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ICL Journal | Vol 7 | 1/2013 | © Verlag Österreich 5

Principles of national constitutionalism limiting individual claims in human rights lawConstitutionalism and the balance between national and international legal reform

Paul De Hert & Stefan Somers*

Abstract: The scope of the fundamental right to freedom of religion has been broadly dis-

cussed in recent jurisprudence and doctrine. Doctrine has however paid little attention to

the role of constitutionalism and its principles such as this of the separation of church and

state and the division of power. These principles are often not mentioned as such in inter-

national human rights treaties. Does this mean that they are irrelevant in human rights

adjudication?

This article addresses the proper function of constitutionalism in human rights jurispru-

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pean Court of Human Rights is used as a trigger to look at the relationship between reli-

gion, constitutionalism and human rights, and at the legitimacy of supranational courts.

The article argues that international human rights jurisprudence must take national consti-

tutionalism and its principles into account when dealing with the freedom of religion, even

when does principles are not explicitly enshrined in human rights treaties. For this the use

of the margin of appreciation seems to be appropriate.

Keywords:� +LHUDUFK\� RI� /HJDO� 1RUPV�� 1DWLRQDO� &RQVWLWXWLRQV�� (XURSHDQ� +XPDQ� 5LJKWV��

5HOLJLRXV�)UHHGRPV��&RQÀLFWV

I. IntroductionThis article discusses the relationship between constitutionalism and human rights

law. The analysis is partly triggered by Lautsi v Italy,1 the Grand Chamber judgment that “is probably the case with the largest number of state party interventions ever to come before the Court so far, including both states, NGOs, members of the European Parlia-ment and others, and also one of the cases with the most elaborate concurring and dis-senting opinions (18 pages in total)” 2. In Lautsi the Grand Chamber had to judge wheth-HU�RU�QRW�WKH�SUHVHQFH�RI�FUXFL¿[HV�LQ�,WDOLDQ�SXEOLF�VFKRROV�FRQIRUPV�WR�WKH�IUHHGRP�RI�UHOLJLRQ�DQG�WKH�IUHHGRP�RI�HGXFDWLRQ�DV�HQFRPSDVVHG�LQ�WKH�(XURSHDQ�&RQYHQWLRQ�RQ�Human Rights and its First protocol.

* The authors want to thank Dara Hallinan, Fisnik Korenica and Cécile Mathieu for their close reading, their suggestions and their useful comments.

1 Lautsi v Italy�$SS�QR��(&W+5��*UDQG�&KDPEHU��0DUFK��2 http://echrblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/grand-chamber-judgment-in-lautsi-no.html.

6 P. De Hert & S. Somers, Principles of national constitutionalism limiting

Lautsi forms a new episode in the Court’s dealing with the relationship between state and religion. The question – whether or not the presence of religious acts or symbols in public spaces or buildings breaches the freedom of religion of others, or non-believers ±�LV�KLJKO\�UHOHYDQW�LQ�WKH�OLJKW�RI�WKH�UHOLJLRXV�UHYLYDO�LQ�:HVWHUQ�(XURSH��7KH�RQ�JRLQJ�globalisation processes – ‘glocalisation’ 3 – has led to the emergence of a multicultural society wherein religious diversity is growing and religious tensions are increasing.4 As a UHVXOW�RI�WKLV�UHOLJLRXV�UHYLYDO��WKH�VSHFL¿F�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�VHWWLQJV�LQ�ZKLFK��DQG�DVVXPS-tions upon which, religion and politics have been allocated their separated social spheres – where private conviction may not exert itself within the public realm – are being chal-lenged.5�5HOLJLRQ� WKXV� UH�HQWHUV� WKH�SXEOLF�VSDFH��JHQHUDWLQJ�FRQÀLFW�DQG� LQFUHDVLQJO\�becoming a topic in court,6 – consequently, it results in more legal analysis.7

The focus of this contribution is not on human rights law, but on constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is the term of use to denote a legal model that contains institutional mechanisms for the limitation and the control of power on the one hand, and protects individual rights and freedoms on the other. From this broader viewpoint we believe that there is more to Lautsi than an isolated interpretation of religious freedom. In what fol-lows, we will try to grasp this broader picture. We will focus on the legitimacy of supra-national courts, the character of human rights and the nature of constitutionalism, rath-er than on interpretations of the freedom of religion. Thus, instead of taking a human rights stand on Lautsi, we use it as a trigger for an inquiry into the relationship between religion, constitutionalism and the balance between national and international legal re-form.

The core of our argument is that constitutionalism matters. It deserves its proper place in adjudication by national and supranational courts. A pure human rights picture ZLOO�QRW�VXI¿FH��2EVHUYHG�LQ�WKLV�OLJKW��ZH�ZLVK�WR�GHIHQG�WKH�DSSURDFK�RI�WKH�(XURSHDQ�Court of Human Rights employing a prudent approach to the development of its freedom of religion case law (the judgements of which however, have been maligned as offering SRRU�SURWHFWLRQ��DV�EHLQJ�K\SRFULWLFDO�DQG�LQFRQVLVWHQW��RU�HYHQ�DV�DQWL�,VODP��:H�EH-

3 The term is used by Ronald Robertson to denote the connection between global homogeneity and local plurality. See Ronald Robertson, ‘Glocalization: Time-space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity’, in M. )HDWKHUVWRQH�HW�DO��HGV��Global Modernities��6DJH�3XEOLFDWLRQV��

4 The large numbers of Muslim immigrants particularly attract much attention in the debate on the impact of globalization in western society. Nonetheless, Islam is only a part of the religious revival. As 2OLYLHU�5R\�SRLQWV�RXW�µ,VODP�LV�D�PLUURU�LQ�ZKLFK�WKH�:HVW�SURMHFWV�LWV�RZQ�LGHQWLW\�FULVLV��:H�OLYH�LQ�D�postculturalist society, and this postculturalism is the very foundation of the contemporary religious UHYLYDO�¶�2OLYHU�5R\��Secularism Confronts Islam��&ROXPELD�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��[LLL�

5 See the reference to Graham Ward and Michael Hoelzl in the article of Baderin: A.M. Baderin, ‘Religion DQG�,QWHUQDWLRQDO�/DZ��)ULHQGV�RU�)RHV"¶��(XURSHDQ�+XPDQ�5LJKWV�/DZ��0RUH�FRQ-cretely, we can point out that many Muslim believers may very well accept laïcité as the rule of the game in the public square, but they no longer adopt it as a way of living their religion in private. They ZDQW�WR�EH�UHFRJQL]HG�DV�UHOLJLRXV�LQ�WKH�SXEOLF�VSKHUH��2OLYHU�5R\��Secularism Confronts Islam (Co-OXPELD�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��

�� ,Q�WKHLU�ZRUN�RQ�WKH�(XURSHDQ�&RQYHQWLRQ�RI�+XPDQ�5LJKWV�+DUULV��%R\OH��%DWHV�DQG�%XFNOH\��IRU�H[-ample, point to the growing importance of religion in society to declare why article 9 of the convention concerning religious freedom leads to more and more cases at the Strasbourg Court. D.J. Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights��2[IRUG�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��

7 In the Netherlands, for example, a new journal was launched this year with the title: ‘tijdschrift voor religie, recht en beleid’�>MRXUQDO�IRU�UHOLJLRQ��ODZ�DQG�JRYHUQDQFH@��,Q�WKH�LQWURGXFWLRQ�RI�WKH�¿UVW�HGL-tion, Berger points out the need of academic research on the topic of law and religion because of the growing importance of religion in contemporary society. M. Berger, ‘Nieuwe spelers, nieuwe regels?’ [New players, new rules"@��7LMGVFKULIW�YRRU�UHOLJLH��UHFKW�HQ�EHOHLG��


lieve that, in its prudent approach, the Court has acted wisely recognising the limits of its own legitimacy and the boundaries of international human rights and has found an overall elegant balance between the need to develop international human rights protec-tion on the one hand – as a legitimate and important tool in the protection of citizens – DQG�WKH�QHHG�WR�UHVSHFW�WKH�VLJQL¿FDQFH�DQG�RQJRLQJ�QHFHVVLW\�RI�QDWLRQDO�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO-LVP�LQ�WKH�VROXWLRQ�RI�UHOLJLRXV�FRQÀLFW�RQ�WKH�RWKHU��

We begin to build this argument by demonstrating the inseparable link between reli-JLRQ�DQG�FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP��7KH�GHPRQVWUDWLRQ�RI�WKLV�OLQN�MXVWL¿HV�RXU�ODWHU�SURSRVLWLRQ�that the theme of religion is one in which deference to national constitutional approach-HV��DV�RSSRVHG�WR�LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\�RULHQWHG�WRS�GRZQ�DSSURDFKHV��LV�QHFHVVDU\��2XU�FRQ-WULEXWLRQ�¿UVW�LQWURGXFHV�WKH�LGHD�RI�FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP��LWV�KLVWRU\�DQG�LQWLPDWH�UHODWLRQ�with religion. We stress the religious origins of constitutionalism in history. A discussion of Hobbes, Locke and Hume will also allow us to give an impression of the plurality of SRVVLEOH�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�FKRLFHV�DQG�WKH�LQWHJUDO�UROH�WKH�GH¿QLWLRQ�DQG�SODFHPHQW�RI�UHOL-gion has played in the development of constitutional thought through the ages. The role of constitutionalism in managing religious tensions is very different in their respective work, as it is in the different constitutional regimes that have been set up throughout KLVWRU\��VHFWLRQ��

After establishing the link between religion and constitutionalism, we then demon-strate that each form of constitutionalism is unique and that religion’s place and role within that constitutionalism is unique. Constitutionalism has taken many forms of ap-pearance throughout history and cannot be perceived as a universal set of rules. Accord-ingly, state-church relations will differ from one legal system to another. We thus dem-onstrate that the substantive constitutional approach, and solution, to religious strife is KLJKO\�GHSHQGHQW�RQ�WKH�KLVWRU\�RI�HDFK�VRFLHW\��VHFWLRQ��

We then comment on how an emergent multiculturalism and religiosity have changed the makeup of the societies on which these historically contingent constitutional settings were based and accordingly have begun to pose questions to assumptions as to the place and role of religion within these societies. We then consider this change in light of the new legislative context in which problems are approached. We consider how, in relation WR�WRGD\¶V�FRQÀLFWV��FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP�DQG�LWV�PHFKDQLVPV�RI�GHDOLQJ�ZLWK�UHOLJLRXV�WHQ-sions now operate as only one level in a multi-layered and increasingly international legal approach and indeed are even challenged by international human rights law, to the point where some even speak of a ‘twilight’ RI�FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP��VHFWLRQ��DQG��8

In elaborating this tension between national constitutionalism and supra-national hu-PDQ�ULJKWV�SURWHFWLRQ��WKH�UROH�RI�WKH�(XURSHDQ�&RXUW�RI�+XPDQ�5LJKWV�LV�UHFRQVLGHUHG�LQ�WKH�OLJKW�RI�WKH�OHJLWLPDF\�GH¿FLW�RI�LQWHUQDWLRQDO�&RXUWV��&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP�LV�IRXQGHG�QRW�only on the protection of human rights by the judge but also on the principle of public sovereignty vested in the democratic procedures. Constitutionalism requires an elabo-rated balance between these two principles that are – in Habermas words – ‚gleichurs-prünglich9. This analysis of position, legitimation and mandate of the Court provides a

�� 3HWUD�'REQHU�DQG�0DUWKLQ�/RXJKOLQ��HGV��The Twilight of Constitutionalism��2[IRUG�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��

9 Habermas sees the ‚Gleichusrprunglichkeit’ of human rights and public sovereignty as an expression of both public and private autonomy. Underneath this notion lies Habermas vision on humanity. In his opinion humans are both free and determined. They are free because they have free-will and are able


framework through which one can analyse the legitimacy of the behaviour and logic of WKH�&RXUW�µEH\RQG�KXPDQ�ULJKWV¶��VHFWLRQ��.

Finally, we evaluate the position and reasoning of the Court in light of our consider-DWLRQ�RI�WKH�IUDPHZRUN�IRU�WKH�OHJLWLPDF\�RI�LWV�DFWLRQ��EHDULQJ�LQ�PLQG�WKH�VSHFL¿FLW\�RI�UHOLJLRQ� LQ� QDWLRQDO� FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP�� 7KH� SRVLWLRQ� RI� WKH� (XURSHDQ� &RXUW� RI� +XPDQ�Rights can, from this perspective, be labelled as ‘prudent’ in its reverence to national constitutions as the primary ground on which any religion state readjustment must oc-FXU��,W�GHDOV�ZLWK�WKLV�ÀDPPDEOH�DUHD�HOHJDQWO\��XVLQJ�YDULRXV� OHJDO� WRROV�VXFK�DV�WKH�margin of appreciation and the incorporation of national constitutional principles into its jurisprudence to operate with an awareness of its mandate in a multi-layered legal sys-tem and the limits to its legal and practical legitimacy, whilst maintaining and developing human rights protection. This is an approach that strikes the right balance between the FKRLFHV�RI�WKH�FROOHFWLYH��UHVXOWLQJ�LQ�FHUWDLQ�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�DUUDQJHPHQWV��DQG�WKH�FODLPV�RI�WKH�LQGLYLGXDO��VHFWLRQ��

II. Constitutionalism and its relation with religionConstitutionalism is the term of use to denote a legal model that contains institu-

tional mechanisms for the limitation and the control of power on the one hand, and protects individual rights and freedoms on the other. Fundamental rights are one impor-tant part of constitutionalism, but the scope of the latter is broader. These principles are formed by an interaction between the rule of law and popular sovereignty which are both meant to protect fundamental rights of the citizens. The idea of constitutionalism con-WDLQV��DV�+DEHUPDV�PDGH�FOHDU��D�¿QH�EDODQFH�EHWZHHQ�KXPDQ�ULJKWV�DQG�SRSXODU�VRYHU-eignty, between a liberal and a republican approach of freedom that are ‘gleichursprüng-lich’.10 As a result of this, constitutionalism in our approach is not only a solid and clear picture of State-institutions. It also indicates the principles that apply in the functioning of these institutions. Thus, in our approach, the attitude of State-institutions to always balance human rights and popular sovereignty for guaranteeing the freedom of its citi-zens is a very important element of constitutionalism.

