property rights
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Property Rights. Wednesday, Feb. 1. Property Rights. Bundle of entitlements defining the owner’s rights, privileges, and limitations for use of a resource (Tietenberg) - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Property Rights
Wednesday, Feb. 1
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Property Rights
• Bundle of entitlements defining the owner’s rights, privileges, and limitations for use of a resource (Tietenberg)
• Rules that specify both the proper relationships among people with respect to the use of things and the penalties for violating those proper relationships (Randall)
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Non-attenuated property rights are:• Completely specified• Exclusive• Transferable• Enforceable and enforced
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How is property held?Who has rights of use?
• Private property• Common property• Public property• Open access (res nullius)
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Coase Theorem:
• When property rights are fully specified, assigned, transferable, divisible, secure and transaction costs are zero– Trade eliminates the pareto relevant
externality– Resource allocation is invariant to
the initial assignment of resources
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$
P
Consumer surplus
q Q
MB
A quick review…
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$
P
q
Producer surplus
Q
MC
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$
P
q
S
DQ
Total welfare = PS + CS
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Another Property Rights Parable
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$
Q sound
MB of sound
Two roommates:
Jose wants to study, Ben wants to watch TV
Ben
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$
Q quiet
Jose
MB of quiet
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• What Ben is willing to accept to turn down the TV tells you how much he values sound
• What Jose is willing to accept to turn up the TV tells you how much he values quiet
• So– MB of sound to Ben = MC of quiet to Jose– MB of quiet to Jose = MC of sound to Ben
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$
Ben
MB of sound
Q Sound Q quiet
Jose
MB of quiet
$
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$
Q sound
MB of soundBen
$
Q quiet
JoseMB of quiet
Jose: MB of quiet = MC of quiet
Ben: MB of sound = MC of soundEfficiency
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$
Q sound
MC of sound
MB of soundP
q
What if:
Jose lived there first, so Ben has to bribe him in order to watch TV at an agreed upon volume
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$
Q sound
MC of sound
MB of soundP
q
What if:
Ben lived there first, so Jose has to bribe him in order to keep the TV at low volume
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$
Q sound
MC of sound
MB of soundP
q
MB and MC curves drawn as linear for simplification
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• When property rights are fully specified, assigned, transferable, divisible, secure and transaction costs are zero (and zero income effect)– Trade eliminates the externality– Final resource allocation is invariant
to initial assignment of resources/rights
This is the Coase Theorem
sound
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What if transaction costs are not zero?
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Ben doesn’t speak Spanish, Jose doesn’t speak EnglishJose has to bribe but the marginal benefit of each additional amount of quiet is lower.$
Q quiet
JoseMB of quiet
MB’
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$
Q sound
MB of soundBen
$
Q quiet
JoseMB quiet
q0
p0
q1
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$
Q sound
MC of sound
MB of sound
P
q0
MB’
Ben doesn’t speak Spanish, Jose doesn’t speak English
Ben has to bribe, but the marginal benefit of the same volume is lower.
q1
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$
Q soundq0
p0
q1
MC
MC’
MB
$
MC
MB
MB’
q0q1 Q sound
Jose has to pay Ben, transaction costs are smaller
Ben has to pay Jose, transaction costs are higher
q0 = q0 q1 > q1p0
Jose bears lower transaction costs so “gives up” less than Ben.