process vs. substance. foreign aid, foreign and security policy

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Process vs. Substance

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Page 1: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Process vs. Substance

Page 2: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Page 3: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

The Assumptions

Page 4: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Change One: Relationship Between Contracts and Projects: Preview of Skills Course Next Semester

Key: Not a Grant

Grants available to Non-Profits

Purpose of Grants is often Sub-Grants

Grant: Gift, with conditions but not legally enforceable

Can only refuse to give additional Money

Page 5: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy
Page 6: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy
Page 7: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Contract

Contract Definition

Legally enforceable documentPurpose

Judicial review in event of a disagreement between the parties

Page 8: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy
Page 9: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Contract

A good contract is able to be understood by a member of the judiciary

Projects: Contracts and Grants: Both define obligation by time and money.

Limited time and limited money

Page 10: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy
Page 11: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Judicial Review of Contracts

Judge may be assumed to be a lay-person in terms of the technical aspects of the contract

Page 12: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Judicial Review

For judicial review the contract should strive to make the technical issues as clear as possible

Understandable not just to project teams but to lay individuals as well

Page 13: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Judicial Review of Contracts

Few contracts are in fact brought before the judiciary for determination

Nonetheless, it is this ultimate test--against judicial criteria--that sets the pattern for contract administration

Page 14: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Contracts Administration

Page 15: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Project Planning Documents

Help clarify contract elements

Consists of the following:

A meeting of the mindsSpecific deliverablesConsiderationForce MajeureObjectively Verifiable Indictors

Page 16: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

A Meeting of the Minds

“Intent” of a contract

Establishes for judicial review "why" the contract was entered into

Includes knowing why the two parties have entered into a contract; their long-term objectives

Page 17: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Intent

Page 18: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Meeting of the Minds

Actions consistent with the meeting of the minds are consistent with the contract

Actions inconsistent may constitute breach of contract or non-performance

Page 19: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

A Meeting of the Minds

Relates directly to the purpose and goals identified in the project’s planning document

Project document always indicates “outputs” in the hope that it will result in an agreement that the task is completed

Page 20: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

A Meeting of the Minds

Contractor is expected to obey “reasonable person” rule

contractor is expected to do all the things that any reasonable person would do given the resources available, and

Page 21: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Meeting of Minds

add to the list of outputs in order to reach the agreed upon purpose

contracting agent agrees to modify or add to the inputs in order to reach a modified “meeting of the mind”

Page 22: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

A Meeting of the Minds

Contracting agent has a reasonable right to expect that the contractor will obey the “reasonable person” rule

However, contractor expects that the contracting agent will attempt to take all reasonable actions necessary to realize the overall goal of the activities

Page 23: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

A Meeting of the Minds

“Purpose” of Contract

Most important project focus

Facilitates "meeting of the minds" by clarifying long-term objectives

Page 24: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

In the Development Context

Parties to the Contract:

Developing CountrySponsoring or donor agency

USAID, the World Bank, UNDPHost CountryContractor

NGO, For-profit private firm, University

Page 25: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

In the Development Context

Developing (host) country is usually considered ultimate “client” of the contractor, although this is not legally binding if the contract is made with the donor agency

Page 26: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Deliverables of Contract

Essentially the “outputs”

Things the contractor has agreed to produce

Page 27: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Contract Deliverables

Important to note that deliverables under a contract should be results, not activities (or inputs)

Further, objectively verifiable indicators must be provided for each output with qualitative, quantitative, and time targets

Page 28: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Consideration

Essence of a contract, particularly in terms of its equity provisions

What do a contractor and contracting agent each promise to provide each other?

Page 29: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Consideration

Minimum guarantee is the inputs

Contractor agrees to provide technical personnel, commodities and undertake activities, etc.

Sponsor agrees to pay contractor certain fees, and may provide on-site support, etc. as agreed upon in the contract

Page 30: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Force Majeure

The project framework documents and the contract clarify force majeure by:

Identifying factors that require re-analysis of the ability to perform

Setting levels at which those factors become important

Page 31: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Force Majeure

At input level, contractor identifies assumptions that must be made in order to guarantee ability to produce outputs

Page 32: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Force Majeure

Example: If the contractor assumes that host government will provide ten vehicles and drivers in order produce the project outputs, but in fact only five are provided, then we expect a corresponding reduction in the quantity or quality of outputs produced

Page 33: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Objectively Verifiable Indicators

Indicators that determine if the terms of a contract have been met

To avoid a misunderstanding and provide an objective means for recognizing successful achievement of the project objectives, the contract and associated planning documents must establish “objectively verifiable indicators”