The separation of church and state – one of the main characteristics of Western con-stitutionalism – constitutes a framework in which religion can be practised freely. How-HYHU��ZKLOVW�FXUUHQW�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�FRQFHSWLRQV�GH¿QH�WKH�UROH�RI�UHOLJLRQ�LQ�VRFLHW\��WKH�opposite is also true. Religion, conceptions of religion in relation to other aspects of so-

WR�PDNH�WKHLU�RZQ�GHFLVLRQV��2Q�WKH�RWKHU�KDQG��KXPDQV�DUH�DOVR�GHWHUPLQHG�VLQFH�WKHLU�ZLOO�IRUPD-tion always starts from a pre-existing world, from the ‚Lebenswelt’��2Q�WRS�RI�WKDW��SHUVRQV�DOZD\V�DFW�in a social context, they interact via communication and reason in a dialectical way on normative is-sues. When these debates are open and when as many humans as possible with diverse interest can agree, then the rationality of a society will grow. Because of this both the private free-will and the public will formation have to be protected. This vision of Habermas is an attempt to reconcile liberal and republican political philosophy. As he states: ‚Die politischen Traditionen [liberalism and repub-likanism]… begreifen einerseits die Menschenrechte als Ausdruck moralischer Selbstbestimmung, an-dererseits die Souveränität des Volkes als Ausdruck ethischer Selbstverwirklichung. Nach diesem Verständnis stehen Menschenrechte und Volkssouveränität zueinander eher in einem Verhältnis der Konkurrenz als der wechselseitigen Ergänzung.‘ Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskustheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats [Between Facts and Norms, Con-tributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy@��6XKUNDPS�9HUODJ��

10 See supra introduction.


FLHW\�DQG�DFFRUGLQJO\�JUDQWHG�UHOLJLRXV�IUHHGRP�V��KDYH�EHHQ�HTXDOO\�GHFLVLYH�LQ�VKDSLQJ�the development and form of constitutionalism and of other rights and liberties.11 Van Caenegem, in his general study on the history of Western constitutionalism, notices that: µ7KH�RXWFRPH�RI�WKH�(XURSHDQ�,QYHVWLWXUH�6WUXJJOH��«��ZDV�DGYDQWDJHRXV�WR�WKH�&KXUFK��«�� 3DSDO� DXWKRULW\� FRQVHTXHQWO\� UHDFKHG� LWV� ]HQLWK� DQG� WKH�5RPDQ� FXULD� LQWHUYHQHG�FRQVWDQWO\�LQ�SROLWLFDO�DIIDLUV��«��,Q�WKH�ORQJ�UXQ�WKLV�HFFOHVLDVWLFDO�HPDQFLSDWLRQ�KDV�KDG�unforeseen consequences for the states. By forbidding the kings to perform the clerical investiture because they were laymen, a process of secularization was inaugurated and the road opened for a clear conceptual distinction between the organs and aims of secu-lar society and those of the Church.’ 12

In a similar way, but with its main focus on early modern history, Leonard Hammer points out that the freedom of conscience emerged out of the freedom of religion and that in the opinion of many commentators both of these rights were the forerunners to the notion of civil liberty.13

7KH�VLJQL¿FDQFH�RI�UHOLJLRQ�IRU�WKH�LGHD�RI�FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP�LV�SRVVLEO\�PRVW�DFXWHO\�YLVLEOH�ZKHQ�RQH�ORRNV�DW�WKH�GHYHORSPHQW�RI�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�WKHRU\��2QH�LV�WKHQ�VWUXFN�E\�WKH�FHQWUDOLW\�WKHUHLQ�RI�WKH�GH¿QLWLRQ�RI�WKH�QDWXUH��VLJQL¿FDQFH�DQG�UROH�RI�UHOLJLRQ�LQ�D�VWDWH��2QH�FDQQRW�EXW�QRWH�WKH�SUHRFFXSDWLRQ�RI�+REEHV�ZLWK�UHOLJLRQ�DQG�WKH�UHOLJLRXV�FRQÀLFWV�WKDW�RFFXUUHG�LQ�KLV� OLIHWLPH�14 The basic assumption in Hobbes’ theory is the subjection of the citizens to the sovereign. For Hobbes, personal convictions and the distinction between secular and metaphysical powers were fundamentally impermissible. Religious homogeneity – whether or not imposed by the sovereign – was an indispens-able condition for the state.15

11�)UDQFHVFR�$OLFLQR��µ&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP�DV�D�3HDFHIXO�³6LWH´�RI�5HOLJLRXV�6WUXJJOHV¶��*OREDO�-XULVW�iss. 1, article 8.

12 Raoul Van Caenegem, An historical Introduction to Western Constitutional Law (Cambridge University 3UHVV��±��

13 L.M. Hammer, The International Human Right to Freedom of Conscience. Some suggestions for its development and application��'DUWKPRXWK�3XEOLVKHUV�&RPSDQ\��±��$QRWKHU�DUJXPHQW�RQ�WKH�importance of the freedom of religion is in line with the secularisation process as described by Max Weber. The main idea is that the secularization process and the separation between church and state, created the opportunities for the functional differentiation between art, religion, morality, politics, economy and law. For an exhaustive discussion on this topic, see: Johannes Van Der Ven, Human Rights or Religious Rules?��%ULOO�SXEOLVKHUV��±��

14�)UDQFHVFR�$OLFLQR��µ&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP�DV�D�3HDFHIXO�³6LWH´�RI�5HOLJLRXV�6WUXJJOHV¶��*OREDO�-XULVW�LVV��DUWLFOH��6HH�RQ�WKH�UHOLJLRXV�FRQÀLFWV��9LFNLH�6XOOLYDQ��Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Forma-tion of a liberal Republicanism in England��&DPEULGJH�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��

15 Hobbes’ analysis did not start from a religious point of view. Hobbes’ main concern was the stability of the state. Religion became totally subjected to this concern and thus to the sovereignty of the Levia-WKDQ��/RGL�1DXWD��µ+REEHV�RQ�5HOLJLRQ�DQG�WKH�&KXUFK�EHWZHHQ�Ä7KH�(OHPHQWV�RI�/DZ³�DQG�Ä/HYLD-WKDQ³��$�'UDPDWLF�&KDQJH�RI�'LUHFWLRQ"¶��-RXUQDO�RI�WKH�KLVWRU\�RI�LGHDV��±��+REEHV¶�OLQH�RI�UHDVRQLQJ�ZDV�QRW�WKDW�H[FHSWLRQDO�LQ�HDUO\�PRGHUQ�(XURSH��:LWK�UHJDUG�WR�WKH�JHQHUDO�DSSURDFK�towards church and state in that period, Guido Ceccoli writes : ‘La force de l’Etat était donc fondée sur l’unité religieuse du peuple, selon le principe «un Etat, un roi, une religion». Les différences religieus-es au sein d’un royaume étaient vue comme un vrai danger pour le souverain. Par conséquences, les minorités religieuses étaient systématiquement persécutées dans les pays européens.’ Guido Ceccoli, µ/D�/LEHUWp�GH�5HOLJLRQ�HW�OD�&RQYHQWLRQ�(XURSpHQQH�GHV�'URLWV�GH�O¶+RPPH¶�>Religious Liberty and the European Convention of Human Rights@��Bull.dr.h., 90. In his writings, Hobbes comes very close to a form of state religion. For example, in chapter XV of his ‘Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society’, Hobbes discusses what citizens must do when the demands of the secular JRYHUQPHQW�FRQÀLFW�ZLWK�WKRVH�RI�&KULVWLDQLW\��+REEHV�LV�RI�WKH�RSLQLRQ�WKDW�WKH�VHFXODU�JRYHUQPHQW�may decide what kind of religious worship the citizens must obey and that the secular governors are


Following Hobbes, Locke applied social contract theory, but he contradicted Hobbes’ harsh approach by introducing natural law. In Locke’s opinion, the law of nature was cre-ated by God and understandable for every reasonable human being. This law of nature teaches that nobody may be harmed in his life, health, freedom and property.16 Locke saw freedom of religion and conscience as one of the main foundations of constitutional-ism.17 He rejected the possibility of an imposed religious homogeneity. His approach taught that attempts to impose religious homogeneity would result in growing social FRQÀLFWV��7KXV��EHFDXVH�LW�LV�LPSRVVLEOH�WR�LPSRVH�WKHLU�ZLOO�FRQFHUQLQJ�UHOLJLRXV�PDWWHUV�on society, states should not engage in religious affairs at all.18 Since religious homoge-neity cannot be imposed on society to stabilise the state in a Hobbesian way, one should change the state so that religion is no longer an important issue in the public sphere, but an issue contained mostly within the private sphere. Locke was convinced that the social contract could not reach so far as to deprive the contractors of their freedom of religion and conscience. Therefore, he concluded that citizens should possess inalienable rights to protect their private sphere.19

Very explicit about the religious roots of constitutionalism and of the idea of separat-LQJ� VWDWH� DQG� FKXUFK� LV� 2OLYLHU� 5R\�� ZKR� UHFDOOV� 0DUFHO� *DXFKHW¶V� FKDUDFWHULVDWLRQ� RI�christianity as a ‘religion de la sortie de la religion’.20 Christian sacralisation of the state �VDQFWLRQHG�E\�*RG��ZDV�D�QHFHVVDU\�FRQGLWLRQ�IRU�WKH�DXWRQRP\�RI�SROLWLFV��5R\�VXJ-JHVWV� WKDW� &KULVWLDQ� SUH�PRGHUQ� WKLQNHUV�� VXFK� DV� *XLOODXPH� G¶2FFDP� ��±��have contributed to this idea of political autonomy and even added the idea of the right

the true interpreters of both secular and sacred law. In §17 of the chapter he states that: ‘And as for WKH�VHFXODU�ODZV��«��WKRVH�ZKR�KDYH�WKH�VRYHUHLJQ�SRZHU��DUH�WKH�LQWHUSUHWHUV�RI�WKH�ODZV��$V�IRU�WKH�sacred laws, we must consider what hath been before demonstrated in chap. v. art. 13, that every subject hath transferred as much right as he could on him or them who had the supreme authority. But he could have transferred his right of judging the manner how God is to be honoured; and there-IRUH�DOVR�KH�KDG�GRQH�LW��«��:KHUHIRUH�VXEMHFWV�FDQ�WUDQVIHU�WKHLU�ULJKW�RI�MXGJLQJ�WKH�PDQQHU�RI�*RG¶V�worship, on him or them who have the sovereign power. Nay, for they must do it.’ In paragraph 18 Hobbes goes even further. He asks the question: ‘if that man or counsel who hath the supreme power, command himself to be worshipped with the same attributes and actions, wherewith God is to be worshipped; the question is whether we must obey?’ The answer to this question is that, as long as we do not think that the sovereign is God, we must obey his wish to worship him as God since: ‘divine worship is distinguished from civil, not by the motion, placing, habit, or gesture of the body, but by the declaration of our opinion of him whom we do worship.’ Thomas Hobbes, Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society,��FKDSWHU��±��

16 Maurice Adams, Recht en democratie ter discussie [Bringing up Law and Democracy for Discussion] �/HXYHQ�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��

17 John Swomley, Religious liberty and the secular state. The constitutional context (Prometheus Books ��±��

18 Comparative ideas to those of Locke can also be found in the writings of Madison: ‚I have no reason to conclude, that uniformity of government will produce that of religion‘ and somewhat later he states that ‚Freedom arises from the multiplicity of sects, which pervades America and which is the best and only security for religious liberty in any society. For where there is such a variety of sects, there cannot be a majority of any one sect to oppress and persecute the rest.‘ In the end Madison concludes in line with Locke by stating that ‚There is not a shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with religion.‘ James Madison, Writings��7KH�/LEUDU\�RI�$PHULFD��±��

19 Although this points to a very broad interpretation of the freedom of religion, including the recognition of the freedom to be not Christian, this was perhaps not really the case in the thoughts of Locke. He made this assumptions in a country where religious opponents were all Christians. Some even argue WKDW�KLV�WKHRU\�RI�LQDOLHQDEOH�ULJKWV�ZDV�&KULVWLDQ�EDVHG��)UDQFLV�2DNOH\��Ã/RFNH��1DWXUDO�/DZ�DQG�*RG�±�DJDLQµ��+LVWRU\�RI�3ROLWLFDO�7KRXJKW��±��

20�2OLYHU�5R\��La laïcité face à l’Islam��+DFKHWWH��ZLWK�UHI��WR�0DUFHO�*DXFKHW��Le désenchante-ment du monde��*DOOLPDUG��


of the sovereign to control religion based on the belief that, through the sovereign, the divine will expressed itself. Christian sacralisation of the state has allowed the state to reject the church outside the political arena.21

Whether one considers Christianity predisposed for modern constitutionalism or not, the historical facts do point at the religious origins of Western constitutionalism. It is no coincidence that, to give an example, American settlers and founding fathers, who were RIWHQ�UHOLJLRXV�PLQRULWLHV�ZKR�HVFDSHG�IURP�UHOLJLRXV�UHSUHVVLRQ�LQ�(XURSH��FUHDWHG�WKH�¿UVW�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�GHPRFUDF\�LQ�KLVWRU\�22 They, in part, made use of Locke’s ideas but did so within a Christian framework that can still be sensed in well-known ceremonies such as the naming of God in the presidential inauguration oath.

