The transcendental problem of space and timeAbstractThis article aims to discuss the character of the transcendental concept of spaceand time found in the Transcendental Aesthetic and its importance in the followingissues: the phenomenological problem of the form of intuitive donation, the scientificand metaphysical interpretationofspacetime, thequestionofthecontent ofspacetime occurrences and their experimental contribution, and the question of the form ofrelationsandassociationsofexperimentalcontent. Theobjectiveofthearticleistoradicalie an interpretive approach to !ant"s doctrine of #paceTime in order todemonstrate possible confrontations with current issues of Analytic $hilosophy, whichwill be done, although superficially, in the final chapter.!ey words: spacetime, transcendental aesthetic, form, science, experience, analyticalphilosophy %. &orm of the sensitive representations&irst, we need to direct our attention to !ant's understanding of matter and theform of representations.That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, ( term itsmatter) but that whicheffects that the content of the phenomenoncanbearranged under certain relations, ( call its form *!r+, ,-./%0e will find textual evidence for what !ant understands as forms of intuitions intranscendental aesthetic: 1space and time are its pure forms,sensation in general,itsmatter2 *!r+ A .-3, 45/. According to the supposition put forward in the beginning ofthis article, the content of the transcendental aesthetic doctrine, that is, the proof thattime and space are pure intuitions and conditions of the possibility of 6nowledge is,collaterally, a reaction against the possible material reading of the conditions ofsensibility. (n order to explore and strengthen this supposition, we will start a discussionthat involves the personalities of 7eibni and 8lar6e.1From this point on Critic of Pure Reason will be abbreviated as KrV (Kritik der reinen Vernunft).1&irst, we can observe that, in fact, depending on the way in which oneapproaches time and space, there are two typical modes of considering them, both ofwhich gained a paradigmatic value because they were the two extremes of disagreementbetween these two philosophers *and physicists/. Time and space would be either themetaphysical expressionofrelationshipsbetweenthings, inwhichcasethephysicalphenomena depend on a sufficient reason in order to provide the foundation for theirrelationsofcausality, orabsolutethings, inwhichcasethesephenomenawouldbeconditioned only by the mathematical quantities that represent the positions and instantsas if they were things.(ncorrespondencebetween7eibniand8lar6e, thereis anexampleof thisbifurcation of trends in a prominent expression. According to 8lar6e: 1#pace, finite orinfinite, isabsolutelyindivisible, evensomuchasinthought) *toimagineitspartsmoved from each other, its imagine them moved out of themselves)/ and yet, space isnot a mere point2 *%9:4, p. ;;/. And, according to 7eibni, supposing that...< space is something absolutely uniform, and without the things placedin it, one pointofspace absolutely does notdifferin anyrespect whatsoeverfrom another point of space. =ow from this it follows *supposing space to be#omethinginitselfbesidesthe>rderof,odiesamongthemselves/that it isimpossible there should be a reason why ?od, preserving the same situations ofbodies among themselves, should have placed them in space after one certainparticular manner and not otherwise why everything was not placed the quitecontrary way, for instance, by changing east into west *%9:4, p. ;4/. The latter intends to save the principle of sufficient reason, without which thetransition from @athematics to $hysics would be, according to him, impossible. This isbecause 7eibni is still an advocate of the notion that mathematical truths depend on1matters of reason,2 where nothing related to the relative position of objects is assured,and that the transition of these to 1matters of fact2 is not unrestrictive and depends onthe validityof metaphysical principles such as the principle of sufficient reason.7eibni's argument is constructed by coordinating the principle of sufficient reason withthe principle of the identity of indiscernibles: if space were real, it would be impossibletodistinguishonepoint fromanother andtherewouldnot besufficient reasonforobjects to be one way and not the other) if time were real, the world could have been2created sooner. And there would not exist, in the universe, absolute positions in spaceand time, because they would be indiscernible, and therefore, one and the same. ,ut7eibni also rejects the notion of space and time as absolute substances because he doesnot move away from the position firmly supported by traditional logic, where the ideaof substance had an incorrigible force: in such a way that space, if real, should be eitherthe subject or the predicate. According to Aussell: The relation, then, between a place and the substance occupying it, is onefor whichthe traditional logic hadnoroom. Accordingly, the independentexistence of places was denied by careful philosophers, and admitted by =ewtononly because he was blind to its consequences. *AB##C77, %99;, p. %-9/,utthisisonlyAussell'sopinionwhichreducesthisproblemtoabroaderclass, one that belongs to the class of 7eibni's metaphysics and logic problems, derivedfrom 7eibni's tacit adoption of the doctrine of substance. Textually, 7eibni does notuse this argument.