pursuing pro-competitive reforms in ph … project national orientation workshop & national...
TRANSCRIPT
CREW PROJECT
National Orientation Workshop & National Reference Group Meeting
September 24, 2015
Manila
PURSUING PRO-COMPETITIVE REFORMS IN PH EPI
BY
EDNA ESPOS
OTHER MAIN REGULATORY POLICIES & MARKET FEATURES
Generation Transmission Distribution Supply
Rate
Regulation
• Spot-market
• Bilaterals lifted with RCOA
• Indirect via DU retail rate
Regulated Regulated Market
Non-Price
Regulation
ERC Competition Rules,
ERC/DENR/DOE regulations on
performance standards such as heat
rates; emissions etc
Mainly direct
ERC regulations
Mainly direct ERC
regulations
RCOA Code of
Conduct & other
rules
Horizontal
Structure
Installed generating capacity
ownership,operation or control by
company/related group limited to 30%
of grid, 25% national
Only 1 private
operator of govt
assets
None None
Vertical
Structure or
Cross-
Ownership
1. Allowed between DU & GENCO but former limited to 50% of demand sourced
from associate
2. Dus, GENCOs their officials, stockholder, affiliates, relatives within 4th degree
consanguinity & affinity cannot hold interest in TRANSCO & concessionaire, &
conversely
3. NGCP franchise diluted 2. Exempts a) relatives of Dus/GENCOs etc w/o
employment, consultancy, fiduciary relationship/interest in Grantee &
conversely and b) 1% stock ownership
Generators ,
DUs allowed in
contestable retail
market
OTHER MAIN REGULATORY POLICIES & MARKET FEATURES
Generation Transmission Distribution Supply
Market • 3 separate wholesale.
LUZ-VI WESM. At least
90% physical BCQ
• Wide price separation of
Leyte-Samar-Bohol from
other Visayas sub-grids
on peak hours
• Mindanao 100%
physical bilaterals
3 • 146
(121 EC, 17 PDU, 8
LGU)
• MERALCO,75%
Luzon peak
• VECO, 31% Visayas
peak
• DLPC, 23% Mindanao
peak
• 1 MW
competitive
retail now in
LUZ-VI
• 750 kW
soon; Others
to be
determined
Supply-
Demand
Balance
Inadequate Generation (See
chart)
• Congestion
problems
• Insufficient grid/sub-
grid interconnection
• 79.9% households
electrified (target 90%
by 2017)
• 66% sitios electrified
(target 32.4k by end of
PNoy term)
Not enough RES
supply offer to 1
MW contestable
customers
Market
Concentration
HHI
Luzon 1,280
Visayas 1,879
Mindanao 3,970
monopoly monopoly A/o Oct 2014
MERALCO Local
RES 60%;
Balance to Local
RES of other Dus
& GENCOs
Entry Barriers 100 + permitting and
licensing requirements
Franchise Franchise ERC License
Power Generation Capacity
21,470
32,901
15,54817,025
10,627
23,52725,416
30,318
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Indonesia(PLN) Philippine Vietnam ThailandMW
Increase in PH
Generation Capacity
captured only increased
Residential
Requirements.
Source: IEEJ-JICA (2013)
PRO-COMPETITION REFORM POSSIBILITIES
TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION
(1) Application of PH Competition Law
Limited
prohibitions on agreements between competitors not applicable
Applicability of prohibitions on anti-competitive vertical restraints limited by State Action Immunity & Filed Rate Doctrines
Merger provision not applicable
o only 1 transmission
oECs should merge; MERALCO divest but very difficult because franchise – property right protected by Bill of Rights
(2) Pro-Competitive Regulatory Reforms
Transmission Planning & Investment to Enhance Generation Competition
Robust design and implementation of Incentive Regulation in Rate Methodology. Current ERC approach incorrect (rate base valuation, WACC calculation, no efficiency targets, efficient cost
baselining) and leads to higher tariffs, not efficiency
VISAYAS NODAL PRICES HOURS 8 & 20, 220215
HOUR FUEL CODE RESOURCE_ID PRICE HOUR FUEL CODE RESOURCE_ID PRICE
8 6 5EAUC_G01 5452.9 cebu 8 1 8SLWIND_G01 6105.81 guimaras/panay
8 4 5KSPC_G01 5456.8 cebu 8 4 8PEDC_G01 6099.66 panay
