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POLITICS OF SURVIVABILITY HOW MILITARY TECHNOLOGY SCRIPTS URBAN RELATIONS A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities 2021 FADI SHAYYA SCHOOL OF ENVIRONMENT, EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT

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Page 1: POLITICS OF SURVIVABILITY HOW MILITARY TECHNOLOGY …

POLITICS OF SURVIVABILITY HOW MILITARY TECHNOLOGY SCRIPTS URBAN RELATIONS

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in the Faculty of Humanities

2021

FADI SHAYYA

SCHOOL OF ENVIRONMENT, EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT

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Table of Contents

1.0 New Problems, Old Questions ................................................................... 21

1.1 Jenin Is Not Paris ........................................................................................ 22

1.2 Breakdown in Iraq and Afghanistan ........................................................... 24

1.3 Research Aims & Objectives ..................................................................... 25

1.4 Audience and Contributions ....................................................................... 27

1.5 Thesis Structure .......................................................................................... 28

2.0 Introduction ................................................................................................ 35

2.1 Military Urbanisms and Architectures ....................................................... 37

2.1.1 Spatialising Urban Warfare .................................................................... 38

2.1.2 Militarised Notions of the Urban ........................................................... 40

2.1.3 Cross-sectional Views ............................................................................ 44

2.1.4 Asymmetries .......................................................................................... 48

2.1.5 Conclusion.............................................................................................. 51

2.2 Sociotechnical Approaches to Militarised Objects..................................... 51

2.2.1 Matters of Concern ................................................................................. 53

2.2.2 Mediation and Associations ................................................................... 55

2.2.3 Individuation and Associations .............................................................. 56

2.2.4 Conclusion.............................................................................................. 61

2.3 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 62

3.0 Introduction ................................................................................................ 65

3.1 Constructing the Sites to Study Military Technical Objects ...................... 66

3.2 Mobilising the Sources ............................................................................... 69

3.3 Plan of the Analysis .................................................................................... 75

3.4 Method of Analysis .................................................................................... 77

3.5 A Note on the Visual Strategy of the Research .......................................... 81

4.0 Introduction ................................................................................................ 87

4.1 Primitive Envelopes ................................................................................... 88

4.2 Enclosing Bodies ........................................................................................ 98

4.3 Active Exteriors ........................................................................................ 107

4.4 Dynamic Interiors ..................................................................................... 115

4.5 Hybrid Scripts ........................................................................................... 122

4.6 Conclusion: Extreme Architectures .......................................................... 126

5.0 Introduction .............................................................................................. 131

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5.1 Collecting the Urban Landscape .............................................................. 133

5.2 Urbanising the Technical Object.............................................................. 141

5.3 Moving with Infrastructure ...................................................................... 146

5.4 Urban Scripts for the Warzone ................................................................. 155

5.5 Urban Metascripts for the Home Front .................................................... 159

5.6 Conclusion: Urban as Relational Object .................................................. 167

6.0 Introduction .............................................................................................. 171

6.1 Collecting the Rural Landscape ............................................................... 172

6.2 Mobility as Parameters............................................................................. 179

6.3 Environmental Translations ..................................................................... 185

6.4 Recruiting Humans .................................................................................. 190

6.5 Testing Atmospheric Limits ..................................................................... 195

6.6 Technology Transfers .............................................................................. 202

6.7 Terraining Moves ..................................................................................... 209

6.8 Conclusion: Pre-injured Bodies and Technics ......................................... 215

7.0 Introduction .............................................................................................. 219

7.1 First Contribution: Survivability as Concern ........................................... 219

7.2 Second Contribution: The Urban and Architectural ................................ 221

7.3 Third Contribution: A Method for Tracing Associations ........................ 228

7.4 Addressing the Gap in the Literature ....................................................... 232

7.5 Relations of Equality and Difference ....................................................... 234

7.6 Prospects for Future Architectural and Urban Research .......................... 235

7.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................... 236

Final word count (excluding references and front matter): 71, 314.

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List of Acronyms CONUS Contiguous (or Conterminous) United States CREW Counter RCIED Electronic Warfare DoD U.S. Department of Defense DoT U.S. Department of Transportation DTIC Defense Technical Information Center EFP Explosively Formed Penetrator HEAT HMMWV Egress Assistant Trainer HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, also known as Humvee IED Improvised Explosive Device JLTV Joint Light Tactical Vehicle M-ATV MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle MET MRAP Egress Trainer MRAP Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected Vehicle OCONUS Outside CONUS OWM Kit Overhead Wire Mitigation Kit RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade U.S. United States of America USPTO United State Patent and Trademark Office

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List of Figures Figure 1 Example of how patents are analysed in Chapter 4; excerpt from Patent Application 20120261039A1 (Cho, 2012). ......................................................................... 79

Figure 2 Drawing shows sub-ensemble and humans (Asaf et al., 2015, p. Sheet 9 of 11) . 83

Figure 3 Drawing shows technical object and milieu (Tillotson, 2015, p. Sheet 1 of 7) .... 83

Figure 4 Drawing shows possibilities of increased technicity (Cho, 2012, p. Sheet 3 of 3)83

Figure 5 Process diagram shows assisted door operation (McKee, Scholtes and Hayden, 2015, p. Sheet 6 of 12) ......................................................................................................... 83

Figure 6 Diagram of urban elements, from Field Manual (U.S. Army, 2006b, p. B3) ....... 84

Figure 7 Photo shows testing vehicle in mud, from Test Operations Procedure (ATC Automotive Directorate, 2012, p. 101) ................................................................................ 84

Figure 8 Photo shows welding in the field, from Army news article (Roles, 2009) ........... 84

Figure 9 Landscapes/Terrains informing the concretisation of different military light tactical vehicle types since WWII (by author) .................................................................... 89

Figure 10 Excerpt from U.S. military townhall meeting in Kuwait (PBS, 2004). .............. 90

Figure 11 Excerpt from Patent 8707848 (Mills and Stevens, 2008, secs 0002, 0004). ....... 93

Figure 12 Excerpt from Patent Application 20080066613 A1 (Allor, Husak and Skiotys, 2014, col. 1). ........................................................................................................................ 94

Figure 13 Reproduced mobility terrain diagram from the Bastion APC vehicle brochure (AM General, 2018) ............................................................................................................. 96

Figure 14 Reproduced vehicle underbody geometry diagram from patent art of U.S. Patent 10,323,909 B2 (Carton and Roebroeks, 2019, p. Sheet 4 of 6) ........................................... 96

Figure 15 The four key types of severe bodily injuries causes by IED detonations (Ramasamy et al., 2011, p. 163) .......................................................................................... 97

Figure 16 Comparison between IED-caused fatalities (dark grey graph) and other fatalities (light grey graph); notice the increase during the 2003-2005 insurgency, and after 2007 when the U.S. attempted to reduce risk by transferring security responsibilities to Iraq (Lamb, Schmidt and Fitzsimmons, 2009, p. 2).................................................................... 97

Figure 17 Excerpt from the Urgent UNS (McGriff and Dewet, 2005, pp. 1–3) ................. 98

Figure 18 Excerpt from Patent 6892621 B2 (Grosch, 2005, col. 2). ................................. 100

Figure 19 Patent art showing vehicle as modular parts (Hass and Runow, 2007, p. Sheet 2 of 3). ................................................................................................................................... 105

Figure 20 Patent art showing Oshkosh’s TAK-4 independent suspension system; notice how there is no horizontal axle that connects both wheels, rather each wheel independently responds to the terrain (Schreiner, Roehl and Pelko, 2011, p. Sheet 19 of 21) ................. 105

Figure 21 Patent art showing a schematic of a cab; notice how the cab is an independent entity from the rest of the vehicle including the tunnel form that isolates its drive shaft components (R. D. Johnson et al., 2012, p. Sheet 1 of 3) ................................................. 106

Figure 22 Patent art showing a schematic section of a human and an energy vent coexisting in the extreme event of a detonation (Tunis and Kendall, 2011). ...................................... 106

Figure 23 Excerpt from Patent Application 20120261039 A1 (Cho, 2012, sec. 0003) .... 108

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Figure 24 Patent art showing severe bending angles of a single, jointless, thick sheet of AA2139 (Cho, 2012, p. Sheet 1 of 3) ................................................................................ 113

Figure 25 Patent art showing sectional schematics of layering metals with plastics to absorb the kinetics of projectiles (St. Claire and Imholt, 2012, p. Sheet 1 of 3). .............. 113

Figure 26 Patent art showing schematic of Humvee with the sensing mechanism and how it heats the medium where the projectile travels (Tillotson, 2015, p. Sheet 1 of 7) .............. 114

Figure 27 Reproduced cinematic sections from patent art that capture the explosion event and dynamic terrain as a space-time continuum (Asaf et al., 2015) .................................. 114

Figure 28 Excerpt from FM 3.06-11: Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain (U.S. Army, 2002, p. 1.24) .......................................................................................................... 118

Figure 29 Patent art showing blast attenuation seats; notice the fixing brackets that mount the seat to the ceiling and floor of the vehicle, and the telescopic oscillation mechanism in the back of the seat (Grant and Almstedt, 2015, p. Sheet 1 of 15) .................................... 120

Figure 30 Patent art showing robotic arm operated through computer interface inside the vehicle (Summer, Bosscher and Rust, 2015, p. Sheet 1 of 6) ............................................ 120

Figure 31 Patent art showing door assist mechanism separating inside the vehicle from the outside environment (McKee, Scholtes and Hayden, 2015, p. Sheet 1 of 12)................... 121

Figure 32 Patent art showing layers of protective and peelable film overlaying a vehicle’s glass panel (Cockman, Jennings and Martin, 2012, p. Sheet 1 of 11) ............................... 121

Figure 33 Converging concerns for better mobility and better survivability into an integrated technical object (by author) ............................................................................... 124

Figure 34 Excerpt on “considerations for urban operations” from the MRAP Handbook (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008, p. 34) .............................................................. 135

Figure 35 Excerpt from officer Amble’s account (Amble, 2014) ...................................... 137

Figure 36 Diagram of “relativity of key urban environment elements” from FM 3-06: Urban Operations; notice how the right side of the diagram emphasises “society” over “terrain” in stability operations and unconventional warfare, i.e. counterinsurgency; infrastructure remains the domain of intersection between the social and the physical on both sides of the diagram (Appendix B in U.S. Army, 2006b, p. B3) ............................... 139

Figure 37 Sketch of possible quasi-typologies, as in urban design guides, that translates the military’s reduction of the urban landscape to a set of frictions for the MRAP vehicles; the first row shows sections and the second shows plans (by author) ..................................... 139

Figure 38 An urban morphology map illustrating differences in density and structure between what officer Amble described as an affluent Karada (left) and a chaotic Baghdad al-Jadida (right) districts in Baghdad (original map source: Google Maps, 2019) ............ 140

Figure 39 Armoured vehicles driving on paved roads in urban settings amidst traffic and civilians: (left, DoD Observe archive) U.S. Marines LAVs driving past a checkpoint in Koretin, Kosovo, 1999 and (right, DVIDS archive) a U.S. Army Stryker driving on a busy street in Mosul, Iraq, 2008; photo credits to Sgt. Craig J. Shell, U.S. Marines (Shell, 1999) and Staff Sgt. Gretel Weiskopf, 139th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (Weiskopf, 2004) ............................................................................................................................................ 140

Figure 40 Excerpt from “Appendix B-2 Surviving Contact with High-Voltage Power Lines” in the MRAP Handbook (2008, p. 133) ................................................................. 141

Figure 41 Low-hanging wires in a Baghdad; original photo captioned “Electrical wires on a typical street corner in Baghdad, 2008” as found in officer Amble’s account (Amble,

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2014); photo credit to U.S. Army Sgt. Mark B. Matthews, 27th Public Affairs Detachment ........................................................................................................................................... 144

Figure 42 Low-hanging wires in a Baghdad suburb; original photo captioned “Capt. Marty Kulinski, a soldier with the 769th Engineer Battalion, motions for a woman to continue her normal routine Saturday in Sadr City, Iraq, as he pulls security for fellow soldiers who are interviewing an insurgent suspect…” (James Warden, 2008) ........................................... 144

Figure 43 RG33 6x6 MRAPs encountering low-hanging wires – notice how close to the wires the gunner’s position on the roof and the vertical antennas are; original photo (Alamy stock photos) captioned “MRAP … vehicles manned by soldiers of Charly Battery, 2nd Battalion 12th Field Artillery Regiment as part of 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division patrol the streets of Bohriz in Diyala province, Iraq” (Kli, 2008) ............................................... 145

Figure 44 Illustration of electrocution from “Power Line Antenna Strike” as found in the MRAP Handbook (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008, p. 42) ................................ 145

Figure 45 Excerpt from the OWM Kit Briefing (TARDEC, 2010, p. 5) .......................... 148

Figure 46 Excerpt from This Truck Saved my Life (Friedman, 2013, p. 232) ................... 150

Figure 47 Downsizing in transportation engineering; excerpt from DoT’s report Optimizing Large Vehicles for Urban Environments (Chiarenza et al., 2018, p. 10) .......................... 150

Figure 48 Improvising technical improvements in the field/warzone in Baghdad; original photo (U.S. Army website) captioned “Spc. Richard Pfleegor of Jersey Shore, Pa., a Soldier with Company B, 328th Brigade Support Battalion, 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, welds outriggers onto a bolt-on metal frame April 16…” (Roles, 2009) ............... 153

Figure 49 Developing technical improvements in the industrial base/home front in the U.S.; photo from OWM kit Briefing (TARDEC, 2010, p. 3) ............................................ 153

Figure 50 Assembling manually operated MRAP devices at the Tobyhanna Army Depot; original photo (U.S. Army website) captioned “Jerry Pursel, sheet metal mechanic helper, tests the pull-down kit assembly attached to a CREW antenna system flex-mount device…” (Boucher, 2009) ................................................................................................ 154

Figure 51 A convoy of Caiman MRAPs equipped with the hulking OWM Kit frames that protect the CREW antennas (the thick vertical casings in the photo), the gunner, and other electronic warfare devices against electrocution on top of the vehicles. Original photo (Getty Images) captioned “Soldiers watch as the last American military convoy to depart Iraq from the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division drives through Camp Virginia after crossing over the border into Kuwait on December 18, 2011 in Camp Virginia, Kuwait…” (Tama, 2011) .................................................................................................................................. 154

Figure 52 Excerpt from FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency (U.S. Army, 2006a, p. A-5) ........ 156

Figure 53 Excerpt from the monograph Hearts-and-Minds: A Strategy of Conciliation, Coercion, or Commitment? (Nell, 2012, p. 33 original italics) ......................................... 156

Figure 54 Excerpt from the OWM Kit Briefing (TARDEC, 2010, p. 5) .......................... 156

Figure 55 Excerpt from the Safety Bulletin (Transportation Engineering Agency, 2014, p. 2) ........................................................................................................................................... 160

Figure 56 Excerpt from the pamphlet Counterinsurgency Guidance (U.S. Army, 2014, p. 1) ........................................................................................................................................... 161

Figure 57 Excerpt from AR 385-10: The Army Safety Program (U.S. Army, 2017, p. 17,83) ........................................................................................................................................... 161

Figure 58 Excerpt from the Safety Bulletin (Transportation Engineering Agency, 2014, p. 3) ........................................................................................................................................... 163

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Figure 59 Excerpt from the Safety Bulletin (Transportation Engineering Agency, 2014, p. 6) ............................................................................................................................................ 164

Figure 60 Bridge Formula from DoT’s guidance pamphlet (Federal Highway Administration, 2015, p. 1) ................................................................................................ 166

Figure 61 Bridge Formula, as in Figure 60, applied to Navistar’s “more” urban version of the MaxxPro Dash MRAP, as measured in Table 3 of sub-section 5.3.3 (by author) ....... 167

Figure 62 Comparison of urban design considerations in MRAP (photo from USAASC, 2018) and commercial truck (photo and diagram from Chiarenza et al., 2018, pp. 13, 23): the first has small-high windows that protect during war (outside inward); the second has large-low windows that expand the field of vision to nearby traffic (inside outward) ............................................................................................................................................ 168

Figure 63 Sketch of U.S. military territorial extension via state metascripts, from the home front’s geography to the warzone’s territorialisations of bases and vehicles (by author) .. 168

Figure 64 Excerpt from Fundamentals of Vehicle Dynamics (Gillespie, 1992, p. 309) .... 173

Figure 65 Excerpt from This Truck Saved My Life (Friedman, 2013, pp. 231–232) ......... 174

Figure 66 Excerpt from General Petraeus’s talk at Harvard (Miles, 2009) ....................... 175

Figure 67 Concepts, metanarratives, and techno-material realities (by author) ................ 176

Figure 68 MRAP stuck in soft, muddy ground in Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan; original photo captioned “U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Kyle McGann, 466th Air Expeditionary Squadron, Explosive Ordnance Disposal technician, digs mud from under [MRAP] vehicle during demolition day, March 16, 2014” (Young Jr., 2014) ............................................. 178

Figure 69 Excerpt from the Test Activity Report (1979, pp. 7–8) ..................................... 179

Figure 70 Excerpt from U.S. Army article (Parsons, 2015)............................................... 181

Figure 71 Technical representation of rollover on flat, paved roads as a function of a vehicle’s speed and its body angle relative to the horizontal ground (Varigas Research, Inc., 1979, p. 76) ................................................................................................................ 184

Figure 72 A typical vehicle rollover on flat, paved surface; original photo in Baghdad captioned “A Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicle rests on its turret and hood after a rollover…” (Burke, 2009) .................................................................................................. 184

Figure 73 Excerpt on “Capabilities and Limitations” from the MRAP Handbook (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008, pp. 25–26) ................................................................... 185

Figure 74 Excerpt on “Vehicle Safety” from the MRAP Handbook (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008, pp. 39–41) ................................................................................... 187

Figure 75 Sketch of possible road sections and surface types, as in urban design guides, that translates the military’s reduction of the rural landscape to a set of obstacles for the MRAP vehicles; both rows show cross-sections (by author) ............................................ 189

Figure 76 Instructions to keep an organised and stowed layout of an MRAP’s interior, to protect soldiers from random flying objects in the event of an accident; from the MRAP Handbook (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008, p. 67) ............................................. 189

Figure 77 Excerpt from the Union-Tribune newspaper (Liewer, 2009) ............................ 192

Figure 78 Excerpt from Tip of the Spear magazine (USASFC Public Affairs, 2008, p. 22) ............................................................................................................................................ 192

Figure 79 Excerpt from the Army AL&T magazine (Myers, 2007, p. 52) ......................... 196

Figure 80 Excerpt from the ARL’s medical study (Pakulski et al., 2013, p. 10)............... 197

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Figure 81 MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle testing at the Laguna Mud Course, Yuma Test Center (YTC), Yuma, U.S.; this facility tests for the military vehicles’ traction in mud (ATC Automotive Directorate, 2012, p. 101) .................................................................... 201

Figure 82 MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) stuck in a muddy rural road in Afghanistan, despite all the testing it went through at the YTC (Image source: U.S. Army) ........................................................................................................................................... 201

Figure 83 Excerpt from the NAM website (2013) ............................................................. 202

Figure 84 Excerpt from U.S. Army article (Miller, 2008) ................................................. 205

Figure 85 Excerpt from the Army AL&T magazine (Myers, 2007, p. 53 original emphasis) ........................................................................................................................................... 205

Figure 86 MRAP Egress Trainer (MET) prepared for simulation-training at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, U.S.; the device setup is straightforward: an MRAP cab (without the engine, chassis, and wheels) rotating around a horizontal axis (Stagner, 2013; Rogoway, 2017) ....................................................................................................... 207

Figure 87 Airmen flipped upside-down during an MRAP Egress Training (MET) rollover simulation at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, U.S. (Stagner, 2013) ..... 207

Figure 88 Patent art showing the cab part of an MRAP vehicle used in the MRAP egress training simulator (Henriksson, 2014, p. Sheet 12 of 16) .................................................. 208

Figure 89 Preparatory training to spatially familiarise soldiers with the team’s seating positions in an MRAP (seated driver, seated soldiers, standing gunner) prior to initiating the MET egress training – device seen in the background (Prince, 2019) ........................ 208

Figure 90 Excerpt from U.S. Army article (Miller, 2008) ................................................. 209

Figure 91 Transcript from MET egress training video (Simon, 2009) .............................. 210

Figure 92 Excerpt from U.S. Army article (3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command, 2009) .................................................................................................................................. 211

Figure 93 Excerpt from U.S. Marine Corps website (U.S. Marine Corps, 2018b) ........... 212

Figure 94 Excerpt from U.S. Marine Corps website (U.S. Marine Corps, 2018a) ............ 212

Figure 95 The transportable MET training devices delivered by trailers at Camp Buehring, Kuwait (U.S. Army, 2009) ................................................................................................ 214

Figure 96 Standardised Army Risk Matrix from the Risk Management Pamphlet (U.S. Army, 2014, p. 8) ............................................................................................................... 214

Figure 97 Changing relation from a passive body (closed brackets) within a technical object (closed brackets) to active human and nonhuman associations (open brackets) (by author) ................................................................................................................................ 215

Figure 98 The body-vehicle associations of an architectural character present in the MRAP capsule part merge with the MRAP vehicle part to produce the body-vehicle-terrain associations of an urban character (by author) .................................................................. 222

Figure 99 The associated milieu of the MRAP’s survivability-mobility hybrid script (by author) ................................................................................................................................ 223

Figure 100 The individuation of survivability’s technical individuals (by author) ........... 224

Figure 101 The MRAP is a hybrid of two sets of associations: one with an architectural character (capsule) and another with an urban character (capsule + truck). The former could exist on its own, but the latter is a hybrid of both. Otherwise, the mobile MRAP vehicle becomes the stationary MRAP Egress Trainer device (by author). ...................... 227

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List of Tables Table 1 A list of the primary (P) and secondary (S) sources used in the empirical analysis; sources are listed by document type, count, and source of retrieval (compiled by author). 71

Table 2 Reproduced excerpt from “Appendix A: U.S. Military or Contractor Personnel Electrocuted in Iraq March 2003 through March 2009” (PL for power line, A for Army, M for Marines) in DoD Inspector General’s report (Inspector General, 2009, p. 29) ............ 143

Table 3 Reproduced MaxxPro vehicle model comparison from the Navistar Defense website; smallest dimension shaded in grey and urban MRAP model dimensions emphasised in bold (illustration by author); all data is from the website, and all dimensions are in meters and weights in metric tons (Navistar Defense, 2019)................................... 151

Table 4 Comparison of total paved mileage with respect to overall country area among Afghanistan, Iraq, and Texas; areas are in square miles and road lengths in miles, sources of retrieval listed in the table (data compiled by author) ................................................... 178

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Abstract The University of Manchester Fadi Shayya Doctor of Philosophy 28 December 2020

Politics of Survivability: How Military Technology Scripts Urban Relations

This thesis scrutinises the spatialisation of contemporary urban warfare by embracing a symmetric perspective to the study of military technologies and its potential to script urban relations. While urban and architectural studies are at the forefront of engaging with such pressing issues, the predominant Critical approach remains largely social constructivist and anthropocentric. Technologies are treated as passive projections of Power; they neither break down nor evolve, and they lack agency relating users and environments. Rather than embracing the grand narratives that explain established power structures and social systems, we emphasise the need to study the spatialisation of urban warfare as a process that can be better unpacked at the level of the daily functioning of military technology. At that level, what becomes a vital matter of concern, a disputed issue is survivability. Exploring survivability allows us to examine the mundane relational politics connecting soldiers’ bodies to technical objects and urban landscapes, configuring new relations between humans and nonhumans. The thesis offers an analysis of military armoured vehicles as dynamic and evolving technical objects, and it traces through their functioning and breakdowns a relational politics of survivability that is instigated at that mundane level of urban warfare. Notably, we trace such associations to the MRAP-type vehicles sought after by the U.S. military to restore survivability and negotiate the deadly threat of detonations during the aughts wars on Iraq and Afghanistan. The analysis shows how survivability becomes a disputed issue, a matter of concern, that underpins the military’s technical and doctrinal development. We demonstrate how power cannot be projected without considerations for the survivability of soldiers, equipment, and missions/systems. Such survivability is the outcome of two crucial and interdependent processes: the technical development of concrete armour concepts, materials, and technologies; and the sociotechnical associations between the soldiers and the armoured vehicles. We analyse the former in utility patents that document resolving the armour’s antagonisms in a series of heterogenous inventions, and the latter in military publications, governmental policy documents, and secondary sources that connect the work of humans and nonhumans. While utility patents help us explain technical improvements and lineages in the lab, the military publications and other sources help us explain the deployment of the vehicles in the field and the challenges and breakdowns they encounter, be they combat or non-combat related. Moreover, we analyse the associations of architectural and urban characters related to the armoured vehicles, examined here as mobile fortified enclosures, connecting soldiers’ bodies to different environments in a versatile relational way. The thesis thus makes three contributions to debates in urban studies, architectural humanities, and STS: 1) It advances the epistemological position that survivability is intrinsically connected to the functioning of military technical objects; 2) it expands on the relational theory of the architectural and the urban as a way of connecting, where armoured vehicles extend the scope of architectural and urban research beyond the figure of the static building; 3) it answers a methodological question about employing technical objects to study the spatialisation of urban warfare and the reduction of the landscape into terrain. All three contributions advance a pragmatist perspective on a relational politics of survivability through human-nonhuman interdependency.

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Declaration No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

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Copyright Statement

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iii.The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trademarks and other intellectual

property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions.

iv.Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and

commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo.aspx?DocID=24420), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.library.manchester.ac.uk/about/regulations/) and in The University’s policy on Presentation of Theses.

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Acknowledgments This PhD project would not have been possible without the support of many individuals and organisations. As a first-generation university graduate and a practitioner-turned-academic, I would like to extend my acknowledgements as follows. I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, Professor Albena Yaneva, for guiding me in developing my research project and academic persona. We first met in New York. At the Manchester Architecture Research Group, she provided a highly stimulating intellectual environment through periodic meetings, detailed feedback, and engaging seminars. Her PhD seminar renewed my understanding of social and urban theory, cultivated my writing style, and connected me to an exceptional network of academics. I participated in a masterclass with Professor Bruno Latour. I presented my research in her seminar and received feedback from guest Professors Mattias Kärrholm and Gunnar Sandin (Lund University), Dana Cuff (UCLA), Eeva-Liisa Pelkonen (Yale University), Keith Murphy (UC Irvine), Ole B. Jensen (Aalborg University), Paul Jones (University of Liverpool), Alessandro Armando and Giovanni Durbiano (Politecnico di Torino), and Arlene Oak (University of Alberta). I am also profoundly grateful to my second supervisor, Dr Leandro Minuchin, for his committed reading and active engagement in orienting my research design and focusing its ambitious scope. I thank my viva examiners, Professors Mattias Kärrholm and Stephen Walker, for a stimulating intellectual discussion, Dr Łukasz Stanek for acting as annual review examiner, and Dr Kim Förster for acting as viva chair. Embarking on my PhD course has been generously facilitated by the University of Manchester. I am greatly appreciative for receiving: The School of Environment, Education and Development (SEED) Studentship Award, which funded three years of tuition and stipend (2016-2019); the Faculty of Humanities grant for Internationalisation PGR Mobility Scheme to visit Lund University (2019), where I received feedback from Professor Mattias Kärrholm, Dr Gunnar Sandin, Dr Emma Nilsson, and Dr Sandra Koplajr, among others; funding to attend several academic conferences, training workshops, and writing retreats; and an award from the Living Costs Support Fund during the COVID-19 lockdown. I extend my thanks and appreciation to the IJURR Foundation for awarding me a 2020 Writing-Up Grant, which helped me get through my submission pending year. The PhD journey would not have been the same without the kind and professional support of SEED’s PGR Office staff, SEED’s research and teaching colleagues, Humanities’ colleagues, and teaching assistants’ solidarity. Engaging with the academic community at the university helped me understand my audience and streamline my ideas. The strain of doing doctoral research would not have been as bearable and enjoyable without the light touch of many friends and colleagues, whom I shall name a few here. I appreciate co-organising reading groups with Brett Mommersteeg and Stelios Zavos; co-chairing the 2019 AHRA PhD Student Symposium with Demetra Kourri; participating in department and school academic events; supporting teaching and dissertation supervision (as Teaching Assistant) at the Manchester School of Architecture; organising Arts Methods workshops for PGRs; and becoming Fellow of the Higher Education Academy (2020). Besides, producing this research could not have been possible without the help of my trusted laptop Lenovo X1 Carbon (Gen 2), OnePlus 6 Android smartphone, MS Office 365, Zotero, Adobe Suite, Google Services, Grammarly, Mozilla Firefox, and the university’s library resources. Finally, my partner, friends, and family’s kindness made this arduous journey bearable. I am profoundly grateful for that. To my mom, aunt, late dad, and sisters: this achievement is dedicated to you.

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Chapter 1

Introduction: Unrevised Modernisms

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…it might after all be better to be at war, and thus to be forced to think about the diplomatic work to be done, than to imagine that there is no war at all and keep talking endlessly about progress, modernity, development – without realizing the price that must be paid in reaching such lofty goals…we have first to fathom that a war of the worlds has been raging all along, throughout the so-called “modern age”…what is needed is a new recognition of the old war we have been fighting all along – in order to bring about new kinds of negotiation, and a new kind of peace. (Latour, 2002, p. 3)

…military experts constantly revise their strategic doctrines, their contingency plans, the size, direction, and technology of their projectiles, their smart bombs, their missiles; I wonder why we, we alone, would be saved from those sorts of revisions. It does not seem to me that we have been as quick, in academia, to prepare ourselves for new threats, new dangers, new tasks, new targets. (Latour, 2004b, p. 225)

1.0 New Problems, Old Questions

One common thread among the Critical studies on contemporary urban warfare is

the urban character of the new battlefield. It is a physically dense, stacked, and

labyrinthian space; it is packed with civilians and formal/informal systems of governance

and communication; and it accommodates flows within varying qualities of infrastructural

networks. We observe such description in scholarly works of critical urban and

architectural studies (e.g., Graham, 2011; Weizman, 2017b) across fields like Human

Geography, Architecture, Planning, and Sociology (Chapter 2). The same thread runs a

critique of how the military studies contemporary urban and architectural theory and the

philosophy of space (e.g., Graham, 2004c; Weizman, 2006a). It also follows an

explanatory metanarrative of how Capitalism circulates surplus capital through the built

environment, best explained through the notion of “the urbanization of capital” (Harvey,

1985) and ultimately exemplified through the spatial reorganisation project of mid-19th

century Paris, i.e., Haussmannisation (Chapter 2).

Not only does the military study the same spatial theories as in the academic

literature – for, after all, it acts “in this world” (Yaneva, 2021 forthcoming), but it often

comes to the same conclusions and findings only to employ it for its military objectives1.

The military, as a state institution and technological organisation, also engages in

international development, peacekeeping, homeland security, civil defence, and logistics,

1 For example, see Combat in Hell: A Consideration of Constrained Urban Warfare (e.g., Glenn, 1996), Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future (Harris et al., 2014), and Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban Areas in 2025 and Beyond (Lawton and Shields, 2016)

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among other involvements. It has come a long way from examining mid-19th century Paris

to analysing 20th-century wars, especially more recent conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia-

Herzegovina, Chechnya, Iraq, Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, Northern Ireland, former

Rhodesia, Palestine, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen.

So, why do Critical urban and architectural studies continue to insist on creating

this divide with the military as an outsider to studying the urban, developing technology,

and instigating violence? Why do these studies continue to reference 19th century “French”

Haussmannisation as the all-encompassing explanatory model of systemic and structural

power differentials between those strong, imperial, and high-tech, and those weak,

common, and low-tech? Our questions intend to provoke the unrevised task and purpose of

studying contemporary urban warfare in urban and architectural studies based on outdated

epistemological modes of analysis, which fall behind on tackling the daily functioning of

military technologies and the relational politics that it instigates.

1.1 Jenin Is Not Paris

An exemplary account for invoking Haussmannisation is the critical literature’s

analysis of Israeli military operations during the Second Palestinian Intifada (2000-2005),

particularly the use of the air force and armoured bulldozers to clear ways in the dense

urban fabric and the barricades during the 2002 battles of Jenin and Nablus. Such military

strategies that target the built environment and infrastructure are even dubbed

“demodernization” (Graham, 2004b, 2006b, 2011), referring to a kind of absolute power

for setting a society backwards by stripping it from its infrastructure. As appalling as these

military operations were and as appealing the idea of demodernisation is, what happened in

21st century Jenin is not what and how it happened in 19th century Paris. The French capital

was not bombarded by the air force, nor it was demodernised by bulldozers. Conversely,

Jenin and Nablus were not spatially reorganised to equip them with boulevards and parks.

In the spirit of Latour, we pose two philosophical problematics here: How to study

situations as they happen through the actions of the actors and “in this world” not the one

that ought to be? And how to escape the binaries of modernise/demodernise,

military/civilian, east/west, and moral/immoral to keep pace with the contemporariness of

urban warfare through the functioning of the technical objects, the spatialisation generated,

and the technical thought, i.e., “technics” (Simondon, 2017), guiding it?

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The existing Critical studies depart from the proposition that the urban is

asymmetrical. Urban and architectural studies have demonstrated this repeatedly,

highlighting in the process all sorts of inequalities, injustices, and distribution differentials.

So, why repeat this task when studying militarisation and warfare? Instead of replicating

the outcomes of military thought through larger and external explanatory frameworks, our

ambition is rather to unpack how military technologies operate on a daily basis and thus

contribute to the spatialisation of military action and its inherently relational political

agency. By so doing, we will embark on a symmetrical study of the spatialisation of

warfare. This will imply examining the military’s technical objects as mediators that act,

evolve, or breakdown, not as artefacts projecting and symbolising absolute power (Chapter

3). They do not act only to transport power unchanged but to withstand and endure a

displacement, or “transformation” (Latour, 1996c; Yaneva, 2021 forthcoming), that makes

the realisation of power possible. This ability to withstand a displacement is what the

military calls “survivability.” This is not the mere notion of human interdependence

(Butler, 2016) or biological survival, but the ability of humans and nonhumans (i.e.,

soldiers, equipment, and systems) to remain “mission capable” (U.S. Army, 2005, pp. 1, 7–

8) upon encountering an antagonism or a breakdown. The mediating role of military

technologies in warfare can be explored through studies of military inventions and analysis

of breakdown situations, in addition to military practices of making terrain.

This notion of survivability is not sufficiently explored in the literature. The

literature on military urbanisms and architectures studies the urban as a medium for

warfare and militarisation where constituted and known subjects and objects are in conflict:

the strong military; the weak civilians; the technical objects that neither evolve nor

breakdown; and the urban landscape that is shaped by forces outside it. In turn, a larger gap

becomes visible where technological change is simplified to a binary of spillover from

military to civilian domains and Politics is reduced to a structural asymmetry concerned

with disproportionality. Therefore, we will unpack survivability as a complex phenomenon

(easily attributed to humans only) of the networked agency of entities with different

ontologies – human (be they military, civilian, in government, or in science and

engineering) and nonhuman (technologies, landscapes, procedures, urban artefacts), all

mobilised in situations of urban warfare.

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1.2 Breakdown in Iraq and Afghanistan

technical activity belongs neither to the pure social domain nor the pure psychic domain. Technical activity is the model of the collective relationship, which cannot be confused with one of the two preceding ones; it is not the only mode and the only content of the collective, but it is of the collective, and, in certain cases, it is around technical activity that the collective group can arise. (Simondon, 2017, p. 250)

The military has tested, both at testing centers and in the field, the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, also called an MRAP. The MRAP provides dramatically improved protection against IEDs. The military has said that it is four to five times as good as an up-armored HMMWV. More important, military commanders tell us that it will reduce deaths and casualties from IEDs by 67 to 80 percent. The Brookings Institution found that 1,400 Americans died in Iraq due to IEDs from March of 2003 through June of 2007. If we had had MRAPs in the field from the start--and we could and should have--938 to 1,120 Americans would be alive today. (Senator Biden (DE), 2007)

Nowhere was such a breakdown more evident than in the aughts protracted

occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. Wars claimed in the name of the modern yet suffering

huge losses and becoming an even larger fiasco. However, these wars will not be analysed

from the outside as actions within dualisms of East and West, modern and nonmodern,

good and evil, democracy and dictatorship, to name a few (see ‘Rethinking the Modern

Constitution’ in Yaneva, 2021 forthcoming). Unlike Critical studies that tackle the urban as

asymmetrical, as passive projections of Big Politics (with a big “P”), we will explore the

mediating role of military technologies and how they act by “making the social hold”

(Latour, 2005) through a relational politics of survivability between humans and

nonhumans.

Our study follows the development of the MRAP as the means of a mediation so

desperately sought after by the U.S. military to restore survivability and negotiate the

deadly threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Described

as “one of the largest material acquisition programs since World War II” (Howitz, 2008),

developing the MRAP stirred up major debates within the U.S. political institutions and

public sphere. The new armoured vehicle was the improved technical mediation – besides

changes to doctrine and training – to restore survivability where the once prominent

Humvee2 failed. A failure that led to the defence secretary stepping down3 (PBS

2 This is the popular name for the HMMWV, short for High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, which was the U.S. military’s main mobility and light tactical vehicle during the 1990s Gulf War and other military operations. It also became famous in its civilian version, the Hummer. 3 Amidst many controversial matters, including torturing and abusing prisoners in Iraq and the initial unfounded claims about Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction, Donald Rumsfeld stepped down, and

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NewsHour, 2006; Stolberg and Rutenberg, 2006) after ineffective attempts at improving

the military’s armour, in what became to be known as “the lost two years” (Lamb, Schmidt

and Fitzsimmons, 2009). The MRAP reassembled inventions from technical developments

in metallurgy, electronics, and advanced materials. Eventually, the cost for restoring

survivability through the MRAP program amounted to a near $50 billion in U.S. dollars

and produced more than 27,000 vehicles from an initial plan for 500 (Singer, 2012; Sisk,

2012).

The MRAP vehicles became the figure of a mobile fortification that spatialised

asymmetric warfare by attempting to establish symmetry with the IEDs. Their fortified

enclosures emphasised the separation of a safe inside and a dangerous outside, yet their

occupants (i.e., the soldiers) still had to negotiate this separation and establish sociability

with the local citizens (Chapter 5) or complement the work of mediation through training

for extreme situations (Chapter 6). Thus, we venture into the military’s world of

technology as “a most active site of progress” (Simondon, 2017, p. 31) to explore how the

MRAP as a figure of extreme human-technology relations push the cognitive, corporeal,

and material performance amidst bodies, vehicles, and terrain. We follow the technical

development of the MRAP and how it incorporates a script – a programme of actions, a

vision for survivability – that fails as much as it succeeds. The MRAP emerges as a most

suitable research object to study asymmetry through architectural and urban lenses. The

former looks at the MRAP as a fortification that protects its occupants and draws its

principles from military experience, while the latter looks at the MRAP as a vehicle that

must realise movement/mobility by terraining its environment no matter its character.

1.3 Research Aims & Objectives

Our thesis aims to study the relational politics of military technical objects,

demonstrating how urban and architectural scholars can trace the urban as a type of

associations. Its ambitious premise is situated in pragmatist studies of urban and

architectural associations among humans, their technical objects, and their environments

(Kärrholm, 2007; Yaneva, 2009b, 2010; Kärrholm, 2013, 2016; Yaneva, 2017; Mubi

Robert Gates got appointed as Secretary of Defence. The latter aggressively pushed for the rapid acquisition of the MRAP vehicles.

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Brighenti and Kärrholm, 2019; Yaneva, 2020; Mubi Brighenti and Kärrholm, 2020;

Yaneva, 2021). We plan to achieve this aim through the following research objectives:

1. Review the relevant literature on the spatialisation of warfare and militarisation,

surveying a body of research on military urbanisms and architectures from the

Architectural Humanities and Human Geography but also from the Social Sciences. To

identify the gaps, the literature is situated against a pragmatist theoretical framework of

sociotechnical associations inspired by Actor-Network Theory and Gilbert Simondon’s

philosophy of technical evolution.

2. Collect data on sociotechnical associations and technical inventions from a range of

original primary sources that have never been analysed before as such in urban and

architectural studies, complemented by secondary sources where we trace situations of

breakdown in the field.

3. Analyse the data in four moves:

a. Analyse situations of breakdown of military technologies that instigate an

improvement to the mediation of the technical object (i.e., the vehicle), be it

upon the deadly impact of IED detonations (Chapter 4) or frictions in Iraq’s

urban landscape (Chapter 5) and Afghanistan’s rural landscape (Chapter 6).

b. Unpack the realisation of the survivability script by scrutinising the

sociotechnical associations among a network of inventions in the lab, the

military institution’s work, and the soldiers and vehicles’ actions in the field.

c. Trace the concretisation (Simondon, 2017) of the vehicles as objects of

survivability and relational to their terrain, not as dialectical moves between

problems and solutions but as a continuous evolution that adapts,

oversaturates, and eventually becomes a new technical object.

d. Follow processes of terraining where the landscape (people, environment,

infrastructure) is encountered, experienced, and re-discovered through the

feedback loops of the vehicles and their success/failure to mediate

survivability.

To show how survivability becomes a disputed issue, a matter of concern, that

underpins the military’s daily functioning in war, our methods include: 1) analysing the

technical development of concrete armour concepts, materials, and technologies in utility

patents, which document resolving the armour’s antagonisms in a series of inventions; and,

2) analysing the sociotechnical associations between the soldiers and the armoured

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vehicles in military publications, governmental policy documents, and secondary sources,

which document the vehicles’ deployment in the field and the breakdowns they encounter.

1.4 Audience and Contributions

Accordingly, we argue throughout the thesis for the need to trace associations of

architectural and urban characters in the figure of the MRAP as a mobile armoured

enclosure/envelope. Our architectural training and skills to analyse and design spatial

figurations give us the ability to engage with the engineering of the MRAP and its

spatialisation of asymmetric warfare. However, and more importantly, we argue (Chapter

7) that analysing the MRAP through this method furnishes new possibilities for architects

and urbanists to address the architectural and the urban as associations, as a very specific

way of connecting people and things, and technologies and landscapes. Particularly, one

that frees our thinking from the preconceived figures – or “hylomorphisms” to stay in the

style of Simondon – of building and city, only to trace them in new figures like that of the

vehicle. By no means is this method a refutation or abandonment of the common figures;

rather, the claim recognises the extension of such associations via a lineage of technical

schemas to new figures of human practice and inhabitation. Also, this does not make a

vehicle an architectural or urban object, but it allows us to examine the architectural and

the urban as associations established in a technological era of advanced mobility. This, in

turn, allows us to explore extreme situations and their impact on building/construction and

the human body4 in the changing landscape around us, and not only in distant frontiers5.

The thesis aims to make three contributions to debates in urban studies, the

architectural humanities, and STS (Chapter 7). First, it advances the epistemological

position that survivability would not be the same without the agency of the technical

object. Second, it expands on the relational theory of the architectural and the urban as

associations crafted through armoured vehicles, extending the scope and domain of

architectural and urban studies beyond the figure of the static building. And third, it

4 An example of changing conceptions of the human body, and to stay with MRAPs and IEDs, would be the U.S. Army’s new high-tech crash test dummy WIAMan, short for Warrior Injury Assessment Manikin (Boss, 2017). It is described as “a ground-breaking anthropomorphic test device” designed specifically to test the impact of extreme detonations, like those of IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan. It measures potential skeletal, spinal, and extremity injuries via sensors embedded in 3D printed parts that simulate the human body. 5 An example of distant frontiers would be the series of events entitled Architecture in the Extreme, convened at the Architectural Association to discuss challenges for building in extreme polar environments (AA, 2019).

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answers a methodological question about how to employ technical objects to study the

spatialisation of urban warfare and terrains. All three contributions contribute to a better

understanding of a relational politics of survivability.

1.5 Thesis Structure

The thesis is structured into seven chapters: Introduction, Literature Review,

Methodology, three Empirical Chapters, and Discussion. The Introduction Chapter sets the

scene and states the aims and objectives. We begin with reviewing a body of relevant

scholarly literature against the theoretical framework of the thesis. We frame the reviewed

literature as military urbanisms and architectures, mainly drawing on “the architecture of

occupation” and other works from urbanist/architect Eyal Weizman (2002, 2003, 2006b,

2006a, 2017b) and “the new military urbanism” and other works from urbanist/geographer

Stephen Graham (2003, 2004b, 2007b, 2009, 2011, 2016). The accounts of this literature

examine the physical and socioeconomic impact of war on humans and their buildings,

cities, and infrastructure to show how militarisation organises flows across the landscape

by deploying networks of obstacles (walls, barriers, checkpoints) and surveillance

(biometric cards, electronic detection, GPS) among others. However, the accounts start

from constituted technical objects that fit into known social/power structures. This body of

work does not take into account the daily functioning of the technical objects, their

operational dynamics and breakdowns. As military technology remains static, it is often

used as a projection of social, economic, and political factors. We review the literature

against a theoretical framework that draws on STS, Actor-Network Theory, and the

philosophy of technology.

Then we outline the method for tracing the associations of survivability. Informed

by STS and ANT, the method presents a twofold strategy. A first strand to analyse how the

MRAP assembles survivability as a “script” (Akrich, 1992; Latour, 2005), or program of

actions, that regulates the impact of detonations on the vehicle and its occupants. It is

deployed to discuss how mediating the extreme terrain of detonations is sociotechnical,

i.e., scripted into the engineering of the armoured vehicle as well as the training of its

drivers and occupants. It helps conceptualise the MRAP as a highly protected and enclosed

atmospheric capsule that privileges the survivability of specific bodies and not others. A

second strand to examine how the genesis of the MRAP and its becoming a reliable

technical object for survivability is a process of “concretization” (Simondon, 2017), i.e.,

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balancing the technical functioning with its geographic environment. It helps conceptualise

the MRAP as an urban object that develops and operates relational to its urban terrain, the

urban being intensities of the built, the paved, and the infrastructural. This method allows

us to trace changes or “de-scription” (Akrich, 1992) in the first strand and processes of

increasing the “technicity” (Simondon, 2017) of the technical object in the second strand,

which is its technical capacity that relates humans to nonhumans.

Unable to be in the field of warfare, our twofold tracing method constitutes a

quasi-ethnographic approach that relies on analysing primary and secondary sources

whose combination has not been yet explored in architectural and urban studies. It is quasi-

ethnographic because it follows the actor-networks and collects observation in the publicly

accessible sources that were (and continue to be) active in shaping and informing of

military strategy and practice during the occupation of Iraq (2003-2011/present) and

Afghanistan (2001-2014/present). The primary sources include utility patents, military

references and studies, governmental regulations, and video material, while the secondary

ones include second-hand accounts of events or primary sources, such as news articles,

reports, commercial brochures, and websites. We equally trace technological change across

all sources, be they military or commercial, taking into consideration how the specialised

lens of each domain and source type frames the matter at hand. The approach grants us a

way of “being there” and grasping the field.

This brings us to the three empirical chapters that we structure by the types of

breakdowns and the sources to trace them in. The first (Chapter 4) analyses the assembling

of the MRAP vehicle as a survivability script against combat-related breakdowns (i.e.,

detonations) through a series of inventions and as documented in utility patents. The

second (Chapter 5) and third (Chapter 6) analyse the adaptation of the MRAP vehicle

against non-combat related breakdowns upon deployment to urban and rural terrains and as

found in military publications, governmental documents, and secondary sources.

In Chapter 4, entitled “Engineering the Military Script,” we explore the complex

technical and geographic relations that inform “scripting” the MRAP for survivability. We

trace the “concretization” (Simondon, 2017) of the MRAP, which is the resolving of

tensions between its technical and geographic milieus/environments as it develops from an

inert protective enclosure centred around a passive human body to an active body-vehicle-

terrain machine. Instead of a conventional cross-patent analysis to trace innovation

patterns, we analyse “major and minor improvements” (Simondon, 2017), the former being

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fully integrated primary changes that discontinue/mutate the technical object and the latter

being non-integrated secondary changes that maintain the technical object. These

improvements constitute the military’s feedback loops of experiencing an extreme

environment of detonations during mobility in their endeavour to maintain survivability.

We analyse different aspects of the MRAP script and its dynamic engineering in seventeen

utility patents and four patent applications, published between 2005 (the initial request date

for MRAP vehicles) and 2017 (the most recent technical development).

The patents allow us to identify how the associations between the soldiers’ bodies

and the MRAP, and those between the MRAP and its terrain, evolve and transform. They

evolve from topographic notions of Euclidean space and inside-outside separation to

topological ones of feedback loops, flows, and distributed agencies between humans and

nonhumans. With the evolving associations, the bodies of the soldiers transform from

passive receivers of the impact of terrain to active mediators of its impact, complementing

the mediation of the vehicles. We introduce the active process of terraining, which is the

making of terrain, and argue that this is a useful translation between military and academic

communities of practice: 1) to understand how the urban, as a theoretical category, is

performed as intensities of terraining through the mediation of technical objects; and 2) to

trace how versions of terrain script and stabilise the technical object.

In Chapter 5, entitled “Electric Streets, Fortress Highways,” we examine how the

military’s MRAP script gets “de-scripted” upon breakdowns in Iraq. The military

encounters the urban landscape as infrastructural intensities of narrow streets, low-hanging

power lines, overhead clearances, and relations with civilians. The chapter analyses how

the MRAP stacks technical devices and compresses the space of survivability to a bounded

interior, asking the following questions: How does the MRAP encounter the urban? How

does it relate to the locals/civilians? How does the military figure survivability relational to

urban infrastructural intensities? And how does the MRAP relate to different versions of

the urban landscape as it circulates between the warzone in Iraq and the home front in the

U.S.? We follow the MRAPs upon their fielding in Iraq (since 2007) and later upon their

return to the U.S. (after 2012) through tracing breakdown situations of electrical shocks,

signal jamming, and road safety upon frictions with various infrastructural networks. Our

sources are military publications (briefings, field manuals, guidance, handbooks, strategy,

techniques), Department of Defense reports, Department of Transportation pamphlets,

Army news articles and professional bulletins, and commercial defence brochures. We

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argue that the military reassembles various dimensions of warfare through the MRAP and

relational to survivability in non-combat related urban situations.

Examining the specificity of the MRAP script and the deployment of the vehicles

in Iraq (and later in Afghanistan) leads us to find what happens upon the end of military

operations. As the MRAPs return to the U.S., we follow how the military subscribes to a

different set of concerns about public safety and defence readiness that submit the MRAP

to new mobility restrictions. We introduce this lens to show how the technical object stops

mediating survivability against IEDs and electrical shocks to realise a different version of

an urban landscape. In the U.S., the military’s MRAP becomes a truck6 that must abide by

the federal transportation regulations, including becoming a heavy artefact that must be

transported by other trucks.

In Chapter 6, entitled “Breathing in an Upside-down World,” we examine how the

MRAP script gets “de-scripted” upon breakdowns in Afghanistan, and we follow the

military as it adapts regional/rural variants of the vehicles to non-urban intensities. The

military encounters the rural as the lack of infrastructure, paved roads, and flat surfaces.

Instead, the rural to the MRAP is defined by its irregular surfaces, soft soil, and risk of

falling into bodies of water. The chapter analyses how the survivability script cuts across

bodily, architectural/vehicular, and urban/landscape scales as it expands the testing,

simulation, and training requirements for the MRAP, asking the following questions: How

does the MRAP encounter the rural? How does a land vehicle operate relational to water?

And how does the MRAP recruit the human body to become an active part of the technical

object? We follow the MRAPs upon fielding their Iraq-versions to Afghanistan (since

2008) then upon adaptations for an Afghanistan-version (since 2010), tracing breakdown

situations of rollover, drowning, and bodily traumas during encounters with rugged terrain.

Besides the sources used in Chapter 5, additional sources for this chapter include military

publications (risk assessment, medical reports, test operation procedures), Congressional

reports, and military training videos. We argue that the military reassembles further

dimensions of asymmetric warfare through the MRAP, this time by differentiating the rural

from the urban as intensities of the lack of infrastructure and relational to a terraining

process that enrols human bodies to co-mediate with the MRAP.

6 The analysis of this aspect does not cover the transfer of the MRAP to Law Enforcement Agencies like the Police, which is the scope for another study.

