proceedings master en goldensky · to operate effectively, active participation is required from...

Co-management/Shared Governance of Natural Resources and Protected Areas

in Viet Nam

Proceedings of the National Workshop on Co-management Concept and Practice in Viet Nam

Soc Trang, 17 – 19 March 2010

Edited by Daniel G. Spelchan, Isabelle A. Nicoll &

Nguyen Thi Phuong Hao

Published by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH • Management of Natural Resources in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province, Vietnam • Nature Conservation and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in the

Phong Nha-Ke Bang National Park Region, Vietnam Funded by The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) Editors Daniel G. Spelchan, Isabelle A. Nicoll and Nguyen Thi Phuong Hao Cover picture: Illustration from the 2010 GIZ drawing competition, drawn by Lý Trung Huyên ISBN: 978-604-9801-00-6 © giz, April 2011

i

Contents

Foreword .......................................................................................................................................... ii Keynote Paper: Co-management and Shared Governance – the “Effective and Equitable Option” for Natural Resources and Protected Areas? .................... 5 Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend

Co-management: Concepts and Practices in Viet Nam ................................................................ 27 Steven Swan

Co-management: from Jargons to Realities ................................................................................. 45 Hoang Huu Cai

Scalar dimensions of Co-management in Viet Nam: Some preliminary insights from the Mekong Delta .................................................................................................................. 51 Edmund Joo Vin Oh

Poverty and Climate Change in the Mekong Delta: Selected findings from Soc Trang Province ...................................................................................................................... 63 Dennis Eucker

Benefit-sharing Mechanism for Special-use Forests – Lessons learned from Bach Ma National Park ................................................................................................................. 75 Hans-Dieter Bechstedt, Duong Viet Tinh and Doan Bong

Effective Mangrove Conservation through Co-management in the Mekong Delta, Viet Nam ....................................................................................................................................... 89 Klaus Schmitt

Lessons Learned from Seven Years Implementing the Project ‘Strengthening of Participatory Water Management in Soc Trang Province’ .......................................................... 103 Pham Ba Vu Tung, Nguyen Van Hao, Tran Quoc Chuong, Nguyen Thi Hoai An, Pham Van Nam and Che Khanh Duy

Overview of Legal Framework and Supporting Policies on Fisheries Co-Management in Viet Nam ...................................................................................................... 115 Nguyen Thuy Duong and Ngo Tien Chuong

Co-Management in Fisheries in Viet Nam .................................................................................. 125 Nguyen Thi Kim Anh

Fisheries Co-Management in Binh Dinh Province, Viet Nam ..................................................... 133 Peter Todd

Property Rights and Rights Allocation for Resource Co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon, Viet Nam .................................................................................................... 145 Truong Van Tuyen, Nguyen Viet Tuan and Truong Quang Dung

Development of Fishing Societies in Thua Thien Hue through Community-based Management ................................................................................................. 159 Nguyen Quang Vinh Binh

ii Co-management/Shared Governance in Viet Nam

Foreword

Co-management is a natural resource tool which is increasingly being used around the world in situations where there is a real need to protect natural resources while also providing for the livelihoods of local people who have traditionally relied upon these resources. Co-management involves two or more stakeholders (usually the government and local communities) coming together to negotiate how to manage a particular area or set of natural resources, agreeing upon a fair sharing of management functions, benefits, responsibilities and power. For co-management to operate effectively, active participation is required from all stakeholders, which often necessitates the empowerment of local communities in order for their voices to be heard at the negotiation table.

Over the past 10 years, co-management has been trialled in Viet Nam in a variety of contexts, locations and institutional arrangements. These piloting initiatives have applied co-management to forestry, mangroves and fisheries, with varying degrees of success. However there has been a lack of opportunities for practitioners implementing these pilot initiatives to share experiences and learn from other applications of co-management both in Viet Nam and internationally. The ‘National Workshop on Co-management Concept and Practice in Vietnam’, held in Soc Trang on 17-19 March 2010, was designed to provide such a forum. During the workshop, practitioners were able to exchange experiences, ideas, failures, successes and lessons learnt, and were able to identify future challenges for the approach in Viet Nam.

These proceedings are a collection of papers from contributing workshop presenters. The papers outline practical experiences of implementing co-management in Viet Nam, as well as considerations for future applications. In the keynote and first paper of the proceedings, Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend discusses the origins of natural resource conflict while highlighting the potential benefits of co-management/shared governance arrangements in this context. In the following paper, Steven Swan outlines the current understanding and general applications of co-management in Viet Nam, as well as provides an overview of the evolving national legislative, policy and regulatory framework.

Following this are three more conceptual papers which: describe future challenges for the co-management approach in Viet Nam, including changing the role of local communities in natural resource management (Hoang Huu Cai); question the ultimate end to what co-management and its applications should be aiming to achieve (Edmund Oh); and explore the relationships between poverty, vulnerability, climate change and the impacts of economic growth policies in Viet Nam – to which co-management offers a potential solution to poverty reduction and resolving environmental conflict, particularly in the light of forecasted consequences of climate change (Dennis Eucker).

In the next section the proceedings move into more specific applications of co-management in Viet Nam to forestry, specifically Special-use Forests (Hans-Dieter Bechstedt), mangroves (Klaus Schmitt) and water (Pham Ba Vu Tung).

In the final section Nguyen Thuy Duong provides a review of national legislation related to fisheries co-management, while Nguyen Thi Kim Anh provides a general overview of fisheries co-management and Peter Todd, Truong Van Tuyen and Nguyen Quang Vinh Binh detail more specific examples of the application of co-management to fisheries in Viet Nam.

Foreword iii

The papers in these proceedings highlight the wide-spread application of co-management in different settings in Viet Nam, while they also emphasise the need for clear definition, understanding and adoption of terms related to co-management, including closely related concepts of collaborative management, shared governance, community-based conservation, participatory management and community-based management.

The papers also outline a number of current and future challenges facing co-management practitioners in Viet Nam, including:

• Empowering local communities;

• Realigning traditional views on hierarchy and power;

• The lack of an enabling legal framework;

• The lack of understanding of co-management; and

• Developing the capacity of local communities and authorities.

We hope that the workshop and proceedings will contribute towards a greater and more cohesive understanding of co-management in Viet Nam, with the exchange of experiences and lesson learnt enabling practitioners to address current and future challenges and enhance applications of the approach.

Daniel Spelchan

Isabelle Nicoll

iv Co-management/Shared Governance in Viet Nam

Co-management and Shared Governance 5

Keynote Paper: Co-management and Shared Governance – the “Effective and Equitable Option” for Natural Resources and Protected Areas? Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend1 Vice-Chair of the IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy, www.iucn.org; Coordinator of the ICCA Consortium, www.iccaforum.org; and President of Paul K. Feyerabend Foundation, www.pkfeyerabend.org

“Imagine you want to shoot an arrow. The farther back you pull the bowstring, the farther the arrow flies…The same is true for our own understanding and vision…The farther back we look into history, the farther we can see into our future…”. Through this phrase, attributed to an American indigenous leader, I would like to invite you to a journey towards your distant past and, from there, to take inspiration for the present and future of natural resources in Viet Nam.

Through millennia, the main managers of natural resources – and decision makers about them – have been the human communities that gained their sustenance from a careful interaction with the surrounding nature. They were gatherers, hunters, herders, peasants, fishers, forest users, users and keepers of oases and water sources, builders of terraces and water channels, breeders of animals and selectors and pollinators of plants. They lived with and by the natural resources and often moved with them, following wild herds and fisheries. Many such ‘human communities’ – both settled and mobile – were actually ‘created’ around the opportunity to manage a specific set of natural resources. In this sense one can confidently affirm that cultural diversity and biological diversity evolved together throughout the world (see Posey 1999).

1 Traditional and indigenous natural resource management and conservation In a stupendous variety of natural environments human communities developed, throughout history, their own unique ‘bio-cultural systems’. Such systems comprise the local geo-climatic setting, natural resources and biodiversity, but also the evolving bodies of knowledge, practices, know-how and institutions through which communities related through time to their surroundings, gained their livelihoods and developed their cultural and spiritual identity. Interestingly, some specific components of such systems appear to have actively fostered the conservation2 of biodiversity. These practices, that are often similar throughout the world, include rules and limitations regarding access to natural resources (e.g. the identification of sacred, forbidden, reserved spaces) and rules and limitations regarding their use (e.g. species-specific interdictions and taboos). In turn, such rules and limitations were (and still are) closely related to the accumulated local knowledge of communities and their in-depth understanding of the relations between natural resources and people’s livelihood. In many cases, rules and limitations have actually been strengthened by punctual experiences of scarcity, for instance as a consequence of 1 [email protected]: This is a revised version for publication (November 2010) of a key-note paper offered at the ‘National Workshop on Co-management Concept and Practice in Viet Nam’, Soc Trang City, Viet Nam, 17-19 March 2010. Most references are omitted for ease of reading and can be found in the papers by Borrini-Feyerabend et al. listed in the references. 2 “Conservation is the management of human use of the biosphere so that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations. Thus conservation is positive, embracing preservation, maintenance, sustainable utilisation, restoration, and enhancement of the natural environment." (IUCN, UNEP and WWF 1980).

6 Co-management/Shared Governance in Viet Nam

a natural disaster or war-related disruption. As environmental knowledge slowly became engrained into cultural values (e.g. world views and spiritual and religious beliefs, but also the maintenance of social privileges), customary institutions strengthened their capacity to have rules agreed upon and respected within and between communities. For this, the power to exclude users and sanction infringements has been essential, but so have been the webs of voluntary mutual obligations within and between communities.

It is impressive to discover how often in the past, and in places still today, traditional and indigenous peoples dedicate specific practices, ceremonies and at times even some specific individuals to ‘maintaining a good relationship between people and nature’. Among the Kasena of Burkina Faso, for instance, a man called Tigatu, descending from the original inhabitants of the land, is endowed with a mixture of religious and political authorities and responsibilities. The community assigns to him the discretionary power to open new lands for cultivation, to declare the time of harvest for both wild and domestic products, to arbitrate conflicts related to natural resources and to safeguard the sacred groves – the “skin of the Earth” that needs to remain covered with vegetation for “the Earth to be able to breathe”. Similarly, throughout the Pacific, traditional authorities instruct their communities as to where they need to respect “no-take zones”, i.e. areas dedicated as refuge and nursery for the fisheries necessary for their livelihood. In the Amazons, biodiversity is better conserved within indigenous peoples’ territories (which cover more than 25% of the whole basin) than in the protected areas of the relevant states (Nepstad et al. 2006), let alone the areas devoted to development purposes.

Indeed, far from being mere opportunistic or destructive users, indigenous peoples and traditional communities in both terrestrial and marine environments prove often very successful in conserving biodiversity. Often they even manage to locally enrich biodiversity by developing new agricultural varieties, promoting habitat connectivity and expanding/creating specific habitats. This is particularly evident for mobile indigenous and traditional peoples, who maintain pastures, wetlands and trees beneficial to both domestic herds and wildlife, but even sedentary communities have created and preserved remarkable landscapes and intertwined their livelihoods with many wild species (for a variety of telling examples see www.iccaforum.org).

Throughout the world, customary management practices for natural resources are still in use and can be studied in terms of their results for the conservation of biodiversity. Yet, community-based practices are by no means the dominant characteristic of contemporary natural resource management. In place of traditional institutions and values, many of today’s management practices are dominated by technology-intense and market-oriented production controlled by private or corporate landowners and state governments. In the last few centuries these new actors and their modes of production have been aggressively expanding throughout the world.

2 Various forms of “enclosure of the commons” and their consequences In Western Europe, the agricultural revolution that preceded the industrial revolution was based on progressive innovations such as crop rotation, safer storage systems, mechanical cultivation and harvesting, improved irrigation techniques and new crops (e.g. potato, tomato and maize) that minimised losses, decreased the need for labour and increased the overall output of the productive process for a given unit of land. These innovations were initiated by the appropriation and partition of common lands by private individuals and, later, by the state. The phenomenon that goes under the name of “enclosure of the commons” started in England in the 13th century and reached its climax there in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. By that time, half of the arable land of England, previously held as feudal commons and used by peasants to grow food crops or graze their flock, was ‘enclosed’ and reserved for cash-oriented production (initially for sheep rearing and, later, also for tillage) for the benefit of the aristocracy. Trees were cleared, marshes were drained, efforts were made to improve the fertility of the soil and large portions of land were enclosed and offered for lease.


Among the consequences of the enclosure of the commons was an increase in economic productivity of the land, coupled with substantial benefits for whoever could directly appropriate, buy or lease it. In parallel, however, the human cost for the landless peasants reached tragic proportions. In some estates as many as nine-tenths of the peasant population were forced to leave their land of birth and migrate to urban areas, swelling there the mass of the “wandering poor”. Incidentally, this mass of destitute people provided the labour pool for the industrial revolution as well as a good part of the migrant population towards the New World (colonisation) and the colonies to come. This same wrenching human dislocation proceeded at a different pace throughout the European continent and did not go without rebellions. Thousands of peasants were slaughtered in the ensuing repressions, which at times had to be contained by the intercession of kings, the Church and specific legislation. As aptly described by Karl Polanyi (1957) in The Great Transformation: “Enclosures have appropriately been called a revolution of the rich against the poor”. The lords and nobles were upsetting the social order, breaking down ancient laws and customs, sometimes by means of violence, often by pressure and intimidation. They were literally robbing the poor of their share in the commons, tearing down the houses which, by the hitherto unbreakable forces of custom, the poor had long regarded as theirs and their heirs.

Appropriation by land enclosure, side by side with the expansion of the monetary economy and efforts to increase land productivity, did not stay confined to Western Europe but actually spread throughout the world. In the colonies, policies of deforestation and enclosure by order of the state were applied to benefit individuals (such as the conquerors/owners of the haciendas of South America) or the colonial powers in general. In Africa, the colonial triad of taxation, export cropping and monetisation took care of tearing apart local peasants from their affiliations and obligations to their kin and communities, creating the social and environmental crises at the root of many modern famines. In Asia, large-scale appropriations (e.g. for the forests) set out the bureaucratic dominance still at work in today’s national states. The emerging state powers also embraced mechanised, large-scale agriculture dependent on capital-intensive irrigation, pesticides and fertilisers (the ‘green revolution’ of the second half of the twentieth century). Total food production increased spectacularly and some believe that the green revolution is responsible for having spared Asia some major famines in the last decades. Negative environmental and social consequences, however, have also been reported. These include chemical pollution, habitat degradation, erosion of biodiversity and agro-biodiversity, unsustainable energy expenditures per food production unit, loss of farmers control over land and food, as well as debt and impoverishment for the more marginal farmers, whose lands were (and still are) unsuited to the green revolution’s seeds and who were/are themselves unsuited to deal with the demands and vagaries of the market. Many such farmers have become landless labourers or had to migrate to urban slums3. Similar phenomena accompany the process by which small scale fisheries are being supplanted by industrial fishing and aquacultures throughout the world.

Paradoxically, the policy of ‘land collectivisation’ of the Soviet Union from the late 1920s to the end of communism went in the very same direction as the enclosure of the commons of capitalist countries. The violently imposed collectivisation (Conquest 1988) ushered a situation of collective serfdom for the peasants, depriving them of their own culture and traditions, including traditional collective institutions (such as the obshchina and mir of Russia), agricultural practices (such as family farms) and animal raising practices (such as nomadic pastoralism in Central Asia). In opposition to its very name, the land collectivisation was a gigantic effort by the State to appropriate under its own misguided rule – and thus to ‘enclose’ – the immense swath of land of the Soviet Union. While efforts were successful in terms of destroying what pre-existed them (already in the 1940s, 90% of land was under collective farms), the aim of enhanced productivity was more than humiliated. When they did not cause tragic famines4, they produced food in 3 Due to combined debt and crop failure, thousands such farmers are reported to be committing suicide in India each year (Stone 2002). 4 More than three million people died because of starvation in Ukraine in the early thirties, when the land collectivisation policy was forced upon them (see Snyder 2010).


inefficient and environmentally damaging ways. Similar problems with state imposition of agricultural policies on rural peasants took place also in China, especially in the late fifties, with a death toll also estimated in millions (Kane 1989; see, however, also Gao 2008).

In both capitalist and state-controlled systems of managing natural resources: cultivated land expanded at the expense of forests and wildlife habitats; use values were replaced by market/monetary values; and traditional experience-based and culture-embedded institutions and rules were replaced by the ‘science-based’ decisions of politicians, bureaucrats, experts and merchants. In parallel, a progressively smaller percentage of any given countries’ population remained employed in, or in control of, rural production. Family plots for the production of staple foods such as grain, rice and maize are still a feature of many societies, but a huge number of communities lost their common control over the wilder areas (e.g. forests, lakes, rivers, pastures) that used to be strongly associated with them ‘as a community’.

In the medium term, the taming of nature that accompanied these various forms of enclosure of the commons obtained impressive production results that benefitted a proportion of the world’s inhabitants: the wealthy residents of urban areas and the rural elite. It has also generated problems, however, in terms of degraded soil and water, polluted air, depleted resources due to excessive extraction (e.g. from the sea and forests) and a sustained loss in biological diversity (habitats, species and genetic varieties). In parallel, subsistence peasants and fishers have become landless labourers or migrants to urban slums, and nomadic pastoralists, shifting cultivators and hunters-gatherers have been forced to settle. Many customary and community-based rights and traditional and indigenous natural resource management (NRM) systems unique to peoples and environments have been overlooked, negated or simply crushed by the inexorable advance of modernisation and ‘development’. As a result, many traditional and indigenous NRM systems weakened, when they did not altogether disappear.

Today, the agro-industrial-market system is the dominant NRM system at the global level. Agricultural and fisheries production is based on large, energy-intensive and highly-mechanised farms, animal raising units, aquaculture and fishing by trawlers and factory ships. Every day, international trade moves huge financial means (real and virtual) that have profound consequences for both natural resources and people. These processes are dominated by a few countries, international corporations and financial giants. Strategic resources, such as oil, are tightly controlled, and many countries are seriously dependent on foreign imports for food and other basic necessities (including the hydrocarbons now necessary to produce food), virtually existing under the patronage of the traders that run their markets. These phenomena are in part intended (as components of chosen development paths) and in part imposed by a variety of socio-economic constraints. They have some very positive results, such as raised standards of living in many countries, and increased communication and interdependence among people belonging to different cultures and regions. But they also have negative results, as the loss of traditional NRM systems goes hand in hand with a loss of bio-cultural diversity and food sovereignty, and a variety of environmental problems – from climate change to degradation of soil, freshwater, natural forests and fisheries. In addition, in countries where the political establishment and state bureaucracy are not under the effective control of citizens, damaging alliances may easily develop between state powers and individual, corporation or party interests (Nelson 2010). These alliances tend to entrench corruption and unfair decisions, with lasting damages on natural resources and people.

As the ecological damages intrinsic to the agro-industrial market system have started affecting private and social interests throughout the world, environmental and social concerns are slowly moving to the fore. Many of the contemplated solutions, however, remain entrenched in market-based, neo-liberal approaches. Mechanisms such as Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) can effectively exist side by side with unabated unsustainable exploitation and pollution. State-enforced conservation through protected areas is also becoming an accepted feature of the agro-industrial NRM system, with the recent ‘Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) Conference of Parties (COP) 10’ approving new and expanded global targets for


their coverage5. In absence of specific safeguards, however, protected areas can end up expanding right into the land and resources of indigenous peoples and local communities – those who, paradoxically, have succeeded in conserving them so far. In all, societies are not even close to the extent and depth of change they should make in order to stop their current unsustainable patterns and stem and repair the negative trends in biological and cultural diversity6. The 2010 ‘Third Global Biodiversity Outlook’ (SCBD 2010) paints – indeed – a grim picture for the future of life on our planet.

3 The interface between traditional natural resource management systems and the

global agro-industrial market system Even a rapid look at the historical phenomena mentioned above, which proceeded with peculiar traits and characteristics in each region of the world, shows that new actors have progressively emerged in the governance and management of natural resources. Such new actors include private and corporate landowners and representatives of the state, such as political leaders, bureaucrats and ‘scientific experts’. The new actors took over the roles hitherto played by indigenous peoples and local communities – sometimes by persuasion and democratic means, but quite often also by deception and force. As a result, communities have been “de-responsibilised” (Banuri and Amalrik 1992) in their roles as natural resource managers and, often, lost both their interest in it and their related knowledge and capacity. Table 1 schematically sets out the current ‘interface’ between the traditional NRM systems that developed through history as unique solutions to unique contexts and the recently-emerged global agro-industrial market system.

The interface illustrated in Table 1 goes hand in hand with many other global phenomena: from economic development (increased production and consumption of goods by part of humanity) to rising flows of trade, travel and communication; from enhanced population dynamics (e.g. growth, migration, urbanisation) to widening power gaps between the rich and poor in both economic and military terms. A phenomenon not usually highlighted is the weakening, among indigenous peoples and local communities, of local knowledge and wisdom about their environments and natural resources, the erosion of their cultural differences related to that, and the undermining of the local, traditional institutions that could make management decisions and command action and respect about them. Such losses in our human and institutional capacity accumulated through the millennia are profound, and possibly as worrying as the loss of biodiversity itself.

It would be wrong, however, to see the interface between the traditional NRM systems and the global agro-industrial market system of Table 1 as a snapshot of a ‘historical shift’ that will inexorably advance and, sooner or later, will be completed anywhere in the world. As a matter of fact in most countries, in the South as well as in the North, both sides of the interface – i.e. the traditional NRM systems as well as the global agro-industrial market system – are alive and strong. While much is being lost, much is also discovered, re-evaluated, restored and re-possessed through the new means that have become available, not the last of which is human interaction and communication. If we investigate contemporary NRM systems of indigenous and local communities, for instance, we find puzzles of old and new knowledge, practices, tools and values of different cultural and historical origin. Such hybrid systems represent communities’ on-going attempts to adapt to environmental, economic and political change.

5 “By 2020, at least 17 per cent of terrestrial and inland water, and 10 per cent of coastal and marine areas, especially areas of particular importance for biodiversity and ecosystem services, are conserved through effectively and equitably managed, ecologically representative and well connected systems of protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures, and integrated into the wider landscape and seascapes.” (extract from CBD 2010). 6 See, for instance O’Neill et al. 2010.


Table 1: Traditional and indigenous natural resource management systems vis-à-vis the agro-industrial market system – a destructive or creative interface? (adapted from Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004a)

Traditional NRM systems Agro-industrial-market system

Tenure and use of natural resources based on common property regimes, regulated by customary laws

Tenure and use of natural resources based on private and state property regimes, regulated by written law

Aim at securing long-term sustainable community livelihoods, defined in a general sense

Aims at relatively short-term, precisely measurable production results, generating private, corporate or state wealth

Are mostly subsistence-oriented Is market-oriented

Important religious, mystical and symbolic values attached to nature

Nature is physical and biological matter to be precisely understood, dominated and controlled

Supported by the social organisation of communities and by forms of reciprocities with other communities

Promoted by the state and private businesses and backed by the police and military power

Local, relatively small-scale, many context-depending features

Supra-national, international, global, large-scale, similar everywhere

Based on local knowledge and skills, the recognition of indeterminacies and an emphasis on experimentation and adaptation

Based on ‘objective science’, aims at the reduction of subjective decisions and uncertainties

Based on the control of land, biological resources and water

Based on the control of energy sources (e.g. oil and gas), mineral sources and water

Based on simple technology and small capital investment, including for transportation

Requires sophisticated technological inputs and major capital investments, including for transportation

Traditional, usually long-time tested at the local level, in the relevant area

Innovative, often recently tested and only in areas different from the context of application

Decision-makers are tightly knit social organisations, closely interacting with society and acting in the local sphere

Decision-makers are economically-tied individuals, corporate or state decision-makers, dispersed and acting on a global scale

Politically and economically weak on the large scale

Politically and economically powerful on the large scale

Mostly implicit, working on the basis of feedback from other cultural elements

Mostly explicit, based on intentional strategies separated from the rest of society

Generally designed to avoid risks and waste Ready to accept risks and waste to maximise profits

Integrate conservation and use, focus on sustainable use

Separates conservation and use, focuses on strict conservation and maximum use in separated areas of the landscape/seascape

Understand conservation as sustainable production and maintenance of ecosystem ‘functions’ to sustain livelihoods

Understands conservation as preservation of biodiversity and maintenance of ecosystem ‘services’ for economic, recreational and scientific purposes

The development of new and composite NRM systems is generally unsystematic and can even be chaotic, taking place by series of trials and errors where new elements are adopted, old elements dismissed, and institutions re-arranged. In more or less conscious forms of ‘adaptive


management’ and ‘adaptive governance’, evolving NRM systems constitute a worldwide laboratory in which communities interact with a variety of other actors and experiment with different options. The interface presents us with several risks: if the conditions that allow human ingenuity and collaboration to flourish are not available, if the institutional capacity to learn and evolve is not nurtured and if no flexibility is allowed, we can end up combining the worst of the traditional and modern worlds. We can find, for instance, that inequities are perpetuated and their destructive consequences for people and the environment are actually multiplied by new and more powerful technologies and means.

The interface, on the other hand, also presents us with marvellous opportunities. We can engage different actors in dialogue and action about natural resource management and take advantage of a multiplicity of capacities and comparative advantages for sound NRM systems. We can combine traditional wisdom and new technical capabilities, cultural identity and universal values, historical awareness and efficient practices. We can develop collaborative, adaptive and intelligent NRM systems that take advantage of the best the traditional and modern systems have to offer. This, as a matter of fact, is the very essence of the processes we refer to as ‘co-management’ and ‘shared governance’. 4 Advances in international policy: governance to the fore In the last 15 years international policy has increasingly recognised the importance of optimising the interface between traditional and modern NRM systems. The list below includes some of the relevant agreements, conclusions, resolutions and recommendations adopted at international policy meetings:

• Biosphere Reserve Strategy, UNESCO MAB (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation – Man and the Biosphere programme), Seville, Spain, 1995;

• Wise Use Policy, Ramsar Convention, COP no. 7, 8 and 9, 1999 to 2005;

• Durban Accord and Durban Action Plan, ‘Vth World Parks Congress’, Durban, South Africa, 2003;

• Final recommendations, ‘First Marine Protected Areas Congress’, Geelong, Australia, 2005;

• Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, United Nations, 2007;

• Resolutions on Collaborative management of natural resources; Governance of natural resources; Mobile peoples and conservation; Community conserved areas; Indigenous peoples and conservation; Areas conserved by indigenous peoples and local communities; and Indigenous conserved territories, International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), ‘World Conservation Congress (WCC) no. 1’, Montreal, 1996; ‘WCC no.2’, Amman, 2000; WCC no. 3, Bangkok 2004; and ‘WCC no.4’, Barcelona, 2008; and

• Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Articles 8j and 10c and provision on access and benefit sharing, ‘CBD COP 7’, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2004; and re-affirmation and revisions at ‘COP 9’ Bonn, Germany, 2008; and ‘COP 10’, Nagoya, Japan, 2010.

Here are some of their key messages that can be distilled from the above-mentioned conventions and agreements:

• Conservation needs the capacities, concerns and engagement of society as a whole, not of expert professionals or government officials only;

• Conservation needs to pay more attention to the crucial ties between biological and cultural diversity, and to the conditions that allow indigenous peoples and local communities to be empowered and active;


• Conservation needs equity: a fair sharing of the costs and benefits of preserving biodiversity and managing natural resources in a sustainable way; and

• Conservation needs to respect human rights: seek to ‘do no harm’ to people and have a positive impact on livelihoods as often as possible.

The above messages have to do with participation, culture, equity, human rights and their repercussions on management of land, natural resources and biodiversity. Crucially, however, they also have to do with a relatively new concept that has become ubiquitous and rather central in dealing with natural resources: the concept of ‘governance’.

What distinguishes governance from management? A condensed, very rough definition can be proposed as follows. Management is about “what to do?” with the land, natural resources and biodiversity at stake. Governance is about “who decides what to do and how?” More specifically, management deals with:

• Traditional and scientific understandings of relevant phenomena;

• Specific aims to reach;

• Strategies to get there;

• Actions that needs to be taken; and

• Available means (human, financial, etc.).

Throughout the process, we can monitor whether the desired results of management are or are not being achieved and thereby obtain a measure of management effectiveness.

Governance, on the other hand, deals with:

• Power, authority and responsibility in taking management decisions;

• Reporting the management’s results and taking responsibility for them (accountability);

• Human relations among actors, including formal and informal, and open and hidden conflicts, collaborations and alliances;

• History, culture, customs and values that inform decision-making;

• Generating, keeping and sharing information; and

• Available means to influence decisions and redress injustices.

Throughout the process, we monitor whether decisions are made with respect to a number of explicit standards and criteria and thereby obtain a measure of the governance quality. The term ‘good governance’ is thus used to encapsulate a situation in which a minimum bundle of agreed criteria is well respected (SCBD 2004; see section 5 below)7.

While analyses and studies related to management have attracted interest and resources for decades, the systematic analysis of governance is a relatively recent phenomenon. The reason for this discrepancy could be related to the fact that while management can appear (to the non-professionals) as an ‘objective science’, governance is seen to depend in a profound way on the history, culture, traditions, knowledge, political will and capacities of each people or country. As a matter of fact, however, management and governance are so tightly connected that there is little meaning in analysing one without the other. The fact that governance issues have been neglected for a long time may be interpreted as an indication that the ones in power – be those political or technical elites – simply have not welcomed being questioned or evaluated, or even being at all ‘visible’. Much work still needs to be done to analyse and understand

7 The concept of ‘good governance’ has also been used to describe a neo-liberal attitude that calls for the least possible regulations and especially no barriers to economic production and trade. This is not the understanding espoused by this paper.


governance of natural resources and biodiversity, and the mechanisms and pathways by which it operates. As of now, this work has only begun (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004b; Dudley 2008).

5 Understanding governance Starting at the 2003 ‘Vth World Parks Congress’ in Durban, the governance institution of a given protected area or set of natural resources has been described (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2002; Borrini-Feyerabend 2003; Graham et al. 2003) with reference to two main properties:

1. Quality

2. Type

When dealing with quality, we refer to a number of principles and values freely chosen by the concerned people and country and enshrined in their constitution, natural resource law, protected area legislation and policies, and/or cultural practices and customary laws. The international agreements and instruments that emerged from the international conventions and agreements mentioned above in this paper have identified a number of such broad principles, including:

• Legitimacy and voice – i.e. the capacity of men and women to influence the decisions concerning them, built upon their freedom of association and speech;

• Subsidiarity – i.e. the fact that governance stays with the institutions closest to the natural resources at stake, compatibly with their capacity;

• Equity/fairness – i.e. seeking the equitable sharing of the costs and benefits of managing natural resources and providing impartial justice as necessary;

• Transparency – i.e. allowing a transparent flow of information on processes and institutions related to management decisions;

• Accountability – i.e. having clear lines of reporting and answerability on the part of the decision-makers and key actors, who should assume responsibility for their choices, actions and inactions;

• Direction/vision – i.e. having clear management objectives in the short and long terms, well grounded on the complexities of the specific context; and

• Performance – i.e. meeting management objectives while responding to the needs and concerns of stakeholders and making wise use of resources.

Cross-cutting all these criteria is the respect of human rights and of the rights of indigenous people and local communities – both settled and mobile.

Regarding type, we basically ask the question: ‘Who holds management authority and responsibility and is held accountable for the crucial decisions regarding the protected area or natural resources at stake?’. At the ‘Vth World Parks Congress in Durban’, the conservation community developed a broad consensus regarding four possible main answers to that question as it was applied to protected areas:

1. The government (and its agencies at various levels);

2. Various actors together;

3. The owners of the concerned land and natural resources (e.g. individuals and corporate actors, but also civil society organisations, religious or military institutions etc.); and

4. The concerned indigenous peoples and local communities.

On the basis of the four main answers just listed, four main ‘governance types’ were identified and set vis-à-vis the IUCN management category in the IUCN protected area matrix (see Table 2).


Table 2: “The IUCN protected area matrix”: a classification system for protected areas comprising both management category and governance type (originally published in Dudley 2008)

Governance types

A. Governance by government

B. Shared governance C. Private governance

D. Governance by indigenous peoples & local

communities

Protected area categories

Fede

ral o

r nat

iona

l min

istry

or a

genc

y in

ch

arge

of m

anag

emen

t

Sub

-nat

iona

l min

istry

or a

genc

y in

ch

arge

of m

anag

emen

t

Gov

ernm

ent-d

eleg

ated

man

agem

ent

(e.g

. to

an N

GO

)

Tran

sbou

ndar

y m

anag

emen

t

Col

labo

rativ

e m

anag

emen

t (va

rious

fo

rms

of p

lura

list i

nflu

ence

)

Join

t man

agem

ent (

plur

alis

t m

anag

emen

t boa

rd)

Dec

lare

d an

d ru

n by

indi

vidu

al la

nd-

owne

r

…by

non

-pro

fit o

rgan

izat

ions

(e.g

. N

GO

s, u

nive

rsiti

es, c

o-op

erat

ives

)

…by

for p

rofit

org

anis

atio

ns (e

.g.

indi

vidu

al o

r cor

pora

te la

nd-o

wne

rs )

Indi

geno

us te

rrito

ries

and

co

nser

ved

area

s– d

ecla

red

and

run

by

indi

geno

us p

eopl

es

Com

mun

ity c

onse

rved

are

as—

de

clar

ed a

nd ru

n by

loca

l com

mun

ities

Ia. Strict Nature Reserve

Ib. Wilderness Area

II. National Park

III. Natural Monument

IV. Habitat/ Species Management

V. Protected Landscape/ Seascape

VI. Managed Resource Protected Area

Table 2 lists four main governance types as they apply to protected areas. Conceptually, however, it is rather straightforward to apply the same main governance types to biodiversity and natural resources in general. Let us now see such types in a bit more detail.

5.1 Type A: Governance by government (at federal, state, sub-national or municipal level)

Here a government body (such as a ministry or park agency reporting directly to the government) holds the authority, responsibility and accountability for managing the territory, area or resources at stake, determines their main management objectives, and develops and enforces a management plan. The same agency, which can include sub-national or municipal governments, often also owns the concerned land, water and resources. In some cases, the government retains full control over decisions and implementation of decisions. In other cases, it decides the management objectives but delegates execution to a para-statal organisation, a Non-Government


Organisation (NGO), a private operator, or a community. This delegated management is still encompassed under governance Type A, as authority and responsibility are retained by government even if execution is delegated. Under this governance type, the state legal framework may or may not prescribe a legal obligation to inform or consult local stakeholders prior to deciding and enforcing management decisions. Participatory approaches are, however, increasingly common and generally desirable. Accountability measures vary from country to country. 5.2 Type B: Shared governance Complex institutional mechanisms and processes are employed here to share management authority and responsibility among a plurality of formally and informally entitled parties, including governmental and non-governmental actors. Shared governance, sometimes also referred to as co-management, comes in many forms. In collaborative governance, decision-making authority and responsibility rest with one agency but the agency is required – by law or policy – to inform or consult or share tasks with other stakeholders. Some such forms of participation in decision making can actually be very meaningful. For instance, a multi-stakeholder body can be responsible for developing technical proposals to regulate and manage the natural resources at stake. Its proposals may need to be submitted to a decision-making authority for approval, but they usually carry weight and influence, and particularly so when they are developed by consensus. In joint governance, various actors sit on a body endowed with decision-making authority and responsibility. Decisions may or may not require consensus, implying different levels of influence on the part of any one actor. In any of these cases, once decisions about management are taken, their implementation can be carried out directly or delegated to one or more agreed parties. A particular form of shared governance concerns transboundary areas and natural resources (e.g. water bodies, migrating fauna, fisheries), which involve at least two or more governments and possibly several other local actors.

5.3 Type C: Private governance Private governance comprises land and natural resources under individual, NGO or corporate control or ownership, which can be managed for-profit or not-for-profit. Typical examples are areas acquired by conservation NGOs explicitly to set them aside from development processes with expected detrimental consequences for biodiversity. Other examples are private protected areas exploited for tourism or trophy hunting. Many individual landowners also pursue conservation out of respect for the land and a desire to maintain/enhance its aesthetic and ecological values. Incentive schemes, such as the reduction of levies and taxes, can support biodiversity-friendly schemes under this governance type. The authority for managing land and resources rests here with the landowners, who determine the conservation objective, develop and enforce management plans and remain in charge of decisions, subject to applicable legislation. The accountability of private governance of natural resources to society at large is usually quite limited. Some accountability, for example in terms of long-term conservation, can be negotiated with the government in exchange for specific incentives (as in the case of easements or land trusts).

5.4 Type D: Governance by indigenous peoples and local communities In the IUCN matrix (see Table 2), this governance type includes two main subsets: (1) indigenous peoples’ territories and areas managed and conserved by indigenous peoples; and (2) areas managed and conserved by local communities. The subsets, which may not be neatly separated, apply to both sedentary and mobile peoples and communities. IUCN specifies that this governance type can apply to protected areas if the management authority and responsibility rest with indigenous peoples and/or local communities through various forms of customary or legal,


formal or informal, institutions and rules. When the governance type results in effective conservation of biodiversity and associated ecosystem functions and cultural values, it is referred to as “territories and areas conserved by indigenous peoples and local communities” and often abbreviated as ICCAs (IUCN CEESP 2010; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2010). In general, this type of governance can be relatively complex. Land and/or some resources may be collectively owned and managed while other resources may be managed individually or on a clan basis. Different indigenous peoples and communities may be in charge of the same area at different times, or of different resources within the same area. Rules generally intertwine with cultural and spiritual values. The customary organisations deciding about how to manage natural resources, however, at times possess no legal recognition or sanctioning power. In other cases, indigenous peoples and local communities have legal title to the land, water or resources, and/or they are fully recognised as the legitimate authority in charge of state-listed protected areas. Whatever the structure, there usually exist specific institutions and regulations designed to achieve the agreed management objectives. 6 Shared governance and co-management We now come to the subject of our international workshop, for which this paper has been prepared. Indeed, we could have started from here but – if you have followed my argument so far – you will understand why it would have been neither wise nor instructive to describe ‘shared governance’ and ‘co-management’ outside of the broader historical and policy context from which they emerged. Let us now focus on column B of the IUCN matrix, i.e. on the governance type in which decision making power, responsibility and accountability are ‘shared’ between governmental agencies and other stakeholders, in particular the indigenous peoples and local communities, sedentary or mobile, who depend on the natural resources culturally and/or for their livelihoods.

How can power, authority and responsibility be actually shared among governments, communities and other right-holders and stakeholders? The most effective way of doing so is through a process of negotiation. Through such a process representatives of governments, communities and other actors meet, exchange their views, find an accord about aims and solutions and develop a more or less formal co-management agreement about sharing authority, responsibility and accountability regarding the territory, area or natural resources at stake.

As part of that, they may also develop a shared governance institution to remain in charge of implementing the agreement and taking any further needed decision through time. Shared governance and co-management are thus very closely related, but we speak of governance when we refer to decision making processes and institutions and of management when we deal with technical and practical matters regarding what to do about the natural resources at stake

In a graphic representation, one can place a process of negotiation along a continuum in between a situation of full control by a state government and a situation of full control by local actors, such as private landowners or a local community with customary rights. The following Figures 1, 2 and 3 depict such a continuum from the perspectives of three actors: a governmental agency; a local community; and a supporting NGO. For each actor, ‘moving along the continuum’ means engaging with other actors in new ways. There is not a single specific point along the continuum at which we can say that we enter into a shared governance situation, but we can safely affirm that some form of negotiation among the parties, in particular between governmental agencies and communities, is necessary. Throughout the world, the forms that such negotiations can take vary enormously, as well as the agreements and institutions they produce.


Figure 1: Sharing power in decision-making about natural resources from the point of view of a governmental agency (please read from left to right)

Figure 2: Sharing power in decision-making about natural resources from the point of view of local actors (please read from right to left)

Full control by governmental agency Type A

Shared control by agency in charge and local actors

Type B

Full control by local actors Type C & D

SShhaarriinngg ppoowweerr iinn ddeecciissiioonn--mmaakkiinngg aabboouutt nnaattuurraall rreessoouurrcceess:: aa ccoonnttiinnuuuumm

(authority, responsibility and accountability)

Losing all control on land and resources

Letting the government make most decisions

Asking for the support of some

partners (e.g. technical or

financial support) but controlling all

its conditions

… from the point of view of local actors (e.g., a local community)

Negotiating agreements and

contracts to share formally or informally

the management authority and responsibility

Conserving or taking on full management

authority & responsibility

and remaining staunchly

independent



Type B




Enforcing rules & repressing violations

Consulting & seeking consensus (at times via benefit sharing)

Negotiating specific

agreements

Sharing authority & responsibility in a formal way (e.g.

via seats in a governance body)

Recognising/ transferring

authority and responsibility

… from the point of view of a governmental agency…


Figure 3: Sharing power in decision-making about natural resources from the point of view of a supporting NGO

Shared governance/co-management is an approach commonly adopted throughout the world. Tens of thousands of forests are co-managed in India and Nepal between villages and forestry agencies, as villages agree to protect their local forests and use their resources sustainably and forest agencies guarantee their exclusive access to them. The natural regeneration achieved in this way has been a recognised ecological success. In places as different as the USA and Peru, Madagascar and Canada, forests that used to be managed by governmental agencies are now under co-management schemes, which are proving to be less expensive and more effective for conservation. Freshwater resources, coastal resources, fisheries and wildlife are also co-managed by different communities, agencies and municipalities from Japan to the Caribbean, from Namibia to Spain. Increasingly, national governments also devise collaborative agreements for the governance/management of natural resources (in particular water and migratory wildlife) in transboundary settings. Major international authorities (e.g. river basin authorities for the Okavango and the Mekong) have been created in this way: their challenge being a way to deepen the engagement of the many concerned local right-holders and stakeholders. Not last, from Australia to Mexico, from Italy to Colombia, from South Africa to the Philippines, countless protected areas are under shared governance settings: governmental agencies, local communities and other stakeholders devise and implement agreements for their on-going management. This is not the place to describe cases in detail but it is recommended that whoever is keen to pursue shared governance and co-management learns from the case descriptions and lessons available in the literature (see, for instance, Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004a8).

8 This document is downloadable as pdf from the internet in both English (http://www.iucn.org/about/union/commissions/ceesp/ceesp_publications/sharing_power.cfm) and French (http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/2010-011.pdf) and can be requested free of charge for deserving users from the IIED Natural Resources Group (3 Endsleigh Street, London WC1H 0DD, UK – contact Dr. Michel Pimbert at [email protected]).



Type B




Letting the government deal with that alone!

Supporting the government to communicate with local actors and achieve their support

Proposing various forms of support

but letting the local actors choose

what they need…

Letting the local actors

deal with that alone!

… from the point of view of a supporting NGO…

Facilitating the negotiation of specific

management agreements among

government. agencies and local

actors


7 Key characteristics of co-management and shared governance Is it possible to distil the key characteristics of shared governance and co-management vis-à-vis other forms of governance and management? At the most basic level, three elements appear crucial for this distinction:

1. A negotiation process;

2. A co-management agreement; and

3. A pluralist governance institution.

7.1 A negotiation process We cannot affirm that there is a unique ‘right process’ to develop a management partnership, but we know that the quality of such a process is extremely important, and a partnership is generally as strong, or as weak, as the process that generated it. Broadly speaking, the process develops through three main phases:

• Organising for the partnership;

• Negotiating the co-management agreement and shared governance institution; and

• Learning by doing, i.e. implementing the agreement, sustaining the functioning of the shared governance institution and continuing the monitoring and reviewing of their results and impacts through time.

Among the lessons learned so far in co-management processes is that these three phases are all important, and each should include some activities and results (see the non-exhaustive items listed on the right of Figure 4) that should be achieved before ‘passing to the next phase’.

7.2 A co-management agreement The co-management agreement is usually a package comprising a co-management plan for the area or resources at stake, plus one or more complementary accords (e.g. projects, initiatives, by-laws), that are necessary for the plan to be accepted and signed-off by everyone. In a proper co-management plan we find the usual management elements (objectives, strategy, activities, means, budget, etc.) but we also find clearly specified the recognised parties in the agreement (the right-holders and stakeholders for the area and resources at stake) and the functions, rights and responsibilities they agreed to share. Examples of responsibilities taken up by indigenous peoples and local communities in co-management agreements include:

• Surveillance of the area and concerned natural resources;

• Limitation of activities and/or use of specific resources; and

• Regular biological monitoring through time.

Examples of recognised rights and benefits for indigenous peoples and local communities include:

• Exclusive right of residence in, and access to, the territories and resources;

• Exclusive right to gather products or to hunt, fish and cultivate land according to agreed procedures;

• Benefits from local initiatives for sustainable development;

• Benefits from economic incentives for local biodiversity-friendly practices; and

• Exclusive right of setting up businesses (e.g. related to tourism in conjunction with a protected area).


Figure 4: The three main phases of a shared governance/co-management process

7.3 A pluralist governance institution A typical governance institution is composed of one or more bodies with clear decision-making authority, responsibility and accountability regarding the area or resources at stake. Such bodies usually have some statutes or set of rules that specify their aims and internal functioning. In the case of shared governance, such bodies are pluralist, i.e. they group together different actors, usually from the government at different levels and from civil society, but they can also include business organisations. The different types of bodies that can be part of a governance institution include:

• Decision-making bodies – directly responsible for decisions;

• Advisory bodies – responsible for developing technical proposals or for providing advice upon request, or for helping to resolve conflicts etc.;

• Executive bodies – responsible for interpreting and implementing decisions; and

• Mixed bodies – holding a combination of responsibilities, usually for different zones or types of resources.

One or more bodies of various types can be part of a governance institution for the same territory, area or set of natural resources. For instance, as described in Figure 5, such an institution may consist of:

1. A relatively small body including all the most closely concerned right-holders and stakeholders. This body could be in charge of developing by consensus a co-management plan for the area or resources at stake, plus one or more complementary accords (the co-management agreement). Nominally, this body could have a purely

PPhhaasseess ooff aa sshhaarreedd ggoovveerrnnaannccee//ccoo--mmaannaaggeemmeenntt pprroocceessss • Start-up Team • Social communication • Organising of IPs and

communities • Agreeing on negotiation

procedures

• Situation analysis • Patrimonial vision • Strategy • Facilitation, conflict

management towards AAGGRREEEEMMEENNTT (e.g. management plan + sharing functions, rights and responsibilities + complementary accords + resources)

• Setting up the GGOOVVEERRNNAANNCCEE BBOODDIIEESS

• Implement, enforce, clarify

• Action research • Monitoring and

evaluation • Improving as learning

proceeds

III. Implementing and revising the agreement and

institution (“learning-by-doing”)

II. Negotiating

the co-management agreement and shared governance institution

I. Organising for partnership

Formal decision-making body Rep. of various Ministries

Rep. local tourism sector Rep. local fisheries sector Rep. conservation & science sector

Local Committee in charge of developing a co-management agreement Rep. local fisheries sector

Rep. local tourism sector Rep. naturalist guides Rep. research body Rep. local government

Consensus-based proposals

Decisions by majority voting

Technical support and execution


advisory role, as it may be prescribed that their consensus agreement be submitted to a higher level body, responsible for final decisions. In reality, however, a technical consensus developed by the legitimate representatives of all closely concerned right-holders and stakeholders carries inevitably a great influence. In the example of Figure 5 such a body is indicated as PMB;

2. A ‘decision making body’ – possibly larger, and including elected representatives with a mandate about the specific area and resources at stake. This body could receive the co-management agreement and make a final decision about it (e.g. approve it, or send it back for modifications). In so doing it may request, as appropriate, the advice of secondary advisory bodies, such as a scientific committee, an elders’ council, or a conflict-management committee. In the example of Figure 5 such a body is indicated as IMA; and

3. An ‘executive body’ in charge of implementing and reporting the results of the co-management agreement developed by the advisory body and approved by the decision-making body. This body could be instructed to report regularly about the results of implementing the agreement, and to develop regular evaluations with the help of independent advisors. In the example of Figure 5 such a body is indicated as GNP.

Figure 5: An example of shared governance institution inspired by the one developed for the Galapagos Marine Reserve/World Heritage Site (adapted from Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004a)

8 Recommendations for effective and equitable shared governance/co-management After outlining the basic lexicon and grammar for shared governance and co-management, it is important to recall that, as these practices spread around the world, people have been experimenting with different approaches and mechanisms and kept on learning lessons. Four practical lessons, confirmed in different contexts, have been transformed below into recommendations for concerned decision makers, scholars, experts and practitioners in Viet Nam.


8.1 Develop shared governance/co-management only for ‘coherent management units’ The territory and natural resources to be governed and managed should make good sense as an ecological unit, but also as an economic unit, a socio-cultural unit, an administrative unit, and possibly also as a livelihood unit, allowing people to develop strong bonds with the resources they manage and use for their basic sustenance. It is important to ask whether the chosen management units relate to local history, culture and customary rights. Is it also crucial to ask whether the units are practical (e.g. how easy is it to organise a meeting if all the stakeholders are to be gathered?).

