PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK AND SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD:

THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION’S MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO AVOID THE KILLING

FIELDS

In 1949, Representative Michael J. (Mike) Mansfield (D-Mont.) said:

“Unfortunately, I do not know too much about the Indochinese situation. I do not

think that anyone does. . . .” That is not surprising, in 1954 there were no U.S. books

on Indochina (the three former French colonies of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos)

and one estimate put the number of American scholars who were expert on the area at

less than five.1

Mansfield was one of the first American politicians to step into this gap.

Elected to the Senate in 1952, his interest in Indochina was sparked when Supreme

Court Justice William O. Douglas introduced him to Vietnamese nationalist Ngo

Dinh Diem in May 1953.2 The Montanan's early role in Indochina is best

remembered because of his friendship with Diem. After his second visit to Vietnam

in 1954, Mansfield influenced the Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration to support

Diem.3 In the spring of 1955, Mansfield helped force the administration to stick with

Diem after it had decided to replace him. Townsend Hoopes concludes that Mansfield

caused a “national self-imprisonment” with Diem because Mansfield had the

influence in the Senate to terminate aid if Diem were replaced. Thus, Secretary of

State John Foster Dulles was forced to back Diem to keep Mansfield's support.

1

Columnist Joseph Alsop considered Mansfield the “deciding factor” in saving Diem

in April 1955.4

The Senator's visits to Indochina in the 1950s are often discussed with the

origins of the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam, but Mansfield also used those

trips to establish a long-term relationship with Prince Norodom Sihanouk of

Cambodia, a. friendship that continued at least into the 1980s.

The Mansfield/Sihanouk Relationship

When Mansfield first visited Indochina, it was not yet common for Senators

to travel abroad.5 Mansfield admitted that on this first visit to Indochina, “I had to

check a map to be certain of the capitol cities of the more remote nations. And the

maps often did not agree, so little interest was there in that part of the world at the

time.”6 On that first trip in 1953, Sihanouk refused to meet with Mansfield, but the

Senator spent one hour with Cambodian Prime Minister and Sihanouk protégé Penn

Nouth. Ambassador Donald Heath cabled the State Department that Mansfield acted

as a conveyer of administration opposition to any Cambodian shift toward neutralism

or negotiation with communists.7 In his reports on this visit, Mansfield emphasized

the need to defend Indochina, short of committing U.S. troops.8

When Mansfield returned to Indochina in 1954, Cambodia was viewed as the

only part of Indochina with a good chance of avoiding a Communist take-over.

Mansfield again met with Penn Nouth, but not with Sihanouk. Cambodia had turned

2

to the U.S. for protection after gaining independence from France, but sought

Chinese help after the U.S. embraced Cambodia's traditional enemy, South Vietnam.

Penn Nouth thanked Mansfield for making the Cambodian situation known.9 In his

1954 report, Mansfield was optimistic about Cambodia, saying: “The Cambodian

Government under the young and energetic King Norodom Sihanouk Varman was

both leading and being led by the powerful nationalist surge.”10

On his third trip in 1955, Mansfield continued to hear positive reports about

Cambodia but he also heard that the U.S. may have been “pushing too hard,” causing

“an anti-American reaction” and forcing Cambodia to “all-out neutralism.”11 On this

visit, Sihanouk invited Mansfield to meet with him. Sihanouk had been made king by

the French in 1941, at age 18, but resigned as King on March 2, 1955. On September

11, shortly before Mansfield’s visit, Sihanouk led his followers to victory at the polls

and became Premier.12

Sihanouk hosted a dinner in Mansfield’s honor in 1955. The Senator had

changed his tune about Cambodian neutrality since his 1953 report. Francis Valeo,

Mansfield’s top aide and an Asian expert, recalled that Sihanouk

was favorably disposed towards the Mansfield Reports of

1953-55. He felt that the Senator, unlike most Americans. . .

understood his situation, appreciated his concept of a genuinely

independent Cambodia which as an oasis of peace in Indochina

3

could remain outside the conflict in Vietnam. . . . This was the

period in which the idea of neutrality by any country in the

struggle with communism in Asia was treated with disdain by

most proponents of U.S. foreign policy. In Sihanouk's ears,

Mansfield sounded a different drum.13

1 ?.As cited in William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part I

(Princeton, N.J: Princeton U. Press, 1986), 52, 264, 313.

2 ?.William O. Douglas, interview with John Stewart, 9 Nov. 1967, 15, John F. Kennedy Oral

History Project, JFK Library, Boston, Massachusetts. See also Gibbons, Part I, 93.

3 ?.See for example, David L. Anderson, Trapped By Success: The Eisenhower Administration

and Vietnam, 1953-1961 (N.Y.: Columbia U. Press, 1991), 83.

4 ?.As quoted in Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Atlantic, Little,

Brown & Co., 1973), 253-257 and Joseph Alsop, Interview with Richard Challener, 4 Mr. 1966, 10-11,

John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton University Library.

5 ?. Francis Valeo, interviews with Donald A. Ritchie, 1985-1986, 89, 95-96, Senate

Historical Office Oral History, Washington, D.C.

6 ?.As cited in Mansfield, St. Patrick's Day-1965 speech to the Irish Fellowship Club, Chicago,

4, Mansfield papers Series XXII, Container 75 (hereafter cited MP).

7 ?.Heath, Telegram to Department of State, 24 Sept. 1953, Foreign Relations of the United

States, 1952-1954, Indochina (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1982), Part I, 809-810. See also Gibbons, Part I,

143-144.

8 ?.Mansfield, Indochina: Report On A Study Mission to the Associated States of Indochina,

Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, U.S. 83d Cong., 1st sess., S. Rept. (Washington D.C.: GPO, 27 Oct. 1953),

III, 1-8. See also Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,1954, (Washington

4

The initial meeting of Sihanouk and Mansfield was the beginning of a remarkable

friendship. In his report, Mansfield praised Sihanouk and was optimistic about

Cambodia’s future.14

With John F. Kennedy’s election to the presidency, Mansfield became

majority leader. When Kennedy sent Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson on a well-

publicized trip to Vietnam in May 1961, Mansfield turned down Johnson’s invitation

D.C.: GPO, 1977), 46-53 and Gibbons, Part I, 145.

9 ?.C. Douglas Dillon, Telegram to Dulles, 4 Aug. 1954, United States-Vietnam Relations,

1945-1967, Book 10 (Wash. D.C.: USGPO, 1971), 699-700. See also Mansfield, Summaries of

meetings with C. Douglas Dillon, 28 Aug. 1954; Jim Lucas, 30 Aug. 1954; Bob Johnson, 31 Aug.

1954; Parsons and Ed Sessions, 31 Aug. 1954; Penn Nouth, 1? Sept. 1954 and Tep Phan, 1 Sept. 1954,

MP, XXII, 95, #2.

10 ?.Mansfield, Report On Indochina, U.S. 83d Cong., 2d sess., S. Rept. (Wash.: GPO, 15 Oct.

1954), 12-13.

11 ?.Mansfield and Valeo, Conversations with Col. William Tudor, 25 Aug. 1955 and Tillman

and Peggy Durdin, 12 Aug. 1955, MP, XXII, 95, #3.

12 ?.Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power (London: Verso, 1985), 42, 158-164.

