July 2017

As we announced in last Quarter’s Investment Letter, SCM has terminated all uses of Russell Index data effective April 1, 2017. The principal benchmarkfor Symons Value is the S&P 500® Index and the secondary benchmark is the S&P 500® Value Index®. The principal benchmark for Symons Small CapValue is the S&P Small Cap 600® Index and the secondary benchmark is the S&P Small Cap 600® Value Index.

For the first six months of 2017, the S&P 500® Index performance was 9.34%1, and the S&P 500® Value Index® performance was 4.85%1. The net-of-fees performance for the Symons Value strategy was 4.03%. For the first six months of 2017, the S&P Small Cap 600® Index performance was2.79%1, and the S&P Small Cap 600® Value Index performance was 0.86%1. The net-of-fees performance for the Symons Small Cap Value strategy was5.59%. Since our Chief Investment Officer, Colin Symons, CFA, took responsibility for our flagship Value strategy on January 1, 2000, $1 invested in Valueis now worth $4.84 before fees (generating performance in the top 6% of peer value managers2), while $1 invested in the benchmark S&P 500® Indexis now worth $2.313. Likewise, $1 invested in Small Cap Value at its inception on October 1, 2006 is now worth $2.28 before fees (generating performance in the top 36% of peer small cap managers2), while $1 invested in the benchmark S&P Small Cap 600® Index is now worth $2.633.

THE BIG PICTUREThe history of past stock market peaks is worth every investor’s careful contemplation. What you find at every peak is a Wall Street narrative of why thistime the market is reasonably valued and there is “no risk” to investors. Unfortunately, every such narrative of “no risk” has been followed by nerve-shattering downside risk for popular stocks, indexes and benchmarks.

1972 — The narrative of “no risk” was that the “Nifty Fifty” stocks would provide investors with substantial profits forever because of their high-qualitybusinesses that no one could compete with. Remember Kodak, Polaroid, etc.? The actual result was a market decline of 45% in 1973-74.

1987 — The narrative of “no risk” was that Portfolio Insurance (Program Trading) would instantaneously protect investors against any market downturn.The actual result was, because for every seller there has to be a buyer, a market decline of 30% with no protection from Portfolio Insurance.

2000 — The narrative of “no risk” was that tech, media and telecom stocks were the new economy and profits didn’t matter. The actual result was amarket decline of 47% (the Nasdaq 100 declined 83%) in 2000-02.

2007 — The narrative of “no risk” was that housing prices never decline. The actual result was a market decline of 53% in 2008-09.

In every one of the above situations Wall Street’s after-the-fact response was that “no one could possibly have foreseen the crash” — which is true if youare investing by looking in the rearview mirror. If you continue to look in the rearview mirror, it quickly becomes obvious why investors should have beenwary about market risks. In 2017, we are once again faced with a seriously overvalued market.

2017 — Pick your narrative — There is no risk because of the promised Trump economic revival; alternatively, there is no risk because the Fed’s ZIRP (ZeroInterest Rate Policy) and QE (Quantitative Easing) market interventions will provide the foundation for permanent economic growth. The actual result?Do you believe that this time the result will be different? Do you believe that either the President or the Fed is so all-knowing and all-wise that we willhave an “all-is-well” economy and stock market indefinitely? As Dirty Harry said — “You have to ask yourself one question. Do you feel lucky?”

So what happens next? The immediate past is the future for most investors. Investors have a hard time separating what has happened recently from whatwill happen. Do you really expect the next five years to be like the last five years for the stock market, with weak economic growth, almost no corporate profit growth, and the stock market going up about 75%? Investing through the rearview mirror of past gains is a great way to have a spectacular wreck. But, at the same time, never forget that investing through the rearview mirror of past losses is a great way to miss good opportunities.

If you invest by looking forward, then downturns enable you to take advantage of good opportunities and are not to be feared. This is the core of our job— risk management. SCM seeks to manage three dimensions of risk — the depth of losses, the duration of losses and the frequency of losses. Looking inthe rearview mirror offers no real options for risk protection in down markets. Indexes driven by the most overpriced stocks provide steep losses that goon for a long time and recur regularly. Less obvious but equally important is the impact of such downside performance on investor behavior, with the well-known result that investors often cannot stand the pain and so get out of the market around market lows. Subsequently, investors find it difficult toget back into the market until a sustained upturn has occurred. Benchmark differentiated portfolios, such as SCM’s, that seek to manage downside risk,can both better preserve investors’ capital and make it more likely that they maintain their investment positions and reap the reward of full market cycleperformance. Looking forward can enable investors to reduce the depth, duration and frequency of portfolio losses compared to indexes and benchmarks.