In general, a balance should be sought between the ecological scale (which tends to call for large units) and the social scale (which is best at the village level or just above that). While the two scales should be reconciled at a meaningful mid level, one should also be open to accept very small as well as very large units, according to the circumstances. For example, in the USA it has been found that some sub-watersheds of 500 to 4,000 hectares are truly the best size for watershed management. In lran, however, the pastoral landscapes of mobile indigenous peoples typically need to span more than 10,000 hectares. In Senegal, a recent mission in charge of proposing a governance institution for a transboundary biosphere reserve decided, as a first step, to subdivide the areas into three main zones, where the concerned stakeholders have intertwined interests, feel the same problems and can be engaged to develop common solutions. Each zone so identified is of the order of 200,000 hectares. For areas as large as these it is essential to foresee several nested levels where the concerned parties are directly involved in discussing issues and developing/submitting management plans and initiatives. The crucial level at which people should always be involved is the one of the natural/traditional community.

8.2 Pay special attention to social communication and the internal organisation of all parties that need to negotiate a management agreement

When seeking to develop a shared governance/co-management setting, few elements are as fundamental as information. Social communication campaigns should thus precede all negotiation attempts. They should deal with the land and natural resource issues at stake, as well as explain the process that will unfold to develop the co-management agreement and shared governance institution. Importantly, the social communication campaigns should not just ‘pass on’ information, but open up spaces for discussion, submission of ideas and proposals and mutual learning. Before entering the negotiation phase, all actors should be well informed about the issues at stake and should have clarified internally what they wish to achieve. They should also have identified one or more representatives, as appropriate, to bring their voice to others in the negotiation platform and, possibly, in the governance bodies to come. These are the essential elements of internal organisation that all the participants in the negotiation phase should possess. A co-management start-up team can be in charge of the social communication campaign as well as of assisting parties – especially indigenous peoples and traditional local communities – to organise themselves for the negotiation.

8.3 Strengthen the communities’ capacity to engage in governing/managing natural resources, as necessary

Throughout the negotiation process some actors, in particular indigenous peoples and traditional rural communities, may need support to strengthen their capacities to relate with other actors and optimise their benefits from natural resource management (e.g. legal and technical advice, support to register officially, help to map and demarcate their territories, training to carry out biodiversity inventories or develop administrative skills to account for benefits and costs, financial support to travel to meetings, etc.). In the occasion of developing a shared governance setting, members of start-up teams can assist communities to develop such capacities.


Increasingly it is also found that local communities, and the local youth in particular, need information about the history of their natural resources and the ways by which people were accustomed to use them and manage them through customary institutions. Again, competent start-up teams can assist communities to review and re-acquire such knowledge, but also to generate valuable new knowledge and ideas through participatory action research (e.g. community resource use maps, trend analyses, biodiversity registers, biodiversity protocols). In participatory action research, the communities are assisted to develop their own questions, collect their own data, carry out their own analyses and acquire knowledge for their own sustainable use of resources. Participatory action research demands time and uncommon human resources, but is one of the more powerful pathways towards effective co-management/shared governance of natural resources.

8.4 Engage in shared governance with ‘true communities’ – the stronger they are, the better for everyone involved!

The term ‘true community’ is used here to indicate a community that is conscious of itself and its environment, has a strong sense of identity, nurtures its internal solidarity, shares common rights and responsibilities among its members and actively seeks to achieve ‘the good life’ as it has collectively defined it. Such a community is a reliable partner and can contribute actively in developing management agreements and governance institutions. Indeed, shared governance does not work in all contexts. The concerned government, communities and partners need to be negotiating in good faith, and be open to allow some sharing of power. Such openness will return to them benefits and power multiplied – but their willingness to share power should be real, not only a façade, and negotiation should take place among actors that deserve mutual recognition and trust. There is no doubt that shared governance/co-management is at its best in the context of a fair sharing of power between enlightened governments and true communities!

Acknowledgements This paper is a revised transcription of a key note presentation offered at a national workshop in Soc Trang (Viet Nam) in March 2010. I am sincerely grateful to all the workshop participants and in particular to Ms. Nguyen Thi Kim Anh, Mr. Steve Swan, Mr. Nguyen Chi Thanh, Mr. Pham Trong Thinh, Mr. Edmund Oh Joo Vin, Mr. Nguyen Duy Luong and Mr. Giang Phan for their comments and suggestions during and after the workshop. Without the trust, advice, support and patience of Klaus Schmitt and Joachin Esser this paper would not have been possible. They, and the kind editors of this collection – Mr. Daniel Spelchan, Ms. Isabelle Nicoll and Ms. Nguyen Thi Phuong Hao – are also very warmly thanked! Comments to this paper are welcome to [email protected].

References Most references used to compile this paper can be found in the publications by Borrini-Feyerabend et al. referenced below and are not reproduced to maintain a shorter and more readable paper. Banuri, T. and Amalric, F. 1992: Population, Environment and De-responsabilisation. Case

Studies from the Rural Areas of Pakistan. Working Paper POP 1. Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad.

Borrini-Feyerabend, G., et al. 2010: Bio-cultural diversity conserved by indigenous peoples and local communities – examples and analysis. ICCA Consortium and Cenesta for GEF SGP, GTZ, IIED and IUCN/CEESP, Teheran. http://www.iccaforum.org/images/stories/Database/ea%20icca%20english.pdf


Borrini-Feyerabend, G., Pimbert, M., Farvar, M.T., Kothari, A. and Renard, Y. 2004a: Sharing Power – Learning by doing in Co-management of Natural Resources throughout the World. IIED and IUCN/CEESP/CMWG, Cenesta, Teheran.

English:http://www.iucn.org/about/union/commissions/ceesp/ceesp_publications/sharing_power.cfm

French: http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/2010-011.pdf

Borrini-Feyerabend, G., Kothari, A. and Oviedo, G. 2004b: Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected Areas. Towards Equity and Enhanced Conservation. Best Practice Series, 11. IUCN/WCPA, Gland (Switzerland) and Cambridge (United Kingdom). http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/pag_011.pdf

Borrini-Feyerabend, G. 2003: Governance of protected areas: innovation in the air…. Policy Matters, Vol. 12: 92-101.

Borrini-Feyerabend, G., Banuri, T., Farvar, M.T., Miller, K. and Phillips, A. 2002: Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected Areas: Rethinking the Relationship. Parks, Vol. 12(2): 5-15.

Conquest, R. 1988: The harvest of sorrow: Soviet collectivization and the terror-famine. Arrow Books, London.

CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity) 2010: Strategic Plan for Biodiversity, 2011-2020 approved at COP 10, Nagoya, October 2010. www.cbd.int

Dudley, N. (Ed.) 2008: Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories. IUCN WCPA, Gland (Switzerland).

English: http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/PAPS-016.pdf

French: http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/PAPS-016-Fr.pdf

Graham, J., Amos, B. and Plumptre, T. 2003: Governance Principles for Protected Areas in the 21st century, a Discussion Paper. Institute on Governance, in collaboration with Parks Canada and Canadian International Development Agency, Ottawa.

Gao, M. 2008: The Battle for China’s Past. Mao and the Cultural Revolution. Pluto Press, London.

Kane, P. 1989: Famine in China, 1959–61: Demographic and Social Implications. In: Ruzicka, L., Wunsch, G. and Kane, P. (Eds.): Differential Mortality. Oxford University Press.

International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (lUCN), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 1980: World Conservation Strategy: Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable Development. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland.

IUCN CEESP (Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy) 2010: Strengthening what works, CEESP Briefing Note no.10 http://www.iccaforum.org/images/stories/pdf/briefing%20note%2010%20in%20english-%20resolution%20150%20dpi.pdf

Nelson, F. (Ed.) 2010: Community Rights, Conservation and Contested Land. Earthscan, London.

Nepstad, D., Schwartzman, S., Bamberger, B., Santilli, M., Ray, D., Schlesinger, P., Lefebvre, P., Alencar, A., Prinz, E., Fiske, G. and Rolla, A. 2006: Inhibition of Amazon Deforestation and Fire by Parks and Indigenous Lands. Conservation Biology, Volume 20(1): 65–73

O’Neill, D.W., Dietz, R. and Jones, N. (Eds.) 2010: Enough is Enough: Ideas for a sustainable economy in a world of finite resources. The report of the Steady State Economy Conference. Center for the Advancement of the Steady State Economy and Economic Justice for All, Leeds, UK.


Polanyi, K. 1957: The Great Transformation. Beacon Press, Boston, Massachusetts, USA (first published in 1944).

Posey, D.A. (Ed.) 1999: Cultural and Spiritual Values of Biodiversity. UNEP, Nairobi and Intermediate Technology Publications, London.

Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (SCBD) 2004: Biodiversity Issues for Consideration in the Planning, Establishment and Management of Protected Areas Sites and Networks. Technical Series no. 15. SCBD, Montreal, Canada. http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-ts-15.pdf

Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (SCBD) 2010: Global Biodiversity Outlook 3. SCBD, Montreal, Canada. www.cbd.int/doc/publications/gbo/gbo3-final-en.pdf

Snyder, T. 2010: Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin. Basic Books, New York.

Stone, G.D. 2002: Biotechnology and Suicide in India. Anthropology News, Vol. 43(5): 1-4.

Co-management Concepts and Practices in Viet Nam 27

Co-management: Concepts and Practices in Viet Nam Steven Swan1

Independent consultant for the GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) project ‘Nature Conservation and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in the Phong Nha-Ke Bang National Park Region’ Abstract In preparation for the ‘National Workshop on Co-management Concept and Practice in Viet Nam’, this discussion paper was commissioned by the conference organisers to provide a basic understanding of co-management concept and practices as applied, across all sectors and ecosystems in Viet Nam, with particular emphasis on the forestry sector. The paper gives a description of the present understanding of the co-management concept in Viet Nam, within the conceptual framework of ‘collaborative natural resource management and governance’. The evolving national legislative, policy and regulatory framework for co-management in Viet Nam is described, analysed and commented on, with particular emphasis on draft policies that could significantly strengthen the enabling environment for co-management of protected areas. A concise ‘state-of-the-art’ synthesis is presented of co-, and related collaborative, management initiatives in Viet Nam to date. Key lessons learnt from attempts to establish collaborative management models in Viet Nam over the past decade are indicated, and the paper concludes with a brief evaluation of the pros and cons of implementing co-management activities inside terrestrial protected areas in Viet Nam at a time of important policy reform.

Keywords: Collaborative management; regulatory framework; policy; protected area

1 Introduction: co-management concept and application outside Viet Nam The focus of this paper is the co-management concept and its application in the Vietnamese context; however the scope is broadened to consider the closely related concepts of collaborative management, shared governance, community-based conservation and community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). These various related terms form a spectrum, or continuum, of collaborative stakeholder engagement in natural resource management as depicted in Appendix I: moving from isolated state management (far left), through to transferral of authority and responsibility to a non-state stakeholder (far right).

For the purposes of this discussion paper, co-management is defined as a “situation in which two or more social actors negotiate, define and guarantee amongst themselves a fair sharing of management functions, benefits, mandates, and responsibilities for a certain area or a set of natural resources” (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004a). This definition can be considered to be an internationally accepted concept of co-management, which has been explored in practice throughout the world over the past 20 years or so. In addition to the conceptual framework presented in Appendix I, further clarification of what co-management is, in relation to other related terms of collaborative natural resource management and governance, can be gleaned from a tentative typology presented in Box 1.

In Southeast Asia, this international understanding of co-management has been pioneered at the project level by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), financed by grant aid of one form or

1 [email protected]


another, and in a variety of ecosystems (e.g. Tyler 2006; Mahanty et al. 2007), predominantly forestry (e.g. Ironside 2006) and fisheries (e.g. Garaway and Arthur 2004; APFIC 2005). Similarly, in China (with comparable cultural, social and political contexts to Viet Nam), pilot co-management projects have been attempted, in forest (e.g. Borrini-Feyerabend and Farvar 2007), rangeland (e.g. Mearns 1997; Sneath 1998, Banks et al. 2003; Zhaoli et al. 2005; ICIMOD 2007; 2009) and wetland (e.g. Yan and Wu 2005) ecosystems.

Box 1: Typology of collaborative natural resource management/governance

Collaborative natural resource management and governance – (referred to throughout this paper as ‘collaborative management’) represents an overarching spectrum (Borrini-Feyerabend 1996) of multi-stakeholder natural resource management and governance modalities, where representatives of key stakeholders discuss objectives and accept roles, rights and responsibilities to varying degrees of participation and inclusion. Trade-offs and compensations are discussed and parties are aware of the commitments made by others (Borrini-Feyerabend 1997).

State management outreach – simplest and most limited form of collaborative management, characterised by duty-bearing state authorities acknowledging the needs and aspirations of other stakeholders, consequently non-state actors are consulted in issues of natural resources management. Non-state actors inform, but do not participate in natural resource management decision-making processes. Responsibilities for, and benefits from, natural resource management are not shared, but retained by duty-bearing state authorities.

Co-management – where two or more social actors negotiate, define and guarantee amongst themselves a fair sharing of management functions, benefits, mandates, and responsibilities for a certain area or a set of natural resources (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004a). ‘Management’ here, concerns the decision-making processes on what (largely technical) actions are to be taken to sustainably use and conserve natural resources. In a co-management system these decisions are made by more than one stakeholder. Co-management models can be based on extractive resource benefits and/or non-extractive ecosystem service provision.

Shared governance – constitutes the sharing of power, responsibility and accountability for natural resource management. Governance is defined as ‘the interactions among structures, processes and traditions that determine how power is exercised, how decisions are taken, and how stakeholders have their say’ (Graham et al. 2003; Rojas and Cohen 2004; Borrini-Feyerabend 2008). In a natural resource context, governance refers to ‘who holds authority and responsibility and who can be held accountable’ (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004b; Borrini-Feyerabend 2008).

Community-based natural resource management – is the management of natural resources by communities who have legal rights, transferred from the State, in addition to local institutions, and economic incentives to take substantial responsibility for sustained use of these resources (Soeftestad 1999; USAID 2000; CBNRMN 2001). Communities are the primary implementers operating within the framework of national legislation and regulations. Community Forestry Management (CFM) is one form of CBNRM.

Source: Swan 2010

Within Viet Nam, the understanding of the co-management concept is variable: some NGO pilot projects (particularly in the coastal zone) have a sound grasp of the concept and emerging international good practices of implementation; others (often in the biodiversity conservation sector) have used the term ‘co-management’ more loosely and synonymously with other community-based conservation interventions, and are not fully acquainted with international


‘standards’, or other pilot interventions in the region, or even within Viet Nam (see section 4.4. and Table 1 on key lessons learnt for further details).

Government of Viet Nam (GoV) agencies, tasked with managing natural resources, are familiar with multi-stakeholder co-operation; but have hitherto not expressed their understanding in explicit terms of ‘co-management’ as defined by international understanding of the concept (see section 2: national legislation). Over the past two decades of development elsewhere in the world, co-management has been perceived by national and local government as an undesirable (if not threatening and seditious) concept, which promoted ‘transferral of authority’ to manage public goods and services, from state to non-state actors. This management authority has been perceived by the GoV as a fundamental responsibility of the State in meeting national and international commitments to environmental protection, socio-economic development and preservation of cultural heritage. The term co-management has also previously had connotations of ‘collectivised’ forest management, a post-war policy experiment and management modality that contributed to rapid rates of deforestation and unsustainable natural resource use as a result of a ‘dispersal’ of responsibility, rather than a sharing of it (Swan 2008b). Policy and legislative frameworks for collaborative management have not been static since the introduction of ‘Renovation’ political reforms in the 1980s; the enabling environment for co-management has been steadily evolving and is discussed in the following section.

2 National policy, legislative and regulatory frameworks for co-management Appendix II presents an annotated list of the key legal texts that apply to co-management in Viet Nam. Current formal GoV position, understanding and acceptance of co-management are reflected in national legislative and regulatory frameworks as: policy is generally supportive but not explicit; law provides the basis for exploring multi-stakeholder natural resource management modalities; regulations can be more explicitly supportive or, contradictorily, restrictive. The 2004 Land Law forms the basis for development of terrestrial co-management models by identifying communities as legal entities with rights to hold long-term land leases. Most recent legislative developments with potential to support co-management in Viet Nam include: Decree 151, which focuses on the development of local agricultural co-operatives (Community-Based Organisations that could be applied to natural resource management); and Decision 380 on a pilot policy for Payment for Forest Environmental Services (PFES). At the time of writing (early 2010), a number of new decrees, that could have varying degrees of positive implications for co-management, are under development by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) regarding Special-use Forest (SUF) system management and financing (see section 2.2), in addition to a nationwide decree on PFES; and by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE) on implementation of the Biodiversity Law.

The forestry sector has a range of existing ordinance that influences the degree of non-state actor involvement in forest protection, management, development and sustainable use. Community Forestry Management (CFM), in particular has a detailed package of legislative and regulatory ordinance as a result of the national pilot programme 2006-08 (Enters and Nguyen Quang Tan 2009 – see section 4.2 below). Forestry sector legislation is discussed below in the context of the on-going policy experiment of forest socialisation (section 2.1); the case of SUFs is also discussed in more detail (section 2.2). The legislation for fisheries and aquatic resources is less comprehensive. 2.1 Forestry sector Over the past decade, the GoV has been engaged in a policy experiment of socialising the forestry sector (see National Forest Development Strategy - NFDS): the State (MARD) shares some of the responsibilities, and resultant benefits from managing the forest estate with other stakeholders (other government agencies, local communities, emerging civil society, international NGOs, private sector, etc.). Socialisation of the forestry sector is relatively advanced in two of the


three categories of forest management: Production and Protection forests, while piloting CFM has a relatively well-established history in Viet Nam (see section 4.2).

As a result of the socialisation policy to open the national forestry estate’s management to society at large, more and more individuals, organisations and economic sectors are participating in forest protection and development. This process of socialisation often entails conflicts over forest resources and services due to the varying functions, responsibilities, interests of, and benefits for, the different stakeholders involved. Co-management is presented as a means of strengthening the direct involvement of communities and other non-state actors, in decision making and achieving conflict resolution between stakeholders (Dinh Duc Thuan 2005).

2.2 Special-use Forests Extension of the forestry sector socialisation experiment to SUFs is supported by national-level policy (Management Strategy for a Protected Area System in Viet Nam to 2010, in addition to the NFDS) and increasingly through evolving legislation based on land and forest laws. The NFDS promotes the continuation of piloting community-based forest (and other collaborative) management modalities, and even introduces the concept of multiple-use zoning within SUFs (specifically that degraded Ecological Restoration sub-zones may be used for sustainable non-timber forest product production to benefit people living in and adjacent to the protected area).

However, a significant gap persists between policy and regulatory framework, with national regulations on forest management (Decision 186) largely prescribing a state-only, no-use regime for natural resources within SUFs (despite up to 80% of Viet Nam’s SUFs having been estimated to be inhabited - PARC 2006). Decision 186 (Article 18) strictly prohibits all acts of natural resource exploitation (hunting, logging, non-timber forest product collection, etc.) within the core zone (with the exception of the service-administration sub-zones) of SUFs. Thus, sustainable extractive resource use, as an incentive for co-management, is currently not a legally tenable option in Viet Nam at present. In the realm of ecosystem service-based co-management, however, regulations on ‘ecotourism’ activity management in national parks and nature conservation areas (Decision 104) could realise potential solutions to improved benefits from SUFs for rural livelihoods. Decision 104 develops the pro-tourism position of the forest management regulations (i.e. Decision 186, as articulated in Article 22) to promote community involvement and benefit capture from SUF tourism activities.

At the time of writing, significant positive changes and opportunities are anticipated from a number of new decrees, scheduled for approval within 2010, and currently being drafted (see section 2 above), particularly a new degree on the organisation and management of the SUF system that includes, for the first time, provisions of ‘co-management’, in addition to supporting articles on PFES incentives. The December 2009 draft of this decree, presented at a national revue workshop, interprets co-management as primarily a contractual arrangement between SUF management boards and non-state stakeholders, with no explicit statements of a negotiated process; yet this does not preclude the option of SUF management boards embarking on participatory co-management processes of negotiated responsibility and benefit sharing. It should be noted that the draft decree also largely maintains the strict no-use resource regime prescribed in national forest management regulations; thus PFES (including nature-based tourism) would be the main incentives for stakeholders to commit to a co-management process and system. Presently, this draft decree is being reviewed by MARD; further changes can be anticipated before approval in late 2010.

Collaborative management of SUFs may also be promoted further by a proposed prime ministerial decision to approve ‘Piloting Mechanisms of Sharing Responsibilities and Benefits in Management, Protection and Development of Special-Use Forests’ supported by a World Bank-funded, nationally implemented project, the Viet Nam Conservation Fund (VCF). Under this initiative, five SUFs are developing a variety of site-specific floral resource-, or ecosystem


service-based, collaborative management models that go beyond what is possible under existing and emerging national legislation and regulations on forest management.

3 State institutions involved in co-management The management of natural resources falls under the jurisdiction of two main line ministries: MARD, responsible for forestry and fisheries; and MoNRE, responsible for biological diversity, wetlands and land use (including coastal zone) planning. MARD is the politically and technically stronger of the two (with MoNRE established only in 2002); this is reflected at the provincial and district levels - Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) is likely to be the key partner in development of any co-management model at the local level, be it fisheries or forestry. Within MARD, the two key departments are the (new) Directorate of Forestry (DoF) and Department of Fisheries Resources, Exploitation and Protection (DFREP). The legal department within MARD is responsible for drafting the immediate legislative and regulatory frameworks that govern natural resource management.

Protected areas in Viet Nam are currently not governed under a single institutional framework, but by several different legislative, policy and regulatory instruments issued by different ministries (Larsen 2008). MARD-DoF is responsible for six nationally managed national parks, and for implementing the VCF, a crucial project piloting resource-based co-management models. The majority of Viet Nam’s 164 SUFs are managed by provincial DARDs, under their respective People’s Committees; some national parks, not managed by national DoF, report directly to provincial People’s Committees.

4 Implementing co-management and similar initiatives in Viet Nam Implementation of co-management and other collaborative management interventions in Viet Nam over the past decade has been through piecemeal pilot project-level initiatives, implemented by international or national NGOs, and financed through small to medium-scale donor grant aid. Co-management experiences in Viet Nam have been largely confined to two arenas of activity over the past decade, with limited interaction between practitioners in the two areas:

1. Piloting co-management of coastal zone resources, particularly fisheries (Nguyen Thi Hai Yen and Adrien 2003; Truong Van Tuyen et. al. 2006; Pomeroy and Guieb 2008; Truong Van Tuyen 2008; Takahashi 2009) and mangroves (Le Thi Van Hue 2004; Sultana and Thompson 2004; Le Thi Van Hue 2008; Swan 2008a; Schmitt 2009; Swan 2009a;b); and

2. Attempts to pilot co-management of Special-use Forest (terrestrial protected area) resources as a response to the dissatisfaction of the performance of the Integrated Conservation Development Project (ICDP) model (Sage and Nguyen Cu 2001) throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Scott 2001; Apel et al. 2002; Nguyen Thi Dao 2002; Andersen and Long 2006; Humphreys and Swan 2007; Corbett 2008; Swan 2008b;c).

Co-management of wetland resources has largely been pursued by rural development projects, focusing on fisheries of the coastal zone (in particular Tam Giang Lagoon, Thua Tien Hue Province – Viet Nam News 2008), as well as mangrove forests at a handful of localities along the coast. Co-management of SUFs has been attempted by biodiversity conservation agencies in a few upland protected areas (Swan 2008b); together with new initiatives, most notably the VCF, in a limited number of SUFs. A third area of limited co-management experiences has been in the field of community-based tourism (e.g. Nguyen Thi Dao 2008; Stevens 2009).

Pilot projects in Viet Nam have developed a variety of co-management systems, each sharing common components: management institutions (boards/councils); user groups/associations; common vision (future desired states/goals); management strategies (how to move from present


to future desired states); local-level legislation/regulations (by-laws/contracts/agreements); funds (village forest protection and development funds; benefit sharing mechanisms); and monitoring mechanisms. Few projects have all these elements of a co-management system, and few pilots have progressed to the stage of implementing these systems.

4.1 Special-use Forests Four hierarchical levels of non-state actor engagement have been identified among pilot co-management projects in SUFs, participatory planning, functioning, management and governance (Swan 2008b). Participatory SUF planning is currently feasible, but is resource consumptive; in the absence of any national guidelines for SUF gazettement processes that might promote a participatory approach, such processes are not adopted by government agencies engaged in SUF feasibility studies and investment planning. Attempts at participatory SUF functioning have largely been manifested as pilot community ranger teams, which have proven to be unsustainable in terms of local government adoption and institutionalisation (Andersen and Long 2006; Swan 2008b; Duong Duy Khanh et al. 2009).

No effective and sustainable systems of co-management have yet been demonstrated for SUFs in Viet Nam. A number of promising models have been, or are being, developed; but further external technical and financial inputs will be required to realise their potential as instructive pilots. Due to a near-complete absence of impact monitoring, the collective experiences in SUFs have thus far failed to demonstrate unequivocally significant gains for either biodiversity conservation or sustainable livelihoods. Repeated attempts to introduce co-management to Vietnamese SUFs over the past 10 years, in the absence of a supportive enabling environment, have done little to advance achievements or understanding beyond the known failings of collaborative management’s progenitor, the predominating ICDP paradigm (Wells et al. 1999; Hughes and Flinton 2000; Sage and Nguyen Cu 2001), which collaborative management was expected to surpass.

4.2 Community Forestry Management Developments in public administrative and legislative reforms over the past 10 years in Viet Nam have created an enabling environment for Forest Land Allocation – the ‘transferring’ (not sharing) of management, protection, and use rights of natural Production Forests and less critical Protection Forests to individual households and (to a much smaller degree) collectively to rural village communities. In response to this opportunity, and in parallel to experimentation with co-management models, Viet Nam has witnessed relatively intensive development of pilot CFM (Hardcastle 2002; GFA 2004; Ha Thi Minh Thu et al. 2005; Huynh Van Thuong et al. 2005; Le Van An 2006; Nguyen Quang Tan 2006; Meijboom and Wode 2007; van der Poel 2007; Nguyen Thi Hong Mai 2007; Vickers and Dickinson 2007; Gilmour and Doan Diem 2008; Nguyen Quang Tan et al. 2008a-d; Enters and Nguyen Quang Tan 2009; Nguyen Quang Tan et al. 2009; Wode and Bao Huy 2009). CFM is typified by management and governance of forest resources by communities for commercial and subsistence purposes, including sustainable management of timber production, non-timber forest products (NTFPs), biodiversity and cultural heritage conservation (RECOFTC 2004).

After intensive piloting by several externally-assisted projects across the country, the GoV has implemented a pilot CFM programme, which has already undergone an initial phase of implementation with inconclusive results (Enters and Nguyen Quang Tan 2009). DoF are currently preparing for a second phase of nationally implemented piloting, yet, despite achieving technical consensus through exhaustive piloting, progress in political acceptance and institutionalisation of CFM principles and practice by the GoV appears to have stalled (Wode and Bao Huy 2009). Bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, after approximately 15 years investing in CFM, appear unwilling to invest in further piloting without stronger indications from the GoV of CFM adoption. Significant challenges of legislative development, administrative reform,


sustainable compensation mechanisms, local stakeholder capacity development, and technical harmonisation require surmounting before CFM can be sustainably adopted as a mainstream, nationwide forest management approach (Wode and Bao Huy 2009).

4.3 Future opportunities In addition to potential opportunities presented by new legislative developments indicated above (see section 2), future directions for co-management in Viet Nam are likely to focus on regulatory (e.g. hydrological and carbon cycle management) and enriching (e.g. recreational) ecosystem services (e.g. Bui Dung The and Hong Bich Ngoc 2009; CARE 2009; Dang Thanh Ha 2009; Ngo Tri Dung and Tran Nam Thang 2009). Resource-based co-management in protected areas, beyond VCF piloting, still remains elusive, but experimentation of more collaborative forms of NTFP- or timber-based CFM models, in Production and Protection forests, may resolve some of the existing shortcomings of smallholder CFM. It is clear the DoF is paying great attention to the development of PFES and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) systems. Co-management principles could inform effective service provision in both incidences; although REDD will require a certain degree of top-down process necessitated by the need to meet international market demands and trading standards.

4.4 Key lessons learnt Table 1 presents the key lessons learnt from attempts to establish co-management models in Viet Nam over the past decade. Lessons presented here are generic themes emerging from Vietnamese context-specific co-management experiences and are drawn predominantly from the forestry sector, with fewer fisheries examples informing the debate. Limitations apply to all forest management categories but are more acute for SUF co-management than CFM of Protection and Production forests and co-management in wetland ecosystems. Lessons learnt can be categorised into two principal areas of co-management underperformance: (1) an evolving, but still limiting, enabling environment in Viet Nam (challenges confronting primarily the GoV); and (2) less-than-best practice conceptualisation, design, implementation, evaluation and documentation of pilot interventions (challenges primarily to civil society and international donor communities).

5 Pros and cons of implementing co-management activities in protected areas Evaluating the pros and cons of implementing co-management activities inside protected areas recapitulates the two decades-old conservation debate of intrinsic biodiversity value-based no use versus utilitarian- and rights-based sustainable use, as viable approaches to protect biological diversity (Sutherland and Reynolds 1998; Sage and Nguyen Cu 2001). The main hypothetical arguments are summarised in Table 2. It is clear from this juxtaposed list of pros and cons that the issues surrounding co-management are complex and have uncertain consequences in the Vietnamese context.

Globally, co-management has demonstrated significant gains for biodiversity conservation and sustainable livelihoods (e.g. Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004a); equally, there are many examples of failure on one or both accounts (e.g. Agrawal and Redford 2006). What is required of protected area co-management in Viet Nam is to learn, and share lessons learnt, from both international and national experiences. At present, this is not occurring to a sufficient degree: the same mistakes are being repeatedly made, and few projects are critically evaluating, documenting and disseminating achievements and failures. In light of the complexities and uncertainties over Vietnamese protected area co-management experimentation, it is clear that a cautious piloting approach is required (ICEM 2003).


Table 1: Key limitations in the enabling environment for, and project-based implementation of, co-management models in Viet Nam

Enabling environment limitations Project implementation limitations

Concept – limited understanding of co-management concepts by (particularly local – provincial/district) government

Concept – limited understanding of co-management concepts. Tendency to adopt a technical output- rather than a process-oriented approach. Focus on product-, rather than service-based benefit sharing mechanisms

Assumptions – non-state actors do not possess the capacity to sustainably manage natural resources; the transaction cost of negotiating co-management agreements is prohibitively high

Assumptions – providing/increasing management responsibilities and resultant benefits will yield incentives for sustainable development (conservation) that are stronger that those offered by unsustainable development

Legislative and regulatory frameworks – evolving national legislative and regulatory frameworks incrementally present opportunities to explore co-management, but changes are slow and gradual

Role – misplaced emphasis on technical implementation by external agency vis-à-vis catalytic facilitation and capacity development support, integrated with national and local government planning and decision making processes

Context – strong cultural/socio-political systems of top-down hierarchy and decision making: both government and communities perceive natural resource management as a state-led responsibility (co-management perceived as undesirable/inappropriate)

Context – incomplete understanding/consideration of (limiting) enabling environment and specific Vietnamese national context (see column opposite); in addition to specific situation and local context of individual sites

Government institutions – basic capacity, governance and motivation of state institutions tasked with natural resource management forms an insufficient basis for effective (adaptive) co- management

Project design – over ambitious project design in terms of scale and (thematic) scope: too many interventions spread over too wide an area and too little local capacity, resulting in under achievement across all interventions. Inadequate attention to (a participatory) design process

Drivers – large-scale, external, politically-facilitated, commercial economic forces, not rural subsistence use (poverty), are the prime drivers of biodiversity loss in Viet Nam; communities/civil society are socio-politically weak actors with limited capacity to influence such drivers

Duration – insufficient timeframes devoted to complete co-management process; agreements negotiated too hastily to achieve meaningful or effective consensus. Project objectives (and therefore experiences) limited to developing co-management models/mechanisms (outputs) but not supporting their implementation (outcomes).

Poverty – livelihood vulnerability and unsustainability remain urgent priority concerns for local communities vis-à-vis adoption of additional management responsibilities

Technical assistance – inadequate (implementer and donor) institutional commitment to externally-instigated co-management process

Incentives – insufficient incentives offered by the GoV to compensate for non-state actor engagement. Unsecure/denied tenure/equitable access and benefit sharing from natural resources/environmental services.

Human resources – insufficient technical capacity in project staff. Inadequate attention to capacity development needs of all stakeholders (both experiential learning and forming training inputs)

Disincentives – ineffective disincentive system (enforcement of rule of law), exacerbated by confused legislative and regulatory frameworks, does not complement incentive mechanisms of co-management

Reach – pilots (to date) engage only a fraction of the community. Communities considered homogeneous whole; socially marginalised sub-groups neglected (e.g. gender inequality); limited benefits captured by local elite. Inter-community collaboration also often neglected.

Compensation – traditionally, the GoV has adopted a compensatory approach to mitigating livelihood costs of natural resource protection (e.g. 661 ‘green books’); undermines genuine attempts at shared responsibilities/benefits

Monitoring – inadequate or absence of (environmental and social) impact monitoring undermines adaptive co-management in the immediate-term, and the wider sharing of lessons learnt (see ‘communications’ below)

Communication – no national forum (cf. MARD CFM or REDD working groups/networks) for discussing novel co-management concepts, sharing resources and lessons learnt, collective learning and vertically mainstreaming into national decision making: policies, legislations, regulations, plans, programmes

Communication – poor documentation and dissemination of lessons learnt: predominance of positive output reporting to donors/media; negligible documentation and sharing of outcomes. Mistakes recur; opportunities for adoption of good practice replication and up-scaling missed; failure to influence national decision-making. Scant analysis of costs/benefits vis-à-vis state-led management.

Sources: Andersen and Long 2006; Corbett 2008; Nguyen Quang Tan et al. 2008a-d; Pomeroy and Guieb 2008; Swan 2008; Truong Van Tuyen 2008; Enters and Nguyen Quang Tan 2009


Table 2: Main arguments for and against protected area co-management in Viet Nam

Pros Cons

Incentives – provides incentives for non-state actors to conserve resources/services through sustainable use/economic valuation via ecosystem service payments

Disincentives – (for illegal use) still required to balance incentives (for sustainable use/service payments); some level of law enforcement is still required

Cost-effective – alternative to (untenable) resource-demanding enforcement of strict no-use regulations

Cost-ineffective – monitoring of sustainable use agreements/ecosystem service provision also a costly and technically challenging necessity

Regulation – of otherwise unregulated, illegal resource exploitation in response to market demands

Weak incentives – market demand potentially offers greater incentives (e.g. income from poaching) than those offered through co-management

Economics – installs private/collective property rights to resolve non-exclusion/non-rival market inefficiencies of public goods/service provision

Economics – failure of effective monitoring and enforcement of co-management agreements result in a ‘tragedy of the commons’; increased levels of demand resulting from increased access

Co-benefits – potential to deliver ‘win-wins’ of significant biodiversity conservation and sustainable livelihood outcomes

Limited application – requires secure tenure/access rights unobtainable under current national regulations for special-use forests

Sustainable – avoids costly and economically unsustainable compensation to local communities for loss of access to resources

‘Tragedy of non-commons’ – In the absence of effective enforcement, there is no de facto loss of access to resources, thus co-management is undermined

Services – co-management of ecosystem service provision obviates many of the resource-based model’s cons (see column opposite)

Services – payment for ecosystem services conceptually and practically is even more novel than co-management; PFES/REDD models have significant upstream complexities (risks/costs)

Additional capacities – brings additional (e.g. human) resources and (e.g. traditional knowledge) competencies to protected area management

Insufficient capacity – no stakeholders have the capacity to effectively implement co-management agreements (communities - insufficient technical capacity; state agencies - insufficient monitoring/enforcement capacity)

Rights-based approach would suggest that rural poor communities should not lose access to crucial resources through protected area gazettement

Diffused responsibilities – public goods/service provision is primarily the responsibility of the state; devolving responsibilities will result in failed conservation

Pragmatic – lack of effective buffer zones for many of Viet Nam’s protected areas forces consideration of zoned regulation within core zones; spatially delimited co-management could regulate resource use at sustainable levels

Other priorities – investment in socio-economic development and ecosystem rehabilitation in buffer zones is paramount to ensure integrity of dwindling value of protected area core zones

Experimentation – Current de facto use of protected area natural resources is unsustainable and unregulated; there is little to lose in experimenting with co-management

High risk – biodiversity at ecosystem and taxonomic levels in Viet Nam is so fragmented and threatened, that risks of failed experimentation with socialised management modalities cannot be afforded


References Agrawal, A. and Redford, K. 2006: Poverty, Development, and Biodiversity Conservation:

Shooting in the Dark? WCS Working Papers No. 26. Wildlife Conservation Society, Bronx.

Andersen, F.K. and Long, B. 2006: An Assessment of, and Lessons Learnt from, two Pilot Community-Based Natural Resource Management Mechanisms in the Truong Son Mountains, Viet Nam. WWF Greater Mekong – Viet Nam Programme, Quang Nam Forest Protection Department, Pu Huong Nature Reserve and Danida, Hanoi.

Apel, U., Maxwell, O.C., Nguyen Trong Ninh, Nurse, M., Puri, R.K. and Trieu Van Co 2002: Collaborative Management and Conservation: A Strategy for Community-based Natural Resource Management of Special-Use Forests in Viet Nam. Fauna and Flora International, Viet Nam Programme, Hanoi.

Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission (APFIC) 2005: Regional Workshop on Mainstreaming Fisheries Co-Management, Siem Reap, Cambodia, 9-12 August 2005. Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission, Siem Reap.

Banks, T.J., Richard, C., Li, P. and Yan, Z. 2003: Community-based Grassland Management in Western China: Rationale, Pilot Project Experience and Policy Implications. Mountain Research and Development, Vol. 23(2): 132-40.

Borrini-Feyerabend, G. 1996: Collaborative Management of Protected Areas: Tailoring the Approach to the Context. IUCN, Gland.

Borrini-Feyerabend, G. (Ed.) 1997: Beyond Fences: Seeking Social Sustainability in Conservation (2 vols.: ‘Process Companion’ and ‘Reference Book’), World Conservation Union (IUCN), Gland and Cambridge, United Kingdom.

Borrini-Feyerabend, G. 2008: Implementing the CBD Programme of Work on Protected Areas: Governance as key for effective and equitable protected area systems. IUCN-CEESP-TGER/TILCEPA Briefing note 8, February 2008. The World Conservation Union (IUCN) Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy’s (CEESP) themes on Governance, Communities, Equity, and Livelihood Rights in Relation to Protected Areas (TILCEPA); and Governance, Equity, and Rights (TGER) and Centre for Sustainable Development (CENESTA), Tehran.

Borrini-Feyerabend, G. and Farvar, M.T. 2007: Co-management of Natural Forests: a Manual to Guide a Local Process in Song Pan County (Sichuan, China). Natural Forest Management Project, Delegation of the European Commission to China and Mongolia.

Borrini-Feyerabend, G., Pimbert, M., Farvar, M.T., Kothari, A. and Renard, Y. 2004a: Sharing Power: Learning-by-Doing in Co-Management of Natural Resources Throughout the World. IIED, IUCN-CEESP-CMWG, Cenesta, Tehran.

Borrini-Feyerabend, G., Kothari, A. and Oviedo G. 2004b: Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected Areas: Towards Equity and Enhanced Conservation. The World Conservation Union (IUCN), Gland.

Bui Dung The and Hong Bich Ngoc 2009: Upland Farmers and Payments for Forest Environmental Services: An Experiment in Central Viet Nam. Presentation at the national workshop on Linkages of Forest Protection, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction - Issues and Approaches in Viet Nam. 4-6 March 2009, Hanoi.

CARE 2009: Community visions for watershed management: Linking forest and land use management to economic development through community planning. Presentation at the national workshop on Linkages of Forest Protection, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction - Issues and Approaches in Viet Nam. 4-6 March 2009, Hanoi.


Community-Based Natural Resource Management Network (CBNRMN) 2001: Community-Based Natural Resource Management. www.cbnrm.net/resources/terminology/terms_cbnrm.html. Accessed 18/12/2009.

Corbett J. 2008: Paper Parks and Paper Partnerships: Lessons for protected areas and biodiversity corridors in the Greater Mekong Subregion. IUCN.

Dang Thanh Ha 2009: Payment for Forest Environmental Services and Improved Livelihood of the Poor: Piloting National Policy in a Local Context of Dong Nai Watershed. Presentation at the national workshop on Linkages of Forest Protection, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction - Issues and Approaches in Viet Nam. 4-6 March 2009, Hanoi.

Dinh Duc Thuan 2005: Forestry, Poverty Reduction and Rural Livelihoods in Viet Nam. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Forest Sector Support Programme and Partnership, Hanoi.

Duong Duy Khanh, Nguyen Nhat An and Tien Dung 2009: Village Protection Teams (VPT): Opportunities and Challenges. Presentation at the national workshop on Linkages of Forest Protection, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction - Issues and Approaches in Viet Nam. 4-6 March 2009, Hanoi.

Enters, T. and Nguyen Quang Tan 2009: Community Forest Management Pilot Programme: Final Evaluation Report. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Department of Forestry, Hanoi.

Garaway, C.J. and Arthur, R.I. 2004: Adaptive Learning: a Practical Framework for the Implementation of Adaptive Co-Management – Lessons from Selected Experiences in South and Southeast Asia. MRAG Ltd., London.

GFA 2004: Training Package: Community Forestry. Vietnamese-German Technical Co-operation, Social Forestry Development Project Song Da, Hanoi.

Gilmour, D. and Doan Diem 2008: Community Forest Management Pilot Program: Mid-Term Review. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Department of Forestry, Hanoi.

Graham, J., Amos B. and Plumptre, T. 2003: Governance Principles for Protected Areas in the 21st Century. Institute on Governance and Parks Canada, Canada.

Ha Thi Minh Thu, Vo Nhu Toan and Long, B. 2005: Forest Land Allocation Method. Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Quang Nam Province, Tam Ky.

Hardcastle, J. 2002: Opportunities for Indigenous Community Management of Forest Resources in the Central Truong Son Uplands, Quang Nam. World-Wide Fund for Nature Indochina Programme and Quang Nam Forest Protection Department, Hanoi and Tam Ky.

Hughes, R. and Flinton, F. 2000: Integrated Conservation and Development Experience: A Review and Bibliography of the ICDP Literature. IIED Biodiversity and Livelihoods Issues No. 3, IIED, London.

Humphreys, R.S. and Swan, S.R. 2007: Case Study: Collaborative Management of Protected Areas. Fauna and Flora International, Viet Nam Programme, Hanoi.

Huynh Van Thuong, Ha Thi Minh Thu and Long, B. 2005: Community Forest Management and Protection in Quang Nam Province, Viet Nam. World-Wide Fund for Nature Indochina Programme and Quang Nam Forest Protection Department, Hanoi and Tam Ky.

International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) 2007: ICIMOD’s Regional Rangeland Program for the Hindu Kush–Himalayas. Mountain Research and Development Vol. 27(2): 174-177.

International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) 2009: Co-Management of Rangelands in the Hindu Kush-Himalayas. International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, Kathmandu.


International Centre for Environmental Management (ICEM) 2003: Viet Nam National Report on Protected Areas and Development: Review of Protected Areas and Development in the Lower Mekong River Region. International Centre for Environmental Management, Indooroopilly.

Ironside, J. 2006: Report of the Second Regional Workshop of the Co-Management Learning Network on Indigenous Peoples and Protected Areas in Southeast Asia: Yen Bai Province, Viet Nam December 11-16, 2006. Co-Management Learning Network on Indigenous Peoples and Protected Areas in Southeast Asia, Chiang Mai.

Larsen, P.B. 2008: Linking livelihoods and protected area conservation in Viet Nam: Phong Nha Ke Bang World Heritage, local futures? In: Galvin, M. and Haller, T. (Eds.): People, Protected Areas and Global Change: Participatory Conservation in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Europe. Perspectives of the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South, University of Bern, Bern. Geographica Bernensia, Vol. 3: 431-470.

Le Thi Van Hue 2004: Community-based mangrove forest management in Giao Lac commune, Giao Thuy district, Nam Dinh province. In Phan Nguyen Hong (Ed.): Mangrove Ecosystem in the Red River Coastal Zone. Viet Nam National University, Centre for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies, Mangrove Ecosystem Research Division, Hanoi.

Le Thi Van Hue 2008: Economic Reforms and Mangrove Forests in Central Viet Nam. Society and Natural Resources, Vol. 21:106–119

Le Van An 2006: Towards Upland Sustainable Development: Livelihood Gains and Resource Management in Central Viet Nam. In Tyler, S. (Ed.): Communities, Livelihoods, and Natural Resources Action Research and Policy Change in Asia. International Development Research Centre, Ottawa.

Mahanty, S., Burlsem, K. and Lee, E. (Eds.) 2007: A Fair Share? Experiences in Benefit Sharing from Community-Managed Resources in Asia. Regional Community Forestry Training Center for Asia and the Pacific, World Wide Fund for Nature Greater Mekong Programme, and Netherlands Development Organisation, Bangkok and Hanoi.

Mearns, R. 1997: Livestock and Environment: Potential for Complementarity. World Animal Review, Vol. 88: 2-14.

Meijboom, M. and Wode, B. 2007: Manual: Participatory Land Use Planning and Forest Land Allocation. GFA, GTZ and DED, Dong Hoi.

Ngo Tri Dung and Tran Nam Thang 2009: Community Forest Status and Incentive Structures for Effective Forest Management in Nam Dong District, Thua Thien Hue Province.

Nguyen Quang Tan 2006: Trends in Forest Ownership, Forest Resources Tenure and Institutional Arrangements: Are They Contributing to Better Forest Management and Poverty Reduction? The Case of Viet Nam. In Understanding Forest Tenure in South and Southeast Asia - Forestry Policy and Institutions Working Paper No 14. Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), Rome.

Nguyen Quang Tan, Nguyen Ba Ngai and Tran Ngoc Thanh 2008a: Whose Forest Tenure Reform Is It? Lessons from Case Studies in Viet Nam. Forest Governance Learning Group Viet Nam Policy Brief No.1. Forest Governance Learning Group Viet Nam, Hanoi.

Nguyen Quang Tan, Yurdi Yasmi, Tran Ngoc Thanh and Hoang Huy Tuan 2008b: Community Forest Management for Whom? Learning from Field Experience in Viet Nam. Forest Governance Learning Group Viet Nam Policy Brief No.1. Forest Governance Learning Group Viet Nam, Hanoi.

Nguyen Quang Tan, Tran Ngoc Thanh and Hoang Huy Tuan 2008c: Community Forest Management in Dak Lak and Thua Thien Hue Provinces: A Synthesis of Survey Findings. Forest Governance Learning Group in Viet Nam, Hanoi.


Nguyen Quang Tan, Nguyen Ba Ngai, Tran Ngoc Thanh, William Sunderlin and Yurdi Yasmi 2008d: Forest Tenure Reform in Viet Nam: Case Studies From the Northern Upland and Central Highlands Regions. Regional Community Forestry Training Center for Asia and the Pacific and The Rights and Resources Initiative, Bangkok and Washington.

Nguyen Quang Tan, Tran Ngoc Thanh, Hoang Huy Tuan, Yurdi Yasmi and Enters, T. 2009: Red Books for Greener Trees: Strengthening Community Forestry in Viet Nam. Forest Governance Learning Group Viet Nam Policy Brief August 2009. Forest Governance Learning Group Viet Nam, Hanoi.

Nguyen Thi Dao 2002: Co-management of Protected Areas: Finding Solutions for Song Thanh Nature Reserve, Viet Nam. Master of Science in Conservation Biology research thesis. Durrell Institute of Conservation and Ecology, University of Kent, Canterbury.

Nguyen Thi Dao 2008: Van Long Nature Reserve, Viet Nam. Centre for Sustainable Development, Tehran.

Nguyen Thi Hai Yen and Adrien, B. 2003: Re-Structuring the Hon Mun Marine Protected Area Village Committees: Review and Initial Recommendations. Ministry of Fisheries, Khanh Hoa People’s Committee and World Conservation Union, Nha Trang.

Nguyen Thi Hong Mai 2007: Chapter 7: Benefit Sharing in Community Forest Management (CFM) Thua Thien Hue Province, Viet Nam. In Mahanty, S., Burlsem, K. and Lee, E. (Eds.) (2007). A Fair Share? Experiences in Benefit Sharing from Community-Managed Resources in Asia. Regional Community Forestry Training Center for Asia and the Pacific, World Wide Fund for Nature Greater Mekong Programme and Netherlands Development Organisation, Bangkok and Hanoi.