Hume takes a different approach again. Like Hobbes and Locke, Hume was sensitive WR�WKH�SURSHQVLW\�RI�UHOLJLRXV�GLYHUVLW\�WR�JHQHUDWH�FRQÀLFWV�LQ�VRFLHW\��+LV�VROXWLRQ�ZDV�radically different and turned away from the idea of banishing religion to the private sphere. Hume saw a practical solution in the formulae of an established state church. Such an institution, Hume contended, weakens rather than strengthens religious belief. An established church induces religious apathy rather than fomenting religious strife.23

Although the methods with which these philosophers used constitutionalism are very different, their aims were the same: to pacify religious tensions within society through different conceptualisations of religion and religion’s place in society.24 These theories illustrate the consistent and continued need to approach religious problems with a deep-er understanding of power controls within a constitutional setting and the need to ap-proach constitutionalism with religion as a key shaping factor in society.

Thus, ever since the emergence of constitutionalism, it has dealt with religious ten-VLRQV��2QH�FRXOG�VD\�WKDW�LW�KDV�FDUULHG�RXW�WKLV�WDVN�ZLWK�JUHDW�GHYRWLRQ�DQG�VXFFHVV��,Q�(XURSH�DQG�WKH�8QLWHG�6WDWHV��FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP�KDV�QRW�UHVWUDLQHG�UHOLJLRXV�GLYHUVLW\��

21�$ERXW�WKH�FRQWULEXWLRQ�RI�WKH�,VODP�WR�FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP��VHH�2OLYHU�5R\��La laïcité face à l’Islam, (Ha-FKHWWH��±��$PDUW\D�6HQ��Identity and Violence: The Illusions of Destiny��$OOHQ�/DQH��

22�(YHQ�ORQJ�EHIRUH�LQGHSHQGHQFH�GLG�WKH�$PHULFDQ�FRORQLHV�GHYHORS�D�IRUP�RI�FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP�ZKHUH-in the state and religion operated within different spheres. An example can be found in Roger Williams, the ‘founding father’ of Rhode Island and – in Martha Nussbaum’s opinion – one of the founders of the American vision on freedom of religion and conscience: Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of conscience. In Defence of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality��%DVLF�%RRNV��6HH�DOVR��:LOEXU�.LWFKHQHU�-RUGDQ��µ5RJHU�:LOOLDPV¶��LQ�5�6��$OOH\��HG��James Madison on Religious Liberty, Prometheus Books, 1985, 115–142. In Williams’s opinion, conscience is the main characteristic of human beings. Because of this, humans are able to make judgments on normative questions. For Williams (who himself was YHU\�UHOLJLRXV��GHQ\LQJ�WKLV�DELOLW\�ZRXOG�EH�OLNH�GHQ\LQJ�WKH�YHU\�QDWXUH�RI�KXPDQNLQG��$SDUW�IURP�his vision on the freedom of religion and conscience, Williams was, like Locke, of the opinion that the state should serve its citizens and not the other way around. Because of these two reasons, Williams concluded like Locke that the state should not interfere in religion. Being Rhode Island’s founding fa-ther, Williams had the opportunity to apply his theory in practice. Therefore, Rhode Island, and its 17th century constitutionalism, served as a site for religious freedom. Because of the decoupling of public politics and private philosophical convictions, different religions could exist peacefully side-by-side. 2QH�VKRXOG�KRZHYHU�QRWLFH�WKDW��DOWKRXJK�5KRGH�,VODQG�ZDV�D�IRUHUXQQHU��LW�ZDV�QRW�DQ�LVRODWHG�FDVH�in the United States. Some other states also developed a constitutional structure respecting the sepa-ration between church and state before the war of independence. John Swomley, Religious Liberty and the Secular State. The Constitutional context��3URPHWKHXV�%RRNV��±��

23 David Hume, Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth��LQ�(��0LOOHU��HG��Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary �/LEHUW\�&ODVVLFV��

24 About the role of the laïcité model in France in the creation of a French identity and the foundation of D�UHSXEOLFDQ�VWDWH�RQ�WKH�EDVLV�RI�WKH�LGHDV�RI�WKH�)UHQFK�5HYROXWLRQ��VHH�2OLYLHU�5R\��La laïcité face à l’Islam��+DFKHWWH��


Instead, constitutionalism has offered a framework through which the solution to reli-JLRXV�FRQÀLFW�ZDV�EXLOW�LQWR�WKH�IRXQGDWLRQV�WR�D�VRFLHW\�25

III. The different appearances of constitutionalism.,Q�WKH�SUHYLRXV�VHFWLRQ�ZH�DUJXHG�WKDW�UHOLJLRXV�FRQÀLFWV�KDYH�EHHQ��RXW�RI�KLVWRULF�

necessity, imagined into constitutional frameworks. We also saw that the birth of consti-WXWLRQDOLVP�ZDV�LQÀXHQFHG�E\�UHOLJLRXV�FRQFHUQV��:H�HYHQ�REVHUYHG�D�PXWXDOO\�EHQH¿FLDO�relationship between religion and constitutionalism. Step by step, the state became emancipated from the church and conversely personal religious convictions were freed from governmental interference.

+RZHYHU��FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP�LQ�HDFK�VRFLHW\�FRPHV�RXW�RI�D�VSHFL¿F�KLVWRULFDO�FRQWH[W�ZKLFK� LQ� WXUQ� GH¿QHV� WKH� SUDFWLFDO� RSHUDWLRQ� RI� FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP� LQ� WKDW� VRFLHW\�� 7KH�United States and France, for instance, have apparently similar constitutional frame-works with regard to the idea of a separation of church and state; but in practice, there are considerable differences.

Alicino is of the opinion that for many Americans, the French prohibition on conspicu-ous religious expressions in public schools of 2004 would be impossible in America as a breach the Constitution of the United States. According to him, one of the most important reasons for these differences is the positive role that religion plays in the ‘American found-ing myth’, as opposed to the assault on religion as an element of ‘feodalité’, in the French revolution.26 As a result of these historically different perceptions, France and the United States differ in contemporary function and approach to religion as a part of society. . Secu-larism in the States is passive and demands the state to play a passive role by allowing the public visibility of religion. In France, on the other hand, an assertive secularist approach exists that requires the state to play an ‘assertive’ role to exclude religion from the public VSKHUH�DQG�FRQ¿QH�LW�WR�WKH�SULYDWH�GRPDLQ��$FFRUGLQJO\��.XUX�VXJJHVWV�WKDW�WKH�8QLWHG�States thus offers an example of ‘passive secularism’ whereas France offers an example of ‘active secularism’.27

2I�FRXUVH�WKHUH�DUH�PDQ\�PRUH�H[DPSOHV�RI�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�GLYHUVLW\�ZLWK�UHJDUG�WR�WKH�UHODWLRQVKLS�EHWZHHQ�VWDWH��UHOLJLRQ�DQG�VRFLHW\��(ULF�7DUGLI�GLVFXVVHV�WKUHH�PDLQ�FDW-egories.28�,Q�WKH�¿UVW�ZH�¿QG�FRXQWULHV�ZKLFK�KDYH�DGRSWHG�D�V\VWHP�RI�VWDWH�UHOLJLRQ�29

25 This is the central thesis of Alicino‘s paper; Francesco Alicino, ‘Constitutionalism as a Peaceful “Site” of 5HOLJLRXV�6WUXJJOHV¶��*OREDO�-XULVW�LVV��DUWLFOH��2I�FRXUVH�RQH�FDQ�REMHFW�WKLV�E\�DUJXLQJ�WKDW�WKHVH�UHOLJLRXV�FRQÀLFWV�ZKHUH�DOO�IUDPHG�ZLWKLQ�D�&KULVWLDQ�FRQWH[W�EXW�RQ�WKH�RWKHU�KDQG�RQH�PD\�QRW�QHJOHFW�WKDW�WKHVH�LQWHU�&KULVWLDQ�FRQÀLFWV�ZKHUH�DWWHQGHG�ZLWK�PRUH�KDWUHG�DQG�YLROHQFH�WKHQ�SUHVHQW�UHOLJLRXV�WHQVLRQV�LQ�(XURSH��0D\EH�WKH�IDGLQJ�RI�WKLV�LQWHU�&KULVWLDQ�KDWUHG�DQG�YLROHQFH�ORQJ�EHIRUH�WKH�ULVH�RI�WKH�PXOWLFXOWXUDO�VRFLHW\�PXVW�EH�DGGUHVVHG�WR�WKH�LQÀXHQFH�RQ�VRFLHW\�RI�PRG-ern constitutionalism.

26�)UDQFHVFR�$OLFLQR��µ&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP�DV�D�3HDFHIXO�³6LWH´�RI�5HOLJLRXV�6WUXJJOHV¶��*OREDO�-XULVW�iss. 1, article 8, 25–26.

27 Ahmet Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion, The Unites States, France, and Turkey �&DPEULGJH�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��6HH�DOVR��9HLW�%DGHU��Secularism or Democracy? Associational Governance of Religious Diversity��$PVWHUGDP�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��±��

28�(ULF�7DUGLI��Ã&XOWXUH�VKRFNV�LQ�D�JOREDOL]HG�ZRUOG��KRZ�ÄDFFRPPRGDWLQJ³�GR�VWDWHV�QHHG�WR�EH�UHJDUGLQJ�WKH�XVH�RI�UHOLJLRXV�V\PEROV�LQ�WKH�SULYDWH�VSKHUH"µ��International Journal of Public Law and policy, 87.

29�7KLV�FDWHJRU\�LQFOXGHV�VHYHUDO�,VODPLF�FRXQWULHV��EXW�DOVR�(XURSHDQ�QDWLRQV�VXFK�DV�WKH�8.��*UHHFH�and Norway.


The second category includes all countries which have adopted a strict secularism.30 The WKLUG�DQG�ODVW�FDWHJRU\�FRQVLVWV�RI�PL[HG�RU�K\EULG�V\VWHPV�JUDQWLQJ�DQ�RI¿FLDO�UHFRJQL-tion to certain religions.31

Tardif’s typology gives us a template and example through which to understand that quasi identical constitutional principles will be interpreted differently in different legal V\VWHPV��([WUDSRODWLQJ�IURP�RXU�FRQFOXVLRQV�UHODWLQJ�WR�UHOLJLRQ��RQH�FDQ�VXJJHVW�WKDW�constitutional traditions (as opposed to principles, the former being wider and including WKH�VSHFL¿F�VRFLHWDO�FRQWH[W�LQ�ZKLFK�FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP�IXQFWLRQV��GLIIHU�IURP�RQH�OHJDO�system to another. As a consequence, considering constitutionalism as ‘denoting a legal model that contains institutional mechanisms for the limitation and the control of power on the one hand, and for protecting individual rights and freedoms on the other’, it stands to reason that if constitutionalism is unique in each society, the reception of hu-man right claims will also be unique.

This is a position taken increasingly by modern constitutional studies, which accept that constitutional principles have universal value but that their role within constitu-tional systems is related to legal traditions. Zucca, for example argues that the universal value of human rights is unproblematic as long as the concept of ‘the people’ remains universal as well.32 From the viewpoint of constitutional democracy this means that con-VWLWXWLRQDO�SULQFLSOHV�DUH�HPEHGGHG�LQ�VRFLHWDO�DQG�LQVWLWXWLRQDO�FRQWH[WV�ZKLFK�¿OO�XQLYHU-sal – rather theoretical – concepts with substantive normative content.33 Abdullahi An-Na’in goes even further and observes that the inscriptions of universal human rights – probably the most universal constitutional values – may not be perceived as self-evi-dent.34 International treaties themselves being the result of a process and the interna-tional human rights that are proclaimed in these treaties can therefore not be perceived as self-evident, immutable principles of law.

The foregoing allows the conclusion that universal constitutional principles are the induction of diverging constitutional traditions and not the other way around. At this point of the argumentation we need to return to Habermas’ understanding of constitu-tionalism as a result of the interaction between the rule of law and popular sovereignty DQG�DV�EHLQJ�EDVHG�RQ�D�¿QH�EDODQFH�EHWZHHQ�KXPDQ�ULJKWV�DQG�SRSXODU�VRYHUHLJQW\�35 This balancing exercise takes – because of historical and political reasons – a different shape in all states. Whilst this does not mean that the possibility of universal human rights needs to be abandoned, it needs to be clear that interpretations of human rights will depend on the cultural and institutional context of a given society. Universality is the result of a mediated international legal order. This is why – as is demonstrated further on – the margin of appreciation has an important role in human rights jurisprudence.

30�7KH�EHVW�H[DPSOHV�LQ�WKLV�FDWHJRU\�DUH�)UDQFH��6ZHGHQ��VLQFH��DQG�7XUNH\�31�,Q�WKLV�FDWHJRU\�ZH�¿QG�FRXQWULHV�OLNH�*HUPDQ\��$XVWULD��%HOJLXP�DQG�/X[HPERXUJ�32 Lorenzo Zucca, &RQVWLWXWLRQDO�'LOHPPDV��&RQÀLFWV�RI�)XQGDPHQWDO�/HJDO�5LJKWV�LQ�(XURSH�DQG�WKH�86$ �2[IRUG�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��

33 This is for instance the viewpoint of Alan Brudner in his book: Alan Brudner, Constitutional Goods �2[IRUG�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��S��

34��$KPHG�$EGXOODKL��Ã³$UHD�([SUHVVLRQV³�DQG�WKH�8QLYHUVDOLW\�RI�+XPDQ�5LJKWV��0HGLDWLQJ�D�FRQWLQJHQW�Relationship‘, in D. Forsythe and P. McMahon, Human Rights and Diversity; Area Studies Revisited �8QLYHUVLW\�RI�1HEUDVND�3UHVV��

35 See supra introduction.


IV. The return of the religious The historical role of constitutionalism in dealing with religious tensions notwith-

standing, at the moment, the role of constitutionalism is criticised in Western countries irrespective of their constitutional tradition. It is argued that constitutionalism – or at least some of its arrangements – cannot be reconciled with the rise of multiculturalism.