Quarterly Investment LetterSECOND QUARTER 2017

1 S&P index performances obtained from www.spdji.com.2 Data rankings are prepared using Zephyr domestic equity universes based on investment style/fund. For Value 182 managers and for Small Cap 165 managers were included in their peer

group analysis for the same time period.3 Net worth calculated based on S&P index cumulative performances for the same time period obtained from Zephyr.

Index information is presented for comparison purposes. The indices are unmanaged, not investable, have no expenses and reflect reinvestment of dividends and distributions. Different types of investments involve varying degrees of risk, and there can be no assurance that the future performance of any specific investment, investment strategy, or product made reference to directly or indirectly in this newsletter, will be profitable, equal any corresponding indicated historical performance level(s),or be suitable for your portfolio. Due to various factors, including changing market conditions, the content may no longer be reflective of current opinions or positions. Moreover, you should not assume that any discussion or information contained in this newsletter (article) serves as the receipt of, or as a substitute for, personalized investment advice from Symons Capital Management, Inc. To the extent that a reader has any questions regarding the applicability of any specific issue discussedabove to his/her individual situation, he/she is encouraged to consult with the professional advisor of his/her choosing. A copy of our current brochure, discussing our advisory services and fees, is available for review upon request. Please see Value and Small Cap Value Performance Statistics pages for supporting information and disclosures.

THE ECONOMY AND INVESTMENT MARKETSIn June the Fed raised the Fed Funds rate for the third time in six months, setting the target range at 1% to 1.25%. This series of interest rate increasessuggests a reversal of the Fed’s ZIRP. The Fed also outlined how it intends to begin to reduce its $4.5 trillion of balance sheet assets (which were at $0.8trillion in 2008), which suggests a reversal of the Fed’s QE policy. Rather than easing monetary conditions as the Fed has done since late 2008, the Fedis beginning to tighten monetary conditions. Tightening typically occurs when the Fed believes the economy is overheating. Is the economy overheating,or is the Fed worried about something else?

Rather than overheating, it looks like the economy is continuing to slow. Auto sales and other retail sales are slowing. Consumer discretionary incomesare flat or declining. Debt continues to grow as consumers try to maintain their standard of living. Labor force participation is declining — fewer peopleof working age are productively employed — even though the unemployment rate, which includes only people looking for work, is quite low.

Economies in the rest of the world don’t look any better. Three European banks failed in June — one in Spain and two in Italy. The Bank of Japan hasintervened in Japan’s government bond market so much that there are days when no Japanese government bonds are traded — in other words, thereis no market. What happens if the BOJ ever decides to stop their interventions? At this point, some believe that they can’t stop their interventions becauseit would result in a financial crisis, which is precisely the reason for central bank interventions around the world over the past eight years. Finally, whilewhat is going on in China is always difficult to fathom, it is clear than their rate of economic growth is slowing, and their debt burden is skyrocketing.

Bottom line, the data suggest that the gap between the trajectory of our shambling economy and the trajectory of financial asset prices is continuing towiden. Perhaps the Fed is beginning to recognize that reality. Perhaps the Fed understands that there needs to be a correction in financial assets prices,and, as in past business cycle downturns, sustainable economic growth will come only after unsustainable debt and speculative excesses in the financialmarkets are purged, and imprudent investors take a hit. As in past business cycles, marginal enterprises will fail, which should include marginal banks —even if they are “too big to fail.”

EQUITY STRATEGIES AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENTHow many investors really believe that the strength of the stock market over the past several years is due to fundamentals that point to coming strongeconomic growth? Or are investors still hoping that the Trump economic miracle will arrive or the Fed will resume its financial market interventions if thestock market suffers more than the most modest of downturns? Is Trump or the Fed omnipotent in their ability to support stock prices? Can the Fedassure a positive path for equities, regardless of which path the economy takes?