13 ?.Valeo, Letter to the author, 12 Sept. 1990; Valeo, Senator Historical Office Oral History, 99,

108 and Mansfield, Letter to the author, 24 Sept. 1990 (Mansfield recalls meeting Sihanouk on the

1953 trip but admits that his memory is “shadowy” on it. In his Senate Historical Office oral history,

Valeo remembers meeting with Sihanouk in 1954, but that was not his recollection when writing to this

author. It seems likely that the first meeting occurred in 1955, but it is possible that it occurred earlier).

14 ?. Mansfield, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, U.S. 84th Cong., 1st sess., S. Rept. (Wash. D.C.:

GPO, 6 Oct. 1955), 15-17.

5

to accompany him because of his new responsibilities and Johnson took Valeo in his

place. Valeo tried to persuade Johnson to visit Sihanouk, but the State Department

vetoed the idea. Mansfield found this administration policy of antagonism toward

Cambodia incomprehensible.15

At President Kennedy’s request, Mansfield traveled to Indochina in late 1962.

Sihanouk was unable to meet with Mansfield on this visit but held a dinner in his

honor. Herbert Spivack, the Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Cambodia, chronicled

the continuing problems between Cambodia and the U.S. The Cambodians feared

Thailand and South Vietnam and were disturbed by border incidents with each.

Sihanouk did not believe that the U.S. was doing enough to protect Cambodia's

borders from American allies and he continued to turn toward China as a result.16

In his public report, Mansfield credited Sihanouk with making Cambodia into

“one of the most stable and progressive nations in Southeast Asia.” In his private

report to Kennedy, Mansfield criticized U.S. policy, calling it “erratic.” Mansfield

wanted Kennedy to reassure Cambodia that Thailand and South Vietnam would not

“overwhelm” her. Further, he asked Kennedy to “welcome the opportunity” to reduce

America’s “one-sided aid” to Cambodia.17 In March 1963, a Cambodian official

15 ? Valeo, Senate Historical Office Oral History, 175, 193-94 and Mansfield, Confidential

memorandum to John F. Kennedy, 2 Nov. 1961, MP, XXII, 103, #16.

16 ?.Mansfield, Conversation with Herbert Spivack, 28 Nov. 1962 and “Proposed Toast to be

Given by Senator Mansfield. . .,” n.d., MP, XXII, 95, #10 and 53, #8.

6

praised Mansfield's understanding of Southeast Asia and concluded that if Kennedy

followed Mansfield's advice, the burden on the U.S. would be reduced.18

After Diem was assassinated in November 1963, Sihanouk became more

suspicious of the U.S., fearing that he would be next, and Cambodia quit accepting

U.S. economic aid. Mansfield was one of the few Americans to support Cambodia's

position. Realites Cambodgiennes called Mansfield “. . .a 'man alone,'” as “his views,

so penetrating on the Far East, are still shared only by a very small group.” The

magazine added: “. . . If one day Cambodia and the U.S. understand each other and

become friends again, it will be in the first place because of the heroic Senator from

Montana who knew how to stop the Khmers from losing hope in America.”19

Kennedy was assassinated in the same month as Diem. With Johnson now in

the White House, Mansfield began to push the President for “U.S. understanding,

sympathy and sensible encouragement for the Cambodian desire to stand on its own

feet without one-sided U.S. aid.” Mansfield viewed a neutral Cambodia as the

“prototype” of a peaceful Southeast Asia and thought that the new administration

17 ?.Mansfield, J. Caleb Boggs, Claiborne Pell, and Benjamin Smith, Vietnam and Southeast

Asia, U.S. 88th Cong., 1st sess., S. Rept. (Wash. D.C.: GPO, 1963), 13 and Mansfield, “Southeast Asia--

Vietnam,” [secret memo to Kennedy], 18 Dec. 1962, 11-12, MP, XXII, 103, #15.

18 ?.Philip D. Sprouse, Telegram to Secretary of State, 27 Mr. 1963, MP, XXII, 53, #9.

19 ?.E.H. Oliver, translator, Editorial, "The Greatest Homage," 4 and Editorial, "Thank You,

Senator," 6, Realities Cambodgiennes, 6 Dec. 1963, MP, XXII, 52, #6. See also Ellen Hammer, A

Death in November (N.Y.: E.P. Dutton, 1987), 308-09.

7

“underestimated” Sihanouk.20

In 1965, after the administration started to systematically bomb North

Vietnam and committed ground troops to South Vietnam, Mansfield pressured

Johnson to send him to Vietnam. The President eventually acquiesced and sent a

group of Senators headed by Mansfield.21 Mansfield used this trip to meet secretly

with Sihanouk on November 30. Diplomatic relations between the two countries had

been broken in May and Valeo believes that the State Department attempted to

dissuade Mansfield from completing this visit.22 On this visit to Phnom Penh,

Sihanouk said to the Senator: “. . .you represent to Cambodia Justice in the

Occidental world.” A handwritten and unsigned note in Mansfield's files indicates

that a street in Cambodia was being named for him. Robert Shaplen called Mansfield

one of the “two Americans that Sihanouk liked best.”23

20 ?.Mansfield, “Southeast Asia and Viet Nam,” [memo to Johnson], 7 Dec. 1963, and

Mansfield, Memorandum to the President, “Developments in Viet Nam,” 9 Dec. 1964, MP, XXII, 103,

#13.

21 ?. Gregory A. Olson, Mansfield and Vietnam: A Study in Rhetorical Adaptation (East Lansing:

Michigan State U. Press, 1995), 165.

22 ?.Valeo, Senate Historical Office Oral History, 389-90; Valeo, interview with the author,

Washington, 17 May 1991. See also Meloy to Rusk, 11/17/65, International Meetings and Travel:

Mansfield: S.E. Asia, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.

23 ?.Huot Sambath, Elizabeth Shotwell, translator, Letter to Mansfield, 20 June 1966 and

unnamed, n.d. note in files, MP, XXII, 52, #6; Shaplen, Bitter Victory (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1986),

235.

8

Mansfield sent a telegram to Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk

summarizing his meeting with Sihanouk. The Prince emphasized his desire to rebuild

relations, but the U.S. needed to meet three conditions: recognize the present

boundaries of Cambodia; pay an indemnity for Cambodian lives lost; guarantee that

Cambodia's frontiers would be respected and that there would be no more bombings

or incursions. Sihanouk made clear that he did “not wish to lose contact with the

United States even in the absence of formal diplomatic relations. . . .” 24

In his report to Johnson, Mansfield expressed concern about the war “spilling

over into Cambodia,” writing that Sihanouk

seeks to prevent there what has happened in Viet Nam. He is

under no illusions about the Chinese, the Viet Namese--north

or south--or anyone else. He is not at all certain how long he

can prevent the spillover of the war into his country but he can

be expected to take energetically any tack and exhaust every

possibility for insulating his own country from the conflict. 25

For the remainder of the Johnson Administration, Mansfield continued to

labor for a Cambodian solution, but U.S. allies continued to violate Cambodia's

24 ?.Mansfield party, Telegram to President and Secretary, 1 Dec. 1965, MP, XXII, 99, #1.

25 ?.Mansfield, Two Reports On Vietnam And Southeast Asia to the President of the United

States, U.S. 93rd Cong., 1st. sess., S. Rept., (Wash. D.C.: GPO, 1973), 29, 31.