Protected Areas for Resource Conservation (PARC) 2006: Policy brief: Building Viet Nam’s National Protected Areas System: Policy and Institutional Innovations Required for Progress. In: Creating Protected Areas for Resource Conservation Using Landscape Ecology (PARC) Project. Forest Protection Department/United Nations Office for Project Services/United Nations Development Programme/World Conservation Union, Hanoi.

Pomeroy, R. and Guieb, R. 2008: End of Assignment Report on Lagoon Co-Management System to the Integrated Management of Lagoon Activities Project Thua Thien Hue. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, Hue.

Regional Community Forestry Training Center for Asia and the Pacific (RECOFTC) 2004: Multiplying the impact of community forestry: RECOFTC Strategic Plan 2004-2009. Regional Community Forestry Training Center for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok.

Rojas, M. and Cohen, S. 2004: Enabling Activities to Ensure Effectiveness of Protected Areas. In Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity: Biodiversity issues for consideration in the planning, establishment and management of protected area sites and networks (CBD Technical Series no. 15). Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal.

Sage, N. and Nguyen Cu 2001: A Discussion Paper on Analysis of Constraints and Enabling Factors of ICDPs in Viet Nam. Integrated Conservation and Development Project (ICDP) Working Group, Hanoi.

Schmitt, K. 2009: Protection and sustainable use of coastal wetlands through co-management and mangrove rehabilitation with emphasis on resilience to climate change. Management of Natural Resources in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province Project. GTZ and Soc Trang Provincial People’s Committee, Soc Trang.

Scott, P. 2001: Feasibility Study for Collaborative Management of Special-Use Forests in Viet Nam. Non-Timber Forest Project, Hanoi.

Sneath, D. 1998: State Policy and Pasture Degradation in Inner Asia. Science, Vol. 281: 1145-46.


Soeftestad, L.T. 1999: The International Workshop on Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) Washington D.C., United States of America 10-14 May 1998: Workshop Report. World Bank, Washington D.C.

Stevens, M. 2009: Power Disparities and Community-Based Tourism in Viet Nam. In Gmelch, S. (Ed.): Tourists and Tourism: A Reader (2nd edition). Waveland Press, Long Grove.

Sultana, P. and Thompson, P. 2004: Methods of consensus building for community-based fisheries management in Bangladesh and the Mekong Delta. Agricultural Systems. Vol. 82: 327–353.

Sutherland, W.J. and Reynolds, J.D. 1998: Sustainable and unsustainable exploitation. In Sutherland, W. J. (Ed.): Conservation Science and Action. Blackwell Science, Oxford.

Swan, S.R. 2008a: Case Study: Developing a Community-based Mangrove Management System in Da Loc Commune, Hau Loc District, Thanh Hoa Province, Northern Viet Nam. CARE Viet Nam Programme, Hanoi.

Swan, S.R. 2008b: A Rapid Review of the Enabling Environment and Existing Examples of Collaborative Special-Use Forest Management in Viet Nam. World-Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) Greater Mekong - Viet Nam Country Programme, Hanoi.

Swan, S.R. 2008c: Field assessment report on collaborative management at Bi Doup-Nui Ba National Park: current situation, opportunities and recommendations for collaborative management mechanisms in the area. World-Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) Greater Mekong - Viet Nam Country Programme, Hanoi.

Swan, S.R. 2009a Strategy for linking community-based mangrove forest management results to national policy and implementation. CARE Viet Nam Programme, Hanoi

Swan, S.R. 2009b: Case Study: Integrated Participatory Land Use Planning and Community Forestry Process for Community-based Mangrove Management in Da Loc Commune, Hau Loc District, Thanh Hoa Province, Northern Viet Nam. CARE Viet Nam Programme, Hanoi.

Swan, S.R. 2010: Collaborative Natural Resource Management and Governance: CARE International’s Experiences in the Forestry Sector, Northern Viet Nam. CARE International in Viet Nam, Hanoi.

Takahashi, B. 2009: IMOLA Experience in Fisheries Co-Management in Tam Giang – Cau Hai Lagoon in Thua Tien Hue. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, Hue.

Truong Van Tuyen 2008: Final report on the National Consultancy on Community-Based Co-management to the Integrated Management of Lagoon Activities Project Thua Thien Hue. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, Hue.

Truong Van Tuyen, Ton That Chat, Chau Thi Tuyet Hanh, Duong Viet Tinh, Nguyen Thi Thanh, Nguyen Thi Tuyet Suong, Le Thi Nam Thuan and Ton That Phap 2006: Participatory Local Planning for Resource Governance in the Tam Giang Lagoon, Viet Nam 2006. In Tyler, S. (Ed.): Communities, Livelihoods, and Natural Resources Action Research and Policy Change in Asia. International Development Research Centre, Ottawa.

Tyler, S. (Ed.) 2006: Communities, Livelihoods, and Natural Resources Action Research and Policy Change in Asia. International Development Research Centre, Ottawa.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 2000: Developing an HIV/AIDS - Community-Based Natural Resource Management Brief and Tool Kit. United States Agency for International Development, Washington D.C.

van der Poel, P. 2007: Towards A Program-based Approach in the Forest Sector in Viet Nam? Study to provide a basis for revising Program 661 and preparing an ODA financing modality for a revised program, taking into account experiences and results from KfW co-financed forest projects. Draft report. GFA Consultants, Hanoi.


Vickers, B. and Dickinson, C. 2007: Chapter 6: Report of a national-level workshop Hue, Viet Nam - 30-31 March, 2006. In Mahanty, S., Burlsem, K. and Lee, E. (Eds.): A Fair Share? Experiences in Benefit Sharing from Community-Managed Resources in Asia. Regional Community Forestry Training Center for Asia and the Pacific, World Wide Fund for Nature Greater Mekong Programme and Netherlands Development Organisation, Bangkok and Hanoi.

Viet Nam News 2008: A co-operative solution to overfishing. Viet Nam News Agency, Hanoi. www.vietnamnews.vnagency.com.vn/showarticle.php?num=01SUN270108. Accessed 03/11/2009.

Wells, M., Guggenheim, S., Khan, A., Wardojo W. and Jepson, P. 1999: Investing in Biodiversity: A Review of Indonesia’s Integrated Conservation and Development Projects. World Bank, East Asia Region, Washington DC.

Wode, B. and Bao Huy 2009: Study on the State of the Art of community Forestry in Viet Nam. GFA Consulting Group and GTZ, Hanoi.

Worah, S. 2008: Participatory Management of Forests and Protected Areas: A Trainer’s Manual. MS-Training Centre for Development Cooperation and the Regional Community Forestry Training Centre, Bangkok, Thailand.

Yan, Z. and Wu, N. 2005: Rangeland Privatisation and Its Impacts on the Zoige Wetland on the Eastern Tibetan Plateau. Journal of Mountain Science, Vol. 2(2): 105-15.

Zhaoli, Y., Ning, W., Dorji, Y. and Jia, R. 2005: A Review of Rangeland Privatisation and its Implications in the Tibetan Plateau, China. Nomadic Peoples, Vol. 9(1&2): 31-51.


Appendix I: Conceptual framework for collaborative natural resource management and governance Sources: Borrini-Feyerabend 1996; Swan 2008a; Swan 2010; Worah 2008

COLLABORATIVE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE

State management outreach

Co-management Shared governance Community-Based Natural Resource Management

Defining characteristics

State acknowledges needs/aspirations of, and actively consults, other stakeholders

Formally negotiating specific agreements on certain management aspects

Joint decision making through formalised pluralistic institutions and processes

Devolution and transferral of authority to non-state actor(s)

Dominating goal/agenda

State-led conservation, seeking support from non-state actors

State-led conservation, seeking partnership through accommodating socio-economic agendas

State and non-state actors striving for harmony between conservation and socio-economic goals/agendas

Community’s livelihood goals/agenda, achieving secondary conservation outcomes through sustainable use

Degree of responsibility (cost), benefit and power sharing

No sharing of responsibilities /benefits between State and other stakeholders

Sharing some responsibilities/ benefits between the state and other stakeholders

Sharing power between state and other stakeholders

Transferral of responsibilities/benefits to other stakeholders

Contributions of state/non-state stakeholders

Contributions from other stakeholders limited to sharing opinions

Contributions of state and other stakeholders variable but mutually agreed through negotiation and seeking consensus

Contributions of state and other stakeholders variable through mutually agreed balance of power

Contribution from state limited to providing overarching legislative/ regulatory frameworks

Dominant stakeholder (voice, decision-making, and control of processes)

State conservation agencies

State conservation agencies, working towards greater inclusion on non-state actors

Balance of power achieved between state and non-state actors

Communities, operating within the framework of national legislation/regulations

De jure land/resource tenureship

State State, granting rights of sustainable use/benefit sharing

State, granting rights of sustainable use/benefit sharing

State allocating rights of sustainable use/benefit sharing

Prevailing management regime

No use of resources; biodiversity maintained ‘untouched’ to meet national/international conservation obligations

Conservation through zoned no-use and sustainable use zones; service-based incentives for conservation explored

Conservation through zoned no-use and sustainable use zones; service-based incentives for conservation explored

Sustainable livelihood development with conservation values integrated with natural resource management

Value of traditional knowledge (TK) and management systems

Limited opportunities to influence top-down, centralised state management

Opportunity for traditional management practices to complement state efforts through negotiated agreements

Strong opportunities for TK to contribute to state efforts through formal decision-making structures and processes

Traditional knowledge can predominate so long as it remains within the framework of national legislation/regulations

Increasing contributions, commitment, accountability and expectation from non-state stakeholders

Hierarchy of stakeholder engagement in State management of natural resources:

Development functioning management governance


Appendix II: Annotated list of key policy, legislative and regulatory ordinance pertaining to co-management in Viet Nam

Ordinance Notes

Land use

Decision 13-2003-QH11 – Land Law; and Decree No. 181/2004/ND-CP on the Implementation of the Land Law

Identifies communities as legal entities for the first time, with rights to hold long-term land leases (‘red books’). In the context of Special-use Forests, the law permits enclaving of communities within Ecological Rehabilitation Sub-zones and contracting of protection functions in Strictly Protected Sub-zones.

Forestry

Draft decree on the Organisation and management of the Special-Use Forest System; anticipated to be approved within 2010

Defines and gives outline guidance on co-management (in addition to related product- and service-based benefits) for terrestrial protected areas for the first time

Prime Ministerial Decision 18/2007/QD-TTg, dated 05.02.07, Promulgating the National Forest Development Strategy

Policy direction for forest sector advocating socialisation of management functions in an effort to further increase the contribution of the forest sector to poverty alleviation and national economic growth.

Prime Ministerial Decision No. 186/2006/QD-TTg, dated 14.08.06, Promulgating the Regulation on Forest Management; and Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Circular No. 99/2006/TT-BNN, dated 06.11.06, Guiding the Implementation of a Number of Provisions of the Regulation on Forest Management

Prescribes state-only management of, and largely a strict no-use regime for, Special-use Forests. Not conducive towards co-management. Special-use forest management boards entitled to pilot activities beneficial towards achieving forest’s functional purpose

Decision 29/2004/QH11 - Forest Protection and Development Law; and Decree No. 23/2006/ND-CP on the implementation of the Forest Protection and Development Law

Provides guidance on forest management, in addition to forest owners’ rights and obligations. Includes provisions for allocation of forestland to communities for protection, rehabilitation and production purposes.

Prime Ministerial Directive No. 38/2005/CT-TTg, dated 05.12.05 on resurveying and re-planning forests of three kinds (Protection Forests, Special-use Forests and Production Forests)

Communities inside Special-use Forests are expected to be enclaved (rather than resettled) and that provisions have to be made for their livelihoods (i.e. supports the concept of community sustainable use)

Prime Ministerial Decision No. 192/2003/QD-TTg, dated 17.09.03, Approval of the Management Strategy for a Protected Area System in Viet Nam to 2010

Policy justification for socialised protected area (forests, marine and wetland ecosystem) management

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Circular No. 56/1999/TT-BNN-KL, dated, 30.03.99, Guiding the Elaboration of the Convention on Protecting and Developing Forests in the Population Communities in the Hamlets and Villages in the Plains and Mountain Areas

Allows for development of local regulations in forest protection/development; provides legal support for the piloting of co-management and development of natural resource use agreements

Prime Ministerial Decision No. 661/QD-TTg, dated 29.07.98, on Objectives, Tasks, Policies and Organisation for the Establishment of Five Million Hectares of New Forest

Nationwide programme funding reforestation/forest protection efforts. ‘Green book’ contracts compensate local communities for protecting areas of protection forest


Ordinance Notes

Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES)

Prime Ministerial Decision 380/QD-TTg, dated 10.04.08, on the Pilot Policy for Payment for Forest Environmental Services

Establishes basis for development of legal framework for a national policy on payment for forest environmental services

Tourism

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Decision No. 104/2007/QD-BNN, dated 27.12.07, Promulgating the Management Regulations for Ecotourism Activities in National Parks and Nature Conservation Areas

Develops pro-tourism position of the forest management regulations (Decision 186, Article 22) to promote community involvement and benefit capture from special-use forest tourism activities

Decision No. 44/2005/QH11 - Tourism Law Defines ‘ecotourism’ and supports development of community-based ecotourism.

Community Forest Management (CFM)

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Department of Forestry, Official Letter No. 1327/CV-LNCD, dated 07.09.07, on Guidelines for community forest investigation

Instructions for forest inventory methods for preparing village community forest management plans (applicable to Pilot Community Forest Management Programme)

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Department of Forestry, Decision No. 550/QD-QLR, dated 08.05.07, on issuance of ‘Guidelines for development of village community forest protection and development convention’

Formal issuance of Community Forest Management guidelines

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Decision No. 106/2006/QD-BNN, dated 27.11.06, Promulgating the Instruction on Management of Village Community Forests

Approval of the Trust Fund for Forests (TFF) funded 2006-2007 pilot community forestry programme. Also applies to all other ODA-funded community forestry interventions

Fisheries

Government Decree No. 123/2006/ND-CP, dated 27.10.06, on management of aquatic resource exploitation activities by organisations and individuals in the coastal zone of Viet Nam

Authorises provincial People’s Committees to delegate coastal area management to district and communal People’s Committees for them to develop coastal fishery management models with community participation

Government Decree No 27/2005/ND-CP, dated 08.03.05, regulating and guiding the implementation of certain articles in the fisheries law

Gives further details of wetland and marine protected area management; no explicit statements pro/anti co-management

Law No. 17/2003/qh 11 - Fisheries Law Acknowledges integrated (people and State) ownership and management of fisheries resources, with organisations and individuals having legislated rights to exploit fisheries resources.

Community-based Organisations (CBOs)

Government Decree No. 151/2007/N�-CP, dated 10.10.07, on the Organisation and Activities of Collaborative Groups

Recent legislation permitting establishment of farmers’ co-operatives; could also be applied to co-management of natural resources

Co-management: from Jargons to Realities 45

Co-management: from Jargons to Realities Hoang Huu Cai1 Department of Social Forestry, Nong Lam University, HCMC

Abstract A paradigm shift in natural resource management systems from a command and control and sector-based approach, towards sharing responsibility with other stakeholders and accepting market-based instruments has been observed in Viet Nam. However, several case studies show that the drivers of the market orientation process and new social dynamics have created risks to the commons which are the natural livelihood assets of local communities.

This report argues that the current challenges in the development of co-management of natural resources are not only the situation of open accessibility to natural resources, but also the realisation of stakeholders' roles and functions. Natural resource management analysis needs to go beyond the consideration of formal institutional arrangements to a better understanding of stakeholders' linkages with natural resource areas in a new social context. The implementation of co-management needs teams of facilitators with capacity not only in terms of soft skills, but also a commitment to having a neutral position in order to help poor resource users raise their voice in real negotiation processes. Without strong support, co-management, governance and other terminologies are still jargons.

Keywords: Natural resources, governance, local communities, facilitation, Viet Nam

1 Introduction Although various conventional natural resource management (NRM) systems – which are used to manage, for instance, forest, land, and water – have mainly been based on ecological principles and techniques, the realisation of management prescriptions depends on a clear arrangement of stakeholder responsibility. Understanding stakeholders' motivations is thus the crucial factor in the process. The concept of ‘co-management’ was introduced to the natural resource (NR) sector in Viet Nam in 1990s to complement the traditional command and control approach – which was developed in the former central planning period – along with newly introduced market-based instruments. However, co-management, as well as other introduced jargons, can be easily misunderstood, while traditional management systems, based on social control, have not been strong enough to protect resource-dependent communities and to cope with hidden stakeholders, who emerged during the market integration period.

Any successful NRM scheme needs to be based on a better understanding of relationships between stakeholders; however this issue is particularly critical in co-management. Ostrom (1998) used the term ‘governance’ to describe aspects of institutional arrangements, and distinguished it from ‘management’, which is focused more on the technical aspects of NRM. However, the term governance has rarely been used in the natural resource sector in Viet Nam, while ‘management’ tends to cover any intervention from government agencies into natural resource areas. Jargons are useful in providing the basics to guide actions and achieve common objectives, but new jargons may lose their meaning if they are understood in the old paradigm of command and control approach to NRM.

1 [email protected]


1.1 A time line of NRM approaches in Viet Nam Viet Nam has a long tradition of central planning, particularly in the forestry sector. As indicated in the Forest Protection and Development Law (29/2004/QH11), forests belong to the State and have been allocated to the State-run forest enterprises (for Production Forests) and management boards (for Protection and Special-use forests). Along with these ‘forest owner units’, a system of forest control has been developed to ensure conformity to the Forest Protection and Development Law, and to relevant regulations produced by government agencies down to the commune level, the lowest local government unit in Viet Nam.

Rooted in the paradigm of central planning, the command and control approach to NRM has been described as top-down and bureaucratic. Interventions through this approach were based on uniform measures, instead of diversification and adaption to the context. In this command and control approach, local communities are the targets of law enforcement, despite being de-facto forest managers, with traditional forest management systems based on customary laws. The traditional community structure has been disturbed since the national programme for fixed agriculture and resettlement was implemented in 1968 in northern provinces, and 1975 for the whole country. Under this programme, forest communities began to lose their rights to access and control their traditional resource areas. Moved to new locations, their traditional linkage to resources was also lost and community management systems were disrupted. The resource areas started to become open access. This change was exacerbated by large-scale immigration to forest areas through the national programme of ‘New Economic Zone’ development in the 1980s and 1990s; and later, through ‘spontaneous’ immigration caused by people in densely populated provinces seeking land and new economic opportunities moving to forest areas to clear forests and cultivate cash crops, such as coffee, cassava, cashew and rubber.

In 1993, in reaction to high deforestation rates, the Government implemented a decree on barren land development (commonly referred to as Decree 327/CT), which can be seen as the first forestry sector reform in Viet Nam. Under this programme, reforestation was fostered, forest land allocation was started and a contractual forest management system was implemented. However, although the intention of the 327/CT programme was to share forest resource management responsibility with local communities, there were limitations regarding institutional arrangements to encourage the participation of local communities. The ambitious ongoing national programme to reforest 5 million hectares of land, which can be seen as a continuation of the former 327/CT programme, also faces similar constraints. The reason behind this, as described later, is the recognition of the role of local communities.

Since 2000, the ‘market integration’ process has put new challenges to the forestry sector. Facing difficulties and constraints, many forest enterprises had not been operating efficiently. During this period a new policy facilitated the re-organisation of these enterprises, while several market-based instruments were tested in different provinces (focused on payment for environment services). These policies created opportunities to explore new market potentials, for instance, the provision of environmental services, and ecotourism to support forest protection. One of the most important impacts of the market integration period was the increased social stratification that was driven by the privatisation of forest land. In several cases, local elites seized the commons of local communities for private benefit, rather than serving their communities, while in other cases, private businesses were able to capture large amounts of forest land and other resources. The recent increment in number and severity of conflicts/controversies over natural resources can be explained by the emergence of these stakeholders.

The forestry sector has continued to receive important support from international projects, which have been designed to address three broad categories:

1. Natural resource management and conservation – with focus on wise use and sustainable management of natural resources, and increased biodiversity conservation;

2. Rural development – aimed at creating opportunities for a sustainable livelihood enterprise development and income generating activities; and


3. Empowerment and capacity building – aimed at encouraging and assisting interest groups, communities and their local institutions to develop their natural resource management skills and competencies.

To summarise, the situation of natural resource management systems in Viet Nam in the last three decades can be divided into: a phase of post war reorganisation strongly influenced by the government subsidiary; a period of large population relocation, which drastically changed social structures and institutional arrangements at the local level; and the current period of market integration which has driven the privatisation of forest land. Threats to natural resources have come from the low enforcement capacity of the regulatory system, the weakening of social control mechanisms provided by local communities, and the emergence of strong stakeholders who have benefited from the market integration period.

2 The new jargons of co-management The co-management concept has been introduced to Viet Nam along with similar approaches, such as community-based natural resource management and community forestry. New jargons have been added in the forestry sector, such as ‘participatory’, ‘joint management’ and ‘good governance’. These jargons are useful in providing basics to guide actions and criteria to assess management objectives. However, as described above, all jargons need to be understood in the context of a paradigm shift that governs institutional arrangements. Without this, the jargons lose their meaning.

One of the core concepts of co-management is ‘community’. Before 2004, the term rarely appeared in official documents. For instance, under the contractual forest management schemes of the former 327/CT programme (described above) and the current 661/QD project, ‘forest owner units’ sign forest protection contracts with individual households and not with the community. The institutional arrangement of this contractual system looks like a civil contract, and does not support collective action at the community level. To avoid using the word ‘community’ in order to get acceptance, some community forestry development initiatives in late 1990s used the term ‘group of households’. These examples reflect the fact that collective actions in forest management have not been favoured by formal systems.

3 Does ‘community’ really have a stake? The term ‘village community’ occurred in the revised Forest Protection and Development Law (2004). Article 3 (13) of this law defined it as “all households and individuals living in the same village, hamlet or equivalent unit”. In defining conditions to receive forest allocation, Article 29 of the same law indicates that the community should “have the same customs, practices and traditions of close community association with forests in their production, life, culture and belief; are capable of managing forests; have demand; and file applications for forest assignment.” Even if a village community meets these criteria, it is considered a “subject” and not a forest owner. The issues here are that: (1) the modifier ‘village’ was intentionally used before the word ‘community’, which excludes other types of communities; and (2) the perception of homogeneity within a village community, which, as described in the next section, does not in reality exist.

3.1 Case Study: Dong Nai River Basin Since 1994, the author has explored the perceptions and expectations of co-management in selected provinces in the Dong Nai River Basin, including a commune in Lam Dong Province, and several communes surrounding the Cat Tien National Park in the Dong Nai and Dak Nong provinces. The findings of this work show that it is difficult to find such an ideal village community, as required in the law cited above.

Impacted by various relocation events and interventions (as described above), the villages in the uplands can be classified into four categories according to their origins: (a) local indigenous villages in


which social structure has largely been retained; (b) villages established during the New Economic Zone period, which consist of people who share the same origin; (c) spontaneous immigration villages, in which the social structure and the ‘sense of community’ have largely been disrupted; and (d) mixed villages. Between villages, there is diversity in terms of wealth ranking, gender, ethnicity and community migration history.

Table 1 summarises the outcomes of a stakeholder analysis, which investigated stakeholder’s perceptions of co-management. One of the conclusions of the analysis was that it would be too idealistic to rely either on traditional management systems or to enforce ‘outside’ regulations. One particular issue that the analysis uncovered is that any efforts to promote co-management need to consider a component of ‘community organisation assistance’ so that the sense of community can be revived or established.

Table 1: Stakeholder’s perceptions of co-management in selected communes

Local community members NR managers Field-based staff

Ensuring livelihood security Mitigating conflicts in access to and control of natural resources

Collaborating with local villagers

Consolidating access rights to vital resources

Reduce forest law violation Avoiding conflicts

Meeting basic needs and improving livelihood options

Seeking cost-effectiveness in protecting the resource in the mandated areas

Improving enforcement capacity

Developing sustainable livelihoods Ensuring conformity to regulations

The analysis also uncovered different understandings of co-management for various stakeholders:

• To community members, co-management is adapting their livelihoods to a rapidly changing context provoked by market integration and resource degradation;

• To outsiders, co-management reflects a shift towards accepting the crucial role of local communities in sharing NRM responsibilities and benefits;

• To field workers, co-management needs to be developed and implemented through good practices in conjunction with local stakeholders to enable them to encapsulate lessons learnt from the field so that they can meaningfully contribute to the policy-making process.

4 A simplistic model of ‘four actors’ There is a trend of using simplistic models to explain jargons. For instance, the recognition of a multi-stakeholder situation in rural areas can be seen in the widely accepted “four actors” model involving: the government; businesses; farmers; and scientists. Similarly, the interactions of economic, social and environmental dimensions can be found in the model “the triplet: agriculture, farmers and the rural area". An in-depth analysis of these models may be useful in designing a practical co-management system.

Unfortunately, in reality, at the local level, a more complex system of governance exists than the models suggest. Co-management needs more jargons in the design of collective actions which focus more on the commons, because they are not only natural assets, but also the basis for community coherence. In many cases, privatisation of the commons has led to the disruption of the sense of community. Local communities are the weakest stakeholder in negotiating with other stakeholders for their rights.

The simplistic models tend to undervalue their natural assets as well as assume that local villagers can participate in any interventions. A proper process is crucial to ensure fair negotiations so that a


convergence in expectations can be reached in setting co-management rules. Two important lessons which can aid the development of co-management are: (1) avoid stereotypes about the role of the community; and (2) develop better relationships between communities and other stakeholders (forest enterprises, government agencies, private businesses). Clearly, this is a hard process of negotiation that needs a neutral facilitator to assist stakeholders in the development of fair solutions.

5 Conclusions Co-management is a promising approach to solve potential conflicts/controversies in NRM. However, in the context of rapid changes and disruptions to community structure, the following issues need to be taken into account to avoid risks to local communities:

• The new paradigm of co-management requires a change in the attitude of natural resource managers in government agencies towards local communities. Basically, the community is not a source of cheap hired labour, but an institution, having rights and responsibilities to manage resources.

• There is a need to develop active communities with adequate negotiation skills so they can protect their rights of access to and control of their natural assets. Without this precondition, local communities are at greater risk of losing their resources, especially in this period of market integration.

• In order for co-management to be successfully implemented, there is a need to develop a strong team of facilitators and an enabling policy framework.

• Co-management has attributes that are most suited for the management of common property resources, a concept that needs to be further clarified to stakeholders, as the current legal framework does not include this form of tenure arrangement.

5.1 Recommendations The above analyses led to the following considerations

• Co-management development projects need to start by supporting a process of community organisation: to consolidate community coherence; to enhance community capacity and self reliance; and to enable the community to become an efficient local organisation. This would allow communities to partake in better decision making in NRM.

• In the context of current legal framework, some form of ‘cooperative’ needs to be explored to allow communities to practice collective ownership of the commons. A participatory process is crucial to overcoming the risk posed by weakening social control and the domination of new local elites.

• To avoid barriers created by a sector-based approach, an integrated natural resource management initiative needs to be implemented with a special emphasis on better collaboration and networking.

• Co-management needs a team of good facilitators to support a social learning process though co-management. Facilitation skills and attitudes of supporting organisations need to be improved.

• Pilot projects should develop and implement co-management through good practices in conjunction with local stakeholders, so that local stakeholders: can assist scaling up pilot efforts; encapsulate lesson learnt from the field; and can meaningfully contribute to the policy-making process.


References Ostrom, E. 1998: Co-management and forest resources. Paper presented at the CBNRM Workshop.

Washington DC., USA, May 10-15, 1998.

Scalar dimensions of Co-management in Viet Nam 51

Scalar dimensions of Co-management in Viet Nam: Some preliminary insights from the Mekong Delta Edmund Joo Vin Oh1 PhD candidate, Department of Development Sociology, Cornell University

Abstract Far from being a technical, apolitical mode of governance, co-management is in fact an inherently political approach to solving a very political problem. Its recent emergence in Viet Nam has given rise to a pragmatic discourse among its proponents aimed primarily at ensuring the success of current pilot projects, mainstreaming the concept within national policy, and eventually upscaling the approach. This discourse tends to downplay the political nature of co-management while depicting it as an enlightened approach to environmental governance. Reacting towards this view, this paper advocates a critical deliberation of the larger ends towards which co-management is but one means. Drawing on field experiences with aquatic resource co-management projects in the Mekong Delta, this paper explores through the lens of scale several ways in which, with adequate sensitivity to context, co-management may lead to more socially equitable and ecologically sustainable outcomes. A more nuanced understanding of the political and scalar nature of co-management will hopefully help guide policy makers and practitioners in making decisions aimed at these broader goals, rather than simply the propagation of the approach itself.

Keywords: Governance, scale, power, knowledge

1 Introduction In the past 20 years, co-management has garnered significant interest among policymakers, practitioners, and researchers in many parts of the world who seek better ways to manage and conserve natural resources while improving the well-being of those whose livelihoods depend on those natural resources. Viet Nam is no exception, and in recent years co-management has slowly but steadily been gaining acceptance within policy circles as a promising alternative to the conventional centralised approach which entails formal exclusive State control over all natural resources.

As many of the papers presented at this workshop2 attest, co-management in Viet Nam is being experimented with in a variety of contexts, locations, institutional arrangements, and resource types, the most notable being forests and fisheries. As it offers a promising solution to the perennial and worsening problem of resource overexploitation and conflict, co-management has received growing attention from the media and the policy research community, this national workshop being a case in point. Forums such as this provide a platform for practitioners to share lessons learnt. Much of the discussion is aimed at finding ways to ‘get co-management to work’ and thus to widen its adoption by figuring out practical ways to overcome barriers to implementation.

1 [email protected] 2 National Workshop on Co-management Concept and Practice in Viet Nam, Soc Trang City, Viet Nam; 17-19 March 2010.


Yet despite – and perhaps because of – the rising momentum that the co-management discourse has gained, it may be worth pausing to reflect on the ultimate ends we are trying to achieve through co-management. For, as with any new approach that gains sufficient popular support to trigger a paradigmatic shift in thinking and practice, there is a danger that the approach may be regarded as an end unto itself rather than the means towards achieving a larger end, which it was originally intended to be. In other words, as necessary and important as it is to understand and debate how co-management can be more successfully adopted and implemented, it is also – if not more – imperative to examine and re-examine critically what we mean by ‘success’.

This paper is an attempt to do just that. Working from a premise that co-management is essentially a political enterprise enmeshed within – and, importantly, involving reconfigurations of – a web of power relations, this paper uses the concept of scale to explore various ways in which co-management may lead to better outcomes for the various parties involved. The insights arrived at were inspired by the author’s experiences in the field conducting research at a number of co-management projects in the Mekong Delta. Because fieldwork was ongoing at the time of writing, these insights should be seen as preliminary. Most importantly, this paper is intended to provoke deliberation and debate rather than provide definitive applicable prescriptions.

2 Co-management as an approach to environmental governance The term co-management is arguably something of a misnomer. While it does signify two or more different parties sharing the responsibility and authority to manage a particular natural resource, what the term really refers to is the ‘sharing of responsibility and authority’ rather than to the ‘management’ of the resource per se. As such, co-management is not so much an approach to management as it is an approach to governance. Borrini-Feyerabend (2010) puts it nicely when she says that management is about what we do while governance is about who decides what to do and how. This distinction is crucial, as it hints at the larger ends that co-management aims (or should aim) to achieve.

Therefore, while having sound and enforceable rules regulating access to a particular resource is undoubtedly important for ensuring the sustainable use of that resource, the aim of co-management is not, strictly speaking, the formulation – much less the day-to-day monitoring and enforcement – of such rules, although this may well be the outcome of a well-functioning co-management regime. Rather, co-management deals with the issue of who gets to decide what rules are made, and – moving yet another degree of separation from the actual management of the resource – how those rules are made. This includes the often controversial issue of who decides who gets to participate in decision making. These different levels of action or decision making – each governed by a set of rules that are devised by the next higher level of action – correspond to what Schlager and Ostrom (1992) call operational actions, collective-choice actions, and constitutional-choice actions3. Co-management therefore involves making constitutional-choice actions. It is essentially a governance approach; characterising it otherwise simply robs it of its true potential for bringing about meaningful change.

But if co-management is an approach to the governance of natural resources, where then does it all lead to? Paavola (2007) provides a useful way of approaching this question when he suggests reconceptualising environmental governance as “the establishment, affirmation, or change of institutions to resolve conflicts over environmental resources.” This definition highlights a number of points relevant to co-management. Firstly, the focus on resolving conflict is premised on the interdependence between involved parties that characterise social-ecological systems. Interdependence necessarily involves conflicts of interest – which in the case of co-management

3 “Constitutional-choice actions” Schlager and Ostrom (1992, p. 250, footnote) explain, “entail devising collective-choice rules. In establishing an organisation or changing the process by which operational rules are to be devised within an existing organisation, individuals engage in constitutional-choice actions. Fishers creating a marketing cooperative is an example of a constitutional-choice action.”


means conflicts over who gets to use particular resources (Paavola 2007)4. Secondly, the definition emphasises the central role that institutions play in resolving environmental conflict. Importantly, governance is seen as an active, dynamic process that involves the continual re-evaluating of institutions: reaffirming what works, and instituting change where change is called for. Thirdly, as Paavola (2007) points out, by focusing on conflict and its resolution rather than the maximisation of profit and productivity, the definition emphasises that “the choice of governance institutions is a matter of social justice rather than of efficiency.” Arguably, therefore, the ultimate objective of environmental governance is to ensure the socially just and ecologically sustainable distribution of costs and benefits that arise from the use of natural resources. It follows, then, that this is likewise the larger end towards which co-management should be oriented.

3 Why scale matters The concept of scale has been gaining increasing attention in the literature on environmental governance (see for example Gupta 2008; Lebel et al. 2005; Lebel and Garden 2008). As places have become more and more interconnected as a consequence of globalisation, so too have the vulnerability and resilience of social-ecological systems to larger-scale processes of change (Adger et al. 2009). There is now greater appreciation of the fact that most environmental problems are multi-scalar in nature, that is, they concern the interests of those situated at different spatial and temporal scales, and therefore call for solutions that are similarly multi-scalar in scope (Cash and Moser 2000). Consequently, the interactions and linkages between institutions at different scales and levels of governance have increasingly become a matter of policy interest; the challenge therein, is to improve the interactions between these institutions in ways that increase local-level resilience (Berkes 2009; Reid et al. 2006; Young 2006).

Co-management is arguably one of the most effective ways of meeting this challenge. Co-management involves not only the collaboration of governments and local communities – i.e. institutions that operate at very different levels of scale – but it often also demands the intensification of interaction between different levels of government, from national to provincial, district, and commune levels. Such emerging patterns of collaboration often occur in the context of decentralisation of power (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997), the broadening of participation (Béné and Neiland 2006), the building of cross-scale linkages (Wilson et al. 2006a), and the empowerment of actors, who have historically been powerless relative to those at other scales of governance (Jentoft 2005). All of these processes inextricably entail the concept of scale, yet much of the literature on co-management, particularly in the policy arena in Viet Nam, barely acknowledges the scalar nature of co-management. One possible reason why this may be so is that relations of scale inevitably involve relations of power.

3.1 Scale and power relations When scale is mentioned in co-management literature, it is often taken to mean absolute, ontologically real hierarchies of nested levels. Natural scientists use scale to describe “the temporal and/or spatial range and magnitude of a process or observation”, while social scientists

4 Not everyone may be comfortable with the conceptualisation of environmental problems as conflicts over environmental resources. However, it should be pointed out that conflict in this sense does not necessarily refer to ‘open’ or violent conflict, but rather to the conflicting interests of different parties within a social-ecological system, or even between linked social-ecological systems, over the use of a finite set of resources. Such a conceptualisation also includes an ecological sustainability dimension, as many environmental problems can be understood as a conflict between the present generation of resource users and those who are yet to come (and also the non-human elements of nature). As the flip-side of interdependence, such conflict is a fact of life and is here to stay. What is required are ways to manage and resolve – not do away with – such conflict in such a way that environmental benefits and costs are distributed in the most socially equitable and ecologically sustainable ways. This is the task of environmental governance.


tend to use scale to describe “social organisation and the interactions between those levels of organisation” (Silver 2008). As such, scale is used to refer to different dimensions of observable physical or social phenomena (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Different scales and levels used to understand and respond to human-environment interactions Source: Cash et al. 2006

At the same time, however, a growing body of literature has demonstrated that scale is not necessarily only ‘real’ in the sense that it can be observed and proven to exist, but is also a social and political construct that is created and used to further particular interests and should therefore be understood in the context of the power relations that give rise to it (Brown and Purcell 2005; Engel-Di Mauro 2009; Marston 2000; Rangan and Kull 2009; Swyngedouw 2004; Zulu 2009). The relationship between processes occurring at different scales is “continuously being defined, contested, and reconstructed based on power relations between actors across many political and economic levels” (Silver 2008). Processes that involve scale, therefore, both derive from, as well as constitute, relations of power.

Likewise, because it is a multi-scale form of governance, co-management is an inherently political process that is both influenced by, as well as reconfigures, existing power relations. What this means is that efforts to implement co-management should recognise that co-management


arrangements do not take place in a political vacuum, but are almost always enmeshed within a web of unequal power relations. Consequently, there is a need to understand the political context across different scales of governance within which co-management institutions exist (see also Clement 2010). More often than not, however, co-management is depicted as, and treated as if it were, a technical solution to a technical problem. Depoliticising co-management in this way risks, on one hand, underestimating the necessary political support for co-management to work. On the other hand, it may entrench unjust power relations at the expense of the powerless and marginalised.

There are numerous examples of cases where the uncritical application of co-management has resulted in negative consequences. This includes instances where co-management is rendered impotent because it: fails to address the distribution of power (Mirumachi and van Wyk 2010); is used to expand state power by furthering the hegemony of the government (Matose 2006; Natcher et al. 2005; Nayak and Berkes 2008); promotes elite capture (Béné and Neiland 2004); or erodes state sovereignty (Young et al. 2008). Cash et al. (2006) argue that these consequences often stem from so-called “scale challenges”. These include: ignorance, namely a failure to appreciate the complexity of the problem, its cross-scale interactions, and the power relations involved; mismatch, when the scale of institutional authority does not fit the scale of the problem; and plurality, that is the failure to recognise that there are different ways of perceiving and valuing scales (Cash et al. 2006).

4 Scalar dimensions of co-management in the Mekong Delta As mentioned earlier, a growing number of pilot projects attest to the fact that co-management is gradually finding its way into policy discourse in Viet Nam. Where aquatic resources are concerned, one region where there has been significant interest in co-management is the Mekong River Delta. From a scalar point of view, this region is especially interesting as it lies at the intersection of three important scales (see Figure 2). It is situated, first of all, at one end of the scales of jurisdictional and institutional authority within the nation-state, where central authority remains vested within Hanoi. Second, it also represents the terminus along a scale of hydrology that lies within a river basin that extends across the territories of six nation-states. The transboundary governance of water resources among these states is therefore a matter of utmost consequence for the Mekong Delta. Third, as Viet Nam has increasingly liberalised its economy, the region is becoming more and more linked to the global market along a scale of trade.

Figure 2: The Mekong Delta at the intersection of scales

Scale of hydrology within a transboundary

river basin

Scale of jurisdictional and institutional authority within a nation state

Scale of trade within an increasingly integrated global market

Laos

Thailand

Cambodia

Spratly islands(VN)

Paracel islands(VN)

China


Fieldwork encounters with a number of pilot co-management initiatives in the Mekong Delta have yielded several scale-related issues that may prove useful for development practitioners and policy makers to consider. These issues are discussed below.

4.1 The evolving role of the State Given that co-management is almost antithetical to the longstanding official policy in Viet Nam, where resource management remains exclusively under the jurisdiction and control of the State, it is worth asking whether co-management is in fact redefining the role of the nation-state in environmental governance, or conversely, whether it has emerged as a response to broader transformations in State authority. It is also possible that both processes are occurring simultaneously, in a dialectical manner.

Indeed, an appreciation of the broader social and institutional context within which co-management is emerging is critical if co-management is to result in more equitable outcomes (Oh 2010). The transformations associated with doi moi, or the economic renovation policies that began in the mid-1980s, are particularly salient in this regard. Of these, three key processes of change are relevant to co-management.

First, the collectivisation and subsequent decollectivisation of agricultural land has given rise to changing notions of property rights in Viet Nam. Although there appears to be a gradual shift towards a revival of land markets, these are tempered by different understandings of property that are rooted both in the official Communist Party ideology as well as in the ‘everyday practices’ of village life (Kerkvliet 2006)5. Co-management, which often entails assigning property rights over a particular area of resources to a defined community of resource users, may therefore come up against resistance both from conservative government officials who are ideologically opposed to changing the status quo, as well as from villagers who harbour memories of the hardships experienced under collectivisation.

Second, co-management is also emerging in the context of on-going decentralisation of state power. Thus, although the Central Government still exercises authority to legislate and formulate policy, the Province is increasingly becoming a significant locus of power (Malesky 2004). Moreover, significant changes have been afoot in the distribution of power between sectoral agencies in Hanoi. The 2007 subsumption of the former Ministry of Fisheries into the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development is only one of several such developments. How co-management initiatives should position themselves with regard to the changing institutional setting is a matter that needs careful consideration. As the section on ‘finding the right fit’ below argues, co-management initiatives need to engage strategically with both provincial governments as well as decision makers in Hanoi to gain necessary political support.

Finally, the growing market liberalisation has led to a situation where local patterns of resource use and distribution of benefits are increasingly subject to patterns of global supply and demand. In the case of aquaculture, for example, it has been shown that actors engaged in the export value chains of higher value species like the catfish Pangasius hypophthalmus (cá tra), while having a higher potential income than those involved in lower value fish chains, face considerably

5 Kerkvliet (2006) views the emergence of land markets in Viet Nam as a product of several contending ‘schools of thought’. Apart from the free market school towards which there appears to be a growing predilection, there is also: the socialist school of thought which emphasises public, not private, land ownership and a large role for the State in regulating or restricting, if not eliminating, land markets; the ‘family farming’ school of thought which emphasises the household as the basic unit of land ownership and a role for the State to protect family-based farming; and the community school of thought which emphasises “communal (usually local) land ownership and decisions over how land is used and by whom” (Kerkvliet 2006, p. 287). Kerkvliet (2006, p. 287, footnote 8) also acknowledges the possibility of a recent fifth school that “emphasises ecological considerations in how land is used and for what purposes”. Although both tensions and overlaps exist between these different schools of thought, all of them feature to some degree in the current land regime – both in policy and in practice.


higher exposure and vulnerability to global price fluctuations, a situation that government policy has thus far failed to mitigate (Vo Thi Thanh Loc et al. 2010). The State’s inability or reluctance to adequately mitigate the social and environmental impacts of the aquaculture industry has opened up spaces for non-state actors to play a role in environmental governance. Market-based environmental and social standards are increasingly being used to promote sustainable production and resource use. Examples include the Worldwide Fund for Nature’s (WWF) Pangasius Aquaculture Dialogue, GLOBALGAP, and Safe Quality Foods (SQF) (Bush et al. 2009). Such certification schemes are also gradually being used to regulate the use of co-managed aquatic resources. The Marine Stewardship Council’s (MSC) recent certification of clams (Meretrix lyrata) harvested by the Rang Dong Clam Cooperative in Ben Tre is a case in point (Starr 2008).

4.2 The ‘policy lag’ and opportunities for innovation The enthusiasm among practitioners and administrators at the local level to adopt the co-management approach is all too often dampened by a lack of clear policy and legislation at the national level. On one hand, there is a relatively urgent need to implement measures to resolve conflict and reduce overexploitation of resources at the local level. On the other hand, from the perspective of policy makers in central government, there is a need to understand the longer term consequences of any legislative reform, as well as be able to account for the particularities of various local sites, species, and resource types, while providing a policy framework that is also broadly applicable across the country.

Clearly, therefore, there exists a tension between the needs and interests of actors at different scales – both spatial and temporal. This tension, which can be conceived of as a ‘policy lag’, is frequently lamented by local authorities as frustrating their efforts to implement co-management on the ground. Conversely, however, the policy lag can also be viewed as a critical site of interpretation and dialogue that provides entrepreneurial actors the space to experiment and innovate. Indeed, where such innovation has taken place in co-management, it is often because of the willingness of local authorities to go ahead, despite the lack of a clear regulatory framework, and adopt a pragmatic, write-the-rules-as-you-go experimental approach. There have been cases where such ‘fence-breaking’ has been admonished by the Central Government, but where it has led to successful outcomes, it is often held up as a ‘model of best practice’ for others to emulate, and occasionally even makes its way into official policy (Malesky 2004). Some of the more progressive provinces where this has occurred in fisheries co-management include the central provinces of Thua Thien Hue, Khanh Hoa, and Binh Dinh, as well as Ben Tre in the Mekong Delta (Pomeroy et al. 2009).

Another example of such innovation is the Soc Trang Provincial Government’s decision to allow members of the Au Tho B Village Co-management Group – established under the co-management component of the ‘Management of Natural Resources in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province’ project – to access the resources in the mangrove forest adjacent to their village subject to agreed upon regulations. The Provincial People’s Committee, represented in the project’s steering committee, consented to the joint delineation of management zones by the resource user group and local authorities within the ‘full protection’ zone of a designated Protection Forest. They further permitted the use of resources in this zone not covered by existing legislation – for example, the collection of snakes and rats – on a pilot basis. These activities would not normally have been sanctioned under existing national laws, either because of a lack of explicit allowance or because of ambiguous definitions within the law. By nevertheless permitting the piloting of these approaches, the Provincial People’s Committee effectively created a legislative ‘enclave’ where policy experimentation could take place (K. Schmitt, pers. comm., September 18, 2009).

It should be noted that this gradualist approach to policy innovation is neither new nor unique to co-management; rather it has long been the primary mode of policy reform in Viet Nam in policy areas as diverse as land use rights, legal reform, trade, housing and administrative policy


(Malesky 2004)6. In most cases, it is the province that takes the initiative to experiment and innovate, although such innovation is undertaken to varying degrees by different provinces.

4.3 Finding the right fit One of the most important choices co-management practitioners have to make is deciding what scale is the most appropriate for implementing co-management. A balance has to be struck between, on one hand, a scale that is small and practical enough for a co-management arrangement to be institutionalised using available resources, while on the other hand, a scale that is large enough to encompass as many of the parties involved in the particular resource system as possible.

If the scale is too small, the co-management initiative runs the risk of not being able to exclude outsiders, especially where it is difficult to delimit and enforce boundaries. In one capture fisheries co-management pilot site in the Mekong Delta7, for example, the resource user group is comprised of residents of one village situated on the bank of a river. Members of this group have collectively agreed to only use officially permitted fishing gear and fish only at particular times of the day and the year. However, residents of neighbouring villages, including those from the opposite bank of the river, are not similarly restricted, thus threatening the legitimacy of the regulations.

On the other hand, however, projects implemented on too large a scale often sacrifice attention to local particularities in return for administrative efficiency.

Given the political support that is often crucial for co-management to operate, practitioners also need to carefully consider which level of government they need to work closest with. Without the resources and capacity that is often only available at the provincial and national levels, co-management arrangements may be unable to provide adequate monitoring and enforcement to ensure compliance with regulations. Furthermore, as the Soc Trang case mentioned above has shown, political buy-in at the provincial level is indispensable for creating the enabling legal space needed for co-management to be adopted, and possibly to be scaled up later.

4.4 Bridging scales of knowledge For co-management arrangements to engender genuine sharing of power and responsibility, critical attention must be paid to the knowledge base on which management decisions are made (Hoefnagel et al. 2006). This requires acknowledging and coming to terms with the diverse types of knowledge that each group of actors brings to the negotiation table (Wilson et al. 2006b). This diversity of knowledge becomes especially apparent when actors from different scales of governance come together to participate in decision-making. In such meetings of diverse opinions, worldviews, rationalities and beliefs, it bears asking whose knowledge counts in the decision-making process. Furthermore, decision-making often entails synthesising existing knowledge to produce new knowledge. Who, then, is included in, and excluded from, the knowledge production process?

Fisheries management – even under ostensibly ‘participatory’ co-management arrangements – has long relied heavily on formal, written, scientific knowledge while the often tacit, oral, practical knowledge of local resource users tends to be given relatively scant regard if not altogether dismissed (Hoefnagel et al. 2006). If co-management is to result in equitable outcomes, then the participation process should also be equitable, as participation without the ability to determine outcomes is meaningless (Béné and Neiland 2006). The challenge for co-management then, is to find ways for different types of knowledge to be given mutual recognition, value, and legitimacy by 6 Several parallels can be drawn between this experimental and adaptive approach to policy innovation and that which occurs in China, described by Heilmann (2008) as ‘experimentation under hierarchy’. 7 ‘Fisheries Co-management in Vam Nao’ project, An Giang Province.


the different actors involved. Under ideal circumstances this would already be a daunting undertaking; with the added burden of decades of mistrust between the community and the State, the difficulties of fostering genuine participation and legitimacy become even more challenging. Nevertheless, observations of current co-management projects in the Mekong Delta, suggest several ways of approaching this challenge.