Page 34: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Objectively Verifiable Indicators

Indicators show the results of an activityNot the conditions necessary to achieve

those results

Indicators clarify exactly what we mean by our statement of the objectives at each level in the project planning document

Page 35: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Objectively Verifiable Indicators

At input level:

only concerned with consumption of project resources

At the purpose level:These are of particular importance and are

given a special name:

End of Project Status (EOPS)

Page 36: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Coffee Break

Ten Minutes

Page 37: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Change- 2

Focus: For Profits & Non-Profits for Service Delivery After 1975

Contracts vs. Tied Grants

Page 38: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Change 3- Old Patterns

Long Term Cooperative Agreements (1970s)- Ten to Fifteen Years

Land Tenure Center University of Wisconsin

Center for Disease Control in AtlantaNational Association of Schools of Public

Affairs and Administration

Page 39: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Grants and Contracts- 1980s

Non-Profits- Grants and Sub-Grants- Function like Contracts

Contracts- For Profits- Project Driven

Cooperative Agreements- Long Term Grant Commitments (Up to 20 years)

Page 40: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

An Example: 1985- USAID Cooperative Agreement: Performance Management Project

• National Association of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA)

• DPMC Department of Agric.

• IDMC Univ. of Maryland

Director: Dr. Louis A. Picard

Page 41: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Performance Management ProjectResearch Group

• Rondinelli -Foreign Aid• Kerrigan and Luke- Training• Hague and Finsterbusch -Orga-nizational

Development• Kiggundu- Managing organizations • White Program Management• White - Policy Reform• Brinkerhoff strategic Management • Esman-Development Management

Page 42: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Field Operations

• INCAE- Sub-Contract to Catholic University, Paraguay (W. Schaeffer)

• Swaziland- Rukudzo Murapa• Indonesia- David Korten• Francophone Africa: David Gould• Guinea- Robert Groelsema

Page 43: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Technical AssistancePolicy Reform • S. Morrison, Africa, • R. Moore, Guatamala: • Barry Ames, Brazil

Management

• FDMS-Gould-sub-contract U. of Pittsburgh• SADCC Study J. Montgomery, R. Klitgaard, et.al.• Business Management- J. McCullough

Decentralization:

• Ed Connerley and Elinor Ostrom

Page 44: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Change- 4

Continuities and Change in Financing- 2001

Page 45: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Financing MechanismsContracts

IQCs

Cooperative Agreements

Projectization of Foreign Aid

Categorical Grants with sub-grant mechanisms (more like contracts)

Page 46: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Public Private Partnerships:The International Context After 1991

Defined:

Partnerships (formal or informal) between:

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs),Community Based Organizations (CBOs),Governments,Donors (International and Private),Private- Business Sector.

Page 47: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Public Private Partnerships

Origins-  

a. International Donors- Way of Dealing with Umbrella Grants and implementation of development policies

 b. Accepting donor money means accepting donor principles

Page 48: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Public Private Partnerships

c. Comes out of Structural Adjustment and Policy Reform: Structural Adjustment with a Human Face

 d. Seen by some as an alternative to

Contracting Out- Others as part of it e. Critics see it as detrimental to a

market approach to economic change

Page 49: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Public Private Partnerships

Characteristics-

a. Targeted at the expansion of Social Capital and Synergy in the promotion of Economic and Social Development

  b. Seeks a holistic or Integrated Approach to Economic and Social Development

  c. Involves informal processes, cultural sensitivities as well as legal norms and contracting principles.

Page 50: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)

PPP Supporting Factors in the International Context

  1. Democratic Governance- private sector and NGOs seen as legitimate actors; transparency, accountability and responsiveness

 2. Rational Government- Merit Principles, anti-corruption environment, acceptance of non-state actors as service deliverers. Contracting Out

Page 51: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Public Private Partnerships- Factors

Factors that Support PPPs  

3. Decentralization- Subsidiarity: Governance devolved to the lowest levels capable of implementation and contracting out

 4. Legal Frameworks- Acceptance of Contractual Agreement as the basic organizational relationship

Page 52: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Public Private Partnerships-Factors5. Institutional Norms, Organizational Capacity and regularized principles of inter-organizational interaction. Requires high levels of capacity building

 6. Social and Economic Stability

 7. Organizational flexibility across all

sectors

Page 53: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Public Private Partnerships- Factors

8. Social and Institutional Pluralism- win-win rather than zero sum game across social, ethnic, religious and racial groups

 9. Social Networks exist at Grass roots, and intermediate as well as higher levels of government-See diagram

Page 54: Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

Discussion

Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff,Partnership for International

Development: Rhetoric or Results

Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002