9

borders. By 1968, North Vietnamese incursions into Cambodia were increasing and

Sihanouk had little choice but to turn a deaf ear. With North Vietnam increasing it's

violations of Cambodian neutrality and China unable to help during the cultural

revolution, Sihanouk tried to mend his fences with the U.S. In a 1967 interview,

Sihanouk requested that President Johnson send a special envoy to discuss problems,

suggesting Mansfield: “a just and courageous man whom we consider a friend.”26

In a January 14, 1968, appearance on “Issues and Answers,” Mansfield was

warm in his praise of a recent Chester Bowles mission to Cambodia. Bowles, then

U.S. Ambassador to India, was sent by the President to persuade Sihanouk to press

for a more active and better equipped International Control Commission (ICC) to

check for Vietcong/North Vietnamese intrusions into Cambodia. In return, Sihanouk

wanted a clear U.S. statement rejecting the concept of “hot pursuit.” Bowles couldn't

provide that, but believed he persuaded the Prince that hot pursuit would not be

necessary with a stronger ICC presence. The State Department’s version of Bowles

meeting with Sihanouk was that the Prince told Bowles that he “was not opposed to

hot pursuit in uninhabited areas” which “would be liberating us from the Vietcong.”

Mansfield's correspondence with Bowles and Sihanouk disagrees with that

interpretation.27 What Sihanouk actually meant and how the Nixon Administration

interpreted the Prince's remarks became a major issue in the early 1970s when the

26 ?. As quoted in Stanley Karnow, Vietnam (New York: Penguin, 1984), 590.

10

State Department used Bowles' report as partial justification for the secret bombing

campaign in 1969-70.28 Mansfield ended up in the middle of the fray.

Bowles passed along Sihanouk’s greetings to Mansfield with an invitation to

visit Cambodia. This led to an exchange of letters between the old friends. Sihanouk

complained that U.S. and South Vietnamese incursions into Cambodia were

continuing and those killed were always Cambodian soldiers and peasants, not

Vietcong. The Prince wrote: “All big powers have now recognized our borders. . . .

Such a recognition does not imply. . .a political choice between Cambodia and her

neighbors, but a choice between international law and the 'law of the jungle. . . .'”29

Valeo believes that Mansfield persuaded Johnson not to involve Cambodia in

the conflict, even though many in the military wanted to attack the enemy sanctuaries

in that country.30 This restraint during the Johnson Administration changed with the

election of Richard Nixon.

27 ?. Mansfield, Senator Mansfield's Appearance on "Issues and Answers," Cong. Rec., 23 Jan.

1968, S 270-71; Chester Bowles, Letter to Mansfield, 16 Jan. 1968; Mansfield, Letter to Sihanouk, 24

Jan. 1968; Sihanouk, Letter to Mansfield, 20 Feb. 1968, MP, XXII, 114 and 115 and Karnow, 590.

28 ?.For Richard Nixon's self-serving interpretation, see Nixon, No More Vietnams (N.Y.: Arbor

House, 1985), 108-111.

29 ?. Bowles, Letter to Mansfield, 16 Jan. 1968; Mansfield, Letter to Sihanouk, 24 Jan. 1968;

Sihanouk, Letter to Mansfield, 20 Feb. 1968.

30 ?. Valeo, Interview with the author, Wash., 17 May 1991.

11

Mansfield Visits Cambodia at Nixon's Request

Mansfield attempted to persuade the new President to continue LBJ’s policy

of honoring Cambodian neutrality. In March 1969, he cautioned Nixon from the

Senate not to listen to reported military requests for permission to attack enemy

sanctuaries in Cambodia. Mansfield doubted reports that Sihanouk wouldn't object to

the U.S. bombing of Communist targets and prophetically predicted: “. . .an attack on

Cambodia would very possibly bring that nation into the conflict. . . .” Nixon ordered

the secret bombing of Cambodia to begin in March but the first press reports of the

bombing came in May. Appearing on “Face the Nation” after those reports,

Mansfield deplored the first B-52 raids on Cambodian territory as “uncalled for,

unnecessary” and likely to broaden the war.31 But, Mansfield remained ignorant of

the systematic and widespread nature of the bombing campaign until 1973.

Disturbed by reports that Nixon was “backing away” from his decision to

reestablish relations with Cambodia, Mansfield wrote the President on May 2,

praising Nixon's letter to Sihanouk that recognized Cambodia's territorial integrity.

The “interpretations” by other government officials of what Nixon meant by

territorial integrity is what had upset Sihanouk. This pattern had occurred in the past

when improvements in Cambodian-U.S. relations seemed imminent. Mansfield

argued: “If it is imperative for our national interest, as I believe it is, that the

31 ?.Cong Rec., 26 Mr. 1969, 7634 and 26 May 1969, S 5630.

12

Vietnamese war does not spread over Cambodia and the rest of Southeast Asia, the

continued diplomatic estrangement with Phnom Penh is most unfortunate.”32

Nixon had earlier discussed sending Mansfield to Cambodia and in July, he

repeated the request. Mansfield accepted and became the first official American

visitor to Cambodia since relations were restored. Sihanouk designated Mansfield's

trip a state visit and thanked Nixon for sending Mansfield.33

The Mansfield party arrived in Phnom Penh on August 21 and was met at the

airport by Sihanouk. Mansfield received full military honors, a distinction usually

bestowed only on heads of state. That evening, the party attended a formal dinner

where Sihanouk praised the Senator's “ability to understand our point of view.” The

Cambodian leader also complimented Nixon's “friendly attitude.” Valeo was

surprised when Sihanouk said after this dinner that “he didn't know how long he

could hold out,. . .but he was determined to leave the Cambodian people with the

impression of the monarchy as being the golden age in Cambodian history.”

Mansfield’s aide said Sihanouk seemed secure, “the people adored him.” Valeo

recalled meeting the new Prime Minister, Lon Nol, who seemed a “loyal supporter.”34

32 ?.Mansfield, Letter to Nixon, 2 May 1969, Ex Co 26, Nixon Project (hereafter cited NP).

33 ?.Mansfield, “Perspective on Asia: The New U.S. Doctrine and Southeast Asia,” (Wash.:

GPO, 1969), III. See also Statement of Mansfield, 29 Aug. 1969, MP, XXII, 113, #7; Sihanouk,

Telegram to Nixon, 18 Aug. 1969, Ex Fo, NP and “Mansfield in Cambodia,” New York Times, 22 Aug.

1969, 5.

13

The following morning, Sihanouk and Mansfield held their official meeting.

Valeo, Charge d'Affaires Lloyd Rives, and James Lowenstein from the Foreign

Relations Committee staff attended. Lowenstein kept a “verbatim account” of

Sihanouk’s two hour monologue. As a great power, Sihanouk thought that China

could not be “avoided.” Cambodia's relations with China had been fine until 1967

when China tried to export her cultural revolution. Those problems had been worked

out and the two countries were on “good terms,” and while the Chinese “cannot be

pleased that Cambodia has resumed diplomatic relations with the United States,” they

had “made no comment.” The current Communist insurgency in Cambodia was

blamed on North Vietnam whose violations of Cambodian neutrality now exceeded

those of the U.S. Lowenstein's notes indicate Sihanouk saying that he had

protested to Ambassador Bowles against American bombing,

but not against bombing sanctuaries in areas. . .not inhabited

by Cambodians. He added that he learned of such bombing

when he read Time or Newsweek, but he never protested. 'I

never protest against such bombings,' the prince said. . . . It is

in one's own interest, sometimes, to be bombed--in this case,

the U.S. kills foreigners who occupy Cambodian territory and

does not kill Cambodians. But the prince continued, he did

34 ?. As quoted in David Turner, “Mike Mansfield and Vietnam,” (Diss.), U. of Kentucky, 1984,

233-234 and Valeo, Interview with the author. See also Valeo, Senate Historical Office Interviews, 525.

