haiti and the RPOE deploying to Port-au-Prince (Port Canaveral) to

provide human relief. The RPOE worked under the 833rd Transportation Battalion and was

SPOD validated on 23 September.52

833rd Transportation Battalion relocation to Fort Eustis

During Operation Unified Response, the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command

(SDDC) had raced with the 7th Sustainment Brigade to see which unit could deploy to Haiti first.

The 832nd Transportation Battalion from Jacksonville, Florida reached Port-au-Prince before the

10th Transportation Battalion because the latter had six days sailing time from Third Port at Fort

Eustis, Virginia. However, the 832nd sailed on two LCUs from the 10th Battalion that happened

to be in Florida on loan to US Army South. By reaching Haiti first, the 832nd then assumed

responsibility for the JLOTS operation. However, the 832nd also had responsibility for out

loading supplies at the military port in Jacksonville for Haiti. So the 833rd supported the 832nd at

Jacksonville, Florida for 10-20 days during the peak deployment, and its commander took part in

the Joint Assessment Team and the 833rd Deployment Distribution Support Team (DDST) later

deployed to Haiti and took the JTF-PO SPOD reigns from 1 March to 1 May 2010.53

This was not the first time SDDC had deployed a headquarters to a contingency. After the

Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) was redesignated SDDC in 2003, it inherited

the mission of deployment and distribution from “end-to-end” versus the former "port-to-port"

role. So, SDDC deployed its 598th to Kuwait in October 2002 through June 2004 and continued

to deploy other group headquarters to Kuwait. SDDC deployed its 599th Transportation Group to

Kuwait for two six month tours in 2005 and 2007-2008 and its 598th in May to November 2007

and the 597th in November 2006 to May 2007 (because the 595th (Provisional) in Kuwait was not

staffed as a continuing unit by the Army until May 2008). Other reserve units also formed the

backbone of the 595th (Provisional) and still supplement the 595th. All SDDC battalion and

brigade headquarters have a "deploy on order" part of their mission statements since 2006 as a

result of this situation.54

After Haiti, the 597th Transportation Brigade asked for infrastructure and personnel to oversee

and coordinate the three RPOEs at Fort Eustis so the brigade commander and staff could focus

on the overall CONUS wide mission. In early February 2012, COL Charles “Charlie” Brown,

Commander of the 597th Transportation Brigade, proposed to COL (P) Susan A. Davidson,

SDDC Deputy Commander, they should move the military leadership of the 833rd to Fort Eustis

and the civilian part of the 833rd at Seattle could stay in place and become the Pacific Northwest

(PNW) Detachment under a military commander for a transition to a long-term senior civilian

52 690th RPOE 2010 Annual Historical Review. 53 Kent Beck, SDDC Historian, email to Richard Killblane, May 5, 2014. 54 Beck email.

leader. This change overrode plans to move the 833rd to the Port of Tacoma, which Secretary of

the Army Robert Gates approved in early 2012. COL Brown was motivated by cuts to US Army

Reserve funding, which undermined his plans to support the RPOEs, so he needed to free up

battalion level leadership to offset this lack of funds/continuing support.55

Coincidently the workload of the Seattle contingent had been declining, so much so the 833rd

was given the mission of supporting all other CONUS Battalions, even though the key reason for

the Seattle SDDC presence (Fort Lewis or JB Lewis-McChord) had not gone away. MG Kevin

A. Leonard approved the proposal to move the 833rd to Fort Eustis on 4 March 2012 and signed

the OPORD on 22 March, five days before MG Thomas J. Richardson assumed command of

SDDC.56

On 2 July, 2012, the 833rd Transportation Battalion, under the command of LTC Isabel E.

Geiger, relocated from Seattle, Washington to Fort Eustis, Virginia where it assumed

responsibility for the three Rapid Port Opening Elements. The original command only had seven

military positions and the rest were DA Civilians. The headquarters left the civilians in Seattle to

form the Pacific Northwest Detachment to continue to run SDDC port operations and one of the

GS-12s was designated as the interim detachment commander until the PD was permanently

changed. To augment the battalion headquarters, the battalion borrowed around eight personnel

from each RPOE. This would allow the battalion to function as a deployable headquarters at the

cost of the RPOEs until the TDA changed. The SDDC plan was to round out the battalion staff

with a total of 23 military and civilian positions.57

Operation United Assistance, West Africa

As many as 2,600 people in West Africa had died from the Ebola outbreak and at least 6,574 were

infected by September. The two countries heaviest affected were Liberia and Sierra Leon and this

was the worst Ebola outbreak in history. In response to the Ebola crisis, President Obama

announced on 16 September he would deploy as many as 4,000 US troops “to build 17 treatment

centers, train thousands of healthcare workers and establish a military control center for

coordination.” The day before the President’s announcement, the Joint Staff had issued an

Execution Order to the major commands with D-Day for Operation United Assistance on 19

September.58

As in Haiti, the initial response was to deploy a Rapid Port Opening Element (RPOE) Joint

Assessment Team (JAT) with the advance party of an Air Force Contingency Response Group

(CRG) to assess the capabilities of the airports and seaports.

The previous June 2014 emergency readiness exercise (EDRE) did not go well so CPT Michael

Ziegler, JTF-PO Cell of the 597th, asked what each participant needed for a deployment and

improved the EDRE process. While he improved this, he monitored the news and saw the

Administration’s preoccupation with the ISIS threat in Syria. President Obama was scheduled to

55 Beck email, May 5, 2014. 56 Beck email, May 5, 2014. 57 LTC Isabel E. Geiger discussion with Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, VA, 2 May 2014, and Geiger email to

Killblane, May 7, 2014. 58 Power point, “DLA Day Operations United Assistance slides 0846 8 Oct 14.”

give a speech at 2000 hours on 16 September and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel spoke about

the increased threat to America three weeks prior. CPT Ziegler anticipated it could result in a

deployment, so he scheduled an EDRE the next day. While he was at the air terminal at Langley

Air Force Base, he saw four aircraft coming in on unrelated missions, but he “read the tea

leaves” and anticipated something was up. That night the President announced he was deploying

4,000 soldiers to West Africa in response to the Ebola outbreak.59

MG Daryl Williams, Commander of Army Africa, arrived in Monrovia, Liberia on 16 October

and established the Joint Forces Command-Unified Assistance.