While currently high market valuations, measured by historically reliable valuation methodologies, tell us that future market returns eventually will be lessthan historically average returns, it typically takes something more than high valuations for market prices to reverse course. One possibility is central bankstrying to reverse course — raising interest rates, and shrinking their balance sheet holdings of financial assets. Another is investors changing their psychological investment attitude from being indifferent to indications of risks to developing a distinct aversion to risk. We believe that our patient, cautious and disciplined investment approach will enable us not only to survive current market risks, but to thrive as the current market cycle is completed with a downside correction of some unknown magnitude.

CONCLUSIONWhat has kept the market up? No one really knows. Trump hope? ZIRP? QE? Due to the Fed, interest rates are so low that equities are the only option?But the Fed has started to turn away from ZIRP and QE, rates have risen a bit at the short end, and Trump’s economic plan has gone nowhere. Can themarket continue to go on like it has for, say, the rest of 2017? Maybe. But can recent economic and market trends support years of future gains? Prettyunlikely. By many historically reliable valuation measures, such as Hussman’s market cap to corporate revenue, Buffett’s market cap to GDP, or Shiller’sCAPE, the stock market is at or close to record highs, and this market is a much more broadly expensive market than was the 2000 tech bubble marketor the 2008 financial bubble market.

And so we are risk averse with the investment assets that we manage for you. Despite the frustrations of being value-conscious and disciplined in ourstock selections as market valuations become expensive, in both 2000 and 2008 our historically-informed investment discipline put us ahead in preservingwealth as the market reversed course to complete the cycle and return to more sensible and sustainable valuations. We would not be surprised to seehistory repeat itself in the foreseeable future and once again enable us to buy good stocks at attractive prices with the purchasing power we have protected during the downturn.

Yours sincerely,

Ed Symons, JD Colin Symons, CFAChairman & Founder Chief Investment Officer

SYMONS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

PERFORMANCE STATISTICS — VALUE

WWW.SYMONSCAPITAL.COM

Note: This data is presented as supplemental information to the fully compliant GIPS® presentation. Please see back for additional disclosure information. Returns include the reinvestment of all income and dividends. Net of fee performance was calculated using actual management fees. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Symons Capital Management, Inc. — Symons Value Composite Zephyr S t y leAD V I S OR: Symons Capi ta l Management , Inc .

January 2000 - June 2017: Summary Statistics — Supplemental information to the full composite disclosure presentation.

Symons Value Composite (gross of fees) 9.44% 4.52% 384.31% 12.03% 11.74% 80.37% 36.45% 6.24% 0.61 70

Symons Value Composite (net of fees) 8.28% 3.36% 302.58% 12.00% 10.21% 75.36% 39.96% 5.12% 0.61 70

S&P 500® 4.92% 0.00% 131.44% 15.98% 4.91% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 1.00 70

S&P 500® Value 5.81% 0.89% 168.61% 16.47% 5.73% 100.57% 93.59% 1.02% 0.99 70

EXCESS RETURN CUMULATIVE STANDARD RISK-ADJ. UP CAPTURE DOWN CAPTURE ALPHA BETA NUMBER OFMODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY STATISTICS RETURN vs. MARKET RETURN DEVIATION PERFORMANCE vs. MARKET vs. MARKET vs. MARKET vs. MARKET OBSERVATIONS

Symons Value Composite (gross of fees) 68.61% 69.59% 99.63% 88.73% 97.09% 95.36% 28.85% 27.49% 5.04%

Symons Value Composite (net of fees) 81.51% 80.03% 99.71% 92.66% 98.93% 98.59% 57.81% 58.65% 17.88%

S&P 500® 15.86% 3.55% 38.70% 3.13% 17.13% 7.82% 11.79% 17.12% 82.04%

S&P 500® Value 43.87% 62.63% 57.51% 19.89% 29.93% 34.14% 61.56% 47.46% 68.00%

LARGE CAP VALUE PEER GROUP RANKING (SOURCE ZEPHYR)***MEDIAN YTD 1 YEAR 3 YEARS 5 YEARS 7 YEARS 10 YEARS 12 YEARS ANALYSIS PERIOD

RANK 429 MNG 429 MNG 407 MNG 378 MNG 353 MNG 323 MNG 285 MNG 182 MNG

Manager PerformanceJanuary 2000 – June 2017

(Single Computation)

Symons Value Composite (gross of fees)

Symons Value Composite (net of fees)

S&P 500® Value

S&P 500®

*** Zephyr creates domestic equity universes based on investment style / fund behavior using the Morningstar, Mobius, Nelson’s, PSN, and eVestment Alliance databases. Ratings were presented by Zephyr StyleADVISOR as the result of surveys created and conducted by Zephyr.SCM did not pay a fee to participate in these surveys.