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Unlike the breakdowns in Iraq, examining Afghanistan’s terrain uncovers a more

intense form of sociotechnical relations between the MRAP and its users. The direct

impact on the MRAP’s occupants (i.e., drowning) expands the analysis from the MRAP

vehicle as the only technical object of survivability into another technical object, the

MRAP Egress Trainer. This lens shows the emergence of a new technical individual, what

Simondon theorises as “individuation” (2017).

Finally, the Discussion Chapter brings the research findings together and

discusses three research contributions to STS, urban studies, and the architectural

humanities: 1) how survivability becomes a concern for the spatialisation of urban warfare;

2) how the armoured vehicles craft associations of an architectural character with their

occupants and associations of an urban character with their environment; and, 3) how our

method for tracing these associations explains a relational politics of survivability through

human-nonhuman interdependency. The thesis concludes by reflecting on the politics of

survivability through Simondon’s philosophy of equality between human beings and

technical beings (2017) and its implications to our thinking method as urban and

architectural researchers. To avoid static notions of space as a container of constituted

technical objects (i.e., artefacts), and to escape situating military thought within larger

explanatory frameworks imposed from the outside, we ought to give more attention to the

way military technologies operate and how by so doing they instigate new spatial

compositions between humans and nonhumans, and technical and geographic realities.

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Chapter 2

Literature Review: Military Urbanisms

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2.0 Introduction

In the introduction, we raised three empirical problems with armoured military

vehicles, which increasingly shape our understanding of how military technologies reduce

the urban, primarily to something to be survived. First, the vehicles as inventions produced

by the military and their engineering, and documented in utility patents, are different

objects from those that operate in the urban landscape. This is evident in the combat-

related and non-combat related breakdowns that the MRAPs sustain, despite their superior

engineering (Chapter 4), once deployed for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Chapters 5

and 6). Second, the vehicles as mobile envelopes enclose the bodies of soldiers to protect

them through a relation of symmetry. This is evident in the MRAPs’ fortified design

against the disproportionate threat of IEDs to soldiers’ bodies and vehicles (Chapter 4),

which gives urban/irregular warfare its asymmetric character. Third, the vehicles as

technical objects evolve through a process of reducing the urban landscape (as an external

environment) to functional synergies (within the technical object) whose aim is to realise

survivability. This is evident in the military’s focus on the MRAPs relations with paved

roads and infrastructure in Iraq (Chapter 5) and with unpaved roads and irregular terrain in

Afghanistan (Chapter 6). Thus, the feedback loops that circulate between the processes of

invention (in the patents and the workshops) and the landscapes7 of operations (in Iraq and

Afghanistan) are not absolute flows of exchange between known military objects and

bounded landscapes. The technical object, i.e., the MRAP, raises the question of how the

military and their engineering spatialise survivability and mobility through human-

nonhuman associations and coordinate the MRAP vehicle as multiple versions of an object

and different reductions of a landscape8.

To address the research aims and answer the research questions, we review the

literature on military urbanisms and architectures in Human Geography, Urbanism, and

Architectural Studies in the first part of the chapter (2.1). This literature from what could

be called interdisciplinary urban studies examines military urbanisms and architectures as

structures of control over space and territory (Graham, 2011, 2016; Weizman, 2017b). We

begin with reviewing recent literature that posit the urban as a medium and study technical

7 We borrow the “military landscapes” approach from geographer Rachel Woodward (2014) to refer to the extended geographies shaped by militarisation and viewed through military visions across Iraq, Afghanistan, the U.S., and the world. This landscape includes urban, rural, and other figurations. 8 Another notion of the landscape that we employ is the entirety of place (natural, built, inhabited), similar to philosopher of science Peter Galison’s notion of “technical lands/landscapes” and landscape architect/urbanist Pierre Belanger’s “landscape as infrastructure” (2017).

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objects as parts of networks/systems designed to intervene on/in that medium. While their

networks are lively and dynamic, the politics of such military urbanisms and architectures

is socially constructed and objects black-boxed, through conceptual lenses like

Haussmannisation and verticality. Their premise of the military as an established power

misses what underpins such discourse, particularly survivability.

Accordingly, we recognise a gap in studying the politics of militarisation at the

scale of objects as socially constructed artefacts and technological black boxes9 rather than

in relation to their landscapes not as context but as a ground of technical relations. Through

its stable objects that do not evolve or breakdown except through and according to the

social structures that produce them, militarisation’s relation to and impact on the built

environment – as conveyed in the literature – dismisses the complexity of technological

change as a human-nature relation in favour for grand social narratives and explanations.

Thus, the survivability lens flattens the epistemological plane to research humans (military

and civilians) and nonhumans (technical objects and landscapes). It allows us to bridge the

gap in two ways: first, by studying a military practice of spatialising survivability through

the reduction of the landscape (what we call terraining in Chapters 4-6); and second, by

uncovering a politics and knowledge based in technics (after Simondon, 2017), among the

technical objects, the terrain/landscape, engineering and the military.

To address the gap, we draw our theoretical framework from the philosophy of

technology of Gilbert Simondon (Combes, 2012; De Boever et al., 2012; Simondon, 2017)

and the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) inspired Science and Technology Studies (STS),

particularly the sociology of innovation (Callon, 1986b; Law, 1987; MacKenzie, 1989;

Akrich, 1992; Latour, 1992, 1996a; de Laet and Mol, 2000; Law, 2002; Akrich et al.,

2002a, 2002b; Latour, 2004b, 2005; MacKenzie, 2012) in the second part of the chapter

(2.2). While our urbanist-architectural inquiry into technical objects and the built

environment has a sociological character, we employ philosophy to help us probe an

“empirical metaphysics” (see Latour, 2005, pp. 50–51) of beings and agencies in accounts

of making, displacing, and mutating. The theories and concepts of this literature look at

objects, users, and inventions as processes of assembling networks of dynamic human and

nonhuman actors, through associations among the actors and their milieu (spatial,

9 Our use of the term “black box” follows Latour’s pragmatist-realist notion of the invisibility of technical and scientific work upon its success in an apparatus (see Glossary in Latour, 1999b, p. 304), thus focusing on its input/output unless it breaks down. Compare this to a hybrid materialist-phenomenological notion of a symbol/signifier “black box of the world… that can never be opened” (Galloway, 2010, 2018).

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temporal, geographic). Unlike urban STS which is focused on infrastructural materialities

(Graham and Marvin, 2001), Simondon’s philosophy develops a theory of coming-into-

being and the ANT-STS advances theories of sociotechnical relations and flat ontologies.

2.1 Military Urbanisms and Architectures

The crossover between the military and the civilian applications of advanced technology – between the surveillance and control of everyday life in Western cities and the prosecution of aggressive colonial and resource wars – is at the heart of a much broader set of trends that characterize the new military urbanism. (Graham, 2011, p. xiii)

The various inhabitants of this frontier do not operate within the fixed envelopes of space – space is not the background for their actions, an abstract grid on which events take place – but rather the medium that each of their actions seeks to challenge, transform or appropriate. (Weizman, 2017b, p. 7)

Today, militarisation is ubiquitous. It is in discourse, politics, security, war,

technology, health, education, and everyday life. The term10 is generally used as a

descriptor to imply military or military-style discursive and practical influences. It has

become synonymous with different strategies, policies, and practices spilling over from

military to non-military domains. This includes11: the expansion of military authority and

dominion (Lutz, 2002b, 2009b; Woodward, 2005, 2014), the transfer and adaptation of

military technologies (Gregory, 2004; Graham, 2011; Cowen, 2014), and the diffusion of

military strategies and tactics (Graham, 2011; Weizman, 2017b; Khalili, 2020). To escape

modern binaries, the spill over process is problematised as an intensified blurriness and/or

looseness between the boundaries of military and civilian institutions and technologies.

The key theoretical and operational terms in this crucial matter still encompass

stabilised definitions of old and new processes: militarism is the ideology for prioritising

armed violence (e.g., post-911 war strategy); militarisation is the process of

operationalising militarism (e.g., funding university research to advance military

technology); military describes the formal/professional armed forces (e.g., the U.S. Army

and Marine Corps); and, militarised describes anything that has been controlled by a

militaristic ideology and practice (e.g., U.S. ports/borders and the invaded territories of

10 Originating from the Latin mīles which denotes traversing distance (Kent, 1910), an understanding rooted in mobility and terrain. 11 The current field is much more expansive into gender (Cowen and Gilbert, 2008), care (Wool, 2015), costs (Crawford, 2013), testing (Martini, 2017) and more, but beyond the scope of this research.

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Iraq and Afghanistan). This renders militarisation what Latour calls a “matter of fact”

(2005): a universal phenomenon whose nature is readily recognised and stabilised to

explain social relations, economic policies, and war strategies, which in turn makes it

difficult to imagine or experience any way out of this overwhelming social construction.

But how does this “matter of fact” persist or become a “matter of concern,” to use Latour’s

terms (2005), in the literature on militarisation of the built environment?

2.1.1 Spatialising Urban Warfare

This study is situated within the early aughts wars on Iraq and Afghanistan when

military doctrine – spearheaded by the U.S. and embraced by NATO12 – witnessed a major

shift from strategies of air superiority in the 1990s to combat in urban areas in the 2000s

(Chapter 1). The shift in the scale of warfare from air dominance13 during the First Gulf

War, the Bosnian War, and the Kosovo War to urban, asymmetric, and irregular warfare in

Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan, among others14, has been a gradual one in the making.

After WWII, the military’s revived interest in urban areas as the next battlefield started

taking shape in the 1970s upon the end of the Vietnam War and fears of urban wars with

the Warsaw Pact in Europe. It was designated MOBA in the U.S. Army’s report Military

Operations in Built-Up Areas (MOBA) (Renier et al., 1979), and later redesignated MOUT

in the U.S. Army’s field manual FM 90-10 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain

(MOUT) (U.S. Army, 1979).

But it was not until the early 1990s and in the aftermath of a post-Soviet world

that urban warfare in its current version15 became a real probability to the military. Upon

the U.S. military’s unforeseen losses in the Battle of Mogadishu (Somalia) and the Russian

military’s in the Battle of Grozny (Chechnya), the RAND Corporation released its

formative study Combat in Hell: A Consideration of Constrained Urban Warfare,

declaring that “FM 90-10 … the U.S. Army’s keystone urban warfare manual, relies on

World War II tactics generally ill-suited to situations requiring minimisation of non-

combatant and infrastructure losses” (Glenn, 1996, p. vii). It emphasised the primacy of the

urban as a “terrain [that] confronts military commanders with a synergism of difficulties

rarely found in other environments” (Glenn, 1996, p. viii). Accordingly, it underscored the

12 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 13 See Graham on the doctrine of Revolution in Military Affairs (2007b) 14 What geographer Derek Gregory theorises as “the everywhere war” (2011b) 15 As an individual type of warfare not a subset of total war or larger military operations

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value of increasing military survivability and reducing civilian and infrastructural losses

against this “synergism of difficulties” which we will examine in the empirical analysis as

antagonisms (Chapters 4-6).

This focus prevails in the succeeding military publications, and their updates,

confirming not only a new type of warfare and technologies of control but more

importantly a practice of reduction that reproduces reductionist versions of a landscape –

be it urban, rural, or other16, which facilitates the military’s control and survivability. As

we argue and demonstrate in the empirical analysis (Chapters 4-6), this is better understood

as a dynamic and relational process of terraining, i.e., the making of terrain17, where the

landscape gets reduced to antagonisms to be negotiated, mitigated, and/or survived. Rather

than a static, known terrain, terraining becomes a process for making “what was once an

obstacle … become the means of realization” (Simondon, 2017, pp. 32–33). We employ it

as an analytical tool (see Nilsson, 2019, p. 145) to trace this realisation between the

materiality of the antagonisms and the humans/nonhumans’ work to negotiate it, as we

shall see in the analysis.

This is evident in publications that we shall examine later in the analysis

(Chapters 4-6) like the Marine Corps’ 1998 doctrine Military Operations on Urbanized

Terrain (MOUT) and the 1999 intelligence report Marine Corps Urban Warfare Study:

City Case Studies Compilation. The latter featured three sections collecting case studies in

modern urban warfare from the 1990s “Russian experience in Chechnya,” the 1980s

“Israel’s intervention into Lebanon,” and the 1970s “British experience in Northern

Ireland.” And publications like the Army’s field manuals of 2002 Combined Arms

Operations in Urban Terrain (updated from 1993 version), 2006 Urban Operations

(updated from 2003 version), and 2006 Counterinsurgency (updated from 2004 and 1980

versions). This brief contextual overview, which merits its own separate study, sets the

ground for understanding how the urban re-enters the military’s concerns and spatialises

16 The U.S. military’s understanding of the urbanised landscape is varied. To name the key ones: MOUT is concerned with the urban as a general type of densely built and populated human areas; the Department of Defense’s Law of War Manual (Office of General Council, 2015) addresses types like cities, towns, and villages; the Chief of Staff’s Megacities and the United State Army (Harris et al., 2014) addresses the megacity as type; and, the doctrine The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 addresses the urban as part of a multi-layered land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace hybrid (Training and Doctrine Command, 2018). 17 We ground our idea in a similar line of thought from Latour’s “spacing” (1996c), i.e., the making of space, and Yaneva’s “architecture in the making,” which draws on “science in the making” from STS studies (for a literature review, see Yaneva, 2009b).

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their understanding of an urban terrain through a practice of reduction and as found18 in

military publications on urban/asymmetric/irregular warfare.

2.1.2 Militarised Notions of the Urban

The renewed military interest in the urban and their reorganised spatialisation19,

or “spacing” as Latour styles it (1996c), of warfare extended the platform for an academic

literature critical of these military doctrines and strategies and focused on its socio-spatial,

political economic, and geopolitical dimensions. The 2000s and 2010s witnessed a growth

of critical accounts, particularly20 is human geography (Graham, 2003, 2004b, 2004c;

Gregory, 2004; Graham, 2005, 2006a, 2007b, 2008; Cowen and Gilbert, 2008; Graham,

2009, 2011; Gregory, 2011b, 2011a; Graham, 2012; Cowen, 2014), urbanism (Easterling,

1999, 2016; Sorkin, 2005, 2008; Brenner, 2014; Bélanger and Arroyo, 2016), and

architecture (Weizman, 2002, 2003; Misselwitz and Weizman, 2003; Weizman, 2006b,

2006a, 2011, 2017b), which exposed the atrocities of war and expanded our understanding

of the workings of our contemporary urbanities. The accounts formed a body of literature

on current military urbanisms and architectures, differentiating – but not distancing – itself

from historical studies of the 20th century’s World Wars and wars of independence.

The concern with the urban featured in this literature through the analysis of

technologies, objects, strategies, and networks of militarisation, and how they influence the

urban environment itself. Two key empirical and theoretical strands characterised this body

of literature. A first is the extension and application of the concept of Haussmannisation

(almost a recurring motif in critical urban theory21) drawing on the political economy and

socio-spatial strategies of 19th century public works in Paris. A second is the influence of

the socio-spatial theories of philosopher and historian Michel Foucault on technologies of

18 Similar to architect Alison Smithson’s as found method of collecting for her scrap book (see Boyer, 2017) 19 We use this formulation to show spatialisation as a process rather than the managerial/logistical formulations “organization … of space” and “reorganization of the geography,” used by Weizman (2017b, p. 7) and Graham (2011, pp. 87–88) respectively. 20 Although it is not the main focus for our study of urbanism, we also mention here literature that informs our thinking process from anthropology (Lutz, 2002a, 2002b, 2004, 2009a, 2009b) and international politics/relations (Bousquet, Grove and Shah, 2017; Khalili, 2020). 21 The available critical theoretical perspective on “the urban” mainly expands on its Lefebvrian notion as the reality of post-industrial society, which changed its modes of production, consumption, and habitation. Thus, critical urban studies have been concerned with debunking the workings of capitalist processes, even if their epistemologies changed (Farías and Bender, 2011; Brenner and Schmid, 2015). This was evident in the City journal’s debate between advocates of critical urban theory (Brenner, 2009; Brenner, Madden and Wachsmuth, 2011) and those of assemblage urbanism (Farías, 2011; McFarlane, 2011). The debate fell into quasi-ideological arguments between different epistemologies (structural vs. assemblage) fighting under similar anti-capitalist political philosophies.

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control and biopolitics. The two strands crosscut this body of literature, sometimes one

strand more dominant than the other.

The concept of Haussmannisation in the geographical and architectural literature

is a recurrent22 theme and a paradigm that establishes the urban as a medium. Referencing

Baron Haussmann’s public works of spatial and infrastructural rearrangement of 19th

century Paris, hence the name, urban studies employ this concept to explain modern

military and military-style interventions on the urban environment (Gregory, 1994;

Benjamin, 1999; Graham and Marvin, 2001; Lefebvre, 2003; Harvey, 2006; Graham,

2011; Cowen, 2014; Weizman, 2017b). The concept is employed to instrumentally explain

how the urban landscape23 becomes a space for top-down, state-industry-military,

infrastructure-resource master planning that cuts through the dense urban fabric to create

corridors of mobility, visibility, and real-estate exchange values. It is rarely addressed as a

plan that has changed, persisted, or been contested (cf. Jordan, 2004). It is presented as a

meta-strategy of a capitalist political economy and territorial imaginary that renders the

urban landscape physically porous and penetrable24, which achieves a dual objective: 1)

facilitate military mobility to control insurrection and 2) circulate/reproduce capital

through the destruction/reconstruction25 of the built environment, what Harvey coins “the

urbanization of capital” (Harvey, 1985). This renders the landscape a medium where the

state, the military, the industrialists, and the elite re/figure social, economic, and cultural

relations through direct interventions on the landscape.

Haussmannisation in the literature usually goes hand in hand with another

paradigmatic account of the urban, which endows the latter with militaristic character.

Baron Haussmann’s spatial modernisation strategies in Paris were inspired by Marshal

Thomas Robert Bugeaud’s colonial military strategies26 in 19th century Algeria (Misselwitz

and Weizman, 2003; Graham, 2004a, p. 36; Cowen, 2014, p. 190). This historical and

22 “Urbicide” is another paradigmatic theme and theoretical framework in urbanism (Graham, 2003; Misselwitz and Weizman, 2003; Andrew, 2007) and political theory (see special issue edited by Coole et al., 2007; Coward, 2009), although its theories are more grounded in international law, politics, and relations. 23 The literature applies this concept all the way from industrial to contemporary urbanities and cities 24 Michel Foucault’s genealogy of economic liberalism provides another explanation of why cities physically opened-up and abandoned their medieval walls to realise the extension of their networks and connectivity beyond the limitations of physical and juridical limits (see Foucault et al., 2009). 25 The conceptual framework of Haussmannisation later extends in the literature to describe modern planning, reconstruction, and regeneration projects of cities and city centres (Schubert and Sutcliffe, 1996; Rodgers, 2012; Merrifield, 2014). 26 Described as “the first” manual on urban warfare, Bugeaud’s treatise La Guerre des Rues et des Maisons (The War of Streets and Houses) was published in 1847, Paris, upon Bugeaud’s return from his post as Governor-General of French Colonial Algeria where he applied his tactics to control local insurrection.

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theoretical connection between Bugeaud and Haussmann lays the ground for the

contemporary literature on military urbanisms and architectures to read Haussmannisation

as both an economic-military project and a ricochet of colonial practices from the

periphery to the centre (i.e., from the colonies to the West). Despite the theoretical and

methodological nuances of the literature, the first reading subscribes to a structural

analysis, through an economic focus on space making, and grounds its theory in

epistemologies of capitalist production and ordering (Castells, 1979; Lefebvre, 2003;

Graham, 2011; Brenner, 2014; Merrifield, 2014). The second reading aligns with the socio-

spatial theory of philosopher and historian Michel Foucault on “the boomerang effect” 27

(2003, p. 103) that has shown how technologies of control in colonisation

policies/strategies have been bouncing from the colonies back to the West since the 16th

century.

These readings establish the urban as a medium for actions to take place in or

through it. They put too much emphasis on the economic lens and on systems of power as

socially constructed and absolute hierarchies, predetermining what the social and the

spatial are. Such approach is evident in human geography when Graham asserts28 that the

urban as an infrastructural reality is “the very nature of the modern city … [that creates]

the possibility of violence against it, and through it” (2011, p. xxiv original emphasis), as

in the case of switching off the power supply in Iraq in 1991/2003 and Kosovo in 1999

(2005). It is also evident in architectural research when Weizman notes how the political

actions of the military and militarised civilians (i.e., Israeli settlers) become “fully

absorbed in the organization, transformation, erasure and subversion of space” (2017b, p.

7) where “urbanity [provides] not the theatre of war but its very weapons and ammunition”

(2003). The notion became most notable in Weizman’s work on the military “walking

through walls” (Weizman, 2006b) as they tunnel through the built fabric (thus, inverting

the solid-void diagram (see Weizman, 2006a)) to get to the combatants and supress them.

27 The notion of “boomerang effect” is derived from Michel Foucault’s observation that colonisation practices bounce, like a boomerang, from the colonies to their Western colonial seats (2003, p. 103). 28 In his attempt to describe how strategic and geopolitical concerns informed city/urban planning of the Cold War, Graham parallels “white flight to the suburbs” with the military decentralisation of people, urbanisation, and industries, and he references philosopher of science Peter Galison’s “through the bombardier’s eye” expression (2011, p. 14). In fact, Galison’s analysis (2001) assertively starts from bombs and how their impact informs not only decentralisation but distributed networks, which is more likely to be, we claim, the milieu that facilitated (not paralleled) sprawl and “white flight.” For another example on the complexity and failure of distributed protocols and processes, see Derek Gregory’s account of drone strikes in “From a View to a Kill” (2011a).

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While Haussmannisation is concerned with refiguring the urban environment into

an effective and efficient space of flow, mobility, and control, the literature dismisses the

available/projected capabilities and limitations of the technical relations at the core of

realising these processes, and with them the many versions of the urban including its

military reductionist ones. To think through technics (see theoretical framework in 2.2.3)

with Simondon (2017), mid-19th century Paris was not a mere medium of buildings waiting

to be cut through; its public works corresponded to technical relations and objects of

“thermodynamics ensembles.” On the other hand, modern day urbanities are not mere

mediums of urban warfare waiting to be razed or walked through, but they correspond to

technical relations as landscapes of “electrotechnic ensembles” (this is what Chapters 4-6

will discuss about Iraq and Afghanistan). Without considering such energy exchanges,

Haussmannisation remains a flat planar theory contrary to what its proponents set out to

refute (see 2.1.3). Moreover, the literature predominantly conflates the military, the

civilian, and the economic as part of larger social structures that it later reproduces into, as

geographer Deborah Cowen argues, “the modern binary of military/civilian and

public/private violence, even as it is being questioned or contested” (2014, p. 187).

This takes us back full circle to what the methodologies of this body of literature

treat less favourably. The empirical sources of the academic literature on military

urbanisms and architectures seldom tap into architecture and urbanism (i.e., the

militarisation of the landscape) as found in military publications, and without “added”

social explanations (Latour, 2005, p. 100). Among such key publications are the field

manuals, introduced in the previous section (2.1.1), documenting versions of the landscape

that the military have already been iteratively dissecting, decoding, and reducing relative to

the developments of their technical objects’ capabilities, their soldiers’ training and

survivability, and the landscape’s increasing urban complexity. Take for example the

physical reductions (i.e., buildings, blocks, urban typologies, floor layouts, locations of

openings, construction materials, debris, confined spaces, lines of sight, dead space,

projectile paths) in Field Manual FM 3-06.11 Combined Arms Operations in Urban

Terrain (U.S. Army, 2002) and “the urban perspective” in Field Manual FM 3-06 Urban

Operations (U.S. Army, 2006b), which we shall examine later in the analysis (Chapters 4-

6). These and other military publications scarcely appear in the literature except for limited

instances (e.g., Graham, 2007a, 2012; Weizman, 2017b). In contrast, the field manual is

mobilised as key empirical source in anthropological literature on militarisation (see

González, 2007, 2010, 2012) to analyse how the ethnographic content of the manuals

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aligns with recruiting civilian anthropologists into the military’s Human Terrain

counterinsurgency program.

These social constructivist explanations of militarisation and the spatialisation of

urban warfare are predominant in the literature; however, there are exceptions that

approach the landscape as the object of militarisation where politics is always in tension

and figured through a contestation of shaping flows and continuities. It is a tension built

into the process of urbanisation itself as a mode of territorialisation that weaponises the

urban of one group against that of another. This is particularly evident in architectural

research on militarisation whose compositional methods of architecture prioritise the

processes of territorialising (see Mubi Brighenti and Kärrholm, 2020), rather than study

territories as entities and outcomes. This politics of tension is emphasised in the works of

architect/urbanist Eyal Weizman and geographer/urbanist Stephen Graham who argue that

the urban is not a backdrop or theatre for war but its very own medium.

2.1.3 Cross-sectional Views

The literature on military urbanisms and architectures theorises the urban as

volumetric, three-dimensional physical environments against the flatness of orthogonal,

two-dimensional map projections and aerial photography. It implies a shift in vision (i.e.,

the way of seeing) and imaginary (i.e., the way of thinking) from a top, flat29, planar view

to an oblique, multi-dimensional, sectional view. It is a view of the urban – or the

landscape in general – and the territory as stacked layers of human physical interventions.

The literature presents two pivotal concepts: “the new military urbanism” (Graham, 2011)

in Human Geography, and “the architecture of occupation” (Weizman, 2017b) in

Architectural Studies. Both are mantras for scholars of critical urban and military studies

investigating the militarisation and securitisation of urban environments.

In the “politics of verticality” and the “geometry of occupation” (2002, 2003),

Weizman demonstrates how the military as a state institution devises strategic

“splintering” – to use Graham and Marvin’s concept (2001) – of territory through

landscape planning and urban/architectural design. This is the case of how the Israeli

military splinters the occupied Palestinian territories into an archipelago of settlements

29 This extends to criticisms of “flat mapping illustration” (Graham, 2016, p. 8) of contemporary urban theories like planetary urbanization at Harvard’s Urban Theory Lab.

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dis/connected by another splintering of the three-dimensional infrastructural landscape of

roads, tunnels, and flyovers into a six-dimensional one (i.e., three Palestinian and three

Israeli). Thus, the organisation of the landscape itself realises ethnonationalist

discriminatory policies that modulate flows, and it extends the domain to a volumetric and

deep architecture of occupation (i.e. land, sea, air), which Weizman skilfully terms “the

vertical apartheid” (2017b, pp. x–xiii).

The originality of this critical-materialist approach is twofold. First, it adeptly

uses architectural terminology, with influences from human geography, to decode – or as

Weizman styles it: “delaminate” – the spatialisation of violent militarised severing30 of

landscape and territory. It frames militarisation and its organisation of the landscape as

“the architecture of occupation” (Weizman, 2017b), where architecture means: built

physical structures and “political issues as constructed realities” (2017b, p. 6). The depth of

this “architectural project” (2017b, p. xvi) is analysed in cross-section as four functions: 1)

dividing the territory into three “political floors:” surface, subsoil, and airspace; 2)

“territorial stratification” with a legal apparatus for land grab; 3) a “three-dimensional

complexity: a mesh of separated roadways that connect islands to islands and enclaves to

enclaves;” and, 4) extending the section down all the way to geology (see Preface and

Introduction in Weizman, 2017b, pp. x–16). The landscape is read as walls, optics,

frontiers, checkpoints, hilltops, stone cladding, concrete31, and construction methods.

Second, it examines practices of militarisation relationally and in flux. Networks of

humans and nonhumans, soldiers and militants/civilians, Israelis and Palestinians

assemble, disassemble, and reassemble over constantly negotiated physical borders and

boundaries, which form a “political plastic” (Weizman, 2017b, pp. 5, 87–109, 161–182).

Such expanded perspective of the landscape conveys an urbanist lens grounded in

architectural thinking, where the landscape – regardless of its type: urban, rural, suburban,

or frontier – becomes a built stack (i.e., underground, ground, overground) relating the

three terrestrial mediums (i.e., land, water, air).

Weizman’s architectural-urbanist lens expands the field of architectural research

not only into militarisation but to a theoretical strand on using the analytical and empirical

units of fields that study the built environment (i.e., architecture, urban design, landscape

30 See also “territoriological approach” and “sites of walling” in “Introduction: The life of walls – in urban, spatial and political theory” (Mubi Brighenti and Kärrholm, 2019, pp. 1–16) 31 For a study of materialities of cement and concrete in occupied Palestine, see Samir Harb’s doctoral thesis Imaginary and Autonomy: Urbanisation, Construction, and Cement Production in Palestine (2020)

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architecture, and planning) to study the impact of the military and militarisation on the

landscape (see Forensic Architecture, 2014; Weizman, 2015; Weizman and Sheikh, 2015;

Bélanger and Arroyo, 2016; Weizman, 2017a; Carver, 2018; Kripa and Mueller, 2020).

However, we depart from this approach of reading of the landscapes of military operations

in our empirical analysis as it largely remains a Critical urbanistic approach, which

attributes power to the military institution and engage less with the paradigms and

practices of fields that study the built environment (cf. Bélanger, 2009) and produce these

landscapes. It describes the apparatus of occupation after the fact but not how its technical

thought and objects evolve (cf. Ashworth, 2003; Langins, 2004) relationally, and its notion

of “political plastic” remains dialectical and centred around the intentions of the actors

(occupier/occupied) rather than evolving/becoming as “territorial stabilizations”

(Kärrholm, 2007, 2013, 2016) assembling around bodies (Nilsson, 2019).

Scholarship in human geography crosses paths with architectural studies on

militarisation, particularly in Graham’s conceptual framework of “the new military

urbanism” (2011). It is a framework to read the contemporary urban condition and the

spatialisation of urban warfare through “military dreams of high-tech omniscience” (2011,

p. xi) and “high-tech means of consumption and mobility” (2011, p. xiii), which – Graham

argues – protect and sustain global, neoliberal capitalism. The new32 qualifier in Graham’s

concept distinguishes33 the “contemporary militarization of urban life” from that of the 20th

century’s total wars, i.e., the World Wars, and global geopolitical tensions , i.e., the Cold

War (2011, p. 61). The circulation of people, ideas, and technical objects in this

contemporary urban landscape operate under the Global North’s colonial/imperial

hegemony over the Global South, where military typologies (e.g., green zones, bases, and

prisons) define the wider civilian urban landscape (e.g., financial districts, embassies,

consumption spaces, ports, and stadiums).

Similar to “the architecture of occupation,” the geographical lens into military

urbanisms critically examines “the radical reorganization of the geography and experience

of borders and boundaries” (2011, pp. 87–88). It advances an epistemology of the urban

landscape as a stack of architectures: systems, information, and infrastructure. It favours

the construction of a “ubiquitous border” (similar to the frontier concept in Weizman) that

32 One observation here is how Graham draws the connections between the schemas of the new military urbanism and 19th century Haussmannisation, but not with those of medieval military urbanisms. 33 This counts for an interesting distinction against what historian of technology Janis Langins notes on how engineering always meant military engineering and the civilian differentiation only became necessary, and historically separated the fields, with architecture (2004, p. 37).

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connects “the infrastructural architectures of a global network of cities and economic

enclaves rather than the territorial limits demarcating nation-states” (2011, p. 77). And it

realises new state spaces of militant and urbicidal violence. It accounts for five key

features of urbanism (2011, pp. xi–xxx): 1) sites of everyday urban life become

battlespaces; 2) security operations circulate between home and warzone (“Foucault’s

Boomerang”); 3) surveillance figures a political economy; 4) the urban environment

becomes the medium of urban warfare; and, 5) popular culture and public life gets

militarised.

Developing from “splintering urbanism”(Graham and Marvin, 2001), “the new

military urbanism” evolves, in turn, and develops its lens on the politics of verticality

(Graham, 2016). It shares some explanations with the architectural research discussed

earlier, although its scope expands to include – and mix – militarisation with trade,

economy, industry, excavation, and technology. This is evident when Graham (2016)

follows suit with Weizman and argues for a critical vertical politics based on three-

dimensional, cross-sectional, and volumetric analytical views of the terrestrial domains

(i.e. land, water, and air), against planar imaginaries of flatness. Sites and technologies

gain a vertical epistemology: they are categorised to above (i.e., satellites, bombers,

drones, helicopters, sky trains, cable cars in favelas, elevators, and skyscrapers) and below

(i.e., basements, sewers, bunkers, mines, and landfills). Yet unlike “the architecture of

occupation” that is concerned with militarisation, Graham’s human geographical approach

claims to be an ambitious project to study the vertical as a modern phenomenon of stacking

and stratifying. Vertical politics is no more exclusive to a politics of violent separation; it

expands to the domains of “dense and stacked” human societies (2016, p. 4), “vertically

highly stratified” sites and structures (2016, p. 14), and objects that move vertically. In

other words, we understand it as a study34 of vertical sprawl.

Yet, this approach remains heavily social constructivist and anthropocentric where

technologies of control and resistance are pre-determined by opposed social groups,

explained through existing and binary social structures, and always relationally between

the opposed human groups (not the nonhumans). In both these architectural and

geographical readings of the vertical, space remains topographical and does not transform,

34 The reader cannot but be fully-engaged with and moved by the encyclopaedic work documenting these accounts, just like in Cities Under Siege (2011); however, the underlying political economic framework overwhelms the spatial, urbanistic, and architectural analysis by focusing on extraction and accumulation. In the afterword to the book, Graham even speaks of contesting the vertical as a moral evil.

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despite the shift in vision from plan/flat to section/three dimensional. It is true that “the

map is not the territory” (Latour, 2005, p. 133), but the section is not the territory either.

Both architectural and geographical lenses still place the urban as form – a “hylomorphic

schema” in the words of Simondon (2017) – at the centre of the analysis where the social

and the technical are external relations to the making of the urban landscape in all its

vertical, horizontal, and oblique modes. Besides, the accounts speak of the vertical as a

symbol of elitism, corporatism, and power. We see neither “de-formation” (Lash, 2012),

which is decentring and destabilising form, nor “figuration” (Latour, 2005), which is

giving a figure that is not necessarily anthropo-morphic (could be ideo-, techno-, bio-, etc.)

for the actor/object “that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference” (Latour,

2005, p. 71). These accounts remain largely historical without taking into account the

functioning of military technologies: events, breakdowns, or transformations that will

establish symmetry between humans and nonhumans (see Latour’s notion of Historicity in

Yaneva, 2021 forthcoming). They extend power to the powerful.

2.1.4 Asymmetries

The objects of military urbanisms and architectures are abundant in the literature.

They convey the complexity of the built environment through the expansive networks they

collect across geographies and histories. In human geography, “the new military urbanism”

collects humans (citizens, generals, politicians), cities, checkpoints, borders, shopping

malls, airports/seaports, highways, electrical grids, weapons, robots, vehicles, Wi-Fi

networks, electronic toll collection, warfare, security systems (CCTV, biometric), and

policies (national security, surveillance) among others. In architectural studies, “the

architecture of occupation” collects humans (soldiers, generals, civilians, settlers,

militants), warfare, weapons, military strategies (siege, blockades, fortifications, defence

matrices), security systems (cameras, drones, biometric), cities, settlements, houses,

outposts, walls, tunnels, flyovers, reinforced concrete, stone works, and fences, among

others.

While there are apparent distinctions between urban and architectural objects

(cities/infrastructure vs. buildings/walls) or military and civilian objects (security/defence

vs. consumption/mobility) in the lists above, the literature addresses its objects through a

non-binary, seamless urban-architectural and military-civilian mesh. A clear example is

how architecture in “the architecture of occupation” claims to be a “layered structure

laminated together into a unified and effective apparatus” that is “composed of layers of

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radically different kinds – natural and artificial, material and immaterial, low- and high-

tech” (Weizman, 2017b, p. xx). This approach frames the multiple connections that make

possible militarisation.

However, the literature does not show the agency of the objects in their networks,

where they not only realise what they are programmed to do but also break down, fail,

and/or mutate. The objects are stable, immutable, and monolithic, sometimes even iconic

(e.g., the separation wall and sports utility vehicles). They do not possess multiple

iterations or versions. Their functioning is asymmetrically external (i.e., explained with

social and political factors) relative to their internal technics. Their relations to the

reduction of the landscape to specific versions are not evident, as they re-produce their

existing social structures. They remain artefacts of the Politics that constructs, operates,

and maintains them, regardless of their urban/architectural/military/civilian type and

despite their networked and material ontologies. We shall illustrate this in four empirical

examples from the literature.

Two of the accounts are an archetype of “the architecture of occupation:” Antenna

Hill and the Separation Wall. The first describes Israeli settlers occupying a hilltop and

requesting that the military and communications company install a cellular tower to

enhance signal reception, thus realising an occupation through infrastructural

territorialisation (Weizman, 2017b, pp. 87–109). The second describes an intricate

physical-electronic wall system designed by the Israeli military to secure and separate

Israeli from Palestinian territory (Weizman, 2017b, pp. 161–182).

In the account of the outpost of Antenna Hill (or, Migron), the antenna – an

infrastructural object of cellular communication – is recruited into processes of land

occupation and national defence through the settlers’ complaints and the military’s

emergency powers. Thus, the objectivity of the antenna is multiple, and the antenna’s two

“programs of action” (Akrich, 1992) overlap: with its original program as an object of

infrastructure (antenna-cellular), it sends/receives signals; when it is employed as an object

of occupation (antenna-marker), it territorialises/marks settler colonial space. But how do

the two objectivities of the antenna meet (or not)? How is the adaptation realised, and at

what cost? Does anything change in the technicality of the antenna-cellular to become an

antenna-marker? Does the colonial location of the antenna-marker correspond to the pre-

planned location of the antenna-cellular in the cell tower grid? The only thing that breaks

down in this account is the act of occupying when the outpost of Antenna Hill is taken

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down upon acute political and legal contestations35, but only to move and occupy

somewhere else.

In the account of the Separation Wall, the wall is described as a layered structure

of reinforced concrete panels, deep wall-sections of obstacles, surveillance cameras and

outposts, and strategies of land inclusion/exclusion. The wall’s geography is “elastic”

(Weizman, 2017b, p. 6): Israeli planners change the planned course of construction to

include new Israeli settlements, and Palestinian militants dig underground tunnels to cross

from one side to the other. While all layers in the wall’s network are well described, they

are also assigned to a socially constructed apparatus of power that gives the wall its unique

objectivity. But the wall’s objectivity is multiple: the first is the physical wall and obstacles

located on a specific site (wall-local); the second is the complex electronic surveillance

system and its associated technical objects distributed across geography (wall-global).

How do these two objectivities meet (or not)? How do both objectivities respond to the

physical antagonisms of topography and subsoil? How is the wall-global coordinated with

the wall-local across so many networks and actors? How did the wall’s design evolve:

what succeeded or failed? How does it navigate the challenges of public funding, party

politics, and the contestations of the local/international and Palestinian/Jewish/other

communities against the wall?

Among the empirical cases of “the new military urbanism” is an intriguing

account of the Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV) under the heading “car wars” (Graham, 2011,

pp. 302–347). The SUV has become a topic in the literature on consumerism, resource

economy, biopolitics (Graham, 2004a; Campbell, 2005; Lutz, 2015), and “capsularization”

(De Cauter, 2001, 2004). The account describes the SUV as the emblematic example of a

militarisation “linking urban and popular culture” (2011, p. xxvi). Just like gated

communities, it is a capsular space – “SUV cocoon” (2011, p. 316) – that expresses “an

aggressive desire to insulate oneself against the risks and threats of the contemporary city”

(2011, p. 319). It is a passenger vehicle that has been converted from “US military vehicles

for urban warfare … into hyperaggressive civilian vehicles marketed as the patriotic

embodiment of the War on Terror” (2011, p. xxvi). SUVs become “armored ‘capsules’ or

‘exo-skeletons’” in an “urban battlefield” that isolate their occupants from the dangers of

35 While this should not come as a surprise if one follows the agencies of different actors and the continuous work put by Arab and Jewish citizens and activists to resist such settler colonial project, Weizman’s framing makes it difficult to imagine why this should be the case given his description of the absolute hegemony of the Israeli political, legal, and security system.

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the city (Graham, 2011, p. 315). However, and despite its careful political economic

analysis of SUVs as commodities, the account assumes what goes on inside the SUV

(without any ethnographic study); assumes that technology transfer is only from the

military to the civilian domain, and not vice versa; fails to examine the technical evolution

of the SUV as a hybrid of utility (from station wagons and minivans) and performance

(from pickup trucks); and assigns using the SUV to specific groups and not others.

2.1.5 Conclusion

In the first part of the chapter, we set out to review the literature on military

urbanisms and architectures, focusing on two pivotal conceptual frameworks: “the new

military urbanism” (Graham, 2011) in Human Geography and “the architecture of

occupation” (Weizman, 2017b) in Architectural Studies. These two frameworks, their

associated bodies of work, and their distinct approaches (i.e., building-compositional in

architecture and urban-spatial in geography) mapped and analysed the most recent modern

conflicts: the continuing Israeli Occupation of Palestine and the War on Terror in

Iraq/Afghanistan. They expanded the fields’ understanding of the spatialisation of warfare

and strategies of militarisation in an increasingly urban world, and they offered new

platforms for anti-war and anti-occupation politics and activism. However, their approach

remains largely social constructivist and anthropocentric. Accordingly, the objectivity of

technologies is in question; the objects are stable, asymmetric, and non-evolving in relation

to their users (both, occupier and occupied) and environments. In addition, the landscape’s

objectivity is in question too as its antagonisms, i.e., its terrain mode/phase, is not

relational to the technical development of the objects themselves. Next, we review a

different, a symmetric approach to studying technical objects and sociotechnical networks.

2.2 Sociotechnical Approaches to Militarised Objects

Complementary to the earlier contextual overview of how the filed manuals

reference reductionist versions of a landscape (see 2.1.1), we briefly introduce our

technical object, the MRAP. A key aspect of the discussion we shall witness here concerns

semantics: while the asymmetric notion in asymmetric warfare describes a power

differential among combatants, the military aims to establish a symmetric warfare even

though they continue to use the former name. This sets the ground for examining how

technical objects relationally mediate, break down, and/or evolve in the ANT-informed

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STS school of thought, particularly within the pragmatist sociology of innovation, and the

philosophy of technology of Gilbert Simondon, which inspires the former.

The breakdowns we introduced earlier (Chapter 1) are very specific to their

environments and not mere accounts of a general theory or overarching explanation of

urban warfare. The MRAP vehicles were engineered (Chapter 4) to withstand detonations

and ambushes in Iraq and Afghanistan, but they broke down on the urban streets of Iraq

(Chapter 5) and rural roads of Afghanistan (Chapter 6). The vehicles first served with the

U.S. military as specialised route clearing vehicles called JERRV36. But with Improvised

explosive Devices (IEDs) and ambushes becoming the main and immediate deadly threat37

to the military in the field38, the MRAP39 program was born out of the JERRV program

with the key objective to re-establish symmetry by increasing combat survivability

(Chapter 4) for all military units in the field. This is how the MRAPs came to “translate”

(Callon, 1986a, 1986b) the military network in the specific, localised, and constrained

situations of detonations in the field (Chapters 4-6). Yet, the resultant MRAP vehicles were

too big to safely manoeuvre the urban streets of Iraq and rural roads of Afghanistan

without compromising local infrastructure (Chapter 5) or experiencing breakdowns

(Chapter 6).

There is nothing particularly urban about IEDs or ambushes in general, except

that in this situation these modes of warfare took place on the urban streets of Baghdad,

Al-Basra, Al-Fallujah, Al-Mosul, Al-Ramadi, and Samarra among others40 in Iraq, and

later the roads of Afghanistan. This is where the physical constraints of the built

environment intensified the impact of these threats on the military’s equipment and

soldiers – hence the asymmetric character of warfare, and they challenged and tested the

military’s moral and legal duty to reduce civilian and infrastructural collateral losses

without using excessive force (such as air power, see 2.1.1). This added to the “synergism

of difficulties” of an urban terrain that compromised combat survivability41 (as discussed

in 2.1.1), which the military defines as the ability of soldiers, materiel (i.e. equipment), and

36 Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicle (JERRV) 37 What Deleuze and Guattari call a “nomadic war machine” (see 1987, pp. 352–423); for a history on improvisation, see also Buda's Wagon: A Brief History of the Car Bomb (Davis, 2017). 38 For a landscape architectural and urbanist lens of IEDs, see Bélanger and Arroyo’s account of a “geopolitical archaeology” of IEDs that changes Afghanistan’s landscape configurations (2016) 39 Hence the name: Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle 40 As listed in the official MRAP history book (Friedman, 2013), see analysis in Chapters 4-6 41 Throughout the text, we use “survivability” as a short for “combat survivability”

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systems to protect themselves and remain “mission capable” during combat (U.S. Army,

2005, pp. 1, 7–8).

2.2.1 Matters of Concern

The lens of survivability fragments the monolithic structures, i.e., the unified

social explanations (Latour, 2005), of militarisation, rendering the military vulnerable and

“precarious,” to use philosopher Judith Butler’s term (2006, 2016). It is a precariousness

against multiple realities from experiences of breakdowns to encounters of changing

terrains and efforts to improve mediation. Realities that cut across the many worlds of war,

violence, technology, terraining, mobility, and injury, among others. Rather than

representations of a powerful military in one factual and unified world, the lens of

survivability allows us to “feed off uncertainties” and examine it as a “matter of concern”

(Latour, 2004b, 2005, pp. 115–120). We follow the military technology in its process of

functioning; to function, it needs to travel outside the lab from where it was engineered to

where it will be operated; when it functions, it does not function on its own but through the

interactions with its users and environment; when it functions, it fails and becomes

disputed. It becomes a matter of concern – here, for survivability, not a given fact. Once it

is stabilised and saves lives, it gets constructed as a social fact: a highly survivable

armoured vehicle. The more the military attempts to reassemble their strategies and

technical mediation to achieve survivability, the more we can trace the issues they care

about (Yaneva, 2021, p. 103 forthcoming) – not through outside explanations. And the

more we can trace the social ties (Latour, 2005, p. 119), the relations between humans (i.e.,

soldiers, civilians, combatants) and nonhumans (i.e., technical objects and terrain, the latter

which expands to include infrastructure as we shall see in Chapter 5).

Survivability as a matter of concern also shows that in the asymmetrical, unequal,

and outrageous realities of war – which deploy efforts “to minimize precariousness for

some and to maximize it for others” (Butler, 2016, p. 54) – the social cannot hold without

the help of technical objects like the MRAP. Butler’s call for an ethics of survivability42 as

42 Butler is among the very few scholars who discusses the social dimensions of survivability and not the natural/biological abilities of survival: the first is the ability to co-exist while the second adds a biopolitical value to life and a temporal dimension to persist into the future (the latter usually influenced by philosopher Herbert Spencer’s social Darwinism and found in discussions on post-humanity in scenarios of post-nuclear and post-ecological worlds). The U.S. military also makes this distinction between survivability and survival. Examples of the former include Field Manual FM 5-103 Survivability (U.S. Army, 1985) and Army Regulation AR 70-75 Survivability of Army Personnel and Materiel (U.S. Army, 2005); examples of the latter include the training course Survival, Evasion Resistance and Escape (SERE) (USASOC, 2018).

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a relational responsibility for “interdependence” among humans “bound up” with each

other is a powerful critique of war and a call for “sustaining social conditions of life—

especially when they fail” (2016, pp. 33–62). However, it is an asymmetric concept of

survivability whose failure is devoid of nonhumans and does not explain other than human

modes of being in a complex modern world where technical objects have fuzzier frontiers

(see Debaise, 2012, p. 6). As the analysis will show, the military constantly requires

technical extensions to protect them from both: combat and non-combat related

breakdowns (Chapter 4-6). Their socially constructed power cannot be understood outside

“the technical construction of society” (Latour, 1996a; Yaneva, 2021, p. 63 forthcoming).

Unlike the all-powerful militarisation in the literature of military urbanisms and

architectures, survivability is not given, but rather requires continuous collecting,

reassembling, and stabilising. It is achieved as a symmetric social relation among humans,

technical objects, and their environments.

Following the STS invitation to grasp the “full range of contingencies that shape

scientific and technological change” including through military involvement (see

MacKenzie, 1986, p. 363, 1989), we argue that survivability must be approached through,

what Latour styles as (2004b), a “stubbornly realist attitude” to observe, study, and

understand its sociotechnical networks (i.e., the social cum the technical). Unlike the

withering of the experimental Personal Rapid Transit system Aramis whose interest groups

failed to love it enough to endure (Latour, 1996a; Yaneva, 2021, pp. 60–64 forthcoming),

our analysis will show that institutions like the military cannot but remain highly and

dynamically engaged with survivability else their extensions would fail and their power

would disintegrate. Owing to, not despite, the ever-increasing complexities of warfare and

the complications43 of technical projects, survivability as a “matter of concern” flattens the

ontological plane of humans and nonhumans, or what Simondon calls living and technical

beings (see 2.2.3). Unlike Butler’s existentialist account of human precarity as ontology, a

sociotechnical understanding of survivability recognises humans as potentiality where they

participate in the potentiality of technical objects (Combes, 2012; Simondon, 2017). The

precarity, as we shall see, lies in thresholds of adaptation or alienation, following

Simondon (2017), between human soldiers and their technical objects (Chapters 5 and 6).

43 Complications of a technical project due to “engineers [wanting] to reinscribe in it what threatens to interrupt its course” (Latour, 1996a, p. 209; see also Kaldor, 1982)

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2.2.2 Mediation and Associations

In the ANT-informed STS literature, particularly within the sociology of

innovation, the presence/lack of breakdowns (or failures) in technical objects is theorised

through the solidity of the associations (and/or substitutions44) between humans and

nonhumans and relational to their environment (Law, 1987; Latour, 1991, 2005; Akrich,

1992; de Laet and Mol, 2000; Akrich et al., 2002a; Yaneva, 2012, 2017, 2021

forthcoming). When technologies work, they are invisible. It is through the breakdown of

technical objects (or systems) that actors and their relevance and influence in the structure

they mediate become visible and that analysts/researchers can trace. The social emerges as

a composition of a “trail of associations between heterogenous elements” and “a type of

connection between things that are not themselves social” (Latour, 2005, p. 5 original

emphasis). Thus, the social does not pre-exist45 its elements and associations. It is

relational and emergent through action that is not transported unchanged but “[mediated]

… dislocated … borrowed, distributed, suggested, influenced, dominated, betrayed, [and]

translated” (Latour, 2005, pp. 45–46; see also Callon, 1986a, 1986b; Law, 1987).

Technical objects, in the STS literature, are the mediators that perform these actions, thus

generating sociotechnical associations.

Unlike the stable, immutable, and monolithic objects of military urbanisms and

architectures (see 2.1.4), the objects in the STS literature are dynamic, interdependent, and

distributed. Captured in the process of their functioning, they are dynamic in their

networks performing associations or substitutions to translate, displace, modify, or

transport interests; yet they breakdown or fail. Their competencies are distributed among

actors46 within the sociotechnical network where they mediate “our relationships with the

‘real world’” (Akrich, 1992, p. 214; also Latour, 1990, 1991, 1996a, 2005). Moreover,

these objects are diverse in scale, function, and user groups. They have a “script,” that is a

program of actions in their world, which gets “de-scripted” 47 by users and the new

environment when deployed to a new world (Akrich, 1992; Akrich and Latour, 1992).

They possess “fluidity” to accept modification and transformation (without the assistance

of the original script author) or “sturdiness” to resist change (de Laet and Mol, 2000). They

44 Translated in text as AND for association and OR for substitution (Akrich, 1992; Akrich and Latour, 1992) 45 In the words of Latour, “there is no society, no social realm, and no social ties, but there exist translations between mediators that may generate traceable associations” (2005, p. 108 original emphasis). 46 Oftentimes, STS reserves “actors” for humans and uses “actants” for nonhumans (see Latour, 1999b, p. 303) 47 There is a similar thread in Simondon on differentiating the “fabricational intention” (i.e., the script) from the “utilitarian intention” (i.e., the de-scription); he argues that to understand “the mode of existence of technical objects” we must grasp the coming-into-being of technical systems (2017, p. 58 original emphasis).

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are “decentered,” multiple and have “fractional coherence” (Law, 2002). And they must

build alliances, interest users, and resolve conflicts (“accusations”) within the innovation

process (Akrich et al., 2002a, 2002b). Thus, the MRAP has a script, that is a program of

actions in the world of war, and a vision of the world that works in this world only, and as

such it counters extreme detonations.

