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PRESENTATION TO THE

PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE OF

TRANSPORT

13 FEBRUARY 2018

Purpose of the Presentation

1. Progress on train accidents investigations

2. Plan to prevent accidents in the future

3. Progress on support for affected families and victims in train accidents

4. Update on Board management issues

5. Update on Board oversight issues

6. Response to #UniteBehind issues.

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Content

• PRASA Mandate

• A History of PRASA Assets Destruction

• Impact on PRASA Asset Performance

• Progress on Accidents

– Kroonstad Level Crossing Accident

– Geldenhuis Rear-End Accident

– Interventions

• Communication

• Conclusion

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PRASA, as the implementing arm of the National Department of Transport, the

sole shareholder, is primarily focused on the mandate contained in the Legal

Succession Act of South African Transport Services (SATS) Act of 1989, as

amended in November 2008.

The main objective and main business of PRASA is to:

• Ensure that, at the request of the Department of Transport, rail commuter

services are provided within, to and from the Republic in the public interest,

and

• Provide, in accordance with the Department of Transport, for long haul

passenger rail and bus services within, to and from the Republic in terms of

the principles set out in section 4 of the National Land Transport Transition

Act, 2000 (Act No. 22 of 2000)

The second objective and secondary business of PRASA is that:

• PRASA shall generate income from the exploitation of assets acquired by it,

which include real estate and property portfolio.

• A further requirement is that, in carrying out its objectives and business,

PRASA shall have due regard for key Government, social, economic and

transport imperatives and policy objectives.

PRASA Mandate

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A History of PRASA Assets

Destruction

Prasa has rolling stock that is more than 50 years old

Over the past 15 years Prasa has been keeping the system running despite its age

Government has contributed significant funds to keep the system from total collapse

Keeping the system running is exacerbated by the on-going asset destruction

The on-going asset destruction and vandalism has put a further strain on the already

stretched capacity of the old system to operate at acceptable levels of service

INTRODUCTION

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Lack of investments in the system over 30 year period.

Age of the system, with obsolete technology and cost to modernise the system.

Human Error (Manual Authorisations under degraded operating conditions)

Open nature of the system leading to theft, vandalism and operational incidents.

Availability of spares and equipment due to age of the system.

High levels of community unrest , protest and dissatisfaction on service delivery.

BACKGROUND CAUSES TO THE ACCIDENTS

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PRASA ASSETS UNDER SIEGE

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Train Fires

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Rolling Stock Vandalism

• Stripping trains for “Shelter” material

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Destruction of the Infrastructure

Bonteheuwel Example • Substation destroyed Central Line (5 months

to repair • PRASA overhead traction cable recovered at

scrap dealers

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Destruction of Infrastructure

• Ticket office robbery remains a high risk threat to PRASA Rail

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Destruction of infrastructure at stations

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Vandalism at Stations

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Crimes on PRASA Assets: Cable Theft Incidents

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Crimes on PRASA Assets: Signalling Equipment Theft

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Impact on PRASA Asset

Performance

• During 2015/16 a total of 250 coaches were vandalized and affecting fleet availability – between January to December 2017 - 1 441 coaches vandalized

Rolling Stock capacity – fleet availability (End Dec 2017)

Coaches

Motor

Coaches

Trailer

Coaches Total %

Motor

Coaches

Trailer

Coaches Total %

In Service 727 2 221 2 948 65% 613 1 810 2 423 53%

Out of Service - Vandalised & Maintenance 330 557 887 19% 350 856 1 206 26%

Non-Operational - Repair (GO/Wreck) 264 466 730 16% 358 578 936 21%

Total Fleet 1 321 3 244 4 565 1 321 3 244 4 565

March 2016 December 2017

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Except in the Eastern Cape there has been a severe shortage of rolling stock due to vandalism and asset theft.

