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Policy Proposal to Address Prison Overcrowding in California

Press, The Associated. Prison. The Trial Begins Over California Prison Crowding. KCBS, San Francisco, California, USA.

Jamie Ferris, Audrey McFarland, Cara Lauster, and Jose Gil

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Group Member Report

Executive Summary: Cara worked on this.

Problem Definition: Audrey and Jose worked on this. Jamie edited.

Analytical Objectives: Everyone worked on this section.

Evaluation Criteria: Everyone worked on this section.

Alternative 1: Amend the Three-Strike Policy; Jamie worked on this. Audrey edited.

Alternative 2: Institute Rehabilitative Programs; Audrey worked on this. Jamie edited.

Alternative 3: Juvenile Intervention; Cara worked on this. Jamie edited.

Methods of Analysis: Jamie, Cara, and Audrey worked on this.

Analysis of Alternatives: Everyone worked on this section.

Discussion of Results: Everyone worked on this section.

Recommendations: Everyone worked on this section.

_____________ ____________ _____________ ________________

Jamie Ferris Jose Gil Cara Lauster Audrey McFarland

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Executive Summary:

The purpose of our paper is to educate the National Governor’s Association about the

problem of the California prison-overcrowding situation. Our objective is to reduce the prison

population of California by 100%, or 84,000 prisoners within fifteen years. We want to inhibit

crime by implementing prevention and determent policies. We also want to reduce the current

state recidivism rate of 70 percent. In addition, we aim to reduce the negative safety and health

effects of overcrowded facilities.

Currently, California prisons are operating at 197 percent capacity. They cannot keep up

with the increasing costs of corrections or provide adequate living conditions to prisoners. Some

of the effects of prison overcrowding are decreased prison safety, riots in prisons, attacks on

prison guards, electrical blackouts, sewage spills, and the declining mental health of prisoners.

Prison overcrowding affects prisoner’s health, the economy, crime rates, parole and recidivism,

and violence and safety. The United States currently houses five percent of the world’s prisoner

population, which is five times the world average for number of prisoners held in a single

country. The U.S. spends $70 billion on corrections per year, an increase of forty percent in the

past twenty years. California has the largest prison population in the U.S. and it continues to

increase. California also has the highest recidivism rate in the United States at 70 percent.

We extensively researched the issue of overcrowding using databases, peer reviews, and

editorials to grasp the full scope of the California prison-overcrowding situation. From the

research that we conducted, we picked three issues to capitalize on to help reduce the prison

population in California while reducing the recidivism rate simultaneously. We proposed

changes to the three-strike law that would require the third offence to be more serious than the

current law states in order to reduce the number of non-violent offenders for serving life

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sentences. We also proposed implementing substance abuse programs, which suggests that not

treating drug and alcohol abusers costs society more than not treating them. By implementing

these drug and alcohol treatments, offenders would avoid imprisonment, reducing the prison

population. Finally, we propose implementing after school programs in the state of California in

order to reduce the number of juveniles in the prison population.

We ran cost and benefit analyses on all three alternatives that we proposed and found that

all three alternatives’ benefits outweighed costs over a time period of fifteen years. This proves

that our three alternatives are cost effective and efficient. Our recommendation is that the

National Governor’s Association implements all three of our alternatives. By doing this, 17,029

offenders would be released or avoided annually. After fifteen years, this would significantly

reduce the prison population. While the general public and policymakers desire results now, the

annual number of prisoners reduced or avoided shows the annual effectiveness. This issue does

not need further research unless these alternatives prove to be ineffective in fifteen years.

Problem Definition:

Scope: The United States contains 5 percent of the world’s prison population and nearly 25

percent of the world's prisoners (Lithwick, 2009, pg 1). Americans incarcerate 756 inmates per

100,000 residents -- nearly five times the world average. Nearly one in every 31 adults in the

U.S. is in prison, in jail or on supervised release (Lithwick, 2009, pg 1). The nation’s corrections

expenditure amounts to approximately $70 billion each year and over the past 20 years has

increased 40 percent (Lithwick, 2009, pg 1).

Cost/Economic: California has the largest prison population and the highest recidivism rate in

the U.S. [70 percent] (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2010). Prison population reductions and

providing adequate facilities for prisoners are especially difficult at present due to the state

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budget crisis, exaggerating the fact that the correction and rehabilitation expenditure experiences

increases each year (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2010). California’s corrections costs increased

by 50 percent in less than a decade and comprise approximately 10 percent of the state budget

(Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2010). The average annual cost of incarceration has increased by

approximately $19,500 since 2000-01 currently estimated at $47,000 per prisoner (Legislative

Analyst’s Office, 2010). This includes an increase to $8,300 for prisoner health care and $7,100

for security (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2010).

The rehabilitative programs implemented in California exhibit failure to help prisoners

recover from their drug addictions (Katel, 2007, pg 17). According to California State Inspector

General Matthew L. Cate, the treatment program in California was a $1 billion dollar failure

(Katel, 2007, pg 17). The state spends $143 million each year for drug abuse treatment programs

provided to inmates and those released from prison (Katel, 2007, pg 17). Studies suggest that

participation in California’s current drug abuse treatment program has resulted in more prisoners

returning to prison within a year of their release than those not involved in the program (Katel,

2007, pg 17).

In 1978, California adopted capital punishment and approximately 87 percent of all first-

degree murder cases are eligible to pursue the death penalty as punishment. With a 77 percent

increase in death row inmates (Tempest, 2005) and a 67 percent increase in the total California

prison population in the last decade (Urbina, 2009), the costs associated with capital punishment

are only going to increase. Additionally, California Governor Schwarzenegger has allocated an

estimated $356 million for a new death row facility over the next 20 years; it will cost an

estimated $1.2 billion to run this facility while not truly reducing the prison population (Tempest,

2009). When comparing the cost of maintaining the current system of capital punishment in

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California with the cost of merely imprisoning these inmates for life without parole, there is a

difference of $126.2 million dollars per year (Tempest, 2005). Issuing life sentences without

possibility for parole instead, while it does not decrease the physical population of the state’s

prisons, would allow for the reallocation of billions of dollars in the Correction and

Rehabilitation budget which could be used in efforts to decrease or accommodate the rapidly

growing prison population.

Health: The California Correctional Department’s health service has an annual budget of $1.1

billion dollars (Udesky, 2005, pg 797). However, the system has been criticized for providing

inmates with unsanitary conditions. A U.S. federal judge described the health care system as

“incompetence and at times outright depravity” (Udesky, 2005, pg 796). This comment emerged

after hearings for a class action lawsuit filed in 2001. After hearing testimonies, Judge Thelton

Henderson ordered the California prison health care system to go under the control of a court

appointed receiver June 30th of that year (Udesky, 2005, pg 796).