>n the other hand, the former, 8lar6e, intends to reserve the unrestricted passageof =ewton's principles of mathematics to $hysics, without the need for a metaphysicalprinciple: 1(f space was nothing but the order of things coexisting) it would follow, thatif ?odshouldremoveinastraight linethewholematerial worldentire, withanyswiftness whatsoever) yet it would still always continue in the same place *8!C, %9F4, p. ;F;/.!ant offers the transcendental point of view as an expression of the idea that6nowledge is neither purely logical nor purely sensitive, but rather that it depends on thecontribution of both sources of 6nowledge: whereas concepts are subordinate to rules,intuitions test the limits of these rules via the modalities of fulfillment, such asconfirmationor refutationbothimplyamodificationof thecontent of concepts,therefore, a synthetic change, and not a merely analytic test. (t is only fair to note thatthe relationship between concepts and intuitions is not the same as that which subsistsbetween the formal and the material, nor between synthesis and the manifold. (ndeed,concepts also have a material part and can be presented as a theoretic manifold, andintuitions also have a formal part and can be exposed synoptically *not as a manifold/through imagination. Gowever, these are different relations, although they overlap. Therelationbetweenconcept andintuitionis onlytherelationof thegenericwiththepossibilities of regional enrichment, that is, theprocess of particulariationof theconcepts or application of judgments.Anotherwaytounderstandthecontributionofsingularityandtheimmediatenature of intuitions in !ant's wor6 is by observing that all the synthetic judgments arerepresentations of somemodalityof intuitivefulfillment of aconcept, implyingaregional perspective of approaching this concept whereas an analytic judgment doesnot havearegional perspectiveanddoesnot suffer theweight of intuitionsintheevaluation of its truth.&romthe transcendental point of view, intuition belongs to a source ofrepresentationdifferent thanunderstanding, andis usedas a counterpoint for thefoundation, restriction, fulfillment, enrichment, contribution, and application forconceptual operations.0ith this, !ant draws attention to another aspect of the problem thephenomenological and transcendental according to which, intuitions are interpreted asa structural mapping of the location3context of the application of the concepts.>bjectively, intuitions are that which assigns a concept to their relation with an object,and this relation must not be confused with the absolute sense, but rather with the aspect;oftheobject that isofferedtothephenomenal perspective. Iependingonhowthisaspect emphasies some and omits other information or how it provides a more or lesspartial perspective to the intuitive contribution, the relation of influence of the objectover the concept mayhave different weights. =ow, thosewhouse concepts inajudgment are interested in a homogeneous weight of the influence of an object over aconcept, one which definitively influences the decision for one or the other side of theconceptual boundary, in such a way that judgment will be either true or false but neverhalf true or half false nor neither of either. (f the intuitive contribution gives as muchweight for one side as for the other, or has no weight at all, this is because the relationemphasied by phenomenal perspective does not establish a regional affinity betweenthe concept and the object. (n other words, it could be said that in this case the relationestablishedwiththe object does not establisha measure for its contribution, andconsequently, does not providephenomenal 6nowledge. Theyareheterogeneousinrelation to each other, and not homogeneous, to use the words of !ant in the beginningof his (nalytic of Principles, the transcendental schema:. This is what would happen ifthe only possible relation of the concept with the object was given through the randommatter of perceptive intuitions, as empiricists desired, creating the problem of inductionand leading to s6epticism.