Metrorail Service Performance December 2017

Metric YTD Dec 2017 Target YTD DEC 2017 Actual Sets Short

Metrorail 295 219 -26%

Gauteng 141 124 -12%

Western Cape 88 55 -38%

KZN 57 43 -25%

Train set

Requirements

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Train Availability and Service Performance Train/Coach Configuration 59.5% of trains ran with shorter sets than required 12 coach configuration = 288 635 trains. Gauteng:

• 60% trains ran as short configured trains. (2015 59%) Western Cape:

• 90% trains ran as short configured trains. (2015 43%) KwaZulu-Natal:

• 46% trains ran as short configured trains. (2015 xx%)

TRAIN PERFORMANCE: Comparison YTD Dec. 2015 with YTD Dec. 2017

YTD YTD % Change

Dec-15 % Dec-17 % on 2015

Trains Scheduled 493 911 485 100 -2%

Trains Cancelled 19 299 4% 58 895 12% 205%

Trains Delayed 89 542 18% 107 714 22% 20%

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Overcrowding caused by vandalism and destruction

Theft of Signal Cable Train delays, driver forced to proceed on sight, train not protected by othe signals. History shows high potential for rear end collisions and signals passed on danger.

Theft of Perway Equipment Risk of train derailments and consequential disastrous impact.

Theft of Rolling Stock Equipment/component Train delays and cancellations, trains departs with doors not functioning which have a direct impact on railway safety.

Vandalism of signal cables Train delays, driver forced to proceed on sight, train not protected by other signals. History shows high potential for rear end collisions and signals passed on danger.

Theft of Signal Equipment Train delays, driver forced to proceed on sight, train not protected by other signals. History shows high potential for rear end collisions and signals passed on danger.

Root cause for commuter backlash and possible burning of trains Train delays and cancellations

Summary of Impact on Train Operations

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Insurance Impact

Impact of damages on Insurance

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Region Location of Incident Date of Loss Description of Incident Value of Loss Rm

Western Cape Kraaifontein 15-Apr-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (11 Coaches damaged) 32

Gauteng Braamfontein 16-Apr-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (3 Coaches damaged) 9.5

Gauteng Houtheuwel 27-Apr-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (2 coaches damaged) 9.5

Western Cape Retreat 27-Apr-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (2 coaches damaged) 9.5

KZN Umbogintwini – Isipingo 15-May-17 PRASA Rail: Storm Damage 28

Gauteng Wonderboom 18-May-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (5 coaches damaged) 14.5

GautengKwaggastroom –

Houtheuwel19-May-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (2 coaches damaged) 5

KZN Briardene – Temple 24-May-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (3 Coaches damaged) 16

Gauteng Elandsfontein 01-Jun-17 METRORAIL: Collision 25

Western Cape Cape Town Station 12-Jun-17METRORAIL: Train Fire (Several coaches

destroyed)45

Western Cape Koelenhof 14-Jun-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (2 coaches damaged) 5

Western Cape Nyanga 19-Jun-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (2 coaches damaged) 8

Western Cape Van Der Stel 15-Jul-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (1 coach damaged) 5

KZN Various 10-Oct-17 PRASA RAIL – Storm Damage 150

Western Cape Akasia Park 21-Nov-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (3 Coaches damaged) 12

Free State Kroonstadt 04-Jan-17 Shosholoza Meyl: Level Crossing Accident 60

Gauteng Geldenhuis 09-Jan-17 METRORAIL: Rear-end Collision 5

Grand Total 439

Progress on Accidents

Kroonstad Level Crossing Accident

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KROONSTAND LEVEL CROSSING ACCIDENT

KROONSTAND LEVEL CROSSING ACCIDENT

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Passenger Injuries and Fatalities

Passengers from point of departutre 713 Provided Counselling to affected families Yes

Number of Stations travelled before accident 13 Provided medical assistance to injured passengers Yes

Number of passengers that had disembarked 118 Covered all the funeral expenses to affected families Yes

Number of passengers not injured 416

Number of passengers injured and hospitalized 264

Number of Reported Deceased 24

Number of Bodies/Remains Recovered from Scene 21

Males 8

Females 5 Eastern Cape 03-02-2018 2

Children 4 Gauteng 03-02-2018 5

2 undetected Free State 03-02-2018 9

DNA Test Results

Positive DNA Testing/Matching Results 20

Negative DNA Testing Results 1

Still reported missing 3

*More remains have been discovered since 31 January 2018

KROONSTAND RAIL LEVEL CROSSING INCIDENT

Bereaved Family Support

Funerals Already taken place

Geldenhuis Rear-End Accident

GELDENHUIS REAR-END COLISSION

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On Monday 22nd January 2018, the Board commenced with site visit

(Geldenhuis Station –incident site and George-Goch Signal Cabin).

From Tuesday 23rd January 2018 to date, the Board resumed with

interviews of witnesses and these were conducted at uMjantshi House 8th

floor boardroom, Braamfontein.