Among such objects are mundane artefacts like keys, doors, and seatbelts that

constrain or complement their users (Latour, 1991, 1992); French-designed photoelectric

lighting kits that get adapted when distributed as international aid in developing countries

(Akrich, 1992); the distributed work of hand water pumps that provision rural water and

sanitation (de Laet and Mol, 2000); vehicles that assemble interests like the VEL electric

car (Callon, 1986b) and the 1950s/60s British TSR2 reconnaissance aircraft (Law, 2002);

models, images, diagrams, experiences, that assemble buildings and cities (Yaneva, 2009a,

2009b, 2017; Novoselov and Yaneva, 2020); and, technological systems like 1970s/80s

Frances’ experimental Personal Rapid Transit (Latour, 1996a) and missile accuracy and

inertial guidance of the nuclear Cold War (MacKenzie, 1989, 2012). The STS literature

shows that the presence of breakdowns in such technical objects is not only inescapable,

but it is also a test for “the solidity of the sociotechnical network” (Akrich, 1992, p. 224)

realised by these objects, through how rapidly and efficiently the network responds to the

breakdowns. Informed by the STS tradition, we analyse breakdowns of military technical

objects in several situations: combat related (detonations in Chapter 4) and non-combat

related (electrocution in Chapter 5; downing in Chapter 6). Furthermore, we show how the

military network, and by association its larger state/society networks, holds through

resolving breakdowns and subscribing to “metascripts,” or the “ideological field of

operation” (Taylor, 2013, p. 358), of that state/society.

2.2.3 Individuation and Associations

The previous section discussed technical objects as mediators in the STS

literature, which explains how social ties are extended, regulated, held, or broken through

these mediators and within their sociotechnical networks. The literature’s focus is on

scripts/actions and their diffusion among users. However, pertinent to our theoretical

framework and less discussed48 in sociology/anthropology is understanding technical

48 The general focus of the sociology/anthropology ANT literature, discussed above, is on human-nonhuman associations and how objects “mediate” actions and interests. There is no lack of engaging highly technical

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objects as “a multitude of beings resulting from a range of technical operations”(Combes,

2012, p. 58) and along a “technical lineage” (Simondon, 2017, pp. 44–51). This is a crucial

step to defuse the prevalent military-civilian binary in the literature on militarisation (see

2.1.2) through studying technical thought, or “technics” (see Simondon, 2017, p. 237), and

technical objects rather than the capitalist political economy of consumption and

extraction.

These relations are addressed in the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon (Combes,

2012; De Boever et al., 2012; Simondon, 2017) where the “technicity”49, i.e., the evolved

technical functioning/knowledge that generates technical objects, comes-into-being (i.e., it

is ontogenetic), evolves as information (i.e., it is cybernetic), and gets conserved or passed

(i.e., it is transductive). It is “technicity” as “a mode of relation of man with the world”

(Combes, 2012, p. 60; Simondon, 2017, pp. 162, 169), among other modes (religious,

aesthetic), which informs a “consciousness [that] creates socio-political thought”

(Simondon, 2017, p. 237). When discussing our findings in Chapter 7, we shall see how

the MRAP embodies such “mode of relation” (i.e., associations) that informs a politics of

military survivability relational to civilians, terrain, and technological change.

Simondon’s technical objects are not limited and isolated artefacts or “constituted

technical objects” (2017, p. 176) that intervene on the landscape as their medium (like in

the literature of military urbanisms and architectures). They are figures (i.e., assemblages)

associated or “energetically coupled” (2017, p. 54) to a geographic ground50 which they

cannot function without51. The ground is not a context/setting but a milieu described as “a

certain regime of natural elements surrounding the technical being, linked to a certain

regime of elements that constitute the technical being” (2017, p. 59). Simondon calls this

situations; however, the concern remains the making of the social and less the genesis of technical objects as in the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon. 49 Simondon reserves the term “technicity” to describe the concretisation (at the level of elements, not technical objects or ensembles) that has been transported from one historical period to another (2017, pp. 73–74). Similar yet nuanced explanations of the term are “technical mentality” (Boever, Murray and Roffe, 2012, p. 30) and “technical equality” or “equal technical participation” (see Afterword by Thomas LaMarre in Combes, 2012, p. 92). 50 Compare this to the Figure/Ground relation in architecture (or psychology), which is a perceptual technique realised not in the abstraction of buildings (solid) and open areas (void) but in the association that enables a black foreground to become visible on a white background, thus enabling perception. 51 A similar explanation of the potential born out from an association between the figure of the object and that of the ground can be read in philosopher François Jullien’s concept of the “disposition” (1999). It demonstrates the advantage/difference between two philosophies of strategy: the ancient Chinese one that relied on a “setup and its efficacy” approach to “manage reality” (1999, p. 25), in a world where human action is always connected to its environment/terrain; and, a Western one re-presented by the Greek model and enforced by the influential writings of 17th/18th century Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz that advances a moral/psychological “means and ends” approach.

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the “associated milieu,”52 which “mediates the relation between technical … and natural

elements, at the heart of which the technical being functions” (2017, p. 59). Thus, technical

objects are “technical beings” that come-into-being through their association with their

milieu. Their “mode of existence” is ontologically equal to human/living beings (Combes,

2012, p. 59; Simondon, 2017), who also come-into-being through associations with their

milieu. This explains how the MRAP is specifically coupled with its terrain of extreme

detonations. The MRAP is not any armoured vehicle (which the U.S. military has no

shortage of), but a highly localised script53 for protecting soldiers and restoring symmetry

during what is called asymmetric military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The capacities of the technical being are not transcendental, readily available,

concealed, and thus awaiting a “presencing … [i.e.,] a bringing that brings what presences

into appearance” through “revealing” what is concealed (Heidegger, 1977, pp. 9–12). They

are synergies of groups of functions assembled into specialised structures that give a

technical object its coherence. For example, Heidegger’s airliner standing on the runway

does not conceal “the possibility of transportation ” as a “standing-reserve” ready for take-

off (1977, p. 17). It is not even between flying and taxiing where the synergistic technical

functions of an airliner lie. As a technical individual, i.e., a jet54 engine aircraft, it flies at

very high55 altitudes and speeds due to its technics of propulsion. The only significantly

relevant relation to the ground is that it requires “a very long landing strip [for landing at a

high speed]” (Simondon, 2017, p. 53). This relation of speed, landing56, and ground is the

“associated milieu” of the airliner. Similarly, the MRAP contains a military script, which is

a program of actions in the world of war, and a vision of the world that works in this world

only, and as such it counters extreme detonations. But it is not designed to move in an

urban context (on the streets of Iraq, under power lines, and on narrow turns). Thus, it

requires improvements and adjustments to further adapt to an urban milieu (Chapter 5).

52 A simpler but less accurate term is “favourable environment” (Akrich et al., 2002a) 53 Other versions of the MRAP script were adapted to fit other models of armoured vehicles that are not of the MRAP-type, such as the Double-V Hull for the Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle and the armoured cabs for rescue, recovery, and transport trucks 54 We assume Heidegger’s airliner was a jet aircraft as his original German essay was published in 1954 and 1962 according to the Preface in the English translation (1977, p. ix), while the first jet airliner flew in 1949 and entered service in 1952. 55 In contrast lower altitudes and speeds for propeller-powered aircraft 56 Another explanation of this associated milieu can be traced to the evolution of the landing strip onboard of a military aircraft carrier from one parallel to the ship’s hull to an oblique platform. The oblique design reduces landing crashes with other aircraft and ship components. Later, not only the strip but the take-off technology advanced from long to short take-off and from horizontal to vertical landing.

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To achieve a stable mode of existence, Simondon argues that technical objects

need to exist on their own (without a lab or a greenhouse), and in relation to other technical

objects (i.e., to form “ensembles”), with less regulation (by humans) of their milieu. This is

when they tend toward “concretization,” which is the distribution of synergies of

functioning – “synergy after synergy” – to replace or diminish antagonisms within the

objects’ internal coherence and their relations with the natural world (2017, p. 38).

Simondon calls the former the “technical milieu” and the latter the “geographic milieu.”

These two milieus are “two worlds that do not belong to the same system and are not

necessarily completely compatible” (2017, p. 55). The more concretised the technical

object becomes, the more the antagonisms become unperceived and closer to what ANT

calls a black box (see Footnote 9). Yet to come-into-being, technical objects integrate the

two milieus57 while they are “situated at the meeting point” between them (2017, p. 55);

put differently, the two milieus/worlds “act upon each other” via the technical object

(2017, p. 56). This process realises a “techno-geographic milieu” specific to a

concrete/concretised technical object that is “no longer in conflict with itself” (2017, p.

38). We witness a constructive evolution (2017, p. 58) of the technical object such as when

the MRAP script withstands the antagonisms of detonations and restores levels of

survivability that the military had lost. The MRAP’s process of concretisation, or dialogue

with the milieu, is at the core of the military’s spatialisation of a symmetric urban warfare

(Chapter 1) whether through mere survivability (Chapter 4), sociability with the civilians

(Chapter 5), or pushing the bodily limits of soldiers (Chapter 6).

Let us do a little thought experiment and revisit the accounts of Antenna Hill from

the literature on military urbanisms and architectures (see 2.1.4). Simondon explains how

pylons (cement and metal) and high voltage lines (metal and porcelain) are produced by

thermodynamic ensembles to facilitate the emergence of electrotechnic ensembles (2017,

pp. 69–70); they realise a decentralisation of energy transfer across the landscape through

“a synergistic alliance between technical schemas and natural power” that witness the

coinciding of “cement and rock, … the cable and the valley, the pylon and the hill” (2017,

p. 193). In the account of Antenna hill, the cellular tower has no relation to the potentiality

of its ensemble where it must be a node in the frequency grid of its cellular network, and it

57 Simondon’s notion of “milieu” is the varied, vast, and complex domain where humans and technicity progress. Compare this to a static notion of the milieu (i.e., air and sea) in historian Thomas Hippler’s account “Philosophy of the Bomb” (2017, pp. 118–139). Italian military officer Giulio Douhet is the central figure in forging an emerging doctrine of aerial warfare in the early 20th century, without any mention of the role played by technical objects be they airplanes, bombs, or communications. Cities are symbols of civilisation, and they become the target of strategic and tactical military operations.

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must belong to a schema (a plan to expand the network). However, these associations are

relegated58 to the background, and even the location of the antenna on top of the hill is

explained not by the travel of signals but by its strategic location for building a defence

matrix on high ground. This approach does not allow us to witness the functioning of the

technical object and its constructive evolution. In our analysis, we will examine

militarisation and warfare as structured through the evolution and concretisation of the

MRAP technology.

More importantly, such tending toward concretisation, which is relational to

specific assemblages of elements/technicities and realised techno-geographic milieus,

makes technical beings not only ontologically different (to be on par with living beings)

but also ontogenetic59 (Combes, 2012; Simondon, 2017). Any new antagonisms in the

milieu and/or disturbances in the synergistic functioning prompts adaptations that tend

toward a new concretisation to keep the object “self-conditioned” (2017, p. 58). This

means that the existing synergisms of the object continue through “minor improvements”

60 or discontinue through “major improvements” that essentially modify the existing

distribution of functions (2017, p. 42). Thus, the technicities that make up an object contain

the potential61 to reassemble, among themselves or with new technicities, to produce

another object, making it a multiple technical being that stems from a series and a lineage

of technical operations.

This is what Simondon’s philosophy offer us to understand the coming-into-being

of technical objects as “a series of spurts of structurations of a system, or of successive

individuations of a system” (2017, p. 169). The technical object is then the figure of an

“individual” at a specific time and associated to a specific milieu. The “technical reality”

(2017, pp. 73–74) or “functioning schemas” (2017, p. 58) residing in this figure assemble

the technicities carried in various “elements” across time and ensembles of energy

58 What important accounts like Weizman’s Hollow Land (2017b) miss is examining the relation between humans as the associates – not the subject nor the objects – of technical objects. It is a lens that could explain the Zionist settler colonial project, not as one looped with the hundred-years old colonial projects, but as a highly specific and localised one in 20th century technics. 59 See also “emergence” and “affective” in A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) 60 For Simondon, minor improvements risk becoming “corrective measures” if humans oversaturate the external regulation of the functioning (2017, p. 39). The technical object is less “concrete” and more “abstract,” i.e., a tool “transportable everywhere one goes” requiring no “associated milieu” (2017, p. 228). 61 For Simondon, potentials are a “power of coming-into-being without degradation,” a reality and “not the simple virtuality of future states” (2017, p. 168; Heidegger, 1977, p. 17).

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levels/eras62. When the time/energy era and associated milieu63 change, the object

“individuates”64 into a new individual/being (a new figure) through a process of resolving

tensions, establishing communication, and structuring relations between different “orders

of magnitude” (see Bowden, 2012, p. 138; Combes, 2012, p. 4). When the orders mediated

by the technical object change, a “dephasing” occurs and prompts the coming of a new

phase of being. Thus, the technical object’s “unity of being” is “transductive,” i.e., exists

across multiple and diverse individuations and phases (see Combes, 2012, p. 6; De

Beistegui, 2012, pp. 172–173). Ultimately, the technical object is “never fully known”

(2017, p. 39) as much as nature neither is, and knowledge, i.e. technics, “is conceived as an

imperfect doubling of being” (2017, p. 240) where the individuated subject of knowledge

is never the true subject. Informed by this dynamic understanding of technicity, we will

trace the process of individuation from the figure of mobility in the Humvee to that of

survivability in the MRAP (Chapter 4). Moreover, the MRAP itself individuates into an

urban individual and a rural one: the former must negotiate the density of infrastructure

(Chapter 5) while the latter its lack thereof (Chapter 6).

2.2.4 Conclusion

In the second part of the chapter, we established our theoretical framework to

address the gap in the literature on military urbanisms and architectures. We brought

together concepts from the philosophy of technology, the sociology of innovation, and STS

to build a vigorous and pertinent understanding of technicity in the military domain, as part

of the larger technological change (to get beyond the military-civilian technology divide)

and in relation to the ground/milieu/terrain/landscape (to relate to urban and architectural

research) as we shall see in the empirical analysis (Chapters 4-6). The framework

addressed three themes: the objectivity of the technology; the general symmetry

established between the technical objects and their users; and the associations crafted in the

process of the technical functioning. The aim is to understand human-nonhuman relations,

62 According to Simondon, these are: artisanal in 18th century, thermodynamic in 19th century, electrotechnics in early-20th century, nuclear in mid-20th century, and electro-metallurgic in late-20th century (2017). 63 Simondon explains that the “associated milieu” is a “depositary of technicity” at the level of the individual (2017, p. 76), collecting technicities from the elements that make up the individual, which in turn make up the ensemble. This is Simondon’s structure or elements, individuals, ensembles. A simpler, yet reductionist, wording would be Carl Mitcham’s “elements (parts), individuals (wholes), and ensembles (systems)” (see Mitcham, 1994, p. 34). 64 Philosopher Didier Debaise explains how Simondon’s philosophy of “individuation” is a “technique” of transversal communication among diverse domains (technical, biological, physical) possessing a “relational ontology of being” that is “local, situated and linked to constraints” (2012, pp. 1–2). He calls for moving from “being-individual” to “individuation” (2012, p. 3), where the individual has fuzzy frontiers and possesses “fringes” that “extend it to a larger nature and … participate in its identity” (2012, p. 6).

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their associations, and their breakdowns, rather than to explain military technology by

referring to the grand narratives of militarisation.

2.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, we reviewed the recent literature on military urbanisms and

architectures and identified a gap. We offer to study technical objects and sociotechnical

associations drawing theoretical inspiration from the philosophy of technology of Gilbert

Simondon and the ANT-inspired STS literature, particularly the sociology of innovation.

We address the research aims and key research questions by examining militarisation and

its impact on the landscape through human-nonhuman associations and technological

change, rather than by referring to social and political explanations. In the next chapter, we

set the methodology for studying the MRAP as a relational, evolving, and multiple

technical object of militarisation and by tracing technological change to examine its

sociotechnical relations with those who distribute the script and those who use it or change

it, and to understand its associations with the landscape/terrain.

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Chapter 3

Methodology: Tracing Associations

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3.0 Introduction

To answer the research questions and address the gap in the literature of military

urbanisms and architectures (Chapter 2), our research employs a twofold methodological

strategy. A first (after Akrich, 1992; Latour, 2005) analyses how the MRAP, as a series of

heterogenous inventions (by inventors/engineers in the lab), constitutes survivability as a

“script” or program of actions that regulates the impact of IED-related breakdowns on

soldiers and vehicles in the warzone (Chapter 4). The script allows us to study how actions

(or “responsibilities”) are delegated and assigned to technical objects to mediate, on behalf

of the humans. This script also gets “de-scripted” by the MRAP users/occupants (i.e.,

soldiers) in the field when they attempt to regulate combat and non-combat related

breakdowns (Chapters 4 and 5). A second (after Simondon, 2017) examines the genesis of

the MRAP as a “technical individual” that realises survivability through resolving

antagonisms within its incoherent technical functioning and in relation to its geographic

grounding (Chapters 4-6), what Simondon calls the regulation of a “margin of

indeterminacy in [the] functioning” (2017, p. 152). This lens provides scope to study two

aspects of technological change: how the technical object operates relational to specific

technical and geographic environments, what Simondon calls the “associated milieu;” and,

how this process of regulation lies within provisioning or increasing the “technicity” of the

technical object, that is its technical capacity that relates humans to nonhumans. The

process also shows a technical lineage from the aerospace industry and previous war

technologies (Chapter 4), from commercial trucks (Chapter 5), and across the land, air, and

maritime domains (Chapter 6).

The two parts of our strategy are not exclusively mutual, but overlapping and

complementary. For the ANT-STS school of thought is inspired by Simondon’s philosophy

of technology (see Chapter 2), and both scholarships belong to the same pragmatist

tradition. We can say that what ANT-STS calls networks and actor-networks are

equivalent to what Simondon calls ensembles and individuals. Latour explains (2005) that

the actor never exists on its own, but always relationally within a network (hence the

hyphen in actor-network) Similarly in Simondon (2017), the individual is always part of an

ensemble – and made from sub-ensembles – that corresponds to modes of energy

exchanges across space and time65. This shows the MRAPs as active actors in networks of

65 According to Simondon, these are: artisanal in 18th century, thermodynamic in 19th century, electrotechnics in early-20th century, nuclear in mid-20th century, and electro-metallurgic in late-20th century (2017).

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invention (Chapter 4), networks of U.S. state policies and military strategies (Chapter 5),

networks of reciprocal human-nonhuman co-work and distribution of competences, and

across mechanical, electric, and electronic ensembles (Chapters 4-6).

Moreover, both scholarships equally treat technical objects (i.e., nonhumans) and

humans as situated assemblages and localised relations, within their historical, innovation,

and physical environments. This posits the MRAP script as an invention primarily

associated with violent detonations of IEDs (Chapter 4), then as vehicles associated with

articulating non-combat related antagonisms while navigating the urban terrain of Iraq

(Chapter 5) and the rural terrain of Afghanistan (Chapter 6). Still, the methodology

distinguishes the sociotechnical relations between humans and nonhumans from the

technical evolution, what Simondon calls “concretization,” of technical individuals. In the

former, social relations are produced through the scripting and de-scripting of technical

objects as the mediators (of the same relations). In the latter, the concretisation is realised

the increased synergies of sub-ensembles, where “elements” are replaced or reassembled.

As discussed earlier (Chapter 2), the element is the bearer of technicity66 (i.e., evolved

technical functioning/knowledge) which has been transported from one historical period to

another, and it completes Simondon’s tripartite structure of ensemble-individual-element.

3.1 Constructing the Sites to Study Military Technical Objects

So, how can we study the associations of technical objects, especially extreme

military ones? How can we analyse technological change across domains and as a

technical lineage? And how do we negotiate the restrictions and limitations of “being

there”67 (in the field)? These key questions frame our methodological approach to study

the politics of survivability that “script” (Akrich, 1992) and “concretize” (Simondon, 2017)

the military’s MRAP vehicles in relation to their operational landscapes.

One difficult issue for sure in studying the technical objects and operations of the

military is being there (i.e., in the field). On the one hand, it is a high-risk situation to be in

the warzone or during military operations, not least as would be deemed by the academic

66 Simondon reserves the term “technicity” to describe the concretisation (at the level of elements, not technical objects or ensembles) that is transported from one historical period to another (2017, pp. 73–74). 67 Anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s renowned phrase (1988)

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research ethical approval68 requirements. On the other hand, it is a high-restriction

situation to access classified military, engineering, and manufacturing documentation,

especially current information that is not deemed historical or archival yet. Another

challenge to study technical objects as mediators and non-constituted beings – not as

artefacts – concerns examining the politics of survivability at the level of technical

development, which would be a mode of association between humans and nonhumans or

what Simondon calls “technicity” (2017). This necessitates understanding the progress of

technical thought (i.e., “technics”) through the invention processes, and how the associated

milieu is realised through reductions of the landscape into terrain. Moreover, to study

technological change necessitates examining the functioning of technical relations and

objects, rather than starting from a “constituted object” (after Simondon, 2017) or a binary

classification of technology types like military-civilian.

Unable to be on site across the geographies69 of war and industry, and unable to

follow discussions revolving around these military technologies in real time, like Bruno

Latour did following the failed project of Aramis (1996a), or to engage in ethnography70

and interviews with engineers, officers, and politicians, we adopt a quasi-ethnographic

approach that relies on analysing primary and secondary sources. Ours is not an

ethnographic research, but the quasi-ethnographic character of the approach “[devotes]

ethnographic attention” (after Yaneva, 2009a, pp. 25–26) and “[benefits] from an

anthropological search for meaning” (González, 2012, p. 25) through following the actor-

networks, collecting fragments of observations, and documenting the assembling

processes. We find our sources in publicly accessible yet highly specialised online

databases (see 3.2), and their rich content grants us “being there” in the field.

Moreover, we are aware of the covert character of military organisations and the

potential limited access to relevant factual data. However, we do not approach the military

as a secretive organisation that disconnects and isolates itself from the rest of the world

(even though it attempts to). Instead, we approach it as a highly interconnected network,

68 At the beginning, this research went through a “high risk” ethical assessment since it dealt with the risk of potentially dealing with security issues. We were already denied security clearance to attend the Defence and Security Equipment International 2017 in London, where a few MRAP models were exhibited. However, the ethical concern was resolved upon the decision to use publicly available and accessible online sources. 69 These sites are dispersed and difficult to access. They are dispersed across: geographies of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, and by association Palestine, Syria, and what Derek Gregory calls “the colonial present” (2004); geographies of the military-industrial complex in the U.S., and by association those of South Africa, Germany, and Israel; and, geographies of logistics between military bases, what Catherine Lutz calls the “less visible but … unprecedented … global omnipresence and unparalleled lethality of the U.S. military” (2009b). 70 See, for example, Everyday Engineering: An Ethnography of Design and Innovation (Vinck, 2009)

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where the documents we analyse are either marked as Unclassified or with the distribution

statement DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. For the

inventions to be registered as intellectual property (regardless if they serve military or

other purposes), they must be documented in patents that are publicly available as

references, which in turn reference other patents. For small and large defence contractors

to engage with military procurement, many military publications must be publicly

accessible even if they were marked for limited use authorisations71 (for contractors,

government agencies, defence agencies). And for maintaining democratic governance,

many military publications are published and authenticated by the U.S. Department of

Defense under the Freedom of Information Act72 (FOIA) of 1967 (see 3.2.1). These

provisions allow us to study the military and their multi-sited operations “up, down, and

sideways” (Laura Nader, 1969, p. 307; quoted in González, 2012, p. 23) and to substitute

participant observation and interviews with analysing the documents in the publicly

accessible online databases.

3.1.1. The Unique Lens of the MRAP

The MRAP is a unique object of research to examine militarisation and the

spatialisation of asymmetric warfare (see Chapter 2). It was the principal and cardinal

technical object of survivability during the war years on Iraq (2003-2011/present) and

Afghanistan (2011-2014/present), to counter the deadly threat of Improvised Explosive

Devices (IEDs) and replace the Humvee73. Unlike super heavy tracked tanks and wheeled

fighting vehicles, the MRAP is a universal type of wheeled armoured vehicle entrusted

with safely transporting soldiers for various mission types. The MRAPs’ controversial

rapid acquisition program produced more than 27,000 vehicles at a total cost nearing $50

billion in U.S. dollars (Singer, 2012; Sisk, 2012). With approval and production starting in

2006, the first MRAPs were fielded during April 2007 in Iraq and during February 2008 in

Afghanistan before many of them were returned to the U.S. upon the end of operations.

As a script, the MRAP constitutes a relational diagram between the bodies of

human beings (i.e., soldiers) and those of the technical beings (i.e., vehicles), which is

71 For more on this, see “Distribution Statements & Their Corresponding Reasons for Use” (Defense Technical Information Center, 2018) 72 See more at www.foia.gov 73 This was the main transportation wheeled vehicle of the U.S. military whose official name is High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), but it was too vulnerable to the explosive power of IEDs.

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situated in their operational terrain. Thus, the MRAP allows us to investigate not only

sociotechnical associations between users and mediators but also spatial associations

between the soldiers and their protective enclosure and envelope. More accurately, these

are associations of an architectural character, since the MRAP is not an architectural

object. Following Yaneva’s notion on “the architectural as a type of connector” (Yaneva,

2010, also 2005, 2009b, 2017, 2021), the architectural lens allows us to frame the

survivability script as an envelope that encloses the soldiers’ bodies, separating between an

internal safe space and an external dangerous terrain. This realist reading of the MRAP as a

protective capsule is at odds with Graham’s symbolic notion of the SUV’s capsular space

as “an aggressive desire” (2011, p. 319) to insulate anxious, patriotic, right wing citizens

from the dangers of contemporary cities (see Chapter 2).

Thus, we examine the MRAP as a multiple technical object, i.e., a technical being

that “individuates” relationally and produces technical individuals (see Chapter 2), and its

fortification as a site for politics (Yaneva, 2017, p. 109). It is an object of survivability

(Chapter 4), an enclosure with an architectural character (Chapters 4-6), and an urban

object that moves in relation to the presence of infrastructure (Chapter 5) and its lack

thereof (Chapter 6). The MRAP allows us to analyse how militarisation and engineering

reduces the landscape to terrain, and how survivability gets distributed as competencies of

body-vehicle-terrain relations. It also makes possible tracing “major and minor

improvements,” i.e., dynamic processes of adaptation of the technical object as found74 in

the primary sources, and breakdowns as found in primary and secondary sources.

3.2 Mobilising the Sources

The empirical sources of this research are divided into primary and secondary.

The primary are two categories: one includes documents that have a clear methodology,

data, and findings, such as patents and studies; the other includes documents/media

produced as a reference or a first-hand source, such as military publications, governmental

policies, and video material. In comparison, the secondary sources are second-hand

accounts of events or primary sources, such as news articles, reports, commercial

brochures, and websites (for a full list of sources used in the empirical analysis see Table

1). Although we categorise both types of sources into sub-types by domain like military,

74 Similar to architect Alison Smithson’s as found method of collecting for her scrap book (see Boyer, 2017)

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governmental, or private sector to simplify communicating the analysis and findings, we

equally trace technological change across all sources, taking into consideration how the

specialised lens of each domain and source type frames the matter at hand. For example,

patents describe inventions to communities of engineers/inventors; field manuals document

military doctrine for the armed forces; and news articles report events to the public.

The general timeframe for locating and selecting the sources of this research spans

the war periods on Iraq (March 2003-June 2011/present) 75 and Afghanistan (October

2001-December 2014/present). More specifically, from the submission of the Marine

Corps Urgent Universal Needs Statement (Urgent UNS) for MRAP-type vehicles in May

2005 until the end of military operations76 (see “Enclosing Bodies” in Chapter 2). But

since we examine processes of technical evolution and lineage, the sources extend beyond

this period particularly to changes – or lack thereof – in vehicle and armour technologies in

relation to developments in the military’s warfare doctrines (after the Cold War and the

Gulf War) and their understanding of the evolving urban condition (paralleling discourses

of the United Nations; see “Collecting the Rural Landscape” in Chapter 5).

Moreover, the sources are selected following two general threads: a first follows

“major/discontinuous” and “minor/continuous” improvements that adapt the MRAP as a

script for survivability against IEDs (Chapter 4); and a second follows non-combat related

breakdowns when the MRAPs are deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan (Chapters 5 and 6). It

is crucial to keep in mind that the analysed events in these threads are not representative of

the entirety of the wars or the landscapes; however, they are full of accounts of breakdown

and associations among humans, technical objects, and terrain, which allows us to collect

the actor-networks and to be there in the field. Next, we explain how we analyse the

different types of sources and connect the threads.

75 The dates in brackets are the official beginning of operations and withdrawal dates of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, code named Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, respectively. However, the U.S. military (and coalition forces) continued their presence and intervention in other military operations in these countries, mainly against ISIL and the resurgence of the Taliban. 76 December 2019 is the most recent data query follow-up date of this research.

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Table 1 A list of the primary (P) and secondary (S) sources used in the empirical analysis; sources are listed by document type, count, and source of retrieval (compiled by author).

Document/Media Type Definition (from Headquarters, 2002) Source P/S U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Utility Patent (17), Utility Patent Application (4)

USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image Database (PatFT) and Patent Application Full-Text and Image Database (AppFT)

P

U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Army Regulation (2) “directive that sets forth missions, responsibilities,

policies, delegates authority, sets objectives”

Army Publishing Directorate (APD) P

Defense Transportation Regulation (1) United States Transportation Command P Doctrine/Strategy (2) “describe the fundamental principles that guide

military forces or their elements in support of national objectives”

Joint Chiefs of Staff P

Field Manual (5) “focusing on doctrine and training principles with supporting tactics, techniques, and/or procedures”

Army Publishing Directorate (APD); United States Marine Corps; Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL) at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)

P

Guidance Pamphlet – Multi-National Corps-Iraq (1)

Small Wars Journal P

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (1) Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL) at the Naval Postgraduate School; P Marine Administrative Message (2) U.S. Marine Corps P Pamphlet (2) “permanent instructional or information publication” Army Publishing Directorate (APD) P Environmental Assessment (1) U.S. Army Tank-automotive & Armaments Command (TACOM) P Report (2) Inspector General; Defense Health Board P Study (2) United States Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory; Joint Chiefs of Staff P Test Activity Report (1) U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) P Test Method Standard (1) U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) P Test Operations Procedure (1) Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) P Urgent Universal Need Statement (1) Published in Wired Magazine (wired.com); not officially released P Video (5) Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS) P Book (1) Defense Acquisition University (DAU) S Briefing (1) Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) S

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Document/Media Type Definition (from Headquarters, 2002) Source P/S Bulletin (1) “information, procedures, and techniques of a

technical or professional nature relating to equipment and general subjects”

U.S. Army Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) S

Handbooks Published on Global Security (globalsecurity.org); not officially released S Magazine Article (3) Department of the Army; United States Special Operations Command

(SOCOM); U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center (USAASC) S

News Article (14) U.S. Army; Stars and Stripes S Report (7) Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC); U.S. Army War College S Training Circular (1) “used to distribute unit or individual soldier training

information that does not fit the standard requirements”

Army Publishing Directorate; S

Website (9) U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center (USAASC); Tobyhanna Army Depot; Red River Army Depot; U.S. Army Transportation Engineering Agency (TEA); Wright-Patterson Air Force Base; U.S. Army Fort Bragg; U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Army Special Operations Command; U.S. Central Command

S

U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Guidance Pamphlet (1) Federal Highway Administration P Report (1) National Transportation Library P Rule, Regulation (1) National Highway Traffic Safety Administration P Other U.S. Government Audit Report (1) Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) P Hearing, Report (5) U.S. Congress; U.S. House of Representatives; Library of Congress, The

Census Bureau S

Private Sector Commercial Brochure [from defence contractors] (9)

Navistar Defense; SRC, Inc.; Bendix; Crystal Group Inc.; Ford; OT Training Solutions; Pulau Corporation; Submersible Systems; American Iron and Steel Institute

S

News Media Article (14) The New York Times; The Wall Street Journal; Los Angeles Times; Wired Magazine; The Independent; The San Diego Union-Tribune; War on the Rocks; The Air, Land & Sea Times; The Washington Post; Associated Press; PBS

S

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3.2.1. Primary Sources: Patents, Military Publications, and Government Policies

Our primary sources are utility patents, military publications, and governmental

policy documents. We find them in publicly accessible online databases run and managed

by various agencies of the U.S. Federal Government. One key difference among these

sources is how they address and represent an invention or a technical object. The patents

address a technical object as a set or sub-set of functionalities, among other functionalities

or as associated to humans (such as new developments to the suspension of a wheeled

vehicle). The other sources address a technical object as “constituted individual” and

always relational to other constituted human and nonhuman individuals within larger

frameworks of operation (such as soldiers and vehicles in traffic on highway networks).

Utility patents and patent applications (hereafter, we refer to all of them as

patents) are issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office77 (USPTO), an

agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce. According to the USPTO, a patent is “the

grant of a property right to the inventor” and a utility-type patent is “granted to anyone

who invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, article of manufacture, or

composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof” (2015). Our research

focuses on the technical dimension of patents, what Bowker calls the “internalist”78

account (1992). These documents79 target highly specialised communities of engineers and

innovators. We search the databases and analyse seventeen (17) patents from the Patent

Full-Text and Image Database (PatFT) and four (4) patent applications from the Patent

Application Full-Text and Image Database (AppFT). All twenty-one documents are issued

between May 2005 and January 2017.

Military publications are published and authenticated by the secretaries of military

departments (i.e., Army, Navy, Air Force) of the U.S. Department of Defense under the

Freedom of Information Act80 (FOIA) of 1967. Under the guidance of the U.S. Department

of Justice, FOIA ensures the public right to access records of federal agencies, except in

critical matters of national security and property rights. The key community of these

publications is the serving members of the armed forces. All81 military publications used in

77 See more at www.uspto.gov 78 The legal-public part being the “externalist” account (Bowker, 1992) 79 Unlike the inventors’ sketches, models, and technical drawings (cf. Vinck, 2009), patents are technically and legally streamlined to become part of a database/resource of inventions. 80 See more at www.foia.gov 81 All military publications used in this research have been obtained from official U.S. Government databases and websites to authenticate the sources and their contents. The only two exceptions that have been publicly

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this research are unclassified and cleared for a “Distribution Statement A: Approved for

public release. Distribution is unlimited.” The key selected and analysed publications

include five (5) Field Manuals, five (5) soldier training videos, three (3) equipment Test

documents, two (2) Army Regulations, two (2) risk Pamphlets, two (2) investigative

reports, and two (2) medical studies among others (see Table 1). Most of these publications

are available from the Defense Technical Information Center82 (DTIC), the Army

Publishing Directorate83 (APD), the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service84

(DVIDS), and other official defence and government websites.

Governmental policy documents are commissioned and published by the different

agencies of the U.S Government. We differentiate the non-military government documents

as such, although military publications are government issued too, to highlight the overlaps

and connections of technological change across all these domains. Particularly, we refer to

three (3) documents from the U.S. Department of Transportation for traffic safety and

highway usage regulations. In addition, we refer to occupational safety regulations from

the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) at the U.S. Department of

Labor, but only as a reference used in the military publications we analyse. The target

community of these documents is U.S. government leaders and administrators (when the

MRAPs return to the U.S.), commercial companies that manufacture the MRAPs (part of

their compliance with federal rules), and the military at-large (whether based in the U.S. or

deployed abroad). All these publications are publicly accessible on the websites of their

respective agencies.

3.2.2. Secondary Sources: Military Websites, News Media, Commercial Brochures

Our secondary sources also include military publications, news media articles, and

commercial brochures. We also find them either in the same publicly accessible online

databases run and managed by the U.S. Federal Government or in publicly accessible

private sector websites of news media corporations or defence contractors/commercial

companies. Among the selected and analysed publications are (see Table 1): seven (7)

Reports, one (1) Briefing, one (1) Bulletin, one (1) Training Circular, mainly from the

published on non-U.S. Government websites are the MRAP Handbook (available from globalsecurity.org, a prominent database of defence and security documents) and the Urgent UNS (available from wired.com, a leading magazine on technology). 82 See more at discover.dtic.mil 83 See more at armypubs.army.mil 84 See more at www.dvidshub.net

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Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC); fourteen (14) news articles and three (3)

magazine articles targeting the military community, mainly from the U.S. Army website;

fourteen (14) news articles targeting the general public from national and local

newspapers; nine (9) technical brochures from the websites of big and small defence

contractors; nine (9) military websites, mainly Army related; and, one (1) Handbook from

an independent defence and security think tank.

Moreover, we immersed ourselves in relevant non-academic literature to better

grasp this highly specialised topic. We followed the latest military technological

developments (vehicles, weapons, uniforms, tactics), battle strategy, training for urban

warfare, and joint exercises. This includes watching over two thousand (2,000) hours of

videos, publicly available online at YouTube, from defence and intelligence analysis

channels like Jane’s (by HIS Markit), Defense Web TV, Defense News, and Defense

Update, and from defence contractors like Oshkosh, Navistar, and Rheinmetall. These

videos added to our general understanding of the scripting processes in the lab and the

breakdowns and de-scripting processes in the field. Furthermore, we read realist accounts

of the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan from investigative journalists, politicians, and

explosive-specialist soldiers. These described the reality of combat (Junger, 2011;

Alexievich, 2017), the effects of the mountainous landscape on the soldiers (Matloff,

2018), the necessity of the MRAP program (Gates, 2014), and the hyper-tensed situations

of encountering IEDs (Hunter, 2011; Ivison, 2011; Rayment, 2011; Hughes, 2018). Each

of these actors brought forward a world with its relevant set of concerns.

3.3 Plan of the Analysis

The empirical part of the thesis consists of three chapters: Chapter 4 analyses the

assembling of the MRAP through inventions in the lab; and Chapter 5 and Chapter 6

analyse the adaptation of the MRAP upon breakdown in the urban and rural terrains of Iraq

and Afghanistan. Chapter 4 starts with an “autopsy of a failure” (Latour, 1996a, p. ix) by

following the failure of the Humvee to protect soldiers against IEDs and the consequent

development of the MRAP as the technical object of survivability. First, the analysis

identifies how the IED changes the associated milieu of the Humvee, thus forcing its

development till oversaturation and failure. We trace in the patents the figuring of a new

geometry (i.e., the V-shape underbody). Second, the analysis examines the shift in script

from mobility in the Humvee to survivability in the MRAP. We trace in the patents the

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figuring on an independent armoured capsule that separates the soldiers’ bodies from the

rest of the vehicle. Third, the analysis follows how the survivability script extends outward

and inward. We trace in the patents how new sub-ensembles expand protection beyond the

physical capsule of the MRAP and within its interior space. And last, the analysis shows,

through the patents, how all these inventions or sub-ensembles get assembled and their

functions coordinated. Although we generally follow the inventions chronologically85 as a

historical lineage, the analysis is more concerned with the adaptation of the MRAP towards

“concretization,” i.e., becoming self-regulating in relation to its associated milieu through

minor/continuous and major/discontinuous improvements.

Chapters 5 and 6 follow the MRAPs as they get deployed to the field in Iraq and

Afghanistan, respectively. First, the analysis identifies major breakdown events. These

include electrocution upon running into power lines on the urban streets of Iraq (Chapter 5)

and drowning upon rollover into water bodies on the rural roads of Afghanistan (Chapter

6). We trace the narratives of these events in the reporting of news accounts and in

investigative reports and medical studies reporting on the traumas faced by the soldiers in

these situations. Second, the analysis examines how the military addresses these

breakdowns either through a) major/minor improvements to the technical object (Chapter

5), b) creating additional technical objects (Chapter 6), or c) additional regulation of the

sociotechnical associations (Chapters 5 and 6). We trace the first two in military

publications on techniques and tactics (regulations, procedures, risk pamphlets, training

circulars), training videos, and brochures from defence contractors, while we trace the third

in military doctrinal publications on military principles (field manuals) and governmental

policy (rules, regulations). Third, we make connections, where due, in three threads that

cut diagonally across the empirical chapters: a) the analysis of the technical development

of the MRAP sub-ensembles from the patents in Chapter 4; b) the technical inventions in

the commercial truck and passenger car industries that the military draws from; and, c) the

larger U.S. federal policy frameworks that the military subscribes to (what we call

“metascripts” in Chapters 5 and 6).

Throughout the empirical chapters, we trace two levels of associations:

architectural and urban. The two levels do not correspond to the common differentiation of

spatial scales in the disciplines of the built environment between architecture-building and

85 The IED threat emerges in the early/mid 2000s, but counter-IED armour patents and applications substantially-emerge in the late 2000s and in the 2010s.

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urban-city. They correspond to scales of association between the soldiers’ bodies and the

MRAP (i.e., the technical object) on the one hand and the terrain/landscape/infrastructure

(i.e., the associated milieu) on the other hand. Accordingly, the analysis follows the

military and engineering’s technical focus on the terrain/landscape as an associated milieu

and less on the usual human geographical description of cities and landscapes as

constituted entities of people and things. While they remain relevant as a setting, it is the

reduction of these physical geographies through the technical functioning that becomes

pronounced and crucial in the sources such as when the City of Basra in Iraq (Chapter 5)

and the Hamlet of Khosrow Sofla in Afghanistan (Chapter 6) come to be situations of

breakdown in survivability.

Throughout the thesis, we use the plural soldiers to refer to able-bodied and

masculine86 combatant military personnel in the field and the singular military to refer to

the institution as an entity. All our primary and secondary sources use the plural

soldiers/officers, the neutral singular individual soldier/officer, or the generic he. In

addition, all bodies presented and discussed in the empirical sources are those of soldiers

not citizens87.

3.4 Method of Analysis

Patent Analysis is a method commonly used in business intelligence research to

scout the innovation landscape. It takes different forms from patent search, patent

landscape analysis, patent portfolio analysis, monetisation, freedom to operate, and

intellectual property management. The analysis itself employs techniques of data and text

mining, searching for key concepts, and counting repetitive words, among others. Less

often, the method is used to map spatial relations among cities and urban areas, mainly

depending on location metadata. In one such example, smart cities and technological

specialisation of cities is mapped through the “patent portfolio analysis” method to

determine the degree of innovation specialisation/clustering of an urban area88.

86 For the scope of this research, this category subsumes gender and race categories. On a related topic, see how the military opened up all combat and special operations jobs to women in 2016 and graduated the first in July 2020 (Gibbons-Neff, 2020). 87 For more on how the U.S. military prioritised non-military traumas in Iraq and Afghanistan, listen to Derek Gregory’s “Trauma Geographies: Broken Bodies and Lethal Landscapes” (2018). 88 For examples on this see “Patent Portfolio Analysis of Cities: Statistics and Maps of Technological Inventiveness” (Kogler, Heimeriks and Leydesdorff, 2016) and “Mapping Patent Classifications: Portfolio

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However, we analyse our primary sources, including patents, differently. As

stated in the beginning of this chapter, our method opts for identifying two sets of

associations: 1) sociotechnical associations between humans and nonhumans and 2)

techno-geographic associations that concretise the technical object. We analyse the

sociotechnical associations in the instructive language of some sources, which form

“scripts” that are later “de-scripted” by the users in the field. Although we call our research

object the MRAP, we do not start our analysis from a “constituted individual,” but rather

from an assembling that “individuates” into multiple individuals as it progresses. We do

that through analysing the techno-geographic associations that facilitate the coming-into-

being and concretisation of each of these individuals. Consider the following examples.

The first is an example of analysing patents in Chapter 4 (see “Active Exteriors”).

The excerpt (Figure 1) is from a patent titled Method for Manufacturing of Vehicle Armor

Components Requiring Severe Forming with Very High Bend Angles with Very Thick

Gauge Product of High Strength Heat Treatable Aluminum Alloys (Cho, 2012). The

analysis illustrates how we used the conceptual terms of Simondon and ANT (introduced

in Chapter 2) to extract the associations from highly technical sources like patents. The

original excerpt from the patent is represented in Arial sans-serif typeface, while the

explanatory concepts are added in bold Times New Roman serif typeface. The bold square

brackets [x] indicate a first level of explanation, while the bold braces {y} indicate a second

nested level. Ellipsis indicates the removal of redundant text.

and Statistical Analysis, and the Comparison of Strengths and Weaknesses” (Leydesdorff, Kogler and Yan, 2017).

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Historically the [V shaped hulls are made of welded steel plate sub-ensemble], [which is very heavy and added much more weight internal antagonism] to the armored vehicles [to slow down its {mobility external antagonism} … off main roads, in urban areas, and over bridges associated milieu]… 72 percent of the world’s bridges cannot hold the [MRAP individual] (2012, sec. 0003).

[Instead of steel plate armor discontinued improvement], [it would be more desirable to use aluminum alloy plate to make it lighter major improvement] … [traditional aluminum armor alloys such as {AA5083 and AA6061 old elements} are not strong enough technicity] … [a new aluminum alloy, {AA2139 new element} … provide much improved ballistic and mine blast protection increased technicity] (2012, sec. 0004).

… [strategically combining the metallurgical process of manufacturing high strength aluminum alloys and the forming process of V shaped hull could improve the formability of the very thick gauge high strength alloy product thermodynamic ensembles] … (2012, sec. 0008).

Figure 1 Example of how patents are analysed in Chapter 4; excerpt from Patent Application 20120261039A1 (Cho, 2012).

The second is an example of threading different sources from Chapter 5. In a

breakdown account of electrocution where the MRAPs encounter power lines on the streets

of Iraq, we connect a) a Department of Defense investigation into the cause of soldiers’

deaths, b) an Officer’s field account of people and infrastructure in Iraq, c) Army news

articles about improvised innovations in the field against electrical shocks, d) an Army

Briefing about developing and standardising the same innovation at the Army’s

labs/workshops, e) instructions from the MRAP Handbook on avoiding power lines, and f)

doctrinal principles on winning the trust of local citizens in the area of operation.

Throughout this account, we witness a range of sociotechnical associations among the

soldiers, the MRAPs, and the citizens, and a new MRAP that counters IEDs and electrical

shocks individuates. Chapter 5 analyses a similar account, only a new breakdown of

rollover takes place on the rural roads of Afghanistan and instigates a series of technology

transfers across the land, air, and maritime domains.

Following the examples above, we can almost say that the provision, increase, or

reduction of technicity could be traced and analysed through known/experienced

breakdowns documented as scripts in the primary sources, be it for the operation of a

technical object in the patents (Chapter 4) or an ensemble of military operations in the field

manuals (Chapter 5) and test procedures (Chapter 6). In contrast, new/unknown

breakdowns could be traced in the secondary sources and as part of a de-scription (of the

scripts) in the field in relation to tensions resulting from the “oversaturation of the system”

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(Simondon, 2017, p. 177). For instance, the larger and heavier the MRAP becomes to

ensure survivability, the more tension arises with stronger explosions (Chapter 4) and the

abundance (Chapter 5) or scarcity (Chapter 6) of infrastructure. In other words, the primary

sources attempt to resolve antagonisms only to be de-scripted again in the field, not

through a dialectical back-and-forth but rather a successive evolutionary process of

concretisation.

But tracing such associations is not a straightforward task. We have to examine

patents as “inscription devices” that transform technical inventions to text, figures, and

diagrams like Latour and Woolgar’s laboratory apparatuses (1986, p. 51). The body of a

patent document is full of highly specialised descriptions of technical functioning and

references to elements/technicities (like screws, glues, springs, alloys, etc.) and synergies

(like axles, drive trains, armour, etc.). It is in the “summary of claims” part at the end of a

patent document that sociotechnical associations become evident. For example, when a

new type of independent suspension replaces the standard axles, it is not only the technical

object that performs better but the entire ensemble of military mobility, survivability, fuel

consumption, etc. It is in this “written trace” (Latour, 1983, p. 161) that our work attempts

to simplify inscriptions. Therefore, any method that employs discourse analysis, text

mining89, metadata analysis, word counting, or the sort does not fulfil the required task.

89 Although we use such methods as text mining to search for our data in databases that offer this functionality. For example, we started with collecting related patents and applications through a Boolean search (on 5 December 2017) on four platforms to identify patents related to the MRAP technology. The following is a summary. On Scopus/LexisNexis, we searched using “mine AND resistant AND ambush AND protected” and found 165 patents and 114 documents. On Lens, we searched using “mine AND resistant AND ambush AND protected” and found 226 patents. On USPTO Full-Text and Image Database, we searched using “mine AND ambush” and “armor AND land mine,” and we found 88 and 70 patents, respectively. And on USPTO Patent Application Full-Text and Image Database, we searched using “mine AND ambush” and found 97 patent applications. The results from different platforms had a lot in common, which helped me select the relevant documents. Searching for the acronym “MRAP” and its associated words restricts any findings prior to the use of acronym, and thus any attempt at tracing a technical lineage of the MRAP as a “constituted individual” by name. Accordingly, we used various search keywords to attempt tracing back as much as possible, including the Rhodesian Bush War. The keywords included references to geography, technology, and vehicle model names such as “V-hull AND land mine,” “Rhodesia,” “Buffel AND mine,” “armor AND land mine,” “Cougar AND MRAP,” “Caiman AND MRAP,” “Maxxpro AND MRAP,” “RG-31/RG-33/Nayala AND MRAP,” and “Buffalo AND MRAP.” Then, we screened the initial results to narrow down to the most relevant documents. We saved the findings to the open-source reference management software Zotero, which allowed generating a bibliographic data report. With the refined results ready, we traced (by 26 February 2018) the classifications of patents and applications through their primary and secondary classes and subclasses. The outcome was a total of 21 documents: 17 patents and 4 patent applications. We arranged the documents in a spreadsheet; where multiple versions of the same patent existed, we selected the earliest date patent to trace the initial instance of a breakdown; where a patent application preceded a patent, we elected the patent to trace the approved invention.

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However, our method is not without limitations and challenges. The most evident

is decoding the highly specialised content of the patents and tracing the associated milieu.

On the one hand, it is a challenging task for scholars of urban and architectural studies to

decode the technical functioning and trace the associations with the milieus. On the other

hand, it is also challenging to make connections between the technical findings in the

patents and the situated breakdown events commonly described with the usual geographic

locations and names of urban and rural landscapes. Hence, the method is taxing in terms of

time (see 3.2.2) to familiarise the researcher with military practice, vehicles’ development,

and their related technological change. This would have been facilitated by conducting

interviews with the engineers/inventors behind the patents, military strategists/managers

involved in the MRAP program, or soldiers who experienced the breakdowns first-hand.

Moreover, all empirical sources in this research are composed and produced in

(American) English, as the MRAP is a technical object of the U.S. military. However, we

should note the following distinctions. All twenty-one utility patents and patent

applications sourced from the USPTO are published in English. A few were originally

published in other languages prior to registering their English versions90 with the USPTO,

such as Vehicle Protection Against the Effect of a Land Mine (Hass and Runow, 2007)

published in Germany/2004. Others referenced patents that were originally published in

other languages, such as Mine Resistant Armored Vehicle (Joynt, 2008) referencing

documents published in Switzerland/1962, Germany/1969, and France/1978. All military

publications, corporate websites, news media articles, and visuals (maps, photo captions,

videos) we employ in this research are published in English too. While the empirical

chapters describe how the MRAP encounters infrastructure in Iraq and the landscape in

Afghanistan, our online search found no news articles about such encounters published in

Arabic (a language we are familiar with). This can be a lack in the available and accessible

online sources (such as only-print newspapers), or an indication of the lack of concern to

discuss these encounters in the language of the locals.

3.5 A Note on the Visual Strategy of the Research

Since our research is situated in urban and architectural studies and building on

our trained and practiced visualisation skills as architects/urbanists, our visual strategy

90 These patents have the metadata category mark “(30) Foreign Application Priority Data.”

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complements the textual analysis by extracting the urban and architectural associations

embedded in otherwise highly technical textual and visual descriptions in the sources. We

draw our visuals from patents, military publications, governmental policy documents, news

articles, and commercial brochures. In addition, we trace some photographs to their

original sources in online databases like the U.S. Department of Defense’s Observe Photo

Gallery and Defense Visual Information Distribution Service or private sector databases

like Getty Images and Alamy.