Court medical investigators found several cases of cruelty and negligence among CDCR

facility employees (Udesky, 2005, pg 796). In a report provided by the medical investigators to

the court, it was noted that more than 64 prisoners died each year as a result of the health care

system in CDCR (Udesky, 2005, pg796). Inmates have to wait months to see a doctor and

sometimes their appointments are cancelled if nurses believe that the prisoner does not need to

see a doctor (Udesky, 2005, pg 796). The quality of care provided by physicians in California’s

prison is 20-50 percent inefficient (Udesky, 2005, Pg796).

Prison overcrowding across states has raised concerns about chronic diseases that could

easily spread among inmates. In 1996 a report presented to congress describes that HIV (Human

Immunodeficiency virus), HBV (Hepatitis B virus) and Tuberculosis is higher among prisoners

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(Gupta, Altice, 2009, pg 264). According to the CDC, 30 percent of acute Hepatitis B cases in

the U.S. occurs in people who have been incarcerated (Gupta, Altice, 2009, pg 264). The

transmission of the HBV and other pathogens in prisons is known to occur due to sharing tattoo

paraphernalia, razor blades, fights, sexual activity and sharing toothbrushes (Gupta, Altice, 2009,

pg 268). The prevalence of HBV is higher among state prisons and efforts to reduce the virus can

benefit inmates as well as the public population. Considering that the rate of recidivism is 70

percent in California, the flow of inmates leaving and entering the prisons can transfer the virus

to the general public. According to an article by Shaili Gupta, providing inmates with

vaccinations can be a cost effective strategy with savings of $2.3 for every $1 invested in

vaccinations to prisoners (Gupta, Altice, 2009, pg273).

Violence/Safety in Prisons: Overcrowding may increase riots and arguments among

prisoners leading to decreased safety for both inmates and correctional facility staff. At

least 16,000 prisoners sleep on bunks crammed into cells, gyms, dayrooms, and hallways

due to lack of space (Worst of the Worst, 2008). In October 2006, Schwarzenegger

declared a state of emergency based on the numerous effects of overcrowding including:

electrical blackouts, sewage spills, numerous riots, and more than 1,600 attacks on prison

guards in 2005 (Worst of the Worst, 2008). In 2007, a nonpartisan state oversight agency

declared the California prison system a threat to public safety and a possible contributor

to the state budget crisis (Worst of the Worst, 2008).

Crime Rates: Crime rates are nationwide, as well as in California are declining (Rothenberg,

2009, pg 1). Violent crime rates decreased by 46 percent and property crime rates decreased by

38 percent in California between 1995 and 2007 (Rothenberg, 2009, pg 1). However, during that

time California’s prison population increased by 31 percent (Rothenberg, 2009, pg 1). This

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increase suggests that California’s sentencing procedures may not reflect the state’s criminal

justice needs.

The rate of juvenile arrest is as high as that of adults. Those juveniles sentenced to adult

facilities contribute to the overcrowding problem in California. As Graph 3 shows, there is a

normal distribution of the different offences from 1988 to 1998. Property offences contributed to

the majority of arrests among juveniles in California. In total from 1988 to 1998, there were

536,113 juvenile arrests made for property offences compared to 222,822 arrests for violent

offences. Other offences for juvenile arrests totaled to 110,048, while juvenile drug offences

totaled to 95,703 from 1988 to 1998.

Parole/Recidivism: In 1970, citizens of California urged lawmakers to change the state’s

criminal justice system to apply harsher sentences to prisoners with the hopes of deterring

criminal activity. Since then, almost a dozen strict sentencing laws were passed including fewer

opportunities for early release for good behavior and the controversial three-strikes law. It is

estimated that if nothing changes, the number of prisoners will increase to over 190,000 by 2012

(Muradyan, 2008, pg 483).

In January 2008, Schwarzenegger made an attempt to ease the crisis by proposing the

release of 22,000 nonviolent inmates (Muradyan, 2008, pg 498). However, since recidivism

rates in California are the highest in the nation, the proposal faced criticism and failed to pass in

the legislature (Muradyan, 2008, pg 498). Additionally, Schwarzenegger approved $7.7 billion

in new prison construction to the ease overcrowding (Source?). The project proposed adding

16,000 state inmates and 16,000 beds for soon-to-be released inmates (Muradyan, 2008, pg 490).

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Many critics question the decision because they believe the money could be used to finance

recidivism programs to reduce the population in the long run.

In 1994, in an attempt to reduce crime and recidivism rates, California passed proposition

184, known as the “Three Strikes and You’re Out” sentencing law (Greenwood, 1993, pg iii,

and Chen, 2008, pg 345). Under the three-strikes policy, prisoners receive longer sentences for

committing serious or violent felonies (Appendix 5). Such mandatory sentencing laws require

more people to serve lengthy prison sentences in an effort to maintain public safety by

incapacitating criminals from offending again (The California Prison Disaster, 2008). This

system has been criticized as a possible cause of prison overcrowding (Prison Nation, 2009).

In California, the three-strikes policy follows a two-part process. If a defendant has a past

serious or violent felony conviction (considered a strike) when convicted of any subsequent

felony, the sentence for the second felony (the second strike) is double the standard sentence

(Bailey and Hayes, 2006, pg 9). If a defendant has two strikes, any preceding felony conviction

carries a mandatory sentence of 25 years to life in prison (Chen, 2008, pg 349). Since the time of

its inception in 1994, approximately 87,500 inmates have received sentences under the three-

strikes law. Of those prisoners, 7,500 received sentences of 25 years to life for committing their

third offence (Chen, 2008, pg 350).

The state’s parole system is too large and arguably the most ineffective in the country.

Upon release, all offenders are placed on parole for one to three years by requiring parole, the

system is unable to provide adequate services. Approximately 70 percent of California's

parolees return to prison after three years (The California Prison Disaster, 2008). 80 percent of

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parolees have fewer than two 15-minute meetings with parole officers each month, leaving

serious offenders with too little attention, risking public safety (Source?).

A law passed in 2009 limits parole to dangerous ex-criminals and only sends them back

to prison if they commit new crimes. The effects of the law are yet to be determined, but its

implementation on January 25 could help reduce the state’s 70 percent recidivism rate. Parolees

are often returning to prison for small crimes such as failure to attend meetings or failing a drug

or alcohol test (Jailhouse Blues, 2010). In California, only 33 percent of admissions were new in

2004; compared to 1990 when 41 percent of admissions were new. Overcrowded prisons are

adversely affected by high recidivism rates because they cause an increase in the population by

criminals who could be successfully exercising their parole option.