Seventeen witnesses have been interviewed, data and voice loggers were

interrogated.

Completion and submission of the report will be made not later than Friday

16th February 2018.

Interventions

DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVENTIONS

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25 interventions identified for safe working during authorization of train movement

Interventions divided into short, medium and long term

Short term, 16 (64%)

Medium term, 5 (20%)

Long term, 4 (16%)

Distribution of interventions

Expected time to complete

interventions:

a) Short term 0 – 6 months

b) Medium term 6 – 12 months

c) Long term 12 months and more

INTERVENTIONS CLUSTER

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SHORT TERM INTERVENTIONS

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Focus areas:

1. Review of Train Working Rules.

2. Speed Monitoring.

3. Shift handover process – CTC personnel.

4. Train Driver Communication.

5. Refresher Training on Abnormal Working (frequency).

6. New TWR for Re-Signalling Programme.

7. Monitoring and Compliance.

8. Human Factors Management.

SHORT TERM INTERVENTIONS …(cont)

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9. Management of high level of Authorities issued daily.

10. Safety Awareness Campaigns with Staff and all Stake Holders.

11. Safety Management System.

12. Maintenance of Trunk Radios (Inadequate Reliability and Maintainability).

13. Protection of Level Crossings.

14. Improve securitisation of system with SAPS and Security Technology (alarms,

CCTV, drone technology, etc.)

15. Address high levels of Vandalism affecting Abnormal Operating

16. Conditions.

MEDIUM TERM INTERVENTIONS

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Focus areas:

1. Implementation of the New TWR for the roll out of Re-Signalling Programme.

2. Recruitment of additional Section Managers to improve Supervision

3. Repair and Replacement of Vandalised and Stolen Units.

4. Internal Capacity for maintenance of train Communication System.

5. Shift Handover – CTC personnel handover to occur during off peak.

6. Improve Securitisation of system with SAPS and Security Technology (alarms,

CCTV, drone technology, etc.)

LONG TERM INTERVENTIONS

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Focus areas:

1. Shift handover – CTC personnel handover to occur during off peak.

2. Obsolete Signaling Technology – Re-signaling Programme.

3. TCO – Train Driver Voice Communication – network maintenance.

4. GSM-R operationalization.

5. Elimination of Level Crossings.

6. Accelerate Fencing Projects to protect rail servitude against illegal entry and vandalism.

ROLLING STOCK

Increase train set availability

Ad-hoc contractor coach recovery 20 coaches per month

In-house Rolling Stock Coach recovery 30 coaches per month

GO program delivery

Wreck coach recovery – Approval for appointment through regional SCM

SET RECOVERY TARGETS

0 - 3mths 3 – 6mths 6 – 9mths 9-12mths 12-18mths 18-24mths

SETS 60 sets 65 sets 75 sets 80 sets 83 sets 88 sets

CONFIG 70% short 60% short 50% short 35% short 25% short 0%

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ACCELERATED TURNAROUND PLANS

ROLLING STOCK Increase reliability

• Secure availability of rotating machines and wheels

Expedite processes to procure components

Localisation / Regionalise components contracts

Confinement of unique items suppliers

Availability of materials and spares

Approval of contracts for suppliers

Finalise regional tender process for materials and components be started

Expedite procurement processes

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ACCELERATED TURNAROUND PLANS

INFRASTRUCTURE

IMPROVE SYSTEM AVAILABILITY AND RELIABILITY

Reduce Signal infrastructure related delays

Rehabilitation of conventional signalling systems (relays, panels & cables )

Migration of copper to fibre Fund and Procure mission critical spares Vandal proofing of signalling equipment Improve System Redundancy Completion of the new Interlocking (Signalling) System

Reduce perway infrastructure delays

Procurement of on track machine Fast tracking procurement of rail components ( rails and turn outs ) Approve contracts with TFR Implement National Rail Contract

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ACCELERATED TURNAROUND PLANS

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Proposed Security Solutions: Drones

Proposed Security Solutions: Drones

• Day and night surveillance with real time

video and location feedback during

operations.

• Integrated intelligence driven operation

based on crime pattern analysis and

profiling of suspects.