(n this context, time and space are forms of intuition because the exploration ofthepossibilities of intuitiveapplicationwithinconcepts andtheories if wesee66nowledge depends onthe identificationof the regional marginof its intuitivefoundation, and that is determined or measured in an experimental plane,a prioriandhomogeneous: that is, time and space, understood as the final context of an experienceconcerned with proving or refuting a theoretical system of concepts. &or this reason,some laws of intuitive donation can be parallel to the laws of geometry, and the form ofsensitive donation obeys certain necessary laws such as the one where two contradictorytheories cannot be intuitively contextualied by the same temporal and spatialoccurrence *which is an interpretation of a law of physics/. 5Thus the empirical conception of a plate is homo!eneous with the pure !eometrical conception of a circle, inasmuch as the roundness which is co!itated in the former is intuited in the latter$ (6r7, : 181.$nly partially: from the very beginning we cannot disregard the fact that both Iescartesand Gume flirted superficiallywith the transcendental version of the problemof6nowledge, but both lose this sense as soon as they find it. Gume remains s6eptical withregardtotheweight wegivetoour confirmations andrefutations, andrightlysobecausetohimthisweight doesnot dependonthecontent ofrobust metaphysicaltheories but is conditioned by our habit a posteriori. Therefore, it depends not on timeand space, formal and a priori, but on the matter of psychological theories that map ourrepresentation of time and space. Gume confuses the relative weight of intuitivecontributions withtheabsoluteweight of psychological dataandthat is whyinconfusing the sensitive representation with a thing itself he was able to claim that theinfluence of the object over concepts is merely contingent and depends on point of view,almost as if to say that 1objects2 are mere rays of clustered sensitive properties, a viewadopted by other empiricists such as ,. Aussell in -eaning and Truth.. The initiative of The Critique's author is to deny any material theory of time andspace, denying them not only an absolute nature *thus agreeing with Gume/ but also arepresentative or psychological nature, amplifying the insight of the #cottishphilosopher to a transcendental version of the challenge to metaphysics that the insightsuggested. &or!ant, aswehaveseen, timeandspaceareformsthat conditiontheintuitive donation, governing all the different ways to fulfill concepts: subsequently, thelawsthat governthemcanbefoundneitherinlogicnorgeometrybut ratherinthetranscendental axioms of intuitionJ. The introduction of the transcendental ideality oftime and space translates into a matter of time and space as intuitive sources by meansof the global ideality of intuitive organiation in an experimental context made regional8This te4t will be discussed in the last chapter, confrontin! the anal#tic tradition in !eneral$12by the transcendental subject. =ow, it is not a novelty to translate the search for a basiccontext for 6nowledge into a search for time and space9. Gowever, !ant does this in aradical philosophical version of the problem: time and space are not merely the materialcontext wherethings are, but rather theformsthat individualiematterregionally,allowingsynthesis *not inducti*e, andnot throughtables of content for empiricalresearch/ of all the moments of the experience. Thus, he made possible thetranscendental evaluation both of the regional foundation of 6nowledge and the changesintheintuitivefocusthat expandtheregional marginsofour6nowledge, thusalsopredicting changes in the theoretical paradigms%5.-. 8onclusion: confrontation with analytical tradition0ebeganthis article witha controversythat is present inthe discussionsbetween 7eibni and 8lar6e on time and space, and we demonstrated !ant's interest inrefuting them in Transcendental Aesthetic as a case associated with the broader interestin proving that thehere and no!that provide the basic content of representations ofsensitivity cannot be pointed out materially via a theory, whether it be a geographic,physics, mathematic, or metaphysics theory. The issue of time and space, in !ant, isintimately lin6ed to the importance of the issue of intuition as the only 6ey available toustothephenomenological relationofrepresentationwiththeob,ectand, thus, thisquestion depends on the legitimacy of the experimental foundation as a whole. 0hat!ant means we argue is that if, hypothetically, someone defines time and space asthelaboratoryof aparticular scientist, this will haveconsequencesfor theideaof;The fact that, surprisin!l#, the laws that were e4posed b# these a4ioms coincide with the laws of =uclidean !eometr#, althou!h it is not an inferior problem (since it is due to this that some critics have used the e4istence of non>=uclidean !eometr# a!ainst 6ant., is not a matter that can be discussedhere$