14

protest the bombings of Cambodian peasants. . . .35

Lowenstein's account of this meeting was shared with the State Department who

interpreted it very differently than Mansfield.

Sihanouk’s advice for the U.S. was to leave South Vietnam and concentrate

on helping Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Burma to stabilize the region. The

Prince prophesied: “A socialist Vietnam cannot be avoided. . . . Some day, the U.S.

will withdraw from Vietnam. . . .” Hanoi, at least, recognized Cambodia's borders,

while Saigon made claims on Cambodian territory. Sihanouk argued that there was

only one China: “Chiang Kai Chek could be perfectly happy in comfortable

retirement in Hawaii or California,. . .once U.S. decides (to) abandon Taiwan.” He

emphasized the need for improved U.S.-Chinese relations: “Cambodia cannot lead a

tranquil life when there is rivalry and hostility between the U.S. and China.”36

Rives telegrammed Secretary of State William Rogers that the “visit was

personal triumph for Senator, who [is] genuinely admired by Cambodians. However,

in official circles was also success for new U.S. policy enunciated by President

Nixon.” The Charge d'Affaires said that the combination of Nixon's letter to

35 ?.Sihanouk's words seem to have influenced Henry Kissinger. Seymour Hersh reports that

“Shortly after Mansfield's trip, Kissinger became even more obsessed with personally picking targets

for the secret bombings, to avoid civilian casualties at all costs.” See Hersh, Kissinger in the White

House (N.Y.: Summit, 1983), 177.

36 ?.Sihanouk and Mansfield, Memorandum of Conversation, 22 Aug. 1969, MP, XXII, 114 or

115.

15

Sihanouk and Mansfield's “kind and public words” about Rives, would “launch the

embassy in sea of good will.”37

Mansfield met for one and one-half hours with Nixon and National Security

Advisor Henry Kissinger on August 27, 1969, presenting both an oral and private,

written report. Nixon sent Mansfield a note saying the private report interested him

and would be helpful in determining future policy.38 Mansfield’s public report

suggested that Cambodia and the U.S. were “at a threshold that offers an opportunity

to make a clean beginning.” The four people serving in the new Embassy were the

same number Mansfield encountered on his 1953 trip. While that number would

grow, Mansfield hoped to avoid the “overweaning official presence with the

extensive paraphernalia of programs that has become so characteristic of official U.S.

establishments in Asia during the past decade.”39

Sihanouk and Cambodia Fall Victim to the Indochina War

In early 1970, Lon Nol and Sihanouk's cousin, Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak,

led a coup to replace Sihanouk. Kissinger and Alexander Haig link the

administration's lack of knowledge of the coup to Mansfield, because, as Kissinger

37 ?. Phnom Penh Embassy, Telegram to Secretary of State, 26 Aug. 1969, MP, XXII, 114 or

115.

38 ?.Statement of Mansfield, 29 Aug. 1969; Nixon, Letter to Mansfield, 11 Sept. 1969 FO 8, NP.

39 ?.Mansfield, "Perspective on Asia," 11-13.

16

put it, “largely at Senator Mansfield's insistence, no CIA personnel were assigned to

Phnom Penh after the restoration of diplomatic relations.” Shortly after Sihanouk's

fall, Nixon ordered a large CIA contingent to Phnom Penh.40

Mansfield was appalled at Cambodian developments but praised Nixon for

not providing aid to the Lon Nol government. Aid, the Senator believed, would lead

to the commitment of men. It made no sense to wind down the war in South Vietnam

only to increase it in Laos and Cambodia. Cambodia had survived because of

Sihanouk and the “void. . .can only be filled by the same kind of factional infighting

that characterized the South Vietnamese political scene. . . .”41

On April 21, Sihanouk. wrote Mansfield from China:

. . .we have no other recourse than an armed fight for national

liberation and the triumph of justice, even if we have to obtain

them at the price of an ideological change in Cambodia.

The most severe ideology--as long as it is based on social

justice--is infinitely preferable to a regime composed of greatly

corrupted people and anti-popular reactionaries who impose

40 ?. As quoted in Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979),

457-483. See also Alexander Haig with Charles McCarry, Inner Circles: How America Changed the

World (N.Y.: Warner, 1992), 233-234; Hersh, 175-183; Nixon, RN (N.Y.: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978),

446-447 and Nixon, No More Vietnams, 116-119.

41 ?.As quoted in Mansfield, Letter to Reverend Robert Laird, 21 Ap. 1970, MP, XIII, 85, #4.

See also Cong. Rec, 2 Ap. 1970, 10053 and 1 May 1970, 13826.

17

themselves upon the nation with guns and bayonets;. . .through

the odious and anachronistic awakening of a racism which had

been asleep for many centuries. . . . Pray, Senator, accept the

assurance of my eternal gratefulness, of my very high

consideration and of my everlasting friendship.42

Kissinger met informally with the Foreign Relations Committee at J. William

Fulbright's (D.-Ark.) home on April 23. Probably as a result of that meeting,

Mansfield sent Nixon a long letter the following day that included a copy of

Sihanouk's correspondence. Mansfield wrote that the Lon Nol government was in

trouble and we were “subjecting ourselves to severe pressures to rescue it from

collapse.” Even though Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces were leading the

Cambodian assault, it also involved Cambodians and was “operating under the

symbol of Sihanouk.” Mansfield admitted that if Sihanouk's forces won, the new

government would “be heavily sustained by North Vietnamese or Viet Cong forces.”

That “simply underscores the misfortune of the coup in the first place.” U.S. interest

still called for an avoidance of the Cambodian conflict. Sending arms would not

42 ?.Sihanouk, Letter to Mansfield, 21 Ap. 1970, MP, XXII, 114 or 115. Mansfield also heard

from Sihanouk’s long-time aide, Penn Nouth, at this time. People loyal to the Lon Nol regime were

also lobbying the Majority Leader. See Penn Nouth, Telegram to Mansfield, 7 May 1970; Presidents of

Cambodian Senate and Assembly, Letter to Mansfield, 21 Ap. 1970; Valeo, Memorandum for the Files,

12 May 1970, MP, XXII, 114 or 115 and Valeo, Memorandum to Mansfield, 23 Ap. 1970 MP, XXII,

103, #4.

18

change the outcome; U.S. advisors or troops were the only way to have an impact in

Cambodia. The Senator ended his letter:

If we begin again on that pattern, I think it is clear where we

wind up. We will wind up with another American military

commitment and responsibility where none now exists. . . . If

we assume this responsibility it is likely to be accompanied by

another escalation of U.S. military costs and casualties, as the

Vietnamese War is converted into a general Indochina war and,

perhaps, a general Southeast Asian war. That is a path, Mr.

President,. . .which is not likely to be supported either by the

Senate or the people of the nation.