• Identifying, reporting any suspicious

activity during operations and guide

armed Response Teams and SAPS to

scenes of suspected crime in progress,

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• Utilise Forensic Specialists to

respond to crime scenes, collect

and process evidence to ensure

successful arrest. (Current

conviction rate

All equipment and spares are contained in the RPS vehicle. This includes

the following:

- Battery Charger

- Telemetry Radio

- RPS

- Weather Station

- Fire Fighting Equipment

Three stations/screens:

1) Flight commander operating station

2) Sensor operations station

3) Security Management to assist in determining the location of trespassers

by utilising their local knowledge

- Full suite of spares

- Tools

- Generator

- Electrical supply

Command Vehicle

o Time to migrate to the use of modern technology used worldwide (International Best Practice)

o Create ability to “SEE AT NIGHT” without criminal being aware (EYE IN THE SKY)

o Link to tactically correct deployed ground support capable of responding within minutes to apprehend criminals in the act.

o Supported by Law Enforcement to follow criminals (with the EYE IN THE SKY) to their hiding places to ensure successful arrests.

o Provide evidence which will lead to successful prosecution. (Video/Photographs)

o Drones can provide the quickest reaction to alarms once in the air on “Silent” patrol, and follow the criminals to their end destination.

o The nature of the operation is as such that no further information can be disclosed in a public presentation without compromising the intended operation.

o Added advantage

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Conclusion

Securing Rail Corridors

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The cut-out part of the wall

used in the Agrément test

showed that just 5 cm of

the 20 cm thick wall was

impacted by the fire – after

a record three hours!

We plan to have another

fire test in Knysna

(necessary to convince

over 1,000 families who

lost homes) that this is

ideal for their new homes.

It will be showcased with

the Public Employment

Programme Inter-

Ministerial Committee.

We shall have VIPs inside.

We plan to have an

international live feed on

YouTube – including to

Portugal and the USA.

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Attempting to demolish the WCCW 200 mm after fire test of three hours @ 1 100 0C

video

The labour-intensive nature of the Light House concept is shown here. In order to build a new structure, the

only equipment needed is a truck, chipper, small cement mixer, cement vibrator, shuttering (which can be

re-used repeatedly, and will be made through the Eco-Furniture Programme), scaffolding and various small

items. It means that Light Houses will be able to be built simultaneously all over the country, with on-site

capacitation of previously unemployed people (as here in Lisbon, next to the Kruger National Park).

Partnership with the

City of Cape Town

100 Officers

o 60 Commuter safety

o 40 Infrastructure protection

Upskilling of 1500 PRASA Security Employees to Law Enforcement Officers

All Staff to be under Command and Control of the City of Cape Town

50 additional staff to be trained as Peace Officers, Traffic Warden and

Tactical Street survival skills

MoU to be signed over the next 7 days

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Metals Theft Unit

Proposed Solution:

Partnership with Transnet

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Reduction of Speed Restrictions

TypeofRail SteelGrade Length Units TotalLength DeliveryDestinations57kg/m R350LHT/320Cr 60m 144 8640 CapeTown

57kg/m R350LHT/320Cr 60m 10 600 Durban

57kg/m R350LHT/320Cr 60m 250 15000 Gauteng24240

TypeofRail SteelGrade Length Units TotalLength DeliveryDestinations

48kg/m R350LHT/320Cr 60m 294 17640 CapeTown48kg/m R350LHT/320Cr 60m 240 14400 Durban48kg/m R350LHT/320Cr 60m 150 9000 Gauteng

41040

65280GRANDTOTAL

Communication

Communication Plan

Modernisation Station Communication

On-Board Communication

General Communication

Future Plans

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Integrated Communication and Commuter Engagements

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Integrated Communication and Commuter Engagements

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Marketing & Communications Platforms

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Conclusion

ACTIONS AGAINST VANDALISM AND THEFT

Vandal proofing of critical operating infrastructure

Relocation of informal settlements encroaching on rail reserve

Concrete walling in high risk areas

Professionalizing the security department

Declaring critical areas like staging yards national key points

Revision of the Legal Succession Act on fines & penalties

Successful pilot of technology aided asset protection (tagging & micro-

chipping of equipment, kinetic detection sensors, CCTV surveillance &

analysis, rapid response capability & lighting)

Engagement with senior provincial and national SAPS structures

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ACTIONS AGAINST VANDALISM AND THEFT (CONT.)

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Joint planning & deployment with RRRU & Copperheads

Apply Criminal Matters Amendment Act

Armed security guards appointed to escort train crew

Implement Law Enforcement Joint Project with the Cities

THANK YOU

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