SYMONS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

SYMONS VALUE COMPOSITE

WWW.SYMONSCAPITAL.COM

COMPOSITE NOTES

SCHEDULE OF COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE STATISTICS (06-30-2017)

1. TThhee SSyymmoonnss VVaalluuee CCoommppoossiittee was created in October 1986 and consists of all fully discretionary portfolios that are managed in theValue style. The Symons Value investment discipline seeks to invest in securities of companies with established, sustainable businesseswhose current prices provide the prospect of long-term appreciation with limited downside price risk. The minimum account size for thiscomposite is $50,000.

2. For comparison purposes the composite is measured primarily against the S&P 500® index, and secondarily against the S&P 500® Valueindex. Effective April 1, 2017, the S&P 500® index replaces the Russell 3000® Value index as a primary benchmark, and the S&P 500®

Value index replaces the S&P 500® index as a secondary benchmark, since Russell index returns are no longer available without payingsubstantial annual licensing fees. Both benchmarks are unmanaged indices that primarily include large capitalization stocks that arerepresentative of Symons Capital Management Inc.’s Value portfolio management and stock selection style. A direct investment in anindex may involve different liquidity, risks and tax considerations. The Adviser may invest in securities outside of those represented in theindices. S&P 500® returns are shown for the entire composite history.

3. Returns are presented since the beginning of Colin Symons’ tenure as portfolio manager on January 1, 2000. Results are based on fullydiscretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer managed by the firm. The U.S. Dollar is the currencyused to express performance. Composite performance is presented net of foreign withholding taxes on dividends, interest income, andcapital gains. Returns include the effect of foreign currency exchange rates. Returns are presented gross and net of management fees and include the reinvestment of all income. Gross of fees returns are presented before management and custodial fees, but after alltrading expenses. Net of fee performance was calculated using actual management fees. Prior to July 2015, net of fee performance wascalculated using actual management and sub-advisory fees. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

4. The investment management fee is: 1.25% on the first $1 million; 1.00% on the next $4 million; 0.90% on the next $5 million; 0.80% on thenext $15 million; 0.70% on the next $25 million; and 0.60% above $50 million. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients may vary.

5. The annual composite dispersion is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite the entire year.Three-year annualized ex-post standard deviation of the composite and benchmark are not presented prior to 2012, because 36 monthlycomposite returns were not available until December 31, 2012.

6. Securities purchased by Symons Capital Management, Inc. are listed on a major exchange with published values. Generally, month-endvaluations as shown on custodian account statements are used to calculate portfolio assets and returns. Any cash flow equal to orgreater than 5% of a portfolio’s market value would cause the portfolio to be revalued and accounted for properly so as not to distortperformance. Additional information regarding the policies for valuing portfolios, calculating performance and preparing compliantpresentations is available upon request.

7. Symons Capital Management, Inc. is an independent investment management firm, not affiliated with any parent organization,established in 1983 and registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.Prior to October 1, 2001, the firm was known as Dollins Symons Management, Inc. The firm maintains a complete list and descriptionof composites, which is available upon request.

8. Symons Capital Management, Inc. claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has preparedand presented this report in compliance with the GIPS® standards. Symons Capital Management, Inc. has been independently verifiedfor the periods January 1, 1996 through March 31, 2017 by Ashland Partners & Company, LLP. Verification assesses whether (1) thefirm has complied with all the composite construction requirements of the GIPS® standards on a firm-wide basis and (2) the firm’spolicies and procedures are designed to calculate and present performance in compliance with the GIPS® standards.