Nixon was not persuaded, after reading Sihanouk's letter to Mansfield, Nixon told

Kissinger that the Prince “parrots the Communist line in every respect.” 43

On April 30, Nixon announced his decision to aid the Lon Nol government

and attack the sanctuaries in Cambodia. Before Nixon publicly announced his

decision, he met Senate leaders and wrote: “The faces were intent and strained. Some

of the strongest doves were there: Fulbright, Mansfield, Aiken, Kennedy. The

sincerity of my words must have reached them, even though they remained opposed

to the decision I had made. As I left the room, everyone stood and applauded.”44

43 ?.Mansfield, Letter to Nixon, 24 Ap. 1970, MP, XXII, 114 or 115. See also Kissinger, White

House Years, 489, 495.

19

Mansfield remembered the incident differently: “When [Nixon] left the room. . .I, of

course, stood up with the others as a matter of courtesy and respect for the institution

of the Presidency. I do not recall ever, under any circumstances, applauding.” 45

The Cambodian escalation had a profound affect on Mansfield, evidenced by

a memorandum that shows the Cambodian invasion changed his assumptions about

executive prerogative in the conduct of war:

We are asked to seek peace by making war. . . .. Escalation

will not rescue bankrupt policy. I have reached the point in my

thinking where, for the first time, I am giving the most serious

consideration to a termination date after which no more funds

will be appropriated for military operations in Indochina. . . .

The American people feel let down, disappointed, concerned.

They have appealed to the White House. They have appealed

to the Congress. Their only hope, I think, is the Senate. . . .46

(emphasis added)

Mansfield's Efforts to Return Sihanouk to Power

44 ?.As quoted in Nixon, RN, 451.

45 ?.Mansfield, Letter to the author, 11 Aug. 1994. H.R. Haldeman’s recollections support

Nixon’s version, see Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries (N.Y.: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1994), 157.

46 ?.Mansfield, "Cambodia and a New China," Memorandum for the files, 11 May 1970, MP,

XXII, 103, #5.

20

In 1971-72, Mansfield’s focus returned to Vietnam where he introduced a

number of amendments setting a fixed date for the removal of American forces from

Indochina and supported similar proposals made by others.47 Mansfield continued to

write to Sihanouk. No response from Sihanouk is extant, but he did send a message to

Mansfield via a third party that urged Congress to cut off funding for the war.48 By

the summer of 1972, Mansfield was arguing that his old friend, Prince Sihanouk,

must be included in any Cambodian settlement, 49 which happened 20 years later.

With the peace agreements in Vietnam signed in January 1973, Mansfield and

the nation quickly shifted focus from the fragile peace in Vietnam to the continuing

conflict in Cambodia, with Mansfield pushing for Norodom Sihanouk’s return to

Phnom Penh. Mansfield deplored administration bombing of Cambodia, arguing that

Cambodia had been “peripheral” to the Vietnam conflict and that the bombing would

lead to more prisoners of war. With the ending of Nixon's need to protect U.S. forces

in Vietnam, the constitutional justification for the bombing was suspect.50

The emerging Watergate scandal was weakening Nixon and providing the

47 ?.Olson, 222-233.

48 ?.Mansfield, Letter to Sihanouk, 2 June 1971; Cyrus Eaton, Letter to Mansfield, 23 Nov. 1971;

Sihanouk, Cable to Eaton, 16 Nov. 1971, MP, XXII, 114 or 115.

49 ?.See for example, Mansfield, “Excursion From Cambodia,” 18 Aug. 1972, MP, XXII, 48,

#35.

50 ?.Cong. Rec., 18 Jan. 1973, 1321 and 5 Ap. 1973, 11146.

21

impetus for Congress to assert itself. Mansfield became a supporter of legislation to

force the end of the Cambodian bombing. On May 2, the Senate Democratic caucus

easily passed a resolution calling for a bombing halt. More important, on May 10, the

House, which had always supported Nixon, placed restrictions on the Cambodian

bombing. Several days later, Clifford Case (R-N.J.) and Frank Church (D-Idaho)

introduced the Case-Church Amendment to cut off all funding for military

involvement in Indochina not authorized by Congress. In late June, the (Thomas)

Eagleton (D-Mo.) Amendment passed the House, cutting off funds for the

Cambodian bombing. Since the Eagleton Amendment was a Senate-passed rider to a

supplemental appropriations bill, Nixon could not veto it without cutting off funds to

all government agencies. Nixon did veto it, which led Mansfield to say that the

amendment would be introduced “again and again and again, until the will of the

people prevails.” Concurrently, John Dean's testimony at the Watergate Hearings

further hurt Nixon. Secretary of State Rogers worked to avoid a constitutional crisis,

so the White House reached a compromise with Fulbright and the Foreign Relations

Committee to end the Cambodian bombing by August 15. Mansfield, Eagleton,

Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), and Edmund Muskie (D-Maine) were among those

opposed to the compromise; Mansfield argued passionately from the Senate floor:

“The warmaking power is that of Congress exclusively, and the war in Cambodia

does not have a shred of validity attached to it. It is illegal, it is unconstitutional, it is

22

immoral. . . . The bombing must stop--not next month, not on August 15, but now.”

Mansfield was on the losing side of Fulbright's compromise legislation, 64-26, but

Congress had finally forced an end America's involvement in the Indochina conflict.

Nixon reluctantly signed it into law on July 1.51

The Cambodian government sought Mansfield's support in June 1973. Prince

Sisowath Sirik Matak wired Mansfield and other members of Congress.52 Matak

claimed genocide was being waged against Cambodians by the Vietcong and North

Vietnamese forces who had refused to leave Cambodia after agreeing to do so in the

Paris accords. Vietnam Communists, according to Matak, wanted to “depopulate”

Cambodia in order to later “colonize” it. The letter was an appeal to Mansfield to

support continued American bombing in order to preserve Matak's government. 53

The Cambodian Ambassador54 met with Mansfield and his aide, Frank Valeo,

51 ?.Cong. Rec., 14 May 1973, 15436-37; 31 May 1973, 17686 and 29 June 1973, 22307-08. See

also William Berman, William Fulbright and the Vietnam War (Kent, Ohio: Kent State U. Press, 1988),

170-171; William Shawcross, Sideshow (N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, 1979), 284; Kissinger, Years of

Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1982), 355-359.

52 ?.Matak referred to an August 1971 "conversation" with Mansfield, but no record of that

conversation was located.

53 ?.Matak, Letter to Mansfield, 25 June 1973; MP, XXII, 114 or 115.

54 ?.Valeo didn't use the Ambassador's name. Either Sonn Voeunsai represented Cambodia in

Washington or Um Sim had recently assumed the position. The new Cambodian Ambassador to the

United Nations, Khim Tit, approached Mansfield as early as May 12, 1970, tacitly admitting that they

had “miscalculated” in overthrowing Sihanouk, see Valeo, Memoradum for the Files, 12 May 1970, 3.

23

in late June. Mansfield left the meeting early and Valeo sent Mansfield a memo

summarizing what the Ambassador said after the Senator left:

Phnom Penh was prepared to negotiate with Sihanouk but was

not sure that the Prince was in a position to control the

resistance movement and bring the fighting to an end. . . .

He said that it would be possible to restructure the government

inside Phnom Penh for negotiations if Sihanouk would only

give some indication of a readiness to negotiate and with

whom. He implied that Lon Nol was dispensable and that

Sihanouk could return to Phnom Penh. As for the announced

Phnom Penh position to the effect that everything was

negotiable 'except the return of Sihanouk' that was only a front.

Phnom Penh would drop this as soon as there were some

indication that Sihanouk was in a position to negotiate and was

prepared to negotiate as spokesman for the Resistance. . . .