The most common offence by felon parole violators from 1994-2008 consisted of drug

and property claims (Graph # ),. Property crimes increased between 2001 and 2008. Drug crimes

increased from 2002 and 2007, but later decreased. Crimes against people make up the next most

frequent offence committed by felon parole violators. The number of crimes against people

remained fairly steady from 1994-2008. The number of other crimes committed also remained

steady from 1994-2008.

The mean suggests that felon parole violators commit drug crimes most frequently. This

implies that drug rehabilitation programs may be the most useful deterrent for parole violation.

The second highest committed offence indicated by the mean is property crimes, followed by

crimes against people and other crimes. The median also suggests that property and drug crimes

occur the most followed by crimes against people and other crimes. The variance in minimums

and maximums of each type of crime from 1994-2008 suggests that there will be fluctuation in

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the numbers of each type of crime per year. Therefore, the data suggests that there ought to be a

variety of rehabilitative programs for parolees. The standard deviation is high for property and

drug crimes by felon parole violators indicating that the data is spread out across a large range of

values and not close to the mean. The standard deviation for crimes against people and other

crimes by felon parole violators is low, indicating that the values in these categories are close to

the mean; there is not much variation in the values.

The data suggests that if California experiments with programs that attempt to reduce

recidivism rates and thus the average number of years of imprisonment, the state could reduce

the number of inmates and save a considerable portion of its budget. Reducing the number of

parole violators through rehabilitation and limiting the total number of prisoners on parole may

be cost effective and efficient.

Standing: The state of California and the states that California deports prisoners to have

standing.

Baseline Scenario: In the 2009-2010 budget, the state of California attempted to reduce prison

overcrowding by cutting $1.2 billion from the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation [CDCR] budget (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2010). Specifically, the cuts

reduce inmate and parolee rehabilitation programs and make changes to policies for prisoners

including: reducing the sentences of and deporting specific undocumented prisoners, prohibiting

parolees with no serious, violent or sex offences from returning to prison for minor parole

violations, increasing the credits that prisoners can earn to reduce their sentences, increasing the

dollar minimum for specific property offences to be regarded as felonies, and providing

monetary incentives to counties for decreasing the number of people on probation from re-

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incarceration (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2010). The changes were estimated to reduce the

number of prisoners in California by 18,500 in 2009-10 and 25,000 in 2010-11 (Legislative

Analyst’s Office, 2010).

In 2009-10 the state achieved a reduction of only 1,600 inmates and is predicting a

reduction of 11,800 inmates in 2010-2011 (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2010). This benchmark

failure is largely due to the governor’s budget assuming only 200 sentence changes compared to

the 8,500 estimated in the budget (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2010). The legislature also failed

to adopt enough statutory changes to complete the reductions. Consequently, the governor’s

budget proposal allows for only half of the estimated $1.2 billion in savings (Taylor, 2010, pg 1-

2).

On January 12, 2010, a federal three-judge panel ruled that the state must reduce its

prisoner population to 137.5 percent of its intended capacity. This calls for a reduction of

approximately 40,000 inmates within two years. The state has appealed the ruling to the United

States Supreme Court and is awaiting their decision before implementing the plan. The intended

plan includes the changes proposed last year to reduce the budget as well as the governor’s

current proposals which the administration estimates would decrease the prison population by

15,100 inmates (Taylor, 2010, pg 2). Schwarzenegger’s current proposal is to mandate a

maximum sentence of one year and a day in county jail for parolees who have not committed

serious or violent crimes and are convicted of certain property and drug felony crimes, rather

than serving another state prison sentence (Taylor, 2010, pg 1). These changes, if approved, are

estimated to decrease state prison costs by $25.2 million in 2009-10 and $291.6 million in 2010-

11 (Taylor, 2010, pg 1).

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If the state is not required to comply with the federal judge ruling to reduce the inmate

population by 40,000 inmates within two years, Schwarzenegger’s proposal passes, a significant

reduction of approximately 24,500 prisoners in 2010-11 will still occur (Taylor, 2010, pg 4).

This reduction amount will increase in future years as well (Taylor, 2010, pg 4).

Analytical Objectives:

This analysis will attempt to weigh the effectiveness and efficiency of prison reform

programs, aimed to reduce California’s prison population by approximately 100 percent or

84,000 prisoners over 15 years, which will reduce the negative safety and health effects of

overcrowded facilities as well as the financial strain on the state. The analysis will focus on the

literature available for the past 10 years for the state in regard to the current programs and

policies in place.

Additionally, suggestions will address the overarching issue of the state’s correctional

department budget. The suggestions include programs that are effective in reducing recidivism

rates and the total number of years felons spend in state facilities. We will apply national data

and studies to the specific problem facing California. In order to do so, we will measure the

effectiveness of those programs and apply them to the social and political environment of

California. The proposed alternatives include amending the three-strikes law, fostering

rehabilitative programs, and reducing the number of juveniles sentenced to adult facilities.

Evaluation of the alternatives includes cost effectiveness, efficiency, feasibility and whether the

suggested policies will produce net more benefits than the current policies.

Methods of Analysis:

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In analyzing both the tangible and intangible costs and benefits of imprisonment, release

of convicted criminals and implementation of social programs to rehabilitate convicts and

prevent crime, it became clear that many of the social goods would be difficult to quantify. The

State of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Center for Public Policy

Research at the University of California-Davis is currently working on establishing a more

effective model to determine the aggregated cost of crime for use in policy formulation and cost-

benefit analysis (“The Cost of Crime,” 2009). For the purpose of this study; however, the cost of

incarcerating an inmate is provided by California Legislative Analysts’s office. This model takes

into consideration security, healthcare, operations, support, and rehabilitation services (see

Appendix 5).

To determine the effect of limiting third-strike eligibility to serious and violent offenders,

data collected by RAND, a nonprofit research and analysis organization, is used to quantify the

criminal justice costs though it fails to account for social benefits of crime reduction (Greenwood

et, al., 1994, pg 14-15). These costs, determined in 1993, have been adjusted for inflation and

brought into 2009 price equivalents using the conversion model provided by the Bureau of Labor

Statistics (see Appendix 6). Though the most applicable estimate of crime costs, critics propose

that high cost estimates may suggest that any policy expected to increase crime, even a little,

would “cost” more than the status quo (“The Cost of Crime,” 2009). Though imperfect, the

estimates provided allow for a reasonable estimation of the costs associated with the possibility

of higher crime rates versus a lower prison population. Additionally, this analysis by RAND

assumes that the actual implementation of the three-strike policy is as the law was written.