9. The Symons Value composite has been examined for the periods July 1, 1998 through March 31, 2017 by Ashland Partners & Company,LLP. Firm verification and composite performance examination reports are available upon request.

* Performance represents a partial period return for this year.

** n/a — Annual Dispersion and/or 3 Year Ex-Post StandardDeviation not applicable for this period.

2000 22.53% 21.15% -9.10% -0.52% 114 8.32% n/a n/a n/a 50.18 0.00% 62.88% 79.802001 18.96% 17.58% -11.89% -8.18% 126 1.74% n/a n/a n/a 70.65 0.00% 76.94% 91.822002 -13.15% -14.17% -22.10% -16.61% 179 1.43% n/a n/a n/a 81.48 0.00% 79.53% 102.452003 21.81% 20.42% 28.68% 30.35% 182 1.83% n/a n/a n/a 97.98 0.00% 82.53% 118.712004 20.06% 18.71% 10.88% 15.02% 188 1.22% n/a n/a n/a 117.51 0.00% 78.43% 149.812005 11.97% 10.71% 4.91% 8.71% 211 1.11% n/a n/a n/a 139.56 0.00% 76.17% 183.222006 16.00% 14.73% 15.79% 20.78% 244 0.82% n/a n/a n/a 177.68 0.00% 64.83% 274.042007 3.60% 2.49% 5.49% 1.99% 250 1.27% n/a n/a n/a 187.95 0.00% 62.41% 301.132008 -12.03% -12.98% -37.00% -39.22% 251 1.39% n/a n/a n/a 180.07 0.00% 71.00% 253.592009 16.92% 15.65% 26.46% 21.18% 250 1.18% n/a n/a n/a 177.31 1.38% 57.56% 308.032010 11.36% 10.17% 15.06% 15.10% 254 0.71% n/a n/a n/a 200.62 1.36% 50.87% 394.362011 7.68% 6.64% 2.11% -0.48% 307 0.53% n/a n/a n/a 303.11 1.49% 68.02% 445.632012 7.98% 6.93% 16.00% 17.68% 322 0.38% 9.15% 15.09% 15.75% 331.76 1.41% 71.53% 463.792013 18.57% 17.43% 32.39% 31.99% 332 0.92% 7.59% 11.94% 12.97% 392.37 1.46% 74.57% 526.152014 8.94% 7.89% 13.69% 12.36% 329 0.35% 7.17% 8.97% 9.46% 403.61 1.64% 77.53% 520.602015 0.28% -0.67% 1.38% -3.13% 312 0.32% 7.69% 10.47% 10.60% 358.81 1.91% 77.96% 460.262016 7.86% 6.83% 11.96% 17.40% 300 0.45% 7.90% 10.59% 10.73% 367.55 1.97% 75.95% 483.912017* 4.52% 4.03% 9.34% 4.85% 288 n/a n/a n/a n/a 365.64 1.60% 76.32% 479.08

S&P NUMBER OF ANNUAL 3 YEAR EX-POST 3 YEAR EX-POST 3 YEAR EX-POST VALUE OF % NON-FEE % TOTAL TOTAL FIRMGROSS NET S&P 500® ACCOUNTS IN COMPOSITE STD DEVIATION STD DEVIATION STD DEVIATION COMPOSITE PAYING FIRM ASSETS ASSETS

YEAR OF FEES OF FEES 500® VALUE COMPOSITE DISPERSION** COMPOSITE** S&P 500®** S&P 500® VALUE** (USD MILLIONS) ASSETS IN COMPOSITE (USD MILLIONS)

SYMONS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

PERFORMANCE STATISTICS — SMALL CAP VALUE

WWW.SYMONSCAPITAL.COM

Note: This data is presented as supplemental information to the fully compliant GIPS® presentation. Please see back for additional disclosure information.Returns include the reinvestment of all income and dividends. Net of fee performance was calculated using actual management fees. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Symons Capital Management, Inc. — Small Cap Value Composite Zephyr S t y leAD V I S OR: Symons Capi ta l Management , Inc .

October 2006 - June 2017: Summary Statistics — Supplemental information to the full composite disclosure presentation.