In Chapter 4, we examine drawings from the analysed patents to illustrate the

embodiments of the inventions. There is no map representing a terrain or landscape in

these drawings, and humans are invisible except for figure drawings that show

representations of bodily morphological relations (Figure 2) – as situated in the invention.

However, the drawings represent the elements (Figure 4) and technical individuals (Figure

3) mainly within sub-ensembles (Figure 2), and sometimes within their milieu (Figure 2

and Figure 3). And some patents illustrate the functioning not only in terms of drawing but

also as process diagrams (Figure 5) that represent the technical mediation as sequences of

flows, interruptions, and detours. We show how the associations of survivability that we

analyse are embedded in the patents as data and performances.

In Chapters 5 and 6, we examine diagrams (Figure 6) and photographic evidence

(Figure 7and Figure 8) to illustrate human and nonhuman associations of the survivability

script. Unlike Chapter 4, the soldiers and civilians are visible (Figure 8) in the photographs

rendering the associations of the armoured capsule explicitly entangled in a wider network

of infrastructure (Chapter 5) and additional technical objects (Chapter 6). The visuals help

us compare and connect between processes of scripting in the lab/workshop (Figure 7) and

those of de-scripting in the field (Figure 8). They also illustrate the realisation of

survivability as it expands to include sociability with citizens (Chapter 5) and to transgress

bodily, architectural, and urban scales during soldier training (Chapter 6). Moreover, we

represent a few instances of the textual scripts in the MRAP Handbook into visual sketches

that illustrate the spatialisation of the technical object through reducing a landscape to

terrain. The sketches borrow from representation techniques in architectural and urban

design studies to produce urban street sections and rural road sections.

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Figure 2 Drawing shows sub-ensemble and humans (Asaf et al., 2015, p. Sheet 9 of 11)

Figure 3 Drawing shows technical object and milieu (Tillotson, 2015, p. Sheet 1 of 7)

Figure 4 Drawing shows possibilities of increased technicity (Cho, 2012, p. Sheet 3 of 3)

Figure 5 Process diagram shows assisted door operation (McKee, Scholtes and Hayden, 2015, p. Sheet 6 of 12)

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Figure 6 Diagram of urban elements, from Field Manual (U.S. Army, 2006b, p. B3)

Figure 7 Photo shows testing vehicle in mud, from Test Operations Procedure (ATC Automotive Directorate, 2012, p. 101)

Figure 8 Photo shows welding in the field, from Army news article (Roles, 2009)

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Chapter 4

Engineering the Military Script

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4.0 Introduction

In the first empirical chapter, we analyse processes of experiencing, modelling,

and anticipating survivability within a primary military mode of operation in the field:

mounted mobility91, the military’s term for moving in vehicles. This specific mode

demonstrates the modern militaries’ heavy reliance on vehicles and offers us the empirical

basis to explore the MRAP through an architectural lens as an isolating capsular space and

a protective envelope. We draw the reader’s focus to the architectural character of the

armoured enclosure’s major spatial improvements, although the enclosure is not itself

architectural. These connections become visible as the MRAP breaks down and receives

improvements to realise its “techno-geographic milieu” (Simondon, 2017, p. 58). There is

a parallel to be drawn with buildings as envelopes for resolving the relationship with a

specifically located milieu. What makes the MRAP an important and interesting artefact to

study though is its purpose to provide an architectural envelope prepared to move on

different milieus and to respond accordingly. The MRAP is an extreme case of the

architectural envelope on the move.

The chapter is organised in five sections: the first two explore the adaptation of

the envelope as a physical skin/wall; the third and fourth analyse how the envelope evolves

with the terrain and concretises to include actors inside and outside the vehicle; and the

fifth highlights how these relations of adaptation and concretisation come together in the

technical object. The analysis dives, in a truly Simondonian fashion, into the details of

technical ensembles and sub-ensembles to analyse adjustments (minor changes) and

mutations (major changes) to the technical object.

We examine the MRAP as it incorporates a “script” (Akrich, 1992; Akrich and

Latour, 1992) for survivability in the military landscapes of Iraq and Afghanistan, denoting

the technical object’s program of actions to keep soldiers, equipment, and systems

“mission capable” 92 (U.S. Army, 2005, pp. 1, 7–8). What are these actions, and how are

they connected? How do they confer an architectural character on the connections? How

91 This is a mode of military operation through armoured vehicles, usually without the support of dismounted infantry (i.e., foot soldiers). While mounted mobility historically emerged as a function of speed and increased carrying capabilities, the function of protection became a major factor for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, contingent on any limitations to manoeuvre (see ‘Limited Mounted Maneuver Space’ U.S. Army, 2002, p. 1.14). 92 Or as popular science author Mary Roach simplifies it: “the art and science of keeping people safe in a vehicle that other people are trying to blow up” (2016, p. 26).

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do they bring together networks of humans and nonhumans? How does their coherence

realise a techno-geographic milieu? And when do they prevail or change? We attempt to

answer these questions to show how the MRAP embodies technics for survivable mounted

mobility and translates the military’s technological networks for survivability.

We journey to an unusual place for architects and urbanists to answer questions

about the script and its architectural connections, one that is thematically unusual and

empirically distinct from the design language of space, form, type, and program inscribed

in building drawings and city maps. We trace the survivability network in the form of text,

figures, and diagrams in the highly technical world of utility patents, to find traces93 of

registering innovations as technical improvements to change or adjust relations among

bodies and terrain through vehicles and technical inventions. They help us map

survivability both as technics and as a dynamic program of actions that is neither a fixed

construct of the human imagination nor a by-product of technological determination. But

rather, iterations of an “internal distribution of functions” (Simondon, 2017, p. 38) and

modelling human and nonhuman associations94. Each patent and patent application adds

something to the previous iterations to adjust and refine the script, and with it the envelope.

The visual strategy of this chapter complements the analysis in two ways. It

employs an analytical approach to visualise the architectural relations embedded in the

engineering vocabulary of the patents. And it explains through the patent art the complex

technical assemblies of body-terrain-vehicle relations discussed in the analysis. There is no

map representing a building or a landscape in the patent art; and the body is invisible,

except for figure drawings to illustrate morphological relations within interior spaces. Only

associations showing how survivability is continuously modelled and anticipated as a

script to separate the inside from the outside.

4.1 Primitive Envelopes

Survivability has been a longstanding military concern since before the MRAP.

However, it became the top priority of the U.S. military during the wars on Iraq and

93 What Latour and Woolgar call “inscription devices” to describe laboratory apparatuses (1986, p. 51) 94 Combes differentiates the former as a relation within individuation and the latter as a relationship among individuated terms (Combes, 2012, p. xvi).

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Afghanistan. Their fielded personnel (soldiers and contractors) were increasingly targeted

by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Often,

they were ambushed with another attack in the aftermath of the first one95. In the early

years of the wars, the site of this lethal breakdown was nowhere but the widely used96

mobility platform, the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) dubbed

Humvee.

Beginning in Iraq, IEDs and RPGs disrupted the Humvee’s functioning by

changing its engineered relation between the technical and the geographic. The Humvee

was a mid-1980s vehicle program with two key actions: high mobility97 and serving in

support roles behind combat frontlines, which is what it did in the early-1990s Gulf War.

As a script, the Humvee’s mobility focused on negotiating land obstacles such as

depressions, elevations, slops, and waterbodies (see Figure 13). However, its logistics-

oriented program changed to a combat-oriented one since it began to serve in combat and

security operational roles in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Haiti throughout the

1990s (Figure 9). The military adapted the Humvee by adding various armour and

power/engine upgrades, the former to augment it with higher levels of survivability and the

latter to maintain its high mobility capability. Eventually, the Humvee’s adaptation reached

its limits, as we shall see in two patents and other ad hoc interventions. The improvements

attempted to adapt to the changing milieu by adjusting the technical object: the first set

followed a primordial adaptation of adding more of the same, while the second localised

the vulnerability and introduced a new geometric form.

… WILLYS MB (WWII) WILLYS M38 (KOREAN WAR) WILLYS M151 (VIETNAM

WAR) HMMWV + UAH (PANAMA, SOMALIA, BALKANS, GULF, IRAQ,

AFGHANISTAN) MRAP (IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN) M-ATV (AFGHANISTAN)

JLTV (THE UPCOMING WAR) …

Figure 9 Landscapes/Terrains informing the concretisation of different military light tactical vehicle types since WWII (by author)

95 This is an infamous tactic of guerrilla warfare; see the 1979 Warrenpoint Ambush against the British Army in Ireland and the 1967 Cima Vallona Ambush against the Italian security forces in South Italy. 96 The Humvee was and still is the military’s workhorse and widely used light tactical vehicle. 97 Hence the official acronym HMMWV – High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, pronounced Humvee.

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4.1.1. Primordial Enclosure

SPC. THOMAS WILSON: We’re digging pieces of rusted scrap metal and compromised ballistic glass that has already been shot up, dropped, busted- picking the best out of this scrap to put on our vehicles go into combat. We do not have proper armament vehicles to carry with us [to Iraq].

DONALD RUMSFELD: As you know, you go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time. You can have all the armor in the world on a tank, and a tank can be blown up. And you can have an up-armored Humvee, and it can be blown up.

Figure 10 Excerpt from U.S. military townhall meeting in Kuwait (PBS, 2004).

Relocating the Humvee from its support role to the frontlines of combat solicited

an instant and learned response that understood survivability historically, that is, as a

function of the tested and proven mechanical properties of steel armour. The baseline

Humvee (model M998) had no armour, even worse some models had soft/canvas doors. It

was a body-on-frame vehicle type with a steel frame/chassis and an aluminium body.

Separating the chassis from the body/cab (hence, body-on-frame) was a predominant

technique of the commercial truck/car industries to develop chassis that serve various

vehicle bodies (a form of technical standardisation and economic efficiency). Aluminium

was employed for its light weight to serve the “high mobility” part in the Humvees’ script.

Thus, the military’s initial response was to add armoured steel doors and plates to the

vehicle (becoming model M1109) to resist firearms.

Ballistic steel had already become the most performatively optimal, widely

applicable, and highly affordable of all the ballistic protection materials during the warring

twentieth century. It is made from hot-rolled single steel sheets rather than cast or layered

ones. Its making alternates between different phases through processes of heating,

tempering, and quenching, before it becomes the high strength, dense resisting material

that it is. Heating allows steel to acquire a high plastic strain molecular structure

(resistance to piercing and fragmentation), thus individuating to a stabilised form, a unity.

The U.S. military adapted the Humvee with ballistic steel upon feedback loops from

operations in Somalia (Operation Gothic Serpent 1993), Bosnia and Herzegovina (since

1994), and Haiti (Operation Uphold Democracy 1994-1995) (see Gibson, 2013). Then,

IEDs and RPGs in Iraq rendered these minor improvements obsolete: the destructive

intensity of the new threats exceeded the existing levels of protection; and they localised

the lethal impact at the bottom and sides of the vehicles. What happened next did not

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displace the reliance on steel armour, but it did put its application into question given the

new parameters.

The ample evidence from official military documents, accounts from the field,

and reporting in defence and technology publications shows how the military attempted to

adapt steel armour for Iraq through experimenting with its form. Following Simondon, we

understand form as a force, along with matter (Combes, 2012, p. 5), rather than a pure

being (hylomorphism). It is the potential of ballistic steel to be deformed within the limits

of a mould responding to the new threat’s intensities and locations (after Combes, 2012, p.

5). Among these98, the kits are the best examples to explain how form and matter operate

in what became to be known as the Up-Armored Humvee (model M1114) since 2004. A

kit is a set of parts for an assembly. The assembly in question is a set of attachable

armoured steel parts (screwed/welded) to strengthen the Humvee’s vulnerable spots

(bottom, sides). The main material is rolled steel armour manufactured as single planar

parts (doors, bottom, roof). It also includes armoured glass for the transparent window

parts. The kit is modular: its parts are designed as modules to be systematically replicated,

installed, and maintained (doors, side windows, front window, roof panels, bottom panels).

However, all what makes this assembly a kit would not have been possible without the

“dephasing” (Simondon, 2017) of steel: its formability into rolled, planar parts upon

tempering and quenching, parts that are attachable and replicable.

The kit is the new form that armoured steel takes to overlay the vulnerable spots

of the Humvee, specifically the bottom and sides of the occupants’ cab. The localised

impact of IEDs and RPGs, on the bottom and the sides respectively, delineates and figures

the form. In turn, the new form operationalises an envelope around the occupants’ space

(the cab) that couples the technical with the biological. A scripting gesture that begins to

“inscribe” (Akrich and Latour, 1992) the cab as a highly contained enclosure to protect the

soldiers’ bodies inside the vehicle. It is the dephasing of armoured steel (the mechanical

properties that result from heating ballistic steel) that allowed for shaping the envelope-kit

form and gave survivability in Iraq its initial form: the armour kit.

98 The upgrades include the sprayed-on Explosive Resistant Coating (ERC), the Marine Armor Kit (MAK), the Fragmentation Kit series (FRAG1-7), the Armor Survivability Kit (ASK), and the A/B add-on armour kits among others.

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Such technical improvements rendered the Humvee what Simondon terms a

“primitive object.” Primitive, in this context, refers to an unsophisticated relation between

the technical and the geographic, one where the technical object is not in sync with its

geographic milieu thus requiring its constant regulation by the inventor (Simondon, 2017,

pp. 29–30). The Humvee’s armour had to be constantly upgraded throughout the 1990s and

2000s. Even the modular survivability kits remained minor improvements to adjust the

relation with the new explosive terrain, as they only adapted the Humvee and, in the

process, compromised its mobility script99. Military engineering continued scrambling to

model more effective technics survivability.

A worthy observation that merits further investigation in future research is the

relation between provisional responses to survivability in the field and disciplined design

and procurement processes at the institutional level. The former emerges as swift

makeshift adaptations, while the institutional response slowly takes shape through

bureaucratic process, political deliberation, and mass production. Examples include the

infamous Vietnam War era Gun Trucks adapted with sandbags and scrap steel in the field

from military transportation trucks; the same type of tucks re-emerged during the 2003 Iraq

War. Similarly, soldiers added “scrap metal” (see Figure 10) and “[piled] sandbags”

(Roach, 2016, p. 27) to adapt the Humvees during the early years of the Iraq war

continuing the makeshift practice known as Hillbilly Armor100. Besides its speculative

dependence on the mechanical properties of materials like steel, sand, Kevlar, and even

plywood, such in situ practice illustrates how the military scrambles to operationalise

survivability through trial and error: individuals mobilise their non-military training and

skills; groups engage in design and collaboration; and scrap materials get upcycled as

armour.

4.1.2. Ground Interface

... a vehicular mine blast typically subjects a [Tactical Wheeled Vehicle] to forces and accelerations that are, in turn, transferred to the TWV based crew members inside the vehicle. Such forces and accelerations are capable of causing extensive damage to a human body, and can thereby result in the death of TWV based crew members.

99 The military informally dubbed this version of the Humvee “Groaner” (Lenaers, 2007) 100 Hillbilly is a derogatory term referring to rural people in the United states, in this context used by soldiers as slang for unsophisticated makeshift armour.

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Figure 11 Excerpt from Patent 8707848 (Mills and Stevens, 2008, secs 0002, 0004).

A survey of our empirical military and media sources shows that the success of

the Humvee’s armour kits remained under question. Their limited performance failed, and

military casualties continued to rise. This is attributed to the asymmetric character of

warfare where IEDs evolved101 to become larger and deadlier while the military continued

its frenzied scramble to figure out an adequate level of survivability. Accounts of the U.S.

Marines’ operations in Al-Anbar Province in Iraq are testament to the new situation.

Bigger IEDs were buried in the ground along the movement paths of armoured vehicles;

their detonations were so powerful that they lifted Humvees up in the air before destroying

them and causing fatal injuries.

We come across a common thread in the analysed patents that explains how

military engineers framed this breakdown as a relation of flows and geometry (e.g., Figure

11). The ground-originating explosion gave way to two types of flows: the first, a

shockwave (expanding gases) that deformed any surfaces it interfaced with; the second, a

blast (expanding area of pressure) that travelled through the molecular structure of vehicle

parts and into that of the soldiers’ bodies inside the cab. The geometry of the Humvee’s

underbody multiplied the impact of these flows (e.g., Figure 12). It was flat by design like

the underbodies of most military and commercial vehicles; and it had low ground clearance

due to the extra weight of the armour kit it carried. The flat-low configuration trapped the

energy of the explosion between the ground and the underbody of the vehicle, thus

multiplying its impact due to extra resistance between the two interfaces.

It is this extra resistance that informed the new improvement to steel armour. Let

us analyse two patent documents that are revealing in this respect. The first is Lockheed

Martin’s102 patent application Perforated Hull for Vehicle Blast Shield (Mills and Stevens,

2008), filed in September 2007 and published in March 2008 parallel to fielding the first

MRAPs in Iraq (April 2007) and Afghanistan (February 2008). It proposes to attach a

perforated V-shaped shield to the underbody to deflect an explosion’s force away from the

vehicle and its occupants. The angled planes of the V-shape geometry deflect part of the

101 In Iraq, IEDs were assembled from stock shells or old ordnance (Wilkinson, Bevan and Biddle, 2008), leftover from the defeated Iraqi army’s arsenal. While in Afghanistan they were assembled from ammonium nitrates (C. M. Johnson et al., 2012). 102 The corporation is a global security and aerospace company that develops systems like the recent trillion-dollar flagship F35 Lightning II fighter jet.

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upward blast to the sides while the perforations “partially exhaust gases” thus reducing the

impact of the shockwave. The second is Ceradyne’s103 patent V-shaped Blast Shield for

Protection Against IEDs (Allor, Husak and Skiotys, 2014). The final version of two earlier

iterations in October 2012 and May 2013, it proposes a no-welding construction method to

attach a V-shaped shield efficiently and securely to a flat underbody using Methacylate

adhesive and steel bolts instead of welding.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that our military vehicles need a re-design to the bottom of the vehicle to protect against the new threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). One of the first “V” shaped blast hull designs was used by the South African military in the 1980’s … A large problem is attaching the V-shaped blast shield to vehicles that are already in service. One such vehicle is the Humvee … There are over 16,000 armored Humvees in Iraq today with over 100,000 Humvees worldwide. Their flat, low bottom surface makes them vulnerable to the IEDs.

Figure 12 Excerpt from Patent Application 20080066613 A1 (Allor, Husak and Skiotys, 2014, col. 1).

Once again, we observe the operationalisation of a new form, although still a

primitive one. The new underbody configuration constituted a “synergetic group of

functions” (Simondon, 2017, p. 38) among the V-shape geometry, the attaching method,

and the explosive flows. The upward acceleration and sideways deflection of the explosion

shaped the V-shape morphology of the planar rolled steel armour parts (Figure 14). The

force of the explosion informed a dynamic bolted connection to absorb the shear stress of

vibrations. The bolted V-shape shield adjusted the flat geometry to articulate the explosive

flow and reduce its lethal impact on vehicle and soldiers. However, and like the armour kit,

the V-shape configuration remained a single functional unit separate from the

“synergistically associated structures in the technical object” (Simondon, 2017, p. 38). The

intensity of IED explosions together with the low ground clearance of Humvees defeated

even the most advanced attaching methods, both kits and the V-shape.

4.1.3. Conclusion

The first section introduced how the changing character of warfare from air

superiority to urban and asymmetric spatial engagement in the 2000s manifested in the

103 The company is a subsidiary of the multinational conglomerate 3M, which specialises in advanced materials and ceramics.

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proliferation of the IED. The IED’s power lies in its stealthy ability to occupy the ground

and to become integrated within the terrain. Its explosion disrupts the “techno-geographic

milieu” of military mobility: the explosive force disrupts the Humvee’s horizontal

movement and creates a deadly vertical lift; the shockwave deforms the vehicle parts; and

the pressure travels through the vehicle and transforms into injury within the occupants’

bodies. The IED adds new intensities of obstructing flow to the terrain and shifts the

military’s concern from high mobility to a mobility-survivability hybrid in their light

wheeled vehicle fleets.

We witness the early stages of emerging associations between a physical domain

(mechanical metallurgical properties), an environmental domain (occupant-centred

enclosures), and a biological domain (militarised bodies). Survivability is redistributed as

synergies among these domains as the military attempts to adapt the Humvee to the terrain

of its changing role and context. The minor technical improvements aim to increase

survivability by articulating the acceleration of explosive flows in two forms104: a techno-

morphological change to integrate deflective geometry: the V-shape dubbed as “lifesaving

geometry” (Associated Press, 2008); and an architectural conception of the occupants’ cab

as an isolated enclosure: the armour kit. Yet, the military’s grasp of terrain stays largely

topographical as the improved Humvee continues to be a container space for the soldiers’

bodies.

104 In Simondon’s words, the first would be a minor improvement or a “detour” and the second would be a major improvement or an “mutations which are oriented” (2017, p. 43)

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Figure 13 Reproduced mobility terrain diagram from the Bastion APC vehicle brochure (AM General, 2018)

Figure 14 Reproduced vehicle underbody geometry diagram from patent art of U.S. Patent 10,323,909 B2 (Carton and Roebroeks, 2019, p. Sheet 4 of 6)

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Figure 15 The four key types of severe bodily injuries causes by IED detonations (Ramasamy et al., 2011, p. 163)

Figure 16 Comparison between IED-caused fatalities (dark grey graph) and other fatalities (light grey graph); notice the increase during the 2003-2005 insurgency, and after 2007 when the U.S. attempted to reduce risk by transferring security responsibilities to Iraq (Lamb, Schmidt and Fitzsimmons, 2009, p. 2)

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4.2 Enclosing Bodies

The military’s emerging concerns for surviving a terrain of deadly blasts and

shockwaves (Figure 16) ushered in an urgent need for a radical improvement to what they

conceived of as a “survivability baseline.” The Marines’ Urgent Universal Need

Statement105 (Urgent UNS) of May 2005 was the initial document to officially request “to

increase survivability and mobility of Marines operating in hazardous fire areas against

known threats” (Inspector General, 2008, pp. 2–3). It described a severe situation where

the Up-Armored Humvee broke down in Al-Anbar Province, Iraq, thus establishing the

rationale for an MRAP capability, and eventually leading to its rapid acquisition. The

following is a telling excerpt from the Urgent UNS statement.

There is an immediate need for an MRAP vehicle capability to increase survivability and mobility of Marines operating in a hazardous fire area against known threats…

[Joint Theater Trauma Registry Report] for [October 2004] indicates IEDs are number one Level Ill and Level IV mechanisms of injury. Motor Vehicle accidents [MVAs] are number two mechanism of injury requiring Level Ill treatment. Together IED and MVAs account for 68% or over 750 level Ill and IV grave and serious casualties.

The … fleet is constantly exposed to IED/RPG/SAF threat while conducting active combat, combat support and combat service support as well as the inherent dangers that accrue to vehicles conducting line and long haul missions over the open roads … MRAP capability will provide the operating forces a multi-role vehicle system capable of mitigating four of the greatest casualty-producing agents during [Operation Iraqi Freedom]: IEDs, RPGs, SAF and [MVA] casualties. The MRAP will mitigate or eliminate the three primary kill mechanisms of mines and IEDs - fragmentation, blast overpressure, and acceleration. It will also counter the secondary kill mechanisms of vehicle crashes following mines strikes and fire aboard vehicles. The MRAP vehicle capability will help establish a baseline survivability index that will increase protection and reduce the number of casualties requiring level Ill and IV medical treatment in a given theater of operations.

Figure 17 Excerpt from the Urgent UNS (McGriff and Dewet, 2005, pp. 1–3)

105 The Urgent UNS was one of a few military political and managerial tools to collect enormous power into a single situation. It mobilised the U.S. Department of Defense and its many organisations, the U.S. Congress and its different committees, the armed forces, and defence contractors from different industry sectors. It mobilised what was described as “one of the largest material acquisition programs since World War II” (Howitz, 2008). See also Urgent Needs Process (Commandant of the Marine Corps, 2006, 2009).

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The excerpt (Figure 17) describes the loss of survivability as a function of

incapacitating and disabling soldiers during an operation due to abortive types of injuries

that their bodies sustain. The intensity of the threat and the inadequacy of the protection

both cause severe bodily traumas, translated here in the military’s medical terms for “levels

of care.” Unlike Levels I and II which can receive initial battlefield care and mobile

surgical care respectively, explosions and their aftermath in Iraq inflicted Levels III and IV

traumas and injuries. These include head, neck, and spinal injuries and severe burn and

other traumas (see Figure 15), the types that might require blood transfusion, limb salvage,

and full medical and surgical care at a high volume trauma centre (such as an Air Force

Theatre Hospital106) or an overseas medical centre (such as the Landstuhl Regional

Medical Center107, Germany) (Defense Health Board, 2015, pp. 3–4). The Statement set up

these medical limitations and considerations of the human body as the index for a

survivability baseline that could be offered by the MRAP capability.

The early MRAP-type vehicles were developed by South African defence

contractors (like state-owned Denel) for the colonial Rhodesian Security Forces during the

Bush Wars of the 1960s-1970s. The modern version of the MRAPs travelled from South

Africa to serve with specialised units of the U.S. military, mainly the Explosive Ordnance

Disposal teams. However, the Urgent UNS statement listed fourteen specific requirements

to attain the anticipated survivability baseline, key among them are an integrated V-shaped

hull, armoured glass, anti-armour-piercing protection, four-point restraint harnesses, anti-

shock cushioned seats, cab fire suppression system, and rollover protection (McGriff and

Dewet, 2005, pp. 1–2). Our analysis of the patent documents in the following sections

shows how this anticipated baseline became the guiding road map for a program of actions

to restore survivability, an occupant-centric program concerned with technics of enclosing

bodies in advanced protective envelopes.

Let us start to examine a major improvement to the technical object where it

changes from a single entity to become an assemblage of interdependent modules working

to avoid severe bodily traumas. We analyse two modes of detaching – mechanical and

architectural, as documented in three patents and two patent applications. The first is a

106 Like Air Force Theater Hospital in Balad, Iraq and the Craig Joint Theater Hospital at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan 107 This is the largest U.S. hospital outside of the U.S., and it is “a tertiary referral center for EUCOM, CENTCOM and AFRICOM supporting more than 530,000 beneficiaries” (Trunkey et al., 2010, p. 35).

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mechanical mode that transforms the explosive energy into mechanical work that detaches,

deforms, and crumbles the vehicle into parts. The second is an architectural mode that

detaches and differentiates the occupants’ space as a capsule: an autonomous, well-

isolated, well-protected atmospheric enclosure (see Sloterdijk, 2016) to separate a safe

interior from a hostile outside environment. The capsule becomes an architectural sub-

ensemble within the armoured vehicle’s ensemble.

4.2.1. Sacrificial Parts

A first mode of detaching suggested sacrificing part of the whole, or the

decoupling of a vehicle’s wheel-axle assembly upon encountering a detonation. The

military modelled this mediation of hostile terrain upon two principles: a blast energy is

countered by or transformed to another mode of energy (including the mechanical energy

of the detaching itself); accordingly, a blast’s damage is reduced to avoid an abortive

impairment such as a vehicle crash or immobilisation during combat. An illustrative

example from the early years of the war is the German-based Rheinmetall Landsysteme’s

patent Mine Protection Device, Particularly for Wheeled Vehicles (Grosch, 2005). Filed in

2003, this improvement preceded the design and production of the MRAPs. It describes a

mechanism to sacrifice part of the vehicle in lieu of the whole (Figure 18) by using a

counter-explosion. As one of the wheels drives over an IED or triggers a landmine, a

pressure-sensor signals a pyrotechnic-separator to detonate a wedge charge that detaches

the affected wheel from the vehicle.

It is an object of the present invention to prevent the transmission of a shock wave from an exploding mine into the drive work structure of a vehicle so as to prevent transmission of the shock wave throughout the entirety of the vehicle. Thus, the present invention endeavors [to minimize applied damage to the vehicle so that on-site repairs to the vehicle are still possible

Figure 18 Excerpt from Patent 6892621 B2 (Grosch, 2005, col. 2).

Another example of a similar improvement is Oshkosh Corporation’s patent

application Axle Assembly (Schreiner, Roehl and Pelko, 2011). Becoming a patent in 2013,

this improvement was applied to the second generation of MRAPs and became Oshkosh’s

signature independent suspension system (the TAK-4) that equipped thousands of military

wheeled vehicles (see 4.5). It is a mechanism to maintain functionality in the form of what

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the military calls “residual mobility,” which is a capability for vehicles to continue moving

despite the damages so as to avoid the total immobilisation of an on-site “mobility kill.”

The mechanism (Figure 20) collects a threefold improvement to the axle assembly108: add

shielding plates for some components (differential and steering arms); provide vents in the

proposed shields and existing block components (side and skid plates); and enhance the

suspension system to support shocks in case of lift-crash109. Such design allows the axles

to absorb and dissipate a blast’s energy thus reducing the impact on the occupants and

potentially sustaining the continuity of a vehicle’s mobility.

Yet, a different example of creating sacrificial parts proposes isolating the

occupants’ space from the rest of the vehicle. It divides the vehicle (technical ensemble)

into modules (sub-ensembles) to distribute the synergies of survivability. Let us consider

the invention in Rheinmetall Landsysteme’s patent110 Vehicle Protection Against the Effect

of a Land Mine (Hass and Runow, 2007). Updated to another patent in 2009, the document

depicts the vehicle as “building blocks” and differentiates the occupants’ space (also “crew

space” and “cabin” in the document). It describes a mechanism to localise the blast impact

away from the occupants’ space and into either the front or rear blocks that contain the

wheels and axles (Figure 19). In this situation, connecting fasteners release the main

middle crew block through exploding bolts, and spare electric motors continue to drive any

undamaged wheels and axles.

We witness a shift for mobility from moving-on to moving-with111 the terrain. The

inventions ascribe a better responsive mediation to the terrain, as an interface with the

ground. Wheels and axles are recruited in the protective ensemble, which was exclusively

assigned to armour in previous designs. The performance of protection is enhanced by

redistributing the impact of the blast to the subsystems that encounter the ground first

(wheels and axles), and through maintaining residual mobility and avoiding an abortive

impairment. These technical improvements constitute the initial thinking for separating and

protecting occupants within the vehicle.

108 A typical axle assembly includes wheel-end, steering, drive train, and suspension components. 109 Lift-crash is the event of a blast force lifting a vehicle in the air, causing its fall and crash on the ground. 110 An updated version of this patent is US Patent 7594561 Mine Protection Vehicle System (Hass, Runow and Krutzfeldt, 2009). 111 We draw on Latour’s concept of “spacing” or moving with space (in Literature Review, see Latour, 1996c)

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4.2.2. Capsules

A second mode for detaching suggested substantially isolating the occupants from

the mechanical components of the vehicle. This conception of terrain includes the vehicles’

accelerating mechanical parts upon an explosion, which threaten the occupants’ bodies

inside the cab module. Thus, there emerges the need to detach and differentiate the

occupants’ space as a well-isolated capsule, not just a cab whose function is to seat

humans. What we call capsule refers to the sub-ensemble with a pronounced architectural

character that is concerned with enclosing and protecting the occupants’ bodies from the

terrain, including the explosion’s shockwave and blast, the ground’s debris, and the

vehicle’s accelerating parts. This can be witnessed in a BAE Systems (Tactical Vehicle

Systems L.P.) patent112 entitled Armored Cab for Vehicles (R. D. Johnson et al., 2012).

Eventually evolving through four113 other patents, it documents an invention based on the

MRAP principles to produce capsules for future vehicles (such as the JLTV) or to upgrade

old ones (such as the Humvee). The patent describes a design for an armoured cab that

isolates all the vehicles mechanical parts away from the occupants. The cab is an

independent structural and architectural armoured enclosure (Figure 21); it has a V-shaped

or curved underbody geometry to deflect blasts; and it houses the transmission and power

train in a tunnel outside the enclosure. This improvement is best understood against one

that encloses the mechanical parts within the enclosure such as the 2008 patent Mine

Resistant Armored Vehicle (see 4.5).

We analyse one distinct experimental attempt to drastically modify the survivable

architecture through re-thinking the relation with the ground. The concern here is twofold:

increase survivability by displacing the localisation of the blast under the vehicle; and

maintain mobility by minimising the need to add extra heavy armour. An example of such

an experimental attempt is Hardwire, LLC’s patent application entitled Vehicle with

Structural Vent Channels for Blast Energy and Debris Dissipation (Tunis and Kendall,

2011). Hardwire is a defence contractor specialised in armour systems that have been

furnishing the military’s MRAPs with ballistic glass and anti-explosion solutions. Their

invention proposes a major improvement to the Humvee’s occupant space making it a

porous object (Figure 22). In the details, vertical vent channels run through the vehicle and

provide a mechanism to discharge the blast momentum originating underneath. The

112 Updated versions of this patent are US Patents 8387511 (Johnson et al., 2013), 8616617 (Sherbeck et al., 2013), 8733226 (Johnson et al., 2014), and 9766047B2 (Harmon et al., 2017). 113 Published in March 203, December 203, May 2014, and September 2017

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method counters the upward lift of a blast as the vents relieve and discharge most of the

energy, gas, and debris driven by an explosion under the vehicle. The channels also serve

as anti-deformation structural elements for the occupants’ compartment. Thrust

mechanisms (using combustible material such as solid rocket fuel) complement the work

of the vents by producing a reactive hold down force. The thrust force pushes downwards

to counter the counter-gravitational upward lift of the blast.

Despite its drastic approach that brings the soldiers and the blast so close together,

the military has been testing this invention. The New York Times even reported on how the

inventors borrow from fluid dynamics in aeronautical engineering “[likening] the chimney

to an exhaust vent on a rocket” (Drew, 2011) that disperses the supersonic acceleration of a

wave blast. The 2011 patent application became patent, with versions published in 2013

and 2015. The invention remains a stark example of engineering’s attempts to isolate the

occupants’ space, even though such extreme improvement did not concretise yet.

4.2.3. Conclusion

The second section showed how the Humvee adaptations failed to reduce IED

casualties and continued to inflict severe trauma114 and injury levels that required full

medical and surgical care at specialised hospitals in theatre or overseas. The collapse of

survivability is completely medicalised and measured in critical trauma levels (neck/spinal

injuries, severe burns) in turn intensifying the associations among the physical,

environmental, and biological domains of military mobility in Iraq. The U.S. Marines first

request to mobilise the MRAP capability beyond specialised units (clearing explosive

ordnance) and to all units operating in the field. Iraq has become a terrain of explosive

ordnance, and the concretisation of the MRAP as a counter-explosive protective enclosure

replaces the Humvee and its adaptations.

The patents demonstrate the engineers’ early responses to the traumatic reality of

Iraq’s explosive terrain. Their technical improvements focus on residual mobility and

pristine body enclosures. The mobility-survivability hybrid concertises further as a series of

114 Our analysis uses trauma-informed lens specific to typical physical traumas resulting from IED explosions, as described in military and medical publications. In no way this approach is specialised, based on aggregate or comprehensive data. Among the limitations to this lens is accounting for other types of physical injuries, mental health outcomes (PTSD), and the traumatising experience of being in such an extreme event.

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topological relations between the “figure” or “deformation” (after Lash, 2012) of the

vehicle and that of the terrain. On the one hand, the wheels and axles embody deformation

as a mechanism to deflect/absorb/dissipate the mutations of the explosive energy; on the

other hand, the vehicle is no more a unit, but a coordinated assembling of parts for mobility

(power train) and survivability (capsule). The architectural character of the occupants’

space stands out as a contained, protective capsule making survivability the effect of the

extreme architectural envelope developed as a response to the milieu. In the following

sections, we will see how the engineers’ advanced responses to the traumatic realities of

the war expand the technical ensemble of survivability (while responding to the need of

mobility) beyond the vehicle and recruit the mobility environment and the occupants’

bodies.

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Figure 19 Patent art showing vehicle as modular parts (Hass and Runow, 2007, p. Sheet 2 of 3).

Figure 20 Patent art showing Oshkosh’s TAK-4 independent suspension system; notice how there is no horizontal axle that connects both wheels, rather each wheel independently responds to the terrain (Schreiner, Roehl and Pelko, 2011, p. Sheet 19 of 21)

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Figure 21 Patent art showing a schematic of a cab; notice how the cab is an independent entity from the rest of the vehicle including the tunnel form that isolates its drive shaft components (R. D. Johnson et al., 2012, p. Sheet 1 of 3)

Figure 22 Patent art showing a schematic section of a human and an energy vent coexisting in the extreme event of a detonation (Tunis and Kendall, 2011).

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4.3 Active Exteriors

The U.S. military increased their initial acquisition of MRAP vehicles from a few

hundred to more than 27,000 vehicles between 2006 and 2012, making the MRAP

capability the new standard for raised protection levels in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unlike the

Humvee’s cab that was complemented with ballistic steel kits, the MRAP’s envelop was

originally engineered using military grade steel. This is steel armour plate that is an alloy

of iron, carbon, and other elements combined in specific ratios using specific melting,

rolling, and treatment techniques. Its types include carbon steel and High-Strength Low-

Alloy steel115 (HSLA) produced in the U.S. at an industrial scale by major manufactures

ArcelorMittal USA and Evraz North America. However, applications of steel armour plate

reached two performance limitations: they increased weight thus reduced mobility; and

they still could not withstand the kinetic energy of EFP116 types and intensities of

explosives. For alternatives, land vehicles engineers resorted to aerospace, electronics, and

advanced materials engineering.

We now move to a phase where innovations in the capsular enclosure and its

envelope shifted from passive to active protection. We analyse how the steel envelope

progresses to alternative advanced materials and new assemblages. Similar to smart

climatic technologies for building envelopes, the new improvements employ advanced

materials, environmental sensors, energy computation, and reactive measures. Armoured

land vehicle design borrows material and electronic technologies from aerospace

engineering to mitigate the impact of external threats on the interior of the enclosure and

its occupants. We continue to analyse the construction of survivability in five patents and

one patent application. Two improvements augment the performance of the envelope, and

a third expands the technical ensemble of survivability.

4.3.1. Enhanced Envelopes

115 According to the American Iron and Steel Institute, carbon steel is the most produced steel worldwide “that has properties made up mostly of the element carbon and which relies on the carbon content for structure;” and, HSLA steel has “higher strength, and in some cases additional resistance to atmospheric corrosion or improved formability, […] obtained by moderate amounts of one or more alloying elements such as columbium, vanadium, titanium, used alone or in combination” (AISI, 2019). 116 The kinetics of the Munroe effect, characteristic to shape charges, compromise thick, solid steel and penetrate layers of steel plates. Explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) are an example of shape charges.

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A first improvement acts on the materiality of the armour, that is the performance

of its constitutive materials according to how their properties are forged or arranged. The

invention replaces conventional heavy steel plates with lighter materials having advanced

mechanical properties for higher ballistic protection (e.g., Figure 23). In its pursuit for such

materials, military engineering borrows applications from the aerospace industry and

develops them for protected land mobility.

Historically the V shaped hulls are made of welded steel plate, which is very heavy and added much more weight to the armored vehicles to slow down its mobility and limit the ammunition and personnel carrying capacity. The vehicle's weight and size severely [limit] its mobility off main roads, in urban areas, and over bridges (reference 1). 72 percent of the world's bridges cannot hold the MRAP. Its heft also restricts several of the vehicles from being transported by C-130 cargo aircraft or the amphibious ships that carry Marine equipment and supplies.

Figure 23 Excerpt from Patent Application 20120261039 A1 (Cho, 2012, sec. 0003)

We trace a key invention that produced the second generation of MRAP vehicles

to Cho’s patent application entitled Method for Manufacturing of Vehicle Armor

Components Requiring Severe Forming with Very High Bend Angles with Very Thick

Gauge Product of High Strength Heat Treatable Aluminum Alloys (Cho, 2012). Alex

Cho’s ATI Inc. company engineered advanced Aluminium Alloy applications for the U.S.

Army, U.S. Air Force, NASA, Airbus, Space-X, Bombardier, Alcoa, and BAE Systems.

The company’s web resumé recounts how its expertise facilitated “[manufacturing and

delivering] light weight AA2139 underbody armour for [the MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle

models] … which were expedited to Afghanistan in 2012” (ATI Inc., 2019). The patent

application describes a mechanism to manufacture a stronger V-shape underbody geometry

by reducing joints and employing lighter-but-stronger materials. The new steel alternative

is the high-strength-light-weight Aluminium Alloy AA2139 (also developed by Cho),

similar to applications of Aluminium alloys in the aerospace industries (such as AA2050

and AA2196 for Airbus planes and AA2098 and AA2195 for the F-16 and Typhoon fighter

aircraft). The reduction of joints is achieved through two special methods: a manufacturing

method for Aluminium alloy plates, and a forging method for forming severe-angled-V-

shaped-geometry from a single plate, without welding/jointing (Figure 24). The outcome is

a lightweight capsule with a jointless and seamless V-shape underbody.

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Let us look at another invention in Raytheon Company’s patent entitled Layering

Non-metallic Layers between Metallic Layers to Improve Armor Protection (St. Claire and

Imholt, 2012). One of the world’s top defence contractors specialised in aerospace and

electronics engineering, this is one of Raytheon’s few attempts at developing technologies

for land vehicles like the MRAPs. It describes a mechanism for increasing the plasticity of

armour whose deformation absorbs the energy of accelerating projectiles. This

improvement responds to the evolution of explosives, specifically EFPs and shape charges,

by inserting plastic sheets (such as polycarbonates) between metallic sheets of armour. The

plastic layers intercept projectiles in the skin of the vehicle (Figure 25). Compared to

brittle metal, plastic permanent deformation diffuses the projectiles’ velocity and pressure,

thus reducing penetration of the armoured envelope and setting off shrapnel fragmentation

inside the enclosure.

4.3.2. Smart Environments

A second improvement recruits the environment of the vehicle to multiply the

reactive protection of the envelope. It extends the physical envelope delineating the vehicle

to include its surrounding atmospheric environment. The invention taps into smart designs

for autonomous sensing and reacting protocols that counter the shockwaves of explosions.

It achieves extending the physical envelope by adding sensing and computing devices,

capturing the atmospheric variations, and deploying counter-explosives. Although the two

improvements discussed below have not yet been approved for application, they illustrate

how survivability is engineered from within the envelope outward to the terrain.

Here is one such invention, dubbed “force field” by The Washington Post

(Basulto, 2015), in Boeing Company’s patent Method and System for Shockwave

Attenuation via Electromagnetic Arc (Tillotson, 2015). Another global defence contractor

specialised in aerospace and electronics engineering; this is one of Boeing’s few attempts

to engineer systems for land vehicles. It describes a mechanism to recruit the “atmospheric

air” surrounding a vehicle as an “intermediate medium” that extends the protective

envelope (Figure 26). The improvement responds to shockwaves defined in the patent as

“traveling discontinuities in pressure, temperature, density, and other physical qualities

through a medium,” which – unlike shrapnel and debris –penetrate a thick physical armour

at the molecular level (2015, col. 1). In the details, a lightweight device on the vehicle

senses a projectile/explosion and heats the air through an electromagnetic arc, beam, or

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current (via electric, laser, microwave, or plasma means). The heat alters the air’s

molecular density generating a transient medium, between vehicle and explosion, that

intercepts the shockwave through reflection, refraction, absorption, and/or deflection.

Another relevant invention is documented in Plasan Sasa’s patent Vehicle

Underbelly System (Asaf et al., 2015). This Israeli-based company specialises in vehicle

survivability, and it has equipped MaxxPro and M-ATV MRAPs with advanced armour

solutions (Friedman, 2013, p. 26). The patent describes a smart mechanism to complement

passive with reactive protection, where the V-shaped underbody counter attacks a blast to

resist its deadly effects. The improvement adds an autonomous communication protocol,

deformable armour, and explosive charges to the underbody of the vehicle. First, the

protocol senses a detonation and converts the sensing into data that characterises the

shockwave’s parameters (location of a peak, direction of progression, duration, magnitude

distribution, and spatial geometry). Second, the protocol initiates a sequential counter-

detonation employing the charges. Third, the V-shape armour deflects the blast and

deforms, absorbing the blast energy in this mutation process.

The patent art of Plasan’s document offers another way to engineer the body-

environment relations. It depicts the explosion event and the reactive protection protocol as

frames of movement and change. Rather than a two-dimensional illustration of a section

that cuts through a moment in space-time, a cinematic-like sequence117 captures the flows

of terrain acting on the underbody of the vehicle (Figure 27). The representation of the

dynamic debris and underbody deformations renders visible the expanding gases of a

shockwave and the expanding area of pressure of a blast. The explosion event becomes a

spacing-timing (after Latour, 1996c) continuum of displacement, acceleration, and vibrant

matter. Unlike the expressionless figure drawings that do not represent the erratic

movements of the human body (neck, spinal cord, limbs) while it is harnessed to the seats

inside the capsule.

4.3.3. Energy Transfers

117 Similar to techniques of “flip book” in graphic design, “stop motion” in film, and “cinematic sections” or “serial sectioning” in architecture. For the latter, see the works of architects Enric Miralles, Foreign Office Architects, and Reiser +Umemoto (Carpo, 2013, p. 95; Hensel and Turko, 2015, p. 16).

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A third improvement recruits physical changes in states of matter, i.e., “dephasing

(Simondon, 2017), to multiply the reactive protective capacity of the envelope. A physical,

yet not chemical, change from solid-to-liquid and solid-to-gas states rearranges the

particles of a matter thus absorbing/dissipating a blast’s shockwave in materials such as

thermoplastic polymers and fluid retaining materials. It is a form of energy transfer that

reduces and redirects the blast momentum away from the enclosure. Both improvements

discussed below have not been put to application; yet they illustrate how survivability is

engineered from within the envelope outward to the terrain.

Let us analyse the invention in Foster-Miller, Inc.’s patent Blast/Impact

Mitigation Shield (Parida, Dana and Zaouk, 2015). This military robotics company was

acquired by QinetiQ North America in 2004, whose Q-NET protective net against RPGs

became a major addition to the MRAP protection. The patent describes a mechanism to

reduce a blast’s impact by transferring its energy to state changes in matter. A damping

matter is added to the underbody shield, which changes state from solid to fluid (thus

absorbing the energy) upon an explosion event. The state change is physical not chemical,

where “the phase change material has an extremely high heat of fusion (145-195 J/g), and

thus it requires a lot of energy to transition it from a solid to a liquid state” (2015, col. 4).

The suggested damping material is a thermoplastic polymer like high-density polyethylene

(HDPE) or ultra-high-molecular-weight polyethylene (UHMW-PE). A spacer, made of

spaced-blades (called plunger), allows for the expansion of the energy-absorbing material

upon transition.

Another invention is documented in the U.S. Navy’s patent118 Shock Transfer

Armor (Knies and Moser, 2017). Although we did not find an actual application for this

patent, the invention is one of a few that recruit the physical state change of matter to

protect MRAPs and Humvees. It describes a mechanism to absorb a shockwave when high

fluid retaining materials (HFRM) change state from solid to gas. The patent defines HFRM

as “a material that is able to absorb from 50% to up to 1000% of its weight in water”

(2017, col. 2). The improvement119 attaches an appliqué (add-on) armour-shield to the

underbody of a vehicle, with spherical beads or cylindrical pellets of HFRM layered

between metallic or plastic plates. The beads/pellets absorb the blast energy “through a

118 Submitted on behalf of the United States of America, represented by the Secretary of the Navy 119 More info in the earlier 2013 patent application Material and Process for Coupling Impulses and Shockwaves into Solids

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phase transformation, and … HFRM particle acceleration” (2017, col. 4), thus reducing

impact on the crew compartment. In the details, the spherical or cylindrical form of the

beads/pellets increases the surface area of the HFRM and the air volume in between. To

put things in perspective, the patent describes commercially-available beads/pellets

measuring 150 to 500 micrometres (μm) that can swell with water to about 3 millimetres

(mm) (2017, col. 3). A blast wave increases the kinetic energy of the HFRM in the

underbody shield leading to vaporisation of the absorbed fluid (such as water); the vapor is

released away from the vehicle through the sides of the shield. Thus, we witness the

realisation of survivability as a form of energy exchange through the dephasing processes

of high-density materials that absorb/dissipate the energy of a detonation.

4.3.4. Conclusion

The third section examined how engineers realised complex constructions of

terrain to achieve better improvements of survivability. They expanded the network of

actors making up terrain, which lead to expanded adjustments in the capsule and its

envelope. Besides ground, explosion, and accelerating vehicle parts (see 4.2.2), terrain

expanded to include the atmospheric environment and the envelope expanded to include

the critical work and high performance of advanced materials and smart technologies.

The proposed improvements in the patents expand the network of survivability to

metallurgy, thermodynamics, polymer chemistry, and electromagnetism. They advance the

work of survivability on three fronts: defensive mechanisms change from passive to

active120; armour outgrows steel into composite materials121; and protection extends

beyond the physical capsule into the surrounding atmosphere. The new technics

redistribute the competencies of protection beyond a conventional container of bodies, and

the technical object becomes more entangled with its ground, atmosphere, and materiality.

Levels of survivability increase as a function of better human and nonhuman adjustments.

120 This technical improvement resembles the explosive reactive armour120 (ERA) usually placed on M1 Abrams tanks, M2 Bradley fighting vehicles, and Stryker armoured vehicles. 121 Composite armour might become an application of the new JLTV vehicles, akin to the composite armour of the M1A1 and M1A2 models of the Abrams tank, made of steel, depleted uranium, and ceramics.

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Figure 24 Patent art showing severe bending angles of a single, jointless, thick sheet of AA2139 (Cho, 2012, p. Sheet 1 of 3)

Figure 25 Patent art showing sectional schematics of layering metals with plastics to absorb the kinetics of projectiles (St. Claire and Imholt, 2012, p. Sheet 1 of 3).

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Figure 26 Patent art showing schematic of Humvee with the sensing mechanism and how it heats the medium where the projectile travels (Tillotson, 2015, p. Sheet 1 of 7)

Figure 27 Reproduced cinematic sections from patent art that capture the explosion event and dynamic terrain as a space-time continuum (Asaf et al., 2015)

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4.4 Dynamic Interiors

Let us now look at innovations inside the capsule responding to the severe effects

of terrain that continue to travel through the envelope. We have already seen (4.3.2) how a

blast could travel as accelerating vibrations through the molecular structure of materials,

despite their thickness or advanced properties. To address such threats, engineers shift

focus from blocking flows of terrain (outside to inside) to attenuating their impact once

they reach the inside of the capsule. The interior space joins the technical ensemble as it

becomes the new frontier, the new line of defence, between occupants’ bodies in direct

tension with the effects of terrain. We unpack how survivability is constructed through two

improvements, which we analyse in five patents and one patent application. A first

improvement manages the localisation of occupants’ bodies inside the vehicle. A second

one manages the intensities of flow between the inside and the outside of the protected

enclosure, producing protocols of coordination between humans and nonhumans.

4.4.1. Machinic Bodies

A first improvement manages the localisation of occupants’ bodies inside the

vehicle. The engineers adopt a body-centred lens to localise and reduce the impact of

terrain. They focus on how bodies become prone to impact as blasts travel through the

vehicle’s seats and into the seated occupants’ bodies; and they focus on how the bodies can

interface with the terrain without leaving the safety of the enclosure. The first situation is

grounded in a trauma pathology understanding of the body as an injury sustaining object,

while the second mobilises insights from assistive interfaces.

With new types of IED-related severe bodily injuries (see trauma levels in 4.2),

engineers tap into biomechanics, trauma pathology, and ergonomic design to protect the

soldiers’ body parts from bone fractures, back and head injuries, and other traumas during

explosion events. They innovate seat designs that absorb pressure waves and transfer less

impact to the soldiers’ heads, necks, spines, and limbs. Here is an exemplary invention

documented in Med-Eng’s patent Blast Attenuation Seat (Grant and Almstedt, 2015).

Starting as a patent application in January 2013, the patent of this leading protective

equipment manufacturer paves the way among other patents for attenuation seat design,

particularly by Granite Tactical Vehicles Inc. (Berman, 2017) and the now-defunct

Survivability Solutions LLC (Lamparter, Coman and McLeon, 2015). It describes a

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mechanism to reduce the impact122 of a blast on the seated123 bodies of the occupants. Its

aim is to attenuate the impact of a blast shock transferred to the occupants’ bodies through

the vehicle by reconfiguring the standard method of fixing the seats to the floor of the

vehicle. Instead, the seats are mounted to the ceiling or walls of the capsule’s interior so

they can oscillate with the vertical force of the blast (Figure 29). The mounting device has

elastic deformation properties that allow for vertical and horizontal swaying, using

hydraulic posts and trailing arms. In addition, a four-point harness (borrowed from Auto

Racing, instead of a three-point seatbelt) and a foot pad (independent from the floor)

secure each of the occupants’ bodies to move with the movement of the seats.

