psm 522 decentralisation assg 2

8/17/2019 PSM 522 Decentralisation Assg 2

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Chapter 14 of the new Constitution sets out the provision for local governance in Zimbabwe.

Analyze this section and explain if the new constitution went far enough in providing a basis

for the creation of a devolved or decentralized system of local governance? utline and

discuss arguments in support for and against the assertion that it does ma!e ade"uate

provision for devolution. #n what ways if any does the new constitution promote a better

system of local governance than what earlier existed in Zimbabwe given the ob$ectives of

decentralization from literature? %&eference and cite from scholarly literature and the new

constitution' (25 marks)

Contents

Contents......................................................................................................................................1

#ntroduction................................................................................................................................1

(ey design principles for decentralisation.................................................................................)

*ecentralisation in Zimbabwe...................................................................................................)

+ecurity of existence...............................................................................................................)

Clearly demarcated and relevant powers................................................................................)

&evenue raising powers..........................................................................................................,

-udget and xpenditure control.............................................................................................,

Administrative autonomy......................................................................................................./

0ocal *emocracy..................................................................................................................../

+upervision.............................................................................................................................

#ntergovernmental cooperation...............................................................................................

&ole of the Constitutional Court.............................................................................................

Comparison of current constituition to the previous one...........................................................2

Conclusion..................................................................................................................................2

&eferences..................................................................................................................................2

Introduction

#ntellectual proponents in support of decentralization cite allocative efficiency %public goods

aligned to local preferences'3 improved productive efficiency and integrity3 and superior cost

recovery. he possible shortcomings of decentralization documented in the discourse include

potential failures of policy coordination3 tendencies toward 5elite capture6 of localgovernments3 and disappointments stemming from inade"uate capacities in local government.


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&ondinelli and 7ellis %12,' summarized decentralization into four main practices3 namely3

administrative8 political8 fiscal and mar!et types. Crawford %9::2' observed that several

African governments have chosen to implement political decentralisation !nown as

devolution as well as administrative decentralisation %deconcentration'. ;ohnson et al. %9::)'

contests that deconcentration is the fre"uently encountered form of decentralisation in mostAfrican countries. hey gave an example of passport offices located in the provincial foci of

the countries. *econcentration means that critical decisions are the only ones which will be

referred to the head"uarters. #n contrast3 delegation pertains to the handing over of

responsibilities of administration and finance to semis

view that it is the handover of responsibility for strategic management and resource

mobilisation and distribution from the central government and its agencies to 5%a' field units

of central government ministries or agencies3 %b' subordinate units or levels of government3

%c' semi


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A case for devolution

*evolution is appreciated as one of the mechanisms that empower the public to contribute

effectively in the management of public concerns and is conse"uently beneficial to local

democracy according to Chi!ulo %122'. Fowever3 as Goetz and Gaventa %in Crawford3

9::1' discern3 participation and the manifestation of Hvoice> do not inescapably translate to being heard or listened to. Beople 5can simply be ignored6.

&ondinelli3 7ellis I Cheema %12=' conclude that devolution empowers national levels of

government to respond to challenges of a purely local nature negating the need for policy

instructions and directives from the central government. hese issues should not be inter<

$urisdictional. -arnett3 @inis I Jan +ant %122/' argue that a devolved system accentuates the

existence of mechanisms for rational local political competition3 transparency3 and

accountability with public processes that are accessible to the public. hese mechanisms have

to be accountable to the public and administered by the rule of law. *ecentralisation is not a

panacea to the challenges of governance. n itself3 decentralisation is necessary but not

sufficient8 authors have noted that certain conditions have to exist for decentralisation to

achieve its theoretical benefits. he next section discusses these principles that ensure

successful decentralisation.

Key design principles for decentralisation

he tangible yield of decentralisation3 to a substantial degree3 is contingent on certain

circumstances that are explicitly or implicitly assumed in conventional analyses3 particularly

the presence of !ey institutional disciplines. Azfar3 (Kh!Lnen3 and @eagher %9::1' focused

on three !inds of institutional disciplines

M Civic disciplines are those related with the ability and opportunities of citizens3 media3 and

nongovernmental organizations present their views !nown to the government %5voice6'3 and

to switch to other neighbourhoods or suppliers of services %5exit6'.

M Intergovernmental disciplines pertain to relationships between the different echelons of

government. his can be central government oversight of local government processes3 or

fiscal constraints %or restrictions to taxing authority' enforced by the centre on lower levels of

government.