He came very close to saying that the sole condition for a

settlement, in the last analysis, was some commitment from

Sihanouk against reprisals, against persons in Phnom Penh and,

secondly, some assurance that Cambodia would not come

under the domination of North Vietnam. . . .

24

Because of his friendship with Sihanouk, the Phnom Penh government wanted

Mansfield to mediate between Sihanouk and the current government. Valeo told the

Cambodian Ambassador that Mansfield could not serve as intermediary without the

“concurrence of the Executive Branch.”55

Mansfield wanted a role in a Cambodian settlement. He immediately wrote

the President summarizing the meeting with the Cambodian Ambassador. The

following day, Mansfield sent Kissinger a copy of a Swiss interview with Sihanouk

and a film of a Sihanouk visit with the Khmer Rouge forces in Cambodia. Mansfield

did not ask to be an intermediary, but Tom Korologos reported to Kissinger that

Mansfield was “dropping broad hints to me that perhaps he would, indeed, like to do

something for you, but he is not about to ask.” Mansfield made the same point to the

Washington Star-News, he planned a “courtesy call” on Sihanouk in Beijing, but

“neither Nixon nor Kissinger has approached him about raising substantive issues

with the former Cambodian ruler.” For his part, Kissinger was negotiating with the

Chinese about bringing Sihanouk back to Phnom Penh, but Kissinger chose to ignore

Mansfield's “broad hints” and continue his personal diplomacy.56 In the case of

55 ?.Valeo, Memo to Mansfield, 28 June 1973, MP, XXII, 114 or 115.

56 ?.Mansfield, Letter to Nixon, 29 June 1973, MP, XXII, 114 or 115. See also Korologos,

Memorandum to Kissinger, 31 July 1973; Mansfield, Letter to Kissinger, 30 June 1973; William L.

Stearman, Memorandum to Kissinger, 27 July 1973 and Kissinger, Letter to Mansfield, 31 July 1973,

CO 26, Box 14, NP; George Sherman, "Diplomacy on Cambodia Awaits Bombing Cutoff,"

Washington Star-News, 29 July 1973, 1 and Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 343-355.

25

Sihanouk, Kissinger's personal diplomacy could not succeed.

In late July, the Senate Armed Services Committee exposed the 1969-70

secret bombing campaign in Cambodia and the false reports the Pentagon submitted

to Congress. The State Department used Mansfield's 1969 conversations with

Sihanouk as part of its justification for that Cambodian bombing, as reported by

Oswald Johnston in the Washington Star-News on July 25. Sihanouk denied that

interpretation to the New York Times and Mansfield agreed with Sihanouk, telling

Johnston: “I don't recall that in any way, shape or form.” On August 8, Joseph Alsop

wrote a scathing attack about Mansfield, calling him a “holy idiot” and suggesting

that he could supply the Armed Services Committee with the “truth.” The truth, as

Alsop reported it, was that Sihanouk first told Chester Bowles in 1968 that American

bombing would be acceptable and repeated that offer to Mansfield in 1969. President

Johnson had not acted on the offer, but Nixon did. Alsop reported that Nixon gave

notice of the secret bombing to the late Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.) and John Stennis

(D-Miss.), the chair and second-in-command on the Armed Services Committee.

According to Alsop, Russell and Stennis agreed with the bombing and saw no need to

inform other senators. Thus, Fulbright and the Foreign Relations Committee were

ignored.57 Nixon and Kissinger sought friendly Democrats to tell about the secret

bombing campaign.

26

Marshall Wright of the State Department called Mansfield's office and called

Alsop's article a “terrible, poisonous piece and we had not a damn thing to do with it

and are, in fact, furious about it.” Wright was probably telling the truth, but someone

at the White House must have planted this anti-Mansfield piece with Alsop. The

journalist was angry with the Democratic Congress for cutting off funds to Cambodia

and was “a friend and sometime confidant” of Kissinger. Alsop was viewed by many

of his peers “as a high-profile conduit for the government line.”

Based partially on the Mansfield/Sihanouk conversations, Secretary of State

Rogers had assured several Senators and the Foreign Relations Committee that the

U.S. bombing of Cambodian sanctuaries “had Sihanouk's tacit support so long as

Cambodian lives or property were not in danger.” Sihanouk denied Roger's

assertion.58 Mansfield reviewed his notes and agreed with the Prince:

Insofar as I understood it then and now, there was not in his

comment any agreement, actual, tacit or implied, by Sihanouk

57 ?.Nixon verifies Alsop's account that Russell and Stennis were consulted, but offers no

explanation for how he could justify ignoring the Foreign Relations Committee. See Nixon, No More

Vietnams, 108-111. Nixon undoubtedly circumvented the Foreign Relations Committee because of his

hatred for Fulbright and because a majority of members would have opposed the bombing.

58 ?.Mansfield, Memorandum, dated 26 July and 8 Aug. 1973 and note concerning telephone call

from Marshall Wright and signed "dls," 8 Aug. 1973, MP, XXII, 114 or 115. See also Oswald Johnston,

“U.S. Says Sihanouk OKd Bombing,” Washington Star-News, 25 July 1973, A-5; Joseph Alsop, “The

Cambodian 'Cover-Up,'” Washington Post, 8 Aug. 1973; Joseph Alsop, with Adam Platt, "I've Seen the

Best of It" (N.Y.: W.W. Norton, 1992), 475, 478; Berman, 181 and Shawcross, 93, 288-289, 330.

27

with the bombing. There was more the complaint that with a

pitiful army and difficult terrain what could he do about vio-

lations of Cambodian neutrality in remote regions. . . . To the

best of my knowledge, there was no concurrence by Sihanouk.

While many claim Mansfield knew of the secret bombing, the Senator denied

any 1969 knowledge of “planned raids,” but just of “sorties” mistakenly straying into

Cambodia and his knowledge of “sorties” came entirely from media accounts, never

the executive branch. In his memoirs, Kissinger continued to interpret Sihanouk's

1969 statement to Mansfield as implicit acceptance of U.S. bombing, yet he absolved

Mansfield of any knowledge of the Menu bombing program, writing that the

Majority Leader “undoubtedly assumed Sihanouk was speaking of accidental

bombings.”

Mansfield was angry at this partial administration leak of his private 1969

memorandum to Nixon, believing it to be selective and taken out of context,

ignoring, for example, his discussion of the need to compensate Cambodians for

damage done by these sorties.59 The use of Mansfield's report to justify the bombing

continued into the Gerald R. Ford Administration. As late as March 1975, the

executive asserted the 1969 bombing was kept secret at Sihanouk's “insistence.”

Indeed, that view appears to have become the historically accepted one.60

28

After the bombing cut-off, Sihanouk continued to plead his case through

Mansfield and not the administration. Senator Mansfield might have helped Kissinger

and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai persuade Sihanouk to accept the coalition Kissinger

claims he and Zhou favored. Kissinger argued that the coalition government was no

longer possible after the bombing cut-off; the Khmer Rouge were destined to win,

which caused China to lose interest. William Shawcross suggests that Kissinger was

not interested in Sihanouk or negotiation, which is what caused the shift in China's

policy. Nixon, too, blames the congressional bombing cut-off for the eventual defeat

of the Lon Nol government. But, the settlement Nixon envisioned was not practical.