8 4 5TPC_G02 5454.71 cebu 8 1 6SACASL_G01 5904.41 negros
8 4 8PEDC_G01 6099.66 panay 8 3 6PAL1A_G01 5481.52 negros
8 3 6NASULO_G01 5476.16 negros 8 3 6NASULO_G01 5476.16 negros
8 3 4LGPP_G01 3724.71 leyte 8 3 6PAL2A_G01 5476.16 negros
8 3 6PAL1A_G01 5481.52 negros 8 4 5KSPC_G01 5456.8 cebu
8 3 6PAL2A_G01 5476.16 negros 8 4 5TPC_G02 5454.71 cebu
8 3 4LEYTE_A 3743.38 leyte 8 6 5EAUC_G01 5452.9 cebu
8 1 8SLWIND_G01 6105.81 guimaras/panay 8 3 4LEYTE_A 3743.38 leyte
8 1 6SACASL_G01 5904.41 negros 8 3 4LGPP_G01 3724.71 leyte
20 6 5CPPC_G01 9011.63 cebu 20 6 8PDPP3_G01 10037.89 panay
20 6 5EAUC_G01 8994.99 cebu 20 1 8SLWIND_G01 10037.51 gumaras/panay
20 4 5KSPC_G01 9028.71 cebu 20 4 8PEDC_G01 10019.88 panay
20 6 8PDPP3_G01 10037.89 panay 20 3 6PAL1A_G01 9250.4 negros
20 4 5TPC_G02 9024.87 cebu 20 3 6NASULO_G01 9235.62 negros
20 4 8PEDC_G01 10019.88 panay 20 3 6PAL2A_G01 9235.62 negros
20 3 6NASULO_G01 9235.62 negros 20 4 5KSPC_G01 9028.71 cebu
20 3 4LGPP_G01 4613.96 leyte 20 4 5TPC_G02 9024.87 cebu
20 3 6PAL1A_G01 9250.4 negros 20 6 5CPPC_G01 9011.63 cebu
20 3 6PAL2A_G01 9235.62 negros 20 6 5EAUC_G01 8994.99 cebu
20 3 4LEYTE_A 4640.12 leyte 20 3 4LEYTE_A 4640.12 leyte
20 1 8SLWIND_G01 10037.51 guimaras 20 3 4LGPP_G01 4613.96 leyte
PRO-COMPETITIVE REFORM POSSIBILITIES: GENERATION & SUPPLY
(1) Application of PH Competition Law
Constrained
No GENCO/related group caught by 50% market share threshold
generation rates for at least 90% regulated via DU retail rates
Source: PEMC Annual Report
PRO-COMPETITIVE REFORM POSSIBILITIES
GENERATION & SUPPLY
(1) Application of PH Competition Law
ability/incentive to game organized electricity market not dependent on
market share.
p
P’
(2) Streamline/Simplify Permitting & Licensing Requirements
(3) Build Generation Adequacy
Mandatory long-term contracting for 100% of DU demand thru
CSP with DOE Circular
Weak incentives for generation investment in restructured &
privatized industry. Excessive market , finance, regulatory risk
Missing money problem of electricity spot markets
ERC must ensure auction design competitive & transparent;
maximize participation of existing investors & encourage new
entry; format minimizes procurement cost; promote regulatory
stability; sustain investments e.g. reasonable price ceilings
Proper sequencing of policy reforms
delay RCOA for < 1 MW market until generation adequacy
achieved or at least make it optional to consumers
(4) ERC to promulgate and implement market behavior rules
prohibiting market manipulation
prohibit physical withholding, economic withholding,
uneconomic production, others
set conduct & market impact thresholds; default bids
(5) Proper Market Rules & Appropriate Market Design
MC pricing principle
price caps as scarcity price (& relationship between offer
price and offer cap)
Gross pool vs net pool
-2000
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
1 6
11
16
21
26
31
36
41
46
51
56
61
66
71
76
81
86
91
96
101
106
111
116
121
126
131
136
141
146
151
156
161
166
171
176
181
186
191
196
PhP
Off-Peak Offers By Plant Type, Per MWh, Jun-Sept 2006
Binga-Hydro
Magat-Hydro
SRoque-Hydro
Sta Rita-NG
Ilijan-NG
Tiwi-Geo
Leyte-Geo
Makban-Coal
Sual-Coal
Pagbilao-Coal
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
20000
1 9
17
25
33
41
49
57
65
73
81
89
97
105
113
121
129
137
145
153
161
169
177
185
193
201
209
217
225
233
241
249
257
265
273
281
289
297
305
313
321
329
337
345
353
361
369
377
385
Peak Prices/MWh of Marginal Plants, June-Sept 2006
Angat Binga Magat SRoque Kalayaan Sta Rita Ilijan Tiwi
Calaca Makban Masinloc Sual Pagbilao Limay BPPC
PRO-COMPETITIVE REFORM POSSIBILITIES: INSTITUTIONS
Institutions That Work Well
Build Administrative capacity of regulator or simplify rules
and regulations to align with regulator’s administrative
capacity
Independence of Market Operator