In the study of the three-strike policy, RAND establishes violent crimes, generally any

crime that causes injury to or threatens victims with a deadly weapon (see Appendix 5). Serious

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crimes include those elements as well as other crimes where potential for violence exists

(Greenwood et, al., 1994, pg 5). To establish the number of non-violent/serious offenders that

would not be required to serve the 25 to life sentence when restricting the scope of the three-

strikes policy, and therefore the number by which the prison population would decrease, it was

assumed that the percentage of violent/serious offenders of the total population [62%] was

proportional to the percentage of violent serious offenders of the population serving third-strike

sentences (California DCR, 2009). While this assumption is likely an over-generalization of

crime distribution trends, for the purpose of this study, presuming that the distribution of crime

type is fairly standard across criminal populations in the state allowed for a more approachable

analysis.

The RAND analysis looks to the effect of the three-strike policy on crime and criminal

justice cost (though not evaluating the effect on prison population). The study looks at the

relationship between felony crime rate and keeping felons in correctional facilities for longer

time periods. In the evaluation, crime rate is modeled as dependent on the number criminals on

the street and the cost of crime is dependent on the number of inmates in the system (Greenwood

et, al., 1994, pg 10). The study projected offender populations by modeling the estimated

percentage of prisoners whom would or would not commit another felony. This proportion was

derived from a multivariable study that uses indictors to estimate the average length of criminals’

crime career and likelihood of re-offending. The study suggests that most criminals, depending

on age, average frequency of crimes committed, as well as other variables, eventually stop

committing crimes and therefore stop posing a threat to society (Greenwood et, al., 1994, pg 12).

Though the research and its utilized models have limitations (chronological age of offenders,

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variations in offending patterns, etc), the conclusions drawn by the RAND researchers proved

sufficient for the analysis of effectives of the three-strike policy provided in this study.

Indirect benefits analysis should include reduced childcare costs for families who pay for

out of school care for their children, increased school costs, improved school performance,

increased compensation, reduced crime, and reduced welfare participation. Approximately 28%

of parents with children between the ages of 6 and 12 pay for outside of school child care

services (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 20). On average, mothers with children

under the age of five pay $79 a week for child care compared to $23.70 a week for the after

school programs (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 20). The average participant’s

family would save $1,777 if they were enrolled in after school programs (Brown, Frates, Rudge,

& Tradewell, 2002, p. 20).

Increased schooling costs are directly related to how successful the after school program

is (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 21). Each year the after school program is

effective; the state is required to fund the student’s education for an extra year (Brown, Frates,

Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 21). The class of 2000 had a graduation rate of 68.7% according

to the Department of Education in California, but this doesn’t mean that the dropout rate was

31.3% because some students may have transferred to schools outside of California (Brown,

Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 22). In fact, students who participated in the after school

programs only dropped out at a rate of 23% compared with a 50% dropout rate of those who did

not participate in the after school program (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 22).

Currently the average high school dropout costs the state of California $2,247 in addition to

education costs. If we assume that the probability of graduation will increase by 22% for the

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average student, then the cost of the program per participant is $742 if the student continues

his/her education for another year and a half (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 23).

An additional societal benefit is the improved school performance. Data shows that those

students who participated in the after school program had better attendance and better test scores

than those who did not participate in after school programs (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell,

2002, p. 25). Students were also more likely to succeed at their grade level if they participated in

these after school programs and were less likely to be put in lower level, more expensive classes

(Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 25). Intangible benefits of the improved school

performance include, but are not limited to higher self-esteem and more enthusiasm from

students about their education (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 26).

Increased compensation is also an additional benefit to society and the individual.

Students who do not graduate from high school will face employment problems in the future due

to the lack of a high school degree (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 28). Not only

are employment options significantly decreased, but their potential earnings also decrease

significantly (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 28). According to the 1999 Current

Population Survey of the U.S. Consensus, 55% of the 25 years and older population who did not

receive a high school diploma reported no earnings (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002,

pg 28). Of the 25 years and older population who did receive their high school diploma, only

25% reported no earnings (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 28). The government

may expect a return from the after school programs investment through taxes and reduced level

of dependence on social government programs from those students who complete their high

school education and obtain future employment (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg

28).

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Reduced crime is another benefit to society due to the after school programs. On average,

after school programs produce a return of $5.92 per dollar spent in after school programs

(Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 30). Since the total cost calculated previously

equals $10,038 for each student who participates in the after school programs, we must take that

amount and multiply it by the return expected ($5.92*10,038) for a benefit in crime reduction of

$59,425 per participant (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 30).

As mentioned previously, those earning higher incomes from completion of their high

school degree and potentially further schooling in college are less dependent on social programs

such as welfare (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 32). In a study called the Perry

Preschool Program, the average participant received $3,349 less in welfare reimbursement than

did a non-participant over their lifetime (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 32).

Welfare programs are classified as “administrative savings,” therefore there is no tangible gain

(Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 32).

Rehabilitative programs is an alternative that will reduce overcrowding. The treatment

cost data were collected from a study that used the Drug Abuse Treatment Cost Analysis

Program Instrument (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 1). 2,567 clients were involved in the study. Their

information was collected from medical hospitalizations, emergency rooms visits, earnings, and

transfer payments from interviews at the start of the survey and after 9 months.

Substance abuse treatment costs were calculated using a combination of cost data

obtained from providers and administrative data on days in treatment (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 4).

Monetary benefits were calculated from survey and administrative data, and may include

medical care, mental health services, criminal activity, earnings and government transfer

payments depending on the study (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 4). The estimated average direct cost

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of substance abuse treatment programs was compared with the average change in non treatment

costs associated with treatment [monetary benefits] (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 4). The Consumer

Price Index component was used to adjust all costs and benefits to 2001 (Ettner et al., 2006, pg

4). The analysis used was based on clients entering the substance abuse treatment program

between January 4, 2000 and May 31, 2001 (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 4). The clients also

completed a 9-month follow up survey.

In order to perform a sensitivity analysis, a larger group of inmates was examined

(N=6,545) and for a longer period of time [1 year]. (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 1). The results of

sensitivity analysis found that there were no significant changes in unemployment or

disability/retirement benefits. Welfare payments increased minimally possibly because of social

workers aid in encouraging public aid programs (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 8). Most crimes occur

without arrests, therefore, the number of arrests was increased to represent the crimes that occur

without arrests. Increase in arrests were determined by inflating the number of arrests among the

study group by the ratio of crimes to arrests in the general population for all available crime and

arrest statistics (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 9). The average benefit of substance abuse treatment

resulted in decreases in the victimization and other costs of criminal activities rose to $3,986 (SE

= $957; p < .0001) and $4,687 (SE = $1,061; p < .0001), compared with the original increases of

$3,019 and $2,657. Therefore, estimates of the cost–benefit ratios are probably conservative

(Ettner et al., 2006,pg 9).