M Public sector management disciplines are the techni"ues in which each government entity

regulates and restrains the behaviour of its own official such as anticorruption procedures.

hese three do not have clear distinctions amongst them but overlap.


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Jisser and Chigwata %9:1=' discussed eight prominent design principles which are listed

below and discussed under the three types of institutional disciplines mentioned above.

i. +ecurity of existenceii. Clearly delimited and relevant powers

iii. &evenue roles

of NplanningN3 NimplementingN3 NpromotingN3 NevaluatingN government programmes as they relate

to central government influence or manipulation. #n addition3 the fact that functions of local

authorities not provided in the Constitution NNmay6 be conferred by an Act of Barliament

points towards maintenance of the status "uo. +9/, Constitution claims local authorities have

the Hright to governN and that they have Nall the powers necessary for it to do soN. #t is not

certain which powers are meant here.

#evenue raising poers


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he constitution fails to ac!nowledge the revenue


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authorities. #n light of this degree of ministerial intervention3 it is uncertain whether

meaningful devolution can be realised. he situation in the City of Farare %or any other city

for that matter' is a case in point3 where the council>s operations are regularly directed from

the @inister>s office3 usually in express disrespect of the provisions of the rban Councils

Act.

&ocal Democracy

#t is worth noting that there are now directly elected councillors and mayors rather than more

appointees. he challenges however come to provincial and metropolitan councils where the

ma$ority of members are indirectly elected. his casts doubt on the level of local democracy.

his is compounded by the fact that elections are held concurrently. Another !ey change is

the safeguard against the arbitrary removal of councillors.

!upervision

he 9:1= Constitution is not explicit in providing for regulation3 monitoring3 support andintervention while parliament decides the nature and extent of supervision. here is obscurity

when it comes to constitutional limits to this supervision thus bringing into "uestion again the

autonomy of provincial and local governments.

Intergovernmental cooperation

&egarding intergovernmental cooperation between provincial and metropolitan councils and

local authorities3 the constitution does provide for. +urprisingly3 it states that an Act of

Barliament will provide for Hcoordination> rather than cooperation among the three tiers of

government. his apparently fails to recognise organised local government. #t is not clear

how consultations nor participation and engagement will be guaranteed given the silence ofthe constitution.

he Zimbabwe &eport %9:14' sees the inclusion of members of Barliament in provincial and

metropolitan councils as a way to improve consistency in the formulation and implementation

of national and provincial policies. @embers of Barliament %even ministers' are now

obligated not only to interrelate productively with local people but also to deliberate on local

issues. Conse"uently3 provincial councils have the capacity to become a more accessible

governance and decision


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enough time for local issues? hese "uestions are difficult to answer and perhaps the

Constitutional Court would deal with them. -ut then again3 can it?

#ole of t'e Constitutional Court

here is opacity when it comes to the capacity of the Constitutional Court to arbitrate if andwhen parliament has laid down laws that undermine devolution. Can it stri!e them down?

he Constitution is unclear whether devolution is a constitutional matter. Dhat are

constitutional matters anyway? his is another debate where scholars will not find common

ground easily. &egardless that the status3 powers and functions of provincial and local

government are circumscribed by the Constitution and Acts of Barliament< s 9/,%1'3 it is "uite

apparent that the Constitution promotes parliamentary sovereignty over devolution. his

brings in uncertainty over the respect for devolution.

Comparison of current Constitution to t'e previous one

+ection 111A of the Zimbabwe Constitution %as amended 9::2' provided that Brovincial3

district or regional governors

%1' or the better administration of Zimbabwe3 an Act of Barliament may provide for the

appointment by the Bresident of governors for any areas within Zimbabwe.

%9' Governors appointed in terms of an Act of Barliament referred to in subsection %1' shall

have such functions and powers in relation to the areas for which they have been appointed as

may be prescribed by or under the Act of Barliament.