It would make sense – as obvious as it sounds – to widen participation in knowledge production and decision making so as to encompass as many as possible of those who experience the costs and benefits of the decisions made. Unfortunately participation is often limited to male heads of households. A more genuine participation can be fostered if greater opportunities are afforded to women, the aged, ethnic minorities and other traditionally disenfranchised groups, to not only be represented at meetings, but more importantly to have a platform where they can be comfortable with making their voices heard.

For various parties to be comfortable with sharing their respective knowledge, a common medium of knowledge exchange must be found through which meaningful participation can be fostered. The choice of language and levels of literacy are issues to be considered if certain segments of those involved are not to be excluded. For example, using visual communication techniques, such as those used in participatory rural appraisals (PRA), have been known to result in much broader participation than if techniques demanding a high level of literacy are used. Careless use of modern audio-visual communication tools like the projection of PowerPoint slides may likewise alienate, rather than engage, local participants in meaningful discussion.

This latter point provides an insight into the close association between knowledge and power. It bears noting that communication techniques themselves are expressions of power, and those able to decide which techniques are used are already in a privileged position. The use of maps provides another good illustration of this point. Maps are powerful representations of reality that are central to the co-management process as they help to define boundaries of the resource system to be managed. What is less apparent, however, is that when used in certain ways, the act of mapping can itself serve to either reinforce or challenge existing relations of power. Osseweijer (2003), for example, notes that “certain information found on maps, such as place names – which in our eyes may not seem of any special value at all – [may be] part of a body of secret knowledge, the possession of which can generate status or power within society.” It can also be tempting to use the full array of technology at our disposal to produce and use detailed maps based on layers upon layers of remote sensing data. For certain rural villagers, however, such maps – as ‘accurate’ as they are – may not necessarily mesh with their understanding of their surroundings. Whose knowledge, then, should be used as a basis for decision making?

What is needed, ultimately, is for both facilitators and participants of the co-management process to exercise a greater sensitivity towards the plurality of knowledge and the value systems that underlie that knowledge. Co-management has the potential to lead to much more equitable outcomes if its proponents could understand that it is not necessarily the most accurate or correct knowledge that will lead to better decisions, but rather the knowledge – and the process of sharing and co-producing knowledge – that generates the greatest legitimacy among all parties involved.

5 Conclusion The arguments provided in this paper have shown that co-management is far from the technical, depoliticised mode of governance that the policy discourse often portrays it as. Rather, attempts to introduce the concept take place within, and simultaneously have the potential to reconfigure, existing webs of power relations that extend across different scales of governance. Because co-management is an inherently political endeavour, political support from various levels of government is absolutely critical for it to be initiated, let alone for it to succeed. Co-management also inevitably involves multi-scalar processes, yet the use, production, and reproduction of scale is itself a means through which power relations are expressed and maintained.


Drawing on the author’s experiences with aquatic resource co-management in the Mekong Delta, this paper has explored a number of dimensions in which the interaction between scale and power in co-management is apparent. It is hoped that a more nuanced understanding of the political and scalar nature of co-management will help guide policy makers and practitioners in making decisions that will contribute towards achieving outcomes that are both socially equitable and ecologically sustainable.

Acknowledgements The research on which this paper is based was supported by a WorldFish Center Doctoral Research Fellowship, a Milton L. Barnett Scholarship from the Cornell University Southeast Asia Programme, and an International Research Travel Grant from the Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies, Cornell University. The author would like to thank the Research Institute for Aquaculture No. 2, Ho Chi Minh City, for facilitating access to various co-management sites in the Mekong Delta. Comments on this paper from the two anonymous reviewers were very helpful and are gratefully acknowledged. All errors and shortcomings, however, remain the sole responsibility of the author.

References Adger, W.N., Eakin, H. and Winkels, A. 2009: Nested and teleconnected vulnerabilities to

environmental change. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, Vol. 7(3): 150-157.

Béné, C. and Neiland, A. 2004: Empowerment reform, yes ... but empowerment of whom? Fisheries decentralization reforms in developing countries: A critical assessment with specific reference to poverty reduction. Aquatic Resources, Culture and Development, Vol. 1(1): 35-49.

Béné, C. and Neiland, A.E. 2006: From participation to governance: A critical review of the concepts of governance, co-management and participation, and their implementation in small-scale inland fisheries in developing countries. WorldFish Center Studies and Reviews No. 29. Penang, Malaysia and Colombo, Sri Lanka. The WorldFish Center and the CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food.

Berkes, F. 2009: Evolution of co-management: Role of knowledge generation, bridging organisations and social learning. Journal of Environmental Management, Vol. 90(5): 1692-1702.

Borrini-Feyerabend, G. 2010: Co-management and shared governance: The "effective and equitable option" for natural resources and protected areas? Presentation at the National Workshop on Co-management Concept and Practice in Vietnam, 17-19 March 2010, Soc Trang City, Vietnam.

Brown, J.C. and Purcell, M. 2005: There's nothing inherent about scale: political ecology, the local trap, and the politics of development in the Brazilian Amazon. Geoforum, Vol. 36(5): 607-624.

Bush, S.R., Khiem, N.T. and Sinh L.X. 2009: Governing the environmental and social dimensions of Pangasius production in Vietnam: A review. Aquaculture Economics and Management, Vol. 13(4): 271-293.

Cash, D.W., Adger, W.N., Berkes, F., Garden, P., Lebel, L., Olsson, P., Pritchard, L. and Young, O. 2006: Scale and cross-scale dynamics: Governance and information in a multilevel world. Ecology and Society, Vol. 11(2): 8. http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss2/art8/


Cash, D.W. and Moser, S.C. 2000: Linking global and local scales: designing dynamic assessment and management processes. Global Environmental Change, Vol. 10(2): 109-120.

Clement, F. 2010: Analysing decentralised natural resource governance: proposition for a “politicised” institutional analysis and development framework. Policy Sciences, Vol. 43(2): 129-156.

Engel-Di Mauro, S. 2009: Seeing the local in the global: Political ecologies, world-systems, and the question of scale. Geoforum, Vol. 40(1): 116-125.

Gupta, J. 2008: Global change: Analyzing scale and scaling in environmental governance. In Young, O.R., King, L. A. and Schroeder, H. (Eds.): Institutions and environmental change: Principal findings, applications, and research frontiers. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA 225-258.

Heilmann, S. 2008: Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise. Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID), Vol. 43(1): 1-26.

Hoefnagel, E., Burnett, A. and Wilson, D.C. 2006: The knowledge base of co-management. In: Motos, L. and Wilson, D.C. (Eds.): The Knowledge Base for Fisheries Management. Amsterdam, the Netherlands, Elsevier. Vol. 36: 85-108.

Jentoft, S. 2005: Fisheries co-management as empowerment. Marine Policy, Vol. 29(1): 1-7.

Kerkvliet, B.J.T. 2006: Agricultural land in Vietnam: Markets tempered by family, community and socialist practices. Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 6(3): 285-305.

Lebel, L. and Garden, P. 2008: Deliberation, negotiation and scale in the governance of water resources in the Mekong region. In: Pahl-Wostl, C., Kabat P. and Möltgen J. (Eds.): Adaptive and Integrated Water Management: Coping with Complexity and Uncertainty. Springer, Berlin and Heidelberg: 205-225.

Lebel, L., Garden, P. and Imamura, M. 2005: The politics of scale, position, and place in the governance of water resources in the Mekong region. Ecology and Society, Vol. 10(2): 18.

Malesky, E. 2004: Levelled mountains and broken fences: Measuring and analysing de facto decentralisation in Vietnam. European Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 3: 307-336.

Marston, S.A. 2000: The social construction of scale. Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 24(2): 219-242.

Matose, F. 2006: Co-management options for reserved forests in Zimbabwe and beyond: Policy implications of forest management strategies. Forest Policy and Economics, Vol. 8(4): 363-374.

Mirumachi, N. and van Wyk, E. 2010: Cooperation at different scales: challenges for local and international water resource governance in South Africa. Geographical Journal, Vol. 176(1): 25-38.

Natcher, D.C., Davis, S. and Hickey, C.G. 2005: Co-management: Managing relationships, not resources. Human Organization, Vol. 64(3): 240-250.

Nayak, P. and Berkes, F. 2008: Politics of Co-Optation: Community Forest Management Versus Joint Forest Management in Orissa, India. Environmental Management, Vol. 41(5): 707-718.

Oh, E.J.V. 2010: Property rights, societal structure, and state-society relations: The emergence of and prospects for co-management in Vietnam. Paper presented at the Revisiting Agrarian Transformations in Southeast Asia: Empirical, Theoretical, and Applied Perspectives, 13-15 May 2010, Chiang Mai, Thailand.


Osseweijer, M. 2003: Conflicting boundaries: The role of mapping in the co-management discourse. In. Persoon, G.A, van Est, D.M.E. and Sajise, P.E. (Eds.): Co-management of natural resources in Asia: A comparative perspective. NIAS Press, Copenhagen.

Paavola, J. 2007: Institutions and environmental governance: A reconceptualization. Ecological Economics, Vol. 63(1): 93-103.

Pomeroy, R. and Berkes, F. 1997: Two to tango: The role of government in fisheries co-management. Marine Policy, Vol. 21(5): 465-480.

Pomeroy, R., Kim Anh Thi Nguyen and Ha Xuan Thong 2009: Small-scale marine fisheries policy in Vietnam. Marine Policy, Vol. 33(2): 419-428.

Rangan, H. and Kull, C.A. 2009: What makes ecology 'political'?: rethinking 'scale' in political ecology. Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 33(1): 28-45.

Reid, W.V., Berkes, F., Wilbanks, T. and Capistrano, D. 2006: Bridging scales and knowledge systems: Concepts and applications in ecosystem assessment. Island Press, Washington, D.C.

Schlager, E. and Ostrom, E. 1992: Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis. Land Economics, Vol. 68(3): 249-262.

Silver, J.J. 2008: Weighing in on scale: Synthesizing disciplinary approaches to scale in the context of building interdisciplinary resource management. Society and Natural Resources, Vol. 21(10): 921 - 929.

Starr, P. 2008: Clams and cockles in the Mekong Delta. Catch and Culture, Vol. 15(1): 28-34.

Swyngedouw, E. 2004: Scaled geographies: Nature, place, and the politics of scale. In Sheppard, E. and McMaster, R.B. (Eds.): Scale and geographic inquiry: Nature, society, and method. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.

Vo Thi Thanh Loc, Bush, S.R., Le Xuan Sinh and Nguyen Tri Khiem 2010: High and low value fish chains in the Mekong Delta: challenges for livelihoods and governance. Environment, Development and Sustainability. Vol. 12 (6):889-908. Advance online publication.

Wilson, D.C., Ahmed, M., Siar, S.V. and Kanagaratnam, U. 2006a: Cross-scale linkages and adaptive management: Fisheries co-management in Asia. Marine Policy, Vol. 30(5): 523-533.

Wilson, D.C., Raakjær, J. and Degnbol, P. 2006b: Local ecological knowledge and practical fisheries management in the tropics: A policy brief. Marine Policy, Vol. 30(6): 794-801.

Young, O.R. 2006: Vertical interplay among scale-dependent environmental and resource regimes. Ecology and Society, Vol. 11(1): 27. http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art27/

Young, O.R., King, L.A. and Schroeder, H. 2008: Summary for policy makers. In Young, O.R., King, L.A. and Schroeder H. (Eds.): Institutions and environmental change: Principal findings, applications, and research frontiers. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. xiii-xix.

Zulu, L.C. 2009: Politics of scale and community-based forest management in southern Malawi. Geoforum, Vol. 40(4): 686-699.

Poverty and Climate Change in the Mekong Delta 63

Poverty and Climate Change in the Mekong Delta: Selected findings from Soc Trang Province Dennis Eucker1 German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA): Institute for Asian Studies

Abstract The Mekong River (Cuu Long) Delta is among the regions which are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change in Southeast Asia. Increased incidence of floods, salt water intrusion and a change of the rainy season threaten economic vitality and can potentially reverse the positive development trend in the region. At the same time, climate change puts more stress on poor and vulnerable groups in particularly, since they have fewer options to adapt. Dealing with adaptation to climate change has become an imperative for the Government of Viet Nam. The present paper is concerned with challenges and opportunities of poverty reduction in the Mekong River Delta against the background of forecasted and already occurring impacts of climate change. The main focus is on the causation of vulnerability and poverty in general and on identifying paths which may lead to tackling vulnerability by overcoming poverty in particular. To this end, the concept of ‘social vulnerability’ is applied within the broader framework of Amartya Sen’s capability approach. The approach is based on empirical and actor-centred field research from three coastal districts in Soc Trang Province in the Mekong River Delta. Findings reveal that policy makers should accord more caution to issues such as: (a) land tenure and land use; (b) management of natural resources; and (c) access to markets for the poor; in order to raise the capabilities of the population to cope with climate change. Addressing these challenges must go hand in hand with better cooperation between policy sectors involved and demands for more integrated development approaches.

Keywords: Vulnerability, poverty reduction, capability, Viet Nam

1 Introduction Viet Nam, in the context of maintaining an opening-up policy, has changed rapidly in the past 25 years. Prominent features include renovation (doi moi) policies, full re-integration into the global economy, transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, and administrative reforms. Viet Nam has also made impressive progress in poverty reduction – poverty has more than halved and GDP per capita has more than doubled over the past 15 years. Part of this success is essentially due to the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS) and to effective development planning as stipulated in the Socioeconomic Development Plans. However, these changes and successes have generated new sets of challenges: integrating regional and local markets into the global economy, for example, has lead to a disparity of incomes; and an unsustainable use of natural resources has increased environmental degradation.

Most importantly, though, Viet Nam is likely to be one of the five countries most adversely affected by climate change (Dasgupta et al. 2007), which potentially may affect and undermine further development efforts. During the last 50 years, Viet Nam’s annual average surface temperature has increased approximately 0.5-0.7°C, while the sea level along its coastline has 1 [email protected]


risen by approximately 20 cm. Climate change has resulted in more severe and/or frequent occurrences of natural disasters, especially cyclonic storms, floods and droughts becoming more extreme (ISPONRE 2009).

In such a context, clearly, sustaining the advances that have been reached will prove challenging. Coping with adaptation to climate change by dealing simultaneously with other given challenges is an important task to be considered by the Government of Viet Nam in their development strategy. While a National Target Plan to respond to climate change has not entered its implementation phase yet, much can be learned from experiences that were made, successes that were achieved and challenges which persist against the background of poverty reduction.

Soc Trang Province, located in the southern coastal region of the Mekong Delta, will be seriously damaged under different climate change scenarios. People living in the coastal area are increasingly getting a foretaste of the imminent consequences of climate change while, at the same time, poverty is still widespread. Understanding reasons for poverty as well as identifying opportunities for adaptation to climate change becomes a prerequisite condition in order to formulate robust strategies for sustainable development.

In the framework of a project analysis of the GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) project ‘Management of Natural Resources in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province’, and in collaboration with the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), a study on interlinkages between poverty and climate change was undertaken in early 2009 in the coastal zone of Soc Trang Province. More precisely, the study aimed to analyse poor people’s vulnerability to climate change. The main questions were, first, to what extent have the consequences of climate change been starting to affect people’s lives and, second, how far do these changes potentially undermine the impacts of Viet Nam’s poverty reduction programmes.

This paper presents selected findings from Soc Trang Province. Section 2 will deal with the underlying conceptual approach to this study, while section 3 provides an overview of the methodology. Selected findings from the study will then be presented in section 4. Finally, section 5 will present a summary and recommendations.

2 Conceptual approach The underlying approach to this study is based on a distinction between the concept of ‘poverty’, on the one hand, and the concept of ‘vulnerability’, on the other hand. Even though the two concepts are closely interlinked, certain differences remain: while poverty may broadly be defined as “lack or want” (Chambers 1989), vulnerability is rather understood as “defencelessness, insecurity, and exposure to risks, shocks and stress” (ibid.). Both concepts mutually reinforce each other, even though they may not be equated: while human poverty may cause vulnerability, the latter will influence the capability of people to leave the ‘vicious circle’ of poverty (Yamin et al. 2005). Both the extent of poverty and vulnerability are thus decisive to people’s degree of well-being2. Putting the two concepts of poverty and vulnerability together allows for a comprehensive analysis of the state of well-being in a given region or area, or of a particular population or social group, respectively. In this context, it must be pointed out that a given strategy for poverty reduction will only lead to increased people’s well-being if it proves successful not only in alleviating poverty, but in minimising people’s vulnerability to external risks, shocks and stresses as well.

To link the two concepts of poverty and vulnerability, the present paper’s approach is therefore based on dealing with the specific aspect of vulnerability to climate change, and in how far poverty causes vulnerability to climate change. While in practice there will be more sources of vulnerability than ‘just’ being vulnerable to the consequences of climate change (e.g. being 2 Well-being, according to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Glossary (2005), may be defined as “a context- and situation-dependent state, comprising basic material for a good life”, such as freedom and choice, health and bodily well-being, good social relations, and security.


vulnerable to market shocks or to diseases), and while vulnerability to other risks, shocks and stresses may also increase vulnerability to climate change, a distinction was made in the present study between direct vulnerability (i.e. the degree to which people are directly exposed to climate-related changes) and indirect vulnerability (i.e. other external risks, shocks or stresses that increase people’s vulnerability to the forecasted consequences of climate change).

The underlying understanding of poverty that was applied in the present study is based on a multi-dimensional approach. Analysing poverty against the background of income-related indicators may be useful under many circumstances, but does not allow for a comprehensive understanding of the real and surmounting causes and characteristics of poverty (Stiglitz et al. 2010)3. The multi-dimensional concept of poverty is mainly based on the capability approach formulated by Amartya Sen (Sen 1999). Based on his understanding, poverty is characterised by a multiple deprivation of capabilities manifested in the five dimensions of: (1) human; (2) economic; (3) protective; (4) political; and (5) socio-cultural capabilities. Essentially, based on this approach poverty is equal to a lack of capabilities. Seen from an analytical perspective, the capability approach allows for an assessment of the impacts of poverty reduction strategies both on poverty as well as on the specific dimensions of poverty. Box 1 provides an overview of the multidimensional concept of poverty as it will be applied in the present study.

Box 1: Dimensions of human well-being (Capability approach)

1. Being able to live a human life of normal length; access to appropriate housing conditions, sufficient food, health care, clean drinking water, and education (human capabilities)

2. Being able to make a living; access to land, environmental resources, hired labour, and further income opportunities (economic capabilities)

3. Being able to react effectively to external threats and to acute changes (protective capabilities)

4. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life: public participation, and accountability (political capabilities)

5. Being able to participate actively in social life (socio-cultural capabilities)

Source: Sen (1999)

3 Methodology The study followed a two-step process. The first step involved a desk study of the poverty reduction strategies as outlined by the Government of Viet Nam (GoV), which included the CPRGS and its subsequent programmes such as 134 and 135, as well as other poverty-related programmes and interventions applied in Soc Trang Province. This step formed an important basis for understanding the set-up, the aims and the implementation patterns of the prevailing strategies. Information gained from the desk study was then supplemented by information gained through interviews with representatives from government agencies in Soc Trang Province4.

3 One prominent example of a poverty assessment that applies a multi-dimensional concept of poverty is the Human Development Index (HDI) by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 4 Interviews with representatives from government agencies in Soc Trang Province were held with the directors and/or vice-directors from the: Department for Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD); DARD Sub-Department of Forest Protection; DARD Sub-Department of Aquaculture; DARD Centre for Agricultural Extension; DARD Sub-Department of Rural Development; DARD Sub-Department of Exploitation and Aquatic Resource Protection; Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DoNRE); DoNRE Sub-Department of Environmental Protection; Department of Planning and Investment (DPI); and from Viet Nam Bank for Social Policy (VBSP) Soc Trang Branch Office.

KE SACH

MY TU

MY XUYEN

VINH CHAU

LONGPHU

SOCTRANG

CU LAO DUNG

NGA NAM

THANHTRI

An Quoi BVillage

Vam HoVillage

Bien Tren/Bien Duoi

VillagePhno Pon

Village

Nha ThoVillage

Tra SetVillage

Au Tho BVillage

Khu 5/Khu 6

Sections

Km


The methodology applied for the second step comprised a qualitative impact assessment of poverty reduction strategies against the background of climate change in selected villages in the three coastal districts of Soc Trang Province. More precisely, this step consisted of participatory workshops, household surveys and semi-structured interviews with local authorities that were conducted in each of the selected villages. The workshops were based on an actor-centred method for impact assessment which utilised a participatory and process-oriented workshop tool. Over the course of each workshop, an analysis of perceived living conditions was conducted. Due to pragmatic reasons, only the previous five years (2004-2008) were covered in the analysis. The tool allowed for an analysis of programmes and projects in the particular context of the selected villages and revealed whether poverty in these villages has actually been reduced. Composition of workshop participants was carefully arranged in the preparatory phase and, to an overwhelming part, consisted of poor household members. In total, 340 people participated in the workshops, while 190 household surveys were completed. Interviews were conducted with 19 local authorities.

The empirical phase covered villages from all of the three coastal districts of Soc Trang Province. In Vinh Chau District (in the western coastal area of the province) five villages were selected. In Long Phu District (in the central coastal area) one village was selected. In Cu Lao Dung District (in the eastern coastal area) two villages were selected. Figure 1 provides an overview of all the districts and the location of villages that were selected for the empirical phase.

Figure 1: Location of selected villages in the coastal zone of Soc Trang Province

4 Selected findings 4.1 Poverty and perceived living conditions A comparison of poverty rates between the local context and the national and provincial context shows that poverty in the selected coastal villages is generally much higher than in Viet Nam and in Soc Trang Province. The poverty rate in Viet Nam was 22% in 2005, with the aim of further reducing it to 10-11% by 2010 (Xuan Hong 2009). In 2008, the poverty rate in Soc Trang


Province was 18.7% (GSO 2008). Compared to these figures, the prevalence of poverty is higher in almost all of the selected coastal villages. However, there are some differences remaining between, as well as within, the selected villages. The more closely the villages are located to the shoreline, the more prevalent poverty is. Households which are located in front of the protective dykes are significantly more affected by poverty than those households located behind the dykes. For example, the total poverty rate of Au Tho B Village (Vinh Chau District) is 33% while poverty in front of the dyke is 71%. Poverty is also high in resettlement areas.

Villages which are located more closely to district capitals and which are directly interlinked to their markets are clearly less effected by poverty: for example, poverty rates in the two sections Khu 5 and Khu 6 of Vinh Chau Town (Vinh Chau District) as well as in Nha Tho Village (Long Phu District), which is located closely to the district’s capital, are much lower than the average poverty rate of the selected villages. As can be seen from Box 2, the poverty rate in the western coastal area of Vinh Chau District is significantly higher than in the two other coastal districts.

Box 2: Poverty rate in selected villages along the coastal area (in 2008)

a) Vinh Chau District (western coastal area): - Phno Pon Village (Vinh Tan Commune): 37% - Khu 5, Khu 6 sections (Vinh Chau Town): 19%, 24% - Bien Tren, Bien Duoi villages (Vinh Chau Commune): 44% , 36% - Au Tho B Village (Vinh Hai Commune): 33% - Tra Set Village (Vinh Hai Commune): ~34%

b) Long Phu District (central coastal area): - Nha Tho Village (Trung Binh Commune): < 10%

c) Cu Lao Dung District (eastern coastal area) - Vam Ho Village (An Thanh Nam Commune): 27% - An Quoi B Village (An Thanh Ba Commune): 22%

Source: Interviews with village authorities

In Soc Trang Province agriculture and aquaculture are the two main income generating sectors for the rural population. Before 2006 aquaculture production contributed significantly to the overall economic growth of the province, but most of the shrimp farmers now have to struggle with a severe loss in revenue. The shrimp sector has been struggling with a decline in prices since 2005/2006 and many shrimp farmers in the coastal zone are facing serious economic problems. Due to a lack of knowledge, expertise, funds, and technology, many ponds are now lying idle. Those shrimp farmers affected by this negative development are increasingly searching for alternative sources for securing their income and livelihoods. Many of the shrimp farmers think about transforming their shrimp ponds back into farming land. These findings are confirmed by authorities at the provincial level. Due to expansive credit policies, most of the farmers are heavily indebted. The consequences are an increase in seasonal and long-term labour migration. A significantly higher number of farming households are now involved in the exploitation of aquatic resources, which increases pressure being put on the natural and aquatic resources along the shoreline5. Moreover, the fishing sector has to struggle with ever-depleting resources in shore waters. 5 In all of the selected communities, income generation based on the collection of a variety of aquatic resources such as clams, crabs, and goby is a common activity for many people. It is highly prevalent in the mudflat areas, but not so much in the mangrove forests. Particularly the poor people living in front of the dyke as well as resettled people are dependent on these resources, but other households also collect resources, especially during high tide.


By focusing on poor people’s living conditions, the findings from the workshops show that the perceived overall living conditions have slightly deteriorated over the previous five years. Figure 2 provides an overview of how perceived living conditions, based on people’s opinion and feelings, have changed in the selected villages. Changes in living conditions are mainly due to factors concerning land use and land tenure, environmental changes, access to resources and access to markets.

Figure 2: Average perception of living conditions in the selected villages (2004-2008) Source: Workshops at village level

Results from the household surveys support the findings from our workshops: 33% of people stated that their living conditions have been deteriorating over the previous five years while 40% said their living conditions have not changed, and only 27% stated their living conditions have improved.

Reduction of income affects both land owners and landless people. However, those who possess land for cultivation or livestock breeding are still less affected by deteriorating living conditions than landless people, despite any prevailing market constraints. Out of those interviewed, 24% of land owners stated that their living conditions have gotten worse, in comparison to 54% of landless people who complained about deteriorating living conditions. Thus, land ownership still provides for some guarantee of securing a living.

Environmental challenges pose a serious threat to people’s well-being in many of the villages that were analysed. These challenges include the availability and quality of groundwater, industrial pollution and an extensive use of pesticides on the fields which is tremendously threatening the health of rural farmers.

Table 1 presents an overview of results from the workshops in the selected villages and shows in which dimensions of poverty and in which villages an improvement of living conditions could be reached. It also provides findings of the most prevailing challenges to further development.

4.2 Perceived consequences of climate change The consequences of climate change are increasingly influencing the living situation in the coastal villages. Negative impacts from climate change include off-season rainfall putting a strain on people’s harvests, an increased level of salt water intrusion, seasonally reduced level of groundwater (especially around the urban centres) and a “coming closer” of the sea. Particularly vulnerable to climate change are those households located in front of the dyke as well as small farmers and agricultural cooperatives. Concerning sea level rise, the phenomenon apparently

-2

-1

0

1

2

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Perc

eptio

n of

livi

ng c

ondi

tions

Year

Perception of living conditions (average)


leads to an increase of aquatic resources close to the shoreline which means potentially higher revenues to the group of aquatic resource collectors.

Table 1: Development trends in the selected villages (2004-2008)

District/ Village

Development trend

Perceived improvements

Perceived positive stability Perceived deterioration

Vinh Chau/ Phno Pon

Negative Housing conditions, drinking water, climate security

Food security, health, crime, social security, credits, education, training, participation, accountability

Income, environment

Vinh Chau/ Bien Tren, Bien Duoi

Negative Housing conditions, drinking water, education, training, accountability

Food security, health, crime, access to wetlands, participation

Income, access to land, environment, climate security,

Vinh Chau/ Khu 5, Khu 6

Negative Food security, environment, access to sea, access to wetlands

Housing, drinking water, health, crime, social security, land, credits, education, training, participation, accountability

Income, groundwater

Vinh Chau/ Au Tho B

Negative Housing conditions, drinking water, health, environment, credits, education, training

Food security, crime, social security, climate security, participation, accountability

Income, access to wetlands, access to sandbanks

Vinh Chau/ Tra Set

Positive Housing conditions, drinking water, health, income, environment, education

Food security, access to land, access to the sea

Off-farm labour opportunities

Long Phu/ Nha Tho

Negative Housing conditions Food security, health, crime, social security, climate security, education, training, participation, accountability

Drinking water, income, credits, environment

Cu Lao Dung/ Vam Ho

Negative Housing conditions, drinking water, environment, credits, education

Food security, crime, social security, climate security, access to wetlands, training, participation, accountability

Health, income

Cu Lao Dung/ Au Quoi B

Negative Housing conditions, water, health, education

Food security, environment, crime, social security, training, participation

Income, credits

At the same time, awareness of climate change is low: there is hardly anyone at the local level who knows about the term climate change and about the related and forecasted changes; instead people hope that “the weather will stabilise again soon”.

In all of the villages, people are afraid of a devastating natural disaster which could destroy the dykes and people’s houses. Asked about the potential worst case scenario to people’s lives, data from the survey shows that a natural disaster is feared the most (see Figure 3). In this vein, many people referred to ‘Typhoon Linda’ which in 1997 put many of the coastal villages in dire circumstances.

In terms of direct and indirect vulnerability, while security from climate-related shocks, risks and stresses is an area of huge concern, even more worrisome are those factors which influence the


level of indirect vulnerability of the people. Changing precipitation patterns, increased levels of salt water intrusion, reduced levels of groundwater, and sea level rise have doubtlessly started to influence people’s lives, but the lack of income and arable land, and partially degrading environmental conditions will tremendously increase long-term vulnerability if no countermeasures are taken.

Figure 3: Perception of what would be the worst that could happen to the people in the selected villages Source: Household survey data

4.3 Poverty reduction Concerning poverty reduction, the 2006-2010 Socioeconomic Development Plan (SEDP) for Soc Trang Province highlights further economic development as an issue of prime importance. The focus is on: (1) strengthening the local economy; (2) creating labour opportunities for the rural population; (3) encouraging private investments while, at the same time; (4) spurring public investment. In the short run, it is planned to establish mechanisms to further improve the average basic living conditions of the poor local population. In this regard, the two Government programmes 134 and 135 are considered to be very important tools. In the long run, the strategy of the Provincial Government is to focus on raising the education level and the capacities of the local population, especially the poor, while providing them with opportunities to benefit from the overall socioeconomic growth. In terms of specific approaches to directly raising the income level of poor segments of the population, continuous support is primarily being provided via the Viet Nam Bank of Social Policy (VBSP) and via the Agribank of Viet Nam (even though the clientele of the latter rather consists of better-off farmers and non-poor population groups). Interestingly though, the current SEDP does not refer to aspects of direct adaptation to the consequences of climate change. Moreover, local development planning does not take into account forecasted changes.

Results from the selected villages show that, on the one hand, many dimensions of poverty have been reduced in recent years. Basic human living conditions have dramatically improved, such as housing conditions, food security, primary education, and health care. On the other hand, however, poverty reduction programmes did not have sufficient impacts in those dimensions where deterioration of living conditions has occurred, such as land use, environmental and resource conditions, and income and access to markets. In other words, the poverty reduction

41

19

17

5

10

8Experiencing a major natural disaster

Losing main source of income

Close relative falls ill

Respondent falls ill

Government resettles household

Other


programmes that were in existence during the timeframe under investigation (2004-2008) did not sufficiently counter these negative developments.

Consequently, the question is what opportunities do poor people take in order to cope with given challenges? In the selected villages, when their livelihoods are threatened, people will either rely on support and sources from the Government (additional to what is provided through the poverty reduction programmes) or they will receive help through their families and social networks. Land owners have potentially more access to credits than landless people. However, many of the landowners are heavily indebted due to the transformation of their rice fields into shrimp ponds and are therefore restricted from further access to credits. Thus, many of the landowners increasingly also have to rely on private sources of support. This is a highly alarming trend, especially against the background of the forecasted consequences of climate change that leaves many people and village communities vulnerable. While in the past credits have improved many farmers’ income situation in the short-term, it has made them more vulnerable to climate change, especially in the context of bad market conditions.

Particularly worrisome, however, is the finding that almost one out of seven of the respondents replied that there is no source of support he or she could rely upon. Figure 4 provides an overview of people’s risk mitigation strategies and shows their sources of support.

Figure 4: Risks mitigation strategies and sources of support in the selected villages (Question raised: “What are your sources of support in case your income is threatened?”) Source: Household survey data

5 Concluding remarks The present paper has provided an overview of poverty dynamics in selected villages in the coastal zone of Soc Trang Province against the background of climate change and, in this context, provided an analysis of the impacts of Viet Nam’s poverty reduction strategies. Even though the region has experienced high economic growth rates over recent years and it was possible to significantly reduce poverty rates, figures show that the number of poor people is still higher in the selected villages than in other regions of the country.

Findings from the study show that poverty reduction strategies have improved living conditions by rising the degree of, and access to basic services (such as housing conditions, water, education, food security, and – to some degree – health). However, the overall living conditions for poor people have deteriorated over the past few years. The surmounting challenges, i.e. low saving

20

7

10

15

27

2

5

15

Family

Village

Mass organisations

Government

Local bank

Sell land

Other

No sources of support


ratios at the household level and, increasingly, debt pitfalls, cannot be solved with the prevailing instruments that are applied for poverty reduction.

Climate change has evolved as an overarching challenge for development (as well as for development strategies) in the selected villages. There is clear evidence that the consequences of climate change increasingly put a strain on poor people’s capabilities to leave the ‘vicious circle’ of poverty, since they are extremely vulnerable to those impacts and have no (or only few) means to adapt. In this vein, the deterioration of living conditions is, on the one hand, partly due to changes which can be related to prevailing climate trends and climate-related events, and, on the other hand, due to a bad market situation for rural products, which will ultimately increase people’s vulnerability in the mid- to long-term if no corrective measures are taken. In this context, three main areas of concern were identified:

1. Land use and land tenure: Land use is rather unsustainable and policies for land-tenure have contributed to a situation in which many people find themselves landless and do not have opportunities to gain access to new land parcels. Moreover, agriculture and aquaculture have not developed into job-generating sectors for these landless people. At the same time, agricultural and salt cooperatives (such as in Bien Tren and Bien Duoi villages) lack knowledge, financial resources and innovative means in order to effectively adapt to the consequences of climate change and to support their members in growing crops that are more resistant to off-season rainfall and to irrigation water affected by salt water intrusion.

2. Management of natural resources: Natural resources form the basis for guaranteeing a minimum income to the impoverished and newly impoverished people. Thus, sustainable management of natural resources is a crucial factor which can pave the way for getting more and more poor people into growth-oriented market structures. Within this context, improved levels of consideration for environmental conditions and the management of natural resources can be observed – based on information provided by interviewees at the province level, there is an ever-increasing level of enforcement of, and compliance with, respectively, environmental regulations observable at the local level. However, local awareness of the negative consequences of climate change has to be increased in order to put an emphasis on the environmental sector and its role for adaptation. To this end, co-management should be applied at the local level. This will allow for more effective management and better coordination of interests between the needs of poor people on the one hand and sustainable protection of natural resources on the other hand. However, in order to protect the coastal zone from rising sea levels, protection and reforestation of mangrove forests should be ensured along the coastline. The local population is much more aware of the importance of the mangrove forests now than in the past. However, illegal cutting of mangrove forests is still going strong in the majority of the selected villages, due to prevailing poverty and lack of labour opportunities.

3. Access to markets for the poor: Creating off-farm labour opportunities is an important task in order to: overcome income poverty of landless people; increase the savings ration of poor households; provide them with the necessary capabilities to prevent further pitfalls; and ultimately increase their capabilities to adapt to climate change. At the same time, strategies that lead to better access to, and integration into, respectively, supra-regional and international markets for farmers should be followed. Simultaneously, creating more and better labour opportunities will effectively improve sustainability of natural resources and will take prevailing pressures from the environmental sector. The formation and extension of clam cooperatives must be seen as a useful approach for providing poor people with income. In the mid-term, when sustainability of mangrove forests is guaranteed, certified agro-forestry in strictly controlled areas may provide for the creation of more off-farm labour opportunities. Paradoxically though, the challenges for dealing with and adapting to the consequences of climate change may bring market opportunities to the region that have not been effectively dealt with yet. Climate change brings a high demand for solutions of how to adapt in the best possible way under


prevailing conditions. Thus, the most promising way to pave the way to markets for the poor will be, in the mid-term, to provide adaptation solutions which are based on local skills and on local labour.

These central findings show that there are no single-sector solutions to the prevailing challenges. Therefore, there is an urgent need for reorientation and adjustment of the poverty reduction and growth strategy in the region. Relevant government departments must be urged to follow a much more integrated approach to poverty reduction and sustainable development than they did in the past. The upcoming SEDP for 2011-2015 should provide a framework for this.

ICAM (Integrated Coastal Area Management) can serve as a fundamental point of origin for overcoming the given challenges. The importance and relevance of more integrated approaches to sustainable development in the coastal zone of Soc Trang Province was confirmed by all institutional stakeholders that were interviewed. While some of the interviewees understood the emphasis of ICAM to be the alleviation of poverty, others thought ICAM was playing more of a role to protect coastal mangrove forests. Regardless of these two prevailing lines of argumentation, all interviewees agreed that ICAM may improve the current situation, be it for the protection of the mangroves or, directly, for the poor.

Against this background, the institutional conditions for stepping into a formal ICAM are given. However some of the stakeholders involved in our survey stated that there are still many challenges to be tackled including: limited level of communication and cooperation between both the lead agencies at the provincial level and between those agencies at the local level; insufficient capacities in terms of human resources; and a limited availability of state of the art knowledge and technical expertise.

Thus, lessons learned from other provinces where ICAM strategies have been formulated and implemented – such as the coastal provinces of Ba Ria/Vung Tau, Thua Thien Hue, and Nam Dinh – should be analysed for their potential to be applied in Soc Trang Province.

Acknowledgements I am grateful to all those who helped make this study possible. Thanks are particularly due to the Chief Technical Advisor, the National Coordinator, and the project staff from the GIZ (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) project ‘Management of Natural Resources in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province’. Thanks also to the Director, Vice-Directors and other staff from the Sub-Department of Forest Protection of Soc Trang Province. Gratitude should particularly be expressed to Mr. Hong Thanh Nhan for his great support and detailed knowledge while working in Soc Trang Province and to Mr. Quang Thanh Phu who provided for all necessary logistics as well as other activities to prepare for the survey phase.

References Chambers, R. 1989: Editorial Introduction: Vulnerability, Coping and Policy. In: Chambers, R.

(Ed.): Vulnerability: How the Poor Cope. IDS Bulletin, Vol. 20(2): 1-7.

Dasgupta, S., Laplante, B., Meisner, C., Wheeler, D. and Yan, J. 2007: The Impact of Sea Level Rise on Developing Countries. A Comparative Analysis. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 4136, February 2007. World Bank, Washington D.C.

General Statistics Office of Viet Nam (GSO) 2008: Statistical Yearbook of Viet Nam 2008. GSO, Hanoi.

Institute of Strategy and Policy on Natural Resources and Environment (ISPONRE) 2009: Viet Nam Assessment Report on Climate Change (VAARC). ISPONRE, Hanoi.


Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005: Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Policy Responses: Findings of the Responses Working Group (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Series): Glossary. Island Press, Chicago.

Sen, A. 1999: Commodities and Capabilities. Oxford University Press, New Delhi.

Stiglitz, J., Sen, A. and Fitoussi, J.P. 2010: Mis-measuring our Lives. Why the GDP Doesn’t Add Up. The Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. New Press, New York.

Xuan Hong 2009: Viet Nam Realises Some MDGs Ahead Schedule. Viet Nam News Online. http://vietnamnews.vnagency.com.vn/Home/Index.html. Accessed 03/10/2009.

Yamin, F., Rahman, A. and Huq, S. 2005: Vulnerability, Adaptation and Climate Disasters: A Conceptual Overview. In: Yamin, F. and Huq, S. (Eds.): Vulnerability, Adaptation and Climate Disasters. IDS Bulletin, Vol. 36(4): 1-14.

BSM for Special-use Forests 75

Benefit-sharing Mechanism for Special-use Forests – Lessons learned from Bach Ma National Park Hans-Dieter Bechstedt a 1, Duong Viet Tinh b and Doan Bong a a Viet Nam Conservation Fund 2, Central Region b Hue University of Agriculture and Forestry

Abstract Most observers today agree that the Vietnamese Government’s policies on forest protection, protected area management and forest land allocation have often failed to yield the desired results. In 2004, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development assigned the newly created Viet Nam Conservation Fund (part of the World Bank-supported Forest Sector Development Programme) to establish a new financial mechanism for the support of Special-use Forests. Key elements of this programme are co-management arrangements based on a benefit-sharing mechanism between Special-use Forest authorities and local villagers for the sustainable use of forest resources. These benefit-sharing mechanism agreements are intended to be developed in a highly participatory manner to balance more effective biodiversity conservation with local needs for food security and income. In preparation of such an agreement, that up to now still lacks legal recognition, a survey was carried out in 10 villages of Bach Ma National Park’s buffer zone. Results have shown that those agreements would be welcomed by local people, if agreed restrictions on the use of certain forest products were combined with long-term user rights and a more effective approach from local authorities to stop illegal logging and wildlife hunting by well-connected outside networks.

Keywords: Forest land allocation, co-management, protected areas, ethnic minorities, indigenous rights

1 Introduction Despite some increases in overall forest cover over the last couple of years (mainly due to the booming plantation industry), natural forests in Viet Nam continue to decline in quantity and quality (FCPF R-PIN Template 2008). This includes so-called Special-use Forests (SUFs), i.e. national parks, nature reserves and cultural/historical/environmental sites – the country’s pillar for biodiversity conservation. Stricter conservation law enforcement will be unavoidable in the future, however, it should not be applied at the expense of forest-dependent, mostly poor, rural upland communities. For that purpose the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) has coined the term ‘benefit-sharing mechanism’ (BSM), and is presently preparing a Prime Minister’s Decision which would allow the establishment of pilot examples between Special-use Forest Management Boards (SUF-MBs) and local communities over the sustainable use and protection of forest resources. Regional offices of the World Bank/Global Environment Facility (GEF)-supported Viet Nam Conservation Fund (VCF) were requested to prepare BSM Pilot Studies in six different areas countrywide. The following report presents results from one of those BSM Pilot Studies in Bach Ma National Park, Thua Thien Hue Province.

1 [email protected] 2 This paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the VCF Secretariat


2 Case studies on the impact of forest land allocation policies In order to address the problem of continuing forest degradation during the second half of the last century, the Vietnamese Government began to introduce new policies and programmes in the beginning of the 1990s aimed at devolving3 forests to local communities. In 1991, the Forest Protection and Development Law was approved, and in 1993 a new Land Law was enacted that allowed the allocation of land to individual households. These laws and other regulations substantially expanded the magnitude and duration of tenure rights. They opened, at least in principle, the opportunity to transfer forest land previously managed by State Forest Enterprises (SFE) and other state entities, to local households. From this devolvement of forest management, the Government was expecting to increase forest cover (Xuan Phuc 2003; 2008), while improving local villager’s livelihoods through creating incentives for them to invest labour and capital into forestry.

Many observers today agree that the introduction of forest land allocation policies has produced rather mixed results (Sikor 2002; Xuan Phuc 2003; Tran Ngoc Thanh 2005; Nguyen Quang Tan 2006; Nguyen Quang Tan et al. 2008a, 2008b; Xuan Phuc 2008; McElwee 2008, 2009)4. While there are a few reports emphasising that these policies have resulted in new opportunities for (mainly better-off) rural households to reap some extra benefits, according to most other studies these policies were seen in more negative terms with respect to their two major goals. As Xuan Phuc (2008) concludes in his review of those studies, the implementation of this round of forest land allocation policies did not result in devolution of power and decision making, but just the opposite, they gave “grounds for greater state presence at the local level, at the same time, reinforcing existing unequal power structures”.

In their study on the impact of forest land allocation on agriculture and natural resource management in Bac Kan Province, Castella and Dang (2002) and Castella et al. (2006) summarise the goals of forest land allocation as follows: (1) end to shifting cultivation and regular migration through the introduction of a sedentary livelihood system; (2) development of village economy through tree plantations; and (3) protection of forest resources. In their final review they conclude that the restriction of shifting cultivation has created difficulties for upland groups that have traditionally relied on swidden agricultural practices. Local people found themselves confronted with a production system that did not suit their cultural and physical environment.

In his report on forest land allocation based on field surveys in two districts in Dak Lak Province, Nguyen Quang Tan (2006) criticises the forest land allocation process for its lack of local participation, lack of equality in its distribution of land, and its failure to carry out land use planning ahead of its implementation. Sikor (2002) observed what he called a “fundamental disjuncture” between the concept of land tenure promoted by the Land Law (1993) and people’s lived relations to the land. In his survey of a Black Thai village in Chieng Dong Commune (Song La Province), he found that local people not only ignored and circumvented the new regulations, but also protested openly against some of their legal requirements.

In their more recent paper, Nguyen Quang Tan et al. (2008a) argue on the basis of an empirical study in eight villages in Hoa Binh and Dak Lak provinces that, while forest land allocation has been widely implemented, it has not been able to provide necessary power over forests to local people, as the State still maintains its significant control over the allocated forest areas. Nguyen Quang Tan et al. (2008a) states that the goal of having a positive effect on poverty alleviation has not been reached, rather forest land allocation has actually contributed to poverty increases.

3 The term ‘devolution’ of forest management here denotes the transfer of decision-making power from central to local levels, to be distinguished from ‘decentralisation’ which describes a transfer of administrative control from central to regional or local subdivisions. 4 Forest cover in Viet Nam reached its lowest point of 25-31% of the total land area by 1991-1993, climbing back to up to 32-37% by 1999-2001 (Xuan Phuc 2003; 2008). However, the increase was due to a boom in mono-cropping of industrial tree plantations (Acacia, Eucalyptus, rubber) and much evidence exists that natural forests have further declined (FCPF 2008).


Other shortcomings of the land allocation policies mentioned in the literature cited in this section include some of the following:

1. As forest land was given out individually, only some households benefited which has enhanced social differentiation. In some instances, better-off members of the village, such as village officials and their relatives, got larger and better quality parts of the forest, while poorer members were left out. Forests were not allocated to the village community as a whole, which would be more in line with traditional practices of common property resource management;

2. Land allocation did not stop clearing of land for agricultural purposes;

3. Land allocation kicked-off a plantation boom with environmentally and socially controversial industrial tree cropping which is now very much supported by national and provincial governments;

4. Land allocation was carried out in ignorance of, and partial contradiction to, traditional notions on forest resources and their use among communities/villages; and

5. Land allocation provided no contribution to poverty alleviation, which would have required capital and labour investment, but on the contrary, resulted in many cases in restricted access to land resources and increased food insecurity.

3 Benefit-sharing mechanism or co-management of natural resources, concepts and definitions

Benefit-sharing mechanisms is the preferred term used by MARD and VCF, and is just another term for co-management or participatory management, a partnership arrangement that is based on the sharing of responsibilities, rights and benefits. It is, as Borrini-Feyerabend (2000) states, a pluralist approach to the management of natural resources, recognising and incorporating a variety of partners in a variety of roles, generally to the end goal of environmental conservation, sustainable use of natural resources and the equitable sharing of resource-related benefits and responsibilities. However, as Borrini-Feyerabend (2000) points out, the co-management process needs some basic conditions to flourish, including full access to information on relevant issues and options, freedom and capacity to associate, freedom to express needs and concerns, a non-discriminatory social environment, the will of partners to negotiate, and confidence in the respect of agreements.

Increasing numbers of co-management agreements can now be found all over the world in different fields, such as in fisheries, wetlands, watersheds, wildlife, forests and protected area management. As highlighted in the ‘Regional Conference on Small-scale Fishery Co-management in Viet Nam’5, there are a number of successful co-management arrangements involving coastal fisheries and mangrove resources operating in different parts of the country, actively encouraged and supported by some provincial governments, albeit still lacking a clearly formulated legal framework.

With respect to co-management arrangements under a BSM framework for forest protection and forest use, there are a number of key conditions and elements required for successful implementation. The process should start with an assessment of the feasibility of co-management which establishes the appropriateness and usefulness of co-management based on site-specific key elements and conditions. On a supra-community level, co-management needs to meet the following conditions: (1) enabling policies and legislation; (2) new and more clear national/provincial commitments to environmental governance; (3) evidence on the ground that enforcement of policies and environmental laws and decisions are taken seriously; (4) more involvement of civil society organisations, such as non-government organisations, academic 5 Held in Danang City on 26-27 October, 2009. Organised by the Department of Capture Fisheries and Resources Protection and hosted by MARD.


and/or research institutions that can facilitate the co-management process; and (5) support through national and international alliances and networks. There are, on a community level, some indispensable key elements that need to be part of any co-management arrangements, such as true participation, transparency and accountability, support by national and local policies, effective evaluation, and enforcement of rules.