Symons Small Cap Value Composite (gross of fees) 7.98% -1.44% 128.22% 18.65% 8.15% 81.76% 85.08% 0.02% 0.86 43

Symons Small Cap Value Composite (net of fees) 7.07% -2.35% 108.29% 18.64% 7.21% 78.50% 87.16% -0.82% 0.86 43

S&P Small Cap 600® 9.42% 0.00% 163.24% 19.24% 9.42% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 1.00 43

S&P Small Cap 600® Value 8.49% -0.93% 139.93% 20.02% 8.26% 99.29% 105.52% -1.07% 1.03 43

EXCESS RETURN CUMULATIVE STANDARD RISK-ADJ. UP CAPTURE DOWN CAPTURE ALPHA BETA NUMBER OFMODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY STATISTICS RETURN vs. MARKET RETURN DEVIATION PERFORMANCE vs. MARKET vs. MARKET vs. MARKET vs. MARKET OBSERVATIONS

Symons Small Cap Value Composite (gross of fees) 74.93% 4.46% 93.87% 6.71% 89.73% 93.03% 57.38% 35.45%

Symons Small Cap Value Composite (net of fees) 84.65% 5.18% 94.72% 19.11% 94.11% 95.89% 79.20% 60.50%

S&P SmallCap 600® 5.81% 21.24% 30.94% 6.54% 5.73% 4.34% 4.75% 6.25%

S&P SmallCap 600® Value 14.96% 59.54% 42.23% 17.57% 7.27% 11.11% 18.27% 22.90%

SMALL CAP VALUE PEER GROUP RANKING (SOURCE ZEPHYR)***MEDIAN YTD 1 YEAR 3 YEARS 5 YEARS 7 YEARS 10 YEARS ANALYSIS PERIOD

RANK 259 MNG 259 MNG 238 MNG 222 MNG 197 MNG 175 MNG 165 MNG

Manager PerformanceOctober 2006 – June 2017

(Single Computation)

Symons Small Cap Value Composite(gross of fees)

Symons Small Cap Value Composite(net of fees)

S&P SmallCap 600®

S&P SmallCap 600® Value

*** Zephyr creates domestic equity universes based on investment style / fund behavior using the Morningstar, Mobius, Nelson’s, PSN, and eVestment Alliance databases. Ratings were presented by Zephyr StyleADVISOR as the result of surveys created and conducted by Zephyr.SCM did not pay a fee to participate in these surveys.

SYMONS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

SYMONS SMALL CAP VALUE COMPOSITE

WWW.SYMONSCAPITAL.COM

COMPOSITE NOTES

SCHEDULE OF COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE STATISTICS (06-30-2017)

1. TThhee SSyymmoonnss SSmmaallll CCaapp VVaalluuee CCoommppoossiittee wwas created in October 2006 and consists of all fully discretionary portfolios that are

managed in the Small Cap Value style. The investment objective for the Symons Small Cap Value investment discipline is long-term

capital appreciation achieved by investing in companies that can be purchased at attractive valuations. The minimum account size for

initial inclusion in this composite is $250,000.

2. For comparison purposes the composite is measured primarily against the S&P SmallCap 600® index, and secondarily against the S&P

SmallCap 600® Value index. Effective April 1, 2017, the S&P SmallCap 600® index replaces the Russell 2000® Value index as a primary

benchmark, and the S&P SmallCap 600® Value index replaces the Russell 2000® index as a secondary benchmark, since Russell index

returns are no longer available without paying substantial annual licensing fees. Both benchmarks are unmanaged indices that primarily

include small capitalization stocks that are representative of Symons Capital Management Inc.'s Small Cap Value portfolio management

and stock selection style. A direct investment in an index may involve different liquidity, risks and tax considerations. The Adviser may

invest in securities outside of those represented in the indices. S&P SmallCap 600® returns are shown for the entire composite history.

3. Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer managed by the firm. The U.S.

Dollar is the currency used to express performance. Composite performance is presented net of foreign withholding taxes on dividends,

interest income, and capital gains. Returns include the effect of foreign currency exchange rates. Returns are presented gross and net

of management fees and include the reinvestment of all income. Gross of fees returns are presented before management and custodial

fees, but after all trading expenses. Net of fee performance was calculated using actual management fees. Past performance is not

indicative of future results.