The next morning, 17 September, when the key players met in the 597th conference room, they

were not sure if they were conducting an EDRE or it was a real deployment because of the

President’s speech. At 1800 hours, COL Johnson, Commander of the 817th Contingency

Response Group (CRG) (USAF) at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, called warning them

to get the joint assessment team (JAT) ready to roll. At 1700, COL Jason Vick, Commander of

the 597th, told the 688th Rapid Port Opening Element (RPOE) to get their stuff together to

deploy. MAJ Matthew Rivera’s 688th RPOE was on two-hour recall, MAJ Mike Blanton’s 689th

was next on recall, and MAJ Anthony Freda’s 690th was the “pusher unit.”60

The three RPOEs had a standing agreement between them that the pusher RPOE would provide

equipment and backup personnel for the other two. RPOEs were normally filled to 100 percent

status, but had the other two RPOEs deployed as scheduled, the 690th would have had to give up

13 personnel to the 688th and 22 to the 689th because of personnel non-deployable for schools

and permanent change of station (PCS).61

The size of the JAT varied from four to six personnel and was the call of the commander. In this

case, the size was dictated by the fact that only 14 people in the 833rd Transportation Battalion

had current Yellow Fever vaccinations. The vaccination was good for ten years and the others’

had expired. The 688th RPOE selected four key individuals who would eventually deploy as

members of their JAT: MAJ Matt Rivera (688th RPOE), CW2 Robert Smith (690th RPOE), SFC

Blair T. Peirce (689th RPOE) and SGT Charlie J. Blanchfield (688th RPOE). SFC Pierce was an

88H and platoon sergeant of the clearance platoon and Blanchfield could drive any truck or

forklift making him a one-man RPOE.62

The JAT package consisted of one HMMWV with a trailer and an expandable DRASH tent.

They had their SINGCARS keyed. They added the Beacon radio system, which had sitcom voice

capability. They packed more hot weather clothing. That night they tried to get medical issues

taken care of but the McDonald Health Clinic was closed. They received more intelligence

updates and finished about 2100 and then they went home for the night. Pierce was content with

the intelligence he received about what to expect on the ground.63

59 CPT Michael Ziegler and 1LT Jeff Miller interview by Richard Killblane at Fort Eustis, VA on 23 October 2014. 60 Ziegler and Miller interview. 61 MAJ Anthony Freda interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, VA, on 27 October 2014. 62 Ziegler and Miller interview, 63 SFC Blair T. Pierce interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, VA, 12 March 2014.

Since COL Johnson was flying out from the west coast to link up with the 817th CRG at

McGuire, this gave the RPOE time to drive up there instead of having them fly down to Langley,

stop, reload, refuel and then take off again. CPT Ziegler recommended the JAT drive up to

McGuire. At 2026 hours 17 September, the JAT equipment was loaded onto a commercial truck

and line-hauled to McGuire while the Brigade van was utilized to transport the Soldiers the

following day.64

At 1200 hours 18 September, the JAT drove to McGuire Air Force Base to meet up with the

817th Contingency Response Group (CRG) and arrived late due to traffic congestion. At 0500 the

next morning, they took off in a C-17 with the CRG advance party. The plane arrived in Rota,

Spain and remained overnight. Amazingly the plane did not break down as every other US Air

Force plane does when landing in Rota. The next morning they arrived at Roberts International

Airport in Monrovia and were met by two embassy personnel. They offloaded their equipment

from the C-17 and took the passenger to a hotel. SFC Pierce remained with the equipment.65

That day, the JAT set up its DRASH tent and established its TOC inside. The RPOE and CRG

had about 20 personnel on the ground. The CRG/JAT’s mission was to assess the capability of

the airfield to determine whether it could handle C-130s or C-17s. The next day, they sent their

assessment to the 597th Transportation Brigade that forwarded it to USTRANSCOM. The airfield

was not as bad as anticipated. It had fire trucks and could handle 12 C-17s at a time, so they did

not need to transfer cargo to C130s.66

That first day, aircraft started arriving. The CRG borrowed one civilian forklift to move cargo off

the runway. They established a forward node at the end of the runway to stage equipment. SFC

Peirce and on Air Force driver took turns operating the forklift. About ten aircraft arrived per

day, so the workload was not that big. DLA had two representatives down there who contracted

the trucks. The rest of the CRG arrived the following week. All the arriving equipment was life

support for the task force advance party.67

The JAT had no time to receive training or protective clothing prior to deployment but the Ebola

outbreak was mostly in the interior and not urban centers. The JAT was kept in the city away

from contact with people infected with Ebola. CPT Ziegler sent the JAT internet links that

instructed them on Ebola and preventive measures. Simultaneously, the remaining Soldiers of the

833d Transportation Battalion were on Joint Base Langley-Eustis receiving the same training.

Their battalion S3 shop planned and executed the pre-deployment training requirements at

Jacobs Theater while extending an invitation to 53rd Movement Control Battalion, which was

also preparing for their upcoming deployment. Meanwhile, they continued to send follow-on

equipment to Langley on 17 and 18 September. The battalion continued to develop multiple

courses of action to support the evolving mission requirements. 68

64 Ziegler and Miller interview. 65 Pierce interview. 66 Pierce interview. 67 Pierce interview. 68 Ziegler and Miller interview.

On 17 September, the 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary) similarly received a warning

order from the XVIII Airborne Corps to deploy to West Africa. The 7th Transportation Brigade

(Expeditionary) emailed David Sanders at CASCOM that day wanting to know what medical staff

they were supposed to have on their MTOE and what medical support they were supposed to

receive for a deployment, since they had no physician assistant on staff.

Liberia did not want the soldiers to carry weapons. The joint assessment team had received no

medical training or protective clothing prior to deployment, but fortunately the Ebola outbreak

was mostly in the interior and not urban centers. So the joint assessment team remained in the

city away from contact with people infected with Ebola. Meanwhile, its parent battalion

continued to send follow-on equipment to Langley on September 17 and 18, and continued to

develop multiple courses of action to support the evolving mission requirements.

MAJ Matt Rivera, the Commander of the 688th RPOE, wanted to bring in more forklifts and

personnel with the follow-on packages, but Colonel Johnson allowed no more than ten soldiers

to deploy. Instead of bringing in more material handling equipment, Johnson allowed the RPOE

to use the Air Force equipment to work the clearance yard. By doctrine the contingency response

group just cleared the runway and the RPOE moved it from the clearance yard to the forward

node or in this case onto awaiting vehicles. Because Johnson wanted to keep the number of

personnel down, the contingency response group and RPOE shared the same material handling

equipment.

On 20 September, the first 747 jet airliner arrived at 0200 hours in the morning. It delivered tents

and folding cots for Monrovian Medical Units (MMU). The joint assessment team busted cargo

nets off the tents and put them on host nation 18-wheelers. These trucks began moving cargo off

the airfield. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Commander Valentine (USN) coordinated for warehouses

around the airport to store different classes of supply. The joint assessment team spent the entire

night at the airfield. On 21 September, the second deployment of 45 US Soldiers arrived in Liberia.