We used numbers from the California Department of Corrections to determine that there

were 12, 338 drug offenders in 2008. (California Department of Corrections, 2008). (see Table

???? ) This equals 25percent of the total prison population. Theoretically, we decided to enroll

75percent of the drug offender prison population (including possession) in a substance abuse

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program. This equals 9,524 prisoners. Then we found a study by the Prison Journal that looked

at Drug Treatment Alternative-to-Program (DTAP) (Sung, 2001, Pg 281). The program educated

non-violent drug offenders for 15-24 months of residential training and life skills. Participants

received educational and vocational training, job skills, connections to social networks and job

market information (Sung, 2001, pg 281). The participants also received 30-36 months of

vocational training to obtain job skills, job readiness counseling, resume writing, and

interviewing (Sung, 2001, pg 282). The study found a severe link between drug abuse and

economic status (Sung, 2001, pg 282 ). In this study 92percent (8,514) of prisoners were

employed after release and 8percent (741) were unemployed. Using these numbers we

determined that after 3 years recidivism rates for those that were enrolled in the program and

employed were 13percent or 1,107 prisoner reoffences. Recidivism rates for those that were

enrolled in the program and unemployed were 33percent or 245 prisoner reoffences (Sung, 2001,

pg 282). This resulted in an estimated reduction of 7,905 prisoners per year. Our numbers are

estimated and since the study by the Prison Journal was only of 281 prisoners there is a high

margin of error.

Evaluation Criteria:

For the evaluation criteria, alternatives will be considered in such a way as to determine

their cost effectiveness and whether the social benefits will equal or outweigh both the economic

and social costs. The number of prisoners reduced from the institutional population determines

the effectiveness of the proposed policy alternatives. In regard to Alternative 1, if, when applied

retroactively, as well as into the future, the restriction on the three-strike policy reduces the total

prison population substantially [benchmark of at least 5000 prisoner of 15 years], then the

proposed policy is considered successful. It must be considered, however, that the policy change

21

cannot lead to the release of a large enough number of prisoners that the crime rate increases and,

consequently, public safety diminishes.

SPECIFICS ON ALT 2/3?

Alternatives:

Based on the federal mandate to reduce California’s prison population as well as

concerns for safety, health and the state budget, prison over-crowding must be approached with

multiple methods for decreasing the population. Suggestions from the state include: amending

mandatory sentencing laws, rehabilitating nonviolent drug offenders, and reducing the number of

juveniles sentenced to adult prison sentences. Combinations and variations of these alternatives

should be implemented on a trial basis in California in conjunction with methods previously

proposed by the state in attempt to determine which reduce overcrowding in the most effective

manner.

Alternative 1- Amend the Three-Strikes Policy:

Due to the provision in the three-strikes sentencing policy that the third felony does not

have to be a serious or violent offence, many inmates are incarcerated for 25 years to life on

comparatively minor felony charges such as theft or drug and alcohol related crimes. This

stringent directive leads to high numbers of long-term inmates. According to the California

Legislative Analyst’s Office, the estimated cost of California’s three-strikes policy is $500

million per year (Chen, 2008). By amending the policy to mandate that only a third strike

consisting of a serious or violent offence must carry the 25 years to life sentence, a decrease in

the number of long-term inmates would result (Chen, 2008). Revising the three-strikes law could

22

lessen the cost of extended incarciration, a burden to the state’s budget as well as the physical

capacity of the correctional facilities (Chen, 2008).

According to data provided by RAND, implementing an alternative version of the current

three-strikes policy where the third offence must be a serious or violent offence (see Appendix 3)

to warrant a 25 years to life sentence would maintain 66 percent of the current crime reduction

while incurring lesser costs relative to the current three-strikes policy (Greenwood et, al., 1994,

pg 27). Although it achieves only an estimated 18 percent reduction in crime versus an estimated

28 percent from the existing three-strikes implementation, achieving two-thirds of the benefits

while saving approximately $668 per crime prevented (see Appendix 8) suggests that the

program operates cost effectively (Greenwood et, al., 1994, pg 26-27).

The financial burden of the 3,230 inmates [2008] that would be ineligible for the 25 years

to life sentence under the revised policy is, at present, a considerable drain on the department’s

budget (California DCR, 2009). This financial burden, under current policy, would not begin to

be relieved until at least 2014 when the first group of prisoners sentenced under the three-strikes

provision will reach eligibility for parole (Greenwood et, al., 1994, pg 27). Retroactively

implementing the revised criteria suggests a of 3,230 inmates immediately and improvement of

the overcrowded conditions by approximately 8,000 over the next 15 years. This results in a

decrease of nearly 42 percent of the total projected prison population (California DCR, 2009).

Necessary for public support of this measure as well as the social responsibility of

policymakers, is that the program still incapacitates the most threatening, dangerous criminals

while allowing for alternative options (rehabilitative treatment, job training, etc) for less high-

risk criminals. In addition, the possibility of a 25 years to life sentence could still deter criminals

23

from serious and violent offences, possibly positively affecting the crime rate while reducing the

population of the already over-burdened state facilities.

Alternative 2- Institute Rehabilitative Programs:

A study by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy found that intensive drug

treatment programs reduce prisoners’ chances of re-offending by an average of 17 percent

(Worst of the Worst, 2008). The study finds that for every dollar spent on substantive

vocational, therapy, or substance abuse programs for inmates and parolees, between $2 and $98

can be saved by decreasing expenses (Worst of the Worst, 2008). Programs such as addiction

treatment programs should be created to help addicts recover before reentering society (Prison

Nation, 2009). The study conducted by substance abuse and me uses data obtained from the

California Treatment Outcome Project (CalTOP). This is a large demonstration study that

obtained outcomes data on people admitted to 43 substance abuse treatment providers in 13

counties in California (Ettner et al., 2006, 3).

The direct costs of drug treatment programs includes the monetary benefits compared

with the monetary costs. Costs include prisoner’s medical care, mental health services, criminal

activity, income, and transfer program payments (Ettner et al., 2006, 1). Costs of the client’s

substance abuse rehabilitation was estimated by multiplying the number of days that the client

spent in each treatment program by the estimated cost per day of that program. Monetary

benefits were defined by each inmate (Ettner et al., 2006, 1).---ADD #s

The comparison of costs to benefits suggests that not treating those criminals with

alcohol or substance abuse problems costs society substantially more than the cost of instituting

rehabilitative programs (Ettner et al., 2006, 2). Costs are also incurred through decreased work

24

productivity-especially by those struggling with addiction (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 2). Studies in

this area consistently prove that substance abuse treatment programs produce net social benefits

(Ettner et al., 2006, pg 2).

After the study, decreases in hospital inpatient, ER and mental health service costs

occured. Victimization and incarceration costs decreased and earnings increased (Ettner et al.,

2006, pg 8). This results in a total reduction of $5, 676 in crime costs over nine months (Ettner

et al., 2006, pg 8).