36 In terms of religion, an occasional visitor in France might notice, for example, that laïcité is not accompanied with actual égalité.37

In terms of religious tensions, it is safe to say that with the expansion of multicultur-alism, there has also been an expansion of religious diversity. Certain obvious trends are GHPRQVWUDWLYH�RI�WKLV�±�IRU�H[DPSOH��WKHUH�LV�WKH��UH�DSSHDUDQFH�RI�,VODP�DV�D�FRQVH-quence of a huge Muslim immigration from the South. Roy, however, devotes consider-able energy to show that the picture is far more complex. He points at the rather lazy DWWLWXGH�RI�WKH�,VODPLVW��EHLQJ�TXLWH�FRPIRUWDEOH�ZLWK�WKH�GLYLVLRQ�RI�VWDWH�DQG�FKXUFK��DV�opposed to other fundamentalist groups such as the Jehovah’s witnesses and some Jew-ish groups. These groups more often make religious claims than many Muslim groups do. Additionally, the return of the religious has taken on a more qualitative dimension (in FRPSDULVRQ� ZLWK� WKH� TXDQWLWDWLYH� FKDQJH� WKDW� VWDUWHG� WZHQW\� \HDUV� DJR�� ZKLFK� DOVR�QHHGV�WR�EH�XQGHUVWRRG��DQG�DVVHVVHG��ZLWKLQ�WKH�EURDGHU�IUDPHZRUN�RI�PRXQWLQJ�VHFX-larism and individualism.38

Accordingly, to contemporary eyes, constitutional arrangements created to protect relatively homogenous societies against the involvement of the state, appear backwards DQG�LQFUHDVLQJO\�GLI¿FXOW�WR�DSSO\��1RZ��µ*RG�LV�EDFN¶39, western countries are in search of methods to reengineer the settings of religious peace. In order to respond, legal sys-tems in each society and on each legal ‘level’ enter a recalibration phase. Different ap-proaches are used to readjust the law within a multicultural society. The readjustments take place on many levels, of which national constitutional readjustment is but one.

36 For a study on the debate in Britain see: Derek McGhee, The End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, Inte-gration and Human Rights��2SHQ�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��$OVR�2OLYLHU�5R\�QRWLFHV�WKDW�µ)UDQFH�ZDV�EURXJKW�WR�UHFRJQL]H�D�0XVOLP�UHOLJLRXV�UHDOLW\�WKDW�LW�ZRXOG�UDWKHU�LJQRUH��«��ZKLOH�+ROODQG��VKDWWHUHG�E\�WKH�DVVDVVLQDWLRQ�RI�WKH�¿OPPDNHU�7KHR�9DQ�*RJK�LQ�1RYHPEHU��E\�D�\RXQJ�0XVOLP�RI�0RURF-FDQ�RULJLQ�EXW�'XWFK�FLWL]HQVKLS��FRQIURQWHG�WKH�IDLOXUH�RI�SRVLWLYH�PXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP�¶�2OLYLHU�5R\��Secu-larism Confronts Islam��&ROXPELD�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��

37 Alicino makes the following observation: ‘When Yazid Sabeg, the government’s diversity commis-VLRQHU��VHW�XS�D�JURXS�WR�¿QG�WKH�EHVW�ZD\�WR�FROOHFW�LQIRUPDWLRQ�WR�PDNH�LW�SRVVLEOH�WR�PHDVXUH�³GL-versity”, critics see this ‘ethnic and religious data’ as an assault on the ‘principes fondateurs de notre République’, that is the French Republic’s secular principles. In any case, or we’d better say at the same time, this cannot remove the fact, that even the casual tourist notices, of how multi-ethnic and multi-religious France is.’ Francesco Alicino, ‘Constitutionalism as a Peaceful “Site” of Religious Strug-JOHV¶��*OREDO�-XULVW�LVV��DUWLFOH��

38�2OLYLHU�5R\��La laïcité face à l’Islam��+DFKHWWH��6HFXODUL]DWLRQ�EULQJV�DERXW�WKH�ORVV�RI�the social naturalness of being religious and generates a reconstruction of the religious identity as a minority identity. A need to present oneself as a religious person becomes more urgent, not because WKH�QRQ�UHOLJLRXV�¿JKW�DJDLQVW�WKH�UHOLJLRXV�FRPPXQLW\��EXW�EHFDXVH�WKH�FRQGLWLRQV�RI�PHPEHUVKLS�RI�a religious community become more strict.

39 John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, God Is Back: How the Global Rise of Faith Is Changing the World��$OOHQ�/DQH��6HH�DOVR��3DXO�&OLWHXU��µ6WDWH�DQG�5HOLJLRQ�DJDLQVW�WKH�EDFNGURS�RI�UHOLJLRXV�5DGLFDOLVP¶��,QWHUQDWLRQDO�KRXUQDO�RI�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�ODZ��±��


V. The recalibration of religion and society – national DQG�(XURSHDQ�UHIRUP2Q�WKH�%HOJLDQ�OHYHO��DV�D�UHVXOW�RI�WKH�JURZLQJ�VHQVLELOLWLHV�RI�UHOLJLRXV�PLQRULWLHV��WKH�

visible consequences of this recalibration are easy to spot in the removal of references to the catholic faith from the names of organizations and institutions and in the removal of FUXFL¿[HV�IURP�SXEOLF�EXLOGLQJV��2Q�WKH�OHYHO�RI�ODZ�DQG�JRYHUQDQFH��ZH�KDYH�VHHQ�WKH�Belgian government enact an anti-discrimination law40, establish a centre for equal op-portunities41 and start paying the wages of religious leaders from different faiths, includ-ing Islam.42

2Q�WKH�8QLRQ�OHYHO��WKH�(XURSHDQ�8QLRQ�KDV�HQDFWHG�GLUHFWLYHV�WR�¿JKW�GLVFULPLQDWLRQ�on several grounds, including discrimination based on religion.43�$OWKRXJK�WKH�(XURSHDQ�Court of Justice has not yet had the opportunity to decide a case on these directives, Titia Loenen points out that the Luxembourg Court of Justice will probably take a strict DSSURDFK�WR�UHOLJLRXV�FRQÀLFWV��6KH�DUJXHV�WKDW�WKH�(&-�DQWL�GLVFULPLQDWLRQ�GLUHFWLYHV�ZLOO�be read together with other Union principles such as the freedom of movement (which cannot be reconciled with the wide margin of appreciation as recognised by the Stras-ERXUJ�&RXUW�LQ�KXPDQ�ULJKWV�ODZ��7KXV�RQ�WKH�OHYHO�RI�WKH�(XURSHDQ�8QLRQ��PLQRULWLHV�– including religious minorities – will probably become better protected in the future.44

The readjustment also takes place at the international level, most visibly and rele-YDQWO\�RQ�WKH�OHYHO�RI�(XURSHDQ�KXPDQ�ULJKWV��,W�KDV�EHHQ�REVHUYHG�WKDW�SURFHVVHV�RI�denationalisation have affected human rights law. National judges and non-governmen-tal organisations use human rights as an instrument to build a ‘supranational constitutionalism.’45 The main actors in this process are the courts in Strasbourg and

40 Loi du 30 juillet 1981 tendant à réprimer certains actes inspirés par le racisme et la xénophobie [the law of 30 july 1981 prohibiting certain acts which were inspired by racism and xenophobia ]which was WKH�VXEMHFW�RI�KXJH�PRGL¿FDWLRQV�GXULQJ�WKH�ODVW�GHFHQQLXP�

41 Loi du 15 février 1993 créant un Centre pour l‘égalité des chances et la lutte contre le racisme [the law of 15 february 1993 creating a Center for equal chances and the abatement against racism].

42�/RL�GX��DR�W��DX[�WUDLWHPHQWV�GHV�WLWXODLUHV�GH�FHUWDLQHV�IRQFWLRQV�SXEOLTXHV��GHV�PLQLVWUHV�des cultes et des délégués du Conseil central laïque [the law of 2 august 1974 on the treatment of the KROGHUV�RI�FHUWDLQ�SXEOLF�IXQFWLRQV��«��WKH�PLQLVWHUV�RI�FHUWDLQ�UHOLJLRXV�FXOWV�DQG�WKH�UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV�RI�WKH�FHQWUDO�FRXQFLO�RI�OD\PDQ�@��2I�FRXUVH�WKLV�LV�QRW�DQ�HQWLUHO\�QHZ�V\VWHP��7KH�SUDFWLFH�RI�¿QDQF-ing religions dates from the 19th century and included from the beginning other faiths than Catholi-cism. But this does not mean that the adaptation of this old system to new religions such as Islam was self-evident. There are, in Belgium, for instance, problems concerning the installation of the ‘Muslim executive’, a representative organ that the government requires from the Muslim believers to create in order to receive support from the State.

43�7KH�(8�UXOHV�FRQFHUQ�GLVFULPLQDWLRQ�LQ�HPSOR\PHQW�RQ�JURXQGV�RI�UHOLJLRQ��EHOLHI��GLVDELOLW\��DJH�DQG�VH[XDO�RULHQWDWLRQ��'LUHFWLYH��(&��DQG�LQ�HPSOR\PHQW�LQ�DOPRVW�DOO�RWKHU�DUHDV�RI�HYHU\GD\�OLIH�RQ�JURXQGV�RI�UDFH��(&��

44�7LWLD�/RHQHQ�DW�WKH�LQWHUQDWLRQDO�V\PSRVLXP�Ã5HOLJLRXV�'LYHUVLW\�DQG�WKH�(XURSHDQ�:RUNSODFHµ�RUJDQ-ized by the ‚Religare Research Project‘ at the Catholic University of Leuven on the 13 of January 2011.

� 7KLV�HYROXWLRQ�PDNHV�D�UHSODFHPHQW�RI�WKH�&RXQFLO�RI�(XURSH�E\�WKH�(XURSHDQ�8QLRQ�SRVVLEOH��5HQp�YDQ�GHU�/LQGHQ�±�IRUPHU�SUHVLGHQW�RI�WKH�3DUOLDPHQWDU\�$VVHPEO\�RI�WKH�&RXQFLO�RI�(XURSH�±�H[SUHVVHG�WKLV�IHDU�DQG�DUJXHG�WKDW�ERWK�WKH�(XURSHDQ�8QLRQ�DQG�WKH�&RXQFLO�RI�(XURSH�KDYH�WKHLU�RZQ�UROH�WR�SOD\��$FFRUGLQJ�WR�YDQ�GHU�/LQGHQ�LW�PD\�QRW�EH�QHJOHFWHG�WKDW�WKH�&RXQFLO�RI�(XURSH�IXQFWLRQV�DV�D�EULGJH�EHWZHHQ�:HVWHUQ�(XURSH��WKH�IRUPHU�6RYLHW�8QLRQ�DQG�7XUNH\��5HQp�YDQ�GHU�/LQGHQ�H[SUHVVHG�these concerns on the international Conference on Religion, Beliefs, Philosophical Convictions and (GXFDWLRQ�ZKLFK�ZDV�KHOG�RQ�'HFHPEHU��DW�%UXJJH�

45 This concept originates from: Francesco Alicino, ‘Constitutionalism as a Peaceful “Site” of Religious 6WUXJJOHV¶��*OREDO�-XULVW�LVV��DUWLFOH��±��


Luxembourg. These two Courts have far reaching powers and their judgments have the impact of binding precedents, even taking priority over national constitutional arrange-ments.

This emergence of the international level as a site of legal recalibration can be con-ceived of in two ways. From a positive point of view, this evolution permits society to examine and improve national law via a pluralistic debate on an international level in a constructive way. Local democratic practices can gain legitimacy by way of these inter-national debates and, perhaps most importantly, citizens can gain legal guarantees vis-à-vis their own governments.46 From a negative point of view,47 this ‘new constitutional-ism’ becomes an instrument in the hands of an international activist judicial elite that imposes external standards on democratic countries (this use of international law in or-GHU�WR�FKDQJH�ORFDO�OHJDO�UHJXODWLRQ�ZLOO�EH�GLVFXVVHG�ODWHU��48

7KH�IRUHJRLQJ�GHYHORSPHQWV�VHHP�SURPLVLQJ��1DWLRQDO�DQG�(XURSHDQ�UHIRUPV�VKRXOG�enable member states to accommodate religious claims. Reforms notwithstanding, dis-crimination and exclusion – especially of Muslims – still exists. Because of this, argu-PHQWV�VXUIDFH�WKDW�WKH�OHJDO�UHIRUPV�DUH�LQVXI¿FLHQW��)RU�H[DPSOH��RQH�FDQ�SRLQW�DW�LQ-consistencies in non-discrimination-law and recommend further reform. Dissatisfaction DOVR�UHVWV�ZLWK�WKH�UXOLQJV�RI�WKH�(XURSHDQ�&RXUW�RI�+XPDQ�5LJKWV�LQ�6WUDVERXUJ��7KH�criticism is that this Court is too conservative and does not pay enough attention to the peculiarities of religions, for example, of Islam.49

2QH�FDQ�SDUWLDOO\�XQGHUVWDQG�WKHVH�FULWLFLVPV�IURP�WKH�YLHZSRLQW�RI�D�QHZ�YLVLRQ�RQ�WKH�VHSDUDWLRQ�EHWZHHQ�FKXUFK�DQG�VWDWH�DQG�RQ�WKH�UROH�RI�UHOLJLRQ�ZLWKLQ�VRFLHW\��(XUR-SHDQ�0XVOLPV�DQG�RWKHU�QHZ�UHOLJLRXV�SURWDJRQLVWV�±�ZKRP�2OLYLHU�5R\�FDOOV�WKH�µQHZ�parishioners’ – often take this point of view.50 Members of religious minorities, detached

46�6HH�IRU�H[DPSOH��(UQVW�8OULFK�3HWHUVPDQQ��Ã+RZ�WR�&RQVWLWXWLRQDOL]H�,QWHUQDWLRQDO�/DZ�DQG�)RUHLJQ�3ROLF\�IRU�WKH�%HQH¿W�RI�6RFLHW\"��0LFKLJDQ�-RXUQDO�RI�,QWHUQDWLRQDO�/DZ��±��

47 An elaborated discussion of this can be found in the writings of Alexander Somek. See: Alexander 6RPHN��Ã7UDQVQDWLRQDO�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�ODZ��7KH�QRUPDWLYH�TXHVWLRQµ��-RXUQDO�RI�,QWHUQDWLRQDO�Constitutional Law, 144–149.