Complimentarily, engineers tap into robotics and human-computer interaction to

allow soldiers to operate from within the safety of the enclosure and to minimise the need

for stepping out to the dangerous terrain. We trace this improvement back to when the U.S.

Army’s Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate124 in Fort Belvoir, Virginia,

developed a robotic Interrogation Arm based on a similar device of the specialised

explosive clearance and disposal Buffalo MRAP (similar to 4.2). The Directorate’s work

extends this device from specialised vehicles like the Buffalo MRAP to other MRAPs like

the RG-31. An Army article reports on the effective timing to field the arm device “in Iraq

in May 2007 and in Afghanistan in July 2007” (Fineman-Bertoli, 2008), parallel to fielding

the first MRAP in Iraq in April 2007 (Friedman, 2013).

This invention is documented in the Harris Corporation’s patent entitled

Improvised Explosive Device Defeat System (Summer, Bosscher and Rust, 2015). A

specialist in aerospace and electronics, Harris Corporation’s invention – updated in a 2017

patent – employs its expertise in robotics for detecting and clearing explosive and

hazardous materials. It describes an interface and a mechanism for remote operation from

inside a vehicle (Figure 30). The interface includes a computer control system and a

special hand grip. The mechanism includes a robot system combining a well-articulated,

122 As described in the patent: “A typical mine explosion (such as a 8 kg anti-tank mine) will impart a 200 G load on the vehicle. The configuration of the vehicle seating and suspension and the location of the explosion … will result in the occupants of the vehicle experiencing approximately 80 Gs. Pulse durations are usually in the 10 ms range. Scientific data indicates that the human body can tolerate approximately 20 G pulses for 10 ms without experiencing injury” (Grant and Almstedt, 2015, col. 3). 123 Regular or hung seats in an MRAP fail due to violent vertical and lateral forces of a blast. Occupants’ bodies suffer collision injuries (hitting internal walls and roofs), shock injuries (transferred to legs through the floor), and flailing injuries (as legs significantly move with respect to torso). 124 NV&ESD is part of the C5ISR Center (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) subordinate to the CCDC (Combat Capabilities Development Command).

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well-controlled macro robotic arm and a high-precision, well-controlled micro robotic arm.

The macro arm moves in a plurality of directions to mobilise either the micro arm or a

motorised UGV (unmanned ground vehicle). The operator controls both arms and the

UGV through the computer and its special grip. The improvement responds to two major

limitations, as identified in the patent document: 1) a spatial limitation where fences and

debris restrict the movement of robots like a remote-controlled UGV (2015, col. 6); and, 2)

an operational limitation where precision lacks in some robotic arms – referring to those

early arms mounted on the Buffalo MRAP vehicle (2015, col. 1).

4.4.2. Intense Flows

A second improvement manages the intensities of flow between the inside and the

outside of the protected enclosure. The basic mechanics of entering/exiting a vehicle and

looking through its windows acquire larger complexity for safety, security, and what the

military calls “situational awareness,” which is the capability to remain aware of the

surroundings, to assess risks, and to react in real-time to avoid/reduce harm/injury. Here,

we analyse two patent documents, one concerned with accessibility and assistive

technologies and the other with sustaining a clear visibility for high situational awareness.

Engineers designed special door locks for the MRAPs to limit ingress/egress to

the capsule. Similar to the Berlin Key (see Latour, 1991), only the soldiers have a special

key and can enter – and thus exit – the capsule, denying entry to enemies and keeping them

on the outside. However, door locks might get stuck in the event of rollover (see Chapter

6); so, the army creates a universal key “that fits all locks … responding to emergency

situations when every second counts” (Terry, 2011). In addition, engineers equip the heavy

armoured steel doors with a power-assist system to aid soldiers in opening them and to

keep their hands and fingers safe when closing them. We trace such invention to Control

Solutions’ patent entitled Door Assist System and Method for Controlling Operation of a

Vehicle Door (McKee, Scholtes and Hayden, 2015). A motion control specialist for

medical applications, Control Solutions equips the Caiman MRAPs and other models with

what becomes commercially dubbed the Powered Door System (PDS). The patent – first

version in 2011 – describes a mechanism to automate the operation (opening/closing) of

heavy doors (Figure 31). The improvement motorises the operation of heavy doors and

powers the motors by a local source (battery) independent from the vehicle’s main power

supply. The powered door system has switches and pre-sets to open or close the door from

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inside or outside the vehicle; it also has manual latches to override the pre-sets in case the

power system fails. The system is programmed to control the speed of opening/closing –

including stopping mid-way, and it has sensors to ensure there are no obstructions between

door and frame in order to protect a soldier’s hand/fingers during stepping in/out of a

vehicle.

Situational awareness is the degree to which one is able to maintain a common operating picture of all aspects of the tactical situation. This picture includes an understanding of the friendly and enemy situation and the urban battle space. Since units will have to conduct operations in changing mission environments, it is imperative for commanders and leaders at all levels to achieve and maintain the best possible degree of situational awareness. Enhanced situational awareness will enhance lethality, survivability, and operational tempo.

Figure 28 Excerpt from FM 3.06-11: Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain (U.S. Army, 2002, p. 1.24)

Engineers also designed windows such that they continue to provide clear

visibility under various conditions. To maintain high levels of situational awareness

(Figure 28), and by extension survivability, the occupants of the MRAP depend on window

size/location and state. Situational awareness in the case of driving vehicles necessitates

that soldiers have clear, unimpaired visibility in order to observe the surroundings and

assess risks to reduce breakdown/injury. In Iraq and Afghanistan, MRAP windshields

suffered the impact of blasts and sand abrasion. Different MRAP models had varying

window sizes/locations that affected this capability; however, engineers had two concerns

for survivability: one was maintaining clear visibility through the thick ballistic glass (also

known as transparent armour), and another was protecting soldiers from broken glass

debris in an explosion event. They borrowed another innovation form Auto Racing,

specifically stock-car125, “to protect the expensive ballistic glass on [MRAP] vehicles in

Afghanistan” (D’Elia, 2012). This invention is documented in Clear Defense’s patent

entitled Protective Film Systems and Kits for Vehicular Windows and Window Assemblies

and Methods Using the Same (Cockman, Jennings and Martin, 2012). A leading specialist

in glass security, Clear Defense equipped MRAPs with film laminate. The patent describes

a twofold mechanism to catch shattered-glass debris and to maintain good visibility for the

occupants. This is achieved through applying a protective kit of multi-layered films on the

125 Known also by the name of its regulating body NASCAR (National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing)

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interior and exterior surfaces of a vehicle’s window panels (Figure 32). The interior film

catches shattered-glass debris thus preventing it from injuring the occupants. The exterior

film takes cracks, scratches, and abrasion from the terrain. In either case, the occupant can

peel the damaged film layer to restore a clear visibility.

4.4.3. Conclusion

The fourth section examined how the occupants’ bodies and their interior capsular

space became the focus of innovation for protection. Engineers continued to medicalise

survivability as severe bodily injuries focusing on the cognitive performance of soldiers

(situational awareness) and their bodies’ mechanical performance (seating, operating,

accessing). While it continued to be understood on the micro scale of pressure waves

traveling into bodies through the molecular structures of materials, terrain gained a bodily

scale where measuring its impact and scripting its resistance started from the occupants’

bodies inside the enclosure.

The improvements we analysed in the four patents distributed the work of

survivability over new sub-ensembles of the technical object: seats, doors, windowpanes,

and assistive interfaces. Similar to new meanings that the capsule brought (see 4.2.2), the

consideration of these interior sub-ensembles endowed the MRAP and its capsule with a

pronounced architectural character where humans sit, access, see, and work. Survivability

becomes a function of different corporeal and cognitive performances within/through the

enclosure, rendering the vehicle more than a mere mobile armoured container. The relation

between bodies, terrain, and vehicle is fully topological at this stage, and survivability is

assembled as a program of actions across multiple scales of molecular materialities, bodies

and body parts, vehicles and vehicle parts, and landscapes.

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Figure 29 Patent art showing blast attenuation seats; notice the fixing brackets that mount the seat to the ceiling and floor of the vehicle, and the telescopic oscillation mechanism in the back of the seat (Grant and Almstedt, 2015, p. Sheet 1 of 15)

Figure 30 Patent art showing robotic arm operated through computer interface inside the vehicle (Summer, Bosscher and Rust, 2015, p. Sheet 1 of 6)

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Figure 31 Patent art showing door assist mechanism separating inside the vehicle from the outside environment (McKee, Scholtes and Hayden, 2015, p. Sheet 1 of 12)

Figure 32 Patent art showing layers of protective and peelable film overlaying a vehicle’s glass panel (Cockman, Jennings and Martin, 2012, p. Sheet 1 of 11)

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4.5 Hybrid Scripts

So far, we collected technical responses to an IED-riddled terrain in Iraq and

Afghanistan, and we analysed how emerging concerns for survivability assembled the

MRAP script as multiple improvements, materialities, and scales. We showed how the

vehicular space, i.e., the capsule, that encloses soldiers’ bodies can be analysed through an

architectural lens to situate these improvements as associations among humans, enclosures,

technical objects, and terrain/landscape. However, we have not examined how the

concretisation of the MRAP, into the high performing survivability script it was designed

to be, assembles these multiple improvements as a functioning unity. So, how are they

“coordinated” (after Mol, 2002) as “functional synergies” (after Simondon, 2017) rather

than being a set of collected fragments?

In this section, we uncover this process of coordination by analysing how the

MRAP script progresses from the figure of the MRAP vehicle to that of the M-ATV and

JLTV vehicles. Specifically, we examine how subsequent improvements reference earlier

patents (which we analysed above) and further innovations from the domains of armoured

vehicles, commercial trucks, and heavy-duty construction machinery. The referenced

innovations go as far as the 1940s, collecting technical knowledge from various wars and

“circulating reference” (after Latour, 1999a) across domains and industries. We analyse the

coordination of improvements in four patents. The first describes the M-ATV (third

generation MRAP), while the other three describe the JLTV (post-MRAP).

M-ATV stands for MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle. It is the third generation of the

MRAP vehicles that the military designed with a lighter weight and improved mobility for

the rugged landscape of Afghanistan – hence, the “all terrain” designation. The patent we

analyse, entitled Mine Resistant Armored Vehicle (Joynt, 2008), refers to one M-ATV

prototype – the Cheetah, which was among the finalists126 for the M-ATV program

competition. The Cheetah’s engineers are American defence contractor Force Protection

Industries, Inc. who initially supplied the Cougar and Buffalo MRAPs to the U.S. military

before defence giant General Dynamics acquired their company in 2011.

126 Eventually, the Oshkosh M-ATV won the bid to produce the third-generation vehicles and field them in Afghanistan as we shall see in Chapter 6.

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Unlike other patents that describe inventions of sub-ensembles (parts of vehicles),

this patent127 describes the M-ATV as vehicle, a full technical ensemble. It collects many

of the innovations described before: it has a V-shaped underbody geometry (similar to

4.1.2); a crew capsule (similar to 4.2.2); and enhanced capsule envelopes (similar to 4.3.1).

Unlike the separate capsule in a body-on-frame construction (discussed in 4.1.1), the

Cheetah’s capsule is a monocoque128 figuration. French for single shell, monocoque129 is a

structural enclosure that integrates the body, the skin/envelope, and the frame/chassis of

the vehicle. It isolates the occupants’ space (and engine, in the Cheetah) from the drivetrain

parts underneath (transmission, shafts, differentials, axles, wheels). Compared to the

original MRAP figure, the improvements of the Cheetah offer higher mobility and

survivability levels on Afghanistan’s off-road terrain. These include higher ground

clearance for better off-roading and to distance the vehicle from ground-originating

explosions; compound V-shape geometry with more angles to multiply deflecting IED

explosions; sloped sides, known as glacis, to deflect RPG attacks; and blast-energy-

absorbing pipes to reduce the impact of IEDs. Another version of the 2008 patent was

published in October 2011130 adding a dual V-hull that houses and protects the drivetrain

of the vehicle in-between, thus increasing chances for residual mobility (see 4.2.1).

Among the thirteen131 patents it references, the M-ATV patent cites a version of

Rheinmetall Landsysteme’s patent for modular designs (see 4.2.1), four patents of

armoured vehicles from Cadillac Gage (now Textron), and several other patents on

armoured tanks, amphibious armoured vehicles (including old proposals for submarine

tanks) from the Swiss company MOWAG (now GDELS-MOWAG) and the defunct

French engineering conglomerate Creusot-Loire Industrie. The referenced innovations are

as recent as 2005, but most of them date back to the 1940s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s

collecting work from World War II and the many wars and conflicts since.

127 It is the only patent to document a full MRAP vehicle. 128 The monocoque capsules was and remains to be the predominant design of the anti-landmine vehicles produced in South Africa since the Rhodesian Bush Wars. 129 This is not to be confused with unibody construction in commercial vehicles, which integrates body and frame, but the skin is not structural. 130 An updated version of this patent is US 8033208 Mine Resistant Armored Vehicle (Joynt et al., 2011) 131 See copies of all thirteen patents at the USPTO digital archive.

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HMMWV + MRAP + M-ATV JLTV

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (Humvee) Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected-All Terrain Vehicle Joint Light Tactical Vehicle

Figure 33 Converging concerns for better mobility and better survivability into an integrated technical object (by author)

JLTV stands for Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. It is the newest military light

tactical wheeled vehicle platform to replace a portion of the MRAPs, M-ATVs, and

Humvees (Figure 33). It is engineered to be highly protected, light weight, and

electronically networked, thus combining some of the best capabilities of MRAP

survivability, M-ATV off-road agility, and Humvee high mobility. The “joint” qualifier in

JLTV refers to an economic concern for a joint-service program among the U.S. Army,

Marines, and Special Operations units, unlike the exorbitant multi-service MRAP program

that produced numerous custom models and variations. The three-patent set we analyse

below refers to the winning JLTV prototype from the Oshkosh Corporation, the giant U.S.

manufacturer of commercial and defence heavy vehicles. The patents were published in

2015, ten years after the initial urgent request for the MRAPs in 2005, and the first JLTVs

were fielded during April 2019 to Fort Stewart, Georgia in the U.S. (PEO CS&CSS, 2019)

not Iraq and Afghanistan.

Many of the technical improvements discussed earlier converge in the new JLTV

script. The first patent entitled Energy Dissipation System for an Armored Vehicle Having

Shear Fingers and Crushable Sections describes a mechanism to convert thermal energy to

mechanical energy through the deformation of vehicle parts (Richmond, Krueger and

Pelko, 2015a). The patent describes deformation as the distortion, crushing, bending,

and/or crumpling of parts, an improvement grounded in technics of smart environments

(see 4.3.2) and sacrificial parts (see 4.2.1). The second patent entitled Isolated Cab

Mounting System for an Armored Vehicle describes a mechanism to divide the vehicle into

modules of which one is a structurally isolated occupants cab (Richmond, Krueger and

Pelko, 2015b). The vehicle is assembled along a central structural frame (housing the drive

train and V-shape underbody; see next patent), front and rear sub-frames (housing axles

and suspension), and a crew cab. The improvement is grounded in technics of modular

design (see 4.2.1), capsules (see 4.2.2), and defensive geometry (see 4.3). The third patent

entitled Structural Tunnel Component for an Armored Vehicle describes a mechanism to

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correlate a vehicle’s structure and protection in one element, a structural tunnel

(Richmond, Krueger and Pelko, 2015c). The tunnel mounts the front and rear sub-frames,

and its curvature directs a blast force away from the frame and occupants cab, an

improvement grounded in technics of modular designs (see 4.2.1) and capsules (see 4.2.2).

Among the forty-seven132 patents this tripartite set references, the JLTV patents

cite BAE Systems’ patent (plus five versions of it) for capsules and several other patents

that embody similar technics of modular designs, capsules, intense flows, defensive

geometry, and energy transfers. In addition, they cite two patents for construction

machinery (from Komastsu and Kobelco, Japan), five for commercial cars (from the

General Motors and Chrysler corporations, U.S.), eight for Humvee survivability upgrades,

and others from Navistar, Plasan, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, and Ford. Unlike

Force Protection’s M-ATV patent, the bulk of the referenced innovations collect recent

work from the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, the years of the advent of modern urban warfare.

4.5.1. Conclusion

The last section showed how the MRAP survivability script is assembled as

functional synergies of technical improvements and a coordination among various

conceptions of terrain, bodies, and vehicle. Each of the patents that we analysed in the

earlier sections focused on a localised association among actors and how its technics figure

out in an invention (such as enclosure, envelope, seats, wheels). On the other hand, the

patents that we analysed in the last section demonstrated how the localisations come

together in the final figure of the technical object (the vehicle). The vehicles became tactile

machines, as they traversed the landscape, sensing the undulations of the ground surface,

but also changes in pressure, temperature, density, and vibration of the surrounding

atmospheric environment. The engineers and military’s construction of terrain, and

consequently its associated survivability scripts, proves contingent not only on the

individual technical improvements but on their coordination into synergistic functions,

what we are referring to as technics. Moreover, we find how coordination performs

relationally across the technical landscape of inventions, where concretisation feeds across

the space-time of conflicts, technical objects, and rival corporate institutional networks.

132 See copies of all forty-seven patents at www.uspto.gov (unique link)

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4.6 Conclusion: Extreme Architectures

If a dynamic and realist grasp133 of the architectural upholds it as “a type of a

connector” (after Yaneva, 2010, p. 142), then we can attribute associations of an

architectural character to the MRAP’s capsular enclosure and protective envelope. We

advance this understanding of the MRAP as our analysis has shown a visible shift from an

armoured vehicle’s inert protective container space built around a passive human body to

an active human-vehicle-terrain machine for a mobility-survivability hybrid script.

In the introduction of this chapter, we set out to map survivability both as technics

and as a dynamic program of actions. As technics, we analysed how engineers figured

survivability as iterations of an “internal distribution of functions” (Simondon, 2017, p. 38)

and “functional synergies” (Simondon, 2017, p. 40) among the elements of the technical

object (the vehicle) and its sub-ensembles (enclosure, envelope, seats, windows, wheel

assemblies). As script (program of actions), we analysed how engineers modelled

survivability upon human and nonhuman associations, precisely between the militarised

bodies of occupants and their vehicles/enclosures. The analysed patents do not speak of the

pain134 of bodies of the occupants/soldiers, but they translate military scripts whose key

concern is to avoid injury or reduce its severity level.

We identified four key associations. The first and second are more topographic

than topological. The first bodies in container space is the basic relation of bodies as

objects in a Euclidean space. It starts with the adaptation of the Humvee’s cab and

continues with the development of the MRAP’s capsular enclosure. The second

capsularised bodies is a relation of intense inside-outside separation. It begins with the

MRAP script, then it figures in various iterations of armoured capsules and monocoque

enclosures. On the other hand, the third and fourth associations are more topological than

topographic. The third bodies in networked space is a relation of feedback loops between

human and/or nonhuman actors. It situates bodies amidst flows/transfers within the

enclosure, through the envelope, and with the environment. The fourth machinic bodies is

133 Here we borrow this theorisation of the architectural from Yaneva’s work, which originally looks at buildings (not other enclosures) as “quasi-autonomous architectural machine that mediates experiences and practices” (2010, p. 142). 134 This argument employs a trauma-informed lens specific to typical physical traumas resulting from IED explosions, as described in military and medical publications. Among the limitations to this argument is accounting for aggregate data on pain at different trauma levels and the trust that soldiers put into the MRAP vehicle (apart from general institutional publications with the catch phrase “this truck saved my life”).

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a relation of distributed agency within a hybrid body-vehicle machine. The occupants’

bodies are fully immersed within the mediation of the enclosure and the vehicle’s parts.

These associations are not mutually exclusive – technically or historically. They are

overlapping phases in the process of “concretization” (Simondon, 2017) of the MRAP as a

highly survivable mobile enclosure, whereby the technical object resolves antagonisms in

the functioning between its technical and geographic milieus.

These body-vehicle associations constitute the military’s feedback loops through

the environment, which inform the making of terrain through a process of reduction. The

landscape is reduced135 to dynamic disturbances and localised energy depositions that

compromise the military’s trinity of survivability– soldier, materiel, mission. Shockwaves

(expanding gases), blasts (expanding pressure), and armour penetration (severe

acceleration) became the actors terrorising the military by impairing the weakest link in the

trinity, the human body. Thus, we see the terrain emerge through the technical object as

breakdowns in mechanisms of protection and sensing, both functions of survivability and

mobility. And terraining, as a practice of reduction (or, making of terrain) falls at the heart

of realising a relationality as an operative (and real) practice, and it is continuously

constituted as a principle.

Collating the inventions from the analysed patents showed us the MRAP vehicle

as a “disparate aggregate of scientific and technical solutions” (Serres 1995, p.45 quoted in

MacKenzie, 2002, p. 70) from armoured vehicles to aircraft, rockets, trucks, race cars,

construction machines, assistive technologies, smart technologies, robots, and many more

others. Still, we know from Simondon that “the technical object is never fully known”

(2017, p. 39) as the milieus and technicity are constantly individuating in a dynamic and

changing world. We should continue to not assume that the military prefigures how terrain

evolves, and thus survivability and the technical object. In the next two chapters, we follow

the MRAP vehicles as they are fielded to Iraq and Afghanistan to examine how they allow

the military to simulate (reconstruct not represent) the landscapes as urban and rural,

respectively.

135 Reducing the landscape relative to survivability concerns is by no means the only reduction that the military practices (others are related to mobility, combat, and logistics to name a few); however, it is the one that takes priority in the situation of increased casualties from IEDs.

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Chapter 5

Electric Streets, Fortress Highways

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5.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter, we suggested that the MRAP’s capsular enclosure and

protective envelope can be examined through associations of an architectural character

between the vehicle’s occupants’ bodies and the extreme mobility terrain. The associations

realise the feedback loops from terrain, as “exchanges of energy” (Simondon, 2017, p. 39),

through the technical object. Hence, survivability is understood as a series of technical

improvements that individuate a new technical object (from Humvee to MRAP) and/or

concretise it by folding the antagonisms of its milieu (detonations) into its total functioning

(the MRAP script). But how can we follow the MRAPs in the field as they are deployed to

Iraq and Afghanistan? How to study the military’s figuring out of the urban through the

technical object? And how to study terraining in action – to emulate Latour’s insightful

title (1987)? The utility patents are exclusive references of countering the detonation event

through the work of engineers back in the lab. Their highly technical character136 reduces

the entire experience in the field to the combat-related detonation event; yet relations to the

landscape of the warzone reveal obstructions to the vehicles’ mobility through a range of

non-combat-related breakdowns.

This chapter analyses terraining137 in Iraq as a function of coordination between

survivability and mobility, eventually producing a very unusual survivability-mobility

hybrid script. For besides the advanced technical mediations for survivability developed in

the lab, the MRAP’s mobility in the urban landscape of Iraq runs against new antagonisms

and collects a wider network of human and nonhuman actors. The urban emerges as

encounters with infrastructural networks and risk for the local civilians, forcing the

military to coordinate their survivability with the civilians’ welfare. The urban is

differentiated across the expansive military landscape, and the military is forced to

consider infrastructure and civilians in Iraq and the U.S. We trace these processes of

coordination and differentiation in how the military urbanises the MRAP as a survivability

enclosure and a mobility vehicle.

136 Mainly because patents are a type of specialised documents belonging to a “techno-scientific order” (Hemmungs Wirtén, 2019) and conveying an inside/internalist technical level “occupied by company engineers, strategists, and scientists” (Bowker, 1992, p. 70). 137 We have defined terraining as an active process of interaction between a landscape and a technical object rather than referring to terrain as a static and merely physical geographic feature.

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Through quasi-ethnographic138 analysis of breakdowns in Iraq, we account for

specific situations of friction between the MRAPs’ physical features and the infrastructure

they encounter while moving. The first set of frictions take place on what The New York

Times once called “Iraq’s mean streets” (Dixon, 2008) and includes encounters between:

the vehicles’ high profile and the low clearance of overhead utility lines; the vehicles’

vertical extensions and overhead structures; and, the vehicles’ wide body frames and

narrow street layouts. The second set of frictions realise an expansive military landscape

between the warzone and the home front where the vehicles’ excessive weight

compromises pavement integrity upon its fielding back in the U.S.

We analyse these situations of friction and their interpretations in several sources

available from the digital archives of the U.S. military’s Defense Technical Information

Center (DTIC) and the U.S. Federal Government. The former includes invention briefings,

safety bulletins, medical studies, Department of Defense reports, user handbooks, doctrinal

publications, and risk guides; the latter includes regulations from the Department of

Transportation and the Department of Labor. In addition, we analyse military news articles

and corporate websites/brochures. The sources are selected such that they show the non-

combat-related antagonisms of the MRAP during its operation in Iraq (2007-2011) and

upon its post-war transfer to the U.S. (since late 2000s).

The visual strategy of this chapter complements the analysis in two ways. It

employs photographic evidence to illustrate human and nonhuman associations of the

survivability-mobility hybrid. And it sketches reductions in the physical environment (such

as urban street sections), borrowing from representation techniques in architectural and

urban design studies, to map the military terrain. Unlike the previous chapter, the soldiers

and civilians’ bodies are visible in the visuals, and the architectural associations of the

armoured enclosure get entangled in a wider network of landscape/terrain. Survivability is

shown to be continuously modelled and anticipated as a separation between an inside and

an outside, this time expanding beyond the technical mediation to relations of sociability

and psychology. Understanding the emergent urban environment/terrain in Iraq paves the

way to explore the non-urban/rural terrain in Afghanistan (Chapter 6).

138 Since we do not do ethnography and our work mainly consults digital archives, we use “quasi-” to denote the research’s ethnographic stance where we “devote ethnographic attention,” following Yaneva (2009a, pp. 25–26), through following the actors, collecting fragments of observations, and documenting arrangements (see more in the methodology chapter).

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5.1 Collecting the Urban Landscape

We address the questions of this chapter through exploring the urban as it emerges

out of relations of friction139 (see Figure 39). This means that we do not depart from a set

definition of the urban, but we expect to gain it as we follow the MRAP’s encounter with

its landscape of operation in Iraq. We define friction140 here as the physical resistance

between the survivable mobility of the MRAP and the built environment it encounters. It is

a physical resistance of a serial character141, i.e., it is sequentially experienced by the

MRAPs and their occupants as a series of physical encounters that interrupt their

movement paths and potentially lead to a breakdown. We start from the premise that the

domains of Traffic, Transportation, and Automotive Engineering, and in compliance with

governmental and industrial standards, fold these frictions into the figuration of the

vehicles: their dimensions, weight, and operational procedures. They endeavour to

maintain flows by reducing and/or managing road accidents, infrastructure maintenance, or

vehicle safety design. This is the reason heavy vehicles like trucks and buses142 have

weight limits on roads and bridges, height limits under overhead structures, articulated

arrangements for turning radii, and extra design requirements for visibility from inside the

cab, among others.

However, several factors rendered such compliance obsolete to the MRAPs. Their

survivability script (analysed at length in Chapter 4) increased the vehicles’ physical

dimensions143 far beyond those of their Humvee predecessor. Meanwhile, little

consideration was granted to this matter as priority went for rapid design and

manufacturing to satisfy the urgent needs for survivability in the battlefield, with a blatant

disregard for Iraq and Afghanistan as peoples and landscapes. It was not until the mass

139 What we call friction can be thought of as what the military understands as “second and third order effects,” where actions become entangled in chains of effects and causes beyond their control (Miller, 2006). 140 Our notion of friction is the actual resistance between physical objects; it does not relate to the metaphorical notion of frictions within commodity chains in the illuminating work of anthropologist Anna Tsing (2005). 141 We use the term as an analogy from Gordon Cullen’s notion of “serial vision” in urban design (1961; in Boyer) where pedestrians experience an urban landscape as a series of views sequentially revealed along their walking path. 142 Unlike everyday urban spaces that fold these requirements either in a seamless fashion (where , or until accidents happen (see Moses Bridges) (Mihandoust, 2015; Garutti, 2016; Yaneva, 2017), the warzone plays by different rules. The military prioritises their survivability and realises it in the hulking, inward-oriented architectures of the MRAPs. 143 Besides their basic large dimensions, the MRAPs get even larger with extra armour kits and electronic devices added to them to increase survivability. The add-ons that extend the height include the OGP kit, OWM kit, and CREW antennas; those that increase the width include the MEAP and Net kits; those that increase the length include the Jackal, Rhino, and SPARK.

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deployment of the MRAPs on the streets of Iraq that the extent of overriding established

arrangements of the urban landscape and antagonising local civilians became visible to the

military and their counterinsurgency strategies. The large physical dimensions of the

vehicles clashed with low-hanging power lines (see 5.3.1), overhead structures, and turns

on narrow streets, often leading to deadly non-combat consequences. Compliance with the

regular traffic standards on the streets of Iraq was not possible as an afterthought.

It is through these situated frictions of the MRAPs with the infrastructure and the

built environment of Iraq that we analyse three things: 1) how terraining reduces Iraq’s

urban landscape through the military’s feedback loops; 2) how survivability’s architectural

character grows through new body-vehicle associations; and 3) how the technical object

feeds outward to the urban terrain, becoming emblematically urban for the first time.

We begin tracing these frictions to the document that surveys them: the U.S.

Army’s MRAP User Handbook entitled MRAP Vehicles: Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures. Published almost a year and a half after the fielding of the first MRAP in

April 2007, the handbook is an instructional guide to “familiarize Warfighters and leaders

with the MRAP vehicle, its capabilities and limitations, and planning considerations for its

employment” in Iraq and Afghanistan (2008, p. 1). We analyse this document144 as a

source that charts a survivable mobility map of Iraq and Afghanistan, in the form of

instructions, procedures, and warnings. Specifically, we analyse the handbook’s primary

concern for the restrictive technical and geographic relations between the vehicles’

physical dimensions and weight on the one hand and the confined character of some urban

areas in Iraq on the other hand. The document does not refer to cities and urban areas by

name. However, we trace references to the urban landscape reduced to terrain, such as

“urban areas and other restricted terrain” (2008, p. 3), “urban or confined areas” (2008, p.

6), “bridges” (2008, p. 25), and “through traffic” (2008, p. 26). The reduction process

emphasises antagonisms that restrict and confine a survivable mobility, consequently

concealing/eliminating the other elements of the landscape. The handbook has no shortage

of such antagonisms including narrow streets, gates, bridges and overpasses, traffic, low-

hanging wires and power lines, water bodies, trenches/ditches/culverts, and road shoulders

(2008, pp. 26–27). Understanding the landscape as series and intensities of antagonisms

144 Specifically, Chapter 6 “Capabilities and Limitations” and Chapter 7 “Employability Considerations.”

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facilitates the military’s mission to operationalise survivability as coordinated functions of

articulation, as we shall see next.

Avoid contact with overhead power lines. Avoid streets and alleys that are too narrow for particular

vehicles… Consider civilian vehicle and pedestrian traffic flow when

planning patrol routes… Heavy vehicles can damage or even destroy civilian roads in

the [Area of Operations]. They can also damage or destroy underground and above ground utilities.

Avoid using night-vision devices (NVDs) or blackout driving around civilian traffic using white lights. Doing so endangers you and the civilians, and they can see you anyway.

Figure 34 Excerpt on “considerations for urban operations” from the MRAP Handbook (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008, p. 34)

The above excerpt (Figure 34) is representative of the handbook’s concerns for

survivable mobility in the warzone. It collects relations between road networks, utility

networks, civilian traffic flows (vehicular and pedestrian), and military traffic flows. It

describes a dynamic landscape where people and vehicles move, bodies and utilities risk

harm, and various factions of humans/nonhumans, enemies/allies, and civilian/military

collide. Surveying these relations allows the military to expand improvements of the

technical object to include the vehicles’ occupants – drivers, gunners, and passengers. The

handbook instructs its users on safe action and considerate behaviour while operating the

MRAPs, compounding survivable mobility with well-trained/behaved users and well-

scripted vehicles. Furthermore, documenting these frictions in a handbook realises larger

concerns beyond the immediate instructions to articulate imbroglios and comply with

traffic safety, as we discuss later in the chapter (see metascripts in 5.5).

In similar excerpts from the handbook, we trace the military’s methodical

attempts at outlining physical features of a landscape that foreground the different

frictions. It does not list frictions by type, but the handbook reduces the landscape into

groupings of serial/repetitive physical features based on the disruption and breakdown of

MRAPs on the streets of Iraq. In particular, the handbook reduces the urban to spatial

layouts of roads/streets/routes associated to walls and gates, poles and wires, overhead

structures, depressions in the ground, and traffic. We refer to these associations as quasi-

typologies of urban streets, similar to the analytical tools employed in architectural and

urban design studies; and we visualise them in a matrix to better understand the connection

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(see Figure 37). Despite the wealth of infrastructural and cultural difference among

Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, and other Iraqi urban areas, these quasi-typologies reduce the

urban to terrain, thus offering another way to engineer the body-environment relations.

Forward to 2013, we trace the continuity of this reduction in an article entitled

“Driver Training Revamped” from the Army’s official safety magazine Knowledge. The

handbook’s warning to avoid “streets and alleys that are too narrow” in Iraq develops into

two forms of improvements. One is the prerequisite driver training, an advanced five-day

MRAP driving program at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey; the other is a

simulation of Iraq’s cities, a training obstacle course that simulates “an array of terrain

features … including … narrow passages between shipping containers to simulate an urban

environment” (Dykstra, 2013, p. 12). A practice of reduction par excellence, the standard

shipping container145 replaces the built environment in Iraq to carve out the narrow flows

of the MRAP and reconstructs some frictions of the urban landscape.

Finally, we wrap up this section by analysing a unique account where these

military frictions overlap with civilian everyday life in a district of Eastern Baghdad146.

The situation is probably common in areas ravaged by conflict and occupation, but the

account is unique amidst news reporting on fighting and violence in Iraq. It is a personal

reflective piece by former Army Officer John Amble entitled “On MRAPs; or Protecting

Troops and Eroding Local Support in Baghdad” (2014) from War on the Rocks, an online

national security analysis platform hosting contributions from military scholars and war

veterans. Officer Amble’s account assembles an urban situation of streets, utilities,

civilians, urban activities, and conflict, which he contextualises through service experience

in a landscape divided by developmental disparities and socio-economic inequalities (see

Figure 38).

145 For more on the use of shipping containers and replicating “urban morphologies of the developing world” in the simulation of urban warfare, see the fascinating compendium Fronts: Military Urbanisms and the Developing World (Kripa and Mueller, 2020). 146 The event takes place in ‘Tisa Nissan,’ a district in Eastern Baghdad. The name is an English-to-Arabic transliteration of ‘the ninth of April,’ and the district is also known as New Baghdad or ‘Baghdad Al-Jadeeda.’

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It was mid-summer 2008, another hot day in east Baghdad, and that was the sole topic of discussion among the group of Iraqi men who had gathered around our patrol. We were in a small square in Tisa Nissan, the part of the city at which the relative affluence of Karada to the west meets the chaotic, unplanned sprawl that had come to define much of Baghdad al-Jadida and Kamaliya to the east in recent years… “But why did they tear down our power lines?” For the first time in our deployment, the residents of our demographically diverse area of operations were united. They were united against MRAPs… The vehicles, newly arrived in our area of operations, were causing significant property damage. And so the commander of the brigade that my tactical psychological operations (PSYOP) detachment supported asked for my teams’ help with quelling the growing public anger.

Figure 35 Excerpt from officer Amble’s account (Amble, 2014)

The account is a unique source on such encounters, both in English and Arabic

news media reporting147. Its ethnographic narrative (Figure 35) of quotidian encounters148

captures a complex situation. The MRAP protects the soldiers, tears down the power lines,

and aggravates the locals. Different actions and actors that assemble around the technical

object and reveal the antagonisms and contradictions of the situation. The MRAP’s work to

ensure survivability of the soldiers stands at odds with its disruption of the civilian’s urban

environment and reconfigures the military-civilian relationship. We observe that officer

Amble’s training in psychological operations informs his account on the necessity of

building further and stronger relations between the military and the locals (see analysis in

5.4). Such perspective is not unique or new, and it is at the centre of the military’s

counterinsurgency strategy of coercing and co-opting the locals, also known as Hearts-

and-Minds. What is noteworthy though is how the technical object acquires a program of

distinct but complementary actions. One must protect the soldiers and their military

operations in urban areas. Another must cultivate and sustain the loyalty of the locals by

preserving their urban infrastructure, which feeds back to the first action. This second set

of actions by the MRAPs feeds into what U.S. military doctrine of urban warfare, in Field

Manual FM 3-06: Urban Operations, emphasises as an “urban focus” (see Figure 36) on

the battlefield through the “amplified importance of civil (societal) considerations” (see

Appendix B in U.S. Army, 2006b, pp. B1–B18). In the following sections, we explore this

147 Our online search for stories/reports about military vehicles cutting power lines in Iraq returned no results. It used different keyword combinations and Boolean search operators both in the English and Arabic languages, and it was last performed in February 2020. 148 The type of co-existence of contrasts that war photography is infatuated with.

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complex script further and examine how the military attempts to provision survivable

mobility while considering the interests of urban local civilians (see 5.4).

5.1.1. Conclusion

The first section set the ground to understand the urban as we follow the

movement of the MRAP. The MRAP becomes more than the capsular space or extreme

envelope engineered to protect from explosions (see Chapter 4). Its deployment in the filed

exposes the difficulty of coordinating the survivability and mobility scripts to produce a

survivability-mobility hybrid. Friction between the large vehicles – and by extension their

occupants – and the infrastructure generates further practices of reducing the landscape to a

terrain of physical urban obstacles and limitations that must be articulated to stay safe.

Unlike commercial vehicles engineered relationally within frameworks of traffic safety,

the military figure of the survivable MRAP has not been originally engineered as such

(more on safety in 5.5). Next, we analyse how the military attempts to coordinate

survivability and mobility through “corrective measures” and “mutations” to articulate the

urban terrain only to make the vehicles even larger and more cumbersome to handle.

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Figure 36 Diagram of “relativity of key urban environment elements” from FM 3-06: Urban Operations; notice how the right side of the diagram emphasises “society” over “terrain” in stability operations and unconventional warfare, i.e. counterinsurgency; infrastructure remains the domain of intersection between the social and the physical on both sides of the diagram (Appendix B in U.S. Army, 2006b, p. B3)

Figure 37 Sketch of possible quasi-typologies, as in urban design guides, that translates the military’s reduction of the urban landscape to a set of frictions for the MRAP vehicles; the first row shows sections and the second shows plans (by author)

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Figure 38 An urban morphology map illustrating differences in density and structure between what officer Amble described as an affluent Karada (left) and a chaotic Baghdad al-Jadida (right) districts in Baghdad (original map source: Google Maps, 2019)

Figure 39 Armoured vehicles driving on paved roads in urban settings amidst traffic and civilians: (left, DoD Observe archive) U.S. Marines LAVs driving past a checkpoint in Koretin, Kosovo, 1999 and (right, DVIDS archive) a U.S. Army Stryker driving on a busy street in Mosul, Iraq, 2008; photo credits to Sgt. Craig J. Shell, U.S. Marines (Shell, 1999) and Staff Sgt. Gretel Weiskopf, 139th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (Weiskopf, 2004)

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5.2 Urbanising the Technical Object

Let us now examine how the MRAP created a new relation with overhead types of

infrastructure in Iraq and gave rise to a new understanding of the urban landscape. We

analyse the situation through the lens of a non-combat-related breakdown, electrocution,

that compromises survivability. The MRAPs were the tallest military vehicles serving in

Iraq. The V-shaped underbody and the high ground clearance increased the overall height

of the vehicles, in addition to vertical devices like antennas, turrets, and others. The

MRAPs operated in some of the densest built fabrics of Iraq where they ran into low-

hanging wires and power lines that stretched over the streets to connect civilian households

to utility networks (Figure 41, Figure 42, Figure 43). The combination of taller vehicles

and lesser vertical clearance with power lines became a recipe for electrocution – that is,

death from electric shock (Figure 44). The MRAPs sustained electric hazards to the

soldiers’ bodies and their equipment, leading to death, injuries, or damage from electric

shock.

Accidental contact (or close proximity) between a mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicle (especially its radio antennae) and high-voltage power lines can result in severe injury or death to vehicle occupants… When an energized line makes contact or arcs through the air from the power line through the MRAP vehicle to the ground, the earth becomes hot and the voltage dissipates in concentric rings away from the initial contact point. The power in the gradient voltage rings will vary based on soil composition and moisture content … [extending] from 10 meters in dry soil and up to 40 meters in wet soil.

Figure 40 Excerpt from “Appendix B-2 Surviving Contact with High-Voltage Power Lines” in the MRAP Handbook (2008, p. 133)

This specific height relationship between land vehicles and power lines had not

been a key feature in the military’s repertoire of obstacles to mobility and survivability.

Rather, the military anticipated power lines in urban terrain as part of a network of “critical

infrastructure,” an electromagnetic restriction to radio communications, or a spatial barrier

to projectile trajectories in “urban airspace” as exemplified in the Army’s Field Manual

FM 3-06.11: Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain (2002)149 and the Marine

Corps’ Warfighting Publication MCWP 3-35.3: Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain

149 The same understanding continued in the Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures ATTP 3-06.11 Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain (U.S. Army, 2011a), which succeeded FM 3-06.11.

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(MOUT) (1998)150. Thus, a new associated milieu of tall-MRAPs-low-hanging-power-lines

emerged and obstructed mediating survivability, this time from above the enclosure.

The increasing number of fatalities (“severe injury or death”) is the military’s key

concern and measure of the electrocution breakdown. The above example from the MRAP

user handbook (Figure 40) shows how the military spatialised this concern as hazard

related to the location of the vehicle under the power lines and on wet soil. With the

capacity of flesh and metal to store/circulate electricity, the high-voltage electric current

associated the bodies and vehicles through harm. We traced the only documented fatalities

from electric shocks to the only findings documented in the Department of Defense

Inspector General’s report151 entitled Review of Electrocution Deaths in Iraq: Part II -

Seventeen Incidents Apart from Staff Sergeant Ryan D. Maseth, U.S. Army (2009). The

report investigated different causes of electrocution among eighteen military personnel

(Army, Marines, Navy) and contractors between March 2003 and March 2009 in Iraq (see

Table 2). Only four of the eighteen cases involved operating vehicles. Let us analyse the

four incidents to stay with the MRAPs, as reproduced in Table 2 from data in the report’s

appendix.

The four incidents might seem inconsequential to the statistics of war casualties

when compared to the colossal152 human, economic, and political costs of the wars on Iraq

and Afghanistan. They are not even the main cause of electrocution during military

operations in Iraq as the Inspector General’s report shows. However, this type of data helps

us examine the techno-geographic milieu of this breakdown. The report attributes the

hazardous situation to the characteristic “low-hanging” spatiality of the electrical wires,

which realises specific actions for the vehicles (“snagged”) and the soldiers (“grabbed,”

“came in contact with,” or touched). Unlike officer Amble’s description of “unplanned

sprawl” in some neighbourhoods of Baghdad (as in 5.1), the urban areas here are reduced

to metadata. The table lists the cities of Balad and An Nasiriyah and the military

150 The same understanding continued in the Marine Corps Reference Publication MCRP 12-10B.1: Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) (2016), which succeeded MCWP 3-35.3. 151 About seven years in the lead for developing a technical mediation against this hazard. 152 As per the latest update (Evangelista and Stern, 2018), the Costs of War project at Brown University reported that “more than 480,000 people have been killed by direct war violence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan” including “at least 244,000 [Afghan, Pakistani, and Iraqi] civilians … killed in the fighting” and thousands of U.S. service members and civilian contractors died in combat or from injuries. Over eight million people are displaced by the wars, “hundreds of thousands of soldiers and contractors [are] wounded and [live] with disabilities and war-related illnesses,” and many civilians died “indirectly as a result of the destruction of hospitals and infrastructure and environmental contamination.”

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installations of Al Taqaddum and Al Asad without describing their socioeconomic

conditions or urban fabric. The key observation here is the formation of a body-vehicle-

terrain association that causes electrocution: intercepting live power lines atop the vehicle.

Table 2 Reproduced excerpt from “Appendix A: U.S. Military or Contractor Personnel Electrocuted in Iraq March 2003 through March 2009” (PL for power line, A for Army, M for Marines) in DoD Inspector General’s report (Inspector General, 2009, p. 29)

No. Rank Date Synopsis Code U.S. ARMY A1 CPT

(O3) 18-Sep-03 Balad ~Soldier inadvertently grabbed power lines and

was fatally injured when he tried to lift/move power lines while on top of Bradley vehicle.

PL

U.S. MARINE CORPS M1 LCPL

(E-3) 2-Apr-03 An Nasiriyah ~ While manning a .50 caliber rifle on

top of a 7-ton truck, he was electrocuted when the vehicle snagged low hanging power lines.

PL

M3 SGT (E-5)

28-Jan-05 Camp Al Taqaddum, Iraq ~ While assigned to a Route Recon Convoy that was conducting a search for unexploded ordnance, came in contact with a low hanging electrical wire and was electrocuted.

PL

M5 LCPL (E-3)

16-Apr-07 Camp Al Asad, Iraq ~ While riding in the gun turret of a 7- Ton Truck, he was electrocuted after touching a low hanging electrical wire.

PL

5.2.1. Conclusion

In both examples from the MRAP user handbook and the Inspector General’s

report, we observe how the military learns and produces knowledge: the military knows the

urban through the technical object and through the type of landscape that this object

encounters. In this situation, Iraq’s urban landscape is reduced to an infrastructural mesh of

low-hanging power lines made visible when encountered by the large physical dimensions

of the MRAP, thus operationalising an electrocution. But the MRAP had no measure

against electrocution in its program of actions; it concretised as a counter-IED capsule and

envelope. So, how did the military resolve this antagonism of the new techno-geographic

milieu? How did the survivability script integrate non-combat-related with combat-related

threats? Next, we examine how the new situation forced the military to improve the MRAP

in uncommon ways.

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Figure 41 Low-hanging wires in a Baghdad; original photo captioned “Electrical wires on a typical street corner in Baghdad, 2008” as found in officer Amble’s account (Amble, 2014); photo credit to U.S. Army Sgt. Mark B. Matthews, 27th Public Affairs Detachment

Figure 42 Low-hanging wires in a Baghdad suburb; original photo captioned “Capt. Marty Kulinski, a soldier with the 769th Engineer Battalion, motions for a woman to continue her normal routine Saturday in Sadr City, Iraq, as he pulls security for fellow soldiers who are interviewing an insurgent suspect…” (James Warden, 2008)

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Figure 43 RG33 6x6 MRAPs encountering low-hanging wires – notice how close to the wires the gunner’s position on the roof and the vertical antennas are; original photo (Alamy stock photos) captioned “MRAP … vehicles manned by soldiers of Charly Battery, 2nd Battalion 12th Field Artillery Regiment as part of 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division patrol the streets of Bohriz in Diyala province, Iraq” (Kli, 2008)

Figure 44 Illustration of electrocution from “Power Line Antenna Strike” as found in the MRAP Handbook (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008, p. 42)

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5.3 Moving with Infrastructure

Let us continue to analyse how urbanising the technical object reintegrates the

MRAP with the urban landscape. The military attempts to restore a working relation

between the excessively high and wide MRAP vehicles and the urban streets of Iraq. While

the MRAP script furnishes a survivable enclosure against combat-related blasts and

shockwaves (see Chapter 4), the new technical improvements concerned the survivability

of the MRAP vehicle against non-combat threats in the urban landscape. This entailed a

program of actions that has not been figured into the MRAP survivability script. Here, we

notice a subtle differentiation between the MRAP as a script for survivability (analysed at

length in Chapter 4), which the military calls MRAP capacity153, and the MRAP-type

vehicle as the figuration of this script in a vehicular mode. Following Simondon (2017, pp.

38–39), we distinguish the vehicle as the “total functioning” (concrete technical ensemble)

of a mobility-survivability hybrid and the MRAP script as a “functional sub-ensemble

within the total functioning.” Such distinction allows us to analyse the non-combat-related

antagonisms as “marginal consequences” of the concrete object – the MRAP vehicle,

which become stages or “chain-links in its functioning.”

Next, we analyse how new improvements concretise the MRAP vehicle where the

military and their engineers attempt to coordinate the survivability and mobility scripts, to

eliminate or attenuate friction with Iraq’s urban areas. Specifically, we examine three

breakdowns: electrocution (intercepting low-hanging power lines), bridge strikes (hitting

overhead structures), and vehicle handling (tuning on narrow streets).

5.3.1. Power from Above

The first is the story of an improvement that expands the MRAP’s survivability to

mitigate the risk of electrocution. We analyse a story of technical improvisation in Camp

Taji north of Baghdad, in one of the earliest accounts that attempted to resolve the

antagonism of low-hanging power lines. The military starts to adapt the survivability script

153 The MRAP came to be, both as name and capacity, with U.S. Department of Defense’s 2006/2007 MRAP Rapid Acquisition Program. The first-generation vehicles were known as MRAPs, despite their various brands, categories, and variants. The second-generation were MRAP II. The third-generation vehicles retained the designation its name M-ATV for MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle, while the latest generation became a new platform all together. It was named JLTV for Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and it integrated most of the MRAP script although via advanced technics.

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(as discussed in Chapter 4) to the urban streets of Iraq consequently urbanising the MRAP

vehicles. An Army article entitled “Welding Together a Defense” (2009) recounts scenes

of soldiers fabricating on-site, low-cost, add-on devices to their “state-of-the-art” MRAPs

for an “an extra level of protection…to help brave the roads of Iraq.” The soldiers at Camp

Taji fabricate154 a rudimentary rail-frame-device and install it on top of the MRAPs “to

safely push low hanging electrical wires over the vehicle” (see Figure 48). They attenuate

the risk of electrocution through the makeshift device, whose non-conductive plastic tubes

push away the live electric wires and interrupt the flow of electric current into the vehicle,

the equipment, and the occupants’ bodies. This account is among the earliest attempts at

“corrective measures” (Simondon, 2017), i.e., quick fixes to the technical object.

The military recognised the usefulness of the mediation assembled in the field and

improved the rudimentary device into a standardised, modular version that was mass-

produced and fielded to equip most MRAP vehicles operating in Iraq. Since 2009, the

military developed the new device at TARDEC155, the Army’s lead R&D laboratory for

advanced military ground systems and automotive technologies (2017). The lab is in

Warren, Michigan, next to Detroit, the car capital of the world, and within a global

agglomeration156 of the automotive industry. All MRAP vehicles operating on the streets

of Iraq received this survivability upgrade warranted by the Army’s lead R&D

organisation. The invention concretises in two ways: it acquires a modular design that can

expand “to accommodate new technologies” (2010, p. 6), and it has feasible variants that

employ high-wear, commercially available components, to be installed using “existing bolt

holes” on the vehicles. The standardisation and modularisation aim to integrate the new

positive function to the total functioning of the MRAP vehicle.

The only reference to this improvement is a briefing from the digital archive of

the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), at the Department of Defense. The

briefing nominates a technology for the “Army Greatest Inventions” award, eventually

winning it at the 2009 Army Science Conference in Orlando, Florida. The invention is the

154 In other photographs, we come across multiple versions of this makeshift device including the following combinations: single/double arc, full/partial arc, and centre/side arcs. 155 TARDEC stands for the Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center, subordinate to the Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM). In2019, TARDEC was renamed into Ground Vehicle Systems Center (GVSC) and RDECOM into Combat Capabilities Development Command (CCDC). Both are subordinate to the U.S. Army Futures Command. 156 According to the Detroit Regional Chamber, the State of Michigan has 18 automotive manufactures HQ-R&D, 12 assembly plants, 27 components assembly plants, 8 proving grounds, 97 top suppliers, 85 entrepreneur resources, 47 mobility projects, 20 universities, and 24 transportation hubs (HERE et al., 2019).