A linear regression of net benefits was examined as a function of the client's age; sex;

marital, employment, and homelessness status; education; treatment modality; primary substance

abused; and ASI subscale scores. Alcohol abusers should obtain $8,185 more in net benefits than

those who abused methamphetamines, cocaine, heroin, or marijuana (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 8).

The analysis includes a nine-month follow-up program with clients as well as follow-up

survey data (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 10). Reductions in crime costs, including incarceration,,

compose composed 65 percent of the total benefits. 29 percent is attributed to increased wages,

and six percent to decreased medical and mental health care costs (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 10). An

analysis of eleven studies determined that the benefit–cost ratios determined from substance

abuse treatment ranged from 1.33 to 23.33 and that benefits depict a significant relationship to

decreased criminal activity, smaller contributions of earnings, and decreased healthcare expenses

(Ettner et al., 2006, 10). The benefits of investing tax revenue in substance abuse treatment are

obvious even without accounting for health and quality-of-life benefits to citizens (Ettner et al.,

2006, 12). In order to establish a link between the monetary benefits of treatment and the

duration and intensity of treatment, further research is required (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 12).

25

Alternative #3- Reduce Number of Juveniles Sentenced to Adult Prison Sentences:

As Figure 2 depicts, there is a normal distribution of the different offences from 1988 to

1998. Property offences contribute to the majority of arrests among juveniles in the state of

California. In total, from 1988 to 1998, there were 536,113 juvenile arrests for property offences

compared to 222,822 for violent offences. Other offences for juvenile arrests totaled to 110,048,

while juvenile drug offences totaled to 95,703 from 1988 to 1998.

The number of arrests for property offences peaked in 1991 and then decreased (Advisor

C. N.). By 1998, juvenile arrests for property offences decreased by 16,644. A similar trend is

found for juvenile violent offence arrests (Advisor C. N.). The number of arrests for violent

offences peaked in 1994 and then decreased (Advisor C. N.). By 1998, violent arrests decreased

by 2,783. Drug offences were highest in 1988, but then decreased and remained consistent

through the 1990s (Advisor C. N.). Juvenile arrests for other offences nearly doubled from 1988

to 1993 (Advisor C. N.). These offences remained fairly consistent from 1994 to 1998 (Advisor

C. N.).

According to the Legislative Analyst’s Office, while the population of juveniles in

California has increased 22 percent, the number of juvenile arrests has decreased by 14 percent

(Advisor C. N.). Similarly, juveniles arrested on felony charges declined by 20 percent between

1997 and 2007 (Advisor C. N.). Reason for this may include increased enforcement, more

effective prevention and intervention programs, and other economic factors (Advisor C. N.).

The majority of juvenile offenders commits one or two offences and never offends again

(Advisor C. N., 1995). There are a small number of juvenile offenders who commit the bulk of

the crimes (Center, 2000). These offenders typically begin committing crimes at an early age

26

though most juveniles are not incarcerated until they have a well-established record of criminal

activity (Advisor C. N., 1995). Juvenile arrest rates are high, consistent with adult arrest rates,

however there are benefits to providing services to those juvenile offenders (Advisor C. N.,

1995).

By implementing cost effective programs to keep juveniles from participating in criminal

activity, the incarceration rate among juveniles would most likely decrease (Advisor C. N.,

1995). These programs keep juveniles in school, prevent gang related activity, and provide help

for substance abuse, which could help reduce juvenile crime (Advisor C. N., 1995). The derived

social benefit of implementing after school programs is substantial as shown in Appendix 10. As

a result, after school programs have been established all over the country to deter juveniles from

criminal activity (Advisor C. N., 1995).

Vice-President of Research-Resources for the Future at Vanderbilt Owen Graduate School of

Management Mark Cohen conducted a comprehensive study on after school programs in 1998.

He estimated the future benefits and costs of preventing high-risk youth from participating in

criminal activity through after school programs (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg

6). Cohen uses data including dropout rates, drug abuse, and the direct and indirect impacts of

crime (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 6). Cohen also calculates the present values

of the costs of an average career criminal, average heavy drug abuser, and average high school

dropout (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 6). The data shows that the cost to

society is high, but society is willing to pay to evade these costs (Brown, Frates, Rudge, &

Tradewell, 2002, pg 6). It is concluded that continuing after school programs is beneficial as long

as the benefits of the programs outweigh the costs of implementation. Cohen claims that by

preventing 50 percent of the after school participants from becoming career criminals each year,

27

the benefits would range from $3.5 to $4 billion each year (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell,

2002, pg 7).

According to The After School and Education Safety Act of 2002, the direct costs include

$50,000 for elementary schools and $75,000 for middle schools (Brown, Frates, Rudge, &

Tradewell, 2002, pg 18). Each school would qualify for a $5 grant for each child per school day

(Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 18). In addition, each school educating low-

income students would be eligible for $200,000 in funding (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell,

2002, pg 18). Schools must provide a 50 percent cash subsidy to insure one and a half times the

funding that is provided in grants by the state (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 18).

Therefore, the total cost per student will be $7.50 per school day. Annually, each student will

cost $1,350 [7.50*180] (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 18). If we assume a

discount rate of four percent, in fifteen years the cost per child would equal $15,010.

Statistics prove that career criminals cost society anywhere from $1.4 to $1.7 million

over his or her lifetime (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 1). On average, students

who drop out of high school end up costing society between $268,133 and $428,130 compared to

a student who stays in school and graduates (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 1).

Finally, the average drug abuser costs society anywhere from $408,268 to $1,070,324 (Brown,

Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 1). With these staggering societal costs, one must conclude

that after school programs should be implemented in order to keep students and children out of

criminal and gang activity. To derive the social benefits of after school programs, one must

consider indirect outcomes of school programs.

28

It is difficult to measure whether the benefits outweigh the costs because the benefits

occur over an individual’s lifetime, not just in their adolescent and early adult years (Brown,

Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 2). A common way of deriving these benefits is by

conducting a study of individuals who participate in the after school program compared to a

control group of those who do not participate. However, since the programs have recently been

implemented, there is little data to base these findings on, making it difficult to quantify (Brown,

Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 2-3).

Analysis of Alternatives and Discussion:

To evaluate the costs and benefits of the proposed alternatives, we considered the current institutional and social needs budget, and resources in California and used existing evaluative methods to determine the outcomes. We completed a literature review and solidified the alternatives. We considered the effectiveness of our proposed alternatives and evaluated them with consideration to the difference in demographics in the California legal system

Providing convicts with rehabilitative programs is beneficial to prisoners and public safety. The short term benefits of releasing prisoners to save money fails to outweigh the long term costs of sending untreated criminals back into society (Rothenberg, 2009). If California provides services to help prisoners succeed independently then the number of prisoners would likely decrease significantly. The California employment program for prisoners has been cut due to the California budget cuts; this is significant because those that are unemployed are at a greater risk to return to prison (Rothenberg, 2009).