48�6HH�IRU�H[DPSOH��5DLQHU�:DKO��Ã,Q�'HIHQFH�RI�Ä&RQVWLWXWLRQ³µ��LQ�3��'REQHU�DQG�0��/RXJKOLQ��HGV��The Twilight of Constitutionalism��2[IRUG�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��±��

49 Its ruling in the Sahin-case was particularly criticised for the wide margin of appreciation granted to 7XUNH\��6HH�%��%OHLEHUJ��µ8QYHLOLQJ�WKH�UHDO�LVVXH��(FDOXDWLQJ�WKH�(XURSHDQ�&RXUW�RI�+XPDQ�5LJKWV¶�GHFLVLRQ�WR�HQIRUFH�WKH�7XUNLVK�KHDGVFDUI�EDQ�LQ�/H\OD�6DKLQ�Y��7XUNH\¶��&RUQHOO�/DZ�UHYLHZ��±��7�+RRSHV��µ7KH�/H\OD�ùDKLQ�Y��7XUNH\�&DVH�%HIRUH�WKH�(XURSHDQ�&RXUW�RI�+XPDQ�5LJKWV¶��&KLQHVH�-RXUQDO�RI�,QWHUQDWLRQDO�/DZ��±��&��0RULQL��µ6HFXODULVP�DQG�)UHHGRP�RI�5HOLJLRQ��7KH�$SSURDFK�RI�WKH�(XURSHDQ�&RXUW�RI�+XPDQ�5LJKWV¶��,VUDHO�/DZ�5HYLHZ��±��

50�7KH�ÃQHZ�SDULVKLRQHUVµ�DUH�WKH�0XVOLPV�LQ�(XURSH�WKDW�EHFRPH��WR�XVH�WKH�ZRUGV�RI�2OLYLHU�5R\��µRFFL-GHQWDOLVp¶�RU�ZHVWHUQL]HG��)RU�DQ�RXWOLQHG�GLVFXVVLRQ�RI�5R\�RQ�WKLV�WRSLF�VHH��2��5R\��L’Islam Mondi-alisé [Globalised Islam@��(GLWLRQV�GX�6HXLO��±��DQG��±��5R\�SRLQWV�RXW�WKDW�UHOLJLRXV�claims seldom result from socio-economic circumstances and that they more often result from feelings associated with identity. This is especially the case with the ‘new converts’. In an interview with a Belgian journal, Roy pointed out that the debate on headscarves began when three young girls, who were integrated into French society and were diligent students, one day came to school with a head-scarf and declared: ‘My body is my business’.�*��*RULV��µ,QWHUYLHZ�PHW�2OLYLHU�5R\��ZH�EHJULMSHQ�QLHWV�van de nieuwe godsdienstigheid’ [Interview with Oliver Roy: We don’t understand anything of the new religiosity@��mondiaal magazine,��$OVR� LQ��2OLYLHU�5R\��L’Islam Mondialisé [Globalised Islam@��(GLWLRQV�GX�6HXLO��±��7KH�VDPH�YLVLRQ�LV�DOVR�H[SUHVVHG�LQ�WKH�ERRN��6�7��+XQWHU��HG��Islam, Europe’s Second Religion. The New Social, Cultural, and Political Landscape (Praeger 3XEOLVKHUV��2Q�DQRWKHU�RFFDVLRQ�5R\�SRLQWV�RXW�WKDW�WKH�SURFHVVHV�RI�DVVLPLODWLRQ�DQG�PXOWLFXO-WXUDOLVP�LQ�(XURSH�DUH�IDLOLQJ�VLQFH�$QJOR�6D[RQ�PXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP�UHTXLUHV�WKDW�UHOLJLRQ�LV�HPEHGGHG�LQ�D�VWDEOH�FXOWXUDO�EDFNJURXQG��WKDW�GRHV�QRW�H[LVW�IRU�LPPLJUDQWV��DQG�WKH�)UHQFK�DVVLPLODWLRQ�DSSURDFK�


from their traditional culture, use their religion to rebuild their identity. Since they are also largely westernized, they also draw upon Western values such as human rights, to protect their identity.51 International human rights are therefore looked to as a safety net to protect the identity of different minorities.52

However, these expectations of protection are not always met and human rights judgments such as Leyla Sahin53 and the cases concerning the French law of 15 March 2004 on the prohibition of le port de signes ou tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse54 foster the perception that the freedom of religion – perceived as an important realization of Western society – is only applicable in a homogenous western society, to certain pre-sanitized concepts of religion. Western constitutionalism thus becomes con-taminated with a sense of hypocrisy.

2Q�WKH�IDFH�RI�LW��DQG�ORRNLQJ�DW�WKH�MXGJHPHQWV�IURP�D�SXUHO\�KXPDQ�ULJKWV�SHUVSHF-tive, there seems to be certain plausibility in this claim. However looking beyond human rights to the legal frameworks the Court is part of, and accordingly viewed as a point of interplay between legal recalibration of religion of various legal levels, these cases and WKHLU�UHDVRQLQJ�DQG�GHFLVLRQ�WDNHV�RQ�D�GLIIHUHQW�VLJQL¿FDQFH��,Q�RUGHU�WR�HYDOXDWH�WKH�OHJLWLPDF\�RI�WKH�DFWLRQV�RI�WKH�&RXUW��RQH�PXVW�WKXV�¿UVW�FRQVLGHU�WKH�SRVLWLRQ�RI�WKH�Court within a multi-layered legal system and consider its jurisdiction and legitimacy ac-cordingly.

requires a secularization of beliefs and behaviours (which is not in line with the religious feelings of LPPLJUDQWV��7KH�SUREOHP�LV��VD\V�5R\��µWKDW�WRGD\¶V�UHOLJLRXV�UHYLYDO�±�ZKHWKHU�XQGHU�IXQGDPHQWDOLVW�or spiritualistic forms – develops by decoupling itself from any cultural reference. It thrives on the loss of cultural identity: the young radicals are indeed perfectly “Westernized.” Among the born-again and WKH�FRQYHUWV��QXPHURXV�\RXQJ�ZRPHQ�ZKR�ZDQW�WR�ZHDU�WKH�YHLO�EHORQJ�WR�WKHVH�FDWHJRULHV��,VODP�LV�VHHQ�QRW�DV�D�FXOWXUDO�UHOLF�EXW�DV�D�UHOLJLRQ�WKDW�LV�XQLYHUVDO�DQG�JOREDO�DQG�UHDFKHV�EH\RQG�VSHFL¿F�cultures, just like evangelicalism or Pentecostalism. And this loss of cultural identity is the condition ERWK�IRU�LQWHJUDWLRQ�DQG�IRU�QHZ�IRUPV�RI�IXQGDPHQWDOLVP�¶��2OLYLHU�5R\��Secularism Confronts Islam �&ROXPELD�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��;,�DQG��5R\�WKXV�GHPRQVWUDWHV�WKDW�,VODP�LPPLJUDQWV�FRSH�ZLWK�DQ�LGHQWLW\�FULVLV��2Q�WKH�RQH�KDQG�WKH\�GR�QRW�IRUP�D�SDUW�RI�WKH�:HVWHUQ�FXOWXUH�EXW�RQ�WKH�RWKHU�hand they are detached from the middle-east culture. As a result of this they refer to an international Islam. Roy argues that this movement, which detaches religion from a cultural background and places it in the area of the personal convictions of the individual believer (in connection with a vague inter-QDWLRQDO�FRPPXQLW\�RI�EHOLHYHUV��FDQ�±�OLNH�3URWHVWDQWLVP�LQ�HDUO\�PRGHUQ�&KULVWLDQLW\�±�IRVWHU�WKH�VHFXODUL]DWLRQ�RI�,VODP��7KH�EHOLHI�WKDW�UHOLJLRQ�LV�LQ�WKH�¿UVW�SODFH�D�SHUVRQDO�PDWWHU��LV�WKH�¿UVW�VWHS�to a restriction of religion to the private sphere.

51 See for example: Amélie Barras, Using Rights to Re-invent Secularism in France and Turkey��(XUR-SHDQ�8QLYHUVLW\�,QVWLWXWH�:RUNLQJ�3DSHUV��

52 Roy points to the fact that Muslims appeal to the concept of human rights and minority rights, even though they were created to defend social groups – like homosexuals – with values that are not ac-FHSWHG�LQ�,VODP��2OLYLHU�5R\��L’Islam Mondialisé [Globalised Islam@��(GLWLRQV�GX�6HXLO��

53�6HH� IRU� H[DPSOH�� 6\OYLH� /DQJODXGH�� µ,QGRFWULQDWLRQ�� 6HFXODULVP�� 5HOLJLRXV� /LEHUW\� DQG� WKH� (&+5¶��,QWHUQDWLRQDO�DQG�&RPSDUDWLYH�/DZ�4XDUWHUO\��±��

54�,Q�WKH�FRQFOXVLRQ�RI�WKHLU�GLVFXVVLRQ�RQ�$UWLFOH��RI�WKH�&RQYHQWLRQ�-DFREV��:KLWH�DQG�2YH\�IRXQG��IRU�example, that it is ‘extremely regrettable that the Court has, in its judgments on the Islamic headscarf, shown a lack of understanding of the meaning of this symbol.’ Francis Jacobs et al., The European Convention on Human Rights��2[IRUG�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��6HH�DOVR��1LFKRODV�*LEVRQ��µ5LJKW�WR�HGXFDWLRQ�LQ�&RQIRUPLW\�ZLWK�3KLORVRSKLFDO�&RQYLFWLRQV��/DXWVL�9��,WDO\��&DVH�$QDO\VLV¶��European Human Rights Law Review, 211–212.

The French headscarf cases are: Dogru v France�$SS�QR��(&W+5��'HF��Kervanci v France�$SS�QR��(&W+5��'HF��Hatice Bayrak v France�$SS�QR��(&W+5��0DUFK��Mahmoed Sadek Gamaleddyn v France�$SS�QR��(&W+5��'HF��Sara Ghazel v France�$SS�QR��(&W+5��0DUFK��-��6LQJK�Y�)UDQFH�$SS�QR��(&W+5��0DUFK��DQG�R. Singh v France�$SS�QR��(&W+5��0DUFK��


VI. The limited legitimacy of supranational constitution-alism

We noticed above that universal constitutional principles are the induction of diverg-ing national constitutional traditions and that constitutionalism somehow has to balance human rights with popular sovereignty. Since these considerations are fundamental for an appropriate understanding of the existence, scope and function of international hu-man rights, such as the right to freedom of religion, this section will develop an in depth understanding of this fundamental aspect of international constitutionalism and accord-ingly establish its limits.

At the heart of this topic again lies our understanding that popular sovereignty and human rights – which are ‘gleichursprünglich’ – need to be balanced against one an-other. ‘The emergence of transnational constitutional law is’ however, as Alexander Somek points out, ‘correlated with the demise of parliaments as representative institutions.’55 This observation reveals two interrelated mechanisms that must be stud-ied in any evaluation of the legitimacy of the actions of an institution of international human rights: Firstly, the relationship between national and international law and sec-ondly, the relationship between judge and parliament.

&RQFHUQLQJ�WKH�¿UVW�LVVXH��ZULWHUV�VXFK�DV�0DUF�%RVVX\W56�DQG�3DYORV�(OHIWKHULDGLV�DUH�of the opinion that international human rights are different from national constitutional rights. Whereas national constitutional rights concern basic questions on political legiti-macy, international rights mainly try to establish legal relations between states who are VRYHUHLJQ�DQG�RQO\�ERXQG�E\�WKHLU�RZQ�ZLOO��$V�(OHIWHULDGLV�SXWV�LW��ULJKWV�LQ�LQWHUQDWLRQDO�law ‘bring about secondary international remedies, i.e. standards for institutional inter-YHQWLRQ��SHUVXDVLYH�RU�HYHQ�FRHUFLYH��LQWR�WKH�GRPHVWLF�DIIDLUV�RI�D�VWDWH�ZKHQHYHU�WKDW�state is responsible for the most serious violations of human dignity and has not been willing or able to remedy the violations within its own legal system.’57 As a consequence, the new international constitutionalism needs to be a ‘thin’ constitutionalism58, a consti-WXWLRQDOLVP�WKDW�LV�VXI¿FLHQWO\�UHPRYHG�VR�WKDW�±�DV�LV�WKH�FDVH�ZLWK�IHGHUDO�FRQVWLWXWLRQV�– it leaves room for the constitutional traditions of the national member states. Interna-tional human rights may not replace national constitutionalism in a supranational con-stellation.59 We need a kind of transnational constitutionalism that is not superior to na-tional constitutionalism but which operates in a sophisticated balance between both ways

55�$OH[DQGHU�6RPHN��Ã7UDQVQDWLRQDO�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�ODZ��7KH�QRUPDWLYH�TXHVWLRQµ��-RXUQDO�RI�,Q-ternational Constitutional Law, 148.