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modular MRAP device called the Overhead Wire Mitigation kit, or OWM kit for short. To

better understand the figuration of the new device, we borrow an analogy from Forest

Ecology to compare the spatiality of the OWM kit to that of a tree canopy protecting a

micro ecology beneath it (see Figure 49). We shall call this device the Canopy. It is

basically a modular set of two non-conductive-curved-guides installed on an MRAP

vehicle (see Figure 49). The two guides/rails curve from the front to the back of the vehicle

to protect it during forward/reverse movement in the “confined spaces of an urban

environment” (2010, p. 6). One guide is installed on each side to protect the vehicle “even

when approaching wires at an oblique angle.” The guides are made of “non-conductive

fiberglass and CPVC tubing”157, which denies the flow of electric current through the

Canopy and into the metallic body of the vehicle. In turn, interrupting the flow minimises

“interference with on-board communication and jamming equipment” to preserve the

electronic capabilities for countering remotely detonated explosives (see device in 5.3.2).

Currently, all MRAP vehicles operating outside the wire in Iraq are required to have a wire-clearing device installed on their vehicle. To date, over 3,000 objective OWM kits have been fielded to units across Iraq… Without a doubt, the RDECOM-TARDEC OWM is having a lasting and significant impact on urban operations and continues to provide protection and greater mobility for our Warfighters.

Figure 45 Excerpt from the OWM Kit Briefing (TARDEC, 2010, p. 5)

The functions of protecting soldiers were redistributed between the MRAP script

and the Canopy, add to it preserving the power lines as we shall see later (in 5.4.1). The

Canopy rounded and smoothened the movement space of the MRAPs through Iraq’s wired

streets, literally creating a large curve that scooped and pushed low-hanging power lines

over the vehicles. The Canopy, in its standard and modular figure, integrated the MRAP

vehicle a little further in Iraq’s urban landscape, and the device became a requirement for

all MRAPs operating in Iraq (Figure 45). The military realised a new level of survivability

for their soldiers, electronic equipment, and vehicles, and by substitution for the broader

connection to the military network across Iraq and the Pacific.

157 CPVC is a kind of plastic polymer; the acronym is short for chlorinated polyvinyl chloride which is a more flexible version than regular PVC.

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5.3.2. Overhead Boundary

The second example is an improvement to maintain electronic capacities and

advantage. Like electric wires, overhead structures obstruct the mobility of the tall MRAPs

and intercept their vertical extensions. This type of accidents is referred to as a “bridge

strike” in Traffic Engineering, where tall vehicles – usually trucks or buses – strike a low-

clearance overpass. Several procedures can mitigate – or not158 – a bridge strike including

signposts of clearance limits, prior planning of driving routes (see Figure 34), and/or driver

assistance technologies. The MRAP’s bridge strike is particularly threatening to

survivability if its CREW antennas run into a rigid overhead structure (see Figure 51).

CREW159 is a signal-jamming electronic system designed to disrupt and defeat remote-

controlled detonations of explosives (SRC, Inc., 2018). The U.S. military employs this

system to increase survivability, as part of the tactics of electronic warfare; so, it is

imperative for them to protect the antennas and reduce any friction with other objects.

This improvement is documented in an Army article entitled “Depot Produces 12k

Antenna Flex-mount Devices” (2009). The military develops an improvement at the

Tobyhanna Army Depot, which is the Army’s centre for industrial and technical excellence

and the military’s lead and joint160 logistics support C4ISR161 provider for the U.S. Armed

Forces (U.S. Army, 2019). Located in Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania, the Depot offers

logistical support including fabrication-manufacturing and engineering-design-

development among other capabilities as part of the U.S. Army Materiel Command. The

article describes a device to protect CREW antennas before “contact with a hard object

such as an overpass, bridge or low-hanging wires.” It is a “retrofitted” device made from

existing mechanical parts that the Depot employees “assemble, fabricate and ship … for

use in Southwest Asia,” a reference to the region of Iraq and Afghanistan. The two-part

device is a bracket kit performing two complementary mechanisms: a flex-mount and a

pull-down (Figure 50). The flex-mount allows the antenna to tilt upon contact with a hard

obstacle (see the triangle-axle part in Figure 50). The pull-down allows soldiers to

manually tilt the antenna from the safe interior before reaching an obstacle (see the pulley-

158 See the Robert Moses bridges story (Mihandoust, 2015; Garutti, 2016; Yaneva, 2017). 159 CREW is short for Counter RCIED Electronic Warfare, where RCIED is a Remote Controlled Improvised Explosive Device. Its formal name is AN/VLQ-12 CREW Duke System, manufactured by SRC, Inc. 160 The Depot two designations: one for the Army (Army Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence for C4ISR and Electronics, Avionics, and Missile Guidance and Control) and another for the Air Force (Technology Repair Center for Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence and Tactical Missiles). 161 Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

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cord part in Figure 50). The advanced and costly CREW device receives a low-cost, basic,

mechanical mechanism to assist in protecting it. The mechanism works independently or

with the assistance of the soldiers.

The functions of protecting the soldiers were redistributed among the MRAP

script, the Canopy, and the tilt-pull device, add to it preserving civilian infrastructure as we

shall see later (5.4). The tilt-pull device provided basic technical (auto tilt) and

sociotechnical (manual pull) mechanisms to protect an electronically sophisticated CREW

antenna, which in turn maintained the military’s electromagnetic spectrum and fed out

survivability from within the MRAP on the streets of Iraq. Like the Canopy, the tilt-pull

device integrated the MRAP vehicle even a little further in Iraq’s urban landscape, as it

equipped many vehicles fielded in Iraq.

5.3.3. Tight Flows

To meet demand for a smaller and shorter version to improve mobility in Iraqi cities, Navistar developed the Dash … With the same engine as the MaxxPro Plus, it could do 67 mph and had a turning diameter of 55.5 feet, better than that of the lighter RG31. Compared to MaxxPro, MaxxPro Dash was also shorter and narrower, for better maneuverability in confined spaces.

Figure 46 Excerpt from This Truck Saved my Life (Friedman, 2013, p. 232)

Vehicle downsizing, sometimes referred to as rightsizing, is a policy or practice of preferentially replacing existing vehicles with the smallest appropriate vehicles, potentially offering improved direct vision of other road users, improved maneuverability in urban environments, and reduced conflict with human-scale street geometry.

Figure 47 Downsizing in transportation engineering; excerpt from DoT’s report Optimizing Large Vehicles for Urban Environments (Chiarenza et al., 2018, p. 10)

The third example is an improvement to navigate confined areas. Besides its

excessive height, the MRAP’s width obstructed its access through narrow spaces and

gateways, and its length compromised its turning radius around narrow curves. This is a

problem of flow and infrastructure in Traffic Engineering and a problem of vehicle design

in Automotive Engineering.

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Here is an account of this friction between the technical object and the urban

landscape in two sources. The first is the report documenting the official history of the

MRAP Program entitled This Truck Saved My Life (Friedman, 2013), and the second is the

corporate website of Navistar, a major defence contractor. The report describes how the

Army and their commercial-industrial partner Navistar Defense modify the Dash version

of the MaxxPro MRAP model to better fit Iraq’s urban streets. It discusses the urban as

attributes of the vehicles, enumerating the advantageous physical features for an effective

urban mobility (Figure 46). These are not mutually exclusive attributes, but ones that

together optimise this MRAP model as a better urban version than other models.

Table 3 Reproduced MaxxPro vehicle model comparison from the Navistar Defense website; smallest dimension shaded in grey and urban MRAP model dimensions emphasised in bold (illustration by author); all data is from the website, and all dimensions are in meters and weights in metric tons (Navistar Defense, 2019)

MaxxPro Model Le

ngth

Wid

th

Hei

ght

Whe

el B

ase

Turn

ing

Dia

met

er

~ B

ase

Wei

ght

~ M

ax

Ope

ratin

g W

eigh

t

Notes 1. MRAP 6.45 2.59 3.05 3.88 18.90 17.17 19.73 The basic model to

counter IEDs and small firearms

2. Plus 6.45 2.59 3.05 3.88 18.90 17.64 24.04 additional armour (EFPs), enhanced performance

3. Dash 6.25 2.59 2.77 3.68 16.46 15.42 22.23 “lighter, smaller and more mobile variant”

4. Dash DXM 6.25 2.62 2.92 3.50

3.73 16.46 16.91 23.36 “independent suspension … for extreme theatres like Afghanistan”

The report references the urban through the vehicle’s physical feature and ties

back to the corporate website of Navistar Defense. The website exhibits the line of Maxx

Pro MRAP models, including the Dash, and catalogues the various technical details of

each vehicle. We compiled this data from the website and reproduced a comparison (Table

3) between the four MaxxPro MRAP models. The numbers in the table illustrate that the

Dash’s dimensions became relatively smaller than the other models, an improvement

known as “downsizing” in Transportation Engineering (see Figure 47). The length and

wheelbase (distance between axles) of the Dash become 20 cm less than the initial MRAP

(see rows 1 and 3 of the table). This seemingly small difference amounts to a 13% (1.22 m)

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improvement in the turning radius, one that brings the MRAP closer to the turning162

figure of a car rather than a truck.

The functions of protecting the soldiers were now redistributed among the MRAP

script, the Canopy, the tilt-pull device, and the downsizing. Reducing the dimensions and

turning radius of the vehicle allowed for better manoeuvring in Iraq’s confined areas, thus

reducing situations where slowing/stopping vehicles make them sitting targets for an

ambush. While this improvement did not apply to all MRAP models, it differentiated one

specific model for urban operations and informed the design of the next generation M-

ATV and JLTV platforms.

5.3.4. Conclusion

The third section analysed how the new improvements to the MRAP vehicle

attempted to coordinate its survivability and mobility scripts to achieve a survivability-

mobility hybrid. The MRAP script was already concretised through extreme protective

architectural associations between the occupants’ bodies and the terrain, but the MRAP

vehicle required integration into the urban landscape. For, “possession of territory is …

first and foremost a matter of movement and circulation” as Paul Virilio succinctly put it

(2000). The MRAP vehicle, which is the figuration of the MRAP script in all its

possibilities and limitations, received bulky OWM kits, automatic/manual tilt-pull devices,

and modifications in physical dimensions. The improvements managed to urbanise the

MRAPs, i.e., integrate them in their new techno-geographic milieu (the warzone’s urban

landscape), at least until the withdrawal. Yet they produced a most uncommon, and dare

we say most hideous, technical adaptation that embodied the top-down, heavy-handed, and

scrambling approach of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.

162 For technical standards, see “Appendix C: Bus Vehicle Characteristics” of AASHTO-TVF-1 Guide for Geometric Design of Transit Facilities on Highways and Streets (American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, 2014)

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Figure 48 Improvising technical improvements in the field/warzone in Baghdad; original photo (U.S. Army website) captioned “Spc. Richard Pfleegor of Jersey Shore, Pa., a Soldier with Company B, 328th Brigade Support Battalion, 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, welds outriggers onto a bolt-on metal frame April 16…” (Roles, 2009)

Figure 49 Developing technical improvements in the industrial base/home front in the U.S.; photo from OWM kit Briefing (TARDEC, 2010, p. 3)

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Figure 50 Assembling manually operated MRAP devices at the Tobyhanna Army Depot; original photo (U.S. Army website) captioned “Jerry Pursel, sheet metal mechanic helper, tests the pull-down kit assembly attached to a CREW antenna system flex-mount device…” (Boucher, 2009)

Figure 51 A convoy of Caiman MRAPs equipped with the hulking OWM Kit frames that protect the CREW antennas (the thick vertical casings in the photo), the gunner, and other electronic warfare devices against electrocution on top of the vehicles. Original photo (Getty Images) captioned “Soldiers watch as the last American military convoy to depart Iraq from the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division drives through Camp Virginia after crossing over the border into Kuwait on December 18, 2011 in Camp Virginia, Kuwait…” (Tama, 2011)

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5.4 Urban Scripts for the Warzone

We have now analysed how the military adapts the MRAP vehicles to an urban

milieu to minimise friction with infrastructure, thus increasing their occupants and

equipment’s survivability against non-combat-related threats. In this section, we explore

strategic scales163 of survivability and mobility that expand the milieu to include wider

networks and more actors. We stay with the technical object, but we trace associations of

survivability and mobility that extend beyond the vehicle’s physical armour and into the

sociology and psychology of Iraqi civilians164 and their urban environment. Enter

strategies of coercing and co-opting the locals, which we trace in counterinsurgency

publications to analyse how the various scales intersect through the MRAP. The military

adjusted the technical object to respond to the new concerns, as they were forced to

establish working relations with Iraqi locals affected by the MRAPs’ mobility.

One representative aspect of officer Amble’s account, which we discussed earlier

in the chapter (see 5.1), describes how the MRAPs assemble civilians around them as an

angry, disgruntled crowd. We do not know more about how that specific situation

unfolded, but we learn about the local sentiment against the disruption of ordinary urban

activities of civilian life and as conveyed through the officer’s experience. As such, we

scrutinise the psychological lens of the account – informed by officer Amble’s background

in psychological operations – to understand how the technical object gets entangled in this

situation. We start from TARDEC’s briefing (see 5.3.1) that emphasised the need for

“winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people” through preserving “power, telephone,”

and even laundry wires (2010, p. 2), which their ordinary activities depended on. We trace

the psychological lens from the briefing back to two sources where we explore an example

of the military setting out to make alliances with Iraqi locals through negotiating the bulky

size of the MRAP vehicles and the disconnect it creates between soldiers and civilians. The

two sources are the 2006 Field Manual FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency and the 2012

Monograph Hearts-and-Minds. They cut across a concern for ‘preserving existing

infrastructure’ (Figure 54) against ‘building trusted networks’ (Figure 52) and ‘appealing

to emotions and intellects’ (Figure 53), respectively.

163 When discussing similar scales, military publications do not formally refer to survivability; however, they convey concerns for the safety and survival of their soldiers, which we explore under notions of survivability. 164 Important here is the work of anthropologist Roberto J. González on how the military mobilised Anthropology and recruited anthropologists in counterinsurgency and its experimental program the Human Terrain System (González, 2007, 2008, 2012).

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5.4.1. Preserve Utilities

A-26. Once the unit settles into the [area of operations], its next task is to build trusted networks. This is the true meaning of the phrase “hearts and minds,” which comprises two separate components. “Hearts” means persuading people that their best interests are served by [counterinsurgency] success. “Minds” means convincing them that the force can protect them and that resisting it is pointless.

Figure 52 Excerpt from FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency (U.S. Army, 2006a, p. A-5)

… winning hearts-and-minds equates to subjugating the total person by appealing both to the emotions with a positive end-state vision of the future and to the intellect by presenting decisions of immediate consequence and rational self-import. Addressing the entire human psyche, the strategy is simultaneously one of conciliation and of coercion…

Figure 53 Excerpt from the monograph Hearts-and-Minds: A Strategy of Conciliation, Coercion, or Commitment? (Nell, 2012, p. 33 original italics)

Greater ability to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people – The high profile of the OWM kit makes a bold statement to the local population, and shows intent to preserve their existing infrastructure.

Figure 54 Excerpt from the OWM Kit Briefing (TARDEC, 2010, p. 5)

In the account of the Canopy device from TARDEC’s briefing (see 05.3.1), we

saw how the military sought to connect with Iraqi locals through preserving the power

lines that the MRAPs threatened to cut. The military accorded the Canopy device new

performative roles of technical mediation and symbolic representation to mediate this

friction, besides mitigating electrocution for the occupants of the MRAP (see 5.3.1).

Technically, the Canopy device was tasked with preserving the wire network servicing the

locals. As the MRAPs move, the Canopy performs a scooping mechanism: its curved rails

scoop and guide the low-hanging wires up and over the MRAP, aiming not to cut them in

the process (RDECOM Public Affairs, 2010; TARDEC, 2010, p. 3). Symbolically, the

Canopy’s hulking dimensions were tasked with conveying to the locals a sense of trust in

how the military cares about their ordinary lives through preserving their infrastructure

(Figure 54).

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This example is an uncanny hybrid of technical mediation and what Simondon

calls the “primitive structuration of the magical world” (2017, p. 227). It collects technical

expertise from the Army’s lead R&D laboratory for automotive technologies, and it draws

on basic – if colonial – psychological and anthropological representations of the locals and

their belief systems. For a moment, the briefing represents the MRAPs and their Canopies

as totem poles. Yet, and similar to Amble’s unique account amidst war reporting, we could

neither trace the successful impact – or failure – of the Canopy device in the military

publication that we have analysed nor could we find other stories about the wires in

English and Arabic news media reporting. Even more, the briefing does not foreground

who these locals are, how does the solidity of the military-civilian alliance hold, or whether

the technical-symbolic hybrid approach has any tangible effects. The only thread clear to

us is how the military’s predominantly technocentric lens of Iraq’s landscape attempts to

keep the locals/civilians at bay, thus making them elements of the techno-geographic

milieu of survivable urban mobility.

5.4.2. Build Sociability

The psychological lens in both accounts of officer Amble and the Canopy device

is part and parcel of the U.S. military’s counterinsurgency operations against armed

factions and their support civilian base in Iraq and Afghanistan. The military attempts to

recruit165 the allegiance and cooperation of the locals to aid military efforts in managing

hostilities. With this in mind, we continue to trace how the military set out to connect with

Iraqi civilians through negotiating the isolating effect of the MRAP design. To start, here is

an operational controversy for the MRAPs in Iraq: Should the soldiers operate from within

or without the safety of their vehicles? The psychological lens of this concern focuses on

how the MRAP’s inward-oriented design (see Chapter 4) prevents interpersonal contact

and trust building between the soldiers and the locals. We trace this concern to the

beginnings of the MRAP program and the initial fielding of the MRAP vehicles to Iraq in

2008, particularly to circulating references on the civilians’ psychology from the 2006 field

manual FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency.

165 See Anthropologist Roberto González’s crucial work on “mercenary anthropology” (2007, 2012), which critically scrutinises how the U.S. military expand their counterinsurgency efforts by recruiting anthropologists and social scientists via the now defunct Human Terrain System program (2008).

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A research paper from the Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare School for field

officers argues against employing the MRAPs as they de-humanise the soldiers in the eyes

of the locals. It references the pre-MRAP 2006 field manual FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency,

which is “the first US Army manual dedicated exclusively to counterinsurgency” in over

twenty years (reviewed in González, 2007). The field manual highlights the importance of

establishing presence in the field by working on the ground so that the locals “begin to see

Soldiers and Marines as real people they can trust and do business with, rather than as

aliens who descended from armored boxes” (U.S. Army, 2006a, p. A-5; quoted in Flurry,

2008, p. 4). Similar references circulate in the 2007 key pamphlet Counterinsurgency

Guidance, issued for U.S. soldiers operating in Iraq by their Commanding General

Raymond Odierno166. It calls on U.S. forces to “get out and walk – move mounted [in

vehicles], work dismounted [on foot]” in order not to insulate themselves from the Iraqi

people (Odierno, 2007). Likewise, the MRAP handbook (see 5.1) reminds military leaders

to balance protecting their troops and interacting with the locals, and it warns soldiers of

“the psychological effect large armored vehicles have on interacting with the population”

(Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008, p. 28). This last reference to the negative impact

of the vehicle’s large sizes on the locals’ psyche stands in stark contrast to the briefing’s

quasi-religious celebration of the positive symbolism of the hulking Canopy (see 5.4.1).

5.4.3. Conclusion

In the fourth section, we begin to see how the military considers the MRAP from

the point of view of the urban landscape and the civilians. On the one hand, it is an alien

machine that disrupts infrastructure that the Iraqi locals depend on. On the other hand, it is

considered an unsurmountable architectural fortress, a working envelop that hinders

interactions between humans (civilians and soldiers). These considerations were at the

heart of counterinsurgency operations, where often the military endeavoured to increase

sociability with the Iraqi civilians but the MRAPs did not facilitate it. In what concerns

survivability, the military attempted to overcome these antagonisms in the technical object

to win the locals over and reduce their support of the enemy. The improvements continue

to depend on the technical mediation of the bulky MRAP vehicles, and we witness the

development of more sociotechnical improvements that involve the humans (soldiers)

166 Commanding General of Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNC-I) then United States Forces – Iraq (USF-I)

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stepping out of their vehicles and contributing to the overall work of their own

survivability.

5.5 Urban Metascripts for the Home Front

We set out at the beginning of this chapter to analyse the urban as emergent

relations by following frictions of the MRAP’s survivability and mobility in Iraq. We

focused on Iraq as the MRAP’s area of operations, but we always understood that within

the framework of “military landscapes” (after Woodward, 2014). These are the networks of

geographies shaped by military concerns and viewed through military visions of the world,

including extractive sectors, industrial bases, logistics spaces, and warzones. Following the

technical improvements of the MRAP in the previous sections, we traced actions to sites in

the U.S. where MRAP drivers train in Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey; the

OWM kit is developed in Warren, Michigan; MRAPs receive awards in Orlando, Florida;

and, the tilt-pull device is assembled in Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania. Key epistemological

questions are due here: How does the survivability-mobility script perform across a varied

and expansive military landscape? How is the urban differentiated across geographies

through the same technical object whose circulation realises the networks of the landscape?

More specifically, what kinds of urban does the MRAP generate in what the military

calls167 “theater of war” (Iraq and Afghanistan) and “homeland” (the U.S.)?

To answer these questions, we analyse how the technical object “shifts out” from

one geographic frame to another168, what Akrich and Latour describe as a displacement for

an actant to leave the here and now (1992, p. 260). We turn to a specific situation to

examine associations between the MRAP vehicles and the urban landscape in the U.S. and

what that means for notions169 of survivability and mobility. It is when the MRAPs

returned to the U.S. upon the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq since the late

2000s. This was a “program change” (see Prospective Technology Incorporated, 2010) for

167 For definitions, see DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020, p. 97,216) 168 For example, the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) are only applicable in CONUS. The U.S. Army had to develop a Programmatic Environmental Assessment for the MRAP vehicles upon their return from OCONUS to CONUS to meet these requirements, which outcome was no EIS (Environmental Impact Statement) required (see Prospective Technology Incorporated, 2010, p. ii). 169 In a research paper presented at the EASST/4S 2020 Conference in Prague, we explored this aspect of combat survivability as a speculative imaginary of militarised planetary designs.

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what the military calls “fielding” the MRAPs, i.e. deploying to the field/area of operations

(see U.S. Army, 2015). Despite manufacturing in and shipping from the U.S., the rapid

acquisition process of the MRAPs has only fielded them in Iraq and Afghanistan but not

the U.S. In the sections below, we look first at how the MRAPs embody common safe

mobility regulations across the military landscape. Then, we look at how they differentiate

the urban landscapes of the homeland and the theatre of war by submitting to distinct

frameworks of safe mobility.

5.5.1. Extend Safety

What is the problem with MRAPs returning to CONUS?

Figure 55 Excerpt from the Safety Bulletin (Transportation Engineering Agency, 2014, p. 2)

We analyse the MRAP’s shifting out in a Safety Bulletin170 from the U.S. Army’s

Transportation Engineering Agency (TEA), where we observe for the first time how the

MRAP becomes the object to protect from (Figure 55). That is, the landscape needs to be

protected from the MRAP. As a Traffic Engineering and Highway Safety Bulletin, the

document frames this new understanding within concerns for maintaining public safety,

economic flows, and infrastructural integrity in the U.S. (see Figure 58). We connect the

bulletin’s operational notions and standards of traffic safety to higher level military and

governmental regulations grounded in structural practices of risk management. For risk

management cuts across the expansive military landscape (in the U.S. and abroad), unlike

public safety which is bound to the U.S. geographic limits.

First, let us consider how the shifting out is represented in the bulletin using the

territorial designations CONUS and OCONUS. Issued by the U.S. Board on Geographic

Names in 1959 (USGS, n.d.), the former delineates an inside and the latter an outside.

CONUS designates the Continental United States (the inside), which includes171 the forty-

nine172 States and the District of Columbia in the North American continent. The rest of

170 This is the only issue from the TEA dedicated to operating MRAPs on U.S. roads and highways. 171 Another version of the acronym is the Conterminous or Contiguous United States that includes the 48 States located “between Canada and Mexico” (U.S. House of Representatives, 1990; Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2017, p. DEF-6; United States Transportation Command, 2017, p. 17). 172 Hawaii is not included within CONUS as it is not considered part of North America’s geography.

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the world “Outside”173 CONUS is differentiated as OCONUS174 (Figure 63). We now have

overlapping yet distinct geographic, territorial, and administrative designations that

constitute the U.S. military landscape: CONUS, OCONUS, homeland, and theatre of war.

To simplify, let us consider this military jargon in the language of social science

borrowing from anthropologist Catherine Lutz and geographer Rachel Woodward.

CONUS represents the “battle’s other – ‘the home front’ – and war’s shadow –

‘readiness’” (Lutz, 2002a, p. 7), while OCONUS embodies the stretch of “military

landscapes” (Woodward, 2014) including the theatres/warzones. Now, we can follow the

MRAPs as they return from the warzone to the home front and examine how friction with

infrastructure shifts the military’s concerns from soldiers’ survivability to work safety,

public safety, and defence readiness.

Army operations, whether they involve military situations including tough, realistic training, combat operations, contingency basing, or the industrial base supporting research, development, testing, and production, are demanding and complex.

Figure 56 Excerpt from the pamphlet Counterinsurgency Guidance (U.S. Army, 2014, p. 1)

16–2. Policy: a. OSHA programs and national consensus standards will be applicable to and integrated into all Army equipment, systems, operations, and workplaces (CONUS and OCONUS).

Figure 57 Excerpt from AR 385-10: The Army Safety Program (U.S. Army, 2017, p. 17,83)

Let us examine work safety first. We analyse the MRAP’s association in two

Army documents on risk management. The first is Army Regulation AR 385-10: The Army

Safety Program 175, which is the main policy that cross-references the Army’s doctrinal

publications on managing risk176. The second is Department of the Army Pamphlet Pam

173 Together with “the Commonwealths of Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands; Guam; the U.S. Virgin Islands, and U.S. territories, and possessions,” the two states are referred to as the “non-foreign OCONUS area” (Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2017, p. 106). 174 OCONUS collects defence designations such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command), and others. 175 This version of AR 385-10, dated 24 March 2017, supersedes the version dated 27 November 2013. 176 Such as the System Safety Management Guide (2013) and Risk Management (2014)

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385-30: Risk Management providing guidance on implementing the former regulation,

which is also an updated version of the pre-MRAP risk document177.

The excerpt from the regulation (Figure 56) expands our understanding of military

operations from bound geographies, such as combat in a warzone, to military landscapes of

activities across geographies and territories. The other excerpt from the pamphlet (Figure

57) represents the enactment of this expansive landscape: as a State178 institution, the U.S.

military subscribes to – among others – the U.S. federal government’s national standards

and measures for work safety in all its areas of operation, inside and outside the U.S.

Reference is made here to the programs and standards of the Occupational Safety and

Health Administration, OSHA, which is a federal agency of the U.S. Department of Labor

whose requirements the military’s footprint – all their “equipment, systems, operations,

and workplaces” (Figure 57) – must follow within CONUS and OCONUS. Beyond its

instructive tone, we find that the regulation enacts the military landscape by scripting

OSHA’s requirements into the human and nonhuman actors of the military network. The

actors embody the scripts and transport them on a planetary scale. They extend and

territorialise the State’s institutional concerns of occupational safety across the U.S., Iraq,

Afghanistan, and the associated logistics and industrial geographies.

So, how does this add to our understanding of the MRAP’s survivability? The

combat survivability that we analyse in the technical improvements (see Chapter 4) is a

synergy of functions that serves the military’s direct engagement with violence in the

warzone, hence the protective architectural associations of the MRAP’s capsule and

envelope. However, the State’s concern for work/occupational safety constitutes what

design theorist Damon Taylor calls a “metascript” for engineering the MRAP vehicles,

which is a functioning “located in an ideological field of operation” (2013, p. 358) and

underlying the survivability script among others irrespective of operational geography.

This is why documents like the MRAP user handbook (see 5.1) have general instructions

for operating the MRAP everywhere, such as loading plans, maintenance, tire pressure,

vehicle crashes, falls (off the vehicle), and smashed/pinched extremities (fingers) among

others (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008, pp. 31–43). Also, this explains why the

177 The Risk Management Pamphlet 385-30, dated 2 December 2014, is the updated version of the pre-MRAP Mishap Risk Management Pamphlet 385-30, dated 10 October 2007. 178 I use State (with capital S) to differentiate the United States as a polity from the U.S. 50 states (with small s) as political constituencies within the main polity.

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TEA bulletin references traffic safety in both military and federal regulations when

operating MRAPs in the U.S. Afterall, the MRAPs are equipment of the U.S. military

institution, built by taxpayers’ funds and submitting to State regulations. Accordingly, the

work safety metascript inscribes both the MRAP survivability script and the MRAP

vehicles, and it provisions a compliance with State regulations that facilitates the vehicles’

shifting out from the warzone to the home front. Thus, realising the flows of military

landscapes.

5.5.2. Scale Survivability

MRAPs will usually exceed the weight, height, or width limits … To preserve our Nation’s infrastructure and to keep trucks and buses moving efficiently, States must ensure that commercial motor vehicles comply with federal size and weight standards.

Figure 58 Excerpt from the Safety Bulletin (Transportation Engineering Agency, 2014, p. 3)

Now, we examine public safety and defence readiness as the MRAPs returned to

the U.S. The technical object needed to be urbanised differently to preserve the home

front’s infrastructure. The MRAP ceased to mediate survivability as its counter-blast

capacity became dormant outside the warzone. The vehicles became “ex-MRAP trucks”179

(Friedman, 2013, p. 294), and their heavy weight and large physical dimensions

pronounced new frictions with the U.S. highway and road networks. We analyse how the

MRAPs continued to subscribe to the home front’s public safety rubrics through

compliance with traffic safety measures at the federal and state levels. Unlike the series of

improvements that articulated their mobility in the warzone (see 5.3), the MRAPs’

mobility became highly restricted180 in the U.S. to the extent that most MRAPs are

transported via other vehicles (trailers) to preserve the integrity of the home front’s

infrastructure (Figure 58).

179 Most of the MRAPs are originally based on commercial truck chassis. 180 This situation is specific to military operations. It might not be the case when later some MRAPs get transferred to Law Enforcement Agencies (like the police), although under a different set of rules for operating them in the U.S. and after stripping them of their military equipment.

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MRAPs are wider than most vehicles, which could contribute to sideswipe crashes. MRAPs are also higher, which makes it harder for the driver to see over the hood and vehicle edges. Additionally, the driver’s field of view is very limited due to small thick windows so other vehicles, pedestrians, and obstacles might be obscured … Because MRAPs ride high and have a high center of gravity, the vehicles are also susceptible to rollover. MRAPs are generally also heavier than standard passenger vehicles. This may in turn lead to damage to roads and bridges. Excessive use on roadway shoulders may cause ruts which may lead to an MRAP sinking into the ground surface or overturn.

Figure 59 Excerpt from the Safety Bulletin (Transportation Engineering Agency, 2014, p. 6)

The TEA bulletin assesses the key public-safety-related associations between the

MRAPs and the highway network (Figure 59). Its assessment posits the MRAPs against

heavy commercial vehicles such as trucks and buses, in relation to passenger vehicles

(cars), pedestrians, and the infrastructure itself. Just like in Iraq, the physical features of the

large and heavy MRAPs are at the centre of potential breakdowns of urban mobility and

the disruption of ordinary urban activities of civilian life. Designed from the outside in as

capsular enclosures, the MRAPs have limited visibility of their immediate context. Their

blind spots correspond to their general height, high hoods, long edges, and small windows.

In comparison, commercial trucks are designed from the inside out through high-vision

cabs and peep windows (see Figure 62) to optimise them for urban environments

(Chiarenza et al., 2018). The MRAPs have another limitation: their inadequate stability

due to their heavy weight and high centre of gravity, which could compromise bridge and

road durability and consequently traffic safety. Commercial trucks, on the other hand, are

designed with additional and distanced axles to distribute their weight for optimal

operation on roads and highways. This latter improvement subscribes to the provisions of

the federal Bridge Formula, which we discuss next. The bulletin ends with a list of existing

guidance on MRAP operations from different military commands and centres181 to

mitigate the risks of moving and transporting the MRAPs across the U.S. urban landscape.

We unpack the basic technical mediation to “preserve [the] Nation’s

infrastructure” 182 (2014, p. 3) in a mathematical equation that “establishes the maximum

weight … [that] a motor vehicle may carry on the Interstate highway system” (2015, p. 1).

181 The bulletin lists: The Joint Program Office MRAP, the Army’s Forces Command, the Army’s Evaluation Center, and the Army’s Tank-automotive and Armaments Command. 182 This specific term is part of the actors’ language “to preserve,” and we use it here in lieu of Latour’s concept of “stabilization” in Reassembling the Social (2005).

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This is the Bridge Formula. We trace it from the safety bulletin to a guidance pamphlet183

entitled Bridge Formula Weights, issued by the Department of Transportation’s Federal

Highway Administration (FHWA). The federal jurisdiction of the FHWA and its formula

flattens the U.S. landscape and binds all large and heavy vehicles – commercial or military

– moving on public roads. In Figure 60, we can see how the formula associates heavy

vehicles and infrastructure through a function of weigh distribution. The acceptable

weight184 for a vehicle to drive on public roads and highways must spread over the

vehicle’s axles, those being the assemblies of wheels and shafts that carry the vehicle. The

more the axles and the greater the distance between them, the better the weight distribution

and the lesser the damage to roads and bridges. This is how multi-axle trailers and semi-

trailers haul heavy equipment and materials.

Let us do a small exercise. Apply the formula to Navistar’s MaxxPro Dash model

that was downsized to suit the confined urban spaces of Iraq (see 5.3.3). Based on data we

compiled from the company’s website (Navistar Defense, 2019), the Dash has: a 12.25 feet

wheel base (L), 2 axles (N), and a maximum weight of 51,500 pounds. Calculating the

Dash’s Bridge Formula (using the numbers above) yields a permitted weight on the road

(W) of 42, 250 pounds (Figure 61), which is almost twenty percent less (9,250 pounds)

than its actual maximum weight of 51,500 pounds. The extra weight of the Dash, originally

designed for survivable mobility in urban Iraq, does not make it eligible for safe mobility

in the urban U.S. Except in three cases: it is physically modified by distancing its axles

further (which is not feasible); it is transported via a semi-trailer truck that redistributes its

weight on the road (which is the most feasible); or it is approved via special permit (in

exceptional cases)185.

Through its submission to U.S. specific traffic safety regulations, the MRAP

vehicle – as a technical object – submits to State metascripts of public safety and defence

readiness, which are both vital to mobilise for war as embodied in provisions like the

Highways for National Defense186. The MRAP as a survivability script for soldiers in the

183 The pamphlet was issued in August 2006 and last revised in May 2015; the Bridge Formula was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1975. 184 Both, the total weight of the vehicle with passengers and cargo (Gross Vehicle Weight) and the max weight designated by the manufacturer (Gross Vehicle Weight Rating). 185 The States not the Federal Government decide on approving special permits since “they have absolute authority over their public highways in both peacetime and wartime” (Transportation Engineering Agency, 2019a). 186 The HND provision is part of the Code of Federal Regulations on integrating “the highway needs of the national defence into the civil highway programs of the various State and Federal agencies” and cooperating

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field and the military at large becomes part of a larger survivability system, that of the

State and its systems. The script and the system feed into each other (one allows the other

to progress) only as long as they do not compromise each other’s technical integrity.

5.5.3. Conclusion

The last section analysed a difference. In Iraq, the technics of the MRAP vehicle

were at the core of resolving non-combat-related mobility antagonisms/breakdowns with

the infrastructure and the locals, which complemented the work of the combat-related

survivability script against IEDs/RPGs. In the U.S., the survivability script of the MRAP

got deactivated (there are no explosions), and the technics of the ex-MRAP truck could not

resolve mobility antagonisms with the infrastructure. This is not a differentiation of the

urban between Iraq and the U.S. but one between the urban landscapes of a warzone and a

home front. The differentiation illustrates the variegated make up of military landscapes

and the layered work that attempts to coordinate them. The MRAPs’ return to the U.S. is a

displacement from one situation to another, a shifting out from fielding in the warzone

(OCONUS) to fielding in the home front (CONUS). The vehicles become unfit for urban

mobility once again and receive improvements external to the technical object all together.

The ex-MRAP trucks get transported via other trucks, creating a new technical ensemble

for traffic safety and defence readiness.

𝑊𝑊 = 500 �𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 1

+ 12𝐿𝐿 + 36�

W = the overall gross weight on any group of two or more consecutive axles to the nearest 500 pounds; L = the distance in feet between the outer axles of any group of two or more consecutive axles; N = the number of axles in the group under consideration.

Figure 60 Bridge Formula from DoT’s guidance pamphlet (Federal Highway Administration, 2015, p. 1)

with those agencies regarding highways use and construction (Transportation Engineering Agency, 2019b). Read more on HND and the Title I – Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 (Public Law 84-627) at GOVINFO[DOT]GOV.

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42,250 = 500 �12.25𝑥𝑥2

2 − 1+ 12x2 + 36�

Figure 61 Bridge Formula, as in Figure 60, applied to Navistar’s “more” urban version of the MaxxPro Dash MRAP, as measured in Table 3 of sub-section 5.3.3 (by author)

5.6 Conclusion: Urban as Relational Object

In this chapter, we explored how the military constructs their knowledge of the

urban as a relational and emergent – not static and pre-figured – situation of actions for

different types of technologies (military or civilian). The urban emerges as a relational

object constantly improved by the military as much as the MRAPs are. Military terraining

progresses through folding relations with humans and infrastructure to improve their

scripts of survivability and mobility at home and in the warzone, always considering

civilians though for different reasons. These relations resolve antagonisms, what we called

frictions, between the MRAPs’ physical features and the urban landscape, and the military

urbanises the technical object through coordinating requirements for survivability and

mobility, such as traffic safety, civilian-military relations, and infrastructure integrity.

The strategic mobility of the MRAP between home front and warzone extends the

military’s practice/understanding of the urban as a relational object from the bound

geography of the warzone to the fluid spaces of the military landscape. In the process, they

compound various arrangements of mobility and survivability corresponding to the various

regulatory territories, and the urban becomes a differentiated object across the expansive

military landscape.

In analysing enclosures that protect humans, we distinguish between terrain in

Architecture where a building is designed according to a fixed location and terraining in

vehicular technologies where nothing is fixed. The enclosure of the MRAP is supposed to

ensure survivability and mobility; yet this hybrid script assumes a tabula rasa terrain.

When the vehicle moves with an urban landscape, the terraining leads to a new concept of

survivability that does not discriminate between humans (civilians) and the nonhumans

(urban infrastructure/the built environment). In the next chapter, we follow the MRAP as it

moves with the rural landscape of Afghanistan and see how terraining is performed by the

soldiers’ bodies and the MRAP vehicles.

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Figure 62 Comparison of urban design considerations in MRAP (photo from USAASC, 2018) and commercial truck (photo and diagram from Chiarenza et al., 2018, pp. 13, 23): the first has small-high windows that protect during war (outside inward); the second has large-low windows that expand the field of vision to nearby traffic (inside outward)

Figure 63 Sketch of U.S. military territorial extension via state metascripts, from the home front’s geography to the warzone’s territorialisations of bases and vehicles (by author)

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Chapter 6

Breathing in an Upside-down World

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6.0 Introduction

The preceding chapter attempted to answer epistemological and methodological

questions about terraining in action, as a relational and dynamic process of reducing the

landscape to a network of antagonisms. The epistemological part was concerned with how

the military learns about the urban landscape of Iraq as a structured environment with

developed infrastructure (roads, highways, bridges, power lines, dense neighbourhoods)

and through the technical object, the MRAP vehicle. Thus, we analysed terraining in Iraq

as a function of coordinating a survivability-mobility hybrid script through the encounters

of the MRAP with infrastructural networks and risk for the local civilians. The

methodological part was concerned with how we – as researchers, urbanists, architects –

can follow the MRAPs in the field in Iraq and Afghanistan to analyse the military practice.

Thus, we employed a quasi-ethnographic187 analysis of breakdowns in Iraq to account for

specific situations of friction between the MRAPs’ physical features and the infrastructure

they encounter while moving.

But how was the terraining process different in Afghanistan, knowing that the

military had to modify the same MRAPs intended for Iraq? How did the military assemble

survivability in the land of the Hindu Kush? And what do changes in the technical object

and script of survivability-mobility tell us about the reductions that shape and impose the

military’s worldview on the landscape? To answer these questions, the chapter analyses

terraining in Afghanistan as an expanded field of technologies, technical objects, and

training procedures. Contrary to Iraq, the MRAPs were up to a different relationality in

Afghanistan against a less structured environment and therefore more dangerous terrain.

There was less risk for civilians but higher soldier fatalities riding the MRAPs, a situation

that forced the military to mobilise innovations across its land, air, and maritime domains.

We continue to follow the MRAPs through a quasi-ethnographic188 analysis of a

brutal breakdown of the first-generation MRAP vehicles in Afghanistan as they rolled

187 Since we do not do ethnography and our work mainly consults digital archives, we use “quasi-” to denote the research’s ethnographic stance where we “devote ethnographic attention,” following Yaneva (2009a, pp. 25–26), through following the actors, collecting fragments of observations, and documenting arrangements (see more in the methodology chapter). 188 Since we do not do ethnography and our work mainly consults digital archives, we use “quasi-” to denote the research’s ethnographic stance where we “devote ethnographic attention,” following Yaneva (2009a, pp. 25–26), through following the actors, collecting fragments of observations, and documenting arrangements (see more in the methodology chapter).

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over, and often drowned their occupants in water. The analysis is structured in two parts.

The first part analyses the reduction of Afghanistan to rural terrain and the consequent

technical improvements that fold this terrain into the MRAP vehicles. It continues to

describe a terraining centred around the vehicle. We analyse this situation in engineering

studies, handbooks, technical biographies, and military news articles along two threads:

how the military builds its knowledge of terrain through rollovers; and how they collect the

antagonisms of a rural landscape that renders it terrain. The second part explores the limits

of concretisation of the MRAP as an enclosure-vehicle hybrid and focuses on the body-

vehicle synergy instead. It describes a new terraining centred on the human body. We

analyse this situation in medical studies, testing standards and procedures, doctrinal

publications, documentary videos, and magazine/newspaper articles along two threads:

how the occupants/soldiers’ bodies become active subjects of terraining upon encountering

water in the warzone; and, how the MRAP becomes more than one object tasked with

terraining functions.

Similar to the previous chapter, the visual strategy of this chapter complements

the analysis in two ways. It draws on photographic evidence from the empirical sources to

illustrate the dynamic interiors of the MRAPs as sites of instability and antagonism – not

mere occupant spaces. And it sketches reductions in the physical environment (such as

rural road sections) to explain military references for mobility, borrowing from

representation techniques in architectural and urban design studies. The soldiers and

civilians’ bodies are visible in the visuals, and the architectural associations are shown to

extend from the armoured enclosure of the MRAP vehicle to the enclosure of its new

device trainer – the MRAP Egress Trainer. It is our aim to show through the visuals how

the world of the MRAP transgresses bodily, architectural, and urban scales as it expands

the testing, simulation, and training requirements of survivable mobility.

6.1 Collecting the Rural Landscape

We approach the questions of this chapter through examining a breakdown event

specific to compromising the survivability of the MRAPs in Afghanistan: vehicle rollover.

Congressional, medical, and defence reports agree that MRAPs experience deadly non-

combat rollovers due to their physical features of heavyweight and high centre of gravity

(Feickert, 2010; Brooks et al., 2012; Pakulski et al., 2013). Afghanistan’s irregular, soft,

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and muddy ground resists the MRAPs and destabilises their safe mobility (Figure 68 and

Figure 82). Rollover on irregular surfaces became an event, a situation specific to the

military’s encounter with Afghanistan’s landscape. Accordingly, rollover serves us as a

lens to analyse how the military and the engineers responded to coordinate the

survivability-mobility hybrid script.

Rollover is a type of breakdown in the world of vehicular mobility. It is the event

when a moving vehicle flips on its side or back (see Figure 72). Engineering conceives it

as a relation of failure of stability between a vehicle and its environment, what we refer to

(after Simondon, 2017) throughout the chapter as the “technical milieu” and “geographic

milieu” respectively. We trace an early appearance of rollover in modern military

engineering to a 1979 testing report. In the section “survey of technical literature” (1979,

pp. 22–23), the report draws inspiration from what it describes as the “outstanding work”

on testing and studying highway vehicles (including cars, trucks, trailers, and buses)

mainly performed by the U.S. Department of Transportation and two prominent private

laboratories: the Applied Physics Laboratory at Johns Hopkins University and the

Highway Safety Research Institute189 at the University of Michigan. From the

bibliographic entries, we follow a researcher at the latter institute, Thomas D. Gillespie,

who went on to author one of the most cited books in automotive mechanics entitled

Fundamentals of Vehicle Dynamics. Gillespie’s influential work in automotive and

highway engineering spans university research, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the

Ford Motor Company, the White House, and the World Bank (Nexus, 2020). The

following excerpt from the book defines rollover.

Among the dynamic maneuvers a motor vehicle can experience, rollover is one of the most serious and threatening to the vehicle occupants. Rollover may be defined as any maneuver in which the vehicle rotates 90 degrees or more about its longitudinal axis such that the body makes contact with the ground. Rollover maybe precipitated from one or a combination of factors. It may occur on flat and level surfaces when the lateral accelerations on a vehicle reach a level beyond that which can be compensated by lateral weight shift on the tires. Cross-slope of the road (or off-road) surface may contribute along with disturbances to the lateral forces arising from curb impacts, soft ground, or other obstructions that may ‘trip’ the vehicle.

Figure 64 Excerpt from Fundamentals of Vehicle Dynamics (Gillespie, 1992, p. 309)

189 Today, this is the UMTRI: University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute

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The excerpt (Figure 64) conveys a technical description of a rollover, which relies

on a general differentiation between flat and sloped surfaces. It describes rollover as a

failure of stability between the vehicle’s forward movement and the lateral resistances

acting on it, which we interpret as aspects of the “technical milieu” and the “geographic

milieu” respectively. The two milieus connect through kinetics: in one situation, the weight

is the main actor inducing rollover on flat surfaces; in another, the road slope, type of

ground, and other obstacles contribute, with weight, to rollover. We count this as a first

instance of reducing the landscape to a terrain of surfaces and differentiating them as flat

or non-flat, which corresponds to urban and rural as we will later see in this section. Such

reduction, among others, converts landscape to terrain and informs automotive mechanics

and the automotive industry. But what makes rollover specific to Afghanistan, and how

does this change the MRAPs from their Iraq version? First, let us briefly examine how the

military contrasts Afghanistan to Iraq.

Afghanistan imposed very different warfighting requirements than Iraq. For the region, Iraq was a well-developed country with considerable paved mileage. More or less conventional trucks could operate there. Afghanistan was almost completely unpaved. In a territory about the size of Texas, there are only about 11,000 miles [~17,700 km] of roads, so vehicles operated mainly off-road. They had to be smaller and more agile than those used in Iraq. Trucks had to be far more maneuverable [emphasis added] … The Army operated in the mountains, where it was channeled so that an enemy could predict where its vehicles would go. It had to deal with the most powerful under-body IEDs, because the enemy could take the time to set them up. The Marines operated mostly in flat desert, where their movements were unpredictable. These different conditions were reflected in different decisions as to which vehicles to retain postwar, because the Services’ experience of combat was so different.

Figure 65 Excerpt from This Truck Saved My Life (Friedman, 2013, pp. 231–232)

A key observation across our empirical data is the methodical comparison of

operations and terrain between Afghanistan and Iraq. Reports on IEDs from the U.S.

Congress, the National Research Council, The Wall Street Journal, or Wired magazine

described how their threat increased with insurgents in Iraq then influenced those in

Afghanistan, though military operations started a year and a half earlier in Afghanistan

(Wilson, 2007; National Research Council, 2008; Dreazen, 2010; Higginbotham, 2010).

MRAPs were deployed, as counter-IED architectures, first to Iraq then to Afghanistan,

which meant that they were generally scripted to drive on Iraq’s urban terrain. The

comparison is almost consistent across the military publications we analyse, and the

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official technical biography of the MRAP Program entitled This Truck Saved My Life is the

archetype of such method. Military historian Norman Friedman and his team structure the

historiography of this account by differentiating the terrains of operation in both countries.

We analyse (in Figure 65) a functional differentiation of paved/unpaved ground

surfaces between Iraq and Afghanistan. We map it against a discourse of development

(“well-developed country”) that subscribes to what urbanists Brenner and Schmid call a

“metanarrative of the global urban condition” (2015, p. 155). So, the excerpt relates a

metanarrative of developed/underdeveloped and a differentiation of paved/unpaved ground

surfaces for vehicular mobility. We situate these techno-material realist understandings of

the physical landscape within larger developmental discourses (see Figure 67) that cut

across the military institution and the United Nations (UN), specifically the metanarrative

of urban age (see Brenner and Schmid, 2015, p. 155). Consider the following.

For example, a key strategy shift that accompanied the troop surge in Iraq – in which U.S. troops lived within the Iraqi communities they helped to secure – won’t necessarily work in Afghanistan, Petraeus said.

“You don’t move into a village in Afghanistan the way that we were able to move into neighborhoods in Iraq,” he said. “You have to move on the edge of it, or just near it, but you still have to have a persistent security presence.”

Figure 66 Excerpt from General Petraeus’s talk at Harvard (Miles, 2009)

U.S. military strategy of the aughts counterinsurgency operations can be roughly

sketched in the narrative upheld and presented by General David Petraeus, commander of

the U.S. Central Command. In an address to military veterans at the Harvard Kennedy

School (see excerpt in Figure 66), Petraeus made clear the urban-rural divide between Iraq

and Afghanistan. Iraq is cities and neighbourhoods open for integration; Afghanistan is

villages closed off to strangers. Petraeus’s urban-rural narrative was echoed by many, if

not most, military analysts, notably manifesting in branding an urban insurgency in Iraq

versus a rural insurgency in Afghanistan (see Malkasian and Meyerle, 2009; Meyerle, Katt

and Gavrillis, 2010). In parallel, the UN groups Afghanistan with the Least Developed

Countries (UN DESA, 2010), which are “low-income countries…highly vulnerable to

economic and environmental shocks … [with] low levels of human assets” (UN DESA,

2019). It is a theme and practice further reinforced in UN policy analysis on identifying

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Least Developed Countries to measure their progress through development indicators190

like “paved-road density, paved roads per capita, … and paved roads as a percentage of all

roads” (Kim, 2018, p. 18). We go a step further and compile the numbers referencing the

paved/unpaved indicators across Afghanistan, Iraq, and the State of Texas191 to illustrate

this point (see Table 4). Thus, we see how the lack of paved roads reduces Afghanistan’s

landscape to an off-road terrain and associates it with a rural/non-urban type consistent

with rural/underdeveloped cultural and spatial metanarratives. How does this feed into the

script of the MRAP vehicle?

Urban/Rural Developed/Underdeveloped Paved/Unpaved

Figure 67 Concepts, metanarratives, and techno-material realities (by author)

The association of rural and off-road takes us back to Gillespie’s differentiation of

flat and non-flat surfaces. On the irregular, sloped, and soft/muddy ground of Afghanistan,

the weight and high centre of gravity of the MRAP vehicles are bound to cause a rollover

and threaten the occupants’ survivability with a non-combat-related breakdown. We see

here that terrain is not a synonym for ground/topography, but a conceptual framework for

increasing the effective functionality of mobility through a twofold process: reducing a

landscape to a set of obstacles and improving the technics of articulating these obstacles.

Accordingly, the military seeks a technical improvement to make rural Afghanistan’s

MRAPs “smaller,” “more agile,” and “more maneuverable” vehicles (see Figure 65) in

contrast to those originally scripted for urban Iraq. In the sections that follow, we analyse

how such requirement informs such improvements to ruralise the MRAPs (see urbanising

the MRAP in sections 2 and 3, Chapter 5).