Recommendations:

After analyzing all three proposed alternatives, it is concluded that all three alternatives

are cost effective. Therefore, it is recommended that the National Governor’s Association

implement all three programs. The three proposed solutions would annually avoid incarceration

of or reduce 17,029 prisoners from California’s existing state prison population. The total

present value for all three alternatives at a discount rate of 4.33 percent over fifteen years would

amount to state prisons relieved of 370,672 inmates. The total present value for all three of our

alternatives at a discount rate of 4.52 percent over fifteen years results in a reduction or

29

avoidance of 377,242 prisoners from the state prisons. Finally, the total present value of all three

alternatives at a discount rate of 4.71 percent over fifteen years yields a reduction or avoidance

of 383,971 prisoners in the state prison system.

With the implementation of all three programs, the California prison system population

will significantly decrease. While policymakers and the general public demand results now, the

effectiveness of these programs will be seen on a per annum basis in the reduction or avoidance

of 17,029 individuals in the California state prisons. This social issue does not require further

research unless three proposed programs prove ineffective after fifteen years. Though the costs

of this policy appear to be high given the current budget for the California state prisons, the

benefits outweigh the costs in fifteen years of our policy’s implementation.

30

References

Advisor, C. N. (n.d.). How Many Juveniles are Arrested Each Year? Legislative Analyst’s Office. California. Web 25 April 2010. Advisor, C. N. (1995, May). Juvenile Crime--Outlook for California Part VI. Legislative Analyst’s Office. California. Web 25 April 2010. Bailey, Amanda, and Joseph M. Hayes. 2006. Who's in Prison? The Changing Demographics of Incarceration. California Counts, v. 8, no. 1. San Francisco, Calif: Public Policy Institute of California. Bernstein, Kyle T., Joan Chow, Juan M. Ruiz, Julius Schachter, Evalyn Horowitz, Rebecca Bunnell, and Gail Bolan. 2006. Chlamydia Trachomatis and Neisseria Gonorrhoeae Infections Among Men and Women Entering California Prisons. American Journal of Public Health. Vol 96 No. 10. Brown, W. O., S.B. Frates, I.S. Rudge, R.L. Tradewell. 2002. The Costs and Benefits of After School Programs: The Estimated Effects of the After School Education and Safety Program Act of 2002. Legislative Analyst’s Office. Claremont, California. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Data Analysis Unit. 1998-2009. Chen, Elsa. 2008. Impacts of “Three Strikes and You're Out” on Crime Trends in California and Throughout the United States. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice. Volume 24. Num. 4 (pg 345-422). Ettner, Susan L, David Huang, Elizabeth Evans, Danielle Rose Ash, Mary Hardy, Mickel Jourabchi, Yih-Ing, Hser. 2006. Benefit–Cost in the California Treatment Outcome Project: Does Substance Abuse Treatment “Pay for Itself”? Health Services Research Journal. Blackwell Science Inc. Web. 15 Apr2010. Greenblatt, Alan. 2007. Felon Fallout. Governing. 20.6: 36-8, 40, 42, 44. OmniFile Full Text. Select. Web. 22 Apr 2010. Greenwood, Peter W, Peter Rydell. Allan F. Abrahamse, Jonathan P. Caulkins, James Chinesa, Karyn E. Model, Stephen P. Klein. 1994. Three Strikes and You’re Out. RAND. Santa Monica, California. Web. 11 Apr 2010. Gupta, Shaili. Altice, Frederick L. “Hepatitis B Virus infection in US correctional Facilities: A review of Diagnosis, Management, and public health implications”. Journal of Urban Health. 2009 Vol. 86. No. 2 pg263-279. Jailhouse Blues. 13 Feb. 2010. Economist. London, England. Vol. 394, No. 8669: 37. SIRS Researcher. Web. 06 March 2010.

31

Katel, Peter. 2007. Prison Reform. CQ Researcher. 17.13: 289-312. Web. 1 May 2010. ...2009. Prisoner Reentry. CQ Researcher. 19.42: 1005-1028. Web. 1 May 2010. Lithwick, Dahlia. 15 Jun 2009. Our Real Prison Problem:Why are we so worried about Gitmo? Newsweek. Vol. 153, Iss. 24. 15 Jun 2009: ABI/INFORM Global, ProQuest. Web. 3 Apr. 2010. Office of the Attorney General. March 2000. Report on Juvenile Arrests in California, 1998. California. Web 28 April 2010. Rothenberg, Jackie. 12 Dec 2009. For State Prisons, West Isn’t Best: California Clogs its Jails While New York’s Court Reform Frees Funds. ABA Journal. 95.:15(2). Academic OneFile. Gale. University of Kansas. 6 Mar. 2010. Spiegel, Sarah. 2007. Prison “Race Riots”: An Easy Case for Segregation. California Law Review. Vol. 95 pgs 2261-2293. Summary Statistics on Adult Felon Prisoners and Parolees, Civil Narcotic Addicts, Outpatients and Other Popualations. State of California. Web 5 April 2010. Sung, H.-E. 2001. Rehabilitating Felony Drug Offenders Through Job Development: A Look Into a Prosecutor-Led Diversion Program. Prison Journal. 81: 271-286. Taylor, Mac. 25 Jan 2010. Legislative Analyst’s Office. Web. 12 Apr 2010. Tempest. 6 Mar. 2005. Death Row Often Means a Long Life. Los Angeles Times. Report and Recommendations of the Administration of the Death Penalty in California. California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice. The Cost of Crime: Issues for California-Specific Estimation. Oct. 2009. State of California Department of Correction and Rehabilitation, Center for Public Policy Research University of California-Davis. The California Prison Disaster. 25 Oct. 2008. New York Times, Late Edition - Final, Editorial Desk: 22. NewsBank. Web. 7 Mar. 2010. Udesky, Laurie “Court takes over California’s prison health system”. The world. September 3, 2005. Vol. 366 pg796-797. Urbina, I. 25 Feb. 2009. In Push to End Death Penalty, Some States Cite Cost-Cutting. New York Times, p. 1. Academic Search Premier. U.S. Department of Justice. January 2007. Medical Causes of Death in State Prisons, 2001-2004. Washington DC.

32

Worst of the Worst. July/Aug 2008. Mother Jones. 33 No4. Young, Kathryne Tafolla. 2007. The Privatization of California Correctional Facilities: A Population-Based Approach. Stanford Law and Policy Review. Vol. 18 pgs 439-470.