On 22 September, the joint assessment team assessed the forward node and sent in its report. There

was enough space on the airfield to store cargo and enough trucks to clear the cargo so the forward

node was not needed. On 23 October, DLA awarded a contract for three 42K square foot

warehouses in Monrovia. The next day, DLA delivered 75 GP Medium tents and 13 GP Large

tents to Liberia. 69

The joint assessment team checked every arriving plane to identify the cargo. If it looked like

military, they set it aside from humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian assistance clearance

yard was separate from the JTF-PO. The U.S. AID and World Health Organization organized

cargo. As soon as cargo arrived, they could upload it on trucks and clear the airport immediately.

It took about a week before the mobility warrant officer to gain in-transit visibility.

The plan would change from the 1600 meeting to the 0800 meeting. During that first week, the

690th thought they were going to do the SPOD mission in Liberia but changed the next day. The

US TRANSCOM J3 said the 689th RPOE was not validated to run an SPOD, but the 690th was.

The 597th said they had the say on whether the RPOE was qualified for a mission or not and said

69 Power point, “DLA Day Operations United Assistance slides 0846 8 Oct 14.”

the 689th was capable. US TRANSCOM then came up with idea of an air bridge in Senegal.

Senegal became intermediate staging base (ISB). So the 689th JAT deployed to Senegal. The

USAF Contingency Response Group (CRG) had all the equipment needed for the ISB because

they would transfer cargo from one aircraft to another at Senegal. The 689th RPOE would not

have to clear cargo from the airfield.70

While remainder of the RPOEs waited for the ten-day incubation period of the vaccination, the

planning went from a rapid deployment to a deliberate deployment. There was also a lot of

confusion. First SDDC was not certain whether the 597th or the 598th Transportation Brigade

would command the operation. The RPOEs fell under the control of the RPOEs, but West Africa

was the responsibility of the 598th in Italy. The 598th Transportation Brigade in Italy was the

JTF-PO at the SPODs in both Senegal and Liberia. The Air Force colonel was the JTF-PO for

the APOD. So the RPOEs configured several deployment packages. They first knew they were

going to establish an airport of debarkation (APOD) in Liberia and then 598th wanted a seaport

of debarkation (SPOD) because airfield in Liberia estimated that it could receive nine C-130 total

before it would break down.71

They first knew they were going to establish an airport of debarkation (APOD) in Liberia and

then the 598th wanted a seaport of debarkation (SPOD) because airfield in Liberia estimated that

it could receive nine C-130s total before it would break down. As first on the alert sequence, the

688th RPOE had the airport mission. The rest of the plan would change from the 1600 meeting to

the 0800 meeting. During that first week, the 690th thought it was going to establish the seaport

of debarkation mission in Liberia but the mission would then change the next day. The

TRANSCOM J-3 said the 689th RPOE was not validated in training to run a seaport of

debarkation, but the 690th was. The 597th, however, stated it had the authority to determine

whether the RPOE was qualified for a mission or not. It stated the 689th was capable.

TRANSCOM then decided to create an air bridge to Senegal making it an intermediate staging

base (ISB). On 23 September, the 689th learned it would deploy to Senegal. The 689th Joint

Assessment Team received the chemical suits that also protected against biological hazards prior

to its deployment.

The members of the 833rd Transportation Battalion also received their vaccinations over the next

two days, but the incubation period was ten days so they could not deploy for eight days because

the two days’ travel time would complete the incubation period. The U.S. Air Force surgeon for

the contingency response group said the incubation time was only six days. They originally

planned to fly out on 26 September, but the State Department had failed to get the appropriate

country clearances. So at 0852 hours on 27 September, four personnel of the joint assessment

team from the 689th RPOE deployed out of Langley Air Force Base on a C-17 with the 123rd

Contingency Response Group and their HMMWV and DRASH trailer.

The 689th Joint Assessment Team and 123rd Contingency Response Group arrived at Dakar,

Senegal at 1430 hours the next day. They rode on a shuttle bus two kilometers to the Exercise

Readiness Facility (ERF) at the military portion of the runway. The Exercise Readiness Facility

consisted of two warehouses and one office building. The electricity worked and it had two

70 Freda interview. 71 Freda interview.

latrines. The military personnel stayed at the King Fahd Hotel and traveled back and forth to

work in civilian clothes. They changed into uniform at the airport.

They did not establish the traditional clearance yard and forward node. Senegal would not allow

anything permanent on the airfield except the Exercise Readiness Facility. So they set up the

distribution yard in back that could handle 100 pallets. A forklift enroute to Liberia stopped at

Senegal and the 689th Joint Assessment Team used it for four days until someone in Liberia

asked for it. The contingency response group had all the equipment it needed to transfer cargo

from one aircraft to another at Senegal.

As the intermediate staging base, troops would arrive on C-17s and transfer to C-130s for further

flight into Monrovia. They initially did not think the airfield in Monrovia could not handle more

than a few C-130 flights per day. Once on the ground, they realized C-17s could land on the

airfield in Liberia. So they did not have to transload from C-17s to C-130s in Senegal. They no

longer needed the intermediate staging base. The main body of the 123rd Contingency Response

Group arrived on 3 October, and could handle the airfield mission without the RPOE.

On 26 September, the XVIII Airborne Corps sent a warning order to 53rd Movement Control

Battalion (MCB) to be prepared to deploy to West Africa. Corps provided no specifics about the

mission other than the battalion would provide general transportation support, but it wanted 100

percent of the battalion headquarters. They anticipated the deployment would take place mid to

late October. The 53rd Movement Control Battalion had just returned from a deployment to

Kuwait the previous April and was still on dwell time. The battalion commander, LTC Kevin

Baird, had just arrived in June, but many of his key staff could not deploy because of medical

issues and half would not sign dwell waivers to deploy. He had to borrow staff from units under

his battalion and across the brigade. The 53rd would replace the 688th RPOE so MAJ Rivera

emailed LTC Baird a check list for how to conduct the handoff when they arrived.