6.1.1. Conclusion

The fact that Afghanistan was a predominantly rural landscape, with a few small

urban centres, was not knew knowledge to the U.S. military. They had some idea about the

region’s socio-environmental and socio-political history, but they have not fought there

190 In this case, under ‘SDG 9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure’ of the Sustainable Development Goals. 191 Noteworthy here is the practice of referencing country sizes to U.S. state sizes; we trace the Afghanistan-Texas comparison back to a report from the Country Studies Program, formerly the Army Area Handbook Program, at the Library of Congress (2008). The profile is used by U.S. military and security organisations.

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before. The IED threat forced them to mobilise the MRAP vehicles to Afghanistan, which

were originally designed for Iraq’s paved roads and developed infrastructure (streets,

highways, bridges). They knew that the MRAPs were highly survivable against the deadly

IEDs, but they did not know that it was more difficult to operate them on Afghanistan’s

irregular, soft, and muddy ground. Rollover became the extreme non-combat breakdown,

and it provided the military with an opportunity to find more about rural terrain, to gain

knowledge and adapt the technology. Next, we analyse how engineering attempts to

capture the mechanics of rollover by reducing the landscape to functional parameters.

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Table 4 Comparison of total paved mileage with respect to overall country area among Afghanistan, Iraq, and Texas; areas are in square miles and road lengths in miles, sources of retrieval listed in the table (data compiled by author) Total Area (sq. mi.) Paved Roads (mi.) Notes Afghanistan ~ 251,773 in 2007

(UNSD, 2016) ~11,000 (Friedman, 2013, p. 231) / ~4,632 (extrapolated from SIGAR, 2016, p. i,1,6)

Iraq ~ 169,235 in 2007 (UNSD, 2016)

~ 21,490 [85% of 25,283] (Feghoul, United Nations Development Programme, and International Telecommunication Union, 2003, p. 3)

Texas, U.S. ~268,596 in 2010 (Census Bureau, 2018)

654,923 in Oct 2009 (Federal Highway Administration, 2017)

214,193 miles urban + 440,730 miles rural (Federal Highway Administration, 2017)

Figure 68 MRAP stuck in soft, muddy ground in Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan; original photo captioned “U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Kyle McGann, 466th Air Expeditionary Squadron, Explosive Ordnance Disposal technician, digs mud from under [MRAP] vehicle during demolition day, March 16, 2014” (Young Jr., 2014)

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6.2 Mobility as Parameters

We now analyse how engineering reduces survivable mobility against rollover to

a specific set of parameters corresponding to intensities of speed. We examine a 1979 Test

Activity Report from192 the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) when the

military first studied rollover through the relation of “small military vehicles on flat

smooth roads” (Varigas Research, Inc., 1979). Entitled Methodology Investigation Final

Report: Military Vehicle Rollover, Analysis and Instrumentation (Phase I), the report

describes how rollover became a concern as “a major safety problem” to the Army whose

“improved test methods … have not been employed in the testing of Army vehicles”

(1979, p. 2). We sift the highly technical computing parameters and indices, data listing

and coding, equations and graphs, and statistical analysis of this report to analyse the

concern for rollover as a form of risk management for hazards such as “emergency

maneuvers particularly for accident or obstacle avoidance” (1979, p. 6). The Jeep – the

M151 MUTT193 in the report – is “selected for scrutiny” in the study (1979, p. 51) among

the military’s then light trucks194 and in comparison to the commercial 1963 Ford

Galaxie195 as “a more conventional vehicle” (1979, p. 88). This is one of many situations

where the military borrows from commercial improvements, expanding our thinking on the

primacy of engineering regardless of the domain (see Chapter 2). The military enters the

world of rollover by plugging in to the existing industry’s definitions and tests.

The field of vehicle modeling and simulation is sophisticated enough to handle the rollover description of small military vehicles on flat smooth roads … It is possible to calculate a rollover threshold or index for the M151 from forward velocity and steer angle, however, there are other effects which influence rollover which have not been fully accounted for in the rollover index. These include wheel deflections, vehicle loading, and terrain irregularities. These parametric inputs will increase the accuracy and applicability of the ‘index’ …

Figure 69 Excerpt from the Test Activity Report (1979, pp. 7–8)

192 The report was commissioned to Varigas Research, Inc. and monitored by the TECOM; the Army did not have the required research and computing capability for this kind of task at the time. 193 Recall that the MUTT (Military Utility Tactical Vehicle) is the Vietnam War era utility vehicle of the U.S. military preceding the Humvee. 194 Among the vehicles considered for this testing were five vehicle series categorised by load capacity and characterised by “a high rollover involvement” (1979, p. 6). 195 Back in the 1960s, Ford offered services for NASA through Philco, its subsidiary for electronics and computers (2019). Accordingly, the Galaxie series got its name in the spirit of the space exploration age. The report refers to the “1963 Ford Galaxy” but the right name is Galaxie. The Ford Galaxy is a minivan series produced since 1995.

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To describe and assess a rollover event, engineers reduce the factors affecting a

vehicle’s mobility to parameters and represent them in a computational model. The report

excerpt above (Figure 69) describes parameters of velocity, angles, deflection, loading, and

terrain based on data from tests recording the interaction (called “rollover threshold”) of a

technical object (the M151) and a terrain of flat surfaces. Modelling and simulation convert

the antagonism between vehicle and terrain into such parameters, conveying the primacy

of the technical over economic and ergonomic considerations. Absent here are descriptions

of other actors, mainly humans, costs, and non-flat surfaces. The report does not discuss

humans, be they drivers handling the vehicle or occupants/passengers riding in it, although

it briefly refers to driving skills. It is not concerned with costs, but with the physical

stability of military vehicles on the move. Also, it does not refer to any non-flat surfaces or

rural terrain except for a brief mention of “terrain irregularities” (1979, p. 7), which is

strange given that this was a time when U.S. military operations spanned the Indochinese

Peninsula, including Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia and included various sorts of

irregular and jungle warfare. Situating rollover in a relation among humans, technology,

and specific cities, towns, jungles, or landscapes in the Indochinese Peninsula was not

reflected in this landmark report. The excerpt, like the report, is focused on technical

resolutions to rollover. However, and as the military plugged into the world of commercial

vehicle rollover on highways and urban roads, rollover parameters for flat surfaces were

already developed and in use. The existing parameters informed and dictated how the

military went about integrating innovations in vehicular stability, which did not necessarily

correspond with its operational needs on irregular terrain at the time.

The translation made through testing and simulation prioritised those available

parameters of a breakdown. For the technical object, the parameters are “forward velocity

and steer angle” (1979, p. 7), the two main factors contributing to rolling the vehicle until

its body “makes contact with the ground” (Gillespie, 1992, p. 309). For the environment,

the parameters are smooth flat roads, also referred to in the report as “paved, level

surfaces,” “paved road network,” “paved road,” or “paved surfaces” (1979, p. 24). They

are flat/level meaning horizontal: no slope or grade. They are smooth/paved, meaning

covered with compacted asphalt concrete: no soft ground, surface irregularities, or

topographic features. The military scripted its vehicles for stability against an absolute

reduction for an ideal type of terrain of flat surfaces, leaving it to their drivers to navigate

the endless variations in the field.

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However, the report continues to explain how the same human factor tasked with

navigating the variations of terrain contributes to the breakdown of vehicular movement. In

particular, the Jeep drivers contributed to a most common and dangerous manoeuvre with

the propensity for rollover: The J-Turn manoeuvre. A driver’s knee-jerk reaction could

trigger this severe J-shaped manoeuvre, upon sudden steering and braking at high speed on

a flat surface (1979, p. 70). The high kinetic energy transforms into a force that topples the

vehicle from its stable position and into a rollover (see Figure 71). In 1979, these were the

limitations to stability – along with safety and survivability – not only in improvements

against breakdowns but also in testing breakdowns to gather more accurate and diverse

parameters that facilitate a more accurate and effective reduction of the landscape. We

shall keep this in mind as we analyse how the MRAPs rollover in Afghanistan over a

quarter century later.

This integration [of the Electronic Stability Control] makes MRAPs the first U.S. Army vehicle platform to incorporate this important safety technology intended to reduce the number of MRAP rollovers.

Figure 70 Excerpt from U.S. Army article (Parsons, 2015)

Forward to 2015, almost thirty-six years after TECOM’s 1979 report and fourteen

years since the start of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, measuring and mitigating

rollover resurfaces in a new invention. The 1979 military study borrowed from inventions

used in “various off-road industries such as agriculture, mining, construction and rail” and

“highway vehicle research [including] trucks, tractor trailers, and buses” (1979, pp. 22–

23). Today, the military continues to plug into advanced innovations (Figure 70) in

Electronic Stability Control (ESC) systems of the automotive industry (Pakulski et al.,

2013, p. 10; Parsons, 2015). We trace the new technics of stability to the Army’s Red

River Army Depot in Texas, which is “the Army’s Center of Industrial and Technical

Excellence for Tactical Wheeled Vehicles” including the MRAPs (RRAD, 2020). A 2015

Army article reports from the depot on equipping 2,633 MaxxPro Dash MRAP models –

produced by Navistar Defense – with the ESC system and planning to do the same for the

rest of the MRAPs to “help maximize warfighter safety and survivability” (Parsons, 2015).

The article describes the ESC system as part of “driver assist technologies” that

complement a driver’s “intent” and “spatial feel” when negotiating a potential rollover

event (Parsons, 2015). In automotive language, the ESC is one of many Advanced Driver

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Assistance Systems working to automate many of the driver’s tasks to reduce human error

through information exchange between vehicle and environment, or vehicle and vehicle.

The ESC system automatically operates electronic mechanisms to assist drivers in

mitigating risky driving conditions, including situations of losing control over the vehicle.

The mechanisms include sensors, which collect data while driving, and an anti-lock

braking system, which slows down the vehicle (restricts its engine power) and redirects its

travel direction (redistributes braking on all wheels) (National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, 2007, p. 1; Bendix Commercial Vehicle Systems, 2008, p. 5; Parsons,

2015). In other words, the electronic system collects information from MRAPs to

anticipate drivers’ knee-jerk reactions during the event of restraining unstable vehicles

going into a possible rollover. It achieves such mitigation by redistributing the competent

functioning of the brakes and the engine over the wheels, which are the primary friction

interface with the ground/surface. It mainly works on flat surfaces, hence why it is limited

to tackling rollovers on paved roads and highways but not on non-flat, irregular, soft

terrain. Here, we see how terrain continues to be defined by the same reductions of ground

surfaces, but the complexity of mediation increases with the additional parameters and

measurements that collect and process the terrain with higher accuracy. Mediation

redistributes the synergies of navigating terrain and anticipating rollovers over more

nonhumans including advanced sensing, computation, and braking mechanisms.

In the same reporting from the Depot, we observe how the story of technics

overlaps another of territory. The MaxxPro’s chief engineer at Navistar Defense recounts

another relevant and revealing dimension to the ESC story. The MaxxPro Dash MRAPs

borrowed the system from Navistar’s commercial vehicles, mainly the IC Buses (for

school and commercial use) and International Trucks (for construction, hauling,

emergency, tankers, and utility). We trace the electronic system to Bendix Commercial

Vehicle Systems196, a technology leader in braking systems who designed and produced

the ESC system for Navistar since 2007. This date marked the year when the National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration regulated the ESC system as a standard for all

federal motor vehicles (military and civilian) operating within U.S. territory – proposed for

heavy vehicles since 2012. The ESC now translates a “metascript” (Taylor, 2013) of the

State (see metascript in section 5, Chapter 5) and finds its way into the MRAPs,

196 A member of the Knorr-Bremse Group, specialised in braking technologies

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irrespective whether the military is operating at home or overseas (see CONUS in section

5, Chapter 5). As a technical organisation, the military recruits the ESC system to upgrade

the stability of its vehicles; as an institution of the State, the military subscribes to the

federal regulations of safe driving that hold the U.S. society together, to rephrase Akrich

(1992) and Latour (2005). We see how the MRAP is once again coordinated as a

survivability-mobility script (technical mediation) and a federal vehicle (realising

territoriality).

6.2.1. Conclusion

The difficulty of managing the rural terrain of Afghanistan lies in the type of

antagonism to the stability of the vehicle on an irregular terrain. Iraq’s infrastructure

provided the soldiers with an almost homogeneous “[Euclidean] visual space” (after

Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 371) of the antagonistic elements, once they became known

(power lines, overhead structures, gates, narrow streets). In contrast, Afghanistan’s

irregular, soft ground was impossible to measure, a terrain with “an antagonism without

possible mediation” (Simondon, 2017, p. 168). The increased complexity of the rural

terrain pushed the military institution to plug into state-of-the-art innovation in engineering

from university institutes/labs and commercial industries of passenger and heavy

commercial vehicles. But even with advanced electronic sensing, it remained a “space of

contact” (after Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 371) that relied on human (driver) tactility

and reaction to aid the technical object.

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Figure 71 Technical representation of rollover on flat, paved roads as a function of a vehicle’s speed and its body angle relative to the horizontal ground (Varigas Research, Inc., 1979, p. 76)

Figure 72 A typical vehicle rollover on flat, paved surface; original photo in Baghdad captioned “A Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicle rests on its turret and hood after a rollover…” (Burke, 2009)

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6.3 Environmental Translations

We analysed how the military framed Afghanistan as rural landscape, but we have

yet to see how the military knows the rural terrain through the technical object and its

encounters with Afghanistan’s physical environment. Let us go back to the MRAP user

handbook (introduced in Chapter 5) and analyse how reducing landscape to terrain works

in this situation. The handbook informs the vehicles’ users/occupants about the spatial

dimension – among others – of employing the vehicles, giving techniques and procedures

on how to articulate the vehicles’ movement and mitigate potential obstacles. One thing to

note here is that there is no mention by name of Iraq and Afghanistan in the handbook,

although it is produced based on feedback loops from the operational experience – mostly

failures and breakdowns – of the MRAPs in those particular geographies. Such omission of

names is another form of reduction in line with a relentless military endeavour to

standardise and generalise best practices and lessons learned out of situated events and

case studies197. Let us analyse other reductions that allow the military to know the

characteristics of a rural landscape.

Soft soil poses a risk to MRAP vehicles. It is likely that the four-wheeled MRAP vehicle poses a greater risk of sinking or bogging down in soft soil. Avoid moving too close to the edges of roads that may collapse and cause the vehicle to tip over … Operating on single-lane and/or steeply crowned rural roads, roads with no shoulders, roads with soft shoulders and/or washouts around culverts and especially any road bordering water (canal/irrigation ditch/pond) requires extreme caution. The majority of MRAP vehicles rollovers are due to the road/shoulder/bridge approach giving way under the MRAP vehicle’s weight and high center of gravity … The MRAP will ascend longitudinal slopes of up to 60 percent; however, extreme caution must be exercised on slopes greater than 50 percent. The MRAP vehicle is capable of operating on side slopes of up to 30 percent (use extreme caution on side slopes greater than 25 percent) … Cross-country speeds are significantly reduced due to the high center of gravity. Tall vehicles pose a greater risk of tip or rollover when negotiating slopes, trenches, ditches, and other obstacles.

Figure 73 Excerpt on “Capabilities and Limitations” from the MRAP Handbook (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008, pp. 25–26)

We analyse a first excerpt drawn from the handbook’s “Capabilities and

Limitations” chapter, which describes the spatial challenges of manoeuvring MRAPs

197 Recall the U.S. Marines’ intelligence report “Urban Warfare Study: City Case Studies Compilation” (1999) that was at the forefront of redefining ‘urban warfare’ after the Cold War.

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(2008, p. 25). In the excerpt (Figure 73), we identify an architectural mode of thinking

about the spatiality of the MRAP’s mobility, which reads the landscape as relations along

consecutive crosscuts in the road/path. The excerpt collects roads, soils, slopes, and water

bodies as a loose set of natural and human-made elements whose specific features –

separately or combined – limit or hinder the mobility of the MRAPs. But to compare this

with Traffic Engineering’s road design manuals or Urban Design’s street design guides, we

regroup the handbook’s textual descriptions as visual representations of typical road

sections and surface materials. We draw (see Figure 75) typical sections of narrow widths

(single lane), hazardous geometry (steeply crowned, side slope, longitudinal slope),

precarious edges (no/soft shoulders, trenches), and risky context (bordering water), which

cause vehicles to tip or rollover. Similarly, we create a list (see Figure 75) of materials of

unstable surfaces (soft soil) and submersible mediums (water bodies: canal, ditch, pond),

which cause the vehicles to bog down or sink.

The typical sections and list of materials are useful tools to help us visualise the

antagonisms of MRAP mobility relationally to the technical object’s characteristics of

speed, weight, height, and high centre of gravity. Just like with the Jeep driver in 1979 (see

6.2), articulating these antagonisms is tasked to the human cognitive capacities of the

MRAP drivers: their situational awareness198 (see section 4, Chapter 4). The handbook’s

instructions reinforce what drivers learn during training, through warnings (avoid moving,

use extreme caution) and measurements (slope percentages). Thus, we see how the

survivability-mobility hybrid script expands to include driver training/driving capacities

along with the technical object itself.

In the same handbook, we complement our analysis of mobility drawing on

another excerpt from the “Employment Considerations” chapter, which sets guidance on

how best to use the MRAP on restricted terrain (2008, p. 31). The description (Figure 74)

expands the network by adding actors and employing new discursive strategies, while it

continues to describe a terrain of roads along edges and near water bodies. We can list rain,

locks, doors, and bridges among the new actors. Heavy rains undermine the little structural

integrity unpaved roads possess and multiplies the risk of rollover on weak road edges.

Locked doors risk trapping soldiers inside an overturned vehicle, increasing the risk of

drowning upon rollover into water bodies. Unrated bridges risk collapsing under the

198 Which is the capability to remain aware of the surroundings, to assess risks, and to react in real-time to avoid/reduce harm/injury.

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vehicles’ heavy weight, possibly leading to overturning/drowning in water bodies. Thus,

terrain is not fixed factors but ones whose intensity increases – and with it the intensity of

terrain – with changing climatic conditions (heavy rains), combining the technical and the

geographic (locked in water), and lack of information (unrated infrastructure).

Heavy rains in theater may cause unpaved roads to loosen and give way under the weight of the MRAP vehicle, especially if there is a steep embankment or canal running alongside the road … Unlock combat doors when around bodies of water if the tactical situation permits … Use caution on rural roads. When a vehicle goes off a rural road, the vehicle can overturn when it strikes a ditch or embankment or is tripped by soft soil … Road shoulders in the Middle East do not meet U.S. standards and may collapse under the weight of the MRAP vehicle, especially when the road is above grade and can fall to lower ground (ditches and canals) … Use caution when crossing bridges that are unrated (get prior guidance from combat engineers).

Figure 74 Excerpt on “Vehicle Safety” from the MRAP Handbook (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008, pp. 39–41)

Furthermore, the excerpt mobilises the military’s metanarrative of development to

oblige the actors, as Callon puts it, “to remain faithful to their alliances” (1986a, p. 204).

The military’s metanarrative reduces the entire Middle East region to a single

underdeveloped landscape type by reminding the MRAP drivers that the region has no/low

technical standards for roads and load ratings for bridges. Earlier in the same chapter, a

section on “rough terrain driving” complements this reduction through instructing drivers

not only to acquire training (“good off-road driving Techniques”) but to practice judgment

(“well trained in judging terrain”) and discipline (“must be extremely careful and

mindful”) (2008, p. 35). The survivability-mobility hybrid script expands to account for

new terrain actors and to expand the drivers’ capabilities to include decision making skills.

6.3.1. Conclusion

In the third section, we analysed how the MRAP user handbook realised the

military’s effort to homogenise and systematise the antagonisms of irregular terrain. First,

it homogenised them by collecting and cataloguing reductions of the landscape as typical

elements antagonistic to the MRAP (soft shoulders, water bodies). Its logic separated

antagonisms along two general strands: underdeveloped (rural infrastructure) and unknown

(unrated infrastructure). Second, it systematised the antagonisms as instructions and

warnings talking to the MRAP drivers’ hard skills (driving, situational awareness) and soft

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skills (cognition, judgment). As discussed in the previous section (see 6.2), the

survivability-mobility hybrid script continues to rely on drivers and driving instructions to

complement the work of the MRAP.

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Figure 75 Sketch of possible road sections and surface types, as in urban design guides, that translates the military’s reduction of the rural landscape to a set of obstacles for the MRAP vehicles; both rows show cross-sections (by author)

Figure 76 Instructions to keep an organised and stowed layout of an MRAP’s interior, to protect soldiers from random flying objects in the event of an accident; from the MRAP Handbook (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008, p. 67)

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6.4 Recruiting Humans

The first half of this chapter focused on the reduction of Afghanistan to rural

terrain and the consequent technical improvements that fold this terrain into the MRAP

vehicles. It showed how the MRAP’s survivability-mobility hybrid script in Afghanistan,

as in Iraq, continued to be assembled as a highly political and opulent project of occupant-

centric engineering to safeguard the lives and bodies of U.S. soldiers – not locals/civilians

– riding with the vehicle’s armoured enclosure. However, an unexpected type of

breakdown specific to the terrain of Afghanistan changed the narrative and the practice.

The MRAP went rogue, and its occupants lost control over it when the capsular enclosure

functioned as a lethal rather than a survivable interior. The vehicle’s armoured architecture

separating the occupants from the physical harms of humans and nonhumans outside (as

seen in the patents analysis in Chapter 4) became the antagonism, the terrain.

In the second half of the chapter, we explore the limits of concretisation of the

MRAP as an enclosure-vehicle hybrid and focus on the body-vehicle synergy instead. This

is when the militarised bodies of the occupants change from passive objects of the

enclosure to active subjects in the process of terraining. Fast forward from the early

consideration of rollover in 1979 to a 2008 rollover incident in the Kandahar Province,

Afghanistan. Through a slow quasi-ethnographic description, we analyse a breakdown

account where the human body becomes more visible than before. Two soldiers rolled over

in their MRAP into a water canal. Water bodies entered the scene as a new actor disrupting

survivability. Drowning in water – on land – became the new antagonism to the bodies of

the occupants. We let the detailed description of the event guide us to understand the

intricacies of this breakdown, and our analysis eventually leads us to new improvements

that expand the network of mediation to the humans.

For us readers, the story starts on the pages of the metropolitan daily The San

Diego Union-Tribune (Liewer, 2009) and the inter/national daily Los Angeles Times

(Goffard, 2008). We read two versions of an obituary of Sergeant James Treber and his

heroic act of saving his teammate. Treber was born in Hawaii and graduated in the city of

Imperial Beach near San Diego, California, where he participated in the Reserve Officers’

Training Corps. In June 2008, Treber and fellow soldiers drowned in their RG-31 MRAP

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near Khosrow Sofla199 in the Kandahar Province, Afghanistan; his military body was

buried at Arlington National Cemetery, Virginia; his military unit was based in Eglin Air

Force Base, Florida; and his obituary reported a tribute ceremony at his command’s base

where he received his training in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. So many biographies200 to

recollect; so many bodies to inhabit; so many geographies to dwell. The honouring

obituaries connect and celebrate social relations of military training, service, patriotism,

and heroism across geographies through the fallen soldier’s body. Treber’s drowning made

particularly visible a multiplicity of relations between his body and his MRAP, and it

localised the war from the far mountains201 and deserts of Afghanistan back to the Pacific

and Atlantic coasts of the U.S. Through localising the breakdown amidst a network of

actors, what Latour refers to as “localizing the global” (2005), we collect the distributed

sites of action where the military forges relations among Treber’s body, the MRAP, and

the environment.

We follow Treber’s tribe of Special Forces to identify some of these distributed

sites. According to the Army’s Special Operations Command website, entry-level202

members of the Army’s 7th Special Forces Group – like Treber – train in unconventional

warfare among other things (USASOC, 2020). This is part of the doctrine of Irregular

Warfare203, where the unconventional character refers to a set of military tactics and

techniques that enable and support “a resistance movement or insurgency in a denied area”

(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, p. xi). The denied character refers to restricted or inaccessible

areas to the operations of the military’s local204 “friendly forces” (Joint Chiefs of Staff,

2014, p. GL.7), hence why special operations entail “greater requirements for regional

orientation and cultural expertise, and a higher degree of risk” among other things (Joint

Chiefs of Staff, 2014, p. I.1). Treber and his MRAP operating in Afghanistan’s rural terrain

were informed by such meanings of unconventionality and denial.

199 This same hamlet was among three others, including Tarok Kolache and Lower Babur, that the U.S. military violence literally “flattened” in October 2011 claiming to destroy IED factories (Ackerman, 2011b). 200 See Igor Kopytoff’s “cultural biography of things” (1990) 201 For a better context of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan’s mountains, see Judith Matloff’s fascinating account of “The Green Mountains and the Hindi Kush” (2018, pp. 169–187) and how the air that is depleted of oxygen becomes the soldiers’ enemy. 202 On his first service tour in Afghanistan, Treber was in a 1st Battalion, i.e., entry-level in special forces. 203 Also, includes Counter Terrorism, Counterinsurgency, Foreign Internal Defense, and Stability Operations 204 In the Joint Publication Special Operations (2014), as well as many others, the military employs the term “indigenous” to refer to the locals

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Treber and his fellow entry-level members of the special forces conducted their

training in “urban and rural locations throughout central North Carolina” (USASOC, 2020)

before his deployment to Afghanistan. He never actually trained in the rural terrain of

Afghanistan, only in its replicated/simulated/reconstructed version in rural North Carolina.

The military deemed such training on U.S. terrain satisfactory, but obviously it was not. In

Kandahar: the terrain took control, the MRAP rolled over, and Treber drowned. Rural

North Carolina was not rural Afghanistan after all. The mediation failed, both the training

of the special forces and the engineering of the MRAP.

Treber’s account epitomises the rollover event in the uncharted rural terrain of

Afghanistan. Although not all rollovers led to death or drowning (similar to electrocution

in Chapter 5), the account is central to the story of survivability breaking down and the

military’s worst nightmare coming true: dying in a non-combat related event. Let us

continue analysing Treber’s account in two excerpts, one from the same obituary in The

San Diego Union-Tribune and another from an earlier reporting in the U.S. Special

Operations Command magazine Tip of the Spear.

Treber was one of three soldiers who died June 29, 2008, after a road gave way underneath their [MRAP] and sent it toppling into a canal in Kandahar province. One soldier, Sgt. 1st Class Joe Serna, survived 40 minutes in the chilly water by breathing in an air pocket … Serna…said he was trapped upside down in the MRAP’s rear seat behind some ammunition cans, unable to free himself as water crept up to his face. He hollered for help. Treber, one seat in front of him, climbed over and popped loose his seat belt. ‘He picked me up and moved me to an air pocket,’ Serna said. Treber realized it wasn’t big enough to save them both, so he swam away to find another. [They] tried unsuccessfully to open the vehicle’s doors and hatches. The last thing he heard Treber say was, ‘Joe, my legs are going numb.’ Serna didn’t know until after he was rescued that Treber and the other soldiers, Master Sgt. Shawn Simmons and Sgt. 1st Class Jeffrey Rada Morales, had died.

Figure 77 Excerpt from the Union-Tribune newspaper (Liewer, 2009)

Master Sgt. Shawn Simmons, Sgt. 1st Class Jeffrey Rada Morales and Sgt. James Treber, all from Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), drowned June 29 when, under the cover of darkness, their heavily armored vehicle, an RG-31, dropped off a narrow, unimproved dirt road and rolled upside down into a water-filled canal … Following recovery efforts performed by the rest of the combat convoy, Serna was found alive but suffering from hypothermia and hypoxia.

Figure 78 Excerpt from Tip of the Spear magazine (USASFC Public Affairs, 2008, p. 22)

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Both excerpts recount the breakdown event, although the SOCOM magazine’s

narrative talks to the U.S. military community (Figure 78) and the that of the San Diego

metropolitan daily speaks to the general U.S. public (Figure 77). The excerpts describe two

aspects of the rollover-drowning situation: how a specific terrain – or geographic milieu –

contributed to the rollover of an MRAP, and how the breakdown affected four human

bodies inside the vehicle. Both narratives portray a crude and rudimentary landscape in the

Kandahar Province similar to the MRAP handbook: “a narrow, unimproved dirt road” and

“a water-filled canal.” The Los Angeles Times obituary even refers to the rollover on a

“primitive road” (Goffard, 2008). The MRAP rolls over into a water body, disorienting205

the interior (“upside down”) and compromising its integrity as water seeps in and fills the

breathing medium. The bodies of Treber and his fellow soldiers now struggle for air inside

a trapping enclosure, where the inside-outside separation works contrary to the script. The

occupants need to get out from the enclosed and sealed inside. That drowning MRAP in

Khosrow Sofla switched allegiance206 as a generative site of politics for terraining the

warzone. It became part of the terrain’s antagonisms, which the military set out to control

in the first place.

The outside terrain extended inside the capsular enclosure. In the excerpts above,

the realisation of the deadly outside-inside relation is revealed through an entanglement

between the actions of Sergeant James Treber and Sergeant First Class Joe Serna. Treber

died while saving Serna. The obituaries and tributes celebrated the event as an act of

patriotic and humanistic heroism, but there has not been an official publication

investigating the accident like that concerning electrocution in Iraq (see section 5.2 in

Chapter 5). However, a few rogue actors and their actions emerge, which we encounter

again later in improvements to the training and the technical object. Unlike the highly

organised and disciplined layout of the utilitarian interior we read207 about in the MRAP

user handbook (see Figure 76), the rolled over, drowning interior became a chaotic space, a

water-filled interior trapping all four soldiers. The door and hatch locks were stuck on the

inside, blocking access out of the vehicle. Serna’s seatbelt harness was stuck, confining

him in an awkward, upside-down position until Treber freed him to move. Water seeped

205 It is interesting to see how the etymology of ‘disorient’ comes from the French désorienter or ‘to turn from the east,’ a fit description for a Western colonial power getting resisted in the East by forcing it to turn from the east. 206 In Some accounts, soldiers even dub such failures the “Kevlar coffin” for the U.S. Stryker (Robson, 2011) and the “coffin of wheels” for the British Vector (Johnson, 2009). 207 Recall here the highly technical descriptions of seats, seatbelts, and stowing restraints discussed in Chapter 4.

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from the canal into the interior, replacing air and forcing Treber to move Serna to “an air

pocket” where he can breathe. By the time help arrived, the vulnerable soldiers’ bodies lost

oxygen and heat until they gave up. The dirt road and water canal of Afghanistan’s rural

terrain, together with the disoriented interior, displaced air, stuck seatbelt harnesses and

door/hatch locks, brought fatal consequences to the trapped occupants. We begin to

witness the “dephasing” (Simondon cited in Combes, 2012) of survivability and a

differentiation between the soldiers’ bodies and the technical object emerges more clearly

in the breakdown.

The gone-rogue technical object was an RG-31 model MRAP, a model that the

military trusted with enhanced off-road capabilities. According to historian Norman

Friedman208, “the first MRAP vehicles were deployed from Iraq to Afghanistan in October

2007” in response to the growing IED threat; however, the irregular landscape and lack of

paved roads in Afghanistan entailed that all RG31 MRAPs be assigned to operations there

since 2008 as this model was “the lightest and most maneuverable of the early MRAP

vehicles” (2013, pp. 88, 231, 232). By that time, the terrain in Afghanistan already proved

difficult for many U.S. military vehicles, most prominently the Strykers209. Add to this the

proliferation of IEDs in urban areas and along rural and mountainous roads. Despite its

enhanced mobility, Sergeants Simmons, Rada Morales, Treber, and Serna’s RG-31 MRAP

failed to protect them in the Kandahar Province, leading to fatal consequences in the same

year of its deployment. Eventually, a third-generation model engineered specifically for the

“largely off-road environment of Afghanistan” (Friedman, 2013, p. 2) replaced all first-

and second-generation MRAPs operating there. The name of the new technical object

promised folding more antagonisms: M-ATV or the MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle (see patent

analysis in section 4.5 of Chapter 4).

6.4.1. Conclusion

We conclude this section with some help drawing on philosopher Muriel Combes’

introduction to the work of Gilbert Simondon (2012, p. 4). Particularly, we explain how the

208 The principal investigator for the official MRAP account This Truck Saved My Life 209 As one journalist describing the situation in Afghanistan put it, “the Stryker Brigade [went] Stryker-less” to Afghanistan (Ackerman, 2011a). The reasons, he continues to describe, are two: the “flat bottom of a Stryker absorbs the brunt of a bomb impact, rather than deflecting it;” and, “the Afghan terrain [of mountains and valleys] can’t handle a heavy wheeled vehicle that’s about the size of a school bus” unlike Iraq’s “paved roads, less rugged terrain (on the whole)” (Ackerman, 2011a).

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narrative of military survivability changes through a process of “individuation,” or

being/becoming the thing/individual that the military knows. We should understand the

individuation of survivability in terms of a “resolution of tension between potentials

belonging to previously separated orders of magnitude.” The survivability that the military

knows before rollover facilitates a communication between a bodily order (head, neck,

spinal cord, limbs, severe burns) and a molecular order (expanding gases and pressure,

density and phase change, severe acceleration). The resultant is the MRAP script mediating

the two orders and a milieu that is the MRAP capsule as a highly protected and separated

enclosure. But survivability is not one thing, so its pre-rollover phase is one among many.

When the MRAP submerges, the milieu changes as soon as water replaces air and another

order of magnitude (air as “medium of life”210) connects to the bodily order. A new phase

of survivability comes into being where the human body (of the occupants) becomes part

of the technical ensemble. Next, we analyse the new phase of survivability as associations

among bodies and vehicles that usher technology transfers from the military’s air and

aquatic domains to the land domain.

6.5 Testing Atmospheric Limits

In the era of the MRAPs, controlling and surviving rollover-breakdown events

came a long way from the 1979 initial study. Technical improvements in military and

commercial vehicular mobility grew more complex and expanded to include further

environmental considerations, terrain elements, and vehicle types to serve a growing U.S.

economy of warfare. Accordingly, we continue to analyse the complexity of rollovers in

further military publications, shifting our focus and analysis from an engineering lens (in

the handbook, briefing, and technical studies) to a medical lens of survivability. We follow

the military as it employs its medical expertise on traumas and injuries to expand the

network of survivability from the bounds of the vehicles’ technical systems to include an

improved performance of the human body. To address life and death concerns like those in

the excerpt below (Figure 79), the military expands its repertoire of rural terrain to include

rollover-drowning breakdowns, like the Treber-Serna story.

210 We borrow the term from cultural theorist Eva Horn (2018)

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Imagine being in a combat environment taking enemy fire when, suddenly, your vehicle flips over violently from the force of an improvised explosive device (IED), caved road or impact from another vehicle. Your vehicle is now upside down and water is rapidly filling the inside of the cab. How do you survive? Could you effectively respond to a similar situation and live to talk about it? Could you unfasten your seat belt, recover from being hit by radios, ammunition cans and other equipment flying around in the vehicle, while remaining calm so you can reorient yourself and egress from the vehicle?

Figure 79 Excerpt from the Army AL&T magazine (Myers, 2007, p. 52)

Let us consider an example to illustrate how the military trains human bodies,

adding them to the elements that mediate terrain. We start on the pages of a medical study

entitled Prevention of Injury in Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle

Accidents (Pakulski et al., 2013). This is the only document discussing survivability

through the lens of the soldiers’ bodies, available online from the U.S. Army Aeromedical

Research Laboratory211 website. A group of medical and safety experts monitored the

performance of MRAPs against IEDs, due to their “high public profile and cost” (2013, p.

1) and as rollover became the “deadliest and costliest” Army MRAP accident type (2013,

p. 10). Unlike documents that read survivability through the technical design of the MRAP,

these experts took a trauma pathology approach to understand the accidents (Figure 80).

The technical object and its components, the soldiers’ insufficient training, and the

mobility terrain became causes of the accidents. The experts analysed the causes, types,

and chronological sequences of these accidents in relation to the severity of injuries and

traumas that the soldiers’ bodies sustained.

Although it does not name specific accident locations or soldiers, we examine the

study’s trauma pathological methodology through the Treber-Serna story analysed earlier.

The study listed the same rogue actors of a rural landscape (dirt roads, weak edges, water

bodies) and a technical object (displaced air, stuck seatbelt harnesses and door/hatch locks)

as the “top five MRAP accident injury causes and outcomes (road hazard, rollover, vehicle

issues, personnel, and driver response)” (2013, p. 11 original italics). It concluded with

recommendations for improving the soldier body’s response through a different type of

training (for drivers212 and occupants) and additional technical devices, like the ESC (see

211 Located in Fort Rucker, Alabama, and part of the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command 212 The study references Training Circular No. 7-31 (U.S. Army, 2011b) for MRAP driver training, which has restricted access and could not be downloaded at the time of completing the thesis.

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6.2) and the HEED (see 6.6). We observe a first instance of how the technical ensemble of

survivability expands beyond the vehicle to include the human body. The medical lens

details the new survivability as associations between antagonistic parts of the MRAP

vehicle and its occupants’ bodies.

130 Army MRAP accidents were identified in the USACR / SC data set, which involved 220 Soldiers and Army civilians, 95 of whom were injured, and nine of whom died (2013, p. 4) … Approximately $900,000 of the $1.84 million in rollover injury costs (49 percent), were due to drowning fatalities resulting from rollovers into bodies of water (2013, p. 8) … rollovers were the deadliest and costliest accident type, accounting for all nine fatalities and $3.7 million (56 percent) of $6.6 million in total accident costs. Yet, rollovers made up only 37 (28 percent) of the 130 Army MRAP accidents occurring during the study period. Of particular concern are rollovers into bodies of water, trapping occupants inside the submerged vehicle. Drowning fatalities from such rollovers comprised 56 percent of total fatalities and 49 percent of rollover injury costs.

Figure 80 Excerpt from the ARL’s medical study (Pakulski et al., 2013, p. 10)

Besides bodies, vehicles, and accidents becoming numbers in a warfare economy,

the excerpt (Figure 80) introduces a new powerful actor: water bodies, or “bodies of water”

as in the report. The new actor causes drowning and holds the power of life/death over the

soldiers. The MRAPs are land vehicles. They were not engineered as watertight enclosures

to fully submerge under water, and thus to prevent the drowning of their occupants. The

land is their spatial domain and operational terrain. But not all land; not where there is

tension between land and water. In Afghanistan, such tension materialised in a rural terrain

of soft, weak edges (shoulders, washouts) on narrow dirt roads, which forced the heavy,

high-centred metallic objects to rollover and topple from one medium to another. An

aquatic medium replaced the atmospheric one, generating a new milieu that did not

complement the survivability script of the existing technical object.

Let us examine the existing relations between military land vehicles and aquatic

mediums. Like other land vehicles, engineers test the MRAPs for traversing various land

covers, topography, and human-made obstacles under different environmental conditions,

including some forms of withstanding immersion in water. The main reference source for

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all military vehicles is the Department of Defense’s Test Method Standard213 (MIL-STD-

810) entitled Environmental Engineering Considerations and Laboratory Tests (2000).

Under the Laboratory Test Methods sections, four methods are listed that test for the

impact of water on military materiel214 corresponding to four actors: rain (Method 506.4),

humidity (Method 507.4), salt fog (Method 509.4), and immersion (Method 512.4). Rain,

humidity, and salt fog may pose challenges to the performance, sealing, protective coating,

or physical deterioration of materiel. Only the last test method on immersion addresses

concerns of and limits for “materiel that may be exposed to partial or complete immersion,

with or without operation” (2000, p. 512.4–1). In other words, testing for the MRAPs’

immersion capacity is the closest method to address any potential for drowning in water

bodies. However, this test method is limited in explaining the relation between rollover and

water, as this was not a concern for testing in the first place.

In the technical details, the Immersion Method tests for land vehicles immersing

or submerging in water “to verify watertightness,” or how closely sealed vehicles are

against any water penetrating from the outside. It aims to mitigate or avert effects like

corrosion, short-circuiting, fouling of lubricant, impairment of cargo/weapons, and “failure

of vehicle engines to operate” (2000, p. 512.4–1). It is a test for vehicles whose primary

mobility environment is land, not one for “buoyant items” such as amphibious215 vehicles

designed to operate in water. Application of the test sets limits for the duration and

depth216 of water covering the vehicle, at test facilities called Shallow Water Fording Basin

and Deep Water Fording Facility217. Any vehicle that passes this test is assumed to drive

without interruption within the specified depths and periods of immersing or submerging in

water. Take, for example, how Crystal Group Inc. designed rugged218 computer systems

for the U.S. military, which met219 MIL-STD-810. In an online corporate video, Jim Shaw,

executive vice president of engineering at the group, explains how his company designs

two versions of equipment: one for immersion where they “might see some water

damage;” and, another for fording where they are “mounted in something like a MRAP or

213 This TMS version MIL-STD-810F, dated 1 January 2000, existed during the engineering, testing, manufacturing, and fielding of the MRAP vehicles; it was later superseded by version MIL-STD-810G N1, dated 15 April 2014. 214 Materiel means all equipment, including weapons and vehicles. 215 Such as the LAV, the AAV-7, and the M113 APC. 216 On Average, up to 1-meter over 30-minutes for the Immersion Test and over 1-hour for the Fording Test, specifically for shallow fording depth for tanks and armoured vehicles. 217 See Vehicle Test Facilities at Aberdeen Test Center and Yuma Test Center (2017, pp. 31–32) 218 Built for tough terrain and extreme environments 219 According to their website, these systems are “designed to meet and exceed military standards that test for shock/vibe, extreme temperatures, sand, dust, salt and fog” (Crystal Group Inc., 2019)

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a Stryker that would be flooded occasionally and actually fording through waterways”

(Crystal Group Inc., 2016). While the test method accounts for changes in the milieu (dry

to wet), its focus remains to test for protecting the technical object and by extension the

humans and the mission (the military’s trinity of survivability). It does not test for directly

protecting the humans.

The focus on the technical object and not the humans is not exclusive to the

Immersion Method. For the relation to land entails the impossibility of testing the MRAP

vehicles – or any others – against all possible breakdown scenarios. Hence why, the

military complements the performance of its technical objects by issuing warnings and

instructions (see 6.3) and through providing training (see 6.7). The rollover is a specific

case in point when the terrain antagonises the MRAP. There are no standards or tests for

scenarios where vehicles fall of edges to the ground or into a body of water. Even the Test

Method Standard document (MIL-STD-810) does not mention culverts, ditches, canals,

shoulders, crowns, bridges, or mud – elements of an irregular/rural terrain – in the

laboratory test methods. Add to it the Army’s Test Operations Procedure document entitled

Vehicle Test Facilities at Aberdeen Test Center and Yuma Test Center, which lists separate

test facilities for each situation. Resistance to fall and rollover, or a vehicle’s tilt angle

threshold, is measured at the Tilt Table Facilities and the Side Slope courses at the

Aberdeen Test Center (2012, pp. 35, 64) and the Yuma Test Center (2012, pp. 96, 119).

Resistance to getting stuck in mud (Figure 82), or a vehicle’s traction and abrasion

capacity (Figure 81), is measured against clay and silt Mud Courses at the Aberdeen Test

Center (2012, pp. 28, 60) and the Yuma Test Center (2012, p. 100). All these tests reveal

the complexity of the irregular/rural terrain, but they only scrutinise its antagonisms that

can contribute to rollover. Their technical capacities do not extend testing to humans.

6.5.1. Conclusion

The fifth section analysed how a new phase of survivability emerged through a

change in the “associated milieu” (Simondon, 2017). An aquatic medium replaced the

breathable atmospheric medium inside, rendering the MRAP’s capsular enclosure obsolete.

It follows that, the military learned through rollover about the dangerous terrain of

Afghanistan, and the rollover centred the survivability concern around the human

occupants of the MRAP. The new phase of survivability required assembling innovations

across the three terrestrial environmental mediums of military operations: land, air, and

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maritime. The military transferred breathing technologies from its air and aquatic domains

to that of land vehicle, forging new associations between the humans and the nonhumans.

Let us see how the military figures the new phase of survivability and improves the MRAP

in the next section.

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Figure 81 MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle testing at the Laguna Mud Course, Yuma Test Center (YTC), Yuma, U.S.; this facility tests for the military vehicles’ traction in mud (ATC Automotive Directorate, 2012, p. 101)

Figure 82 MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) stuck in a muddy rural road in Afghanistan, despite all the testing it went through at the YTC (Image source: U.S. Army)

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6.6 Technology Transfers

The story that started with the military viewing the MRAPs through a medical

lens of the human body now continues as a story of transfer of technology. The emerging

focus on the body-cum-technical-object leads the Army and Marines – the main operators

of the MRAPs – to mobilise expertise and knowledge from a comparable long-studied

breakdown. Inspiration would come from the military domain that assembles atmospheric

and aquatic mediums in its technology. This is the domain of military naval aircraft220, the

one that combines air and maritime powers. For aircrew members have long experienced

disorientation, panic, trauma, injuries, stuck seatbelts, and drowning in situations where

their aircraft collided with ground or water. In aviation, these injuries and outcomes fall

within the scope of a medicine subdiscipline called aerospace medicine221. This

subdiscipline deals with “spatial disorientation and other motion and acceleration-based

phenomenon,” according to Navy Captain and NAMRU-D222 commanding officer Rees

Lee (quoted in Ripple, 2016). Lee was interviewed for an Air Force news article on the

occasion of inaugurating the $19 million Kraken Disorientation Research Device at the

Captain Ashton Graybiel Acceleration Research Facility in Dayton, Ohio. Let us examine

how medicine informed a technology transfer to improve the survivability of the MRAPs.

… as Kaneb remembered one senior officer commenting, ‘Teach them what it is like to be drowning.’ With all due respect to that officer, Kaneb’s objective was not to simulate drowning, but to teach the trainees to orient themselves underwater, though even he later recalled that this was accomplished with ‘water in every sinus’ of those under instruction.

Figure 83 Excerpt from the NAM website (2013)

We trace the beginnings of connecting the atmospheric and aquatic to a history

brief from the website of the U.S. National Naval Aviation Museum (NAM). The present

technical and economic development of the Kraken device is grounded in the research

work of physician Ashton Graybiel and his team on the “physiologic impacts of motion

and acceleration on the human body” (Ripple, 2016). It is a type of research that tests for

the endurance of the human body under the influences of velocity and gravitational forces.

220 Here, we recall the works of Peter Sloterdijk (Sloterdijk, 2009, 2016) and Thomas Hippler (2017) about how the air force attacked the enemy’s environment by contaminating the atmospheric medium. 221 Also referred to as Aviation Medicine 222 The Naval Medical Research Unit – Dayton at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

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The Kraken’s brochure describes it as a capsule with the capacity to rotate trainees bodies

along six223 different axes and under variable velocities (NAMRU-D, 2018). The

astounding Kraken device, named after a mythical sea creature, replaces the still-in-use

Dilbert Dunker device, named after a clumsy comic character224. Formally known as the

Underwater Cockpit Escape Device, the dunker was designed by engineer and naval

officer Ensign Wilfred Kaneb back in 1944 (NAM, 2013). Besides the focus on drowning,

Kaneb’s work pioneered training through recruiting the pilots’ human bodies to experience

the trauma of an antagonistic environment (Figure 83). Unlike the Kraken’s “fully

networked capsule” (NAMRU-D, 2018), the Dunker’s capsule is a basic cockpit replica

that flips into a body of water, sometimes rotating along one axis, while trapping pilots

against seatbelts and equipment. To escape, pilots need to unlock their seatbelts and avoid

potential harm from any flying objects, all while controlling their breath and enduring the

shock of crashing into water. By having “water in every sinus,” trainee pilots develop a

familiarity with the possible traumatic event. Thus, the antagonisms of the milieu get

folded into the human body to improve its performance under sever conditions. The

functioning of the improved militarised body becomes more synergistic with the total

functioning of the technical ensemble. This function of the training to develop a trainee’s

“muscle-memory” (see 6.7) gets transferred from aircraft to MRAPs.

Borrowing and collaboration across domains is a growing practice of modern

militaries. Both Graybiel and Kaneb were Navy Officers stationed at the Naval Air Station

in Pensacola, Florida. However, the Kraken device is currently located within the NMRU-

D at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, a move representing a military

realignment that, as Lee puts it, “[brings] together Air Force and Navy scientists with long

histories of ground-breaking and innovative aeromedical research to work side-by-side”

(Ripple, 2016). With the non-combat breakdown of MRAPs and Humvees in Afghanistan

and Iraq, this cross-domain collaborative practice crossed over to land vehicles as never

before. Take, for example, how the MRAP borrowed the HEED – short for Helicopter

Emergency Egress Device – from helicopters, aircraft, and a long history of technical

improvements to scuba225 diving. An emergency breathing device in service with the U.S.

Navy, Air Force, and Marines since 1987 (Submersible Systems, 2019), the HEED is a

223 Including roll, yaw, and pitch. 224 The Kraken refers to a mythical creature in Scandinavian folklore, mostly depicted as a giant octopus or squid. While the Dilbert Dunker is named after Dilbert Groundloop, a WWII-era clumsy comic character featured in Navy instructional publications. 225 SCUBA is an acronym of Self-Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus.

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handheld air container to breathe under water, or to avoid chocking from smoke. The

Army’s Aeromedical Research Laboratory’s MRAP medical study recommended using

this handheld, emergency breathing technology to mitigate drowning and reduce soldier

fatalities (Pakulski et al., 2013, p. 10).

We continue to follow the technology transfer in another specialised military

publication from the Army’s Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (AL&T) organisation.

We analyse how the Army’s AL&T acquired the naval aviation technology to employ

alongside the Army’s vehicles. These would be the HEAT and the MET trainers. The new

devices will become the model rollover simulators that take into consideration the new

breakdown’s complexities. They perform an egress simulation, where soldiers train on how

to exit the trapping enclosure of a toppled MRAP. The October-December 2007 issue of

the Army AL&T226 magazine describes how the Army found the solution to survive

vehicle rollovers in “current technology used to train pilots — the dunker trainer” (Myers,

2007, p. 53). This was Kaneb’s device that trained pilots to escape the submerged cockpit

of their drowning aircraft. The Army drew inspiration from the design of both: simulator

and simulation. They built the HEAT – short for Humvee227 Egress Assistance Trainer –

by adapting the “key [survivability] ideas” of the pilots’ trainer to a Humvee assembly.

When the MRAPs replaced the Humvees, the MET – short for MRAP Egress Trainer –

replaced the HEAT. With the new trainers and their training programs, the Army’s land

vehicles acquired a major improvement, one where the bodies of soldiers become fully

prepared for the technological complexity of the MRAP.

In the technical details, the new land vehicle trainers are drum-like devices that

seat trainees inside and turn them upside-down to simulate a rollover event. One article

even compares the devices to “some sort of Army-inspired amusement park ride” (Miller,

2008). The drum-like device mounts an actual or replica capsule (Figure 88) of the

MRAP/Humvee and trainees sit inside to simulate a combat situation. The MET seats up to

ten occupants and has a gunner’s hatch on the roof, while the HEAT seats four. The cab,

then, turns along a horizontal axis for partial, full, or multiple turns to simulate different

scenarios of a rolling vehicle (see Figure 86). Cameras inside the cab relay228 the soldiers’

226 Acquisition, Logistics and Technology 227 The original acronym is for HMMWV, not Humvee; used here in this form for simplicity and consistency 228 For more on media technologies, political violence, and vision, check the works of Orit Halpern on cybernetic perception and computational cognition (2015) and Derek Gregory on scopic regimes (2011a).

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movements and performance to the trainers outside, who in turn observe and control the

simulation and communicate with the trainees. This training (Figure 89) does not use water

to submerge the trainees, but rather it focuses on the disorientation, shock, and possible

hazards inside a vehicle’s capsule during a rollover event (Figure 87). Drowning is

addressed through adding the HEED devices, as discussed earlier.

Since 2005, there have been 34 Humvee Class A rollovers, accidents that have either resulted in property damage totaling $1,000,000 or more, permanent total disability or a fatality, according to Fort Rucker’s Senior HEAT instructor William Peyregne. Prior to 2005, the Humvee was only involved in 30 Class A rollovers in its 18-year existence.