4 BSM in the context of the Viet Nam Conservation Fund In 2004, the Viet Nam Conservation Fund was established as the conservation component of the World Bank/GEF-supported ‘Forest Sector Development Project’ (FSDP). The VCF included a new financing mechanism to provide small grants to improve the management of Special-use Forests (i.e. national parks and nature reserves), and to mobilise local, national and international assistance to enhance the capacity of SUF-Management Boards and local communities (MARD 2004).

In May 2008 the VCF Secretariat confirmed that the Forestry Protection Department (FPD) had approved the ‘piloting’ of BSMs between SUF-MBs and local communities as a means to mitigate local peoples’ potential loss of access to resources that may result from VFC-sponsored enhanced biodiversity conservation activities. The BSMs were intended to be developed in a highly participatory manner as a framework for resolving possible natural resource conflicts, and as an attempt to balance biodiversity conservation priorities with local needs for food security and income.

It needs to be noted here that under the current forest policies, laws and regulations, forest resource use from SUFs based on collaborative or co-management agreements, is not allowed. However, a consultant has been assigned by the VCF Secretariat to draft and prepare the promulgation of ‘A Decision of the Prime Minister’ which would allow the establishment of pilot examples between SUF-MBs and local communities living inside or close to SUFs, whether forests or wetlands. A number of BSM pilot studies have meanwhile been carried out or are in the process of being implemented by VCF regional offices in different parts of the country, among them a ‘BSM Pilot Study in Bach Ma National Park, Thua Thien Hue Province’.

5 BSM Pilot Study in Bach Ma National Park 5.1 BSM Preparations The BSM Pilot Study in Bach Ma National Park was established to provide a workable framework for a participatory and consultative approach for resolving threats to natural resource use and biodiversity conservation between the SUF-MB and local communities in the Park’s buffer zone. The pilot study has been developed as a means of mitigating the community’s loss of access to forest resources by imposed restrictions, and to encourage and develop communities to have a co-management role in the use, management and protection of the forest. BSM agreements are perceived by relevant stakeholders as:

• An arrangement that would include the agreed delineation of a co-management area where forest resources could be used and protected at the same time;

• Small-scale in size and scope and developed for only a part of the SUF (depending on size and number of communities several BSMs might be required), giving priority to relatively isolated communities living adjacent to the SUF and which are known to be consistent users of forest resources;

• A temporary contract or licence over the extraction of certain specified non-timber forest products (NTFPs) and medical plants, that includes: (a) limits for firewood and wood materials extraction for home construction from a defined area within the SUF (most probably from the Ecological Recovery Zone); (b) agreed seasons and extraction limits which are based only on household livelihood subsistence needs (not for commercial


purposes); (c) an assessment of the contract extension period based on monitoring of the conditions of the contract and on an evaluation of the management of the resources; and (d) an estimate of the necessary support of local communities as contracted partners; and

• A participatory mechanism that requires local communities to form Forest User Groups (FUG), which would be responsible units for the BSM implementation, agreeing and overseeing the agreement, controlling and enforcing sustainable harvesting system regulations.

BSM agreements will not allow any form of hunting or trapping of wild animals, collection of endangered species, timber removal or planting/breeding of exotic species inside the SUF.

5.2 Bach Ma National Park: location, demography, socio-economic and ethnic conditions of its buffer zone

Bach Ma National Park was established in 1991 to protect the centre of the last corridor of forest which stretches from the East Sea6 to the Annamite Mountain Range and runs along the border with Laos People's Democratic Republic. With steep mountains and dense forests, this area is home to a wide variety of animals and plants. At the base of the mountains there is tropical monsoon forest, and above 900 m sub-tropical forest. Being located at the transition zone between Northern and Southern Viet Nam, the flora and fauna of this ecosystem still retains a high degree of biodiversity, including endemic plants and animal species. Bach Ma Mountain peak is the highest point in the park at 1,450 m above sea level and is only 18 km away from the coast. At lower elevations, the natural forest has been extensively cleared and replaced by scrub and grassland.

The fauna of Bach Ma National Park contains a high number of endemic and rare species. To date, scientists have identified 1,493 species, including 132 species of mammals (half of all mammals known in Viet Nam), 358 bird species, 31 reptile species, 21 amphibian species, 57 fish species and 894 insect species (Birdlife International 2002). Nine species of primates are confirmed in Bach Ma, including macaques, langurs, loris and the white-cheeked gibbon. The elusive Saola (Pseudoryx nghetinhensis), only discovered in Viet Nam in 1992, is also said to be present in the protected area. Large predators, such as tigers and leopards, may still remain in remote corners of the park (Birdlife International 2002). However, given its proximity to urban centres (Danang and Hue City) and its easy accessibility, biodiversity conservation is under severe threat. A recent ‘Conservation Needs Assessment’ identified the following major threats to the long-term sustainability of the SUF: (1) illegal hunting, trapping and poaching; (2) illegal logging; (3) overexploitation of NTFPs; (4) the park’s fragmentation, its ‘edge effect’ and isolation from other protected areas; (5) illegal mining; and (6) development of infrastructure (roads, dam building, tourism development) (MBBMNP 2009a).

Bach Ma National Park’s buffer zone stretches over two provinces (Thua Thien Hue and Quang Nam) and includes three districts, 16 communes and 109 villages. A total of around 62,000 people in 13,000 households live in the area. In Phu Loc District (Thua Thien Hue Province), more than 90% of residents are from the majority Kinh people. The same is found in three of Nam Dong District’s (Thua Thien Hue Province) communes, where more than 90% of villagers are Kinh people; however in the three other eastern communes, ethnic minorities make up 80-95% of the population. In the four remote mountainous communes of Dong Giang District (Quang Nam Province), with the exception of Song Kon Commune, the majority of residents are from ethnic minorities (between 69 and 96%) (MBBMNP 2009a). Ethnic minorities are from the Katu (Co Tu) and Van Kieu people (Mon-Khmer group of the Austro-Asiatic language family), and from the Muong (Viet/Muong group) (Khong Dien 2002).

While most Kinh households at the eastern side of the National Park call paddy land their own and have easy access to markets and urban centres thanks to a modern road system, this is 6 The term East Sea has been used in these proceeding instead of the widely used South China Sea


rarely the case for the ethnic minorities, occupying the remote, hilly and mountainous western parts of the park’s buffer zone. Here, most households rely on upland rice cultivation, as well as cassava, maize and a variety of fruits and vegetables, most of it grown in upland fields using swidden (rotational) techniques. In order to complement their daily meals or to supplement their meagre income sources, forest products, in particular NTFPs, are frequently harvested. Increasingly, particularly in Nam Dong District, Kinh and ethnic minority households are involved in socially and environmentally controversial industrial monocropping of Acacia trees for the many paper pulp mills in coastal areas, which is supported by local authorities and private investors (MBBMNP 2009b).

Poverty levels, officially set at VND200,000/month/capita (US$0.35/day/capita), are modest in the five communes of Phu Loc District (between 9% and 24%), as well as in the ethnically mixed six communes of Nam Dong District (between 9% and 22%) (MBBMNP 2009b). Poverty is highest in the remote Song Kon (57%), Tu (42%) and Ta Lu (41%) communes of Dong Giang District, Quang Nam Province (MBBMNP 2009b).

5.3 Survey: objectives and methodologies A survey of 10 villages located in Bach Ma National Park’s buffer zone was carried out during July and August 2009 by a working group under the supervision Hue University of Agriculture and Forestry and members of the Bach Ma National Park Management Board. The major objective of the survey was to prepare the ground for BSM co-management agreements for forest protection and sustainable use to be worked out between the SUF-MB and the 10 villages. In order to achieve this goal, tasks performed by a survey team included:

• Conducting a one week training course for the working group members on the details of the co-management arrangement process under a BSM framework;

• Carrying out a stakeholder analysis;

• Analysing the livelihood constraints faced by the communities of 10 villages as a result of competing interests of different stakeholders, unfavourable policies and power differentials;

• Developing an understanding of local peoples’ perceptions of socioeconomic and environmental changes over the last 20 years, its impact on their livelihoods, on local peoples’ coping strategies and expectations for the future;

• Conducting a natural resource use survey, that includes information on: (1) the identification of NTFPs from the SUF to be used for home consumption and sale; (2) gender divisions of forest resource use; and (3) times and methods applied for forest product harvesting, and an assessment of the long-term sustainability of current forest use;

• Analysing indigenous knowledge systems and existing local common property arrangements;

• Organising discussions and assisting local communities in selecting their representatives;

• Demonstrating ways to settle potential conflicts of interest;

• Considering together with local community members and forest users adaptive and potentially more sustainable local management systems; and

• Discussing, negotiating and drafting potential natural resource use agreements under the BSM, i.e. examples of BSM agreements for future implementation, as well as related Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs).

Survey methods used included: the facilitation of group discussions between SUF-MB, local authorities and community representatives; village meetings; stakeholder analysis; conflict


analysis; SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis on the anticipated opportunities and challenges of BSM agreements; analysis of food security and forest dependency; cropping calendar; village mapping; and household interviews (Duong Viet Tinh 2009).

5.4 Survey results 5.4.1 Overall socioeconomic conditions at the survey sites Of the 10 villages surveyed, five are located in Thuong Nhat Commune (Nam Dong District, Thua Thien Hue Province) and five in A Ting Commune (Dong Giang District, Quang Nam Province). Thuong Nhat Commune partly covers protected forests of the Huong River watershed area, and partly encloses buffer zone areas of Bach Ma National Park. The Commune has 1,930 people residing in 441 households (HHs) over seven villages and two main ethnic groups, with the majority (80%) from the Katu minority people and around 20% Kinh people. The ethnic structure of A Ting Commune is similar. Here, 96% of residents are from the Katu minority and only 4% are Kinh (total population: 2,281 people in 500 households).

As the figures on agricultural and forest land use show (cf. Table 1), with only 0.06 ha/HH and 0.13 ha/HH of lowland cropping land on average in Thuong Nhat and A Ting communes, respectively, almost all households have to rely on upland cropping (usually using swidden techniques) and the collection of NTFPs for their livelihoods. Increasingly, due to government support and land allocation policies, local households are getting involved in Acacia tree monocropping for the paper pulp industry. It was estimated by the survey team that household income was derived from the sale of: agricultural products, including livestock (45% of the total); NTFPs (mainly rattan and bamboo, 35% of the total); and Acacia trees (20% of the total).

Table 1: Land use (forest land classification) in Thuong Nhat Commune (Nam Dong District, Thua Thien Hue Province) and A Ting Commune (Dong Giang District, Quang Nam Province)

Thuong Nhat

Commune A Ting Commune

ha % ha %

Total land area 19,658 N/A

Total agricultural land 812 100 407 100

Lowland crop land, mainly paddy 28 4 63 15

Upland crop land (upland rice, maize, cassava etc.)

254 31 189 46

Plantation, mainly acacia rubber 530 65 155 39

Total forest land 15,424 100 6,229 100

Production Forest 1,676 11 2,259 36

Protection Forest 5,947 39 2,090 34

Special-use Forest 7,801 50 1,880 30

Unused, not classified land 3,422 874

Meetings with community members from A Ting Commune found that major constraints farmers are facing relate to lack of farming tools, lack of information and knowledge on improved agricultural techniques, low prices for agricultural products (for crops, Acacia trees and NTFPs), land erosion and unstable weather patterns, causing droughts as well as floods.


5.4.2 A Tin Village (No. 3 Village), Thuong Nhat Commune, Nam Dong District, Thua Thien Hue Province

A Tin Village was established around 70 to 80 years ago and is a Katu community with 355 inhabitants from 87 households. Its first settlers came from Quang Nam Province at a time when the area, as the elders recall, was still covered by dense forest.

Under the Government’s ‘Fixed Cultivation and Resettlement Programme’ and Programme 135, the village’s infrastructure was improved and 25 households received some support for rebuilding their houses. However, other components of the programme undermined farmers’ traditional subsistence-based agricultural system, and through Programme 327 and follow-up Programme 661, made them dependent on income from the industrial monocropping of trees. Only a few families share the total of 2.5 ha of paddy land available to the village. Cassava is cultivated on 1 ha of land, 4 ha are used for rubber trees and on 30 ha Acacia trees are grown. Home garden crops include vegetables and some fruit trees, while many households look for additional food items by crossing into the nearby forests on a regular basis. Although no data on upland cropping was provided as it is considered to be illegal, there is evidence everywhere that farmers’ subsistence still relies on upland areas for growing rice and other crops using rotational farming methods. While most families are considered to suffer from food shortage for several months per year, only 16 households (18%) have been officially classified as ‘poor’ or ‘hungry’ households.

According to their own account, villagers enter the forest of the National Park on a regular basis all year round, most frequently however, between September and December, when they cross into the forest at least two or three times per month in groups of 2-3 people (mainly men), spending 2-5 days there for rattan, bamboo and timber cutting, honey collection (all mainly for sale) and fishing. Muntiac deer, wild pig, monkey, civet cat and other, smaller animals are trapped by men for home consumption as well as for sale. Women’s forest harvesting is mostly related to cutting palm leaves (for hat making), and collecting bamboo shoots, firewood and snails (for sale). Although against the law, collection of NTFPs is tolerated by the Management Board of the National Park and its forest rangers.

A Tin Village, according to the SUF-MB, is a so-called ‘hot-spot’ place. Up to seven groups with 3-5 members each from this and neighbouring villages, recruited by outside traders and business people, are part of an illegal logging network that operates from the district town. No road checkpoint exists, and thanks to the protection of higher level authorities, this network operates unimpeded (MBBMNP 2009b).

5.4.3 Ra Vah Village, A Ting Commune, Dong Giang District, Quang Nam Province Ra Vah Village is another small Katu settlement with 205 inhabitants and 44 households. After the country’s unification in 1975, the village was moved from a neighbouring district to its present place. With only 4 ha of paddy land shared by 39 families, most households rely on swidden agriculture, growing upland rice, maize, cassava and banana on plots of 1-1.5 ha on average with rotational cycles between five and 10 years. Increasingly, however, due to intervention by local authorities, upland food crop areas, community forests, and community grazing land are replaced by Acacia plantations under so-called ‘reforestation’ schemes. Here, the rate of households classified as ‘poor’ (37) and ‘hungry’ (four) are extremely high (together 93%). The majority of villagers are said to grow rice to cover their household’s needs for not more than six months per year.

According to their own account, villagers from Ra Vah Village visit the forest of Bach Ma National Park two or three times per month, spending 2-5 days there on average. They collect rattan and honey for sale, bamboo and bamboo shoots for sale and home consumption, wild fruits, tubers and vegetables for own consumption, palm trees for roofing and hat-making, herbal medicine for their own use and timber for house construction. During their forest intrusions they regularly meet outsiders, i.e. people from other districts and provinces, who collect cinnamon, trap animals and cut timber. Villagers try to avoid interfering with those groups, as they are said to be


well-connected and villagers are afraid of negative consequences and violent responses. At one stage farmers reported having met a group of 20-30 loggers with heavy machinery cutting trees from within the Bach Ma National over a period of several days without being interrupted by local officials.

With respect to wildlife hunting/trapping from within the National Park, local villagers collect snails (for sale), catch fish and crab (for sale and own consumption), turtles (for sale, some species fetch high prices), birds, wild pig, frogs, rodents and other small animals (all for own consumption). Unlike the past however, when wildlife was abundant, professional hunters are said to have largely disappeared from the area (MBBMNP 2009b).

5.4.4 Traditional forms of local forest management Forests play an important role in the everyday livelihood of the Katu people as well as in their extramundane understanding. Forests are part of their environmental surrounding, protect soils and regulate water resources for their upland and lowland fields. Forests are a major source of food, cash income and provide cures for ordinary diseases. Forests are also an inseparable part of the Katu people’s cultural, spiritual and cosmological world. Forests in the villages surveyed are administered by three overlapping bodies, firstly, the village committee with the village headman at its top, secondly, by local authorities, such as representatives of the Forest Protection Department or State Forest Enterprises, and thirdly through still existing, traditional customary laws which are enforced by household groups under the guidance of a council of village elders. According to those traditional laws, forests can be used by individuals or household groups, i.e. forest products can be harvested and animals trapped, but they still are considered to be the forests of the community. Through negotiations with the council of village elders, villagers or household groups agree on certain areas of the forest for their use. Forests are considered to belong to certain villages, often with agreed buffer zones between them where no villagers from either side are allowed to harvest forest products7. There are also forests which may belong to and are jointly managed by more than one village, based on agreements over duties, responsibilities and punishments for violators (Duong Viet Tinh 2009; Nguyen Xuan Hong 2009).

No villager is allowed to transfer his/her user rights to anyone who is not based in the village. Outsiders, who want to go hunting or collect forest products, have to seek permission from the village headman and approval from the village council of elders. If villagers or outsiders have extended their land into the forest without having asked for permission, the village headman will arrange, negotiate and decide on forms of punishment, which could either be a fine paid in cash or kind (pigs, chicken, wine, sticky rice, etc. or, in more serious cases, a buffalo).

In the extramundane conception of the Katu people, certain forests are inhabited by spirits, such as Kathia forests, where the dead have been buried, and Kalur forests, where some powerful spirits are thought to live. Both kinds of forests should not be infringed in order not to offend those spirits. The survey found, however, that due to interferences by government policies, forest classifications and disturbing activities by SFE and others, these notions have been weakened considerably. Nevertheless, it was also found that traditional and state-induced forms of management, albeit not in conformance with each other, still play a role in everyday management of forest resources (Duong Viet Tinh 2009; Nguyen Xuan Hong 2009).

Based on what farmers consider as plantation forests (in line with government classifications), natural forests (including what is officially classified as Protection Forest and Special-use Forest) and commune forests (partly Protection, partly Production Forest), Katu people in Thuong Nhat have set up their own regulations on forest product exploitation. These refer to agreed specific, selective techniques to be applied, timing as well as zoning in order to avoid overexploitation and 7 Wilkinson (et al. 2008) in their survey in villages of Thuong Nhat Commune found that local residents still predominantly use forest areas which they traditionally consider as belonging to their community.


to allow for restoration and regrowth. So, for example, rattan should be cut mainly between March and September in areas set as harvesting zones by the village leaders. No young trees should be cut, only rattan over 3 m, leaving 40-50 cm of the rattan stem above the ground. Bamboo should be harvested between March and August, cutting only selected mature trees close to the ground and without doing harm to young shoots. Honey should be collected without setting fire to smoke out the bees, in order to allow the insects to return and rebuild the hives the following year (Duong Viet Tinh 2009; Nguyen Xuan Hong 2009).

It needs to be noted here that the survey is not in the position to make a final assessment on the enforcement and effectiveness of the village regulations set up by villagers themselves, as this would have required much longer time in the field. The survey mainly relied on interviews with household leaders, selected women, officials and traditional village leaders. The survey came up, however, with a comprehensive list of more than 60 forest products, including harvesting season and harvesting techniques used and recommended by the village leaders, official village headmen as well as traditional leaders. It was also pointed out by the interviewees that outsiders, mostly Kinh people, regularly penetrate into all three forest types (i.e. Protection, Production and Special-use) for timber cutting, hunting wild animals, gold mining and fishing with electric or explosive devises.

5.4.5 Impact of the Government’s forest allocation policies Official forest land allocation policies are viewed by local villagers from the two surveyed communes in ambiguous terms. On the one hand, they appreciated having received 1-2 ha of forest land for long-term use. On the other hand, they often complained bitterly about restrictions or even total loss of previously used upland cropping areas. Many also expressed their unhappiness about requirements from local authorities to grow Acacia on allocated forest land, however, as they admitted, they lack knowledge and outside assistance for any alternative cropping systems. About one-third of farmers queried indicated they would appreciate it more if forest land would be handed over to the village instead of to individual households. The farmers opposed further restrictions on forest use, however, they would welcome and actively cooperate in the setting up of sustainable harvest ceilings for forest products under the condition that local authorities find effective ways to stop the ongoing depletion of forest resources by powerful and well-connected outsiders, or at least to put outsiders’ forest use under the control and supervision of an empowered and authorised village committee (MBBMNP 2009b).

Data from the villages of A Tin and Ra Vah, as well as from other villages in other parts of Viet Nam’s Central Region clearly indicate that many local upland farmers are subsistence food producers, practising swidden agriculture on upland fields despite continuous government efforts to curb this practice. The Government’s ‘Fixed Cultivation and Resettlement Programme’, in place since 1968, has, in most parts of the country, been ineffective due to a lack of alternative income sources. With the classification of forest land into Production, Protection and Special-use, the country’s swiddeners, mainly ethnic minorities settling in the country’s mountainous areas, have come under renewed pressure. In many cases villagers, such as in Bach Ma National Park’s buffer zone, have lost their swidden area as well as surrounding (community) forest land and grazing areas, now classified as Production or Protected forest. Through the 661 Programme some households may get 1-2 ha of Production Forest back, but not for the purpose of food crop cultivation; the land is returned with the obligation to join government-supported, so-called reforestation schemes of industrial tree monocropping (rubber, Acacia). Red Book certificates are issued and in some cases villagers received long-term loans. Ironically, while intended to contribute to reforestation and poverty alleviation, the Government’s forest land allocation programme in the villages surveyed has actually added to food shortage, poverty and forest degradation as the disappearance of food crop land, communal forests and grazing lands increase the pressure on remaining forest resources (cf. also McElwee 2004; 2008 for other parts of Viet Nam).


5.4.6 Stakeholder and stakeholder conflict in forest resource management In and around Bach Ma National Park there are many actors and many different lines of interest involved in forest use and management. These include local people, the Government’s agencies at the national level (MARD, SUF-MB and its rangers) and provincial level (Provincial People’s Committee, Forest Protection Department, Market and Tax Management Team, State Forest Enterprises, local police and other local service providers), as well as private agents (traders, business people, miners, tourist agencies, hydropower operators, etc.). It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the divergent agendas of all the stakeholders involved, or their convergent, but more often conflicting interests. In general terms, however, major infrastructural decisions which affect forest land management and use, such as on hydropower, road building or tourist projects, are carried out by national and provincial authorities in a non-transparent, top-down fashion without consultation or feedback from lower ranks of government line agencies, not to mention from local people. 5.4.7 Assessment of potential opportunities and challenges for co-management of

forest resources Interestingly, participants in most village meetings clearly indicated their interests in better cooperation with forest officials to protect forest resources against outsiders and their illegal activities. The participants also asked for stricter application of the law, forest land allocation for protection and payment from the Government for patrolling. However, local villagers harbour some mistrust against government officials, including staff members of the Forest Protection Department, who they blame for their ignorance of, or even collaboration with, those involved in the illegal marketing of forest products, in particular, the lucrative timber business.

In Alieng Village, another village of A Ting Commune, community members expressed their outrage over forest exploitation by outsiders: “lowland people are stealing and destroying our resources. Forest resources belong to forest people like us”, one farmer claimed. Like other surveyed villages of Bach Ma National Park’s buffer zone, villagers here expressed a clear interest in agreements that give them certain rights over specified areas, including the right to use the forest at acceptable and agreed limits, while at the same time empowering them to protect the forest against outsiders. They asked for assistance in grouping together families who depend on the collection of forest resources in what could be called ‘Forest User and Protection Units’. There are good reasons to assume that turning the forest from a resource that is ‘free and open to all’ (but actually more free and open for the well-connected and powerful) to a resource that is under the responsibility, control and supervision of village groups, would offer better protection against overexploitation and intrusion by outsiders, as it will re-create and strengthen a feeling of ownership among those who are in charge.

5.4.8 BSM agreement on NTFP exploitation between Bach Ma National Park and local communities

Based on the results of the BSM baseline study, the survey team discussed and negotiated the purpose, scope, and regulations for co-management agreements under BSM, with an elected group of potential future forest users in all 10 villages. Each of the agreements included the following:

• The agreements clarified: objectives; duties and responsibilities of the actors involved; regulations on rewards and punishments; and requirements to be signed by representatives of the SUF-MB, the Commune People’s Committee (CPC) and the village headman;

• A detailed list of species allowed to be harvested, harvesting seasons and techniques;

• Procedures for NTFP harvesting; and


• Application forms, to be signed by representatives of the households, Forest User Groups, CPC and SUF-MB.

6 Conclusions and recommendations 6.1 Conclusions From the survey results of 10 villages in two communes of Bach Ma National Park’s buffer zone the following becomes clear:

Forest land relations are contested between local communities and the State (and increasingly by the private sector) due to different perceptions and agendas. National policies on forest land appear to be driven by concerns about environmental degradation, soil erosion, and drought in the highlands and flooding in the plains. However, in reality they are mainly motivated by a narrow economic ‘modernisation’ and growth paradigm around commercial agriculture, and by getting hold of a repository of ‘untapped’ mountainous resources. While illegal and legal logging and wildlife hunting continues to deplete forest resources with no serious attempts undertaken to stop these activities, planning is underway for more potentially forest damaging developments in and around Special-use Forests or Protected Forests, such as hydropower and road projects, mining exploitations, ambitious tourist developments and large-scale environmentally and socially controversial industrial plantations.

Mountainous people, mostly from ethnic minorities, do not view their forests from an abstract environmental point of view. Forests and forest land for them are an inseparable part of their daily life, in a material and a symbolic sense. In the course of new land laws and policies their livelihoods have become increasingly under pressure. Many have lost their swidden fields, others have faced cropping cycle restrictions, while some people have moved their upland fields to more distant and less controllable places. Most farmers ignore boundary demarcations and disregard the functional classification and carving up of their uplands into Protection, Production, and Special-use forests. At the same time they willingly make use of certain elements of the new regulations, strive for Red Book land certificates where they can get hold of them, and use them as means to access credits.

Despite the situation of increased pressure through top-down policies, local villagers react neither through defending their status quo, nor through full submission under the new rules and regulation. They incorporate elements of the new legislation where they see an advantage, and reject or try to circumvent other elements imposed on them, which they consider as detrimental to their livelihoods. The situation is further complicated through the fact that: (a) new legislation has opened up opportunities for only some strata within the village (mostly those better-off and well-connected with the outside), and that (b) local authorities occasionally interpret national legislation on land relations in different ways (cf. Clément et al. 2007).

6.2 Recommendations The conclusions delineated above have some obviously important consequences for future policies: the more local people are consulted and included in the decision making on forest land use and sustainable harvesting levels, with policies building on traditional, customary forms of land tenure and forest use, the more villagers will be ready to incorporate those elements into their livelihood strategies. Local people are expected to abide by jointly agreed rules and regulations, and protect what has become their forest resource against outside intruders; however, they can only do this if they are more effectively supported and empowered by local authorities. The BSM process, in principle, opens the opportunity for state and community perspectives on forest management and forest use to be brought closer to each other.

Granting limited forest resource use, however, should not be perceived as the ‘magic bullet’ for either poverty alleviation or for effective protection of forest resources. The present agricultural


and forest policy has to move away from its narrow and exclusive ‘modernisation’ agenda of commercial agriculture and forestry, and give better recognition to ethnic minorities’ subsistence economy, which centres around farmers’ swidden fields, instead of labelling and banning it as ‘outdated’ and ‘backward’. Options for agricultural intensification, as presently favoured, together with lowland cash crops, wet rice cultivation, or monoculture tree plantations, are either not available, or not socially and environmentally suitable for poor farmers in remote, mountainous areas. If imposed on those households, they will only increase an already tenuous situation of food insecurity, and result in more environmental instability.

References Bechstedt, H.-D. and Tran Thi Thu Ha 2009: Benefit-sharing Mechanism (BSM) in Forest

Protection and Forest Use – Lessons Learned from a BSM Pilot Study in Song Thanh Nature Reserve – Quang Nam Province. Paper presented to the ‘Regional Conference on Small-scale Fishery Management in Viet Nam’, Danang City, 26-27 October, 2009.

Borrini-Feyerabend, G. 2000: Co-management of Natural Resources: Organising, Negotiating and Learning by Doing. IUCN, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Birdlife International 2002: Directory of Important Bird Areas in Viet Nam. Key Sites for Conservation. Birdlife International, Hanoi, Viet Nam.

Castella, J.-C. and Dang, D.Q. (Ed.) 2002: Doi Moi in the Mountains. Land Use Changes and Farmers’ Livelihood Strategies in Bac Kan Province, Viet Nam. The Agricultural Publishing House, Hanoi, Viet Nam.

Castella, J.-C., Boissau, S., Nguyen Hai Thanh and Novosad, P. 2006: Impact of Forest Land Allocation on Land Use in a Mountainous Province of Viet Nam. Land Use Policy Vol. 23: 147-160.

Clément, F., Amezaga, J.M., Orange, D., Calder, I.R and Large, A.R.G. 2007: A Multi-level Approach to Analyse the Impact of Forestland Allocation on Land Management in Northern Viet Nam. RECOFTC, Bangkok.

Duong Viet Tinh 2009: Report on Assessment of Non-timber Forest Products and the Setting up of Benefit-sharing Mechanism between Bach Ma National Park and Communities. Report for the Viet Nam Conservation Fund, Hue City, Viet Nam.

FCPF R-PIN Template 2008: The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN) Template. http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org. Accessed 08/03/2008.

Khong Dien 2002: Population and Ethno-demography in Viet Nam. Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, Thailand.

Management Board of Bach Ma National Park (MBBMNP) 2009a: Conservation Needs Assessment. Management Board of Bach Ma National Park, Hanoi, Viet Nam.

Management Board of Bach Ma National Park (MBBMNP) 2009b. Social Screening Report. Management Board of Bach Ma National Park, Hanoi, Viet Nam.

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) 2004: Operational Manual. - Viet Nam Conservation Fund. Forest Sector Development Project, Hanoi, Viet Nam.

McElwee, P. 2004: Becoming Socialist or Becoming Kinh? Government Policies for Ethnic Minorities in the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. In: Duncan, C. (Ed.) 2004. Civilizing the Margins. Southeast Asian Government Policies for the Development of Minorities. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.

McElwee, P. 2008: Ethnic Minorities in Vietnam: Are Globalisation, Regionalism, and Nationalism Hurting or Helping Them? In: Leeprecha, P. McCaskill, D. and Buadaeng, K. 2008.


Challenging the Limits. Indigenous Peoples of the Mekong Region. Mekong Press, Chiang Mai, Thailand.

McElwee, P. 2009: Reforesting “Bare Hills” in Vietnam: Social and Environmental Consequences of the 5 Million Hectare Reforestation Program. AMBIO Vol. 38(6):325-333.

Nguyen Quang Tan 2006: Trends in Forest Ownership, Forest Resource Tenure, and Institutional Arrangements: Are They Contributing to Better Forest Management and Poverty Alleviation? FAO, Rome.

Nguyen Quang Tan, Nguyen Ba Ngai and Tran Ngoc Thanh 2008a: Whose Forest Tenure Reform Is It? Lessons from Case Studies in Viet Nam. RECOFTC Policy Brief, No.1, April 2008, Bangkok, Thailand.

Nguyen Quang Tan, Nguyen Van Chinh and Vu Thu Hanh. 2008b: Statutory and Customary Forest Rights and their Governance Implications: The Case of Viet Nam. IUCN. Hanoi, Viet Nam.

Nguyen Xuan Hong 2009: Survey on Indigenous Knowledge Systems of Co Tu People in Thuong Nhat and A Ting Commune and Sustainable Use of Forest Resources in Bach Ma National. Report for the Viet Nam Conservation Fund.

Sikor, T. 2002: Conflicts and Concepts: The Politics of Forest Devolution in Post-socialist Viet Nam. Paper submitted to the 9th Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Victoria Falls, 17-21 June 2002.

Tran Ngoc Thanh 2005: Does Devolution Really Influence Local Forest Institutions? Two Case Studies in the Central Highlands of Viet Nam. In: Guasay, P. and Chayan Vaddhanaphuti: Commonplace and Comparisons. Remaking Eco-political Spaces in Southeast Asia. Regional Centre for Social Science and Sustainable Development (RCSD), Faculty of Social Science, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand.

Wilkinson, N., Arhem, N. and Nguyen Khac Son 2008: Findings on Current and Former Patterns of Forest Use by Katu People in Thuong Nhat Commune, Nam Dong District, Thua Thien Hue Province, Extension Area of Bach Ma National Park. Research paper.

Xuan Phuc 2003: Discrepancy between Customary Law and State Law in Forest Management: A Study of a Dao Upland Community in Northern Viet Nam. In:. Xu Jianchu and Mikesell, S. (Eds.): Landscapes of Diversity: Indigenous Knowledge, Sustainable Livelihoods and Resource Governance in Montane Mainland Southeast Asia. Proceedings of the III. Symposium on MMSEA 25–28 August 2002. Lijiang, China. Yunnan Science and Technology Press, Kunming, China.

Xuan Phuc 2008: Whole Land, Whose Forest? Contesting Highland Forest Resources in Viet Nam. In: Leeprecha, P. McCaskill, D. and Buadaeng, K. (Eds.): Challenging the Limits. Indigenous Peoples of the Mekong Region. Mekong Press, Chiang Mai, Thailand.

Mangrove Conservation through Co-management 89

Effective Mangrove Conservation through Co-management in the Mekong Delta, Viet Nam Klaus Schmitt1 GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) project ‘Management of Natural Resources in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province

Abstract This paper describes first experiences with the participatory involvement of coastal communities in the co-management and protection of mangrove forests along a highly dynamic coastline in Soc Trang Province in the Mekong Delta of Viet Nam. It emphasises the need for mangrove conservation through an integrated approach to coastal area management.

Based on lessons learnt from past experience, and national and international best practice examples, new approaches to mangrove rehabilitation/planting and to effective mangrove management and protection have been piloted.

An examination of recent experiences indicates that co-management is an effective way of maintaining and enhancing the protection function of the mangrove forest belt, while at the same time, providing livelihoods for local communities.

For co-management to be successful, it is essential that there is full political support from all levels and agreement from all stakeholders. The set-up of a pluralistic governance body for joint decision-making and the involvement of the private sector through payment for ecosystem services will contribute to sustainability of mangrove conservation.

Keywords: Integrated coastal area management, community participation, mangrove protection, climate change, payment for ecosystem services

1 Introduction The Mekong Delta, although relatively small in size compared with the entire country, plays an important role as ‘rice bowl’ for the whole of Viet Nam. Rapid expansion of shrimp farming in the Mekong Delta has contributed to economic growth and poverty reduction but has been accompanied by rising concerns over environmental and social impacts. The lack of an integrated approach to sustainable management, utilisation and protection of the coastal zone and economic interests in shrimp farming have led to the unsustainable use of natural resources in the coastal zone, threatening the protection function of the mangrove forest belt and reducing income for local communities.

The coastal zone is not only at risk from the negative ecological consequences of shrimp farming and the destruction of the protection function of the mangrove forests, it will also be affected by the impacts of climate change. Climate change will cause increased intensity and frequency of storms, floods and droughts, increased saline intrusion, higher rainfall during the rainy season and rising sea levels.

The GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) project ‘Management of Natural Resources in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province, Viet Nam’ (hereafter referred to as

1 [email protected]

Thailand

Cambodia

Laos

China

Soc TrangProvince

N N0 200km 0 40km

MekongDelta


the project) aims to protect and sustainably use the coastal wetlands for the benefit of the local population through mangrove rehabilitation and management with emphasis on resilience to climate change.

Soc Trang Province (Figure 1) is one of 13 provinces in the Mekong Delta region and is located south of the Hau River which is the southern-most arm of the Mekong. The Province covers a total area of 331,176 ha, of which 205,748 ha are used for agriculture, 11,356 ha for forestry and 54,373 ha for aquaculture. The population of the province is 1,285,096 out of which 371,266 are Khmer and over 75,421 are ethnic Chinese (2008 figures from Soc Trang Statistics Office Yearbook 2010). The coastal zone has a length of 72 kilometres.

Figure 1: Soc Trang Province 2 The importance of mangroves Mangroves provide a wide range of ecosystem services. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) groups these services under four categories:

• Regulating services: protection of beaches and coastlines from storm surges, waves and floods; reduction of beach and soil erosion; stabilisation of land by trapping sediments; water quality maintenance; sequestration of carbon dioxide; and climate regulation.

• Provisioning services: subsistence and commercial fisheries (food, habitat and nursery ground for aquatic life); aquaculture; honey; fuel-wood; building materials (timber); and traditional medicines.

• Cultural services: tourism and recreation; and spiritual appreciation.

• Supporting services: cycling of nutrients; and habitats for species.

The effect of mangrove coastline protection in Viet Nam has been demonstrated by Mazda et al. (1997) who showed that a 1.5 km wide belt of six year old mangroves reduced the height (and energy density) of incoming waves from 1.0 m to 5 cm (at the coastline/dyke). In areas without

Spartly Islands(VN)

Paracel Islands(VN)


mangroves the waves were reduced to 75 cm in height, due to bottom friction. Wave height is reduced by mangroves due to the much higher drag force of the dense network of trunks, branches and above ground roots as compared to plain soil.

This protection function also has clear financial benefits. US$1.1 million invested in mangrove rehabilitation in northern Viet Nam saved US$7.3 million annually for dyke maintenance (Brown et al. 2006).

The ecosystem services provided by mangroves have implications on food security and income. Up to 80% of fish catches are directly or indirectly dependant on mangroves (Hamilton and Snedaker 1984) which provide food, shelter and nursery grounds. One hectare of healthy mangrove forest produces about 1.08 tonnes of fish per year (Schatz 1991).

The importance of mangroves for fisheries has further been highlighted in a study by Aburto-Oropeza et al. (2008) which states “... in the Gulf of California, fisheries landings are positively related to the local abundance of mangroves and, in particular, to the productive area in the mangrove-water fringe that is used as nursery and/or feeding grounds by many commercial species. Mangrove-related fish and crab species account for 32% of the small-scale fisheries landings in the region. The annual economic median value of these fisheries is US$37,500 per hectare of mangrove fringe”.

3 Integrated coastal area management The coastline of Soc Trang Province is characterised by a dynamic process of accretion and erosion which is created by the flow regime of the Mekong River and its sediment freight, the tidal regime of the East Sea and coastal long-shore currents driven by prevailing monsoon winds. In some areas loss of land, due to erosion, of up to 40 m per year has been recorded, while in other areas land created through accretion can reach up to 45 m per year (Pham Trong Thinh et al. 2009).

Along such a dynamic coastline the mangrove forests south of the Hau River form only a narrow belt which is often not sufficient to protect the coast and sea dyke from erosion. In such a setting mangrove management cannot be done effectively through a sectoral approach. Here mangrove management must be part of an integrated coastal area management (ICAM) approach which requires institutionalised co-ordination and cooperation of local authorities from all levels, and participation of all affected stakeholders. ICAM must also include integrating adaptation measures to climate change.

To achieve this, the project is applying the ecosystem approach, a strategy for the integrated management of land, water and living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equitable way. The ecosystem approach is the primary framework for action under the Convention on Biological Diversity (Shepherd 2004).

ICAM also requires risk management over space and time by looking at the coastal zone as a whole – and not for example only at isolated erosion sites – by considering different options depending on site specific conditions and by putting in place risk spreading strategies to address uncertainties, such as dealing with predicted negative impacts of climate change. The project is therefore piloting new approaches to both mangrove rehabilitation/planting and to effective mangrove management and protection. These key activities are supported by capacity building and environmental awareness raising for staff of local authorities and people living in the coastal zone.

4 New approaches to effective mangrove management and protection 4.1 Mangrove rehabilitation/planting Mangrove planting has been carried out along the coastal zone of Soc Trang Province since the 1980s but planting success has varied significantly. The project, therefore, initiated a detailed


survey by the Southern Sub-Institute of Forest Inventory and Planning from Ho Chi Minh City to analyse the reasons for success and failure of mangrove plantings carried out in the past (Pham Trong Thinh 2011). Based on the lessons learnt from past experience and national and international best practice examples, a mangrove management tool box has been produced consisting of three manuals: Mangrove Nursery (Hoang Van Thoi and Pham Trong Thinh 2011); Mangrove Planting and Management (Pham Trong Thinh et al. 2009); and Monitoring (Pham Trong Thinh et al. 2010).

Appropriate selection of species for the different sites along the coast of Soc Trang Province and the best planting times are described in detail in the tool box. In addition to traditional planting techniques, the tool box covers testing of new approaches for mangrove planting which mimic nature, or in other words, imitate the successful regeneration of nature. It also includes techniques which can be used to transform existing even-aged mangrove plantations into more diverse forests. These techniques aim to create diverse coastal forests in terms of species composition as well as horizontal and vertical structure, thus increasing their resilience to the negative effects of climate change.

4.2 Mangrove management In order to protect and effectively manage mangrove forests the project again started with an analysis of success and failure of mangrove management approaches in the past. In 1992 and 1993, the Government launched decisions 327/CT and 264/CT about incentives for forest rehabilitation on fallow land and new accretion land. In 1998, the 661 Programme was launched. Under these policies, forestland along the coast can be allocated to farmers and protection contracts can be made with payments of 50,000 to 100,000 Viet Nam Dong (VND) per hectare per year. In Soc Trang Province, forest protection contracts were made between 2000 and 2007 with individual households and one local social association, with an annual payment of VND50,0002 per hectare.

Assessments by Joffre and Luu (2007) and Pham Trong Thinh (2011) concluded that individual household based forest protection contracts do not work in the narrow mangrove belt of Soc Trang Province and are financially unsustainable. The project therefore introduced co-management as a new form of mangrove management because co-management has been used successfully for management of natural resources worldwide (Borrini-Feyerabend 2004a). 4.2.1 Co-management Co-management is based on participatory negotiation, joint decision-making, a degree of power-sharing and fair distribution of benefits among all stakeholders. The different forms of control and power-sharing in co-management compared with state and community management are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Schematic representation of the co-management concept

Modified from Borrini-Feyerabend 2004b

2 The average exchange rate in 2007 was VND16,420 for 1 US dollar.

State management Co-management Community management

Control by Government

Agency

Shared control (government agency and stakeholders) Community control

Negotiating specific agreements

Sharing authority and responsibility in a formal way


ICAM

Participation

Zonation

Consultation Organisation

Negotiation Agreement

Implementation

Monitoring & evaluation

Co-management in the context of natural resource management in mangrove forests of Viet Nam is a partnership agreement in which a resource user group gets the right to sustainably use natural resources on a defined area of state owned land (Protection Forest) along with the responsibility to sustainably manage and protect these resources. All stakeholders share the responsibility and authority for the management of a given area or set of natural resources. Resource users and local authorities jointly negotiate a formal agreement on their respective roles, responsibilities and rights in management.

The co-management process should begin with a number of surveys, followed by a four step process3, during which four principles must be applied (Figure 2). In Soc Trang, surveys were used for stakeholder analysis and to investigate existing natural resource use and the prevailing socio-economic situation (Joffre and Luu 2007). The participatory process, the principles and the benefits of mangrove co-management are described below. For further details see Lloyd (2010).

Figure 2: Overview of the four steps (white boxes) of the co-management process and the four key principles (bold writing)

4.2.2 The co-management process Consultation and organisation The initial phase of co-management in Soc Trang began in mid-2007 with capacity building of local authorities at the provincial, district and commune levels. Understanding and acceptance of co-management concepts and process were developed through workshops, a study tour, meetings and coaching (Primmer 2007; PMU CZM 2008).

A prerequisite for the start of the co-management process is its acceptance by local authorities at all levels. Once local authorities agreed a pilot site was selected. The village of Au Tho B in Vinh Chau District was selected because it has a lot of poor, landless people from ethnic minority groups, who rely on the collection of natural resources from the mangrove forests for their livelihood.

An information poster on the co-management process was developed and awareness raising meetings with the local community were held. Data of land use and natural resource use were collected as part of a participatory land-use mapping exercise (Dang Thanh Liem 2008) and data collection has continued throughout the process of co-management.

In late 2008, a start-up group was established, comprising project staff and local authority representatives. This group held a number of consultation meetings with local authorities to improve their understanding of the process and assisted the Au Tho B resource users to organise themselves into a formally recognised resource user group. 3 These steps (consultation and organisation; negotiation and agreement; implementation; monitoring) are a different way of describing the three main phases in a co-management according to Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2000): organising for the partnership; negotiating co-management plans and agreements; implementing and revising the plans and agreements “learning-by-doing”.


Between the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, 11 meetings were held to introduce co-management concepts, identify resource users and organise user group membership and leadership, wealth rank participants into categories ‘very poor’, ‘poor’, ‘medium’ and ‘rich’, and to identify resource use problems.

Through the consultation meetings 240 households were identified as using resources from the mangrove forests for their livelihood. Of these, 90% were very poor or poor households, which emphasises their reliance on natural resource collection for their livelihood. In order to manage such a big group, six resource user sub-groups were established. By the middle of 2010 the number of households in the co-management group had increased to 289.

In January 2009 the resource user group was formally established under Decree 151, after which the negotiation and agreement step of co-management could begin with the local authorities.

Negotiation and agreement In early 2009, the second step of the co-management process started, in which the resource user group and local authorities negotiated acceptable ways to jointly and sustainably manage the natural resources within the mangrove forest area of Au Tho B Village.

Twelve negotiation meetings were held over a six month period to negotiate an agreement regulating resource use including zone establishment and monitoring requirements. On 4 September 2009 a resource use agreement was signed between the resource user group and the local Commune People’s Committee.

The ‘Regulations on the Rights in Forest Protection and Natural Resource Use by the Co-management Group in the Coastal Area of Au Tho B Village, Vinh Hai Commune’ have the objective: “To enable co-management practice to protect the forest and rationally and sustainably use natural resources within the Au Tho B coastal area”. The aim is to achieve the vision: “The forest and fishery resources are well managed, protected, developed and reasonably used in accordance with the Law; there are no poor households, people have stable incomes and children attend higher school levels; and there is a clean and beautiful environment and less impact from natural disasters”.

The agreement contains seven chapters: Objectives; Where and to Who this Regulation Applies; General Provisions; Natural Resource Management; Rewards and Penalties; Report Schedule; and Implementing Provisions. Article 10 of the agreement covers regulations on what can and cannot be done in each zone. It specifies the ‘six W’: who can do what, where, when, how and how much (for details see Lloyd 2010).

In parallel with the negotiation process, the project carried out capacity building activities through the provision of training for leaders from the resource users and staff of local authorities (Phan Trieu Giang et al. 2009; Trinh Hiep and Hoang Dinh Quoc Vu 2009).

Implementation Awareness raising about environmental issues, understanding of the agreement and effective communication between stakeholders, are important prerequisites for the successful implementation of co-management. The project therefore started the early stages of the implementation with the dissemination of the regulations, setting up of information panels and demarcation of the forest boundary and the boundaries of the zones within the mangrove forest.

A pluralistic governance body for joint decision-making, the co-management board, was set up comprising the resource user group, local authorities and the technical department responsible for mangrove management.


The project supported the introduction of efficient wood burning stoves to reduce the amount of dry wood collected from the forest with the aim to improve its protection function. Staff from the Centre for Population, Environment and Development (CPED) trained resource users how to build the stoves (CPED 2009). After that the project provided the materials while the households paid for the labour. First results indicate not only a significant saving in fire wood (40-50%) but also significantly less time is need for cooking when using the efficient wood burning stoves. This results in more time for women and thus the opportunity for more social interactions.

The environmental awareness raising is also supported by the development of an environmental sanitation model which is being carried out in Vinh Hai Commune (Vinh Chau District) by the Environmental Protection Sub-Department of the Department of Natural Resources and Environment.

Monitoring and evaluation Participatory resource use monitoring by the resource users themselves has been tested and is now carried out in a systematic way. This monitoring programme uses two indices4 to monitor sustainability of the resource harvest, namely (1) the amount of resources harvested, and (2) the effort required for the harvest of a defined quantity. If the amount harvested per month remains more or less constant over time (or closely follows a seasonal harvest pattern) one might conclude that there is enough natural regeneration to sustainably support the current harvest volume. If at the same time the effort (i.e. the time needed) to harvest a given amount increases significantly this may indicate that natural regeneration does not support the current harvest volume and that the resource off-take is therefore unsustainable.

The information obtained from monitoring enables the co-management board to make informed and joint decisions and carry out adaptive management and protection of the mangrove forest. This is also supported by the monitoring of compliance with the co-management agreement by the resource users.

4.2.3 Key principles of the co-management process The co-management process needs to incorporate four key principles in its application to maximise its potential for success: ICAM, participation, zonation and monitoring.

Integrated coastal area management ICAM, in contrast to a traditional sectoral approach to management, is a holistic, cross-sectoral, multi-disciplinary approach in which land and sea areas of the coastal zones are managed as an integrated unit.

The ICAM policy is set out in chapter 17 of the proceedings of the 1992 Earth Summit (UNCED 1992). ICAM approaches are also recognised as the most effective tools for implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity with respect to the conservation and sustainable use of marine and coastal biodiversity (AIDEnvironment, National Institute for Coastal and Marine Management/ Rijksinstituut voor Kust en Zee (RIKZ), Coastal Zone Management Centre, the Netherlands 2004).