On 27 September, DLA awarded contracts for Intra-theater Logistics Vessel (MV Vega), 25-bed

EMEDs site preparation, two warehouses in Accra, Ghana, and two acres outdoor storage yard in

Takoradi, Ghana. On 28 September, DLA delivered 5,000 cases of MREs and 13,000 cases of

BTWs to Liberia and Senegal. 72

Other personnel of the 833rd Transportation Battalion received their vaccinations over the next

two days, but Dr. James at McDonald Health Clinic said the incubation period was ten days so

they could not deploy for eight days because the two days’ travel time would complete the

incubation period. The US Air Force surgeon for the Contingency Response Group said the

incubation time was six days. They originally planned to fly out on 26 September, but the State

Department had failed to get the appropriate country clearances, so at 0852 hours on 27

September, a four person JAT from MAJ Mike Blanton’s 689th RPOE deployed out of Langley

AFB with the 123rd CRG and arrived at Dakar, Senegal at 1430 hours the next day. Senegal was

the intermediate staging base (ISB) where troops would arrive on C-17s and transfer to C-130s

for further flight into Monrovia. The airfield in Monrovia could not handle a lot of heavy traffic

and was limited to two C-130 flights per day. The mission of the 689th JAT was to assess the

72 Power point, “DLA Day Operations United Assistance slides 0846 8 Oct 14.”

airports and seaports of debarkation in Senegal. CPT Mike Ziegler picked up the JLISTs that

protected against biological hazards and issued it to the 689th JAT prior to its deployment. 73

The delay in bringing in the main body of the RPOE was the result of the rains and poor

infrastructure in country. Life support was the issue. The deployment created a 200 percent spike

in the import of commodities. It was the monsoon season so they needed stones to cover the

ground to build the ISB, but by 20 October, they only had 30 percent of the requirement. So

everyone had to live in hotels. The availability of hotel rooms dictated the number of people who

could deploy in country. The mosquitoes were so thick because of the rains; there was a curfew

from 2100 to 0600 hours every night. On 24 September, the engineers deployed and assessed the

roads were impassable during the rains. The commanders revaluated their billeting space and

figured out they could bring in more people. 74

The problem with deploying the follow-on logistic package resulted from the disorganization of

US AID and their difficulty articulating what capabilities they needed. The Commander of the 7th

TBX, COL Randy Nelson, asked to get out of the mission, and the XVIII Airborne Corps tasked

the 101st Sustainment Brigade with the mission. On 30 September, the 7th TBX instead deployed

a major and CW5 Sutter to Fort Campbell, Kentucky to brief the 101st Airborne Division on the

capabilities of the 7th TBX and to deploy them into West Africa.

On 30 September, RADM John Kirby, the Pentagon Press Secretary, announced 700 troops from

Fort Campbell would deploy to Liberia in October as the headquarters element for Operation

United Assistance. They would be there for at least six months but could stay longer if necessary.

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), commanded by MG Gary J. Volesky, would deploy to

Monrovia as the Joint Force Command-United Assistance (JFC-UA) Headquarters. The mission

was to support the lead federal agency, the US Agency for International Development (AID).

Another 700 would come from engineer units across the Army. Soldiers from the 86th Combat

Support Hospital at Fort Campbell would also deploy.

On 30 September, DLA’s DDE (-) deployed to Liberia and Senegal to receive, store and issue

supplies.75

Six C-17s with the next chalks of RPOE personnel and equipment arrived from Fort Eustis. The

light sets arrived with this package. On 3 October, the 688th RPOE deployed Chalk #2 with six

additional personnel of the 689th RPOE with four 10K Atlas forklifts and water and food to clear

cargo from the airport. They arrived in Monrovia on 4 October.76

On 3 October, DLA sent first 5,000 gallons of fuel to Mobile lab unit in Liberia. On 6 October,

AFRICOM issued its Base Operations Order.77

73 Ziegler and Miller interview. 74 Ziegler and Miller interview. 75 Power point, “DLA Day Operations United Assistance slides 0846 8 Oct 14.” 76 Ziegler and Miller interview. 77 Power point, “DLA Day Operations United Assistance slides 0846 8 Oct 14.”

On 8 October, the US Marines announced they were deploying 100 Marines, four MV-22 Ospreys

and two KC-130 Hercules aircraft from the Special Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis

Response-Africa in Moron, Spain to Dakar, Senegal with onward movement to Monrovia.78 On 9

October, 100 Marines deployed to Liberia with four MV-22 Ospreys and two KC-130 to fill the

gap until the 101st Airborne Division arrived. 79

On 9 October, 100 Marines from the Special Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis Response-

Africa in Moron, Spain deployed to Liberia with four MV-22 Ospreys and two KC-130 to fill the

gap until the 101st Airborne Division arrived. On 19 October, the advance party of the 101st

Sustainment Brigade deployed to Liberia. This brought the number of soldiers in Liberia to 565.

On 9 October, the J6 E/A DLA representative arrived in Monrovia. DLA already had COL Lisa

Keough deployed forward to Monrovia with DST-OUA-C2, JCASO (Contracting), six-person

DDE Team (Receive, Store and Issue). CPT Ron Carr was deployed to Dakar, Senegal with five-

person DDE Team. On 10 October, DLA delivered another 6,000 cases of MREs and 6,500 cases

of BTWs to Liberia.80

The advance party of the 101st Airborne Division arrived in Liberia. This brought the number of

soldiers in Liberia to 565.81 On 19 October, Eagle Six, Commander of the 101st Sustainment

Brigade (SB), deployed the advance party of the 101st Sustainment Brigade. The bulk of the 101st

Sustainment Brigade would arrive on 26 October.

With no new missions, the 689th JAT redeployed on 21 October. Since Senegal was not had a

case of Ebola in 45 days, the soldiers spent the weekend in Ramstein, Germany to under

controlled monitoring. After which they flew on the rotator flight to Baltimore-Washington

International Airport on 30 October, spent the night and then arrived at Langley the next day.

On Wednesday 22 October, LTC Baird’s 53rd Movement Control Battalion headquarters deployed

out of Langley Air Force Base with 60 Soldiers on a C17 to Monrovia with the mission to provide

movement control in Liberia. It fell under the control of the 101st Sustainment Brigade and picked

up control of movement control teams. The death count from Ebola in West Africa was up to 4,546

cases by then.82

During the last week in October, the remainder of the 53rd MCB pre-staged additional follow-on

equipment in support of Operation Unified Assistance (OUA). The battalion loaded the vehicles

and equipment at Hanks Yard for further movement by commercial carrier to Jacksonville,

Florida for surface movement by sea. Meanwhile, six members of 11th Terminal Transportation

Battalion prepared for deployment as advisors to the 101st Sustainment Brigade in support of

78 “Marines and Ospreys Deployed to Fight Ebola Epidemic,” Military.com News, October 9, 2014. 79 Mike Hixenbaugh, “Eustis soldiers, Marines to join Africa Ebola mission,” The Virginian-Pilot, October 9, 2014,

http://hamptonroads.com/2014/10/eustis-soldiers-marines-join-africa-ebola-mission. 80 Power point, “DLA Day Operations United Assistance slides 0846 8 Oct 14.” 81 Edwin Mora, “100 Soldiers From 101st Airborne Division Arrive in Liberia to Fight Ebola,” Breirbart, 15 Oct

2014, http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2014/10/14/100-Soldiers-From-101st-Airborne-Division-Arrive-in-

Liberia-to-Fight-Ebola. 82 Ali Rockett, “Fort Eustis soldiers head to Africa to support those battling Ebola,” Daily Press, October 22, 2014.

