Nate Ward

Précis 1

9/25/14

Berry argues that understanding Nietzsche’s focus on the Greeks reveals two

things: first, it establishes that certain of Nietzsche’s philosophical concerns overlap with

those of the Greeks, and second, it reveals insight into his philosophical methodology (p.

84).1 Specifically, Berry argues that Nietzsche has been inappropriately aligned with

spurious readings of Heraclitus’ ontology, and that Pyrrho of Elis’ influence upon

Nietzsche has been largely neglected (p. 85). She maintains that a “working knowledge”

of each of these figures independent of Nietzsche is key for forming a clearer reading of

Nietzsche’s texts (p. 85).

Berry highlights the influence of Nietzsche’s philological work on his mature

philosophical methodology (p. 86). Specifically, she establishes Nietzsche’s disdain for

those lacking an “ephetic,” i.e. critical and distant, attitude when studying ancient texts

and argues that Nietzsche neither restricted nor defined philology by its subject matter (p.

87). Rather, he conceived of it as more of an “interpretive art or skill,” which his

colleagues lacked (p. 87). Crucially, Berry maintains that Nietzsche saw little distinction

between philosophical and philological work (p. 88).

Nietzsche accused his colleagues of “myopia” and objected to their interpolation

of “peculiarly modern enlightenment values” onto history (p. 88). Berry argues that

Nietzsche’s aim was separation; ancient and modern worldviews were not to be

1 Berry, Jessica. "Nietzsche And The Greeks." The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche. Ed. Ken Gemes and John Richardson. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford UP, 2013. 83-107. Print.

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reconciled (p. 91). Berry establishes that Nietzsche consistently sought to deepen the

“abyss” between modernity and antiquity (p. 91).

Berry argues that Nietzsche’s attention to Heraclitus suffers from persistent

misinterpretation (p. 92). Nietzsche was more interested in Heraclitus’ character than he

was in the content of his thought (p. 92). Further, she argues that Nietzsche’s account of

Heraclitus’ thought is partly constrained by his desire to present an aesthetic “narrative

arc” of the pre-platonic Greek thinkers and that his focus upon particular features of

Heraclitus’ system should not be construed as an endorsement of their truth or falsity (p.

93). Even if one considered Heraclitus an “unrepentant flux-theorist,” there remains no

reasonable textual position from whence to align Nietzsche with such a doctrine (p. 98).

Berry claims that Nietzsche respected and admired the ancient skeptics, and that

an understanding of their positions is useful (p. 99). Nietzsche’s moral critiques are tied

to his criticism of dogmatism and his interest in psychological health (p. 100). Nietzsche,

in his role as a “diagnostic” philosopher, emphasizes that certain beliefs are held for

unique psychological reasons, not logical ones (p. 101). These twin concerns are central

to Pyrrhonian skepticism, the practice of which is “explicitly diagnostic and therapeutic”

(p. 100-101). Understanding Nietzsche’s reasons for praising the Greek skeptics helps

makes sense of his strong tendency “to promote suspicion” about dogmatic “truths” in

general, it also makes sense of the critical, rather than constructive, aspects of Nietzsche’s

work (p. 102-103). Overall, Berry concludes that it is potentially “disastrous” to remain

blind to the influence of these three figures, Homer, Heraclitus, and Pyrrho respectively,

on the development of Nietzsche’s thought, in all of its stages (p. 104).

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