Therefore, co-management needs to consider what other land/resource uses or controls are present in the vicinity and their interactions with the co-management. Co-management must also be part of an integrated coastal area management strategy which looks at the coastal zone as a whole and which considers different management options depending on site specific and socio-economic conditions. 4 Indices provide measures of relative density. They can be used in comparisons for monitoring without the need for expensive baseline data. Indices can be calculated using non geo-referenced data.


One example for considering land/resource uses in the vicinity of a co-management site is commercial farming of clams on sandbanks adjacent to a co-managed mangrove forest. Here it is essential to look at how people access the sandbanks through the forest and that stakeholders in charge of clam farming are involved in the co-management process and access planning. Furthermore, benefit sharing as part of an ICAM approach should be implemented in such a setting (see section 4.2.4).

Participation The co-management process must be undertaken in a participatory manner with all stakeholders involved.

Zonation Co-management, in contrast to household-based contracts, involves fairly large areas of land which can be divided into zones (areas) in which different management regimes are applied. Zoning allows areas to be set aside for particular activities such as protection of key habitats, nursery areas/breeding sites and resource use. It also helps to reduce or eliminate conflict between different users and to facilitate compliance. That zonation increases the effectiveness of management and protection has been demonstrated by Erdman et al. (2004) who also concluded that abandoning an established zonation system will lead to the well known “tragedy of the commons”5.

Certain areas can be set aside for protection to allow natural regeneration to take place. In a mangrove protection zone, the regeneration of aquatic species will contribute to an increase of species for sustainable harvest in the other zones of the co-management area. Furthermore, protection of mangroves in specific zones will contribute to better protection of the coast from the impacts of storms, flooding and erosion.

The zones must be jointly identified during the negotiation step of the co-management process. The stakeholders must ensure they delineate areas where certain resources are in need of some level of protection, rehabilitation or can be sustainably used. Specific rules are attached to each of the zones in terms of who can do what, where, when, how and how much, to ensure the main aim of the zone is achieved and to enable the effective protection, rehabilitation and sustainable use of resources.

Zonation is not a static concept. In the pilot site of Au Tho B monitoring the sustainability of resource-use by the resource users and monitoring the condition of the mangrove forests by the Forest Protection Sub-department will provide important information about possible changes in zonation over time. Such changes need to be part of an adaptive management by the joint decision-making body, the co-management board.

Figure 3 shows an example of a zonation concept. It includes four zones, the paths for access to the mud flats and sandbanks, the location of the dyke and the six sub-group areas.

Monitoring Monitoring is one of the key principles of the co-management process and at the same time part of the four steps described above.

To ensure sustainability of any monitoring programme it is essential that all monitoring data are stored in easily accessible databases and that clear protocols for data collection and easy to use

5 The “tragedy of the commons” is a dilemma arising from a situation in which multiple individuals, acting independently and in self-interest, will ultimately deplete a shared limited resource even when it is clear that it is not in the long-term interest of anybody for this to happen (Hardin 1968).

N

Sub group areas

Dyke

Access path

500 m

Rehabilitation Zone - inside forestRehabilitation Zone - ourside forest

Protection Zone

Sustainable Use ZoneMud flats/Sea


tools for data analysis are available. In addition, the results of the monitoring must be reported regularly to all stakeholders.

Figure 3: Zonation of the mangrove forest of Au Tho B Village 4.2.4 Benefits of mangrove co-management Benefits of mangrove co-management, which transfers (resource-use) rights and responsibilities to local people, include: effective protection of mangrove forests through zonation and ownership; livelihood improvement through secure and sustainable resource use; resource users are involved in joint monitoring-based management decision-making; reduced workload for authorities; and benefit sharing as part of an ICAM approach.

Effective protection of mangroves will ensure that benefits of key mangrove ecosystem services will be maintained, such as protection of the coast from waves, erosion, storms and flooding (particularly important in the context of climate change) and food, shelter and nursery ground for aquatic species.

Effective protection of mangrove forests Through the jointly agreed co-management regulations the resource users are given clear and secure user rights to sustainably use resources with the responsibility to manage the resources sustainably and protect the mangrove forests. This increases the sense of resource ownership by the resource users and results in improved and more effective protection of the resources (Erdman et al. 2004).

Under co-management, resource users manage an area large enough to allow implementation of an effective management strategy which uses zonation to apply different resource management regimes in different areas enabling effective protection, conservation and sustainable use at the same time. The implementation of a systematic monitoring programme further contributes to the effective management and protection of the mangroves providing the results from the monitoring are used for adaptive management decision-making.


Au Tho B offers an example how co-management can be used in mangrove plantation protection. In areas where mangrove rehabilitation has not been successful due to people inadvertently destroying mangrove seedlings when gathering aquatic resources, particularly using trawling nets, rules needed to be developed to ensure that the seedlings were protected and allowed to grow undisturbed for a period of time. This included limiting who could enter the zone, when it could be entered and what types of fishing gear could be used.

Table 2 below illustrates what is allowed and what is prohibited in the rehabilitation zone outside the forest at Au Tho B to ensure that mangrove rehabilitation is not destroyed by resource users.

Table 2: Permitted and prohibited activities in the rehabilitation zone outside the forest at Au Tho B Village

Permitted Prohibited

Only members of co-management group can enter to catch fish

Non-members of co-management group to enter

To catch juvenile crabs, elongated gobies and cockles when the tide is low and mud is visible

Entering the forest when mud is not clearly visible

Catching by hand or round nets (with diameter less than 50 cm)

Round nets bigger than 50 cm in width

Using long hooks to catch crabs Use of long nets

Using bamboo trapping basket (chúm) for Periophthalmus schlosseri (cá thòi lòi) collection

The use of chemicals and electric fishing devices

Damaging small trees

Once the seedling trees have matured enough not to be threatened by fishing activities the area can then be rezoned to perhaps a sustainable use zone in which the resource use rules are less restrictive. Monitoring of seedling establishment and forest growth will show when the objective of rehabilitating the forest area has been achieved.

Livelihood improvement through secure sustainable resource use The effective protection of mangrove forests and the exclusion of resource use in a protection zone leads to an increase in aquatic resources (Laegdsgaard and Johnson 1995, Mumby et al. 2004, Mumby 2006). This secures the long-term availability of natural resources if combined with the sustainable use of resources in accordance with the negotiated agreement.

In addition to the increase in resources for harvest, which is a clear and tangible benefit of co-management, restriction of legal access to only members of the resource user group further contributes to reducing overexploitation, particularly if coupled with the resource users’ increased sense of ownership and monitoring.

Resource users involved in resource management decision-making Co-management enables resource users to be directly involved in joint decision-making through negotiation and agreement with the local authorities and other stakeholders, and through the pluralistic governance body for joint decision-making, i.e. the co-management board.


Reduced workload for authorities When implementing co-management, individuals will become increasingly concerned not only with their own plot of land but also the resources around them through a wider sense of ownership and responsibility. Therefore, forest protection and policing of resource use will be undertaken by resource users reducing the workload of the authorities and costs for patrolling and forest protection.

There is also less need for conflict resolution as clear resource use rules, which include comprehensive resource use monitoring, have been jointly agreed (CRMP 2001, Fuwa 2003).

Benefit sharing The aim of mangrove co-management is to ensure sustainable use of resources for the benefit of the local population while at the same time maintaining the protection function of the mangroves. The latter is extremely important in Vinh Chau District of Soc Trang Province, where there is only a narrow belt of mangroves along a highly dynamic coastline. Here, resource users who manage the mangrove forests do this primarily with the aim of protection, while sustainable resource use is mainly for subsistence. Resource users therefore have limited options for getting direct financial benefits from the co-management of mangroves. At the same time they and others benefit from the ecosystem services provided by effectively managed and protected mangrove forests. This includes storm, flood and erosion protection for all people living in the coastal zone as well as food, shelter and nursery ground for aquatic species.

The project will therefore pilot a benefit sharing scheme for the sustainable financing of the mangrove forest protection through co-management using benefits from clam cooperatives on sandbanks in front of mangrove forests.

Non-monetary benefits (i.e. ecosystem services) flow from a well managed and protected mangrove forest to those who utilise the sandbanks commercially for clam farming. In exchange, financial benefits should flow from the commercial farming of clams to those who manage the mangroves, and who by protecting the mangroves, restrict their options for getting direct financial benefits from the forest. This is a form of payment for ecosystem services.

Therefore, a percentage of the benefits from the clam cooperative should be used to pay for the operational costs of mangrove co-management. Such a payment scheme will contribute to sustainability by involving the private sector and does not put a burden on the budget of the District for the payment of forest protection contracts.

In addition, through joining the clam cooperative, members of the mangrove co-management group will receive direct financial benefits, which are related to the condition of mangrove forest and their efforts to protect it.

5 Conclusion The experience from Au Tho B has shown that co-management is an effective way of maintaining and enhancing the protection function of the mangrove forest belt while at the same time providing livelihoods for local communities. In addition, involving local communities in mangrove rehabilitation using new approaches, which increase the resilience of mangrove forests to the negative impacts of climate change, further enhances the protection function and other ecosystem services provided by mangrove forests.

For co-management to be successful, it is essential that there is full political support from all levels (province through districts to commune and village) and that there is agreement from all stakeholders.

The co-management process itself must follow the four steps described in this paper – consultation and organisation, negotiation and agreement, implementation, and monitoring – and


must apply the four principles of integrated coastal area management, participation, zonation and monitoring.

The set-up of a pluralistic governance body for joint decision-making and the involvement of the private sector through payment for ecosystem services will contribute to sustainability.

References Aburto-Oropeza, O., Ezcurra, E., Danemann, G., Valdez, V., Murray, J. and Sala, E. 2008:

Mangroves in the Gulf of California Increase Fishery Yields. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the U.S.A. Vol. 105: 10,456-10,459.

AIDEnvironment, National Institute for Coastal and Marine Management/Rijksinstituut voor Kust en Zee (RIKZ), Coastal Zone Management Centre, the Netherlands 2004: Integrated Marine and Coastal Area Management (IMCAM) approaches for implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity. Montreal, Canada: Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity. (CBD Technical Series no. 14). http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-ts-14.pdf. Accessed on 15/03/2010.

Borrini-Feyerabend, G., Farvar, M.T., Nguinguiri, J.C. and Ndangang, V.A. 2000: Co-management of Natural Resources: Organising, Negotiating and Learning-by-Doing. GTZ and IUCN, Kasparek Verlag, Heidelberg, Germany.

Borrini-Feyerabend, G., Kothari, A. and Oviedo, G. 2004a: Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected Areas: Towards Equity and Enhanced Conservation. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, U.K.

Borrini-Feyerabend, G., Pimbert, M., Farvar, M.T., Kothari, A. and Renard, Y. 2004b: Sharing Power. Learning by Doing in Co-management of Natural Resources Throughout the World. IIED and IUCN/CEESP/CMWG, Cenesta, Tehran.

Brown, O., Crawford, A. and Hammill, A. 2006: Natural Disasters and Resource Rights: Building Resilience, Rebuilding Lives. International Institute for Sustainable Development, Manitoba, Canada.

Centre for Population Environment and Development (CPED) 2009. Training Document for Building Improved Cookstoves. Centre for Population Environment and Development. Enabling Access to Sustainable Energy Program, Hanoi, Vietnam.

Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the Department of Agriculture, and Department of the Interior and Local Government (CRMP) 2001: Philippine Coastal Management Guidebook No. 8: Coastal Law Enforcement. Coastal Resource Management Project of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Cebu City, Philippines. http://oneocean.org/download/db_files/crmguidebook8.pdf. Accessed on 15/03/2010.

Dang Thanh Liem 2008: Process and Results of Participatory Land Use Mapping in Au Tho B. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, Management of Natural Resources in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province.

Erdman, M.V., Merrill, P.R., Mongdong, M., Arsyad, I., Harahap, Z., Pangalila, R., Elverawati, R. and Baworo, P. 2004: Building Effective Co-management Systems for Decentralized Protected Areas Management in Indonesia: Bunaken National Park Case Study. Natural Resources Management Program. Jakarta. http://www.irgltd.com/Resources/Publications/ANE/2004-05%20Bunaken%20National%20Park.pdf. Accessed on 15/03/2010.

Fuwa, Y. 2003: Natural resource management from a conflict prevention perspective. JBICI Review No. 8: 35-58.


Hamilton, L.S. and Snedaker, S.C. (Eds.) 1984: Handbook for Mangrove Area Management. Environment and Policy Institute, East-West Center; IUCN, UNESCO, UNDP. Honolulu, Hawaii.

Hardin, G. 1968: The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, Vol. 162: 1243-1248.

Hoang Van Thoi and Pham Trong Thinh 2010: Mangrove Nursery Manual. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, Management of Natural Resources in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province.

Joffre, O. and Luu, H.T. 2007: A Baseline Survey in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province: Livelihood Assessment and Stakeholders Analysis. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, Management of Natural Resources in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province.

Laegdsgaard, P. and Johnson, C.R. 1995: Mangrove habitats as nurseries: unique assemblages of juvenile fish in subtropical mangroves in eastern Australia. Marine Ecology Progress Series, Vol. 126: 67-81.

Lloyd, R. 2010: Co-management in Au Tho B Village A Pilot Test for the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, Management of Natural Resources in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province.

Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005: Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Wetlands and Water Synthesis. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC.

Mazda Y., Magi, M., Kogo, M. and Hong, P.N. 1997: Mangroves as a Coastal Protection from Waves in the Tong King Delta, Vietnam. Mangroves and Salt Marshes, Vol. 1: 127-135.

Mumby, P.J., Edwards, A.J., Arias-González, J.E., Lindeman, K.C., Blackwell, P.G., Gall, A., Gorczynska, M.I., Harborne, A.R., Pescod, C.L., Renken, H., Wabnitz C.C.C. and Llewellyn, G. 2004. Mangroves enhance the biomass of coral reef fish communities in the Caribbean. Nature, Vol. 427: 533-536.

Mumby, P.J. 2006: Connectivity of reef fish between mangroves and coral reefs: Algorithms for the design of marine reserves at seascape scales. Biological Conservation, Vol. 128: 215-222.

Pham Trong Thinh 2011: Mangroves of Soc Trang 1965-2007. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Management of Natural Resources in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province.

Pham Trong Thinh, Hoang Thoi, Tran Huy Manh, Le Trong Hai and Schmitt, K. 2009: Tool Box for Mangrove Rehabilitation and Management. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, Management of Natural Resources in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province.

Pham Trong Thinh, Meinardi, D. and Schmitt, K. 2010: Monitoring of Mangrove Forests. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, Management of Natural Resources in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province.

Phan Trieu Giang, Hoang Huu Cai, Nguyen Quoc Binh and Nguyen Thi Kim Tai 2009: Training Workshop on Communication and Natural Resource Co-management. Department of Social Forestry and Agroforestry, Nong Lam University of Ho Chi Minh City. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, Management of Natural Resources in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province.

Project Management Unit Coastal Zone Management (PMU CZM) 2008: Study Visit on “Co-management of Mangrove Forest Resources” in Koh Kong Province, Cambodia. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, Management of Natural Resources in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province. PMU CZM: Project Management Unit Coastal Zone Management.


Primmer, R. 2007: Report on the Workshop for the Introduction to the Concept of Co-management. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, Management of Natural Resources in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province.

Soc Trang Statistics Office 2010: Soc Trang Statistical Yearbook 2009. Statistical Publishing House, Hanoi, Vietnam.

Schatz, R.E. 1991: Economic Rent Study for the Philippine Fisheries Sector Program. Asian Development Bank Technical Assistance 1208, Philippines, Manila.

Shepherd, G. 2004: The Ecosystem Approach: Five Steps to Implementation. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK.

Trinh Hiep and Hoang Dinh Quoc Vu 2009: Results of Training Course and Learning Experience on “Methods of Multi-Stakeholder Dialogues”. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, Management of Natural Resources in the Coastal Zone of Soc Trang Province.

UNCED 1992: Earth Summit Agenda 21, the United Nations Programme of Actions from Rio. UNCED. http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/res_agenda21_17.shtml. Accessed on 15/03/2010.

Strengthening Participatory Water Management 103

Lessons Learned from Seven Years Implementing the Project ‘Strengthening of Participatory Water Management in Soc Trang Province’ Pham Ba Vu Tunga 1, Nguyen Van Haoa, Tran Quoc Chuonga, Nguyen Thi Hoai Ana, Pham Van Nama and Che Khanh Duya a Research Institute for Aquaculture No.2 (RIA2)

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to present lessons learned from 2003 to 2010 during implementation of the project ‘Strengthening of Participatory Water Management in Soc Trang Province – Viet Nam’. Lessons learned include: (1) technical training and training on environmental management and organisational skills for farmers and government line agencies are necessary; (2) strengthening awareness of stakeholders about environmental issues and the benefits of a technical network is important and should be done continuously; (3) a technical network which facilitates the sharing of technical knowledge among stakeholders (e.g. farmers and local authorities) can play an important role in aquaculture, co-management and water management, though consensus among stakeholders is essential; and (4) strong coordination is needed between researchers, government line agencies and farmers’ organisations.

Keywords: Stakeholders, co-management, task group, technical network, Viet Nam

1 Introduction My Xuyen District is located in the south of Soc Trang Province and has an aquaculture area of 17,700 ha spread over nine communes, all of which is under rice-shrimp farming (Luong Minh Quyet 2006). This shows that rice-shrimp culture is a very important economic activity in the area. However, in recent years, a tendency to replace rice with a second shrimp crop in the area has resulted in changes to water usage patterns and other farming practices. Conflicts over water usage have increased and shrimp farming has adversely affected water quality throughout the district.

2 The project The project ‘Strengthening of Participatory Water Management in Soc Trang Province – Viet Nam’ was set up in 2003 by the Research Institute for Aquaculture No.2 (RIA2) with the aim of strengthening farmers’ organisations (cooperatives and clubs) and their linkages with officials and line agencies to enable them to participate in water management. In order to achieve this, co-management was used along with a focus on training related to technical issues for both shrimp culture and other livelihoods. Figure 1 shows the co-management mechanism applied from 2003 to 2010.

1 [email protected]


Figure 1: Mechanism used for co-management of water resources in Soc Trang Province 2.1 Objectives The proposed development objective of the project is: “Coordinated and participatory management by aquatic resource managers contributes to improved household productivity, economics and environmental sustainability from shrimp culture-dependent households in My Xuyen District, Soc Trang Province”.

The proposed immediate objective is: “Authorities and line agencies at the district and commune level have improved capacity to manage water resources jointly with farmers’ groups and diversify livelihoods in My Xuyen District, Soc Trang Province”.

Five outputs were identified in order to achieve the objectives:

1. Capacity of farmers’ organisations is developed and strengthened;

2. Rice/shrimp systems are supported and strengthened;

3. Capacity of local government officials at different levels to manage water resources jointly with shrimp farmers in My Xuyen District is strengthened;

4. Opportunities for livelihood diversification are identified and pilot activities are promoted and implemented; and

5. A task group of different stakeholders is established and strengthened.

2.2 Study sites and farmers’ organisation In Phase I (2003 - 2005), two farmers’ organisations were selected as examples for the project in Hoa Tu 1 Commune, which is located at the centre of rice-shrimp farming in My Xuyen District (Figure 2). The two farmers’ organisations – Club 4 in Hoa Truc Hamlet and Phu Loi Cooperative in Hoa Trung Hamlet – were selected with a view to developing models for improved co-management of resources in a rice-shrimp farming region of the Mekong Delta.

Good co-management mechanism

Shared communal resources

Environmental sustainability

Improved household economics

Local government officers (province, district, commune)

User groups (Farmers’ organisations and individuals)

Researchers Researchers


Figure 2: Location of Hoa Tu 1 Commune in My Xuyen District

At the start of Phase II (2006 - 2010) the project expanded to work with 11 selected farmers’ organisations. In 2007 the project expanded further to work with 15 farmers’ organisations, while in 2010 the project expanded again to work with a total of 21 organisations in nine adjacent communes in My Xuyen District (Figure 3). These communes were Gia Hoa 1, Gia Hoa 2, Hoa Tu 1, Hoa Tu 2, Ngoc Dong, Ngoc To, Thanh Quoi, Thanh Phu and Tham Don.

The climatic conditions of these communes are similar to the entire district with brackish, salt water intrusion during the dry season and freshwater conditions during the wet season.

The 21 farmers’ organisations which work with the project are listed in Annex 1. These farmers’ organisations existed before the project became involved and had different strengths and challenges. Their involvement in the second phase was needed because two organisations in one commune was too small a project area to assure widespread impact. It was also desirable to strengthen the effectiveness of the farmers’ organisations over a larger area in the Mekong Delta in order to ensure that a smooth-functioning, well-coordinated, sustainable system would remain after the project ended. It was expected that a system of participatory management of the water resources, which involves farmers, farmers’ organisations and other crucial local stakeholders in resource management decision making, would be most effective. 3 Accomplishments of the project 3.1 Communication network strengthening activities RIA2 took the initial lead in coordinating communication network strengthening activities, providing logistical support and organising relevant meetings, training activities and workshops.


At the start of Phase II, district level authorities involved with the project took over coordination and communication network activities.

Figure 3: Location of the nine project communes in My Xuyen District

After baseline surveys were completed, it was discovered that the technical network needed strengthening at three levels, i.e. the farmers’ organisation level, commune level and district/provincial level. A technical network is important as it facilitates the sharing of technical aquaculture and environmental knowledge among stakeholders (e.g. farmers and local authorities), which enables farmers to undertake best management practices, helping increase their income and improving the sustainability of farming practices. Additionally, establishing a strong technical network both achieves project objectives and ensures the sustainability of the projects’ work after the project ends. In order to strengthen the technical network the following activities were undertaken:

• Written regulations on sustainable farming practices were developed for all farmers’ organisations;

• District and provincial level authorities facilitated training courses on rice cultivation technology and cash crop cultivation and were brought together to discuss solutions to pertinent aquaculture issues;

• Exchange visits between farmers’ organisations were organised;

• Each participating farmers’ organisation was divided into two or four subgroups to improve communications within each organisation;


• Sets of loud speakers were set up in sub groups to help announce environmental issues and meetings and to allow members in each subgroup to easily communicate with each other;

• At the commune level, vice chairman and staff of extension services (i.e. from the Agriculture, Aquaculture Extension Office) held monthly meetings to discuss and plan new regulations which were then communicated to the heads of villages and farmers’ organisations;

• A contract between the project manager, the vice chairman of each commune and extension services staff was signed to monitor and support the project’s activities;

• The project organised technical trainings in the field for shrimp farmers as well as training courses on fisheries regulations, financial management and livelihood alternatives;

• Training courses in disease management, environmental issues and water management were given to the famers and district and commune level authorities;

• Technical networks were formalised and included 21 technicians (i.e. one farmer nominated from each farmers’ organisation), plus 55 subgroup leaders, who were organised to transfer knowledge and experiences from trainings and study tours to members of their farmers’ organisation; and

• A task group of stakeholders was set up to meet monthly to help identify necessary activities, needs and solutions related to water management in shrimp farming.

3.1.1 Task group Local authorities at the commune level (i.e. Commune People’s Committee and government departments at the commune level) regularly communicate with, and are influenced by authorities at the district and province level. Additionally, practical relationships between local level government agencies and farmers already existed prior to the implementation of this project; however there was a need to build upon and strengthen existing mechanisms and to focus on participatory structures. Thus, a task group of different stakeholders was established to strengthen existing communication networks and provide an avenue for farmers to raise and discuss issues with government authorities. The task group was also established to manage the technical network and the co-management system. A structure which involved local government agencies and farmers was implemented at the beginning of the second phase and strengthened during that year (Figure 4). The structure ensured regular communication and coordination among all stakeholders.

The task group structure included a management board which consisted of the vice-chairman of the People’s Committee of My Xuyen District (who was chair of the task group), the vice-chairman of the provincial level of the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) and the director of RIA2. Other members of the task group included: staff from the provincial level of DARD; staff from the DARD in My Xuyen District; staff from the provincial level of the Department of Fisheries Extension Centre; staff from the My Xuyen Agriculture, Aquaculture Extension Office; vice-chairmen from each Commune People’s Committee; and some special staff from each of the selected communes.

Over the life of the project, authorities at the provincial, district and commune levels have taken an increasing role in implementing project activities, such as training in livelihoods and cash crops. Formalised responsibilities of local authority members of the task group have also increased considerably during this time and they have taken on tasks such as monitoring and helping farmers with shrimp and livelihoods activities. Terms of reference have been drawn up for each task group member and were finalised jointly with the members in order to clarify responsibilities.


Figure 4: Structure of the task group

The task group have allocated the farmers’ organisations to one of four district technicians whose role is to visit, monitor and solve problems occurring in shrimp culture. Each district technician follows the progress of four to eight farmers’ organisations, visiting four or five per month. Provincial task group members visit the project area once per month, focusing on sites where advice is urgently needed.

Monthly task group meetings, as well as monthly farmers’ organisation meetings, are held in order to consider progress and how to deal with arising problems and issues. In general, RIA2 facilitate work planning, organise meetings, initiate monitoring and develop project plans jointly with other task group members. Concerned staff from DARD at the district and commune levels collaborate with RIA2 in monitoring.

3.2 Management, monitoring and evaluation activities During the monthly meetings of farmers’ organisations, members develop monthly plans to guide their activities. These plans are evaluated and reviewed during the following monthly meeting. Issues about water quality management, disease management, communication networks and training needs are discussed during the meetings and activities are planned for the next month if necessary. Farmers’ organisations also hold annual reviews about the effectiveness of their plans and activities.

Each of the subgroups within the farmers’ organisations have elected a head who is responsible for the management of the subgroup and for liaising with the heads of the other subgroups. It is arranged that the heads of the subgroups meet on a weekly basis and the entire farmers’ organisation meet monthly. Farmers manage their own operations, guided by decisions and regulations of their farmers’ organisation. The farmers’ organisations coordinate the efforts of their members, making joint plans, decisions and regulations, and communicate with staff from the local Commune People’s Committee (CPC).

CPC staff communicate regulations, environmental information and other advice to the farmers’ organisations, provide some support for enforcement and provide higher levels of government

District Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, Agriculture Aquaculture

Extension Office

Task group leader Director of RIA2,

Vice-chairman of People’s Committee of My Xuyen District, Vice-chairman of provincial Department Agriculture and Rural Development

Province Department of Agriculture and Rural Development,

Fisheries Extension Centre

Commune Vice chairmen of

commune People’s Committees

Farmers’ organisations 21 selected farmers’ organisations With 55 sub-groups

RIA II GOOD CO- MANAGEMENT MECHANISM RIA II


with feedback. Authorities at district level of the task group provide advice, training and in some instances material inputs. Provincial level authorities regulate, enforce and support training efforts. All levels of government develop plans for starting shrimp and rice crops for farmers.

Project staff from RIA2: provide and organise trainings; assist farmers’ organisations in developing their plans and structures; and liaise with all other stakeholders on issues affecting the participating farmers’ organisations. The project also contracts one or two staff at each CPC (and sometimes from extension services) to monitor and support the activities of the farmers’ organisations.

Other management, monitoring and evaluation activities conducted included:

• Notebooks and logbooks were provided to farmers to help them record monthly meeting information and water quality monitoring information. This helped the farmers to share and discuss shrimp farming technique information and to review their plans with each other;

• RIA2 staff and commune and district level authorities frequently attended the monthly and annual meetings of farmers’ organisations to assist in both facilitation and discussions on the development, implementation and review of organisation plans;

• Baseline, midterm and end of year surveys were organised for farmers and other stakeholders to evaluate project activities and adjust accordingly; and

• Outcome mapping – a methodology which uses questionnaires and a scoring system – was used to monitor and evaluate human behaviour and adjust project activities.

3.3 Farmer technical strengthening activities The training needs of local government staff, farmers’ organisations and individual farmers were identified through training needs assessments, which continue to be conducted periodically. RIA2 organised the following training activities in order to address identified training needs:

• Training for all members of farmers’ organisations in shrimp culture techniques, post-larvae checking, feed and water management, and prevention and treatment of shrimp diseases;

• On-site follow-up training for individual farmers on shrimp culture techniques;

• Training in alternative livelihood activities, including rice-fish, fresh water prawn culture, pond fish culture, livestock, poultry rearing, mushroom (Metarlizium Anisopliac) growing and cash crop cultivation for all members of farmers’ organisations;

• Support for farmers’ organisations who are returning to rice cultivation;

• Delivery of multiple field technical books for farmers’ organisations;

• Study tours to Vinh Chau Town (Soc Trang Province) and the provinces of Dong Thap and Ca Mau to learn how to improve existing shrimp culture practices as well as raise frogs, eels, mable goby and fresh water prawns.

3.4 Water environment management strengthening activities From the results of the baseline survey as well as discussions with farmers it was identified that awareness of environmental issues surrounding water management needed improving. The following water environment management strengthening activities were undertaken:

• Training in low-cost (test kit) water quality monitoring and management for farmers and local authorities;


• Low-cost water quality monitoring equipment was provided for 55 subgroups and nine communes; and

• Training in low-cost water quality monitoring and management of water quality in and out of ponds for commune officers and targeted organisations.

3.5 Management capacity improvement activities From the results of the baseline survey, RIA 2 organised the following training activities to strengthen the management capacity of all participating organisations and resource users:

• Training in organisation skills for farmers’ organisations leaders; and

• Training in financial management for all members of the farmers’ organisations.

4 Challenges for the project The following challenges have arisen during the course of the project:

• Lack capital to invest in shrimp culture and low living standards mean that farmers cannot follow the regulations of their farmers’ organisation. In particular, most farmers do not have enough income to maintain their pond dykes;

• Farmers’ technicians or local staff had limited ability to transfer technical skills to other members of the farmers’ organisations;

• Local staff and farmers had limited awareness of co-management;

• Changes in staff and organisation heads (new people take time to learn);

• There was no coordination among farmers; each individual farmer measures, manages and treats their own pond environment;

• Low or lack of support from other stakeholders (seed suppliers, feed suppliers, chemical suppliers and researchers etc.);

• Human behavioural changes take time and patience;

• Shrimp culture is a high risk industry as it is influenced by external factors such as low market price, environment pollution and climate change; and

• Crop failure forced farmers to move away or get jobs in town; therefore they did not have time to participate in their farmers’ organisations.

5 Lessons learned A number of lessons were learnt throughout the course of the project. In some cases, these lessons helped to overcome the challenges the project faced. The lessons learnt could also be of use in other applications of co-management:

1. Technical assistance can be considered a starting point for establishing and developing a participatory co-management approach;

2. Livelihood support is essential for establishing and developing a participatory co-management approach and for increasing household income;

3. A task group can play an important role in co-management;

4. Support from local authorities is a basic requirement for the development of co-management and other project activities;


5. Co-management needs collaboration from many stakeholders, from local to international levels;

6. Limited knowledge on co-management exists therefore we are ‘learning by doing’, which requires new ideas and objective criticisms from experts for adjustment and improvement;

7. A co-management system will never be ‘perfect’, therefore it is more important that co-management be adaptable to changing circumstances;

8. Consensus among stakeholders is important;

9. Good water management needs cooperation from irrigation authorities;

10. Technical training and training on environmental management and organisational skills for farmers and government line agencies are necessary;

11. Local government officials or project staff usually hold many duties concurrently;

12. A focus on developing the management capacity of local government officers is important;

13. Technical networks (including the heads of farmers’ organisations and sub-group leaders), regular meetings and communication are important for strengthening farmers skills and collaboration;

14. Strengthening the awareness of stakeholders about environmental issues and the benefits of technical networks is important and should be done continuously;

15. Farmers communicate and work together on a daily basis;

16. Rice/shrimp culture can stabilise productivity;

17. Innovative implementation is needed to ensure that co-management addresses site specific issues;

18. Support from other stakeholders (seed, feed and chemical suppliers and researchers etc.) is needed; and

19. Outcome mapping is useful for monitoring – changes in human behaviour can be quantified through outcome mapping.

6 Conclusion Through the project ‘Strengthening of Participatory Water Management in Soc Trang Province – Viet Nam’ farmers’ organisations and linkages with local authorities have been strengthened through a number of activities aimed at improving: communication and communication networks; capacity to undertake management, monitoring and evaluation; technical skills and technical networks; and knowledge of the environmental issues surrounding water management.

Lesson learned during implementation of the project from 2003 to 2010 include:

1. Technical training and training on environmental management and organisational skills for farmers and government line agencies are necessary, and a focus on building the management capacity of these stakeholders is essential;

2. Co-management can be strengthened through: technical networks; the use of a task group; livelihood support; support from local authorities (at all levels); and collaboration by many stakeholders from local to international levels;

3. Co-management is:

a. Hindered by a lack of on-ground knowledge;

b. Is a process of ‘learning by doing’, which requires new ideas and objective criticisms from experts for adjustment and improvement;


c. Will never be ‘perfect’, therefore it is more important that co-management be adaptable to changing circumstances;

4. A technical network which facilitates the sharing of technical knowledge among stakeholders can play an important role in aquiculture, water management and co-management;

5. Strengthening the awareness of stakeholders about environmental issues and the benefits of a technical network is important and should be done continuously;

6. Consensus among stakeholders is essential in participatory water resource co-management; and

7. Strong coordination is needed between researchers, government line agencies and farmers’ organisations.

References Luong Minh Quyet 2006: Results of Strengthening of Participatory Water Management in

Rice-shrimp Culture, My Xuyen District, Soc Trang Province, Viet Nam. Annual MRC Fisheries Programmed Meeting, 2006, Ho Chi Minh City.


Annex 1: List of farmers’ organisations (clubs/cooperatives)

No. Club/Cooperative Commune Hamlet Year

involvement No. of

households No. of

subgroups

1 Thanh Dat Cooperative Hoa Tu 1 Hoa Truc 2003 23 4

2 Phu Loi Cooperative Hoa Tu 1 Hoa Trung 2003 22 3

3 N.Ngu Co Thanh Cong Cooperative

Gia Hoa 1 Long Hoa 2006 23 4

4 Nong Ngu 14/10 Cooperative

Gia Hoa 2 Binh Hoa 2006 21 2

5 Nong Ngu 14/10 Cooperative

Hoa Tu 2 Hoa Nho A 2006 21 4

6 Quyet Thang Cooperative

Ngoc To Co Co 2006 31 3

7 Club No. 1 Hoa Tu 1 Hoa Truc 2006 17 3

8 Thang Loi Cooperative Hoa Tu 1 Hoa Phuoc 2006 16 3

9 Club No. 1 Hoa Tu 1 Hoa De 2006 12 2

10 Club No. 1 Hoa Tu 1 Hoa Tan 2006 15 2

11 Nong Ngu Club Gia Hoa 2 Nhon Hoa 2007 21 2

12 Thanh Dat Club Tham Don Du Tho 2007 13 1

13 IPM Phu Thanh Club Thanh Phu Phu Thanh 2007 36 3

14 Nong Ngu Club Thanh Quoi Thanh Hoa 2007 19 3

15 Hoa Loi Cooperative Ngoc Dong Hoa Loi 2007 20 3

16 CLB L��ng Hu�nh Ngoc To Luong Huynh 2010 23 3

17 HTX Rice/shrimp Ngoc Dong Hoa Loi 2010 18 3

18 CLB Hoa Nhan Hoa Tu 1 Hoa Nhan 2010 18 2

19 CLB Thanh My Hoa Tu 1 Thanh My 2010 15 2

20 CLB Hoa De 2 Hoa Tu 1 Hoa De 2010 18 3

21 CLB Hoa Phuong Hoa Tu 1 Hoa Phuong 2010 11 2

Total 413 55

Legal Framework on Fisheries Co-management 115

Overview of Legal Framework and Supporting Policies on Fisheries Co-Management in Viet Nam Nguyen Thuy Duong1 a and Ngo Tien Chuong b a Department of Capture Fisheries and Resource Protection – Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development b Strengthening of Capture Fisheries Management (SCAFI) Abstract Co-management is considered a practical approach to small-scale fisheries management in Viet Nam. As such, fisheries co-management is currently being piloted in several areas in Viet Nam with the aim of detecting opportunities and challenges for implementation. An appropriate legal framework is a necessary requirement for the implementation and development of co-management. This report reviews and analyses the legal framework and documents related to the implementation of fisheries co-management in Viet Nam. This report also highlights the implications of such laws and legal documents. At present, laws as well as legal instruments have initially facilitated the application of fisheries co-management in Viet Nam. However, actual implementation has faced some obstacles which need to be promptly resolved, namely coastal area demarcation, clarification of exploitation rights, decentralisation and devolution. To further promote the development of co-management for fisheries in Viet Nam a legal framework needs to be developed which facilitates: the issuance of aquatic resource exploitation rights, in combination with aquatic resource protection; livelihood improvement; and the participation of community-based organisations and stakeholders.

Keywords: Decentralisation, devolution, empowerment, small scale fisheries, participatory management, aquatic resources

1 Introduction Viet Nam is a coastal country with a small scale fisheries industry. Therefore, the introduction of a fisheries co-management approach is very relevant under the context of on-going international integration and development of fisheries management. In this regard, Viet Nam is currently implementing several pilot fisheries co-management projects across the country. The formulation and implementation of the co-management models in different areas varies depending on specific natural conditions, the prevailing socio-economic situation and the cultural context.

A legal framework is an indispensable factor for the successful execution of the co-management approach. Overarching legal documents to both fisheries management and co-management include the Civil Law, the Constitution and the Fisheries Law (2003). Article 17 of the Constitution prescribes that “land, mountains and forests, springs and rivers and inland and marine resources…belong to the entire people’s ownership”. The Fisheries Law and the Water Resource Law together specifically stipulate that “aquatic resources constitute a natural resource under the ownership of the entire people and the uniform management by the State. Organisations and individuals shall have the right to exploit aquatic resources under the provisions of law resources” and “organisations and individuals shall have the right to exploit water resources for living and production”. 1 [email protected]


The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) has recently put emphasis on the revision, modification and formulation of legal documents and guidelines related to fisheries co-management with the aim of facilitating localities to implement the approach. In line with this objective, this report provides an overview of the current legal situation in Viet Nam in regards to co-management. This report however, does not cover all applications of co-management, rather it focuses on legal framework and legal instruments which support the application of co-management to fisheries in Viet Nam. This report specifically clarifies the main implications of laws and legal instruments related to fisheries co-management in particular, and natural resource co-management in general.

2 Existing legal instruments related to fisheries co-management in Viet Nam With regards to legal framework, the Government of Viet Nam has issued a number of policies and guidelines related to the development and protection of natural resources in general, and aquatic resources in coastal and inland areas in particular. These policies and guidelines outline the community’s rights to access aquatic resources and define their responsibilities in regard to environmental protection. The policies and documents also provide for the development of participatory fisheries management models. Specifically, in relation to co-management, the Government of Viet Nam and the Ministry of Fisheries (now incorporated into MARD) have promulgated a series of legal documents relevant to the development and implementation of participatory management and fisheries co-management models (refer to Appendix 1).

Appendix 1 highlights that the Fisheries Law and other legal documents have established a legal framework for decentralisation and empowerment for the purpose of implementing co-management. Apart from legal documents directly related to the development and implementation of fisheries co-management, there have been a series of indirectly related legal documents such as: Law of Environment; Land Law; Water Resources Law; Cooperative Law; Decree No.88/2003/ND-CP by the Government (dated 30 July 2003) which prescribes organisational structure, activities and association management, and legal instruments related to finance, budget, donors etc.; as well as other legal documents relating to participation, inspection, monitoring and complaints.

3 Current implementation status of legal documents related to co-management in Viet Nam

The Fisheries Law as well as other legal documents all clearly clarify the vision for community-based aquatic resource management models. They also empower the role of resource users and other stakeholders and promote decentralisation. By-law documents encourage local communities to take initiatives in the development and implementation of fisheries co-management based on the characteristics and natural conditions in their area. By-law documents also provide a strategic function to protect and develop aquatic resources in a sustainable way. These legal documents have allowed for the implementation of co-management models in Viet Nam over recent years.

However, the execution of legal documents, especially when decentralised down to local levels, remains bottlenecked. Many provinces still face difficulties in: demarcating coastline boundaries, particularly between neighbouring provinces; developing and implementing procedures for the allocation of sea surface to fishing management organisations and communities; and supporting exploitation devolution down to communities. Meanwhile, one of the requirements and prerequisites of co-management is to identify boundaries and allocate areas of water to fishery organisations.

At present, the Strengthening of Capture Fisheries Management (SCAFI) component is one of the four components of the Fisheries Sector Support Programme Phase II co-financed by the governments of Denmark and Viet Nam. This component has been implementing its activities,


including the establishment of fisheries co-management models, in eight provinces, i.e. An Giang, Ben Tre, Binh Dinh, Dak Lak, Thua Thien Hue, Nghe An, Quang Ninh and Son La.

Co-management related activities started in the aforementioned provinces in 2007 and faced many difficulties in implementation from the outset. However, after three years co-management in these provinces has achieved many encouraging developments. Most of the provinces have established community-based organisations and key groups/task forces and have improved capacity and awareness of co-management concepts and legal framework for the execution of co-management models. In particular, local authorities have been involved in creating a favourable legal environment for the implementation of co-management models through, for instance, promulgation of management regulations, decisions on the establishment of community-based organisations, and direct participation in guiding activities.

During the implementation, it was realised that bottlenecks are mainly related to legislative issues of demarcation, decentralisation and devolution of task assignments down to communities. The pilot fisheries co-management model established in Quynh Lap Commune (Quynh Luu District, Nghe An Province) is an example where demarcation is an issue as Quynh Lap is bordered by Thanh Hoa Province and conflicts regularly occur in coastal areas shared by the two provinces. The identification of sea boundaries between the two provinces has not yet occurred, despite the issuance of Decree 123/2006/ND-CP dated 27 October 2006 which requires two provinces sharing a coastal boundary to determine and publicise coastal sea boundaries. Failure to clearly define a sea boundary and subsequent co-management area has halted the development of legal framework necessary for devolution to communities. The pilot co-management model involving 600 ha of tidal area in Van Don District (Quang Ninh Province) – which has an abundant supply of Sipunculidae (Sá Sùng) and Meretrix lyrata (nghêu) – is facing issues and conflict surrounding the lease of 200 ha of this area to 16 households living in Dam Ha Town (i.e. non-local people) for their exploitation. This latter example highlights the need for exploitation rights, as regulated by the Government at central and provincial levels, to be promptly and specifically clarified (DECAFIREP 2009a).

Over recent years, there have been many proposals for a specific regulation on fisheries co-management to be promulgated in Viet Nam (for instance, through supplementation of the Fisheries Law or promulgation of alternative, relevant documents). In a workshop about the identification of issues for modification in relation to the Fisheries Law (2003) – organised by the Legislation Department of the MARD on 11 December 2009 in Hanoi – four out of seven points raised related to the concept of co-management:

• “Formulation of legal framework for accepting the role of communities to jointly administrate with the State. Those who are involved in fishing activities shall be members of the communities”;

• “Local communities are empowered to manage some marine resources and fishing logistic services (for instance, inland water surface and coastal sea area for community-based management…)”;

• “Collect consensus of communities before distribution of the quota on exploitation, aquaculture, export and license…”; and

• “Recognition of the role of communities in the formulation and execution of laws and institutional system, propaganda, dissemination and practice of laws” (Thai Thanh Duong 2010).

Further to the abovementioned proposals, the Department of Capture Fisheries and Resources Protection and the Marine Resource Planning and Economics Institute are in the process of completing the ‘National guidelines on small-scale fisheries co-management in Viet Nam’ for submission to the Minister of MARD for approval and promulgation.


4 Some solutions to fisheries co-management in Viet Nam Development and implementation of fisheries co-management models is a process which takes time in order to conduct many interactive activities. Much depends on factors such as: socio-economic conditions; community awareness; water surface area; marine resources; local traditional customs and practices; and capacity of community leaders. Apart from good preparation and organisation, it is necessary to have sound legal framework from the central level to the local level to support execution. This is seen as a major factor contributing to the success of the application of co-management to fisheries in Viet Nam.

4.1 Policies and institutions MARD needs to reflect and support policy which encourages the development of the co-management approach through the issuance of guidance documents. The modification of laws and by-law documents needs to be promptly conducted with the aim of meeting the requirements of developing trends. For instance, Decree No. 123/2006/ND-CP (now replaced by Decree No. 33/2010/ND-CP dated 31 March 2010) regulates: the decentralisation of management down to the Provincial People’s Committees (PPCs) for the area out to 24 nautical miles from the coastline; and empowerment of communities for management for the area out to six nautical miles. However, sea boundaries among neighbouring provinces have not yet been defined and specific guidelines outlining requirements for organisations involved in marine resource exploitation and management of water surfaces, have not been developed. Additionally, there is also the great challenge of completing a legal framework which would allow the devolution of rights of water surface exploitation and use for fisheries activities to local organisations and communities.

MARD is supposed to promptly promulgate the ‘National Guideline on small-scale fisheries co-management in Viet Nam’ (DECAFIREP 2009b), which will serve as a tool to efficiently support the establishment and application of co-management to fisheries.

4.2 Rights of marine resource exploitation and issuance of fishing rights The State owns all natural resources and can issue the right of use to organisations and individuals in Viet Nam. However, the concept of marine resource exploitation rights and subsequent issuance has not been specifically and appropriately clarified. The legal framework for identifying marine resource exploitation rights and issuance of such rights remains incomplete. Some localities, conditional on competence of local authorities at all levels, and with the aim of sharing benefits and responsibilities for sustainable use and protection of natural resources, have empowered communities and/or fishers groups/organisations to manage marine resources in accordance with the legal framework for land use. Alternatively the application of co-management in Tam Giang – Cau Hai Lagoon (Thua Thien Hue Province) is a practical example of where aquatic resource exploitation rights have been granted (to Giang Xuan Fishing Association) for an inland water surface area (Truong Van Tuyen 2006).

The completion of legal framework and guidelines on issuing rights for aquatic resource exploitation is an indispensable requirement for improving the sustainability of existing co-management activities.

4.3 Combining the implementation of aquatic resource protection regulations and livelihood improvement

Co-management of aquatic resource exploitation can be successful at establishing sustainable fishing practices through forbidding destructive fishing methods and reducing the intensity of exploitation and cultivation of fisheries resources. However, reductions in exploitation and cultivation are not sustainable unless there is a specific solution to sustaining the livelihoods of


the communities which rely on fisheries resources. Therefore, livelihood improvement should be a prioritised objective during the development of co-management models.

4.4 Participation of community-based organisations and stakeholders Co-management requires the participation of communities through community-based organisations. The involvement of authorities, communities and stakeholders is an important factor of co-management – which aims to reduce conflict, reach consensus and co-make decisions (Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb 2008). However, due to the centralised management approach and cultural and socio-political differences within Viet Nam, community-based organisations have not yet been provided rights or a legal framework, and have not developed suitable capacity to take over management functions. One particularly important factor is that community-based organisations do not have an awareness of the benefits of being involved in management and therefore lack motivation. Handing over aquatic resource exploitation rights to community-based organisations is an efficient method of stimulating the involvement of communities. Therefore, the development and facilitation of co-management contributes to not only improving the capacity of community-based organisations, but also provides legal framework to encourage such organisations.

5 Conclusion Viet Nam’s Fisheries Law and other relevant legal instruments have initially facilitated the application of fisheries co-management in Viet Nam. However, the actual implementation has faced some obstacles which need to be promptly resolved through modification, revision and formulation of relevant legal instruments related to co-management.

To further promote the development of co-management for fisheries in Viet Nam a legal framework needs to be developed which facilitates: the issuance of aquatic resource exploitation rights, in combination with aquatic resource protection; livelihood improvement; and the participation of community-based organisations and stakeholders.

References

C�c Khai thác và B�o v� ngu�n li thy s�n (DECAFIREP) 2009a: Báo cáo t� v�n: �ánh giá t ng quan các mô hình ��ng qu�n lý trong ngành thy s�n t�i Vi�t Nam. C�c Khai thác và B�o v� ngu�n li thy s�n, Hanoi.

C�c Khai thác và B�o v� ngu�n li thy s�n (DECAFIREP) 2009b: D� th�o: H��ng d�n qu�c gia v� ��ng qu�n lý ngh� cá quy mô nh� t�i Vi�t Nam. C�c Khai thác và B�o v� ngu�n li thy s�n, Hanoi.

B� Nông nghi�p và Phát tri�n nông thôn (MARD) 2009: Công v�n s� 1700/BNN-KTBVNL ngày 16 tháng 6 n�m 2009 v� vi�c th�c hi�n ��ng qu�n lý ngh� cá quy mô nh�.

Pomeroy, R.S. and Rivera-Guieb, R. 2008: ��ng qu�n lý ngh� cá: S tay th�c hành. Nhà xu�t b�n Nông nghi�p.

Thai Thanh Duong 2010: B�n v�ng - Quan �i�m xuyên su�t phát tri�n ngh� cá. T�p chí Th��ng m�i Thy s�n s� 121, tháng 1/2010.