Operation United Assistance, but the 7th TB (X) had no authorization to send the Soldiers to

support the 101st since the requirement was off ramped at FORSCOM. 83

With a better understanding of the mission, Baird and his staff reorganized the battalion. They

formed a movement control team of four soldiers from battalion staff and four from the 632nd

Movement Control Team to replace the 688th RPOE at the airport. They sent the 632nd

Movement Control Team to Port Buchannan to work the seaport of debarkation (SPOD). They

reorganized the S-3 with 25 soldiers into an air/ground/surface section since the battalion did not

have a SPO section to plan movements. Because the 53rd did not have the capability to talk to

inbound aircraft, it could not replace the 571st Contingency Response Group.

COL Kimberly J. Daub’s 101st Sustainment Brigade cased its colors in a ceremony at Fort

Campbell on 27 October and unfurled them in Monrovia, Liberia as the Joint Forces Command on

12 November. COL Daub had just assumed command of the brigade in June. The 101st

Sustainment Brigade deployed with three of its battalions: 101st Special Troops Battalion, 129th

Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, and the 716th MP Battalion. The 53rd Movement Control

Battalion fell under the control of the 101st Sustainment Brigade and picked up control of all the

movement control teams.

On 18 November, the Department of Defense announced it would mobilize 2,000 Army National

Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers for deployment to West Africa as part of the second rotation of

forces.84

When Baird felt his battalion no longer required the 688th RPOE, he released them. They left

Monrovia on November 14 and went into 21 days of quarantine at Langley Air Force Base. The

JAT had spent just shy of two months in West Africa. Soldiers returning from West Africa

deployment were required a 21-day post-deployment quarantine in Germany. None had any

direct contact with Ebola patients since they built treatment facilities and provided logistical

support to the civilian medical personnel. Chuck Hagel tasked the Pentagon to review the rule

within 45 days and have it completed by 12 December, but the Pentagon asked for a seven-week

extension. They had until 12 January to complete it.

The US completed the last of its 14 Ebola treatment units in Liberia by the end of December. The

US Army and the Liberian engineers built four, while contract engineers hired by the US AID built

the other ten. The next decision was whether to send the soldiers home or to Sierra Leone or

Guinea. By 18 December the Ebola infection rate was down to five a day instead of 52 per day in

September. 19,340 cases were reported in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia since the summer and

7,518 had died. This reduced the need for US military personnel in West Africa.85

83 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary) SITREP, Resolute! 25-31 Oct 14. 84 Army News Service, “Guard, Reserve Soldiers to mobilize for Ebola relief,” Bayonet & Saber, November 18,

2014. 85 Julian E. Barnes and Felicia Schwartz, “U.S. to Complete Ebola Treatment Units in Liberia by End of December,”

The Wall Street Journal, December 22, 2014.

One of the lessons from this deployment was to work out a Memorandum of Agreement with

McDonald Army Health Clinic to issue everyone shots required for Africa Command since it

required the most.

833rd Transportation Battalion FTX participation

DPMO participated in a field training exercise on 17 November 2015 with the 833rd

Transportation Battalion at Joint Base Little Creek (JBLC), and Camp Pendleton, Virginia. The

purpose of the exercise was to prepare a theater distribution plan from past operations of Joint

Task Force - Port Opening (JTF-PO) using lessons learned that were focused on relief in

place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA) procedures and processes. The exercise included 689th

Rapid Port Opening Element (RPOE), 110th Navy Expeditionary Port Unit (EPU), and 10th

Transportation Battalion. The concept of operation involved a platoon of the 359th Inland Cargo

Transfer Company (ICTC) uploading the cargo at Third Port. The 10th Transportation Battalion

units transporting cargo via watercraft from Fort Eustis to JBLC where another element of the

359th ICTC discharged the cargo for convoy to Camp Pendleton. The 689th RPOE set up the

initial marshaling yard and provided ITV after the cargo was discharged. Final event was a

RIP/TOA Symposium conducted by 833rd Transportation Battalion at Camp Pendleton to capture

observations, lessons learned and insights to develop, improve and update current JTF-PO

doctrine.86

Hurricane Matthew, Haiti

As Hurricane Matthew heading directly toward Haiti, the 833rd Transportation Battalion and its

RPOEs anticipated they would deploy based upon the humanitarian assistance mission to Haiti in

2010. They went on alert on 1 October and on 4 October 2016, Hurricane Matthew, by then a

Category 4 hurricane, made landfall on Haiti. The 689th RPOE was on alert status 1 and began

making preparations for deployment.

SOUTHCOM sent out a “be prepared to deploy” warning order. The 621st Contingency

Response Group out of McGuire Air Force Base informed the 597th Transportation Brigade of an

impending deployment the next day. They had to establish the Joint Task Force-Port Opening

operation by 7 October. The 621st notified the RPOE to only bring personnel and communication

set with the JAT.

SPC James J. Nealon III was the communication specialist for the 689th RPOE. He had all the

commo gear laid out for a VIP inspection when the alert came and was told to have everything

packed up ready to deploy in two hours. TRANSCOM gave verbal approval to fulfill Southern

Command’s request for assistance. This began the N-hour sequence of events and the RPOE had

12 hours to be ready to deploy. This operation happened so quickly that the RPOE did not

validate any JOPES data. There was no deployment or execution order nor did higher provide

any guidance for what to do on the ground. TRANSCOM simply provided a C-17 and the JAT

deployed.

86 TC SIGACTS, 15-28 November 2015and DPMO Annual Historical Report 2015.

The JAT consisted of four personnel, CPT Adam M. Grover was 689th RPOE commander and

the surface element lead. For the last two and a half years, 1LT Simon Johnston had been the

forward distribution node officer in charge in the 689th and had just moved up to the XO slot.

They would not have any lieutenant to replace him until November. Johnston had deployed to

Senegal the previous year. For this deployment, the RPOE moved him back to the forward

distribution node. SFC Melissa A. Zappas, was the clearance NCOIC. SPC Erin E. Nealon III

was the communications specialist.

TRANSCOM originally wanted the JAT to deploy out of Norfolk Naval Air Station across the

James River, citing capability issues with Langley, but discussions between Langley and

Transportation Command allowed the C-17 to pick up the JAT from Langley early in the

morning of 6 October. COL Mayer, Commander of the 621st CRG met with the JAT. They had

done several exercises together prior to that. The Transportation Command recently changed the

policy that the RPOE and contingency response group that would deploy on contingencies

together would train together. On the way down the two units went over their plans of what they

would do when they hit the ground.