Nixon wrote that the U.S. could have influenced Lon Nol, that China could “pull the

strings” of the Khmer Rouge, and Sihanouk “would listen to Zhou's counsel.” The

former President envisioned Sihanouk accepting a “limited role” in Lon Nol's

government, and argues that the Khmer Rouge would have ceased fighting in return

for an end to America's bombing. Once Congress ended the bombing, Nixon's

scenario agrees with Kissinger's; the Khmer Rouge had no reason to quit the

rebellion.61 The weakness in Nixon's argument is that it is difficult to imagine

59 ?.Mansfield, Memorandum, dated 26 July and 8 Aug. 1973. See also Kissinger, White House

Years, 251.

60 ?. As quoted in Robert K. Wolthius File, Box 1, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Mich.

See also Seth Mydans, “Sihanouk Enhances Reputation for Unpredictability,” New York Times, 18 July

1997, Online, America Online, 18 July 1997.

29

Sihanouk serving under Lon Nol, and Nixon was unwilling to force Lon Nol out of

government. It is impossible to envision the Khmer Rouge ending the rebellion

without a capitulation by the government in Phnom Penh. A coalition government

without Lon Nol may have equalled that capitulation.

Sihanouk wanted to get his case before the American public. A cable he sent

Mansfield from North Korea was reported in the New York Times several days before

Mansfield received it, suggesting that Sihanouk had a larger audience in mind. After

reading the report in the Times, Mansfield called Kissinger to discuss it and issued a

statement urging Nixon to consider Sihanouk's proposals. If the U.S. suspended the

air war and cut off military aid to Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge would forget the past

and establish diplomatic relations with the U.S., allow the major “collaborators” in

Sihanouk's coup to leave Cambodia, and grant amnesty to the rest of the population

who supported the Lon Nol government. Sihanouk urged congress and the public to

force the administration to end its Cambodian interference.62

Mansfield and Nixon discussed Sihanouk over breakfast on September 7.

Mansfield reported that Nixon “was not adversed (sic) to Sihanouk but was

61 ?.Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 343-355, 360-361; Shawcross, 335-343; Nixon, No More

Vietnams, 176-181 and Sherman, 1.

62 ?.Mansfield, Statement, 13 Aug. 1973; Memorandum for the Files, 17 Aug. 1973 and

Sihanouk, Telegram to Mansfield, 10 Aug. 1973, Casimir Cyril Petraitis, trans., MP, XXII, 49-55 and

103, #5.

30

concerned about how much power and control he would have.” Later in September,

Mansfield read a translation of his August Sihanouk cable to the Senate, suggesting

that Sihanouk's proposals were “in accord with the realities in Cambodia” and urging

the Senate to “bolt the back door to our military reinvolvement in Indochina.”63

The Senator thanked Sihanouk for the North Korean cable and proposals,

telling the Prince that he “urged a constructive response to them by the Executive

Branch,” while assuring Sihanouk that he was in agreement with the Prince about the

content of their 1969 conversation concerning U.S. bombing of Cambodia. Sihanouk

suggested that he would play the role of roving diplomat in a Khmer Rouge

government; the government would be run by Penn Nouth along with several

members of the Khmer Rouge. Mansfield immediately sent a copy of this

correspondence to Kissinger, urging him as the new Secretary of State, to give the

“most immediate and serious consideration” to Sihanouk's proposals. Mansfield

responded to Sihanouk in November, telling his friend he shared his cables with

Kissinger.64 Mansfield worked diligently in 1973 to gain Kissinger's attention and

play a role in a Cambodian solution, but he was ignored.

63 ?.Mansfield, Memorandum, "Breakfast With the President," 7 Sept. 1973 and Mansfield,

"Nomination of Dr. Kissinger and the Cambodian Situation," 20 Sept. 1973, MP, XXII, 103, #5 and 49-

59.

64 ?.Mansfield, Letter to Sihanouk, 6 Sept. 1973; Sihanouk, cable to Mansfield, 15 Oct. 1973,

Paul Vidal, trans.; Mansfield, Letter to Kissinger, 15 Oct. 1973; Mansfield, Letter to Sihanouk, 8 Nov.

1973 and Mansfield, Letter to Kissinger, 14 Nov. 1973, MP, XXII, 114 and 115.

31

In October, French Ambassador Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet and Foreign

Minister Michel Jobert sought Mansfield’s views on Cambodia. Mansfield replied:

Sihanouk was the key person and the only person who could

retrieve the situation. Mr. Nixon, he felt, had begun his

Administration with the same view,. . .but then came the

aggression in Cambodia in the name of support for our war

effort in the Viet Nam war and our too quick move to

recognize and come to the aid of the successor government.

In Senator Mansfield’s view this course had been tragically in

error. Now, we were back confronting the reality that Sihanouk

offered, possibly, the only way out. . . . Mansfield said the

Prince, in all likelihood, would return to Phnom Penh. How

long he could or would stay in power thereafter was another

matter. . . . The Foreign Minister said that Senator Mansfield's

views of the matter coincided with those of the French. . . .

Jobert was puzzled by Nixon’s policy but France was “prepared to offer its good

offices between Sihanouk and the United States.” Indeeed, France actively tried to

return Sihanouk to Cambodia at the head of a coalition government. Mansfield sent a

copy of Valeo's notes of this meeting to Kissinger, suggesting that he “consider the

possibility” of taking the French up on their offer.65

32

Cambodian Ambassador Um Sim requested a meeting with Valeo in early

February. Um Sim recognized “that the only hope--and it is a minimal hope--for

himself and others like him--the only hope lies in the return of Sihanouk.” Once

again, powerful people in Phnom Penh made it clear to Mansfield that Lon Nol could

be made to withdraw from government. Um Sim wanted Valeo to “solicit Senator

Mansfield's intervention in the situation” to find out: “1) what it will take to get

Sihanouk to come back (specifically, how deep a purge of the ranks of Phnom Penh's

officialdom?), and 2) would terms offered by Sihanouk which might be acceptable to

Phnom Penh also be approved by the Resistance leaders in Cambodia?” If Sihanouk

could accomplish this, Um Sim implied that his supporters were “prepared to set the

stage for it inside that city.” Valeo once again made it clear that Mansfield could not

meet Sihanouk in Beijing or contact him without the knowledge of Kissinger.66

It is likely that Mansfield shared this information with Kissinger. Even though

elements in the Cambodian government desired to use Mansfield as an arbitrator,

65 ?.Valeo, Notes of a meeting with Mansfield, Jobert, and Kosciusko-Morizet, 11 Oct. 1973 and

Mansfield, Letter to Kissinger, 15 Oct. 1973, MP, XXII, 114 or 115. See also Shawcross, 335-343.

66 ?. Valeo, Memo to Mansfield, 8 Feb. 1974, MP, XXII, 114 and 115. In 1974, Sihanouk

continued to appeal to the U.S. through Mansfield and the Senator shared these messages with Nixon

and Kissinger, see Korologos, Letter to Salpee Sahagian, 18 Jan. 1974; George S. Springsteen, Jr.,

Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft, 6 Mr. 1974; Mansfield, Letter to Nixon, 28 Jan. 1974 and

Statement of Senator Mike Mansfield, 28 Jan. 1974, CO 26, Box 14, NP. See also Mansfield, press

release, 17 Jan. 1974; Marshall Wright, Letter to Mansfield, 25 Jan. 1974, translations of Sihanouk

cables, MP, XXII, 114 or 115.