56�2Q�%RVVX\WV�YLVLRQ�VHH��0DUN�%RVVX\W��Ã6KRXOG�WKH�6WUDVERXUJ�&RXUW�H[HUFLVH�PRUH�VHOI�UHVWUDLQW"��+XPDQ�5LJKWV�/DZ�-RXUQDO��±��,Q�WKH�VDPH�OLQH�RI�UHDVRQLQJ��%DUGR�)DVVEHQGHU��Ã7KH�PHDQLQJ�RI�LQWHUQDWLRQDO�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�ODZµ��LQ�1��7VDJRXULDV��HG��Transnational Constitutionalism. International and European Perspectives��&DPEULGJH�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��±��

57�&RQFHUQLQJ�UHOLJLRQ��(OHIWKHULDGLV�UHIHUV�WR�5DZOV�DQG�VWDWHV�WKDW��‘[t]he point is that an acceptable law of peoples cannot “require decent societies to abandon or modify their religious institutions and adopt liberal ones”.’�3DYORV�(OHIWKHULDGLV��µ+XPDQ�5LJKWV�DV�/HJDO�5LJKWV´��Transnational Legal Theory, 389–390.

58 For the notion of this concept, we refer to the notion of a thin constitution�IRU�WKH�(XURSHDQ�8QLRQ��3DXO�'H�+HUW��µ(XURSH�RI�WKH��VW�&HQWXU\�DQG�WKH�)HDUV�DQG�)RUPXODH�RI�WKH��th and 19th Century’, in A. .LQQHJLQJ��HG��Rethinking Europe’s Constitution��:ROI�/HJDO�3XEOLVKHUV��

59�:KHUHDV�LQ�(XURSH�D�VXSUDQDWLRQDO�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�VHWWLQJ�LV�HPHUJLQJ��LQ�WKH�8QLWHG�6WDWHV�D�EURDG�FRQVHQVXV�H[LVWV�WKDW�WKH�FRQVWLWXWLRQ�LV�DEVROXWHO\�VXSUHPH�WR�WUHDWLHV��2QO\�UHFHQWO\�VRPH�YRLFHV�propose a relationship of „mutual adjustment“ between treaties and the American Constitution: R.Z.


of thinking about constitutionalism.60� 7KH� (XURSHDQ� &RQYHQWLRQ� RQ� +XPDQ� 5LJKWV� LV��unlike constitutionalism, not a ‘blueprint¶�RI�D�VWDWH±�EXW�KDV�UHVWULFWHG�VLJQL¿FDQFH��6LQFH�it does not contain an elaborated institutional system subjected comparable to that of national states, it covers only a part of constitutionalism.

7R�D�GHJUHH�WKH�DQDO\VLV�RI�WKLV�¿UVW�UHODWLRQVKLS�SURYLGHV�WKH�WHPSODWH�IRU�WKH�DQDO\-sis of the second. The second issue concerns the legitimacy of a judge and of an inter-national judge in particular.61 This relationship can be analyzed on two tracks: Firstly in relation to judicial recognition of the limits and costs of applying and developing the law, DQG� LQ�DQ�HYHQ�PRUH�DPSOL¿HG�ZD\��RI�DSSO\LQJ�VXSUD�QDWLRQDO� ODZ��$V� MXGJH�0DQFLQL XQGHUVWRRG�ZHOO�IRU�WKH�(XURSHDQ�&RXUW�RI�-XVWLFH��WKH�DFWLRQ�RI�D�FRXUW�LV�OLPLWHG�EHFDXVH�of its limited legitimacy. A court cannot act as if it were a legislator. A court cannot draw a blueprint of society and impose it. Judges should be aware of the limited social possi-bilities of the law and, in this case, of supra-national law in particular. Consequently, Mancini points out that since the eighties, ‘faced by intractable economic and social SUREOHPV��«��D�YDVW�QXPEHU�RI� ODZ\HUV�RQ�ERWK�VLGHV�RI�WKH�$WODQWLF�KDYH�FHDVHG�WR�believe that the law should aim at realizing policy ends and no longer identify themselves as social engineers.’62 This is an appropriate understanding of the role of a court. Because of this, a claim-based approach to international human rights may not replace the role of parliaments.63 Tony Judt expresses a similar concern in a different way: ‘However le-gitimate the claims of individuals and the importance of their rights, emphasizing these carries an unavoidable cost: the decline of a shared sense of purpose.’64 Thus claims of individuals must be balanced with collective interests.65 Neglecting this can possibly have

/HYLQ�DQG�3��&KHQ��Ã5HWKLQNLQJ�WKH�&RQVWLWXWLRQ�±�7UHDW\�UHODWLRQVKLSµ��,QWHUQDWLRQDO�-RXUQDO�RI�Constitutional Law, 242–260.

60 See for example: Mattias Kumm, ‚The Best of Times and the Worst of Times. Between Constitutional 7ULXPSKDOLVP�DQG�1RVWDOJLDµ��LQ�3��'REQHU�DQG�0��/RXJKOLQ��HGV��The Twilight of Constitutionalism �2[IRUG�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��DQG��±��

61 For an interesting view on the limited competences of a constitutional judge (concerning the judicial FRQWURO�RI�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�DPHQGPHQWV��VHH��<DQLY�5R]QDL�DQG�6HUNDQ�<ROFX��Ã$Q�XQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO�FRQ-VWLWXWLRQDO�DPHQGPHQW��7KH�7XUNLVK�SHUVSHFWLYH��$�FRPPHQW�RQ�WKH�7XUNLVK�&RQVWLWXWLRQDO�&RXUWµV�KHDGVFDUI�GHFLVLRQµ��,QWHUQDWLRQDO�-RXUQDO�RI�&RQVWLWXWLRQDO�ODZ��±��

62 Federico Mancini, Democracy and Constitutionalism in the European Union. Collected Essays (Hart 3XEOLVKLQJ��

63 Sometimes it is argued that when all the member-states of transnational regimes are democratic, that then the transnational regime will support the democratic values of the member-states. This, how-HYHU��LV�QRW�D�VXI¿FLHQW�DUJXPHQW��$V�3HWUD�'REQHU�H[SUHVVHG��ZH�VKRXOG�QRW�XQGHUHVWLPDWH�D�VKDUHG�belief in democracy but this belief in itself cannot serve as a substitute for a pratical democratic le-gitimation. Perta Dobner, ‚More Law, Less Democracy? Democracy and Transnational Constitutional-LVPµ��LQ�3��'REQHU�DQG�0��/RXJKOLQ��HGV��The Twilight of Constitutionalism��2[IRUG�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��

64�-XGW�JRHV�RQ�DQG�VWDWHV�WKDW��2QFH�XSRQ�D�WLPH�RQH�ORRNHG�WR�VRFLHW\�±�RU�FODVV��RU�FRPPXQLW\��IRU�RQH¶V�QRUPDWLYH�YRFDEXODU\��ZKDW�ZDV�JRRG�IRU�HYHU\RQH�ZDV�E\�GH¿QLWLRQ�JRRG�IRU�DQ\RQH��%XW�WKH�converse does not hold. What is good for one person may or may not be of value or interest to an-other’ Tony Judt, Ill Fares the Land. A treatise On Our Present Discontents��3HQJXLQ�*URXS��

65 This is also one of the main arguments that professor Joseph Weiler made in his speech for the Grand &KDPEHU�LQ�WKH�/DXWVL�FDVH��Ã7KH�(XURSH�RI�WKH�&RQYHQWLRQ�UHSUHVHQWV�D�XQLTXH�EDODQFH�EHWZHHQ�WKH�LQGLYLGXDO�OLEHUW\�RI�IUHHGRP�RI�DQG�IURP�UHOLJLRQ��DQG�WKH�FROOHFWLYH�OLEHUW\�WR�GH¿QH�WKH�6WDWH�DQG�Nation using religious symbols and even having an established Church. We trust our constitutional GHPRFUDWLF�LQVWLWXWLRQV�WR�GH¿QH�RXU�SXEOLF�VSDFHV�DQG�RXU�FROOHFWLYH�HGXFDWLRQDO�V\VWHPV��:H�WUXVW�our courts, including this august court, to defend individual liberties. It is a balance that has served (XURSH�ZHOO�RYHU�WKH�ODVW��\HDUV�µ�-RVHSK�:HLOHU��Oral Submission by professor JHH Weiler on behalf of Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, The Russian Federation and San-Marino –


negative consequences.66 So although courts have to counter-balance the will of the political majority to protect minorities, there are societal limits on their ability to do so.

Secondly, Mancini noticed that courts are not legislators. Courts have limited legiti-macy, especially international courts. These courts are entitled to act only because sov-ereign states expressed their will in a treaty to empower those international Courts. The crucial question then is how far this mandate reaches. It must be clear that these man-dates have limits, even the mandate of the Strasbourg Human Rights Court.67 As already explained, popular sovereignty and national constitutionalism indeed limit the scope of human rights.

In the case of the Strasbourg Court, let us recall that the principle of subsidiarity makes the human rights protection by the Strasbourg Court a secondary mechanism. 1DWLRQDO�DXWKRULWLHV�KDYH�WR�GHDO�ZLWK�WKH�SURWHFWLRQ�RI�KXPDQ�ULJKWV�LQ�WKH�¿UVW�SODFH��The limit of the mandate is thus reached where there is divergence in the conceptions of an entity or issue between States party to the treaty – for example, the form and mani-festation of religious freedom. This limit is expressed and interpreted by the Court through the use of the ‘margin of appreciation’.

9,,�� 7KH�DSSURDFK�RI�WKH�(XURSHDQ�&RXUW�RI�+XPDQ�Rights: Let prudence prevail

:H�FDQ�WKXV�WXUQ�WR�WKH�HYDOXDWLRQ�RI�WKH�(&W+5�DQG�LWV�DSSURDFK�WR�LWV�UROH�LQ�WKH�process of recalibration of religion in society.68�:H�¿UVWO\�DSSODXG�WKH�DSSOLFDWLRQ�RI�WKH�margin of appreciation. We secondly applaud the introduction and use of national consti-WXWLRQDO�SULQFLSOHV�LQWR�(&W+5�FDVH�ODZ�DV�D�PHDQV�WKURXJK�ZKLFK�WR�GHFLGH�ZKHWKHU�LQ-terference was proportionate. Through analysis of these features as consistent strands

Third Party Intervening States in the Lautsi Case Before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights��,��&21��

See also Habermas notion of ‘Gleichursprünklichkeit’ of human rights and public sovereignty. Supra n. 10.

66 ‘Toute garantie ou protection monolithique du je porte à nuire à l’harmonie de l’altérité. Il en résulte que les droits subjectifs qui assurent le bonheur du je violent souvent le principe de la réciprocité proportionnelle entre le je et les autres, d’où la création d’un climat d’insécurité et de malaise; ce qui pourrait conduire au retour à la vengeance privée de la part de l’altérité pour satisfaire à son besoin de justice’: Stamatios Tzitzis, La Philosophie Pénale [The Philosophy of Criminal Law] (Presses Univer-VLWDLUHV�GH�)UDQFH��

67 This was expressed well by Baroness Hale of Richmond at the Barnard‘s Inn Reading on 16 june 2011. In her presentation she stressed that although the Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions, this does not mean that there are no limits to the jurisprudence of the Court. http://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/beanstalk-or-living-in-strument-how-tall-can-the-european-convention-on-human. Consulted on 8 September 2011.

68 We dismiss the argument that the use of the margin of appreciation as a tool to allow the Court to legitimize anti-certain-religions sentiment. These allegations of the hypocrisy of this Court and the failings of western constitutionalism come out most strongly in the representation of the Court as Is-lam-biased. However, the wide-margin of appreciation which the Court has granted to member-states in cases concerning Islam is far from new. Already in the nineties, in the well-known blasphemy cases the Court granted a wide margin of appreciation to the member-states in cases concerning the role of religion within society. See the cases of Otto-Preminger v. Austria�$SS�QR��(&W+5��6HSW��DQG�Wingrove v United Kingdom�$SS�QR�� (&W+5��1RY��6HH�DOVR��(YD�%UHPV��µ7KH�0DUJLQ�RI�$SSUHFLDWLRQ�'RFWULQH�RI�WKH�(XURSHDQ�&RXUW�RI�+XPDQ�5LJKWV��$FFRPRGDWLQJ�'LYHUVLW\�ZLWKLQ�(XURSH¶��LQ�'��)RUV\WKH�DQG�3��0F0DKRQ��HGV��Human Rights and Diversity; Area Studies Revisited��8QLYHUVLW\�RI�1HEUDVND�3UHVV��


running through cases as a means to handle the paradox between universality and pe-culiarity, we can re-evaluate the jurisprudence of the Court, not as erratic, biased or as failing in its mandate to provide human rights protection, but as prudent and consistent, respectful of its mandate.69

Firstly, we have already demonstrated that religion and constitutionalism are tightly bound, not only to each other, but also to the historical context out of which they emerge. Roy rejects Common Law solutions for France and sees clear solutions within the French laïcité tradition.70 Because of the historical and societal context, constitutional concepts are not interchangeable. Profound top-down reform through international fora, without waiting for the initial results of bottom-up reform, is thus inadvisable and would infringe upon constitutional traditions functioning in, and adapted to, unique contexts. In light of this, it is apparent that the application of the margin of appreciation tool is fully merited. Its purpose – to give discretion in cases where a plurality of answers exists within Mem-ber States, is respectful of the idea of constitutional pluralism as discussed – is fully ap-plicable to the Court’s right to interfere in a given society’s approach to concepts of reli-gious freedom.

+RZHYHU��WKH�PDUJLQ�LV�D�FRPSOH[�DQG�ÀH[LEOH�OHJDO�WRRO��$FFRUGLQJO\��WR�VWDWH�WKDW�the margin applies is not akin to stating that the Court has no jurisdiction to rule or that no interference will be found. This would violate the Court’s mandate to provide a mini-mum standard of human rights protection and to act as a supervisory body for national reform. Accordingly, in order to evaluate the Court’s behaviour, we must look more closely at how and why it has applied the margin as it has – namely, we need to see how and why it has chosen to interfere when it has.