That was the first C-17 to land on the airfield during this contingency. The Marine Air Ground

Task Force (MAGTF) had already arrived on CH-53s. No one was there to greet the passengers.

So they linked up with a contracting company Amerijet International to offload their pallets and

the manager told them who they needed to talk to get things done. 1LT Johnston needed to

determine what land was suitable for the cargo yard. He needed to ask the Director of Operations

where they could work and what buildings they could use. Port-au-Prince had little to no

damage, but the area the RPOE had used in 2010 was overgrown with grass and unsuitable. The

JTF-PO set up operations in tents on the west end of the apron where the 82nd Airborne Division

had set up in 2010.

1LT Johnston wanted to establish the cargo yard near the east end of the terminal (near where the

Air Force had established the distribution yard in 2010) closer to the entrance, but it was

unsuitable so they established it on the west end of the terminal. This required the trucks to drive

across the concrete apron and back. Johnston asked his contracting representative how much

would it cost to get the land he wanted mowed and he said could support it for $500. Johnston

found a couple Haitians mowing part of the airport and asked them how much they would charge

to mow the area he wanted. They thought about it for a while and said, “Water for four. Food for

eight.” The lieutenant told them they could definitely do that. He gave them a case of MREs and

a case of bottled water.

The cargo was arriving by truck from warehouses belonging to the World Food Program, World

Health Program, International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Agence d'Aide à la

Coopération Technique Et au Dévelopement (ACTED) and other organizations to the airport.

The Joint Task Force-Port Opening received cargo from the non-government organizations and

sent it out by helicopter to the remote locations of the upper and lower claw of the island, which

were hit hard. This was the reverse of the last Haiti disaster relief effort where cargo came in by

air and went out by truck. Until the rest of the RPOE arrived, Johnston waited at the gate for

arriving trucks in order to escort them across the apron to the cargo yard.

Back at Fort Eustis, CW2 Douglas B. Maxwell was the mobility warrant officer of the 690th

responsible for helping the 689th RPOE deploy. The 690th RPOE pushed the 689th RPOE out.

CW3 McNaughton, the mobility warrant officer for the 689th RPOE, built the load plans for the

689th RPOE and Maxwell loaded them into JOPES. CW2 Patrick A. Bartell of the 688th RPOE

sent up the ULN data on the SIPR. Bartell had worked the West Africa deployment. MAJ Jimmy

A. Henderson (USAF) was the SOUTHCOM JOPES action officer who plugged in the data.

Over the next couple days, the remainder of the 689th RPOE validated the JOPES data and

submitted load plans for four C-17s. After the JAT deployed the JTF-PO sent out the changes to

what they wanted from the main body. The number of chalks changed three times and each time

Maxwell had to input new data. The original request for the RPOE was 34 and was eventually

reduced to 18. As Hurricane Matthew approached Fort Eustis the network enterprise center went

down for 18 hours. They had to send the ULN data to SOUTHCOM and tried faxing it to SDDC

so they could send it to SOUTHCOM, but this did not work. No one had used fax in years. They

found out Langley Air Force Base had an internet capability that worked. Ten minutes after they

sent the data to SOUTHCOM, the internet came back up.

The 833rd coordinated the movement of equipment to Langley for loading on 8 October. The

next day, the request was reduced to just one C-17 and the 689th RPOE had to revalidate its

JOPES data and resubmit new load plans. The main body deployed directly to Port-au-Prince on

10 October.

SPC Nealon’s assistants, SPC Timothy G. Scheid Jr. and PFC Iain W. Fresnoza, came down with

the main body. The packing container for the commo became non-flight worthy and they sent for

another. They had to ship it down filled with boxes to keep gear from shifting around. Nealon

had to search through every box to look for the spare equipment he needed. They borrowed

Marine Motorolas because they worked better than theirs for local communications. Three hours

after its arrival they had plugged in SIPR and NIPR. After they arrived a civilian from

communications technical support came down to assist with the satellite communications.

At that time 1LT Johnston had a team of 15 to do the work of what two had been doing over the

last four days. Since the airfield had planes taxiing to the air terminal during the day, the 1LT

Johnston stationed an NCO and soldier at the gate who would escort the trucks across the apron

with a Polaris four-wheeled all-terrain vehicle. The non-government organizations could not

provide a schedule and trucks would just show up loaded with cargo. They would stack

everything on 463L pallets in the cargo yard. They could stack as many as 50 bags of rice and

beans on each pallet. Rice, beans and soybean oil were the main staples for food. Other supplies

consisted of water purification systems, hygiene kits and lots of tarps. They had to convert the

loads from metric to pounds in order to not break the weight limit of the helicopters.

This was not a traditional RPOE mission in that they were not trained to load cargo on aircraft,

but they adapted to the situation. 1LT Johnston and several soldiers had attended Air Assault

School at Fort Pickett, Virginia the year prior, which helped them understand the helicopters and

how much cargo they could haul.

The problem was changing priorities of cargo going out. Because of cost of fuel, the helicopters

did not want to spend too much time sitting on the ground waiting to be loaded. The other

problem was World Food Program kept sending more trucks than the cargo yard could handle.

Johnston told them to only send five trucks per day and they would send more. The World Food

Program felt they needed to send more but Johnston kept telling them to turn their excess trucks

around.

A couple days after the main body deployed, they began planning the redeployment. They

needed general officer approval for Chapter 3, which allowed the RPOE to fly back with

ammunition. MAJ Hernandez got this approval from SOUTHCOM. Redeployment was

deployment in reverse except that the JAT had deployed with the CRG, so its ULN had not been

previously validated. So they had to get it validated before it could redeploy.

The SOUTHCOM operations order stated the support would end on October 19 and begin

redeployment. The JTF-PO assumed the mission would be extended but on the designated date,

U.S. AID said the mission was a success and the JTF Commander declared the mission

complete. The World Food Program had been sending more trucks to the airport than requested

and they still had a couple hundred bags of rice at the cargo yard when the mission ended. So the

World Food Program had to send trucks to the cargo yard to haul the bags of rice back to their

warehouse.

The SOUTHCOM operations order stated the support would end on October 19 and begin

redeployment. The JTF-PO assumed the mission would be extended but on the designated date,

U.S. AID said it was a mission success and the JTF Commander declared the mission complete.

On October 19, the 689th RPOE validated its JOPES data and submitted its load plans. They

washed down their equipment with a hose by the gas station and the Air Force conducted an air

inspection to ensure it was clean and worthy to fly on the aircraft. It redeployed on October 20.