33

there is no indication that this ever was considered by Kissinger. Since Sihanouk

knew that the Khmer Rouge would “spit him out,” it seems reasonable that he would

have listened to alternatives from his friend, Mike Mansfield. Shawcross suggests

that successfully returning Sihanouk to Phnom Penh at the head of a coalition

government would have been difficult, but possible, if the United States would have

changed the policy of supporting Lon Nol. In 1993, Mansfield indicated that he

believed there was a chance at reconciliation between Sihanouk and elements of the

Phnom Penh government at this time. When asked if he might have succeeded as an

intermediary, the Senator modestly responded: “who knows?” Kissinger made no

serious effort to end the Cambodian war from August 1973 until late 1974, 67 a period

in which Mansfield might have proven useful.

In early 1975, in order to justify administration requests for more funding,

Kissinger sent members of Congress a list of U.S. efforts to negotiate a settlement in

Cambodia. The list showed that few efforts were made in 1973 and early 1974. Those

listed were vague, one read: “throughout the negotiations that led to the Paris

Agreement on Viet-Nam in January 1973, the U.S. repeatedly indicated its desire to

see a ceasefire and political settlement in Cambodia. . . .” Another listing blamed

Congress: “A number of major efforts toward negotiation were made in 1973, efforts

which were thwarted by the forced bombing halt in August of that year.” The list

67 ?.Mansfield, Letter to the author, 2 June 1993; Shawcross, 325-328, 335-343 and Lloyd M.

Rives, Letter to Valeo with enclosed transcripts of interviews, 20 Sept. 1973, MP, XXII, 114 or 115.

34

shows more serious efforts were made in late 1974 and early 1975, but is disingen-

uous even then. For example, it states: “In December 1974 and early January 1975,

we concurred in an initiative to open a dialogue with Sihanouk in (Beijing). Sihanouk

at first agreed to receive an emissary, but later refused.” In reality, that proposal was

made by France and Kissinger's staff erred, causing Sihanouk to back out.68

Um Sim returned to visit Mansfield and Valeo on March 11, to report on his

recent visit to Cambodia. In two instances where the government had tried to contact

Sihanouk, “the State Department had discouraged Phnom Penh from proceeding,

apparently on the grounds that the contacts would be ineffectual.” The Ambassador

reiterated the willingness of Lon Nol and other leaders to step down and “pleaded”

for Mansfield to contact Sihanouk to see what would happen after Lon Nol's

government left Cambodia. Mansfield once again said he could not do that unless

requested to do so by President Ford or Kissinger. Um Sim indicated he would

pursue the matter with the State Department.

Mansfield still sought the opportunity to try to salvage the situation. In an

undated memo that was likely spurred by the Um Sim visit, Valeo listed

preconditions that Mansfield should get from Ford and Kissinger before accepting a

visit to Beijing to talk with Sihanouk.69 The paper trail on Mansfield's final effort to

mediate ends with Valeo's memo. But it was too late in March 1975.

68 ?. Kissinger, Letter to Mansfield, 4 Mr. 1975 and Summary of Negotiating Efforts on

Cambodia, n.d., MP, XXII, 102, #3. See also Shawcross, 335-343, 352.

35

Conclusion

What might have happened if Kissinger had taken Mansfield up on his “hints”

to negotiate in late July 1973? Sihanouk knew that the Khmer Rouge were using him

because of his popularity in the Cambodian rural areas. In September 1973, Sihanouk

told United Press International: “They (Khmer Rouge) love me. But when they do

not need me any more they will simply spit me out.” Even knowing his eventual fate

with the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk would not deal with Kissinger. Sihanouk made it

clear that he traveled to North Korea in August 1973 to avoid meeting Kissinger in

Beijing, but while in North Korea, Sihanouk cabled Mansfield with a proposal to end

the Cambodian civil war. That indicates a willingness to talk with his friend, Mike

Mansfield, but not Kissinger. On September 18, 1973, Howard K. Smith introduced a

Sihanouk interview by calling him “another opponent of Dr. Kissinger who refuses to

meet with him.” The ABC interview with Lou Cioffi went like this:

Cioffi: Why are you so adamant about not seeing Kissinger?

Sihanouk: Kissinger is the number one man responsible for the

sufferings of my people. . . . So my people and all the fighters

of the united front, they consider Kissinger as their number one

enemy, and they requested me not to see him.

Cioffi: Well, if not Mr. Kissinger, why not someone else, say

69 ?.Valeo, Note for the Files, 11 Mr. 1975 and Valeo, memo to Mansfield, “Suggested

Preconditions for an Intercession with Prince Sihanouk in Peking,” n.d., MP, XXII, 114 or 115.

36

like Mansfield, a man who you admit you like and respect?

Sihanouk: I should be very happy to see him as a personal

friend but as a U.S. negotiator, I cannot see him. . . . Why,

because we cannot change our position vis-a-vis the U.S.A. We

cannot have a compromise, a political compromise, with the

traitors in Phnom Penh as the U.S.A. wants us to do.70

We will never know if it was too late for Sihanouk to return to Phnom Penh

and perform the balancing act he had played so effectively for two decades. His

hatred of Kissinger and the Nixon Administration would not allow him to accept a

Chinese/American-created coalition government, even though the government in

Phnom Penh seemed willing to accept one. The Nixon/Kissinger loyalty to Lon Nol

was one stumbling block, but the Cambodian Ambassador made it clear to Mansfield

in late June 1973 that Lon Nol and his top aides could be replaced. It is natural to

ponder what would have happened if Kissinger had played the Mansfield card. In this

case, Kissinger’s personal diplomacy failed.

After the fall of Phnom Penh, John Gunther Dean, U.S. Ambassador to

Cambodia, visited Mansfield and Valeo. Dean, too, had tried to involve Sihanouk in a

coalition government. Using French Ambassador to Beijing, Etienne Manac'h, as an

intermediary, Ford, Kissinger, and French President d'Estaing made the last effort to

70 ?.Lloyd M. Rives, Letter to Valeo with enclosed transcripts of interviews, 20 Sept. 1973.

37

bring such a coalition about in December 1974. By then it was too late, Sihanouk had

no control over the Khmer Rouge who knew they would win their revolution. Such

an effort might have bore fruit in 1973 or early 1974. Dean suggested “it was a 'poor

hand' which he had to play in Cambodia from the beginning.” Mansfield responded,

“yes, from the moment of Sihanouk's overthrow and the United States invasion over

the border.” Valeo's notes indicate no comment from Dean, but the Ambassador “felt

that Senator Mansfield had been right in contending all along that Sihanouk was the

critical figure.” After Dean left, Valeo commented that perhaps the U.S. had learned

that it could not become involved in every crisis that occurred in the world.

Mansfield replied, “I wonder if, in fact, it has been learned.”71

ENDNOTES

71 ?.Valeo, Memo to Mansfield, 2 June 1975, 2-3, MP, XXII, 114 or 115. Mansfield attempted

to keep in touch with Sihanouk and abreast of his situation during the 1970s. After his Senate

retirement, Mansfield met with Sihanouk two more times, both when he was serving as Ambassador

to Japan. When asked what was discussed at those meetings, Mansfield wrote: “When Prince Norodom

Sihanouk visited with me in Tokyo, he discussed his proposal to create a four party coalition including

the Khmers (sic) Rouge. This was achieved through agreement and is in effect the proposal which has

recently been put to a vote by the Cambodian people.” See Mansfield, Letter to the author, 2 June 1993

and Olson, 253.

38