%=' he offices of governors appointed in terms of an Act of Barliament referred to in

subsection %1' shall be public offices but shall not form part of the Bublic +ervice.

rom the above3 it is observed that the local government system did not en$oy any

constitutional protection. &esultantly3 local government existed as a creature of statute and

sub$ect to the whims of the @inister responsible for local government. Amongst the

significant of these enormous powers was the enactment of section 4A of the urban Councils

Act %9::' which provided for the appointment of special interest councillors in all urban

areas.

he current Constitution stipulates that 5whenever appropriate3 governmental powers and

responsibilities must be devolved to provincial and metropolitan councils and local

authorities which are competent to carry out those responsibilities efficiently and effectively6.

his implies that the Constitution guarantees the executive discretionary power to decide

whether a particular province has the Happropriate> competence to efficiently and effectively

administer local affairs and introduce locally relevant socio


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provincial councils or mayors of respective areas will be posturing. hey can supersede every

programme set to be ta!en in their respective provinces as discussed by -hebhe %9:1='.

#t remains to be clarified on which government institution is principally responsible for the

execution of the devolution programme and who3 in the event of resistance between

provincial and metropolitan councils and respective sector ministries3 has the final arbitral

powers. @itchinson %9::=' postulates that dispersal of the powers of oversight andad$udication to several !ey players may have the benefit of warranting that no super ministry

or agency ta!es absolute control of the proposed lower tiers of government. his is why

-ogdanor %1222' advocates for 5a court to police the division6 between various tiers of a

devolved government.

;acobs and Chavundu!a3 %9::=' have observed that most of the developing countries are

peppered with totalitarianism3 the preservation of traditional leadership and strong hints of

colonial tendencies. urthermore3 and broadly3 public structures in the emerging world3 as

debated by Chiren$e et al.3 %9:1=' orbit about small clusters of communities that are

characterised by geo


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decrees. #t re"uires concerted efforts in information dissemination3 demonstration3 incentives3

training3 discussion3 mobilization3 and on'. his strategy covers

the period 9:1= to 9:1 but it never refers to devolution as embraced in the Constitution. he

Bublic Administration3 Governance and Berformance @anagement sub


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)= -ardhan %9::9' at 1,.

)4 -ogdanor %1222' at 1.

)) @itchinson & 5*evolution in ganda An experiment in local service delivery6 %9::='

9=%=' Bublic Administration and *evelopment 941 at 949.

), @organ ( 5he new territorial politics &ivalry and $ustice in post devolution6 %9:1='. Available at

httpEEwww.southerneye.co.zwE9:1=E:2E19Epresident


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41 (ay %9::=' at )18 -radbury ; 5he devolution debate in Dales during the @a$or

governments the politics of a developing union state?6 %9::/' %1' &egional and ederal

+tudies 19: at 19: sub$ect the Hnorthern problem> and the national

"uestion in Zimbabwe6 %9:19' 1%1' buntu ;ournal of Conflict ransformation 9:, at 91)8

see also by same author 5Zimbabwe>s post

policy pro$ections6 %9:1:' 12%4' African +ecurity &eview 1:4 at 1:,.

=/ @organ %9::,' at 124.

= -ardhan B 5*ecentralization of governance and development6 %9::9' 1,%4' he ;ournal of

conomic Berspectives 1) at 121.

=9 (ay A 5valuating devolution in Dales6 %9::=' )1%1' Bolitical +tudies )1 at )1.

== @organ ( 5*evolution and development erritorial $ustice and the north


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1/ Chi!ulo - C 5*ecentralisation and the role of the state in the future6 in @andaza # %ed'

Governance and human development in +outhern Africa +elected ssays %Farare +outhern

Africa Brinting and Bublishing Fouse 122' 1 at =.

1 #ngham - I (alam A ( @ 5*ecentralisation and development heory and evidence from

-angladesh6 %1229' 19 Bublic Administration and *evelopment at =/=.

12 Dorld -an! Dorld development report 9:::E9::1 attac!ing poverty %9::1'.

9: Chi!ulo %122' 1 at =.

91 Cited in Crawford %9::2' at )2.

99 Cited in Crawford %9::2' at )2.

19 &ondenelli I 7ellis %12,' at =

1= Dorld -an! %9::1'.

14 Government of @alawi A review of the @alawi decentralisation process lessons from

selected districts %9:1:'.

1) Government of Zambia he national decentralisation policy towards empowering the

people %9::9'.

1, Dorld -an! %9::1'.

, +ee among others3 &ondenelli %121' at )2,


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Chambers3 &. %12='. &ural *evelopment. Butting the 0ast irst. ( 0ongman Group.

Chiren$e3 0. #.3 Gilibab3 &. A.3 and @usambac3 . -. %9:1='. 0ocal communities> participation

in decision

psm 522 decentralisation assg 2

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