The 689th RPOE would have to go through customs inspection CONUS and Langley did not

have a dedicated customs team. Norfolk did. That is why they planned to fly the RPOE to

Norfolk. The 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) at Scott Air Force Base approved the

landing at Charleston, SC for the customs inspection and then the plane continued to Langley

where COL Chris Riley, 597th Transportation Brigade Commander, and LTC Stacy M. Tomic,

833rd Transportation Battalion Commander, greeted them. Upon return to Fort Eustis, the 689th

RPOE was given a week for recovery time and then returned to alert status 1 on 31 October.

1LT Johnston was one of a few who had participated in two of the three RPOE deployments.

Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico

By the time Hurricane Maria made landfall on the Caribbean Island of Puerto Rico on 20

September, it was a Category 4 hurricane. It knocked out the power grid in the island, destroyed

homes and caused widespread flooding. Similar to the Haiti earthquake relief, the initial external

military response was from a Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard an amphibious assault ship and

US Coast Guard cutters on 24 September. The seaports and airports opened and the next day

deployed eight UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters to island. Since the primary task at hand was

distribution of food and water and restoration of the power grid, the primary military response

was National Guard units from several states and the Army Corps of Engineers.

Since Puerto Rico belonged to the United States, the island fell under the responsibility of the

U.S Northern Command (NORTHCOM). NORTHCOM designated the 3rd Expeditionary

Sustainment Command as the Joint Force Logistic Command (JFLC) for the military operation.

The 4th Sustainment Brigade from Fort Carson, Colorado would supervise the logistical support.

The Puerto Rico State Guard was in charge of National Guard and the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA).

Since the major airports and seaports were operational, NORTHCOM did not see a need to

deploy either the RPOEs or elements of the 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary). This did

not prevent the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) from taking the

initiative though. On 29 September, SDDC directed the 597th Transportation Brigade at Fort

Eustis to embed the commander of the 833rd Transportation Battalion, LTC Stacy M. Tomic,

with the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command as liaison. Her instructions were to assess the

situation and determine if there was a need for the Joint Task Force-Port Opening capability in

Puerto Rico. She was given three seats on the flight to San Juan, Puerto Rico. She took MAJ

Brett Dunning, the Commander of the 690th RPOE, and CW2 Douglas Maxwell, Mobility

Warrant. MAJ Dunning had just assumed command of the 690th RPOE but had observed an

SPOD mission in San Diego.

Prior to leaving, she had alerted the 688th RPOE to prepare a deployment package to open an

airport and the 690th RPOE to open a seaport. The 690th RPOE was the pusher unit for the

688th, but the 688th RPOE did not have any experience conducting a SPOD mission. The 690th

had just conducted a SPOD exercise in Bayonne, New Jersey the previous August. MAJ

Vershunda J. Jones’ four person joint assessment team (JAT) from the 688th RPOE flew

commercial with only commo equipment to Puerto Rico on 29 September, but when the 3rd

Expeditionary Sustainment Command arrived, it determined it did not need the RPOE to

establish an APOD. The international airport was functional.

Meanwhile, Tomic’s liaison team spent the night at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and met with the

3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command the next day. The 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment

Command deployed in several chalks. Tomic’s team caught a C-130 flight to Tampa and spent

the night due to maintenance problems. The next day they received three space available seats on

a C-5A and arrived in San Juan with the third chalk of the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment

Command on 3 October.

When they arrived, the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command had set up operations in the

Convention Center in San Juan with FEMA. Her team checked into the Hilton and the next day

took a rental car to meet with the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command. The next day, they

met with the SDDC representatives in Puerto Rico, Yolanda Santiago, and borrowed their car to

reconnoiter the ports at Roosevelt Roads and Ponce. Puerto Rico fell under the responsibility of

the 832nd Transportation Battalion at Jacksonville, Florida and it had a team based at Fort

Buchanan. None of the ports had been damaged, but she preferred Ponce because it could handle

a large LMSR and had 20 acres of open space for storage. They agreed Ponce was ideal for the

seaport of debarkation mission.

So LTC Tomic then had to convince the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command they needed a

Joint Task Force-Port Opening SPOD. They had taken photos of the port and put together a

power point slide show. They presented it to the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command the

next day. The port opening package not only required the deployment of the 690th RPOE but

also wamted 60 Sailors from the Navy Expeditionary Port Unit 109 and Navy Cargo Handling

Battalion One (NCHB 1) at Cheatham Annex, Virginia. These were the same Navy units the

690th RPOE had trained with during the SPOD exercise the previous August. The 3rd

Expeditionary Sustainment Command finally submitted the request for it to the Puerto Rico State

Guard around 12 October. USTRANSCOM also identified a LMRS USNS Brittin to deploy

equipment. FEMA and the Army Corps of Engineers sent their equipment to Charleston, South

Carolina for upload.

Tomic also wanted to deploy the rest of the 688th RPOE to work at the commercial airport to

clear the boxes weakened by rains. After talking with the 597th Transportation Brigade

Commander, the mission changed to instead just send in the 690th RPOE.

Since the 690th RPOE was third on the alert status, it did not have everyone or everything it

needed to deploy and so borrowed key personnel from other RPOEs. It had to borrow tents; and

working long hours, it took several days to prepare the equipment for air load. The 690th RPOE

was alerted for deployment on 10 October. The 833rd Transportation Battalion and the 690th

RPOE deployed with equipment in four chalks. The first two chalks flew out of Langley directly

to Ponce on 17 October, the third chalk left on 18 October and the fourth chalk left on 20

October. The Navy Expeditionary Port Unit arrived on 26 October and that day, the Army and

Navy established the Joint Task Force-Port Opening at Ponce.

MAJ Sarah Comeu, the Battalion XO, brought down the S-1, CPT Jarrod Farmer; and NCOIC.

The S-3 did not deploy so his assistant S-3, CPT Don Davis, deployed as the S-3. 1LT Cameron

Blackhurst deployed as the S-4. He became the J-4. CPT Rolona Brown was the Southeast

Atlantic OIC and became the J-3 for the SPOD.

Once on the ground, they moved into the empty Port of America building. The building had no

electricity, but the RPOE brought generators and air conditioning units. They had to establish

communications and become operational within 24 hours. They integrated their seaport operation

with the port authority and the US Coast Guard chaired the meeting to de-conflict arriving

vessels. The Navy EPU provided interface between the seaport and the vessel. Because everyone

had trained together, the success of the downloading owed a lot to personal relationships.