Truong Van Tuyen 2006: The final technical report on the Community-based Coastal Resources Management in Central Viet Nam (2003-2006) submitted to International Development Research Centre. www.idrc.ca.


Appendix 1: Legal documents related to fisheries co-management in Viet Nam

No. Documents Participation of communities and stakeholders

Decentralisation

1 Fisheries Law dated 26/11/2003

- Article 5, Provision 1: “The State shall adopt policies to ensure the sustainable development of fisheries; to encourage, and create favourable conditions for, organisations and individuals to exploit and rationally use aquatic resources; to secure the reproduction of aquatic resources and the development of aquaculture in the sea, rivers, lakes, marshes, lagoons and other natural water areas”. - Article 7, Provision 1: “Organisations and individuals shall be responsible to protect the habitats of aquatic species”. - Article 9, Provision 3: “The State shall invest in conserving the gene stocks and bio-diversity of aquatic resources; adopt policies to encourage organisations and individuals at home and abroad to invest in building, and participate in managing conservation zones; adopt policies to support the shift of occupations, resettlement, ensuring the interests of inhabitants in the conservation zones”. - Article 15, Provision 3: “The provincial-level People's Committees shall...make arrangements for people to exercise their rights to supervise, detect and denounce acts of violating the legislation on aquatic resources in the aquatic resource exploitation areas”. - Article 13, Provision 1: “The State shall adopt policies to reorganise production, restructure occupations in the exploitation of aquatic resources in coastal sea areas and restructure the occupations among the sectors of exploitation, culture, processing of aquatic resources, agriculture, forestry and services”.

- Article 5, Provision 4: “The Government delimits coastal sea areas on the basis of their depth and distance from the shore and a number of other characteristics of coastal sea areas so as to decentralise to the coastal localities the general management of such coastal sea areas in association with production and business development”. - Article 7, Provision 4: “Organisations and individuals exploiting aquatic resources by placing weirs, traps or other methods of enclosure in rivers, lakes, marshes or lagoons must reserve a corridor for the movement of aquatic species according to the regulations of the local People's Committees”. - Article 15, Provision 3: “The provincial-level People's Committees shall have responsibility to promulgate regulations on aquatic resource exploitation areas in rivers, lakes, marshes, lagoons and other natural water areas under their management under the guidance of the Ministry of Fisheries; and shall make arrangements for people to exercise their rights to supervise, detect and denounce acts of violating the legislation on aquatic resources in the aquatic resource exploitation areas”.

2 Decree No. 33/2010/ND-CP dated 31/3/2010 on management of aquatic resource exploitation of Vietnamese organisations and individuals in sea areas 2

- Article 4, Provision 2: “Provincial/ municipal People’s Committees of adjoining coastal localities shall base themselves on the specific geographical characteristics of local sea areas to negotiate, determine and publicise the boundaries of coastal sea areas of their provinces”. - Article 10, Provision 5: Responsibilities of MARD: “To guide provincial-level People's Committees

2 Decree was scheduled to take effect upon the day 15 June 2010



Decentralisation

(replacement of the Decree No,123/2006/N�-CP dated 27/10/2006).

in formulating regimes and policies to support fishermen to shift from coastal exploitation to other trades; in developing fishing entertainment services; in performing the community-based management in coastal sea areas; and to provide guidance on legal matters related to aquatic resource exploitation in service of law dissemination and education in localities”. - Article 12, Provision 2: Responsibilities of People's Committees of coastal provinces: “To decentralise the management of coastal routes to district- and commune-level People's Committees; to develop models of community-based management of aquatic resources in coastal routes”.

3 Decree No. 57/2008/ND-CP dated 02/05/2008 promulgating the regulation on management of Viet Nam’s marine reserves of international and national importance

- Article 4: Communities participating in protection and development of marine reserves. 1. The State encourages organisations,

individuals and communities to participate in management, conservation, establishment and development of Marine Reserves as regulated by laws.

2. Organisations, individuals and communities may participate in: a) Communication, education,

awareness raising on biodiversity protection and conservation;

b) Observation, patrol and protection of marine reserves;

c) Scientific research and training in marine reserves;

d) Ecotourism services in Marine Reserves, etc.

4 Decision 131/2004/QD-TTg dated 16/07/2004 approving the aquatic resource protection and development programme till the year 2010

- Article 1, Item 3: Programme Content: (3) “Building up models for organising the management of inshore sea areas suitable to the customs and traditions of local fishermen. At the same time, promoting and highlighting the role of the fishermen's community in the management and protection of aquatic resources as well as their habitats”. (6) Prioritised Project No. 4: “Development of models for management of aquatic resources with community participation”.



Decentralisation

5 Decision No. 10/2006/QD-TTg dated 11/01/2006 approving the master plan for development of fisheries sector by the year 2010 and Vision for 2020

- Solution No. 3: “Marine product exploitation: ...Develop various organisational models of collective economy in fishing activities, and organise fleets engaged in different fishing jobs to efficiently operate and help one another in production and sale of marine products”. “Aquaculture: to strongly develop aquaculture in all kinds of water surface, with special importance attached to rearing marine species in coastal sea areas under community-based management; and set up collective economic organisations of various forms, which creates new jobs for fishermen and protects aquatic resources…”.

6 Directive No. 03/2006/CT-BTS dated 27/03/2006 enhancing the management of fishing exploitation activities on coastal sea areas of Viet Nam

Enhancing the management of fishing activities in coastal sea areas in Viet Nam: “…to re-arrange management of coastal sea areas through a community-based approach; study on development of organisational structures suitable for specific coastal sea areas; to propose policies empowering the communities to manage coastal sea areas to be submitted to the prime minister for consideration and approval”.

- Department of Capture Fisheries and Resources Protection: “to develop operational regulations on aquatic resource exploitation activities which are organised and implemented by teams, groups, professional associations and cooperatives...”. - Department of Collective and Private Economy: “to cooperate with the Economic Planning Institute and Department of Fisheries to re-organise the coastal management in a community-based approach; study to develop organisational structures suitable for coastal sea areas; propose policies empowering communities in coastal sea area management to be submitted by the Ministry to the prime minister for consideration and approval”. - Department of Fisheries (now incorporated into the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development - DARD): � “…Give consultation to PPC on

devolution and guidance to coastal fishermen communities on exploitation and involvement in onshore aquatic resource management according to the community-based approach.

� Cooperate with levels, sectors and professional associations to provide guidelines to fishermen to set up voluntary fishing



Decentralisation

organisations, cooperatives; offshore and onshore fishing activities to be organised in teams and groups in order to support one another in production activities in coastal sea areas; set up patrols in an attempt to ensure the security and safety of fleets during their fishing activities in coastal sea areas…”.

7 Directive No. 02/2007/CT-BTS dated 15/06/2007 enhancing the inland fishing management

Enhancing inland fishing management: Item 2 (g): “….community-based inland fishing management shall involve local people’s responsibility for aquatic resource exploitation and protection and environmental protection; guide local people to set up cooperatives, groups and associations; and assign local people to cooperate with local authorities in management of aquatic resource exploitation and aquaculture in rivers, lakes and lagoons…”

- Department of Fisheries (now DARD) has the following responsibilities: “...(g) community-based inland fishing management shall involve local people’s responsibility for aquatic resource exploitation and protection and environmental protection; guide local people to set up cooperatives, groups and associations; and assign local people to cooperate with local authorities in management of aquatic resource exploitation and aquaculture in rivers, lakes and lagoons”

8 Official Letter No. 1700 /BNN-KTBVNL (MARD 2009) dated 16/6/2009 on Implementation of small-scale fisheries co-management

Enhancing activities to conduct small-scale fishing management models in Viet Nam

- “Municipal/provincial People’s Committees provide steering guidance to DARD, districts, communes and relevant affiliating agencies on the following issues: � Organising propaganda and

dissemination of legal documents related to small-scale fisheries co-management in Viet Nam;

� Encouraging provincial/ district/commune-level authorities to apply co-management as an approach to small-scale fishing management.

� Formulating legal documents, policies and institutions to support the development and implementation of small-scale fisheries co-management;

� Enhancing the set up of management teams or units within the involved communities for co-management with local authorities; and

� Setting up exploitation rights for each specific area and empower local communities or management teams/units to allow them to explore or use resources in an efficient and sustainable way”

Co-management in Fisheries in Viet Nam 125

Co-Management in Fisheries in Viet Nam Nguyen Thi Kim Anh1 Nha Trang University

Abstract In some fisheries, where stocks are distributed widely, shared or co-management systems between the State and local communities are being encouraged. In this report a professional knowledge of co-management in fisheries is presented. Then four recommendations are made for the application of co-management to fisheries in Viet Nam, namely: (1) improving the common legal framework for the application of co-management in the fisheries sector; (2) development of sustainable alternative livelihoods; (3) raising the awareness and improving the capacity of the community; and (4) creating sustainable financial resources for the application of co-management.

Key words: Community, empowerment, decentralisation, legal framework

1 Initial remarks Sustainable fisheries development is a great concern and there is a desire in Viet Nam to promote the ‘The National Action Plan on Sustainable Fisheries Development in 2010-2020’. In implementing the national action plan, fisheries administrators usually face a myriad of overlapping fisheries management options such as transferable individual quotas, establishment of marine conservation sites, adaptability control, ecosystem management, community-based management, co-management etc. Administrators should always consider the strengths and weaknesses of the various options when considering their application to various sites and situations. This report will focus on the co-management approach to managing the fisheries industry.

2 Co-management concept Co-management means that some or all administration responsibilities are officially shared between administration agencies and resource user organisations, as well as relevant interest groups such as scientific communities (Jentoft 1989). This definition is against the simple concept of consultancy – where the government only conducts a public opinion poll among impacted groups before making its decisions on operational issues. Co-management puts resource users in a proactive position, enabling them to have rights to propose, establish, implement and enforce fisheries-related regulations in cooperation with local authorities (Jentoft 2004). Co-management establishes a system in which communities and/or direct user representatives share control and have their natural resource benefit-sharing rights created and guaranteed.

Co-management of fisheries requires the legal delegation of administration functions to various appropriate institutions, which enables fishers to be part of the structure rather than just a component. Co-management also facilitates the acceptance of existing practices and customs of specific fisheries, which means co-management is implemented under both a top-down and bottom-up approach.

1 [email protected]


According to Sandersen and Koester (2000), the co-management concept requires a “democratic and flexible mechanism which aims to regularly deal with resource-related problems”. Co-management should operate within the:

• Principles of democracy, equality and social justice;

• Representative principles of relevant interest groups;

• Principles of transparency and liability; as well as

• ‘Decentralisation’ principle – indicating that the decision-making rights should be devolved down to the lowest administrative level, if possible (McCay and Jentoft 1996).

In the fisheries industry, co-management also requires horizontal cooperation among fishers and vertical cooperation among users, fisheries groups and the government/state.

2.1 Benefits of co-management In co-management “bottom-up approaches are successful largely because people support them so that enforcement costs are lowered. When people devise their own rules, they will formulate ones they consider sensible, effective, and low cost. They will also frame rules that embody local knowledge, that are designed to be adapted to local conditions, and that avoid conflicting with basic norms. They are far more likely to obey such rules than those imposed by outside authorities, which, all too often, are framed in ways that impose high economic costs on users, promote conflict, and are seen as ineffective in helping to maintain the resource” (Acheson 2003).

Once resource users have been enabled to be directly involved in the decision-making process, as co-author with shared responsibility for the formulation, implementation and execution of regulations, they can take ownership of such regulations and rules. Additionally, their knowledge and experience will also be used to its best advantage, making the management system closer to needs and expectation of resource user groups. As a result, the co-management process both legitimises and ensures adherence to the regulations by fishers.

Baird (1999), in a case study on fish farming on the Mekong River in Laos concludes that the major successes of co-management model have been: (1) community solidarity consolidation; (2) enhancement of resource management capacity at national and local levels; and (3) increased fish stock. Baird (1999) also states that “in cases where the co-management system is flexible and adaptable to the social conditions and institutional characteristics of a certain region, it is an appropriate model to improve the capacity of management and fair distribution of natural resources”.

2.2 Structure and actors involved in co-management Co-management can be structured in different forms based on what is more practical and efficient under certain cultural, social and ecological contexts. Effectively, as Pomeroy and Berkes (1997) indicate, no common structure or design to co-management exists. Given this, the co-management approach generates many questions that need to be clarified when implementing the approach, such as:

1. Who are the resource user groups and relevant beneficiaries? In which way do they represent themselves?

2. To what extent is the co-management mechanism institutionalised at the local, regional or national level?

3. How does the asset management mechanism identify state, private or community assets?

4. Which functions are executed by resource user organisations?


It is clear that the way the above-mentioned problems are dealt with will greatly influence the way the co-management system operates in specific situations.

In terms of actors involved, co-management generally involves three actors, namely the state, market and community. These actors have different roles and are all affected by their own competence levels. With regard to the role of the state, the state should formulate some basic rules in an attempt to ensure common principles are observed and common rights, such as social equity, are respected. Additionally, some functions can be only performed by the state including, law promulgation and enhancement of the legitimacy of co-management relations (Pomeroy and Viswanathan 2003). However, Pomeroy and Berks (1997) question whether the state’s role should in fact be restricted to only providing “enabling legislation to authorise and legitimise the right to organise and to enforce institutional arrangements at the local level”.

According to Karlsen (2001), the state cannot give up their entire role in fisheries management and should take overall responsibility and generally monitor the operation of co-management. Hara (1998) considers that the government should also provide financial and technical research support, which aims at ensuring co-management initiatives provide equal opportunities for all parties.

With regard to the market and the community, co-management requires official organisational/administrative entities at the relevant administrative level. In international applications of co-management, examples of organisational entities that have been used include:

• Non-profit corporations in the Alaska Community Development Quota Programme – which are integral to the programme and for connecting different communities through the programme (National Research Council 1999);

• Fisheries cooperatives in the fresh water fish farming industry of Bangladesh – where a fishing quota was only issued to fisheries cooperatives by the Government, therefore requiring fishers to voluntarily gather together to receive this right (Toufique 1997);

• System of fisheries committees in Lofoten and Maine – which were officially established by fishers (Jentoft and Kristofferson 1989; Acheson 2003);

• Producer cooperatives in Japan – who are the legal owners of resource rights and took over the management responsibilities on behalf of the community (Yamamoto 1995);

• Coastal commune people’s committees in Malawi – which were also established to take over management responsibilities on behalf of the community (Hara 1998); and

• System of regional fishing management councils in the USA – which included the integration of resource user participation (Hanna 1995).

While the specific co-management mechanisms differ in the above mentioned examples, it is clear that site specific organisational structure, operational conditions, rules, social relations, procedures and results are key variables in determining the success of the co-management approach.

2.3 The community and fisheries The fisheries industry can be viewed in two different ways: on the one hand, the sector includes fishers, fishing vessels, processing companies, traders etc.; on the other hand, the fisheries sector involves households, communities and a network of civil activities. As indicated by the first viewpoint, fisheries can basically be seen a business separated from its social background. In the second viewpoint, fisheries can be considered as a socio-economic system attached to civil activities. The way we understand the two different concepts will affect the way we identify problems and formulate related policies. In case of the first viewpoint, the community is neither a target group nor an instrument but rather an element. However through the second viewpoint, where policy is based on the community, the community is both target group and instrument, in


which community is the primary concern. In the second viewpoint, resource sustainability and efficient performance of companies are requirements to be met, as defined by the community, however these requirements are largely instruments to meet the higher objective of community conservation.

Sound community involvement and development are preconditions for a sustainable fisheries industry. Therefore, the community needs to play a more important role and take more initiative in fisheries management. In particular, the community is very suitable to aid in the management of small-size fish farming. However, presently the majority of communities are not yet involved in management. Generally, governments can be criticised since they have not really seen the community as an instrument or the target of development. There is a need to further shift the traditional view of fish farming from a trade-oriented one to community-based one. The community needs to be fully integrated in fisheries management and entrusted with the significant task of a counterpart to local government. At the same time, their benefits and rights should be guaranteed and their obligations clearly outlined.

Governmental agencies, universities/research institutions and non-governmental agencies have much potential to support fisheries communities. However, the community should not simply receive support from outside in a passive way. They need their own autonomy and empowerment rather than relying on different forms of support. The community and its members are important in the removal of internal conflicts and prioritisation of community needs. Therefore, the community, as a kind of civil social institution, is currently popularly found in the fish farming sector and needs to play a central role in fish farming management.

2.4 Co-management and fisheries The co-management approach can create a synergy among the community and relevant stakeholders involved in the management of fisheries resource exploitation, use and protection, and can result in certain fisheries management achievements, specifically:

• Better compliance with management regulations thanks to demand-oriented management – i.e. management which addresses the real needs of all stakeholders;

• Movement towards recognising and addressing the real demands of relevant stakeholders;

• Lower management costs in relation to the efficiency obtained;

• Higher cooperation, involvement and responsibility for sustainable resource use among all relevant stakeholders (since resource users and resource managers are the same), which leads to better conservation of fisheries resources; and

• Positive impacts on marine production and trade activities thanks to good conservation of fisheries resources, which contributes to higher income and better economic conditions for fishing communities.

3 Co-management approach to the fisheries sector in Viet Nam Aiming to apply the co-management approach to the fisheries sector, Article 5 of the Fisheries Law (No: 17/2003/QH11) states “Government delimits coastal sea areas on the basis of their depth and distance from the shore and a number of other characteristics of coastal sea areas so as to decentralise to the coastal localities the general management of such coastal sea areas in association with production and business development”. Specifically, Decree No. 123/2006/ND-CP (Decree 123) on the management of aquatic resource exploitation by Vietnamese organisations and individuals in sea areas has created a stronger legal framework for local decentralisation. Decree 123 clearly defines the limits of regions and coastlines and stipulates that “coastal fishing ships which make registration in one province may operate only in


the coastal route of that province”. Under Decree 123 the Ministry of Fisheries (now merged into the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD)) is responsible for guiding “Provincial People’s Committees (PPCs) in formulating regimes and policies to support fishers to shift from coastal exploitation to other trades, in performing the community-based management in coastal sea areas”. Following this, the PPCs are given responsibility “to decentralise the management of coastal routes to district- and commune-level People's Committees; (and) to develop models of community-based management of aquatic resources in coastal routes”. The aforesaid provides an important legal framework for introducing the co-management approach to the fisheries sector in Viet Nam.

Viet Nam has established many community-based management models, however, the influence of these models remains limited. Everyone is allowed to exploit fisheries resources as stipulated by the law (open free approach); thus, the volume of fish extracted is beyond control. Legal documents stipulating the application of co-management in water boundaries have not yet been promulgated. Additionally, observation of management procedures by fishers has been limited due to: the poor living standard of fishers, whose key livelihood is fishing; limited qualifications and difficulties in accessing credit resources which have created obstacles in alternative livelihood generation; and local people’s lack of awareness about environmental and resource issues.

The overall co-management model evaluation report (DECAFIREP 2009) highlights that “community-based co-management models of the fisheries sector reflect a diversity in terms of formality, content and extent of involvement from relevant stakeholders. Some models have been established and have come into stable operation. Some others are under construction but have achieved some encouraging results of production management, environmental protection and fisheries resource conservation. However, these models: failed to formulate a working regulation which facilitates collaboration among communities, local authorities and relevant stakeholders; have not yet clearly identified surface boundaries to be managed; and failed to clarify relevant stakeholders. Many models have not been officially accepted by local government, failing to efficiently promote management responsibilities…”.

Aiming to accelerate the introduction of the co-management approach in the fisheries sector in Viet Nam, the issues outlined in the following sections need to be considered over the coming time.

3.1 Completion of common legal framework for the co-management approach The first macro-level assignment, and the most important, is to create a legal framework that enables local level governments and stakeholders to make their own specific decisions and regulations about co-management model development. This means establishing a legal corridor that encourages and enables co-management to be officially established in Viet Nam’s provinces. In order to achieve this, MARD should promptly issue national guidelines on co-management and the Government should proactively execute Decree 123 on coastal area management decentralisation.

Cities/provinces should devolve water and land use rights down to grassroots entities (as determined by co-management boundaries) and formulate legal instruments related to the definition of responsibilities, benefit-sharing and mechanisms which promote cooperation among relevant stakeholders – including fisheries communities, local authorities, sector administration agencies, universities/research institutions, national security forces, and management boards (e.g. community task forces). In line with the later issue, in order to establish a synchronised coordinated system, co-management models should clearly clarify target groups, management actors and management scope.


3.2 Development of sustainable alternative livelihoods programmes A very important issue is the development of sustainable alternative livelihood programmes to aid local people in case co-management models negatively impact their income. Only when sustainable alternative livelihoods are developed, can resource management procedures be strictly observed. Therefore, active and efficient support policies about shifting occupational structure and creating sustainable production in co-management areas should be formulated to facilitate programmes such as vocational training, soft credit loans for production development, comprehensive infrastructure development, development of non-damaging resource occupations, etc. 3.3 Awareness raising and capacity building for communities Awareness raising and capacity building for communities is an extremely important task. Awareness needs to be improved about: socio-economic and political issues; resource, environmental and ecological issues; and management issues – including knowledge of specific co-management issues, sustainable development and community activities.

In co-management, awareness raising should first be conducted for select, qualified/eligible task force/working group members to enable them to fulfil their duties. This will also act as a successful demonstration to the entire community to encourage them to implement the co-management approach. Dissemination and awareness-raising campaigns should be regularly launched through the broadcast of village/commune radio stations, the publication of brochures, leaflets, panels, posters and through the organisation of training courses etc.

3.4 Creation of sustainable financial resources for the application of co-management Sustainable financial resources are necessary for the ongoing operation of co-management, and should be considered from the outset, particularly in situations where people’s income might be reduced due to more restrictive regulations. It is advisable to seek sustainable financial resources for co-management areas such as, charges/fees from regional livelihoods, percentage from enforcement penalties (which could also be given to individuals of the community who take the credit for detecting and settling violation cases) and other regular expenditures from local government budget.

Official support is also very important for competent, relevant, co-management agencies (such as non-government organisations) and research institutions which provide technical support during the implementation of co-management.

4 Conclusion In conclusion, in order to sustain fishers’ livelihoods, indispensable fundamental preconditions need to be met, namely natural resource preservation and community conservation. Both preconditions might be satisfied through the application of co-management.

In order to promptly and widely apply the co-management approach to the fisheries sector, efforts should be made by the fisheries sector, as well as by relevant sectors/institutions, to consistently implement the co-management approach. In order to facilitate the application of co-management in fisheries in Viet Nam, the following recommendations are made: (1) completion of a common legal framework for the application of co-management in the fisheries sector; (2) development of sustainable alternative livelihoods; (3) raising the awareness and improving the capacity of the community; and (4) creating sustainable financial resources for the application of co-management.


References

Acheson, J.M. 2003: Capturing the Commons. Devising Institutions to Manage the Maine Lobster Industry. University Press of New England, Hanover and London.

Baird, I. 1999: Towards Sustainable Co-Management from the Mekong River Inland Aquatic Resources, including Fisheries, in Southern Laos PDR. A CESVI project, Bergamo, Italy.

C�c Khai thác và B�o v� Ngu�n li Thy s�n (DECAFIREP) 2009: �ánh giá t ng quan các mô hình ��ng qu�n lý trong ngành Thy s�n �ã tri�n khai t�i Vi�t Nam. FSPS II, SCAFI, Hanoi.

Hanna, S.S. 1995: User Participation and Fishery Management Performance Within the Pacific Fishery Management Council. Ocean and Coastal Management, Vol. 28(1-3): 23-44.

Hara, M. 1998: Fisheries Co-Management in Africa. Institute for Fisheries Management Coastal Community Development, Hirtshals, Denmark.

Jentoft, S. 1989: Fisheries Co-Management: Delegating Responsibility to Fishermen’s Organisations. Marine Policy, Vol. 13: 137-154.

Jentoft, S. and Kristoffersen, T.I. 1989: Fishermen’s Co-Management: The case of the Lofoten Fishery. Human Organisation. Vol. 48 (4): 355-365.

Jentoft, S. 2004: The Community in Fisheries Management: Experiences, Opportunities and Risks. In: Hersoug, B., Jentoft, S. and Degnbol, P. (Eds.): Fisheries Development: The Institutional Challenge. Eburon Publishers.

Karlsen, G.R. 2001: Can Formalisation Help? The Introduction of Fisheries Co-Management in the Inshore Fisheries of Dingle, Co. Kerry, Ireland. Marine Policy, Vol. 25: 3-89.

McCay, B.J. and Jentoft, S. 1996: From the Bottom-Up: Participatory Issues in Fisheries Management. Society and Natural Resources, Vol. 9(3): 237-250.

National Research Council 1999: The Community Development Quota Program in Alaska. National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.

Pomeroy, R.S. and Berkes, F. 1997: Two to Tango: The Role of the Government in Fisheries Co-Management. Marine Policy, Vol. 5: 465-480.

Pomeroy, R.S. and Viswanathan, K. 2003: Experiences with Fisheries Co-Management in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh. Kluwer Publications, Dordrecht.

Sandersen, H.T. and Koester, S. 2000: Co-Management of Tropical Coastal Zones: The Case of the Soufriere Marine Management Area, St. Lucia, WI. Coastal Management, Vol. 28: 87-97.

Toufique, K.A. 1997: Some Observations on Power and Property Rights in the Inland Fisheries of Bangladesh. World Development, Vol. 25(3): 457-467.

Yamamoto, M. 1995: Co-Management in Marine Fisheries: The Japanese Experience. Coastal Management, Vol. 23: 195-221.

Fisheries Co-management in Binh Dinh 133

Fisheries Co-Management in Binh Dinh Province, Viet Nam Peter Todd1

Volunteer Service Abroad - Binh Dinh Sub-Department of Capture Fisheries and Resources Protection

Abstract Co-management models are currently being applied in four areas in Binh Dinh Province (Tra O Lagoon, Ghenh Rang, Nhon Hai and Thi Nai Lagoon). Each model is at a different stage of development. Of the four models, Tra O Lagoon is the most advanced, introduced in 2007. The models follow the basic criteria necessary for the successful establishment of co-management: effective policy to allow for the implementation of co-management; regulations to set up an effective co-management structure; empowerment of the local community to undertake management functions; and effective partnerships between the fishing communities and the provincial government department responsible for fisheries management and resource protection. Effective codes of practice, operational plans and resources are necessary for the establishment and ongoing functions of the different groups established to take responsibility for the co-management models.

Keywords: Sustainability, small scale fisheries, empowerment, legal framework, partnership, structure

1 Introduction Coastal fisheries in Viet Nam are considered to be small scale fisheries, located in coastal near-shore waters. With increasing population pressure and the development of more effective (and/or destructive) fishing methods, these fisheries are increasingly over-exploited, causing hardship for the many coastal fishing communities.

The small scale coastal and near-shore fisheries in Binh Dinh Province fit this pattern. These small-scale fisheries comprise a significant proportion of the fisheries economy in Binh Dinh. They are located within a 50-metre deep line from the shore2, where approximately 80% of the total catch of all fisheries occurs. The main fishing methods are small gillnets (mackerel, shrimp, cuttlefish), small trawls (shrimp), longlines, push nets, lift nets (some with lights), and various fish traps. These fisheries include marine coastal waters, estuaries, lagoons and lakes.

As with elsewhere in Viet Nam, small scale fisheries in Binh Dinh are recognised as being over exploited, causing hardship for many coastal fishing communities whose sole or principal source of income is derived from fishing. In 2007 the marine catch in Viet Nam coastal waters (including Binh Dinh) was estimated to be 1,800,000 metric tonnes or more than three times the estimated Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) of 582,212 metric tonnes (Pomeroy et al. 2009).

Binh Dinh has 13 fishing communities amongst 157 coastal communities listed as facing difficulties in the World Bank Report 2005 (Anonymous 2005). The main threats to sustainable management of these coastal fisheries are the high level of exploitation and serial depletion of 1 [email protected] 2 i.e. small scale fisheries activities occur inshore of the 50 m depth contour


fisheries resources. This serial depletion is sometimes referred to as ‘fishing down the food web’. That is, depleting the larger species at the top of the food chain, and steadily catching smaller and smaller fish of less preferred species, including invertebrates, of low economic value. The over exploitation is driven largely by overcapacity of the fishing fleet: ‘too many vessels chasing too few fish’. The over-exploitation includes the continued use of illegal and destructive fishing methods. Although these methods are illegal and heavy fines may be imposed, there is a general lack of enforcement due to limited resources.

The most effective option available for improved resource management to address the problems of small scale fisheries is co-management; the sharing of responsibility for resource management between local communities and the government. The 2003 Fisheries Law and subsequent decisions provide for the implementation of co-management (Pomeroy et al. 2009). Over the past few years co-management models have been applied at a provincial level to begin addressing the problems facing small scale fisheries.

The co-management approach is not unique to Viet Nam. The co-management partnership arrangement has been applied in developing countries around the world, as it became apparent that a ‘top down’ government approach was not effectively managing small scale fisheries. Neither were locally based management initiatives successful where there was no involvement with the government agencies that had overall responsibility for fisheries management (Brown et al. 2005).

In Binh Dinh, the application of co-management models is being progressively applied to several fishing communities by the Binh Dinh Department of Capture Fisheries and Resources Protection (SDECAFIREP).

2 Co-management in fisheries in Binh Dinh There are two essential elements to the co-management of fisheries. The first is the partnership between the government authority responsible for fisheries management and the local fishing communities. The second is the empowerment of the fishing community to make fisheries management decisions concerning fisheries within their community fishing areas.

There are several published papers covering the implementation of co-management. Brown et al. (2005) provides a useful summary of the definitions and principles for the application of co-management. Co-management can be defined as “the sharing of decision making and responsibility for the management of fisheries resources between the local fishing community and the government centralised management”.

Brown et al. (2005) give four main criteria for the successful application of co-management. These are:

1. An enabling policy and legal framework;

2. The participation and empowerment of fishing communities;

3. Effective linkages and institutions; and

4. Resources: a fisheries resource worth managing and the people and resources to do it.

Four co-management models are currently being applied in four fishing areas in Binh Dinh Province: Tra O Lagoon, Ghenh Rang, Nhon Hai and Thi Nai Lagoon (Figure 1). Each model is at a different stage of development. Of the three models, Tra O Lagoon is the most advanced, introduced in 2007.


Figure 1: Map showing the location of the four co-management models in Binh Dinh Province, Viet Nam, April 2010 2.1 Enabling policy and framework Policy provides the overall framework for managing fisheries through the setting of goals and objectives. Legislation provides for the formalisation of these policies through regulations, both at a national and provincial level. The effective application of co-management at a local level requires a national policy recognising co-management as a national goal. The national policy and legal framework in Viet Nam for small scale marine fisheries is described and reviewed by Pomeroy et al. (2009). The concept of fisheries co-management was introduced by the then Ministry of Fisheries in the mid-1990s and is accepted as the national fisheries management approach to small scale fisheries. The application of co-management models in the provinces is relatively new. Binh Dinh has adopted co-management as the preferred option for managing small scale fisheries. At the provincial level, SDECAFIREP has the authority and ability to apply co-management to small scale coastal fisheries in partnership with local communities.

3 Regulatory framework

For the application of co-management in small scale fisheries, the participation and empowerment of local communities to undertake fisheries management activities is critical. The degree of empowerment, and the partnership participation of the government agency, is essential for this to work effectively. To apply co-management, there must be local regulations that will


empower appointed community groups to undertake various fisheries management functions, including the enforcement of national and local regulations.

The regulatory framework for the implementation of co-management models is implemented through the administrative structure of the People’s Committees. At a provincial level, all administrative functions, including fisheries management, are affected through the various People’s Committees operating at district and local community levels. The number of People’s Committees required to give effect to a particular co-management model depends on the number of separate fishing communities that are included in the model.

For each co-management model, a ‘co-management council’ has been established under regulations approved by the local or district People’s Committee. Each council is made up of approximately nine people appointed from local authorities, organisations and local communities, for a two year term. The membership of the councils depends on the particular model and the composition of community structure. For Tra O Lagoon, the co-management model regulation structure is complicated because there are four local People’s Committees who have fishing communities involved in the co-management model (Figure 2). The council for Tra O Lagoon is an ‘inter-community co-management council’, denoting the involvement and representation of the four local People’s Committees.

Figure 2: Administrative and legal structure of Tra O Lagoon co-management model

For Ghenh Rang and Nhon Hai (Figure 3 and Figure 4), only one local People’s Committee is involved for each model respectively.

The Thi Nai Lagoon co-management model is at the very early stages of development. Thi Nai Lagoon is divided into two main areas of jurisdiction, Quy Nhon City and Tuy Phuoc District. Within the Quy Nhon City jurisdiction there are two fishing communities (Dong Da and Nhon Binh) bordering the lagoon. Within the area of the lagoon under the Tuy Phuoc District jurisdiction, there are four fishing communities (Phuoc Thuan, Phuoc Hoa, Phuoc Son and Phuoc Thang). Regulations to establish co-management in Thi Nai Lagoon are progressively being prepared as consultation between SDECAFIREP and the fishing communities proceeds.

My Thang Core Group

My Loi Core Group

My Chau Core Group

My Duc Core Group

Co-Management Council

Regulations

Phu My District People’s Committee

Regulations

My Thang People’s Committee

My Loi People’s Committee

My Chau People’s Committee

My Duc People’s Committee


Figure 3: Administrative and legal structure of Ghen Rang co-management model

Figure 4: Administrative and legal structure of Nhon Hai co-management model

The membership composition of the councils depends on the individual model. The councils may include the chairpersons or deputies of the local People’s Committee, appointed leaders of the local fishing communities, a representative of the Fishing Union, the Chief of Police of the local community, the Chief of the Army for the local community, a fisheries expert from the local People’s Committee, and the chairperson of the Fatherland Committee. Each member is charged with specific responsibilities for the operation of the co-management model. A small operating budget is available, but the individual participation is voluntary. The co-management council has overall responsibility for the application of the co-management model across all the fishing communities within the co-management area.

Ghenh Rang fishing community

Quy Hoa fishing community

Bai Xep fishing community

Core Group

Ghenh Rang Ward People’s Committee

Regulations


Nhon Hai Fishing Community Nhon Hai People’s Committee


Regulations

Core Group


Figure 5: Operational structure ofco-management models

Reporting to the co-management councils are the ‘core groups’. There is usually a core group of approximately 4-5 members for each fishing community within the co-management area. The members of the core group are elected by the local members of the Fishing Union. The core group will appoint a leader and deputy leader. The number of core groups may vary depending on the size of the fishing communities within the co-management area. One core group may cover more than one fishing community. Membership of the core group, as with the co-management council, is on a voluntary basis.

The operation of the co-management model, as separate from the legal administrative structure, is affected through the ‘code of practice’ (Figure 5). The code of practice is the key operational element for the co-management models. The code of practice establishes the roles and responsibilities of the co-management council, and the core groups. The code of practice also establishes a commitment for the co-management council to undertake specified actions, or to implement various fisheries management actions. The codes of practice are initially prepared by SDECAFIREP and are consulted on and agreed to by the local People’s Committee, the co-management council, core groups and fishing community members. SDECAFIREP, the People’s Committee and the co-management councils are signatories to the code of practice.

Codes of practice have been established and are being implemented in Tra O Lagoon, Nhon Hai and Ghenh Rang. In Thi Nai Lagoon, where the application of co-management is in the early stages of development, the concept of co-management and the development of a code of practice are progressively being introduced to each of the fishing communities.

The codes of practice vary for each co-management model, depending on the specific fisheries management requirements. All codes of practice specify a commitment to implement and enforce established fisheries regulations for fishing seasons, mesh sizes, size limits and the use of illegal fishing methods (explosives, poisons). Additional management actions such as the establishment of aquaculture zones and protected areas may also be included in the codes of

practice as management actions to be undertaken in the future. A key management objective for all codes of practice is the protection of fisheries habitat, especially coral reefs. The Code of Practice for Ghenh Rang has been included as Annex 1 as an example.

Tra O Lagoon (1,200-1,600 ha) is a valuable fishing area and wetland of national importance. With a well defined spatial area, it is an ideal location to implement a co-management model for fisheries management.

The co-management model in Tra O Lagoon is the most advanced of the models in Binh Dinh. There are regular review meetings involving representatives from SDECAFIREP, the District People’s Committee, the Co-management Council, core group members and other officials as appropriate for the meeting agenda. The Co-Management Council and core groups provide reviews of the operation of the model and management actions taken. For example, in 2009, as part of the Code of Practice commitment to enforce the regulations on the prohibition of electric fishing, five boats and eight sets of electric fishing gear were confiscated. Such actions by the core groups to enforce regulations do not come without some cost, with reports of threats to damage the boats of core group members.

As part of regular review meetings, additional management proposals to improve the management of fisheries in Tra O Lagoon are progressively being introduced. For 2010, it is proposed to introduce a licensing system with fees for fishing methods and species. This


proposal will provide a source of funding for the functional operations of the core groups. Tra O Lagoon is well known for the fishery of black eels (Anguilla bicolour pacifica). However the species is listed as ‘Vulnerable’ under the list of endangered aquatic species in Viet Nam. Consequently it is proposed to prohibit the fishing of black eels in Tra O Lagoon from 2010. In addition, a proposal to zone the lagoon for various fishing methods by each fishing community is under consideration.

4 Conclusions Co-management is being applied successfully in fisheries in Binh Dinh Province. There are presently four areas where co-management is being applied: Tra O Lagoon, Ghenh Rang, Nhon Hai and Thi Nai Lagoon. Tra O Lagoon is the most advanced and has been in place for over two years, beginning in 2007. The other three models are in the earlier stages of implementation, with Thi Nai Lagoon the least advanced.

The models as being applied meet the essential requirements for effective co-management: an enabling policy and legal structure to give authority (empowerment) to local communities to manage their fisheries, and an effective partnership between the local communities and the government fisheries agency responsible for fisheries management and resource protection.

A key element for the successful implementation for co-management in Binh Dinh Province has been codes of practice that establish the roles and responsibilities for co-management councils and core groups.

Critical to the future success of the co-management models will be adequate resourcing of the co-management councils and core groups. For Tra O Lagoon, this issue is being addressed by the proposal to introduce a fee structure for licensing access to the fishery.

To be successful, there must be a clear definition of the objectives and desired outcomes of the co-management model, so that all participating groups have a clear understanding of what is trying to be achieved. The management objectives should not have a single focus on fisheries resource sustainability. Ideally, the management objectives should include balancing the ecological well being (sustainable fisheries regimes, habitat protection and restoration) with human well being that provides for long term sustainability.

References Anonymous 2005: Viet Nam Fisheries and Aquaculture Sector Study. Final Report. Appendix A.

Ministry of Fisheries and the World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/reference/. Accessed 16/02/2005.

Pomeroy, R., Nguyen, K.A.T. and Thong, H. X. 2009: Small-scale fisheries policy in Viet Nam. Marine Policy, Vol. 33: 419-428.

Brown, D., Staples, D. and Funge-Smith, S. 2005: Mainstreaming fisheries co-management in the Asia Pacific. Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. RAP Publication 2005/24. http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/af347e/af347e00.htm


Annex 1: Ghenh Rang Code of Practice

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM Independence – Freedom – Happiness

2nd Draft

THE CODE OF PRACTICE ON SUSTAINABLE CATCH OF THE LOBSTER RESOURCE IN THE NEARSHORE AREAS OF GHENH RANH COMMUNE – QUY NHON

Chapter I Community awareness

In the near shore areas of Quy Nhon in general and Ghenh Rang Commune and the small surrounding islands in particular, significant fisheries habitats including coral reefs and seagrass beds play very important roles as the nursery and growing grounds of many species, among which some have very high commercial values such as tropical lobsters and reef fish. These potential and abundant resources have created livelihoods and generated incomes for local communities whose lives have depended directly on the resources for centuries, especially the catch and on-growing industry of lobster seeds in recent years.

Apart from its benefits to the local socio-economic growth, this livelihood also has negative impacts on the declining abundance of near shore resources of lobsters and reef fish species as it is voluntarily operated without an effective management approach from the fishing communities. The local marine environment and related habitats of the bottom reefs, coral reefs, the sea bottom and seagrass beds, are degrading gradually with possible serious impacts on incomes and the sustainability of local socio-economic development in the future.

Being aware of this warning situation of the local fisheries harvesting and aquaculture with an emphasis on the importance and roles of fisheries resources to the local socio-economic status, Ghenh Rang fishing community have nowadays understood that their harvest industry must go together with the protection of fisheries resources and marine habitats.

To achieve the overall goal of “The management, protection and enhancement of fisheries resources are responsibilities of all authority levels and fishing communities”, Ghenh Rang fishing community need to participate in the protection and sustainable catch of local resources in partnership with local authorities initiated by SDECAFIREP.

This Code of Practice expresses local expectations on being active stakeholders to participate in the protection and sustainable use of natural resources in general and near shore lobster resource in particular, as well as the significant habitats of Ghenh Rang Commune for recent and future generations.

Chapter II

Rights and Responsibilities on the fisheries catch and aquaculture Article 1. The Ghenh Rang fishing community has the right to fish and farm within waters 6 nautical miles off the coast managed by the Ghenh Rang local authorities.

Based on legislative regulations by the Government, the Ghenh Rang fishing community has the right to fish and farm within waters 6 nautical miles off the coast managed by the Ghenh Rang local authorities.

Article 2. The right to fish and farm must comply with the responsibility to fish and farm in a sustainable manner, and to restore and protect fisheries resources and habitats in terms of sustainable enhancement of the resources and must not violate the Government Fisheries Law


by thoroughly undertaking technical advice recommended by functional agencies (SDECAFIREP).

Article 3. Fishing activities must comply with the regulations on fishing violations:

3.1. Minimum mesh-size for lobster catching:

Purse seine: 2a ≥ 18 mm

Gill-net: 2a ≥ 120 mm

3.2. Allowable catch size for lobster seeds and adults:

SDECAFIREP is required to issue Licenses for catching lobster seeds and adults.

3.3. Fishing seasons:

The fishing season for lobster species (adult lobsters and lobsters at breeding stages) is prohibited between April 1st and July 31st each year.

3.4. Fishing grounds and fishing zones:

Within the near-shore fishing zone (from the shore out to 6 nautical miles off the coast):

• Fishing with trawl-nets is prohibited except for catching small shrimps in surface waters.

• Vessels with high capacity or lengths exceeding the regulated standards are prohibited from fishing within the 6 nautical mile zone.

• Fishing with light systems (except for net-traps and squid pole fishing) is to be reduced.

These practices must also be followed by fishing vessels from other communities fishing within waters managed by Ghenh Rang community.

3.5. Commitment on the prohibition of illegal fishing practices:

Dynamite fishing, cyanide fishing, electric fishing and diving with or without oxygen supplier are strictly prohibited. Heavy penalties will apply to fishers breaking the law against these illegal fishing.

3.6. Commitment to undertake this Code of Practice.

Article 4. The Ghenh Rang fishing community agree to implement following Government recommendations on aquaculture:

4.1. Farming site:

To minimize the impacts from residential waste, fishing boat activities and the impacts of freshwater in the rainy season, farming cages will be moved further off shore. A farming zone for lobster seed on-growing will be established in the future Hon Ngang refugia.

4.2. Selection of seed lobsters for on-growing:

• Seed lobsters must be collected from a high quality local source.

• Seed lobsters sourced from outside the area must be approved by the Core Group.

• Seed lobsters from areas with aquaculture diseases must not be used.

4.3. Farming environment sanitation:

• Food sources for farming must be free from disease and must not contain illegal antibiotics.

• Information about infected seed lobsters and environmental indicators concerning sanitation must be reported to the Core Group and other aquaculturists for quarantine purposes.

• Dead lobsters must be stored in sealed tanks for burning and burying.


• Dead lobsters must not be thrown into the sea.

Waste Disposal: To minimize the impact of waste on the marine environment there will be a waste storage system for every household to collect waste. A group of waste collectors will be established and paid for by households.

4.4. Aquaculture logbooks:

Every household must have a logbook to keep records on starting dates, food sources, lobster health conditions, environment conditions, harvest, details, etc.

4.5. In addition to the above regulations, the households commit to implement this Code of Conduct when participating in fisheries aquaculture.

Chapter III

Protection of fisheries resources and habitats Article 5. The protection of the marine ecosystem and biodiversity (coral reefs, sea grass beds, rare and vulnerable species e.g. sea turtles) in the Ghenh Rang community fishing zone is essential for the long-term survival of the fisheries resources that provide for the economic and social well being of the community.

The protection of coral reefs and fisheries habitat is critical for sustainable management of fisheries resources in Ghenh Rang. The implementation of the Regulation, Hon Ngang Coral Reefs Decision 177/2004/QD-UB January 30th 2004 Quy Nhon People’s Committee, for the management and protection of Hon Ngang coral reefs, is a responsibility for the Ghenh Rang community that will bring about benefits for the whole community.

Article 6. Other commitments to implement the following regulations:

6.1. Coral reef restoration zone (Core zone):

Approximately 20 ha, 300 m wide, south of Hon Ngang and west of Hon Nhan.

The Core Zone is a total exclusion zone to be free from any human disturbance. Within the Core Zone the following activities are prohibited:

• All aquaculture.

• Collecting corals (dead or alive) by any means and for any purpose.

• All fishing by any methods. Strict penalties will be applied for dynamite, cyanide and electric fishing activities.

• Collecting fish as pets and other bottom creatures.

• Recreational activities: sea motoring, surfing, snorkelling and other recreational fishing activities.

6.2. Restricted fishing zone:

The area around Hon Ngang, approximately 80 ha. The Restricted Fishing Zone allows certain activities. Prohibited activities including:

• Collecting corals (dead or alive) by any means and for any purpose.

• Collecting fish as pets and other bottom creatures.

• Strict penalties will be applied for dynamite, cyanide and electric fishing activities, trawl-nets, diving and light systems of over 2000 watts/vessel.

6.3. Areas under the management by Ghenh Rang authority:

Outside of the management area and in areas under the management of the Ghenh Rang


community all legal activities are permitted.

Banned fishing activities with impacts on the resources and natural habitats of fisheries species include:

• Collecting and damaging coral reefs, the faunal system and other related habitats.

• Adding contaminating chemicals to the area.

• Importing infected fisheries species to farming sites or to surrounding areas.

• Building, damaging or changing hydro-system constructions without the permits from local authorities.

Chapter IV Implementation

Article 7. To effectively implement this Code of Practice, The Ghenh Rang fishing community must understand the need to participate in the fisheries resource co-management model with Ghenh Rang authorities and SDECAFIREP.

Article 8. To implement co-management rules, the communal Council of fisheries resource management and co-management groups (Core groups) will represent their community to implement the protection and enhancement of local resources. The operation of the Council and Core groups are regulated in the co-management regulations.

The community agree with the annual budget for the operation of the Core groups. Individuals and institutions are recommended to provide funding and support to the management and protection of fisheries resources including supports to the operation of the Core groups.

Article 9. The Ghenh Rang fishing community encourage individuals and institutions who are participating in the study and surveys of fisheries habitats and resources to provide technical expertise and make recommendations on the management and protection of fisheries resources to strengthen the local socio-economic growth.

Article 10. The Ghenh Rang fishing community request the cooperation and partnership of Ghenh Rang People’s Committee and SDECAFIREP to effectively implement this Code of Practice.

• Monitor and assess the implementation of this Code of Practice.

• Take responsibility on technical consultancy for the management and protection of fisheries resources.

• Consult on effective approaches on management and protection of fisheries resources.

• Coordinate in the enforcement of fisheries violations within their authorities.

Article 11. This Code of Practice has been discussed and agreed by the Ghenh Rang fishing community after being approved by the communal Council for fisheries management.

Amendments should be recommended and made if necessary to meet practical standards and changes of the government regulations by the Council as representatives of the community.

Attachment to this Code of Practice: Zoning map of Core zone and Restricted fishing zone.

Ghenh Rang, date…October, 2009


On behalf of fishing community in Area I On behalf of fishing communities in Areas Core group II, III, IV Core group

On behalf of the communal Council:

Ghenh Rang People’s Committee:

Signature and stamp I. The Development Process of the Code of Practice:

1. Draft this Code of Practice

2. Submit the document for feedbacks

3. Community meetings for feedbacks – with the Council and Core groups

4. Submit the document to Ghenh Rang People’s Committee for approval

5. Extension meeting to introduce the Code of Practice to the community (combined with official introduction of the Core groups)

II. Implementation:

This Code of Practice shall be implemented concurrently with the operation of the Core groups.