4. The investment management fee is: 1.25% on the first $1 million; 1.00% on the next $9 million; 0.90% on the next $15 million; 0.80%

on the next $25 million; and 0.70% above $50 million. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients may vary.

5. The annual composite dispersion is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite the entire year.

Three-year annualized ex-post standard deviation of the composite and benchmark are not presented prior to 2012, because 36 monthly

composite returns were not available until December 31, 2012.

6. Securities purchased by SCM are listed on a major exchange with published values. Generally, month-end valuations as shown on

custodian account statements are used to calculate portfolio assets and returns. Any cash flow equal to or greater than 5% of a

portfolio’s market value would cause the portfolio to be revalued and accounted for properly so as not to distort performance. Additional

information regarding the policies for valuing portfolios, calculating performance and preparing compliant presentations is available

upon request.

7. Symons Capital Management, Inc. is an independent investment management firm, not affiliated with any parent organization,

established in 1983 and registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

Prior to October 1, 2001, the firm was known as Dollins Symons Management, Inc. The firm maintains a complete list and description

of composites, which is available upon request.

8. Symons Capital Management, Inc. claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared

and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS® standards. Symons Capital Management, Inc. has been independently verified

for the periods January 1, 1996 through March 31, 2017 by Ashland Partners & Company, LLP. Verification assesses whether (1) the

firm has complied with all the composite construction requirements of the GIPS® standards on a firm-wide basis and (2) the firm’s

policies and procedures are designed to calculate and present performance in compliance with the GIPS® standards.

9. The Symons Small Cap Value composite has been examined for the periods from October 1, 2006 through March 31, 2017 by Ashland

Partners & Company, LLP. The verification and performance examination reports are available upon request.

* Performance represents a partial period return for this year.

** n/a — Annual Dispersion and/or 3 Year Ex-Post StandardDeviation not applicable for this period.

2006* (10-01) 11.51% 11.51% 7.85% 8.39% 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.54 100.00% 0.56% 274.04

2007 10.80% 10.38% -0.30% -5.54% 10 0.53% n/a n/a n/a 7.33 23.37% 2.43% 301.13

2008 -39.64% -40.24% -31.07% -29.51% 21 1.38% n/a n/a n/a 7.50 13.02% 2.95% 253.59

2009 55.02% 53.59% 25.57% 22.85% 23 3.78% n/a n/a n/a 12.90 14.96% 4.19% 308.03

2010 31.55% 30.32% 26.31% 24.72% 25 1.18% n/a n/a n/a 18.84 13.65% 4.78% 394.36

2011 -6.93% -7.87% 1.02% -1.38% 31 0.56% n/a n/a n/a 23.89 9.61% 5.36% 445.63

2012 5.15% 4.22% 16.33% 18.21% 31 0.60% 14.43% 18.96% 19.95% 24.17 9.93% 5.21% 463.79

2013 17.05% 16.01% 41.31% 39.98% 27 0.85% 11.18% 15.37% 15.95% 21.85 12.15% 4.15% 526.15

2014 0.21% -0.71% 5.76% 7.54% 22 0.22% 8.91% 12.36% 12.68% 18.16 14.70% 3.49% 520.60

2015 2.71% 1.80% -1.97% -6.67% 18 0.35% 8.46% 13.18% 13.42% 15.92 16.50% 3.46% 460.26

2016 20.04% 19.00% 26.56% 31.32% 18 0.66% 9.24% 14.95% 15.48% 18.33 16.37% 3.79% 483.91

2017* 6.05% 5.59% 2.79% 0.86% 17 n/a n/a n/a n/a 18.85 14.45% 3.94% 479.08

S&P NUMBER OF ANNUAL 3 YEAR EX-POST 3 YEAR EX-POST 3 YEAR EX-POST VALUE OF % NON-FEE % TOTAL TOTAL FIRMGROSS NET S&P 600® ACCOUNTS IN COMPOSITE STD DEVIATION STD DEVIATION STD DEVIATION COMPOSITE PAYING FIRM ASSETS ASSETS

YEAR OF FEES OF FEES 600® VALUE COMPOSITE DISPERSION** COMPOSITE** S&P 600®** S&P 600® VALUE** (USD MILLIONS) ASSETS IN COMPOSITE (USD MILLIONS)