The personnel unloaded humanitarian assistance ships delivering pallets of food and water. The

Navy stevedores worked inside the ships. The Surface Deployment and Distribution Command

representative in Puerto Rico contracted 50 civilian stevedores to work the pier and set their

schedules. Without a Gantry crane, they had to use shipboard cranes to offload cargo. The RPOE

moved the cargo from the port to the vacant lot designated the forward node with one of two

Load Handling System (LHS) trucks. A 10K Atlas forklift staged cargo at the forward node by

its destination. Foster Fuels parked a fuel tanker outside the port for vehicles, forklifts and

generators. The 4th Sustainment Brigade also hired commercial trucks to clear cargo from the

forward node. There was a problem of finding enough local drivers though. Many could not

reach San Juan because of debris. Soldiers volunteered to ride with the commercial trucks. The

first military ship to arrive was the USNS Matthew Perry (T-AKE-9). Over the next couple days,

they offloaded 800 pallets of bottled water and 20 unit government rations (UGR). The USNS

Big Horn (T-AO-198) arrived next with more bottled water and government rations.

The USNS Brittin finally arrive on 3 November and delivered power generation equipment.

They downloaded her in two and a half days. US Army North wanted to load 50 pieces of non-

essential equipment. The RPOE made sure it had all the proper documentation and loaded the

data into GATES. As this was going on, LTG Jeffrey S. Buchanan, Commander of US Army

North, flew over to Ponce to inspect the operation. Upon completion of the download, he said

they could begin retrograding military units out of Puerto Rico. Within a couple of hours units

lined up to leave Puerto Rico. Around 250 pieces of equipment converged at the port without

proper documentation.

The 690th RPOE and 833rd Transportation Battalion had trained at SPOD operations, but not

retrograde. This was entirely new to them. To complicate matters, many of the redeploying units

had deployed in such haste they had not filled out military shipping lists (MSL). CW2 Maxwell

saved the day since he knew what was required to redeploy equipment. While loaded the

deployment data into JOPES. SDDC hired a local civilian with a minivan and power washer to

pressure wash the vehicles. They coordinated with the US Department of Agriculture for

inspection. Since Puerto Rico was part of the United States, they did not require a customs

inspection.

Two weeks after the 833rd had arrived, FEMA delivered a berthing barge to Ponce for everyone

to live in. It consisted of air-conditioned containers stacked two high for sleeping and others

served hot meals and provided laundry service. The laundry service had a three-day turn around.

Everyone working at the port moved into the berthing barge.

After the initial redeployment, the 833rd Transportation Battalion reconnoitered two locations

for wash racks and settled on Camp Santiago. CW2 Maxwell then wrote the standard operating

procedures for the redeployment. He recommended a time phase for redeployment where the

units would send their equipment to the wash racks on a schedule and when ready, the RPOE

would call the equipment forward to Ponce. The vehicles received a second spraying at Ponce.

Army North loaded the redeployment data into JOPES and ensured the units followed the time

line. The unit movement officer of the 4th Sustainment Brigade made sure all the units had he

proper paperwork. The Joint Force Logistic Command also sent over representatives to help.

For the second turn, the Brittin delivered cargo loaded on 463L pallets. This time the uploading

went much more efficiently and the Brittin was uploaded and was ready to sail when the US Air

Force arrived with unscheduled equipment at the last minute. The Brittin was leased up to a

certain date and this last minute arrival made the vessel master angry. The Brittin finally set sail

on 28 November. The Brittin made stops at Port Arthur, Texas; Charleston, South Carolina and

Newport News, Virginia. After uploading all Army units, the RPOE turned the port over to the

Corps of Engineers and flew out a couple days later on 29 November. The Brittin discharged all

the RPOE equipment at Newport News on 10 December.

This had been the fourth deployment of an RPOE since the three units were formed nine years

prior. Since the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command fell under the US

Transportation Command, it did not have to wait to be requested but could take the initiative.

Not all maneuver or support commanders understood the port opening capability of the Army. In

this case, the 833rd Transportation Battalion identified an additional port that could bring in

supplies and as it turned out, could also retrograde equipment. Because of the delay in requesting

this capability, the planning went from crisis action to more deliberate, which allowed the

battalion commander to switch out RPOE for the one best trained for the seaport mission. The

RPOEs once again proved their port opening capability.

As the Army embraced rapid deployment concept again after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,

the rapid port opening elements (RPOE) enhanced that capability just as the arrival/departure

airfield control group (A/DACG) had after the Vietnam War. In the past, the transportation

capability competed for space in the deployment against maneuver elements and often lost out.

By agreement, the RPOE could deploy a joint assessment team (JAT) with the contingency

response group, which self-deployed with its own aircraft. If there was someone in the combatant

command headquarters that could submit the JOPES data, the rest of the RPOE could follow

immediately with capability to clear the airfield, or bring in another to open the seaport. The

importance of the JAT was that it could make a proper assessment and could articulate to the

joint task force commander on the ground of the capabilities needed. The port opening capability

of the 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary) seemed more relegated to deliberate operations

such as Operation Iraqi Freedom or as follow-on or port clearance capability.

Interviews:

1LT Cameron Blackhurst interview by Richard Killblane at Ft. Eustis, Va. on 15 March 2018.

CPT Rolona Brown and CPT Don Davis interview by Richard Killblane at Ft. Eustis, Va. on 15

March 2018.

CPT Morgan Carter, CPT Kayla Epple, and 2LT Clay Confer interview by Richard Killblane at

Ft. Eustis, Va. on 1 February 2018.

MAJ William A. Costice interview by Richard Killblane at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 13 February

2010.

MAJ Brett Dunning interview by Richard Killblane at Ft. Eustis, Va. on 1 February 2018.

MAJ Anthony Freda interview by Richard Killblane at Ft. Eustis, Va., on 27 October 2014.

COL Jeffrey Helmick interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, VA, 17 March 2010.

1LT Simon Johnston interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, VA, on 9 November 2016.

1LT Eric Kuntz interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, VA, on 9 November 2016.

MAJ Armando Kuppinger interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, VA, 30 March 2010.

CW2 Douglas Maxwell interview by Richard Killblane at Ft. Eustis, Va. on 1 February 2018.

CW2 Douglas B. Maxwell and SPC James J. Nealon III interview by Richard Killblane at Ft

Eustis, VA, on 4 November 2016.

LTC Cory A. New interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, VA, 20 May 2010.

LTC John Redinger interview by Richard Killblane at Fort Eustis, VA, 24 March 2010.

MAJ Victoria L. Snow, 1LT Eric Wrinkle, and WO1 Caleb Camp interview by Richard

Killblane at Port-au-Prince, Haiti on 14 February 2010.

LTC Stacey M. Tomic, MAJ Sarah Comeu and CSM Darrin Wilson interview by Richard

Killblane at Ft. Eustis, Va. on 15 March 2018.

CPT Michael Ziegler and 1LT Jeff Miller interview by Richard Killblane at Ft. Eustis, Va. on 23

October 2014.

SFC Blair T. Pierce interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, VA, 12 March 2014.

Riddle, LTC Ralph, “Joint Task Force Port Opening – Seaport of Debarkation (JTF-PO SPOD),”

7 February 2010.