Property Rights and Allocation in Tam Giang Lagoon 145

Property Rights and Rights Allocation for Resource Co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon, Viet Nam Truong Van Tuyen1 a, Nguyen Viet Tuana and Truong Quang Dungb a Hue University of Agriculture and Forestry b Hue College of Economics – Department of Agricultural Economics

Abstract Common pool resources such as lagoon fisheries are often overexploited and in decline due to factors such as local poverty and unclear property rights. Overexploitation has resulted from a historically open access system. In Tam Giang Lagoon, Viet Nam, the State rights holders have developed numerous management regulations, but appropriate institutional arrangements are not in place to facilitate implementation. As a consequence, through traditional rights, resource users take opportunities to increase their access to and use of lagoon resources without taking adequate responsibility for protection. Improved management in this context requires a form of governance (such as co-management) which allows active and empowered local communities to play key roles. This type of arrangement needs to involve the allocation of resource rights so that power is shared between the Government and resource users and/or their associated organisations.

This paper draws on research from the Tam Giang Lagoon about current property rights regimes and the rights practices in the coastal lagoon areas, to highlight the need for developing fisheries associations and supporting rights allocation. This paper also outlines the processes that were used to implement co-management of fisheries resources in the lagoon area of Vinh Giang Commune, which included initiatives on the allocation of fishing rights to fisheries associations. This was the first application in Viet Nam where fishing rights were allocated to user organisations. This application of rights facilitated the formalisation of a collective/communal property rights regime over fisheries resources and enabled the operation of fisheries co-management between the local government and fisheries associations. The piloting of co-management in the lagoon area in Vinh Giang also put into place appropriate institutional arrangements which increased control over resource exploitation.

Keywords: Common pool resources, fisheries, fisheries association, community-based, property rights regimes

1 Introduction Tam Giang – Cau Hai Lagoon system is the largest lagoon of its type in Southeast Asia and covers an area of 22,000 ha over a length of nearly 70 km along the coast of Central Viet Nam. The lagoon system plays a significant role in the life of coastal communities and the socio-economic development of the whole province of Thua Thien Hue. Thirty-three communes and towns in five districts are located along the shore of the lagoon. On average, each commune has: seven villages; 1,600 households; and a population of 7,650. Of the seven villages, typically one to three are dependent on fishing while the others are dependent on farming activities.

1 [email protected]


According to the province statistical year book (PCTTH 2007), 17.6% of households located around the lagoon are dependent on fishing for their main source of income. However, non-fishing dependent households also participate in fishing activities, which can be a significant source of household income. For example, in 2006, 18.9% of what are classed as non-fishing dependent lagoon households had their highest income from fisheries sector (PCTTH 2007). The households around the lagoon which are dependent on lagoon resources all engage in either small scale fishing and/or aquaculture activities. These households can be grouped by the fishing gear types they use, i.e. fixed gear fishing (e.g. stake trap and bottom nets), mobile gear fishing (i.e. gill net and Chinese lu), and aquaculture.

The Tam Giang – Cau Hai Lagoon (hereafter Tam Giang Lagoon) has historically been an open access system (in terms of resource user rights), which has lead to the lagoon’s resource becoming overexploited and depleted, as resource users compete to increase access to and use of resources. Addressing the prevailing problems of the lagoon requires an appropriate and clear property rights regime that: facilitates a better resource management mechanism; improves control over lagoon use; and maintains the livelihoods of the traditional fishing groups. In response, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC - Canada) supported the implementation of the project ‘Common Pool Resource Management in Central Viet Nam’ (2008-2011). The purpose of the project is to carry out an analysis of property rights in the lagoon which could then be considered as a basis for fishing rights allocation for development of community-based co-management. This paper contributes to a better understanding of property rights practices and management in dense and diverse, coastal/lagoon areas. This paper also provides guidelines on the allocation of fishing rights to fishers’ organisations for the development of community-based co-management.

2 Resource management and formulation of the property rights over the lagoon

resources Prior to 1975, fishing in Tam Giang Lagoon was managed by local authorities through a system of regulations, bids and various taxes. The villages (lagoon communities) would be invited to bid for the management of lagoon resources. The rights to access the lagoon and undertake fishing were, therefore, administrated by villages. The villages then organised bids to allocate rights for using the water surface to fish to households, groups of families or Van - groups of fishers. The bid winners had the right to set up fixed gear (fish corrals and bottom nets) in the allocated area and had the right to transfer the fishing gear (together with the right of setting up fishing gear) to following generations.

Under this system small scale mobile fishing households did not have to pay tax because it was impossible to collect tax as they did not have a stationary fishing area or residence. Moreover, some of the lagoon area could not be used for fishing as it was used for public purposes, such as for waterways or for traffic (Nguyen Quang Trung Tien 1995; Ton That Phap 2000). It was usually agreed by Van members and fishers in the community that allocated fishing areas would be changed annually by drawing lots for the right to choose a fishing area and by relocating the fish corrals. This was the reason why traditionally fishers in the lagoon did not have fixed, long-term fishing grounds (Ton That Phap 2000). In practice, while fixed gear fishers held property rights to an allocated area, the rights were ruled by the fishing community.

During the collectivisation period (1975-1989) (after the American War ended and Viet Nam became reunited), natural resources became the people’s property as promulgated by the Government. This property rights regime had been in place in the Northern Viet Nam since 1954. For the Tam Giang Lagoon, the ‘co-operativisation’ movement meant the reorganisation of existing fishing practices. Local authorities organised the registration of fishing activities and established fishery teams or groups (similar to agricultural cooperatives). During this period, the lagoon was administrated by the fishery cooperatives. Principles for equal use of the water surface and lagoon resources and a resource use tax were applied. The tax levied on fixed gear was considered a legal acknowledgement of property rights. The fishers who did not register for


fishing and who did not pay tax were likely to lose their property rights if conflicts arose among fishers.

Under the instructions and supervision of local authorities, fishery cooperatives reallocated fishing locations annually by drawing lots and re-arranging fish corrals. If there was no conflict among members, and no new members were admitted, then location rearrangement was conducted every two or three years to reduce the costs. The acceptance of new members was based on the availability of water surface area. If water surface area was available, a meeting of all fish corral owners was organised (although, in practice, only key fishers were invited) to allocate the fishing area for new members and to make decisions on other related issues. The meeting outputs were reported to the commune authority by the cooperative and then approved by the district authority. The district authority would then approve a list of new members to be taxed (Truong Van Tuyen and Brzeski 1998).

After 1986, when Viet Nam applied market-oriented management mechanisms, lagoon resource use rights became complicated through the privatisation of lagoon resources for aquaculture. During this period, provincial and local policies which promoted aquaculture, conflicted with the traditional views on lagoon resource property rights – i.e. ‘land is private property and fishery ground is common property’ – and allowed many households to occupy water surface in order to privatise the occupied area.

Some common types of occupation were to build ponds or set up net enclosures for aquaculture. The occupied areas were regulated by local authorities through approved aquaculture development plans or issuance of land use certificates. This process resulted in some common property becoming private.

3 Property rights regimes, rights practice and legitimacy – Tam Giang Lagoon In Viet Nam, the State holds the rights to all resources (including property), while citizens, organisations and companies can only be granted the right to use an allocated resource. According to Article 164 of the 2005 Civil Code of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (Civil Code), when one is allocated property, one is given the right to posses, use and dispose of it. According to Article 192 of the Civil Code, the right to ‘use’ property includes the rights of exploitation and earning income and yield from it.

Table 1 provides an analysis of the property rights associated with main resource use activities in the Tam Giang Lagoon, including analysis of rights formation and legitimacy. Each of the property rights regimes are discussed in more detail in the following sections.

3.1 Open access rights regime In terms of lagoon resources, an open access rights regime is created through the absence of defined property rights, leaving people free to access and use the resources. This type of rights regime fits in with traditional thoughts and customs which regard fishing grounds as common property. By this way of thinking, every household has the right to access the lagoon to fish or collect resources. However, open access cannot be practiced by all fishers/households. For example, while mobile fishing households are free to choose fishing grounds, gears and fish species following the rule of ‘first come, first served’, fixed gear fishing households are restricted in choosing favourable fishing locations as the open access areas are occupied by other fixed gear fishers. This competition and premium on space has lead to fixed gears fishing households forming groups to claim exclusive rights to an area, which are then recognised by commune authorities. Within these groups, access to fishing grounds is discussed and agreed upon by group members who then decide the amount of fixed fishing gear to be used in that area.


Table 1: A summary of property rights regimes in Tam Giang Lagoon

Resource use activity

Main property rights regime operated

Base for the rights formulation

Legitimacy or legal status of the rights

Fixed gear fishing (i.e. stake trap)

- Open access as available space

- (limited) communal/ group property over specific fishing location

Customary practices, self-management groups supported by local authority

Low level of legitimacy as rights recognised by communities and local (commune) authorities through approval of zoning plan

Mobile gear fishing (i.e. gill nets and Chinese traps/lu)

Open access Customary practices “lagoon is a common property”

Very low level of legitimacy as rights recognised by the community only

Navigation and waterways

Communal and public property

Planned by provincial and local authorities

High level of legitimacy as approved by respective local governments

Aquaculture in net-enclosure areas

Private property Customary practices on fixed gear fishing and farming

Illegal practice. Rights recognised by communities and orally approved by commune government but against provincial regulations

Aquaculture in earth pond area

Private property Customary farming practice and zoning plan for aquaculture

Full legitimacy – with official land use certificate.

Source: CPRMVP 2008

The establishment of specific property rights has reduced the amount of open access area which can be used by mobile fishing households. The decline in open access areas has impacted the livelihoods of these mobile fishing households and some of them have started looking for alternative livelihoods, while others have adapted their fishing practices to increase effectiveness and access to resources. For example, the recent adoption of Chinese lu, a type of mobile net-iron-frame trap, has enabled mobile fishers to fish ‘everywhere’, i.e. areas that they could not previously access.

3.2 Communal/collective property rights Communal/collective property rights refer to the property rights shared by the members of a community or group, mainly fixed gear fishing groups, such as professional groups, villages, cooperatives, and fisheries associations. Communal/collective property rights are established and maintained through customary practices and receive oral recognition from local authorities, which means that their legitimacy is very low. Until very recently, fishing rights were not officially granted to any partnerships, such as communities, organisations or fishers. In practice however, local authorities auctioned the rights to communities (villages) and/or groups without official allocation.

Fixed gear owners share and maintain the rights to access, set up fixed fishing gear (stake traps, fish corrals) and fish in specified locations of the lagoon. The fixed fishing gear is usually arranged in rows for monitoring and rotation. Fixed gear owners register their occupation and number of fishing gear with the commune government in order to pay tax.

In some cases communal/collective property rights can generate collective actions/activities – such as community based resource management – which bring common benefits for communities or groups. Monitoring, surveillance and prevention of destructive fishing activities


are all organised by these community-based groups themselves. The groups that undertake these activities are popularly called self-management groups. Authorised by the commune authority, these groups control access and use of the lagoon in order to generate group benefits. In practice, the local government provides support to strengthen the collective actions/activities and thus collective rights.

While communal/collective property rights are still in the early stages of development, early application of these rights has proved effective. For example, granting rights to a fishing group to undertake restrictive fishing practices in an area, stops others from having undue access to that area and also prevents destructive fishing activities. Further, the control of pond water supply by certain aquaculture self-management groups has helped reduce pollution of waterways and subsequent disease spread. Box 1 outlines the types of holders of communal/collective property rights in Vinh Giang Commune.

Box 1: Holders of communal/collective property rights in the lagoon area of Vinh Giang Commune

i) Production group and village: The Production Group of Giang Xuan was established in 1975 and is in charge of managing the fishing activities of the community. In 1997, the group became one of the administrative units for the village of Nghi Xuan in Vinh Giang Commune. Nghi Xuan is administrated by the village leader. The village authority manages the lagoon resources within its boundaries and the use of lagoon by households. The rules on fishing activities are set up by village authorities and recognised by the Commune People’s Committee (CPC). It is required that all households involved in fishing in the lagoon area comply with the rules for managing fishing activities.

ii) The cooperatives of Vinh Giang: After 1975, two agricultural2 cooperatives were established in Vinh Giang (namely Giang Dong and Giang Nam cooperatives). The cooperatives were in charge of organising and managing fish corrals. Upon the growth of shrimp farming, a third cooperative was established to organise the households participating in shrimp culture and to provide fisheries services, such as market information and feed supply. Since 2004, due to the failure of shrimp farming, the cooperative has ceased to play an active role in household-scale production. The three cooperatives were merged into one to form the Integrated Cooperative of Vinh Giang, which took charge of the management of both agriculture and aquaculture activities. The cooperative is responsible for: 1) provision of agriculture services (i.e. fertilisers, pesticides, irrigation services); 2) development of agriculture and aquaculture plans; and 3) collection of aquaculture fees.

iii) Group of fish corral owners: This fixed gear fishing group was formed by fish corral owners themselves to protect their fishing locations. The group and its fixed gear fishing locations were recognised by the Commune People’s Committee, who allocated rights to manage and use the lagoon’s water surface to the group and its members. Though this allocation did not provide full legitimacy, the practice created a basis for establishing the collective property rights regime currently being used by fixed gear fishing groups. As part of being allocated the rights, it was agreed by group members that unplanned fixed fishing gear (i.e. fish corrals) would not be set up and spaces for waterways would remain unoccupied. Through this rights regime, individuals and groups contribute to the management and protection of resources by stopping internal violations and preventing external intrusion.

iv) Nghi Xuan Fisheries Associations: The Nghi Xuan Fisheries Associations were established under the Decision No. 34/QD (dated 12/12/2008) of the Provincial Fisheries Association of Thua Thien Hue (HUEFIS). HUEFIS is a social-professional organisation which has 110 members and three sub-associations – aquaculture, stake traps, and mobile fishing gears.

2 It was common that households practiced both fishing and farming at the same time and therefore agricultural cooperatives covered both activities


As stated in Article 5 and Article 136 of Decision No. 4260/2005 QD-UBND (dated 19/12/2005) of the Provincial People’s Committee of Thua Thien Hue, the Nghi Xuan Fisheries Associations have been delegated to hold fishing rights.

Source: CPRMVP 2008

3.3 Public property rights Areas in Tam Giang Lagoon which are used for public benefit, such as waterways, waterway transport areas and public service areas, have been designated as public property and public property rights have been given to local authorities (at varying levels) and government departments (such as the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Department of Natural Resources and Environment and the Department of Transportation). Any area in the lagoon which remains unallocated is also considered to be public property. The commune government directly manages these areas and can use them to raise government funds by organising bids for resource use, or leasing the area out to individuals/groups under short-term contracts (one to three years). Box 2 outlines the holders of lagoon public property rights in Vinh Giang Commune.

Box 2: Holders of public property rights in the lagoon area of Vinh Giang Commune

i) The district Department of Agriculture and Rural Development of Phu Loc (district DARD): The district DARD is the agency that is responsible for the management of aquaculture planning and fishing in the district. Article 52 of the Fisheries Law (2003) states that the People’s Committee at different levels is responsible for state management of fisheries. According to Article 13 of the Decision No. 4260/2005 of the Provincial People’s Committee (PPC) of Thua Thien Hue, the District People’s Committee (DPC) is authorised to allocate rights for fishing management to fishery organisations. To assist the DPC in allocation of these rights, the district DARD has been assigned as adviser to the DPC for defining the approach for rights allocation, as guided by the PPC.

ii) The district Department of Natural Resources and the Environment of Phu Loc (district DoNRE): The district DoNRE was established in 2003 with a mandate of land administration, and represents the DPC in issuing certificates of land use and water surface use. Concerning the allocation of rights of water surface management in Vinh Giang Commune, the district DoNRE acts as a counsellor to DPC in allocating fishing rights to the Giang Xuan Fisheries Association.

iii) The Communes People’s Committee of Vinh Giang: The Vinh Giang CPC is the agency responsible for administrative management and resource management at the commune level. The Vinh Giang CPC takes the leading role in making plans for aquaculture and fishing, and provides support to fisheries associations, such as legal support, resources and security (including aids for surveillance control), and support for plan development and implementation.

Source: CPRMVP 2008

3.4 Private property rights Private property rights are the exclusive right of a household or individual to an area in or around the lagoon. In Tam Giang, private property rights have been given for three main types of activities: agriculture; fishing/aquaculture in pens/enclosure areas; and aquaculture in earth ponds (refer to Box 3).


Box 3: Private property rights activities in Tam Giang Lagoon

i) Fishing: The exclusive private right of fishing in Tam Giang Lagoon was established during colonial times (before 1945). These private fishing rights are associated with fixed gear fishing (e.g. fish corral and bottom nets) but are not legally recognised. They are however, historically recognised by the community, or through customary rules. By holding this right, the right holders can stop mobile fishing households from accessing their area.

ii) Aquaculture in pens/net-enclosures: During the early 1990s, fish pens or net enclosures were set up in the lagoon for aquaculture purposes. This practice did not meet any legal difficulties and net enclosure owners were, in effect, able to privatise the occupied area (Truong Van Tuyen et al. 2006). The establishment of net enclosures allowed net enclosure owners to show their exclusive property rights, however it also narrowed the fishing area available in the lagoon for mobile fishers. In order to stop the development of net enclosures and recover the fishing grounds, the provincial government started planning intensive aquaculture areas. In 2008, while many net enclosures still belonged to private/individual property rights holders, their legitimacy had diminished.

iii) Aquaculture in earth ponds: According to the Fisheries Department of Thua Thien Hue Province (2006), in 2005, aquaculture earth ponds occupied an area of 5,350 ha in Tam Giang Lagoon3. This shows that the lagoon area under private property right is relatively large. The private property rights given to this activity have varying levels of legitimacy. The area which is allocated with a license (Land Use Certificate or the Red Book) by the district government is fully recognised by law, whereas an area which is allocated by a commune authority has a lower level of legitimacy and cannot be accepted by law. The Land Law (2003) of Viet Nam states that a Red Book indicates that an owner has use rights which include the right to transfer, mortgage, rent, capitalise, give and exchange. This private ownership is granted at the household level.

4 The process of fishing rights allocation to fisheries association for

community-based co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon From the outcomes of the rights analysis in the lagoon, the IDRC supported the implementation of the project ‘Common Pool Resource Management (CPRM) in Central Viet Nam’ by Hue University of Agriculture and Forestry which facilitated the government allocation of fishing rights over an area of 1,000 hectares of lagoon to the Fisheries Association of Vinh Giang Commune (Decision 942/2009 issued by the People’s Committee of Phu Loc District). This can be seen as the first piloting of fishing rights allocation to a fishers’ organisation in the lagoon, and in Viet Nam. The allocation formalised communal property rights and enabled the operation of fisheries co-management between the local government and the Vinh Giang Fisheries Association (VGFA).

Figure 1 highlights the involvement of linkage partners in fishing rights allocation in the Tam Giang Lagoon. The targeted rights regime established was collective rights, in which the fisheries association (FA) at the community level is the rights holder. Three levels of local government undertake key roles in specifying guidelines and making decisions on rights allocation. These roles are carried out particularly by DARD and DoNRE. The Fisheries Association of Thua Thien Hue Province serves as a focal point for interaction with policy makers and provides legal support to the grassroots/community level fisheries association. The facilitation of fishing rights allocation in Vinh Giang Commune followed the steps outlined in the sections below.

3 The actual culturing area in Tam Giang Lagoon may be smaller than this as some ponds have been abandoned due to water pollution


Figure 1: Partners and process of fishing rights allocation in Tam Giang Lagoon

4.1 Establishment of fisheries association and capacity building Establishment of the VGFA and capacity building was a critical step for identifying a (collective) rights holder for fisheries resources and creating an entity capable of managing the rights. The VGFA establishment was carried out in line with the regulations on management of fisheries resources, which were promulgated under Decision no. 4260/2005 of the Thua Thien Hue People’s Committee. Establishment and capacity building activities were designed to strengthen the VGFA with the following:

� Legitimacy: FAs are recognised by law, represent fisheries communities and work as a social-professional organisation;

� Organisational structure: The fisheries community found the VGFA structure (members, sub-associations, executive board and rules/regulations) to be appropriate and felt free to join to work together in exploitation and protection of fishery resources;

� Capability to achieve objectives and conduct fisheries management activities: The activities undertaken by the VGFA include: assisting local authorities in the re-arrangement of fish corrals; organising training courses to improve VGFA members’ skills to participate in community activities; encouraging members to pay membership fees; proposing plans on fisheries resource management and exploitation; developing regulations on fishing activities in sub-zones; carrying out patrols to manage illegal fishing activities and protect resources; and raising awareness among the community (and VGFA members) about VGFA activities and resource management; and

� Capability to mobilise funds and resources for operational and resource management activities: The VGFA is self-financed to undertake operational and resource management activities.

Commune Gov.

Village Sub FAs

Province FA

District Gov. DARD/DONRE

Province Gov. (DARD)

Co-management

body

User groups

Pratice of rights allocation for co-

management-Zoning plan for

management units-Building capacity

of rights holders -Detail plan for

management-Community-based

regulations-Collective action

plans- Appraisal,

negotiation, right issuance

- Management practice (registration, surveillance…)

- Monitoring & evaluation

FA Members

Right allocationGuidelineAssociation

Outputs-Fomalized

collective rights regime

-Defined rights & roles of partners

-Improved management of access & withdraw

-Reduced fishing intensity

-Improved protection & conservation

-Improved community livelihoods

Practice of fishing rights allocation for fishery co-management in Tam Giang lagoon


4.2 Participatory planning for fishing and resource management Making detailed fishing and resource management plans is essential when specifying rights allocation. Detailed plans can also be used to address the current problems associated with unplanned and/or unfeasible planning of fisheries exploitation. The detailed plans developed by the VGFA aim to: control (i.e. reduce) the fisheries exploitation capacity; maintain livelihoods for fishery communities; and define solutions for community-based resource conservation and livelihood development.

The detailed plans were made with active participation and involvement from the designated rights holders (i.e. VGFA), which is in line with current plans, such as the ‘Master Plan on Management of Fisheries Exploitation in Thua Thien Hue Lagoons by 2010’ (promulgated under Thua Thien Hue People’s Committee Decision No. 3677 in 2004) and the Decision No. 142/2008 of the Phu Loc DPC on adjustment of the number of fish corrals.

To strengthen the detailed plans and their feasibility, technical assistance was provided by organisations such as the Faculty of Extension and Rural Development, Hue University of Agriculture and Forestry, who provided technical support for the preparation of the fisheries management plan in Vinh Giang Commune. Table 2 shows the fishing rights allocation developed under the detailed plan for Vinh Giang Commune.

Table 2: Planning and fishing rights allocation to Giang Xuan Fisheries Association, Vinh Giang Commune

Functional sub-zone

Area (ha)

Current use status (2009)

Planning and allocation of fishing rights

Fish corrals

Mobile HHs

Fish corrals

Mobile HHs Other regulations

Fish corral 543 90 47 56 47 6 rows arranged as planned by provincial master plan

Waterway 324 64 - 64 Max 80 lu/HH

Navigation lanes 26 5 - - Max load of boat/ship is 10 tons.

Buffer zone (capture and aquaculture)

50 7 - 7

Breeding ground 40 7 - 4 Fishing is forbidden from December to March (lunar year).

Seaweed habitat area

10 4 - - Fishing is forbidden from December to June (lunar year).

Total 993 90 134 56 122

Note: lu (called l� Trung Qu�c) is the bottom fish traps made of nets and a steel frame. One unit has a length of 8-10 m and composes 15 traps: HH is household

The Lagoon area has been divided into different functional zones for different purposes. This zoning creates a base for the development of management solutions, for example, the development of regulations or the organisation of self-managed groups. According to the detailed plan, the lagoon area in Vinh Giang Commune is divided into different sub-zones including: fixed gear fishing sub-zones (six sub-zones); waterway combined with mobile gear fishing sub-zone;


lagoon traffic area sub-zone; breeding ground sub-zone; and recovery of ecology system sub-zone. The classification of zones was based on local experiences and knowledge of lagoon resources, current lagoon use and legal status. Based on the sub-zones, sub-fisheries associations (sub-FAs) were established – for example six sub-FAs for fixed gear fishing and one sub-FA for mobile fishing. It is planned that these sub-FAs will self manage their allocated lagoon area.

Planning for the management of capture capacity must meet the twin objectives of reducing capture capacity, while, at the same time, maintaining the livelihoods of the fisheries community. Defining fishing activities, the number of households involved in fishing, the scale of fishing gears, and fishing periods, were all critical steps because they have a significant bearing on local livelihoods. The detailed plans were made by conducting discussions and consultations with different stakeholders at varying levels (including fishing groups, and authorities at the village, commune and district level) in order to gain mutual agreement. In Vinh Giang, two considerations which aided in a mutual agreement being reached were:

• Number of fish corrals (Tro) defined for inclusion in the detailed plan was based on the number allocated to Vinh Giang by the Phu Loc DPC in the provincial master plan; and

• Number of mobile fishing households identified for inclusion in the detailed plan was based on existing number of mobile fishing households in the allocated lagoon area.

In the detailed plans the requirements relating to scale and quantity of fishing gear have either remained unchanged or been reduced, depending on the diversity of fishing activities of a household. Under the detailed plans, a fish corral owner can have a maximum of 40 units of bottom traps and 20 units of gill-nets, while mobile fishing households (who don’t have fish corrals) can have a maximum of 80 units of bottom traps and 40 units of gill-nets.

The plan on re-arrangement of fish corrals (from 90 units to 56 units) was prepared as per the requirements of the district plan on rearrangement of fish corral (2008-2010). A number of solutions to reduce the quantity of fish corrals were discussed and reviewed. However in the end, it was decided that: the reduction would be shared among six sub-FAs and the VGFA would re-arrange the fish corrals; the members of sub-FAs would work together to set up larger scale fish corrals; and the VGFA would find alternative and/or more diverse livelihood opportunities for their members. The financial support for fish corral re-arrangement would come from the provincial government programme on the fish corral re-arrangement and other sources.

4.3 Development of community-based fishing regulations and protection The co-management ‘Regulations on Fisheries Resource Exploitation and Protection in Vinh Giang’ form part of a community-based system that gives a foundation for the community and local authorities to manage the allocated lagoon area effectively. A critical requirement of this system is to set up feasible, community-based regulations that do not contradict current laws. The establishment of the regulations has showed the complexity in harmonising and balancing benefits among resource user groups, e.g. between fish corrals owners and mobile fishing groups. Therefore mutual agreement must be considered and gained as a top priority. One effective practice for achieving this is to discuss equity and benefit-sharing principles (sharing responsibility for protection of common livelihoods) among different groups with an identified aim of achieving mutual agreement. The co-management ‘Regulations on Fisheries Resource Exploitation and Protection in Vinh Giang’ cover the following points:

• Criteria/conditions for fishing in allocated areas including maintenance of existing fishing households and allocation of fishing rights linked together with the responsibility to manage resources by conforming to agreed rules;

• Rules on the number and type of fishing gear, based on type of fishing or household group;


• Detailed rules on fishing activities and resources management in sub-zones;

• Rules on the fishing location, time and species;

• Rules on paying fees for protection of fisheries resources and environment;

• Rules on using inputs and funds for the protection of fisheries resources and environment;

• Rules on task assignment for carrying out patrols;

• Rules on handling conflict over fisheries exploitation and/or management; and

• Rules on dealing with regulation violators.

Defining action plans is also very important because these help specify activities and/or the course of action. By preparing and implementing actions plans, the management capacity of the VGFA was improved. In Vinh Giang, action plans were developed for:

• Organising fishing registration and collecting fees for protection of fisheries resources and environment;

• Community awareness raising about co-management;

• Training on management for VGFA and other local officers;

• Patrolling;

• Implementing regulations on fishing and resource protection;

• Producing VGFA annual financial plans;

• Producing plans for the protection of seaweed; and

• Producing plans for developing alternative livelihoods in conjunction with the re-arrangement of fish corrals.

4.4 Appraisal and allocation of fishing rights Appraisal and allocation of fishing rights is mainly undertaken by the People’s Committee at the commune and district level and local government departments. Specifically the VGFA and CPC prepare proposals on the allocation of fishing rights in line with the DPC’s guidelines, which the DPC use to appraise proposals and make decisions. The process applied is designed to ensure that the allocation of fishing rights to VGFA has a solid legal basis. The legality is further supported as the proposed management plans – including zoning and regulation rules – are in line with the current master plans of district and province and other effective laws.

5 Final Remarks An analysis of property rights shows a mixed function of property rights regimes as opposed to the seemingly clear categories often found in literature. This mixed function varies among specific activities and across points in time. The State rights holders have developed numerous regulations, but institutional arrangements are not in place to facilitate implementation. In this context, the private and collective rights holders claim opportunities to increase access and resource use, rather than taking responsibility for management.

Current property regimes in the lagoon (open access, private and communal) were formulated from customary practices and changed over time. With a low legal basis, the current property rights regimes do not specify the rights of the resource users and partners involved (e.g. households, collective-groups, and even state departments). These systems do not ensure access to the resources and create difficulty in management and control of the exploitation levels. Consequently, resources are declining, which threatens community livelihoods.


Until very recently, neither fishing households nor collective partners were allocated legal fishing rights. However in practice they did assume and practice some level of management rights, though they did not have clear (legal) rights or responsibilities. It is widely recognised that appropriate fishing rights allocation coupled with the issuance of management regulations can be an effective response to the situation. The pilot fishing rights allocation to the Vinh Giang Fisheries Association in May 2009 highlighted the high interest from local stakeholders, while also highlighting the feasibility of strengthening collective property rights for community-based co-management of the coastal fisheries.

The pilot co-management operation has had the following initial results:

• The plans and regulations are realistic and feasible for implementation. This was achieved by ensuring that the planning and development of regulations was done through a participatory approach, with active participation from VGFA members;

• The number of fishing households, including mobile gear fishers and the amount of fishing gear per household, has been controlled;

• Fisheries breeding grounds have been protected. These were the first conservation activities put into practice after many conservation efforts were developed but not implemented;

• Resources used for the management and fisheries association activities, such as the budget, have been improved. Revenue from fee collection has improved as fees are now based on the scale of fishing. As parts of rights allocation, in areas designated for fish breeding and conservation, the VGFA have been able to protect and sustainably harvest seaweed, which has increased the associations funds and had a follow-on effect for the Commune;

• Generally, electric fishing (i.e. the most destructive form of fishing) has been banned in the lagoon area allocated to the VGFA;

• VGFA members have gained some direct benefits, such as maintained livelihoods due to secured access to the fisheries resources. In addition, VGFA members also enjoyed other material and moral benefits by participating in VGFA activities such as VGFA meetings, annual fishing festival, and seaweed production;

• Fishing and aquaculture production has increased. Production in 2009 was recorded as being better than previous years. The implementation of co-management has partly contributed to this improvement due to increased fishery stock and the ban on destructive fishing activities.

References Nguyen Quang Trung Tien 1995: Vietnamese Fisheries in the early half of the 20th century. The

Thuan Hoa Publisher. Hue, Viet Nam.

Common Pool Resource Management in Central Viet Nam Project (CPRMVP) 2008: Reports on the Field Group Discussions. CPRMVP, Thua Thien Hue.

Fisheries Department of Thua Thien Hue Province 2006: Annual report on fishery development for 2005. Fisheries Department of Thua Thien Hue Province, Hue, Viet Nam

People’s Committee of Thua Thien Hue Province (PCTTH) 2007: The Statistical Year Book, 2006. PCTTH, Hue.

Ton That Phap 2000: Fishing in Sam Chuon, An Truyen, Thuan An area. In: Brzeski, V.J. and Newkirk, G.F. (Eds.): Lessons from the Lagoon: Research towards Community Based Coastal Resources Management in Tam Giang Lagoon Viet Nam, Coastal Resources Research Network. Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada.


Truong Van Tuyen and Brzeski, V.J. 1998: Property right issues in Tam Giang Lagoon, Viet Nam. International Association for Study on Common Property Workshop (IASCP), Canada.

Truong Van Tuyen, Ton That Chat, Chau Thi Tuyet Hanh, Duong Viet Tinh, Nguyen Thi Thanh, Nguyen Thi Tuyet Suong, Le Thi Nam Thuan and Ton That Phap 2006: Participatory local planning for resource governance in the Tam Giang Lagoon, Viet Nam. In: Tyler, S.R. (Ed.): Communities, Livelihoods and Natural Resources. Action Research and Policy Change in Asia. The International Development Research Centre. Ottawa, Canada.

Development of Fishing Societies in Thua Thien Hue 159

Development of Fishing Societies in Thua Thien Hue through Community-based Management Nguyen Quang Vinh Binh1 Thua Thien Hue Sub-Department of Capture Fisheries and Resources Protection

Abstract The intensity of aquatic production in Thua Thien Hue’s lagoons is the highest in Viet Nam. Marine resource management faces many difficulties due to limited human resources in public administration compared to the required administrative tasks. Therefore, Thua Thien Hue has developed a small-scale fisheries participatory management strategy, i.e. a community-based fisheries management system, in parallel with the existing public management system.

Under this strategy, fishing societies who use the aquatic resources take initiatives in managing specific water areas under assigned responsibility. Fishing societies themselves are core organisations which help organise and stimulate fishers to meet their common goals. ‘Fishing rights’ are being granted to fishing societies to provide motivation for fishers’ to remain involved in fisheries management and to develop the fishing societies. Since fishers can expect to have long-term rights to use fishing grounds they can initiate many solutions for better management of fishing grounds, resources and the aquatic environment, to ensure their long-term livelihood.

During the initial period of the development of the community-based fishing management system, Thua Thien Hue has focused on establishing, enhancing and developing a system of grassroots fishing societies. The initial successful development of grassroots fishing societies, the execution of autonomous activities as well as cooperation with relevant authorities has so far popularised the concept of fishing lagoon management. Community-based fishing management or participatory management in Thua Thien Hue is facing many difficulties and challenges. Therefore in order to ensure the sustainability of the community-based fisheries management system, fishing societies have been legally established, empowered and supported with overarching regulations and a systematic, institutionalised organisational structure.

Key words: Fisheries, co-management, participatory, legal framework, fishing rights

1 Introduction The intensity of aquatic production in Thua Thien Hue’s lagoons is the highest in Viet Nam (Tran Duc Thanh et al. 2000). Marine resource managers face many difficulties since the availability of human resources is very limited compared to the required administrative tasks. Internationally, concepts such as participatory management, community-based management and co-management reflect best practice in fisheries management and may offer a solution to resource management in Viet Nam.

The concept of participatory management has existed in Viet Nam for a long time (i.e. thousands of years through traditional management systems). As such, during the national development, a series of State and Party policies were formulated based on participatory management using concepts such as: collective autonomy; people know, people discuss, people do, people check; local democracy; the State and people work together; and decentralisation. However, it is not 1 [email protected]


simple to bring these concepts into practice and therefore, very difficult to execute overarching policies and resolutions. How to integrate the ‘community-based initiatives’ into resource management in an efficient, creative and scientific way is very complicated and problematic.

Based on lessons learnt from fisheries management in Thua Thien Hue, and drawing on national and international experiences, a comprehensive marine resource management system is to be developed and implemented in Thua Thien Hue.

1.1 Background Models of co-management and community-based management have been piloted in many areas in Viet Nam over last 10 years. However, practical applications of these participatory fishing management systems have incurred many problems surrounding empowerment and lack of a systematic organisational structure.

One pre-condition for successful co-management is to clearly identify members of the community (Pomeroy and Williams 1994). Additionally, it is important to not only recognise the community, but also recognise the communities’ traditional resource management practices. Internationally, the traditional management practices of Viet Nam’s communities are increasingly being recognised and appreciated in terms of resource management (Ruddle 1998). In Viet Nam, over the last centuries, through using traditionally management practices many ‘fishing villages’ have been able to organise and manage their activities by themselves very well when they were empowered, despite very limited capacity.

In regards to the sustainability of the above mentioned co-management and community-based management systems, many have failed once the implementing project/programme ended, as the organisational structure was not systematic or institutionalised. The self-governing ‘teams’, ‘task forces’, and ‘patrols’ automatically disbanded when the project/programme ended as fishermen no longer had motivation.

It is envisaged that the concepts of ‘fishing rights’ and ‘territorial use rights’ in fisheries for official fishers’ associations may provide long term motivation for fishers to remain involved in fisheries management. It is based on this scientific assumption that a community-based fishing management system is being implemented in Thua Thien Hue.

2 Pilot organisation of fishing societies and fisheries management in Thua Thien Hue In the Thua Thien Hue context, fishing societies were considered suitable organisations for the development of community-based management of small-scaled fishing industries, especially for the province’s lagoon areas which cover 22,000 ha involving five coastal districts, 86 fishing villages, and approximately 7,000 fishing households. However, the use of fishing societies was seen as a difficult approach since this type of organisation did not exist in Thua Thien Hue prior to 2003 when the feasibility of this concept was first examined and other fishers' organisations – including two official organisations i.e. Fishing Trade Union and Fisheries Cooperative – had been in the province for a considerable time.

The first step in developing community-based fisheries management in Thua Thien Hue was to establish the fishing societies. In the pilot site Quang Thai Commune, the Quang Thai Fishing Society (QT Fishing Society) was established with 108 founding members who voluntarily applied for membership. The QT Fishing Society was established on the basis of the agreement between the Fishing Association of Thua Thien Hue and the Quang Thai Commune People’s Committee (QT-CPC). The QT Fishing Society is under jurisdiction of the Fishing Association of Thua Thien Hue, who is responsible for providing technical expertise and organising activities. The QT Fishing Society is to be led by the Commune Party Committee and comprehensively administrated by QT-CPC. The QT Fishing Society is sponsored by the Department of Agriculture


and Rural Development at the district level and the Thua Thien Hue Department of Fisheries (now incorporated into the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development).

The Fishing Association of Thua Thien Hue has issued the decision on the establishment of the QT Fishing Society. The QT Fishing Society is, in fact, an independent organisation, belonging to the Fishing Association of Viet Nam, with legal status and has its own official stamp issued by the Thua Thien Hue Department of Public Security.

In terms of organisational structure of the QT Fishing Society (which subsequent fishing societies in Thua Thien Hue have followed – see Figure 1), the society was initially set up with a provisional Executive Board, whose members were agreed by both the QT-CPC and the Fishing Association of Thua Thien Hue. The provisional Executive Board operated for six months in which time it was responsible for running activities and organising a general meeting to officially vote in members of the (permanent) Executive Board. The Executive Board is made up of a chairman, vice chairman, secretary and other members as nominated.

* The organisational structure of the fishing sub-society simply includes a group of fishers in some areas

Figure 1: Organisational structure of a fishing society in Thua Thien Hue

As part of the organisational structure an inspectorate was established with one of the Executive Board members appointed as chairman. Representatives from the different fisheries sub-societies/groups formed the other members of the inspectorate. The inspectorate is responsible for controlling the observation of regulations and rules by the society, and coordinating patrols to protect fishing grounds and marine resources in the marine production areas managed by the fishing society.

EXECUTIVE BOARD

Members, Vice chairman, Chairman, Secretary, Member,..

Inspectorate

Chairman, Members

SUB-SOCIETY (TEAM, GROUP...)

..... SUB-SOCIETY (TEAM, GROUP...)

Individual-household

----


2.1 Achievements of the pilot Quang Thai Fishing Society The pilot model has attained good achievements and many decisions have been ratified by communities. The initial implementation has achieved remarkable developments, such as:

• Planning and re-arrangement of fishing grounds, water ways and fishing cage areas, in order to clear the environmental, reproductive and migratory habitats of aquatic species;

• Development of a regulation for self-governing of fishing grounds for submission at the General Meeting of the Fishing Society for approval. The regulation was also ratified as a local democratic regulation by the local authorities;

• Protection of production areas of the Fishing Society in coordination with competent state fisheries administration agencies;

• Further re-arrangement of fishing grounds to ensure that all members of the Fishing Society, and in particular those fishing households who suffered from unfavourable conditions due to the initial re-arrangement of fishing grounds, were provided with sufficient fishing area to provide for their livelihood. The Fishing Society has gradually taken initiative in rearranging fishing tools, fishing cages and water ways.

3 Institutional and system development Without institutional and systematic characteristics, and an enabling legal framework, participatory management models will not function well. Whenever the model runs out of resources, it will disappear sooner or later. The legal status which has been supplied to the fishing societies of Thua Thien Hue acts as a bridge connecting local authorities and fishers. The legality of the fishing societies is a prerequisite for the ongoing existence of the organisations after the implementing project/programme ends.

In parallel with the establishment of official fishing societies, emphasis has also been put on completing a regulation on participatory fisheries management, as specified in the ‘Fishing Lagoon Management Regulation’ (TTHPPC 2005). The participatory fisheries management regulation prescribes that a fishing society is a fishers’ organisations which is authorised to manage, exploit and produce aquatic products in a specific water area, but not contrary to the overall State plan. The regulation also outlines that fishing societies are to work together with the State to manage many areas such as fishing grounds, marine resources, marine environments, water ways, and fishing taxes. This framework enables local people to have specific rights to self manage internal activities which the State cannot, due to lack of resources. Under the regulation local fishing communities are responsible for managing natural resources together with state agencies at all levels.

Fifty-six fishing societies have now been set up throughout Thua Thien Hue Province since the establishment of the pilot fishing society six years ago. These societies operate under the regulation of the Fishing Association of Thua Thien Hue (refer to Figure 2), creating a synchronous system over the whole province. The existing system has many bottlenecks (such as limited leadership skills in local fishing societies, financing of the fishing societies, relationships in the participatory management system etc.) which need to be improved, however, it has future potential. Under Thua Thien Hue provincial management plans, water surface area is to be allocated to local fishing societies for marine aquaculture and exploitation in order to facilitate communities to take the initiative in managing these areas. Under the provincial plans fishing societies are allowed to be granted ‘fishing rights’2 (as opposed to individuals), which is designed to reduce the number of focal points of management. In this case, member cards are given to official members of the fishing society and are seen as a ‘professional practice license’ and a common right. 2 Fishing rights are the right to use fishing territory, including quantity of permanent and flexible jobs and aquaculture in specific water areas


Figure 2: Organisational structure of Fishing Association of Thua Thien Hue Province

Local authorities of Thua Thien Hue Province have not just been encouraging community-based fisheries management generally, but have institutionalised it through the organisation of fishing associations and establishment of an enabling framework. Thua Thien Hue Provincial People’s Committee Decision No. 3677/QD-UB approving the master planning for marine resource exploitation enables the “development of community-based fishing management systems with aims to reduce State administration costs, at the same time promote the local democracy of fishers’ organisations in management of fishing grounds, marine resources and marine environment and relevant areas such as waterways, flood control, rescue services…put all-levels of fishers’ groups under jurisdiction of Viet Nam Fishing Association as a key partner, enabling local authorities to coordinate management of marine production in particular, and management of fishing in general in Thua Thien Hue’s lagoons”. The Fishing Association of Thua Thien Hue, apart from being a simple professional association, is entrusted with public tasks, i.e. to develop a strong organisation of fishers’ with aims to cooperate with the State in more efficient fisheries management at the grassroots level in Thua Thien Hue lagoons.

The long term sustainability of the participatory fisheries management system is not only supported by the State and the fishing community, but also being supported by scientists and relevant stakeholders who have assisted in planning for self-governing and providing access to development resources.

4 Initial outcomes By early 2010, more than 4,000 members had enrolled in 56 official local fishing societies located across five coastal districts in Thua Thien Hue. The fishing societies were established covering varying fisheries industries and geographical areas (e.g. some fishing societies covered lagoon fishing, while others covered marine; some societies covered fishing industry, some aquaculture, and others both; some societies covered a series hamlets, others one entire hamlet, and others a sub-population of fishers). Apart from the fishing societies which were established under officially supported programmes/projects, other fishing groups have been established by local fishers and commune authorities as they became aware of the benefits that the groups were having on marine production and management.

The organisational structure of the local fishing societies in Thua Thien Hue is different from that of neighbouring provincial fishing associations as the fishing societies in Thua Thien Hue are officially recognised organisations that have been introduced by the State to develop

FISHING ASSOCIATION THUA THIEN HUE

COMMUNITY RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT CENTER

FISHING SOCIETY LOC BINH 1

FISHING SOCIETY MIEU NHA

FISHING SOCIETY......

MEMBERS: companies, cooperatives, unions


community-based fishing management system in a legal manner. As prescribed by the ‘Fishing Lagoon Management Regulation’, a local fishing society can be granted fishing rights for a specified water area through a so-called ‘red book’ for the fishing industry. This provides significant motivation to develop the fishing societies since fishers can expect to have long-term rights to use fishing grounds ratified by the State, in writing. The organisational structure facilitates the use of fishing societies’ human and financial resources to, together with the State, protect fishing grounds, and conserve and renew common marine resources

In practice, generally, fishing societies are issued fishing rights, however in instances where they are not, fishing activities have at least been authorised by the commune competent agencies. In this way, fishers’ communities, specifically the local fishing society, are responsible for managing and protecting fishing grounds and marine resources.

Empowerment of well-structured fishing communities is an important pre-requisite for the development of a participatory management system. In Thua Thien Hue, when fishers’ societies have been empowered, they have taken initiative in management activities, including management of exploitation areas and protection of natural resources and the environment. While the process of empowerment in Thua Thien Hue has made some progress, it is going very slowly, behind the scheduled roadmap.

5 Recommendations and initial experiences It is recommended that pilot models be established under the jurisdiction of an official public system, with possible financing from ODA (official development aid) projects, in line with official State plans. Since governmental programmes have strong institutional features, if the models attain good results, they can then be scaled up and expanded.

For participatory management systems, it is recommended that well structured official organisations be established under systematic and institutional arrangements. Official recognition will heighten the importance of elected community leaders and acceptance of the entire system. If the organisations are part of a consistent, systematic, institutionalised structure, the greater the chance that the organisations will continue to exist and operate after the implementing project/programme ends.

It is recommended that emphasis be put on the formulation of overarching management regulations which will guide any possible scaling up or expansion of the pilot models. It is impossible to mobilise enough financial and human resources to establish new models at every different site.

National policy remains a challenge for all practitioners. The slow promulgation of bylaws to the Fisheries Law to guide practitioners, few legal documents and inconsistent use of terms in participatory management in marine resources3, remain obstacles.

6 Conclusion: Prospects and Challenges The development of a community-based fisheries management system in Thua Thien Hue has significant potential to manage the provinces’ fisheries resources, but faces significant challenges. Models of co-management and community-based management have been piloted in many areas in Viet Nam over the last 10 years. However many of the models have failed once the implementing project/programme has ended.

In Thua Thien Hue, to ensure the sustainability of the community-based fisheries management system, fishing societies have been legally established, empowered and supported with

3 The term ‘community-based management’ is only found in the ‘Master Planning for Fisheries Sector of Viet Nam by 2010’ developed by the Fisheries Ministry and DANIDA, Denmark in 1998. The term ‘co-management’ has not been found in Viet Nam’s dictionary.


overarching regulations and a systematic, institutionalised organisational structure. ‘Fishing rights’ are being granted to fishing societies to provide motivation for fishers to remain involved in fisheries management and to develop the fishing societies, since fishers can expect to have long-term rights to use fishing grounds.

Over the last centuries, through empowerment, many ‘fishing villages’ in Viet Nam have demonstrated that they can organise and manage their activities by themselves very well, despite very limited capacity. The establishment of fishing societies is designed to empower local communities and promote traditional values and management practices, which are increasingly being recognised and appreciated internationally.

Changing the management approach is a challenge for local authorities, specifically for marine managers as well as relevant competent administration agencies and People’s Committees at all levels. National policy is also another challenge since the Fisheries Law barely refers to aspects of co-management or community-based management. The slow promulgation of bylaws to the Fisheries Law, few legal documents and inconsistent use of terms in participatory management of marine resources, remain obstacles.

Although many difficulties exist, participatory fishing management is the only appropriate way to streamline management structures, reduce administration cost and closely manage the fishing industry and to develop marine resources, aquatic economies and fishing communities in a sustainable way. To achieve this, it is necessary to develop empowered and officially recognised grassroots organisations, such as fishing societies, to enable them to become strategic partners with the State in the application of fisheries co-management.

References Pomeroy, R.S. and Williams, M.J. 1994: Fisheries Co-Management and Small-Scale

Fisheries: A Policy Brief. ICLARM Contribution No. 1128. Manila.

Ruddle, K. 1998: Traditional community-based coastal marine fisheries management in Viet Nam. Ocean & Coastal Management. Vol. 40:1-22.

�y Ban Nhân Dân t�nh Th�a Thiên Hu� (TTHPPC) 2005: Quy ch� qu�n lý ngh� cá ��m phá Th�a Thiên Hu�. Quy ch� qu�n lý khai thác thu# s�n ��m phá Th�a Thiên Hu�. Ban hành kèm theo quy�t �+nh s� 4260/2005/Q�-UB, ngày 19/12/2005. TTHPPC.

Tran Duc Thanh, Nguyen Chu Hoi, Do Nam, Nguyen Mien, Nguyen Nhat Thi, Tran Dinh Lam, Nguyen Huu Cu and Nguyen Van Tien 2000: Impacts of the wetland preservation for Tam Giang-Cau Hai Lagoon System. In: Do Nam (Ed.) 2000: Workshop on management and protection of coastal wetlands in Vietnam Hue, July 1998 – Proceeding. Textbook printing factory, Thua Thien Hue.