In this respect, the Court has developed and enforced human-rights protection when it saw the violation of the right at issue was cutting too close to what it perceived as the core of democratic society, or where state action was deemed disproportionate to the violation of the individual’s right. In this respect the Court has guaranteed that countries GR�QRW�HURGH�KXPDQ�ULJKWV�EH\RQG�D�PLQLPXP�OHYHO�JXDUDQWHHG�LQ�WKH�(&+5��)RU�H[DP-ple, we can observe this logic in the Court’s condemnation of Turkey in the Kavakçi-case of 2007.71�7KLV�FDVH�FRQFHUQHG�0V��0HUYH�.DYDNoÕ��DQ�03�IURP�WKH�SUR�,VODPLVW�9LUWXH�3DUW\��)D]LOHW�3DUWLVL��WKDW�LV�RQH�RI�WKH�VSOLQWHUV�RI�WKH�DEROLVKHG�:HOIDUH�3DUW\��5HIDK�3DUWLVL��$IWHU�KDYLQJ�EHHQ�HOHFWHG�IRU�SDUOLDPHQW�VKH�HQWHUHG�WKH�DVVHPEO\�KDOO�ZHDULQJ�D�YHLO�WKDW�ZDV�SHUFHLYHG�DV�D�ÀDJ�RI�SROLWLFDO�,VODP�E\�ODLFLVP�XSKROGHUV�LQ�7XUNH\��%H-cause of this she was asked to leave the parliament without being able to make her parliamentary oath. Afterwards Kavakçi lost her deputyship and received a 5-year ban IURP�SROLWLFV��.DYDNoL�FRPSODLQHG�WKDW�DUWLFOH��RI�WKH�(XUSHDQ�&RQYHQWLRQ�RQ�+XPDQ�5LJKWV�DQG�DUWLFOH��RI�WKH�¿UVW�SURWRFRO�KDG�EHHQ�EUHDFKHG��7KH�&RXUW�FRQVLGHUHG�WKDW�

69�$OWKRXJK�LW�LV�QRW�LQ�WKH�VFRSH�RI�WKLV�DUWLFOH��ZH�ZDQW�WR�SRLQW�WR�WKH�IDFW�WKDW�DOVR�WKH�(XURSHDQ�&RXUW�of Justice has paid respect to national constitutional traditions. In the Omega Spielhallen�&DVH�WKH�(&-�KDV� UHFRJQL]HG� WKDW� WKH� VSHFL¿F�*HUPDQ� QRWLRQ� RI�+XPDQ�'LJQLW\�� WKDW� GRHV� QRW� WROHUDWH� JDPHV�wherein people shoot wit laser-guns at one another, could form a legitimate interest to outbalance the freedom of movement and in the Sayn-Wittgenstein�FDVH�WKH�(&-�DFFHSWHG�WKDW�WKH�IUHHGRP�RI�PRYH-PHQW�FRXOG�EH�RXWEDODQFHG�E\�WKH�$XVWULDQ�LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ�RI�WKH�(TXDOLW\�SULQFLSOH�WKDW�DEROLVKHV�QRELO-LW\��DOVR�ZKHQ�LW�PHUHO\�FRPSDVVHV�WKH�IRUPDO�QREHO�WLWOH��(&-��2FWREHU��Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn��&��(&-��december 2010, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien,�&��

70�2OLYLHU�5R\��La laïcité face à l’Islam��+DFKHWWH��±��DQG��±��71 Kavakçi v Turkey�$SS�QR��(&W+5��$SULO��


the preservation of the secular nature of the Turkish political system could be a legiti-mate aim in restricting human rights and that the ban on wearing a veil was a means to reach this end. The Court however judged that the sanctions imposed on the applicant were too serious to be regarded as proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. The Court therefore concluded that there had been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and considered that it was not necessary to examine the case in the light of article 8.

Secondly, we salute the emergence and development of national constitutional prin-FLSOHV�WR�FRQFHSWXDOLVH�XQLYHUVDO�KXPDQ�ULJKWV� LQ�VSHFL¿F�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�VHWWLQJ�DQG�WR�avoid the ‘gap’ between jurisdictions.72 In the 1950 Convention there is no reference to principles such as state neutrality and the idea of the separation of state and church. +RZHYHU��WR�KDQGOH�WKH�SDUDGR[�EHWZHHQ�XQLYHUVDOLW\�DQG�SHFXOLDULW\��WKH�(XURSHDQ�&RXUW�of Human Rights introduced these principles into its jurisprudence. It thus uses national constitutional principles that are not enshrined in the Convention as a tool to guide judgement as to whether or not a breach of human rights is proportionate.

In the Sahin case, the Court grounded its judgment on the Turkish73 constitutional principle of the separation between church and state. This principle was recognised as a legitimate interest to be taken into account to limit the freedom of religion.74 Many either GLG�QRW�JUDVS�WKH�VLJQL¿FDQFH�WKDW�WKH�&RXUW�DWWDFKHG�WR�WKH�SDUWLFXODU�7XUNLVK�FRQVWLWX-tional model of laïcité – as expressed by the Turkish Constitutional Court75 – or did not VXI¿FLHQWO\�FRQVLGHU�WKH�LPSRUWDQFH�RI�WKH�YDOXHV�DQG�VSHFL¿FLWLHV�RI�WKH�QDWLRQDO�FRQVWL-tutionalism that the Court was trying to respect.76

72 Constitutionalism encompasses more than merely human rights. As explained above��XQGHU��DQG��FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP�FRQWDLQV��RWKHU��SRZHU�EDODQFLQJ�PHFKDQLVPV�ZKLFK�KDYH�KDG�D�ORQJ�KLVWRU\�LQ�GLI-IHUHQW�VWDWHV��%HFDXVH�RI�WKLV�KLVWRU\��WKH�FRQFHSWLRQ�RI�WKH�IUHHGRP�RI�UHOLJLRQ�LV�LQÀXHQFHG�E\�WKH�particular constitutional setting of a state.

73�2EYLRXVO\��WKH�OLQH�RI�UHDVRQLQJ�LQ�WKLV�FDVH�UHODWHV�WR�WKH�IDFW�WKDW�7XUNH\�KDV�D�VWURQJ�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�HPSKDVLV�RQ�WKH�VHSDUDWLRQ�EHWZHHQ�FKXUFK�DQG�VWDWH��(��gNWHP�DQG�0�&��8]XQ��µ,$&/�1DWLRQDO�5H-SRUW��7KH�5HSXEOLF�RI�7XUNH\¶��LQ�-��0DUWLQH]�7RUURQ�DQG�:��&ROH�'XUKDP��HGV��Religion and the Secu-lar State: National Reports��±��7KH�LPSRUWDQFH�RI�WKH�SULQFLSOH�LQ�7XUNLVK�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�ODZ�DOVR�DSSHDUHG�LQ�WKH�GUDIWLQJ�RI�DUWLFOH��(&+5��,Q�WKH�SUHSDUDWRU\�GHEDWHV��WKH�7XUNLVK�UHSUH-sentatives expressed their concern that a wide provision for article 9 may not undermine Turkey’s DWWHPSWV�WR�UHIRUP�DQG�PRGHUQLVH��&DUROLQH�(YDQV��)reedom of Religion Under the European Conven-tion on Human Rights��2[IRUG�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��±��

74 ‚In such a context, where the values of pluralism, respect for the rights of others and, in particular, equality before the law of men and women are being taught and applied in practice, it is understand-able that the relevant authorities should wish to preserve the secular nature of the institution con-cerned and so consider it contrary to such values to allow religious attire, including, as in the present case, the Islamic headscarf, to be worn.‘ The Court further on investigates whether the aim of preserv-LQJ�WKH�VHFXODU�QDWXUH�RI�WKH�XQLYHUVLWLHV��DV�VWDWHG�E\�WKH�7XUNLVK�&RQVWLWXWLRQDO�&RXUW��LV�SURSRUWLRQ-ate to the limitation of the freedom of religion. Leyla Sahin v Turkey�$SS�QR��(&W+5��1RY��DQG�IXUWKHU�

75 See: Leyla Sahin v Turkey�$SS�QR��(&W+5��1RY��76 Langlaude, for example, criticises the case due to the generality of the concept of the separation be-WZHHQ�FKXUFK�DQG�VWDWH��EXW�GRHV�QRW�SD\�DQ\�DWWHQWLRQ�WR�WKH�VSHFL¿F�QRWLRQ�RI�WKDW�FRQFHSW�LQ�7XUNH\��Langlaude 2006, supra n. 54, 929–944. Decker and Lloydd, from their side, pay much attention to the weight that the Court attaches to the Turkish peculiarities but they think that the Court gave too much ZHLJKW�WR�WKH�7XUNLVK�VLWXDWLRQ��&��'HFNHU�DQG�0��/OR\GG��µ/H\OD�6DKLQ�Y�7XUNH\��&DVH�$QDO\VLV¶��(XURSHDQ�+XPDQ�5LJKWV�/DZ�5HYLHZ��±��6HH�DOVR��/��%XUJRUJXH�/DUVHQ��HW�DO��µ/H�3RUW�GX�9RLOH�à l’Université. Libres Propos sur l’Arrêt de la Grande Chambre’ [The wearing of the Islamic Headscarf at the University. Book Proposed on the Judgment of the Grand Chamber@��5HYXH�WULPHV-WHULHOOH�GHV�GURLWV�GH�O¶KRPPH��±��2Q�WKH�RWKHU�KDQG��LW�LV�KDUG�WR�GLVDJUHH�ZLWK�WZR�RWKHU�OLQHV�of criticism on the Sahin-case. Firstly that the Court did not take into account the fact that the case FRQFHUQV�XQLYHUVLW\�HGXFDWLRQ�DQG�REYLRXVO\�DGXOWV�DQG�QRW�PLQRUV�ZKRP�FDQ�EH�SRWHQWLDOO\�LQÀXHQFHG�


7XUQLQJ�WR�WKH�¿UVW�Lautsi-case, the Court used the principle of neutrality in very clear terms.77�,Q�WKLV�FDVH�WKH�&RXUW�FRQGHPQHG�,WDO\�IRU�WKH�YLRODWLRQ�RI�$UWLFOH��RI�WKH�¿UVW�protocol juncto Article 9 of the Convention.78 The case concerned the presence of cruci-¿[HV�LQ�FODVVURRPV��7KH�&RXUW�IRXQG�WKDW�WKH�SUHVHQFH�RI�WKHVH�REMHFWV��ZKLFK�DUH�±�QRW-withstanding the fact that they are closely tied to Italian culture and history – clearly &DWKROLF�V\PEROV��SRVVLEO\�KDV�D�QHJDWLYH�LQÀXHQFH�RQ�QRQ�EHOLHYHUV�DQG�RQ�VWXGHQWV�RI�a different faith.79�,Q�6XVDQQD�0DQFLQL¶V�RSLQLRQ��WKH�QRYHOW\�RI�WKH�¿UVW�Lautsi-case was ‘therefore to be found in the Court overcoming its previous ultra-cautious position of deference to states in the sphere of religious freedom.’80 It is however important that the chamber did so with reference to a judgment from the Italian Constitutional Court of 12 April 1989. 81 By doing this, the Strasbourg Court introduced Italian Constitutionalism in its own reasoning.

However, it came as no surprise that when the Grand Chamber overruled this deci-VLRQ��LW�H[SUHVVHG�WKH�YLHZ�WKDW�WKH�&KDPEHU�LQ�WKH�¿UVW�/DXWVL�FDVH�PLVLQWHUSUHWHG�,WDO-ian constitutionalism. Concerning the jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court, the Grand Chamber did not – as the Chamber did – read the principle of neutrality into the judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court of 12 April 1989. Instead it noticed that

more easily. See: Jacobs et al. 2010, supra n. 48, p. 413 and Langlaude 2006, supra n. 54, 929–944. Secondly it is also hard to accept why the majority of the Court, as judge Tulkens expressed in her dissenting opinion, did not take into account the fact that Leyla Sahin was a student and that she could QRW�KDYH�WKDW�PXFK�LQÀXHQFH�DV�D�WHDFKHU��)UDQoRLVH�7XONHQV��Dissenting opinion in Leyla Sahin v Turkey�$SS�QR��(&W+5��1RY��6HH�DOVR��$��1LHXZHQKXLV��µ6WDWH�DQG�5HOLJLRQ��Schools and Scarves, An Analysis of the Margin of Appreciation as Used in the Case of Leyla Sahin Y�7XUNH\��'HFLVLRQ�RI��-XQH��$SSOLFDWLRQ�1XPEHU��¶��(XURSHDQ�&RQVWLWXWLRQDO�/DZ�UH-YLHZ��±��

77 See also: Cécile Mathieu, Serge Gutwirth and Paul de Hert ‘Liberté Religieuse: vers un Devoir de Neu-WUDOLWp�GH�O¶(WDW�GDQV�O¶(QVHLJQHPHQW�3XEOLF"¶�>Religious Liberty: towards an Obligation on neutrality within public education?@��-RXUQDO�GH�'URLW�(XURSpHQ��±��

78�)RU�DQ�LQ�GHSWK�DQDO\VLV�RI�WKH�¿UVW�Lautsi-case see: Nicholas Gibson, ‘Right to education in Conform-LW\�ZLWK�3KLORVRSKLFDO�&RQYLFWLRQV��/DXWVL�9��,WDO\��&DVH�$QDO\VLV¶��(XURSHDQ�+XPDQ�5LJKWV�/DZ�5HYLHZ��±��DQG�6X]DQQH�0DQFLQL�µ7KH�&UXFL¿[�5DJH��6XSUDQDWLRQDO�&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP�%XPSV�$JDLQVW�WKH�&RXQWHU�0DMRULWDULDQ�'LI¿FXOW\¶��(XURSHDQ�&RQVWLWXWLRQDO�/DZ�UHYLHZ��±��

79 Dogru v France�$SS�QR��(&W+5��1RY��80�0DQFLQL�JRHV�HYHQ�IXUWKHU�LQ�WKLV�DSSURDFK�DQG�ZDUQV�WKH�&RXUW��µ,I�WKH�(XURSHDQ�&RXUW��DV�WKH�/DXWVL�

case might suggest, abandons its traditional judicial self-restraint and becomes a true arbiter in highly divisive issues, such as religion, it will face many challenges. A crucial one will be to gain the FRQ¿GHQFH�RI�(XURSHDQ�FLWL]HQV��LQ�RUGHU�WR�DYRLG�SURYRNLQJ�SRSXOLVW�UHVHQWPHQWV�ZKHQ�HVWDEOLVKLQJ�ULJKWV�LQ�D�FRQWH[W�RI�FXOWXUDO�FRQWURYHUV\¶�6X]DQQH�0DQFLQL�µ7KH�&UXFL¿[�5DJH��6XSUDQDWLRQDO�&RQVWL-WXWLRQDOLVP�%XPSV�$JDLQVW�WKH�&RXQWHU�0DMRULWDULDQ�'LI¿FXOW\¶��(XURSHDQ�&RQVWLWXWLRQDO�/DZ�review 26–27. The same idea underlines the opinion of Bribosia and Rorive in the Leyla case. They argue that the decision of the Court in the case was to be expected because of the great diversity in DSSURDFKHV�EHWZHHQ�WKH�PHPEHU�VWDWHV�RQ�WKH�WRSLF�RI�KHDGVFDUYHV�LQ�HGXFDWLRQ��(��%ULERVLD�DQG�,��5RULYH��µ/H�9RLOH�j�O¶(FROH��XQH�(XURSH�'LYLVpH¶�>The Headscarf at School: a divided Europe@��Revue trimesterielle des droits de l’homme 982–983.