33

Appendix 1: California Felon Parole Violators Returned with a New Term by Offence Category

Calendar Year Person Property Drug Other Total

1994 2503 7281 5618 1623 17025

1995 2415 7165 6275 1599 17454

1996 2640 6766 6484 1634 17524

1997 2578 6338 7239 1490 17645

1998 2547 5751 7632 1470 17400

1999 2546 5386 7804 1343 17079

2000 2319 5046 7309 1338 16012

2001 2375 5096 5706 1355 14532

2002 2463 5580 4824 1485 14352

2003 2449 6131 5505 1609 15694

2004 2841 6988 6106 1907 17842

2005 3107 7527 7134 2019 19787

2006 3153 7730 7555 2331 20769

2007 3222 7596 7565 2427 20810

34

2008 3358 7623 6537 2434 19952

Minimum 2319 5046 4824 1338

Maximum 3358 7730 7804 2434

Average 2717.2352941

1765

6516.4705882

3529

6583.5882352

9412

1755.0588235

2941

17591.8

Standard

Deviation

343.48725629

6497

973.58907436

0577

927.06032063

466

390.81961494

8599

Median 2547 6766 6537 1609 17454

Figure 1

35

Drug Offenders CS Possession

Drug +

Possession Violent crime

CA Prison

Pop

total total Total total

1998 42,998 19,073 63,862 48633 159563

1999 45,328 19,753 54,052 51175 159563

2000 43,998 19,864 51,588 52532 160687

2001 38,271 15,781 46,313 55730 160655

2002 36,711 14,877 45,171 58204 157142

2003 33,252 13,061 49,726 46961 161785

2004 32,520 12,651 50,273 60625 163939

California Felon Parole Violators Returned with a New Term by

Offense Category

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Nu

mb

er

of

Felo

n P

aro

le V

iola

tors

Person Property Drug Other

36

2005 35,437 14,325 47194 63051 168035

2006 35711 14,562 43546 65215 172528

2007 33738 13,456 47194 66307 171444

2008 31565 11,981 43546 45796 171085

Average 15,399 55839

%

18% of total

prison pop

7% of total

prison pop

32% of total

prison pop

Drug Offender Population in California Prisons

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Years since 1997

Po

pu

lati

on

Drug Offenders

Controlled Substance PossessionCharge

Violent Offenses

Total Drug Related

37

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

140000

160000

180000

200000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Prison Population

Violent Crimes

Substance Possession Offenders

Drug Offenses

38

Death Row Life Sentence

Cost of Trials 20 5

Cost of Appeals 54.5 3

Additional cost of Confinement 63.3 3.5

Total 137.7 11.5

$ in millions

39

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Financial costs

in millions

Cost of Trials Cost of Appeals Additional cost of

Confinement

Total

Cost of Death Row vs. Life in Prison

Death Row

Life Sentence

40

Appendix 2: Juvenile Offences Categories from 1988-1998

Violent Offences Property Offences Drug Offences Other Offences

Year

1988 13,886 49,061 11,646 6,165

1989 17,325 53,116 11,037 7,548

1990 20,453 53,762 8,158 9,000

1991 21,016 54,952 7,396 10,301

1992 21,367 53,768 7,636 10,713

1993 21,402 51,058 7,861 11,652

1994 22,429 48,720 9,375 11,475

1995 22,334 46,135 8,797 10,650

1996 21,962 44,946 7,921 10,811

1997 21,002 42,287 8,484 10,975

1998 19,646 38,308 7,392 10,758

Average 19,646 38,308 7,392 10,758

Median 21,016 49,061 8,158 10,713

41

Sum 222,822 536,113 95,703 110,048

Figure 2

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42

Appendix 3: Cost of Crime Estimates

Crime 1993 2009

Fatal crime $2,953,333.00 $4,448,006.00

Child Abuse $60,000.00 $90,366.00

Rape/Sexual Assault $9,400.00 $131,031.00

Assault/Attempted Assault $87,000.00 $14,158.00

Robbery/Attempted Robbery $8,000.00 $12,049.00

Drunk Driving $18,000.00 $27,110.00

Arson $37,500.00 $56,479.00

Burglary/Attempted Burglary $1,400.00 $2,109.00

Auto Theft/Attempted Auto Theft $3,700.00 $5,573.00

Average (non-violent/serious) $16,342.00

43

Appendix 4: California’s Annual Costs to Incarcerate an Inmate in Prison

44

Appendix 5: Violent/Serious Offences

2009 value Current 3-strike Violent/Serious Only

$ cost (millions) $14,907.00 $10,542.00

Number of crimes prevented (000) 881 999

Cost/crime prevented $24,200.00 $17,520.00

calculated at 4% discount rate

45

46

47

Appendix 6: Criminal Justice Costs 1993 and adjusted to 2009 equivalents

Cost Item 2009 $

Police cost per arrest 926

Adjudication cost per arrest 1930

Cost per trial 5939

Jail operating cost per

prisoner-year

14847

Prison operating cost per

prisoner-year

47000

48

Prison capital cost per

prisoner

144,015

49

Appendix 7:

Appendix 8: Cost Benefit Analysis of 3-strike policy vs. Revision, RAND

50

Calculation of the cost of the after school program Cost/child per day # of School Days

State $5 Local School $2.50

Total $7.50 180

Annual Cost per child $1,350.00

p. 20 Cohen Estimates After School Doc. Summary of Cost and Benefits of After School Programs:

Cost per participant: $10,038 Effect of Act: Range of Benefits

Reduced Child Care Costs $889 to $1,777 Increased Schooling Costs ($989) to ($742)

Improved School Performance $447 to $809 Increased Compensation $29,415 to $38,284

Reduced Crime Costs $59,425 to $88,835 Reduced Welfare Costs $335 to $502

Total $89,522 to $129,465 Net Benefit $79,484 to $119,427

Page 6 of After-School Doc. Cohen 1998

estimates Monetary Value of Saving a High Risk Youth

Classification Low Estimate High Estimate Career Criminal $1,434,455 $1,655,140

Career Drug Abuser $408,268 $1,070,324 High School Dropout $268,133 $428,130

Number of Juveniles reduced due to Intervention programs Discount Rate Number of Years Annual Number of Juveniles reduced Present Value

4.33% 15 8,768 190,853 4.52% 15 8,768 194,236 4.71% 15 8,768 197,701

51

Number of Prisoners reduced by revocation of Three-strike Law Discount rate Number of Years Annual number or prisoners reduced Present Value

4.33% 15 356 7,750 4.52% 15 356 7,887 4.71% 15 356 8,028

Number of Prisoners reduced by Substance Abuse Treatments Discount Rate Number of Years Annual Number of Prisoners reduced Present Value

4.33% 15 7,905 172,069 4.52% 15 7,905 175,119 4.71% 15 7,905 178,242