81 Lautsi v Italy�$SS�QR��(&W+5��1RY��,W�PXVW�EH�DGGUHVVHG�WKDW��LQ�WKLV�FDVH��the Court refers to the principle of neutrality and not to the right not to be confronted with, or insulted by another religion. This must be clear when one compares the case with a German case from the Bundesverfassungsgericht�FRQFHUQLQJ�WKH�SUHVHQFH�RI�FUXFL¿[HV�LQ�FODVVURRPV�LQ�%D\HUQ��,Q�WKLV�FDVH��the Bundesverfassungsgericht based its judgment – in Renata Uitz’s opinion – on the assumption that: ‘from the premise that while in a multi-religious society individuals do not have a right not to be ex-posed to symbols of religions other than their own, this does not empower the state to expose indi-viduals to religious symbols. The justices stated that in a multi-religious polity, a neutral state is a guarantor of peaceful co-existence.’ Renata Uitz, Europeans and their rights. Freedom of religion, �&RXQFLO�RI�(XURSH�3XEOLVKLQJ��


‘the principle of secularism was derived from the Constitution, ruling that it implied not that the State should be indifferent to religions but that it should guarantee the protec-tion of the freedom of religion in a context of confessional and cultural pluralism.’82�2Q�top of that, the Grand Chamber remarked that the Italian Constitutional Court never MXGJHG�RQ�WKH�TXHVWLRQ�DV�WR�ZKHWKHU�RU�QRW�FUXFL¿[HV�DUH�SHUPLWWHG�LQ�WKH�SXEOLF�VSDFH��However, this subject had been dealt with by both the Italian Court of Cassation and the Consiglio di Stato. Both institutions, however, formulated diverging opinions on this is-sue.83 Thus, while referring to these incoherent national cases, the Grand Chamber no-WLFHG�WKDW�WKH�SUHVHQFH�RI�FUXFL¿[HV�LQ�VWDWH�VFKRRO�FODVVURRPV�ZDV�DQ�,WDOLDQ�WUDGLWLRQ�DQG�WKDW��VLQFH�WKH�(XURSHDQ�6WDWHV�KDYH�GLYHUJLQJ�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�WUDGLWLRQV�FRQFHUQLQJ�state neutrality, it falls within the margin of appreciation of the member states to decide whether or not to perpetuate these traditions.84 Accordingly, the Court found that there ZDV�QR�EUHDFK�RI�WKH�&RQYHQWLRQ�VLQFH�WKH�FUXFL¿[HV�RQ�WKH�ZDOO�ZHUH�RQO\�SDVVLYH�V\P-bols and thus could not actively indoctrinate the children .85 From a purely human rights perspective, this result would appear contradictory and the results of the two cases would polarize opinion. However, looked at from the perspective of an interplay between national and international competence, the reasoning in both cases remains consistent, the only difference being the Chamber’s misrepresentation of the ‘legal facts’ of the case when it misinterpreted Italian constitutionalism.

5HIHUHQFHV�WR�QDWLRQDO�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�WUDGLWLRQV�DQG�MXULVSUXGHQFH�LQ�ERWK�WKH�¿UVW�DQG�the second judgment in the Lautsi�FDVH� LOOXVWUDWH� WKDW� WKH�(XURSHDQ�&RXUW� RI�+XPDQ�Rights takes national constitutionalism into account. The fact that both judgments inter-preted Italian constitutionalism in a different way only strengthens this observation: It shows that the interpretation of national constitutionalism played an important part in the deliberations of the Court.86

Through the application of the margin of appreciation, the Court has recognised the limits of its mandate and recognised that it is perhaps not always best placed to enforce national change despite its primary function being the protection of individual rights. Through the introduction of national constitutionalism in its judgments it demonstrates awareness that prudence is needed if one appeals against old constitutional principles in the name of human rights.

The appeal of individual human rights cannot automatically disregard national consti-tutional arrangements. This does not mean we neglect the necessity of international supervision since, as Vermeulen states, ‘the horrors of the Nazi regime made it clear that national constitutions could be easily put aside by a totalitarian state.’87 But the neces-sity of international supervision does not contradict the idea that different national and international principles should be balanced against one another. Human rights are just a

82 Lautsi v Italy�$SS�QR��(&W+5��*UDQG�&KDPEHU��0DUFK��83 Lautsi v Italy�$SS�QR��(&W+5��*UDQG�&KDPEHU��0DUFK��DQG��84 Lautsi v Italy�$SS�QR��(&W+5��*UDQG�&KDPEHU��0DUFK��85 Lautsi v Italy�$SS�QR��(&W+5��*UDQG�&KDPEHU��0DUFK��±��86 A different interpretation of Turkish constitutionalism was also one of the main points in the dissenting

opinion of judge Tulkens in the Sahin-case (Françoise Tulkens, Dissenting opinion in Leyla Sahin v Turkey�$SS�QR��(&W+5��1RY��

87�%�3��9HUPHXOHQ��Ã7KH�)UHHGRP�RI�5HOLJLRQ�LQ�$UWLFOH��RI�WKH�(XURSHDQ�&RQYHQWLRQ�RQ�+XPDQ�5LJKWV��+LVWRULFDO�5RRWV�DQG�7RGD\µV�'LOHPPDµVµ��LQ�$��YDQ�GH�%HHN�HW�DO��HGV��Freedom of Religion, (Brill 3XEOLVKHUV��


part of constitutionalism. Since they do not replace it they must be balanced with other constitutional principles.88

VIII. ConclusionThe purpose of this article was to argue that the challenges which the new religiosity

SRVHV�IRU�:HVWHUQ�OHJDO�V\VWHPV��VKRXOG��SDUWO\��EH�GHDOW�ZLWK�IURP�D�QDWLRQDO�FRQVWLWX-tional point of view, and not only from the international human rights perspective that privileges the individual applicant.

$V� WKH�¿UVW� VHFWLRQ�RI� WKLV�SDSHU� LOOXVWUDWHG��:HVWHUQ�FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP� WKURXJKRXW�KLVWRU\�DGDSWHG�PHWKRGV�WR�GHDO�ZLWK�UHOLJLRXV�WHQVLRQV��2QH�FRXOG�HYHQ�JR�IXUWKHU�DQG�argue that religious tensions contributed in large part to the birth of Western constitu-tionalism, and thus, human rights. This historical evolution also illustrates that the uni-versality of constitutional principles is not pre-given. Universal principles are the result of an inductive process that departs from different legal cultures with their own peculi-arities. Constitutionalism provided the base on which international constitutional con-cepts such as human rights could grow. In line with this we argued that international Courts cannot act as if they were social engineers and that they have a limited legiti-macy and must respect national democratic constitutionalism which grants more power to the legislature.

Different types of constitutionalism are however challenged at the moment by the XVH�RI�LQWHUQDWLRQDO�KXPDQ�ULJKW�LQVWUXPHQWV�VXFK�DV�WKH�(XURSHDQ�&RQYHQWLRQ�RI�+XPDQ�Rights. However, the legitimacy of interference from international fora in matters ‘close’ to the state ought to be limited by a consideration of the nature of rights these interna-WLRQDO�IRUD�SURWHFW��LQWHUQDWLRQDO�KXPDQ�ULJKWV�Y��QDWLRQDO�FRQVWLWXWLRQDO�SULQFLSOHV��E\�DQ�DZDUHQHVV�RI�WKH�OLPLW�RI�WKH�PDQGDWH�JLYHQ�WR�WKH�VSHFL¿F�IRUXP�DQG�E\�DQ�DZDUHQHVV�of their position within a multi-layered system of legislative development. With this in mind, interference based on ‘pure’ human rights reasoning could be very counter-pro-ductive and even, in the long run, damaging to the rights at issue and the States provid-ing its legitimacy.

Accordingly, one can applaud the restraint, prudence and respect for national consti-WXWLRQDO�SULQFLSOHV�VKRZQ�E\�WKH�(XURSHDQ�&RXUW�RI�+XPDQ�5LJKWV�ZKHQ�MXGJLQJ�FDVHV�RQ�religious freedom. This approach shows an awareness of more than just the ‘pure’ hu-man rights issues at play and leaves room for the further autonomous development of national constitutionalism and local reforms trying to handle the new religiosity.

It does this through the use of the margin of appreciation in accepting limits to its mandate and its legitimacy to act, and through the application of national constitutional principles in its jurisprudence, bringing the logic of its reasoning and decision on propor-WLRQDOLW\�FORVHU�WR�WKH�6WDWH�OHYHO��WKXV�DYRLGLQJ�WKH�µJDS¶�EHWZHHQ�MXULVGLFWLRQV��2QH�FDQ�DVN�ZKHWKHU�LW�LV�D�FRQWUDGLFWLRQ�WR�OLNH�ERWK�WKH�¿UVW�DQG�WKH�VHFRQG�Lautsi-FDVHV��2QFH�

88�$V�(YD�%UHPV�QRWLFHG��Ã7KH�PDUJLQ�RI�DSSUHFLDWLRQ�GRFWULQH�SHUIRUPV�D�QXPEHU�RI�UROHV��LW�LV�DQ�H[-pression of judicial restraint, an interpretational aid and a means of expressing the subsidiarity of the (XURSHDQ�&RQYHQWLRQ�WR�WKH�OHJLVODWLRQ�RI�WKH�PHPEHU�VWDWHV�DQG�RI�GHPDUFDWLQJ�WKH�URRP�OHIW�IRU�QDWLRQDO�VRYHUHLJQW\�YLV�j�YLV�VXSUDQDWLRQDO�FRQWURO�µ�(YD�%UHPV��Ã7KH�0DUJLQ�RI�$SSUHFLDWLRQ�'RFWULQH�RI�WKH�(XURSHDQ�&RXUW�RI�+XPDQ�5LJKWV��$FFRPRGDWLQJ�'LYHUVLW\�ZLWKLQ�(XURSHµ��LQ�'��)RUV\WKH�DQG�3��0F0DKRQ��HGV��Human Rights and Diversity; Area Studies Revisited (University of Nebraska Press ��


again, from a purely human rights perspective the decisions seem poliarizing, however this paper argues that the relevant part of the judgements was the reasoning and meth-odology, which remained consistent and correct across both cases. In both cases the Court based its legal reasoning on the proportionality test and national constitutional SULQFLSOHV��7KH�RQO\�GLIIHUHQFH�LV�WKDW�LQ�WKH�¿UVW�/DXWVL�FDVH�WKH�&KDPEHU�PLVLQWHUSUHWHG�the ‘legal facts’ of the case when it misinterpreted Italian constitutionalism.

In conclusion, the necessity to approach religious challenges on several levels is a complex task, and one that should not be based on rash, or broad stroke, decisions. %HFDXVH�RI�WKLV��¿UVW�DQG�IRUHPRVW��ZH�QHHG�WR�ZDLW�IRU�WKH�UHVXOWV�RI�UHFHQW�ORFDO�UHIRUPV�before turning to international mechanisms. Cautiousness is necessary, to the point where ‘over-cautiousness’ may not even be possible for a top-down approach – such as the jurisprudence of a supranational Court.

Paul De Hert�LV�3URIHVVRU�DW�WKH�98%��)UHH�8QLYHUVLW\�RI�%UXVVHOV��DQG�+HDG�RI�WKH�

Department of Interdisciplinary Studies of Law. He is also Associated-Professor at Til-

EXUJ�8QYHUVLW\��(PDLO��[email protected]

Stefan Somers is working in the Research Group Fundamental Rights & Constitu-

WLRQDOLVP��)5&��DW�WKH�98%��)UHH�8QLYHUVLW\�RI�%UXVVHOV��

(PDLO��[email protected]

ReferencesAbdullahi, A.,�µ³$UHD�([SUHVVLRQV´�DQG�WKH�8QLYHUVDOLW\�RI�+XPDQ�5LJKWV��0HGLDWLQJ�D�FRQWLQJHQW�5H-

lationship’, in D. Forsythe and P. McMahon, Human Rights and Diversity; Area Studies Revisited �8QLYHUVLW\�RI�1HEUDVND�3UHVV��±��

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