Figure 84 Excerpt from U.S. Army article (Miller, 2008)

Before HEAT, Soldiers were not trained how to properly exit a vehicle that had turned over on its side or top because of a rollover incident. During these exit attempts, Soldiers were experiencing various problems including: Disorientation…, Loose equipment…, Unlocking seat belts…, [and] Unlocking doors…

Figure 85 Excerpt from the Army AL&T magazine (Myers, 2007, p. 53 original emphasis)

A statistical rationale explains the effectiveness of the new training at improving

survivability (Figure 84), as documented in an Army news article reporting from the

Goodhand Simulator Complex at Fort Rucker, Alabama. That article counts more Humvee

rollovers between 2005 and 2008 – the time the explosion threat intensified in Iraq and

Afghanistan – than in all its previous service years combined in Panama, the Middle East,

Somalia, the Balkans, and Afghanistan. The Humvee’s mediation across all these

geographies reached its expiry date. The first HEAT was developed in 2005; by late

2007229, thirty-one first-generation HEATs were built – with “parts from battle-damaged

HMMWVs” – for use in Iraq and Afghanistan, and thousands of soldiers were trained

(Myers, 2007, p. 53). The Army’s TARDEC230 designed and built the HEAT prototype,

and the Red River Army Depot manufactured and produced the device’s systems (Myers,

2007, p. 54). A recent description of HEAT training on the Marines website reported that

Army soldiers’ survivability in a rollover event increased by 250 percent (U.S. Marine

Corps, 2018a), thus reducing the time of their emergency reaction to exit the vehicle and

229 First MRAP fielded in Iraq was in April 2007. 230 Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center; the same organisation that designed the Overhead Wire Mitigation (OWM) kit (see Chapter 5).

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engage if needed (Figure 85). The transfer of technology from Kaneb’s Dilbert Dunker to

the HEAT was now completed, and the Humvee’s cab served a separate purpose from the

Humvee vehicle.

Production of the METs ensued soon after the HEATs, also designed by

TARDEC and produced by the Red River Army Depot in Texas. The depot completed and

fielded the first seven METs in April 2009 (U.S. Army, 2009), two years after the fielding

of the first MRAP in Iraq in April 2007 (Friedman, 2013). One Army article reported how

General David H. Petraeus, commander of the U.S. Central Command, rushed the MET

production (U.S. Army, 2009) upon statistics of “121 non-hostile-related MRAP rollover

incidents … between Nov. 1, 2007 and Mar. 31, 2009” 231 (3rd Expeditionary Sustainment

Command, 2009). There were twenty METs in total fielded in Iraq and Afghanistan by

June 2009 (U.S. Army, 2009), and many others fielded in the U.S. by 2010 (U.S. Marine

Corps, 2018b). The transfer of technology from Kaneb’s Dilbert Dunker and the HEAT to

the MET was now completed.

6.6.1. Conclusion

The consequences of the rollover-drowning breakdown (previously discussed)

made the humans more visible and therefore the need to focus on training and preparing

them for potential accidents. Thus, the MRAP’s survivability progressed through a major

improvement: the technical ensemble expanded to include two new elements. One is a

rollover training device, and another is the human body. The training device transferred

training/simulation technology from naval aviation to the MRAPs and added new

synergies to equip soldiers with better, trained, and improved bodies. In a Simondonian

sense, the MRAP capsule “individuated” yet into another “being” other than the armoured

capsular enclosure or the cab of a vehicle. It became the new individual of the new phase

that survivability associated to a new milieu, that of training soldiers on rollover at a

training site – not to combat.

231 The article states that the cost of each MET is about $500,000 in U.S. Dollars, with each additional cab at about $200,000 in U.S. Dollars. To keep matters in perspective, here is an excerpt from a Congressional Record: “Adding armor to a Humvee cost only $14,000; a Humvee armored at the factory cost $191,000; today, an MRAP costs between $600,000 and $1 million, though some foreign models cost only about $200,000 in 2004” (Senator Biden (DE), 2007, p. S9604).

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Figure 86 MRAP Egress Trainer (MET) prepared for simulation-training at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, U.S.; the device setup is straightforward: an MRAP cab (without the engine, chassis, and wheels) rotating around a horizontal axis (Stagner, 2013; Rogoway, 2017)

Figure 87 Airmen flipped upside-down during an MRAP Egress Training (MET) rollover simulation at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, U.S. (Stagner, 2013)

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Figure 88 Patent art showing the cab part of an MRAP vehicle used in the MRAP egress training simulator (Henriksson, 2014, p. Sheet 12 of 16)

Figure 89 Preparatory training to spatially familiarise soldiers with the team’s seating positions in an MRAP (seated driver, seated soldiers, standing gunner) prior to initiating the MET egress training – device seen in the background (Prince, 2019)

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6.7 Terraining Moves

Our story ends with examining how the MET device simulates terrain. The

MRAP vehicle was the technical object mediating survivability and mobility in the field

during operation, but the MET device became the technical object tasked with simulating

(and mediating) survivability during training. The narrative of survivability changed from

one merely relying on the nonhumans to one of more pronounced alliances between

humans and nonhumans, also human and humans. Or, as one Sergeant 1st Class K.

Hands232 says in a MET training video, “We’re not teaching combat maneuvers or

anything, we’re teaching how to save each other” (Hiler, 2013). In the last section, we

survey how the MET and HEAT trainers operated through specific training procedures,

risk assessments, and geographic distribution.

We examine examples of rollover training documented in various sources,

including online videos and images of rollover simulation and training. These media are

available from the Department of Defense’s multimedia digital archive DVIDS, short for

the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service. At the time of search in June 2019,

there was a total of eight documentary videos on MET and HEAT training for U.S.

soldiers, officially produced by active-duty military personnel in locations like Fort Hood

(Texas), Camp McGregor (New Mexico), Joint Base Balad (Iraq), the Redstone Arsenal

(Alabama), and Joint Base Mcguire-Dix-Lakehurst (New Jersey). We analyse the visual

content, transcribe the interviews with the trainee soldiers, and crosscheck with Army

published news articles. Furthermore, we analyse related risk management procedures and

survey the different distribution locations of the MET and HEAT trainers.

As Staff Sgt. Thomas Schwenkler crouched awkwardly on the ceiling of an upside down Humvee last week, he wondered why in the world his door wouldn’t open. “When you are upside down, everything gets turned around and it takes a second to figure it all out,” the B Company, 46th Engineer Battalion engineer said. “I kept pushing the door handle down when I should have been pulling it up.”

Figure 90 Excerpt from U.S. Army article (Miller, 2008)

232 Non-commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) of the Dual Vehicle Egress training site at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey

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Pretty much what happened is that I found myself pinned at the seatbelt area…and my head hit the ceiling of the MRAP, and my feet touch the ceiling of the MRAP, and I kind of found myself making a little pyramid, to where, the seatbelt was though unbuckled wouldn’t release from my [inaudible]. With a lot of angling, I was able to become free, but, it was an awkward position just for a moment.

Figure 91 Transcript from MET egress training video (Simon, 2009)

The first excerpt above (Figure 90) is from an Army article on the HEAT, while

the second (Figure 91) is a transcript from an Army video on the MET. The descriptions in

the two excerpts are representative of similar ones found in the other videos and articles. In

the videos, we observe soldiers sitting in MET devices, buckling up their seat belts, and

spinning until they are “upside-down” (Miller, 2008; Simon, 2009; Siniard, 2011),

sometimes rotating a few times in one go. Similar to pilot training (see 6.6), the simulation

induces the experience of disorientation, panic, confusion, and even bodily injury, within

the bounds of a “controlled environment” (U.S. Marine Corps, 2018b). In post-training

interviews in the videos and similar reporting articles, we hear trainee soldiers embody this

control through a differentiation between the training and “the real deal … outside the

wire”233 (Zimerman, 2009), “an actual rollover” (Simon, 2009), “a real-world situation …

in real life” (Carkeet IV, 2013), or “in case it does happen overseas” (Leigh, 2018).

Although it is real, simulation works through this inside-outside opposition between

replicated/re-enacted and the combat situation (the real), constantly associating the latter

with an outside.

The specificity of the MET and HEAT trainers as independent devices –

“individuals” of survivability – necessitates identifying their own training hazards, other

than those of the MRAP vehicles. Put differently, training for safety and survivability in

the field required its own safety during training as the Army’s Risk Management pamphlet

designates “tough, realistic training” under the remit of military operations (U.S. Army,

2014, p. 1). Receiving rollover-egress training became a requirement for troops, even

generals (Zimerman, 2009; U.S. Marine Corps, 2018a), and a “proactive responsive” type

of training (U.S. Marine Corps, 2018b) that developed the soldiers’ “muscle-memory” to

react quickly and communicate effectively in the event of rollover (Hiler, 2013; U.S.

Marine Corps, 2018b).

233 ‘Outside the wire’ is military speak for outside protected installations (camps, bases).

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We trace such requirements to the Army’s Fort Bragg234 website, which lists two

relevant forms235 in this regard: DD Form 2977 Deliberate Risk Assessment Worksheet and

HEAT MRAP Training Participant Screening Sheet (see U.S. Army, 2018). The forms

embody a similar medical lens to the Army’s Aeromedical Research Laboratory’s study

(see 6.5). The first risk assessment form is a spreadsheet that follows the guidelines of the

Army’s Risk Management pamphlet to identify and assess hazards and to develop and

implement controls (U.S. Army, 2014). The form lists four shared hazards between

training with METs and operating MRAPs, which lead to head/neck, pinch point (finger),

struck-by-loose-object, and weather types of injuries. The remaining three hazards are

specific to the training, which include slipping/tripping, ejection of gunner, and injuries

from moving parts. We trace the same hazards to the standardised Army Risk Matrix (see

Figure 96). The second screening form is a questionnaire to survey trainees for temporary

or permanent medical conditions that could affect their participation in the training. It

covers a range of conditions from illness to medication, immunisation, dental work, bone

fractures, back/neck trouble, pregnancy, alcohol, sleep, eating habits, and prior “traumatic

experience in vehicles…such as a HMMWV.” As required risk assessments before any

training exercises, the MET and HEAT trainers establish themselves as independent

technical objects of survivability and extend the metascripts of occupational safety of the

State (see section 5.5 of Chapter 5).

By the end of June, MET systems will spread to 20 locations, including 13 camps in Iraq and six in Afghanistan, said Bill Huggins, the project manager for [PEO-STRI]236 …

Figure 92 Excerpt from U.S. Army article (3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command, 2009)

234 This is the home base of the airborne and special forces where Sergeant James Treber trained 235 See forms in the Appendix 236 Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation in Southwest Asia, an Army agency responsible for developing and fielding new equipment

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MET has been fielded since 2010 at Camp Pendleton, CA; Camp Lejeune, NC; 29 Palms, CA; Camp Hansen, JPN; Kaneohe Bay, HI; New River, NC; Cherry Point, NC; Beaufort, SC; Yuma, AZ; and Miramar, CA.

Figure 93 Excerpt from U.S. Marine Corps website (U.S. Marine Corps, 2018b)

As of FY 2010, 13 [HEAT] have been fielded [at] Camp Pendleton, [California]; Camp Lejeune, [North Carolina]; 29 Palms, [California]; Camp Hansen, [Japan]; Kaneohe Bay, [Hawaii]; New River, [North Carolina]; Cherry Point, [North Carolina]; Beaufort, [South Carolina]; Yuma, [Arizona]; and Miramar, [California]; with another five are to be fielded in FY 2010 to include fielding are Iwakuni, Japan, and Quantico, [Virginia].

Figure 94 Excerpt from U.S. Marine Corps website (U.S. Marine Corps, 2018a)

The MET and HEAT trainers replicate the effects of terrain from the dangerous

field “outside the wire” to the safety of training. Unlike the MRAP vehicles whose milieu

is bound to combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, the trainers’ milieu is bound to training on

military installations regardless of their geography. The trainers follow the soldiers: they

are fielded to military installations in the U.S. to train soldiers awaiting overseas

deployment (Figure 93 and Figure 94); or, they are fielded to Iraq and Afghanistan to train

soldiers already deployed there (Figure 92). Their transportability – ease of transportation

(see Figure 95) – facilitated their mobility across sites to deliver survivability training. The

devices were manufactured in the U.S. and distributed to military installations, and the

training was subcontracted to commercial subcontractors like OT Training Solutions and

the Pulau Corporation237. The excerpts above list the distribution of the METs and HEATs

across military installations in the U.S., Iraq, and Afghanistan. They entered Iraq through

Kuwait: first, they arrived in Camp Arifjan through airlift or sealift; this was a forward

logistics base that received materiel from the U.S. Then, they were deployed to Camp

Buehring, “the gateway” to Iraq (3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command, 2009; U.S.

Army, 2009); this was a staging post for deploying materiel received from Camp Arifjan to

the areas of operation in Iraq. In Afghanistan, the devices arrived at Bagram Airfield

before deployment to the rest of the country. Thus, terraining is not only assigned to

engineers in the workshop and MRAP vehicles in the field, but it is distributed over

237 More can be found on the websites of OT Solutions (2015) and the Pulau Corporation (2017)

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training devices, training sites, training tactics, and safety regulations/procedures across the

military landscape.

6.7.1. Conclusion

The last section analysed how the military folded the terraining of Afghanistan

into its soldiers’ bodies. The MET and HEAT trainers became independent objects of

survivability with their own networks (manufacturing, transportation, operator

subcontractors, trainees), safety measures (risk assessment, screening), and geographic

distribution (U.S., Iraq, Afghanistan, and even Japan). They simulated a shocking but not

harmful rollover and contributed to a macro-scale production of territoriality, across the

military landscape. Besides muscle-memory, the trainers imprint a particular notion of

terrain into the soldiers’ bodies rendering them more adapted to various landscapes.

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Figure 95 The transportable MET training devices delivered by trailers at Camp Buehring, Kuwait (U.S. Army, 2009)

Figure 96 Standardised Army Risk Matrix from the Risk Management Pamphlet (U.S. Army, 2014, p. 8)

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6.8 Conclusion: Pre-injured Bodies and Technics

[ [human body] vehicle ] ] body—vehicle—terrain [

Figure 97 Changing relation from a passive body (closed brackets) within a technical object (closed brackets) to active human and nonhuman associations (open brackets) (by author)

The military continued to construct their knowledge of the landscape as a

relational and emergent context of actions for the mundane use of technologies. When the

MRAP vehicles broke down upon deployment from Iraq to Afghanistan, the military were

up against new antagonisms for survivability and mobility, which called for new

improvements and differentiated a new type of terrain through the technical object. A

precarious mobility surface gave the rural its character against the urban’s hazardous

mobility infrastructure. Iraq’s urban infrastructure provided the soldiers with an almost

homogeneous “[Euclidean] visual space” (after Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 371) of the

antagonistic elements. In contrast, Afghanistan’s rural, irregular, soft ground was

impossible to measure, a terrain with “an antagonism without possible mediation”

(Simondon, 2017, p. 168), at least not those intended for Iraq. Rollover became the

deadliest non-combat breakdown, providing the military with an opportunity to find more

about rural terrain, to gain knowledge and adapt the technology.

The differentiation of terrain (and landscape) as rural (unpaved/off-road) or urban

(paved/flat) becomes deeply grounded in a process of “individuation of oversaturated

systems” (Simondon, 2017, p. 168). This means that tensions between the urban version of

the MRAP vehicle and Afghanistan’s rural terrain oversaturated the military’s desired

survivable mobility, then proceeded to “successive resolutions of tensions” (Simondon,

2017, p. 168) through the potentials of survivability itself. These potentials are a “power of

coming-into-being without degradation,” a reality and “not the simple virtuality of future

states” (cf. Heidegger, 1977, p. 17; Simondon, 2017, p. 168). The military transferred

breathing technologies from its air and aquatic domains to that of land vehicle, forging new

associations between the humans and the nonhumans. Survivability “dephased” (Combes,

2012, p. 4) from a script mediating bodily and molecular orders of magnitude and a milieu

that is the MRAP capsule as a highly protected and separated enclosure. A new phase of

survivability came into being when water replaced air, creating a new order of magnitude,

and the human body (of the occupants) became part of the technical ensemble (Figure 97).

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The MRAP capsule “individuated” yet into another “being” other than the armoured

capsular enclosure or the cab of a vehicle. It became the new individual – the MRAP

Egress Trainer – of the new phase of survivability, and the terraining of Afghanistan was

additionally realised through rollover training that produced a form of pre-injured bodies

that could anticipate extreme rollover breakdowns.

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Chapter 7

Discussion: Politics of Survivability

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7.0 Introduction

In the final chapter, we bring together the analysed accounts of the engineering,

scripting, and breakdown of military survivability to discuss the empirical chapters’

findings. We compare how our findings on body-vehicle-terrain associations are different

from those of a defence matrix or a political economy in the reviewed literature on military

urbanisms and architectures (Chapter 2). It is a difference informed by a Simondon and

ANT-STS inspired methodology for tracing associations (sociotechnical, techno-

geographic, architectural, and urban) with the technical object as the unit of analysis (i.e.,

the MRAP vehicle), rather than mapping networks of constituted artefacts and social

structures. We enumerate three original research contributions and explain their extent in

urban studies, architectural humanities, and STS, reflecting on the novelty of studying the

politics of survivability in primary sources like utility patents and military publications and

on reporting the findings through urban and architectural lenses. Finally, we list the

research limitations and identify prospects for further research.

The three contributions are as follows. First, the research advances the

epistemological position that survivability would not be the same without the technical

object. Second, it expands on the relational theory of the architectural and the urban as

characters of associations and modes and intensities of connection in armoured vehicles,

extending the scope and domain of architectural and urban studies beyond the figure of the

static building. Third, it answers a methodological question about how to employ technical

objects to study the spatialisation of urban warfare and the reduction of the landscape into

terrain. The research also makes general contributions to applying the philosophy of

Simondon in urban studies, the architectural humanities, and STS and to exploring the

synergies between philosophy of technics and sociology of sociotechnical scripts. The

following sections discuss the contributions through the research findings and explain their

extent based on the extensive analysis of the original empirical sources.

7.1 First Contribution: Survivability as Concern

This research’s first contribution is to reframe the factuality of militarisation and

the spatialisation of warfare within concerns of survivability. It adds to existing framing on

state power, military force, crimes against civilians (genocide) and their built environment

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(urbicide), occupation, and militarisation at large. For the discourses of “the new military

urbanism,” Haussmannisation, and “the architecture of occupation” miss the premises that

underpin such concerns (Chapter 2). Survivability offers a lens to examine the urban/rural

landscape primarily as a terrain to be survived during the time of war and through the

interdependence of humans and nonhumans, both military and civilian.

The military’s combat survivability is highly sociotechnical: soldiers are trained to

look out for themselves and their fellow soldiers, always with the help of technical objects

and through the disciplined training and instruction of military doctrine. Similar to Butler’s

call for “interdependence” and relational ontology of the body (2016), the military trains

soldiers on a relational responsibility for interdependence which we read about in various

accounts of military brotherhood like that of Sergeant Treber saving Sergeant Serna in

their drowning MRAP in Afghanistan (Chapter 6). However, the Treber-Serna story is

layered with the presence or lack of nonhuman agencies, from the heavyweight of the

MRAP that rolled it over into the water to the tight enclosure of the capsule that confined

the soldiers, and the lack of additional air supply sources that did not account for losing the

atmospheric medium. Despite it being an account of war like those that Butler critiques,

the vulnerability and failure of the occupants’ bodies in the drowning MRAP are the more

possible due to the lack of adequate technical mediation. This specific breakdown is later

negotiated and reduced by adding air-breathing devices and introducing mandatory

rollover training for all soldiers deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, the human body’s

vulnerability is not ontological like Butler argues (2016, p. 33); instead, it emerges as a

situated relational intensity of the strength/weakness of the sociotechnical associations

between humans and nonhumans. This explains why rollover training aims to produce a

form of pre-injured bodies that could anticipate extreme rollover breakdowns (see “third

advantage” in 7.3).

Moreover, the relational responsibility for interdependence extends the

sociotechnical associations of survivability from intra-military to military-civilian

relations. Contemporary urban warfare forms might have a lineage in the 19th century

militarised urban renewal paradigms, like Haussmann’s, and colonial military strategies,

like Bugeaud’s (Chapter 2). However, these forms evolve with the protections extended to

civilians under new international laws and humanitarian treaties, but most importantly – as

shown here – relational to the increased value attributed to the armed forces’ survivability.

In other words, the military is increasingly forced to coordinate with local communities of

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citizens, be it in the warzone or the home front. When the MRAPs experience electrical

shocks from low-hanging power lines on Iraq’s urban streets (Chapter 5), the military’s

concern is twofold: electrocution of their personnel and materiel and antagonising local

civilians upon cutting their electrical supply. Their response is adding a device to the

MRAP that articulates both concerns: eliminate electrical shocks to soldiers/equipment and

cultivate good relations with the locals by preserving their infrastructure. When the

MRAPs return to the U.S. upon withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan (Chapter 5), the

military’s concern aligns with national defence strategies to preserve the highways’

integrity for defence and public safety purposes. They subscribe to federal policies to

protect local civilians by transporting the heavy MRAPs only via designated means. In

both examples, the military-civilian relations are extended upon immediate or strategic

concerns for survivability through sociotechnical associations between humans and

nonhuman infrastructure.

The survivability lens does not dismiss the fact that civilians are the first and most

casualties of modern wars and conflicts. Neither assumes that international laws and

humanitarian treaties are devoid of biases, inequalities, and militarised mobilisation.

However, in a world of increasing armed conflicts and vast civilian displacement,

survivability is one pragmatist and realist view of the changing relationship between

humans and technology, where interdependence is a hybrid politics and ethics of human-

nonhuman and military-civilian networks and associations. Hence, the thesis contributes to

a sociotechnical understanding of survivability.

7.2 Second Contribution: The Urban and Architectural

This research’s second contribution is extending the theory of the architectural

and the urban associations as modes and intensities of connection that hold, wither, or

change. It draws on the ANT-inspired STS theory of associations, specifically the work of

Albena Yaneva, and on Simondon’s philosophy of individuation, precisely its concern with

technical objects as technical beings. Based on our analysis of protective envelopes and

relations with infrastructure and land, we argue for extending the notions of architectural

and urban associations to the MRAPs and vehicles in general. A better framing of the

notions would be associations of an architectural or urban character since vehicles are not

architectural objects like buildings but could act as urban objects. The following diagram

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explains the relation between the two theories as they emerged throughout the empirical

chapters.

[ {Body-Vehicle} + Terrain] = Body-Vehicle-Terrain

Figure 98 The body-vehicle associations of an architectural character present in the MRAP capsule part merge with the MRAP vehicle part to produce the body-vehicle-terrain associations of an urban character (by author)

The diagram (Figure 98) shows two sets of associations that merge into a hybrid.

It frames a multiplicity of associations that we claim to possess an architectural or urban

character. Our realist accounts of combat/non-combat related breakdowns, urban/rural

terrains, and warzone/home front deployment situate these associations and localise their

politics (Chapters 5 and 6). However, it is not only the different types of accounts that

enrich such a realist approach. The analysis shows that the technical individuals in these

accounts are dynamic and improving to maintain the solidity of the connections; once their

improvement reaches oversaturation, these individuals become new ones (i.e.,

“individuate”) with new associations to new milieus. It is in this process of individuation

and the coming-into-being of successive individuals (what Simondon terms the

“transindividual”) that both sets of associations merge the architectural character of the

capsule with the urban character of the vehicle. Next, we explain each type of associations

as it emerges in the analysis.

7.2.1. Associations of an Architectural Character

The first set of associations in Figure 98 represents those between humans and

their technical object, i.e., the soldiers and the MRAP capsule. They are associations of an

architectural character where the capsule envelopes the soldiers’ bodies within a safe

atmospheric enclosure and separates them from dangerous external terrain. While this is

not the realm of architectural design, style, iconicity, and technology, the MRAP capsule

provisions space explicitly planned for activities like sitting, interacting, working,

communicating, and stowing while on the move (Chapters 4-6). This enclosure must be

structurally sound (monocoque, unibody), safe (armour, door locks), ergonomic

(responsive seats, assisted doors), connected with the outside (windows, radio/microwave

frequencies), and thermally controlled (air conditioning). The architectural character of the

MRAP’s body-vehicle associations realises different modes of connection (move mounted,

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work dismounted) and varying intensities (with/without injuries from detonation) between

the soldiers and their operational terrain. Furthermore, this architectural character is further

elaborated and enacted to extend the solidity of the connections through techniques,

procedures, and instructions in the military’s field manuals, regulations, user handbooks,

and training.

The architectural character of the MRAP’s associations does not instantly reveal a

grounding in architectural schemas as we know them. Unlike the building figure that

realises architectural schemas for living, working, sleeping, eating, and recovering, the

MRAP’s vehicle figure has a technical lineage closer to trucks than buildings. However,

improvements to the MRAP capsule as a protective enclosure/envelope have much in

common with past military fortifications’ schemas. The fortress may have withered as a

building type. However, we see old fortification principles, like those described by

historian of technology Janis Langins (2004), continue to inform the engineering of

contemporary fortifications: armoured vehicles. The MRAP capsule embodies a schema of

principles related to geometry238 (angled/sloped parts, greater distance from the threat),

separation (inside/outside envelope, controlled openings), and visibility (windows, lines of

sight). The import of these schemas from the stationary figure of fortifications to the

mobile figure or armoured vehicles travel from artisanal ensembles of stone masonry

(where thick stone walls respond to artillery fire) to thermodynamic ensembles of

metallurgy (where thick armour steel responds to IED detonations). This lineage239 of

fortification schemas endows the MRAP’s associations with their architectural character.

Nevertheless, we differentiate the MRAP from buildings grounded in a fixed terrain as a

mobile object displaced across varied terrain. The result is a hybrid script that coordinates

survivability with mobility (Chapters 4-6).

Withstand IED detonations + Travel across urban/rural terrains + Transport soldiers and equipment

Figure 99 The associated milieu of the MRAP’s survivability-mobility hybrid script (by author)

238 We find such schemas across different applications. Consider the angled/sloped plane. It is one of the oldest technical schemas for deflection. It is found in houses/buildings where the roof pitch angle redirects rainwater and snow away from the building. It is also found in fortifications where angles of star-shaped plans improve visibility and reduce “dead ground.” 239 What gunpowder artillery was for fortification engineering in the 16th and 17th centuries parallels what IED detonations are for contemporary armoured vehicle engineering.

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This notion of associations in military technical objects has parallels and overlaps

in the literature of military urbanisms and architectures; however, it also shows profound

differences in how the politics of spatialising militarisation is approached. Consider the

lineage of fortifications. It is present in Weizman’s “the architecture of occupation” that

describes matrices, nodes, walls, checkpoints, and an “optical urbanism” (2017b). And

although it does not employ the notion of “the architectural,” the account describes modes

of connection and flow intensities (Chapter 2). However, Weizman’s “the architecture of

occupation” remains closer to a systems architecture240 lens whose constituted objects fall

into their place in the network/structure and territorialise241 the landscape.

In contrast, as a schema, counter-IED fortifications embody the figure of a new

technical object, i.e., the MRAP capsule-vehicle. The MRAP individuates as the new

technical individual of survivability (Figure 100) upon the Humvee’s oversaturation, and it

concretises as a technical object associated with a mobility terrain of powerful detonations.

Then, the MET (MRAP Egress Trainer) individuates as another technical individual of

survivability (Figure 100) upon the MRAP’s oversaturation, and it concretises as a

technical object associated with rollover. Rather than a static territory, the MRAP and the

MET facilitate and spatialise temporary territorialisations242.

HMMWV (mobility script oversaturated for survivability) MRAP

MRAP (mobile vehicle oversaturated for stability) MET

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (Humvee) Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected MRAP Egress Trainer

Figure 100 The individuation of survivability’s technical individuals (by author)

Now, consider the associations of the MRAP capsule. These are not similar in any

way to Graham’s capsular space of the SUV. The two notions of the capsule are very

different. Graham’s SUV capsule offers a sweeping psychoanalytical explanation of the

SUV users’ politics and ideologies of patriotism and militarism (Chapter 2). And although

it attempts to trace the military origins of its technology, the SUV account remains

240 Similar to a national master plan only focused on defences. 241 Weizman’s description of territorialising the Palestinian landscape resembles Vauban’s 16th-century Pré Carré strategy to cordon off the French territory. In contemporary military strategy, the closest thing to this practice is the network of U.S. overseas military bases, both main bases and forward operating bases. 242 See Mattias on “territorial stabilization” (Kärrholm, 2007, 2013, 2016)

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primarily set against an epistemology of the urban grounded in a logic of resource

extraction that explains the political economy of war and fossil fuels.

In contrast, the MRAP capsule offers a realist account of relations between the

inside (the capsule) and outside (the terrain). For example, the capsule’s envelope deflects

or absorbs the force and fragmentation of detonations to protect its occupants from

injury/death (Chapter 4). However, a breakdown could reverse the capsule’s script into one

that threatens its occupants’ lives (Chapter 6). Furthermore, the users’ judgment (i.e., the

soldiers) could override the capsule’s agency if they decide to step out and be more

sociable with the locals (Chapter 5). In no way our description of the capsule implies that

the MRAP users are devoid of political beliefs and ideologies; however, our argument

contests making sweeping assumptions that reduce the technical object to a set of symbols

and signs tailored to established social structures. The MRAP’s survivability informs the

soldiers’ actions and the vehicles’ scripts first and foremost through the body-vehicle

associations that enable technical mediation.

Thus, these associations’ architectural character offers a crucial insight into how

we study militaries and militarisation and their spatialisation of warfare. It allows us to

understand the MRAP enclosure – and maybe vehicles, in general – as a hybrid of

networks of action/mediation. Medieval fortification schemas inform modern armour

designs; technical progress deterritorialises the figure of stationary buildings into that of

mobile vehicles; and heterogeneous networks of technical inventions and training realise a

liveable inside-outside separation. The military, as we understand it, “has never been

modern,” to use Latour’s perceptive expression (1993). Rather than Subjects and Objects,

Nature on the one hand and Urban culture on the other, its processes of militarisation

reassemble hybrids based on experiences of breakdowns, failures, and tried-and-tested

principles; it does so through invention, scripting, and multiplying the mediators first and

foremost of survivability.

7.2.2. Associations of an Urban Character

The second set of associations in Figure 98 represents those between the technical

object and its associated milieu, i.e., the MRAP vehicle and urban warfare terrain. They are

associations of an urban character where the vehicle safely transports the soldiers across

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the landscape and articulates the terrain’s obstacles. This is not243 a typical account of

urban studies. Yet, it is about how the military experiences the urban landscape as

intensities and relational to the MRAP’s mobility. The movement of the armoured vehicles

must consider limitations of road geometry (width, vertical clearance, lane size, slopes),

ground cover (hard, soft, flat, paved, irregular, land, water), and public safety (visibility,

weight, stability, human scale). The urban character of the MRAP’s vehicle-terrain

associations realises different modes of connection (movement with/without infrastructure

and civilians) and varying intensities (vibrations with/without injuries from detonation,

electrical shock, and rollover) between the soldiers and their operational terrain. As with

the architectural character, the urban character is further elaborated and enacted to extend

the solidity of the connections through techniques and procedures in the military’s

doctrinal and instructional publications.

The urban character of the associations is situated as much as the technical object

is. The MRAP is not like any other armoured vehicle, for it is explicitly engineered to

mediate high survivability levels for soldiers, vehicles, and missions during the aughts

occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan (Chapter 2). The MRAP withstands the extreme

disruption of detonations through several synergistic technical functionings (Chapter 4):

thick metal alloy armour; integrated capsule design; unique underbody geometry; high

ground clearance; dynamic interiors; advanced materials; and electronic systems.

Compared to similar truck types, the protective script endows the MRAP vehicle with

excess dimensions (due to extra components), weight (due to extra armour), and instability

(due to a higher centre of gravity). Thus, its geographic grounding corresponds to and

complements the technical functioning best when the MRAP operates on flat surfaces, at

low speeds, on wide lanes, and with enough overall height clearance. This “techno-

geographic milieu” coordinates the MRAP’s functions as an armoured capsule and a

mobile vehicle (Figure 101), and it realises the MRAP as a self-regulating, or

“concretized,” technical object of military survivability.

243 Except in parts of the literature on mobilities in Human Geography (see Bissell, 2010; Merriman, 2019)

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Armoured Enclosure (Capsule) + Motor Vehicle (Truck) = MRAP

Figure 101 The MRAP is a hybrid of two sets of associations: one with an architectural character (capsule) and another with an urban character (capsule + truck). The former could exist on its own, but the latter is a hybrid of both. Otherwise, the mobile MRAP vehicle becomes the stationary MRAP Egress Trainer device (by author).

However, it is precisely because the mobility landscapes of Iraq and Afghanistan

do not always fulfil this specific techno-geographic milieu’s requirements that the MRAP

breaks down. Unlike buildings grounded in a fixed terrain, the MRAP’s mobility displaces

the vehicle across varied terrain and informs its associations to be responsive to that

displacement. Notably, the resultant excess dimensions, weight, and instability of the

MRAP become adverse effects for protected mobility, i.e., antagonisms that disrupt the

technical object’s self-regulation. When exceeding height and width limitations on the flat

and paved roads in densely built-up areas in Iraq, the MRAP risks what we called frictions

(Chapter 5): electrocuting its occupants and equipment from encountering low-hanging

power lines, damaging its jamming devices from hitting overhead structures, getting stuck

on narrow streets and gates, and agitating the locals upon disrupting their infrastructure.

The vehicle’s mobility becomes relational to the landscape’s infrastructural oversaturation,

and the MRAP receives improvements that urbanise it as a technical object (such as

downsizing, height negotiation devices, electrical shock instructions). When exceeding

speed and surface geometry limitations on irregular and soft roads in open areas in

Afghanistan, the MRAP risks rolling over on an unstable ground surface or into bodies of

water, which at best injures the occupants and at worst traps them inside and even causes

their drowning (Chapter 6). The vehicle’s mobility becomes relational to the landscape’s

infrastructural undersaturation, and the MRAP receives improvements that ruralise it as a

technical object (such as off-road suspension, lower centre of gravity, oxygen devices,

rollover training). Through such technical relations, the military realises the landscape as a

terrain safe for their operations.

Thus, the military constructs their knowledge of the operational landscape through

relational and emergent sites of action, in this case, within the MRAP and during its

mobility. They differentiate the landscape through modes of connection (size, weight,

stability) and intensities of infrastructural oversaturation (i.e., more urban) or

undersaturation (i.e., rural/less urban), which gives the MRAP’s associations their urban

character. Furthermore, these modes of connection and intestines of infrastructural

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saturation differentiate the warzone from the home front. On the one hand, the home front

geography of the U.S. is where the MRAP subscribes to “metascripts” of public safety for

transporting on highways and defence readiness for maintaining infrastructural integrity

(Chapter 5). On the other hand, the home front territory of the U.S. extends beyond its state

geography and into places where U.S. soldiers (i.e., labour) and equipment (i.e., property)

operate within “metascripts” of occupational safety in overseas bases and vehicular

enclosures (Chapters 5 and 6).

7.3 Third Contribution: A Method for Tracing Associations

The third contribution of this research is methodological insights into studying

militarisation’s technical objects as dynamic, evolving, and grounded individuals of

survivability. Rather than analysing discourse or content, our method traced and analysed

two sets of associations (Chapter 3): sociotechnical ones between humans and nonhumans

and techno-geographic ones that concretise the technical object – and feeds into the former.

We started from breakdown situations where these associations’ strengths and weaknesses

were explored as to whether their networks seemed to hold up or not. To resolve the

limitations of being on-site or following discussions in real-time, we opted for a quasi-

ethnographic approach to tracing these associations by following actor-networks,

collecting fragments of observations, and documenting processes of assembling in primary

and secondary sources (Chapter 3). We explored the MRAPs’ genesis that made them what

they are (Chapter 4) and followed whom they negotiated the emerging non-combat related

breakdowns in the field (Chapters 5 and 6). The method has three advantages.

The first advantage of this method is that it allows us to study relational politics

through the MRAP’s technical evolution processes. These processes converge from the

development of armour, trucks, aircraft, missiles, and computing across military and

commercial domains (Chapter 4), which is a substantial rationale to study technological

change beyond the military-civilian binary. Accordingly, we do not start from the MRAP

as a “constituted individual” but as a synergistic assemblage of functioning or “sub-

ensembles.” Primary sources like utility patents are home to these synergies, where

improvements to the MRAP travel across the domain and history of inventions in land

vehicles and aerospace engineering. Patents are full of references to basic and advanced

technicities in elements (e.g., fastening/screws, elasticity/springs, strength/Steel alloys,

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lightweight/Aluminium alloys, heating/lasers, and fusion/thermoplastics, among others)

and synergies among sub-ensembles (e.g., wheels with independent suspension, underbody

armour housing drive trains, and occupants’ capsule and monocoque structural frame

among others). The patents allow us to trace how these technicities travel across time and

domains and get deposited in thermodynamic, electrotechnic, and electrometallurgic

ensembles. The MRAP becomes a technical object whose elements of technicity lie

elsewhere (Simondon, 2017, pp. 71–81) in metallurgical processes, material science,

computing, and robotics, and whose technical progress develops many of its parts and

systems from commercial trucks and passenger cars. Tracing such associations in the

sources allows us to examine militarisation and the spatialisation of urban warfare through

the MRAP as a mediator of relational politics and its situatedness across multiple sites of

politics (lab/field, combat/non-combat, urban/rural, warzone/home front).

The second advantage is that it allows us to examine the effectiveness of technical

progress in producing viable survivability politics. Based on the same invention processes

discussed earlier, effectiveness relies on increasing the quality and quantity of information

flows – what Simondon refers to as “cybernetics” – to make intelligent decisions that

resolve technical and geographic antagonisms. Such cybernetics is responsible for realising

the “techno-geographic milieu” of the MRAPs, and the method traces them across primary

and secondary sources. Whether in patents (Chapter 4) or field manuals, medical studies,

testing documents, user handbooks, or technical brochures (Chapters 4-6), the method

finds these cybernetics in the figure of reductions made to the operational landscapes of the

vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan. This practice of reducing the landscape yields what

militarisation and engineering designate as the terrain in its different versions: urban

(Chapter 5), rural, mountain, and desert (Chapter 6). More importantly, the relational and

processual underpinnings of the method allow it to read these geographical reductions as a

lineage or series that parallel and evolve with the technical improvements. Therefore, we

introduce the relational and processual concept of terraining (Chapters 2, 4-6) as a practice

of making of terrain and its continuous constitution as a principle.

The third and lesser-explored advantage of this method is that it allows us to

analyse human-technology relations where human bodies become pre-injured bodies. The

more advanced and self-regulating the MRAP became, through incorporating automated

systems, the more its function of regulation presupposed what Simondon calls “a

variability in its operation” (2017, p. 139). This is why, to stay with Simondon, the self-

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regulating MRAP needs the soldiers as “associates” (2017, p. 139) to participate244 in

stabilising the technical object and maintain high levels of survivability. However, soldiers

are, primarily, the objects of protection of the MRAP, not only the associates regulating it.

Thus, the method traces a scale shift, in the military publications and training media, from

the regulation of humans to their bodies’ pain, that is, the fragility of bodies under the

extreme impact (physical acceleration, pressure, temperature) of IED detonations. These

extreme antagonisms are translated245 through the military’s medical lens (trauma

pathology) to specific injury types (head, neck, and spinal injuries, severe burns, electric

shock, and suffocation) from detonations (Chapter 4), electrocution (Chapter 5), and

rollover and drowning (Chapter 6). Furthermore, the method traces a scale shift across

“orders of magnitude” from a molecular-bodily order under detonations to a bodily-

medium of life order when drowning. This instigates a new technical mediation of the

terrain, only this time one folded into the soldiers’ bodies to complement the technical

object’s work. The MRAP Egress trainer comes-into-being to produce pre-injured bodies.

This is where the MRAP-type of armoured vehicles serves as a lens and a site to

open the black box of terraining246. As a survivability script against powerful detonations,

the technical mediation of the sub-ensembles documented in the patents brings forward a

combination of improvements and redundancies (Chapter 4). Generally, the improvements

account for new antagonisms, and the redundancies account for old recurring ones. They

are not exclusively mutual, as the vehicles simultaneously resolve various antagonisms,

such as mobility, survivability, naturally existing, and human-made. This happens when

the MRAP becomes the vehicle that is not as stiff and obdurate as its predecessor, the

Humvee, was. It concretises as a modular vehicle with a structurally contained capsule,

angular geometry, independent suspension, sacrificial parts, dynamic interior, and thicker

armour. When an IED explodes, all these parts work in coordination to deflect, absorb, and

dissipate the force and pressure of the detonation. All improvements become redundancies

244 Here, we observe that the notion of pre-injured bodies is different from the Foucauldian one of disciplined bodies (Foucault, 1995) in its human-nonhuman interdependence. Pre-injury does not necessarily associate with a specific disciplining that makes bodies docile and responsive to power. Instead, it adds a form of pre-injury as a specific type of experience involving bodies and technical objects, anticipating what might happen during a breakdown. The aim is to reduce the impact of the antagonism, but the outcome is not guaranteed. 245 Similar to what STS scholar Donna Haraway calls “biotic components, i.e., special kinds of information-processing devices” (1991, p. 164) 246 In analysing the MRAP as a protective envelope/enclosure, we distinguish between terrain in Architecture where a building is grounded in a fixed location and terraining in Vehicles where mobile objects are grounded in a changing location.

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to withstand all antagonisms at that moment, including those of the detonation, the debris,

and even the accelerating vehicle parts.

The MRAP reveals other insights into terraining when it encounters non-combat

related breakdowns. Rollover is the result of destabilising the techno-geographic milieu of

the MRAP as a heavy vehicle with a high centre of gravity (Chapter 6). Terraining reduces

the landscape to heavy-MRAP-speeding-on-curves or heavy-MRAP-driving-on-soft-edges;

the military associates the former with paved roads and an urban Iraq and the latter with

unpaved roads and a rural Afghanistan. Similarly, electrocution or damaging equipment

results from destabilising the techno-geographic milieu of the MRAP as a tall vehicle with

vertical antennas and devices (Chapter 5). Terraining reduces the infrastructural landscape

to tall-MRAP-with-vertical-devices-encountering-low-hanging-power-lines-and-overhead-

structures, mainly associated with an urban Iraq. In all cases, these scenarios are to be

anticipated and mediated with additional devices to prevent breakdown.

It is logical to follow the literature of military urbanisms and architectures and

describe the space of the MRAP’s mediation and breakdown as volumetric or three-

dimensional. In Afghanistan, the rollover flips the vehicles on their sides and sometimes

from an air to a water medium (Chapter 6). In Iraq, the vehicles are confined all over: the

paved road from below, power lines and overhead structures from above, and narrow

streets and gates on the sides. Rather than reading the object as an artefact in space, our

method of analysing the MRAP through its associations to its techno-geographic milieu

makes the object an integral part of that space and making247 it. There is an existing

schema of space where the MRAP is expected to move, but once the MRAP moves, it

generates its version of that space and smooth mobility or a breakdown. Hence, we also

propose to think of terraining as an instrument of making space; only it is the more

specialised practice of identifying and articulating antagonisms of the process.

Thus, the method mirrors the processes of engineering and militarisation in their

realist pursuit for the self-regulation or “concretization” of the MRAP. While military

objects are typically analysed according to how they control flows and separate groups like

the walls, flyovers, tunnels, SUVs, and electronic detection systems of military urbanisms

and architectures (Chapter 2), the MRAP heavily relies on reducing the landscape to a

247 Similar to Latour’s notion of “spacing” (1996c)

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terrain of antagonisms to be overcome/survived by creating and sustaining the military’s

inside-outside separation in the vehicles. By mirroring and rethinking engineering, the

method learns how the military acts; it is no coincidence that engineering is the descendant

of military engineering as we learn from historians of science and technology.

7.4 Addressing the Gap in the Literature

This research, and within the scope of military urbanisms and architectures,

examined an era of technological change situated in a military worldview shifting from air

superiority and targeting from above to urban warfare and occupation intricacies.

However, unlike the literature, we claimed that scrutinising a politics of survivability that

underpins militarisation is more pertinent to recognise a relational spatialisation of this

type of military operations rather than a social constructivist politics, which theorises cities

as mediums subordinated by established social structures.

We set out from recognising a gap in the literature (Chapter 2), whose approach

remains mostly social constructivist and anthropocentric. Its technical objects are stable

artefacts reflecting and embodying Politics with capital “P” as they remain subordinate to

humans and not relational to their environments. Through examining breakdowns that

make visible the networks holding the solidity of militarisation, the survivability lens

allowed us to bridge the gap in two ways: first, by studying a military practice of

spatialising survivability through the reduction of the landscape (what we called terraining

in 7.3); and second, by uncovering a relational politics based on “technics” or technical

thought (after Simondon, 2017), among the technical objects, the terrain/landscape,

engineering and the military (see 7.2).

In the research findings and contributions discussed earlier (7.1, 7.2, and 7.3), we

addressed the three aspects of the literature gap. First, we showed how technical objects are

dynamic and relational assemblages that mediate survivability as a script and through

sociotechnical associations between engineering, the military, and their armoured vehicles.

The MRAP realises the shift to urban warfare through a shift in the military script from

mobility to mobility-survivability hybrid. The military’s parameters of the urban bounce

back to their technical object’s objectivity. Second, we showed how human-nonhuman

relations become symmetrical through “a relation of equality” (after Simondon, 2017, p.

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105) between the means of realisation of survivability in both the MRAP and the soldiers’

bodies. The vehicles evolve and individuate into technical objects/individuals of

survivability, and the soldiers add to the regulation of the technical object through training,

techniques, and regulations. Third, we showed how landscapes are relational to the

technical object’s mediation, mainly through their reduction to a terrain that realises the

military vehicles’ associated milieu. The urban becomes an intensity of terraining, and the

MRAP embodies a double relation of exteriority: keeping out the terrain and folding it.

Unlike the literature on military urbanisms and architectures, our analysis was not

interested in a general history of war where people and objects are artefacts that move,

circulate, and collide in space. The aim was to trace politics in a technical lineage of

military technical objects through associations between soldiers, vehicles, and terrain.

There was no description of combat or military operations except for parts (detonations,

driving, training) where we witness the MRAP break down in Iraq and Afghanistan or

causes controversy on how to best conduct counterinsurgency on the streets of Baghdad.

The MRAP (capsule and vehicle) was analysed as a dynamic mediator of military

survivability and not as an object of military strategy that moves in formations of vehicles

or executes different mission types.

Moreover, the chapters did not start with the MRAP or the soldiers (or the

military at large) as constituted entities endowed with power. The aim was to uncover a

politics of survivability that explicates the vulnerability of soldiers’ bodies, training, and

vehicles relational to technological change. While the military institution, strategies, and

objects are vital figures of technical progress, economic spending, and monopoly on

violence, a localised and situated worldview of military performance redistributes notions

of absolute power to a politics of sociotechnical associations, synergies amidst technical

functioning, stabilisation of figure-ground, and coordination across programs of actions.

Thus, our findings on body-vehicle-terrain associations traced the technical object

during functioning, breakdown, and improvement. Instead of embracing the grand

narratives of militarisation that explain established power structures and social systems, we

emphasised the need to study the spatialisation of urban warfare as a process that can be

better unpacked at the level of the daily functioning of military technology. Next, we

reflect on the novelty of studying the politics of survivability in primary sources like utility

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patents and military publications and on reporting the findings through urban and

architectural lenses.

7.5 Relations of Equality and Difference

A politics of survivability achieved through human-nonhuman interdependency

proves the timely relevance of Simondon’s philosophy of equality between human beings

and technical beings (2017). It is not an absolute type of equality as a human political

ideal; it is one where ontologies of coming-into-being are equated, allowing for politics to

emerge as relations of difference (see Combes, 2012, including LaMarre’s Afterword)

among humans or between humans and technical objects. This way, we can examine war

as localisations of human-technology relations, be it those of improvised devices that blow

up millions of dollars worth of technical objects and their associated humans or those of

the same costly technical objects breaking down and failing to protect their associated

humans. It is a political difference between what the human bodies could handle in a

“destructive rupture effect” (2017, p. 265) and what the armoured vehicles could.

The Simondonian relations of technical equality and political difference have

implications to our thinking method as urban and architectural researchers. To avoid a

notion of space as a container of constituted technical objects, i.e., artefacts, we ought to

give more attention to the notion of the geographic as the extension of the technical, thus

realising a relational figure-ground and an association between the technical and the

geographical worlds. This associational notion of the geographic, be it of architectural or

urban character (see 7.2), implies assembling the landscape (natural/made, urban/rural,

people/infrastructure) as series of reductions and feedback loops that inform the objectivity

of the technical object and the symmetry between humans and technical beings. Rather

than a constituted medium to plough through as in the Haussmannisation paradigm

(Chapter 2), the landscape is continuously assembled as the ground for technical thought,

application, and potential that politically differentiates military-civilian, urban-rural,

human-technical, and warzone-home front relations.

Likewise, we ought to give more attention to the notion of the technical through

“technicity,” besides the program of actions of a technical object. Let us recall that

technicity is the evolved technical functioning across time (Chapter 2), which conveys

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knowledge of resolving tensions and mediating antagonisms “deposited” (after Simondon,

2017, pp. 73, 168–169) in the associated milieu. On the one hand, it allows us to study a

“stable equilibrium” (2017, p. 177), which is the concretised mediation (see 7.2) where the

technical individual realises a specific techno-geographic milieu (Figure 99). This is the

concretisation of the MRAP where the program of actions – incorporating technical

mediation and delegations between humans and nonhumans – could be traced. On the other

hand, it allows us to examine (see 7.3) a “metastable equilibrium” (2017, p. 177), which is

potentials of mediation where the adaptation of the technical individual reaches

oversaturation and pushes individuation, i.e., coming-into-being, of a new technical

individual that realises a new techno-geographic milieu. This is the individuation from

Humvee to MRAP to Egress Trainer (Figure 100), where persisting tensions reveal a

structuration process that realises successive structures – and thus, politics – of

survivability within evolving, multiple technical individuals.

7.6 Prospects for Future Architectural and Urban Research

The contributions of the current work open new avenues for research and practice

in architectural and urban research. The first prospect belongs to studying the technicity

that assembles buildings and performs technical mediation. The focus on technical thought

and evolution is of timely relevance to thinking about buildings through eco/environmental

lenses as situated technical objects in a milieu or grounded ensembles. This has

implications for environmental modelling, digital studies, and even fabrication

technologies in architectural research.

The second prospect would be extending the fields of urban studies and

architectural humanities to study the architectural and the urban as modes of connection,

beyond the figures of the building and the city. While those figures remain useful, there is

ample potential in studying the envelopes and atmospheric enclosures of new figures in an

increasingly mobile world, evolving the experimental architectural thought of the 1960s on

walking cities. Furthermore, there is potential for studying how designing buildings for

certain forms of inhabitation affects or gets affected by designing cars for other

inhabitation forms.

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The third prospect would be expanding the scope of architectural and urban

studies to examine the less-studied ensembles of the urban landscape that Simondon

introduces in his work On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects (2017). These

include but are not limited to construction sites, shipyards, factories, workshops, and train

depots. These are the places that architectural pedagogy favour less compared to residential

and commercial building types.

The fourth prospect would be to study how the soldiers’ bodies become enrolled

in the military’s survivability and mobility scripts as affects, movements, and speeds

(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, pp. 260–261). It is an enrolment that is “progressively

acquired” in parts (Latour, 2004a, p. 207), literally to protect the limbs, necks, spines, and

skin/flesh of the soldiers, relational to the soldiers’ worlds of detonation, electrical shocks,

and rollover. Furthermore, it is an enrolment that inscribes soldiers as “a type of user

represented in a blueprint” (Latour, 1996b, p. 238) against detonations anticipated in the

Rhodesian War years before the War on Iraq.

The fifth and final prospect would be expanding the scope of STS to study the

urban as the associated milieu for vehicular mobility technologies. There is potential to

study how car and truck movement shapes the mobility landscape and how the figure of

the vehicle changes with assistive technologies, self-driving technologies, and electric

motors.

7.7 Conclusion

The MRAP as a survivability script against detonations and ambushes tells us a

lot (as urbanists and architects) about the landscape, including its buildings, infrastructure,

organisation, and people. Detonations must exist along routes and ambushes within

concealed environments. It also tells us about the human body’s relations to enclosures,

particularly ones engineered to tolerate intensities of extreme antagonisms, be they human-

made or naturally existing. However, most importantly, the MRAP as a technical object

that assembles technicity across various inventions and histories tells us even more about

our changing association to technology in war and peace and all the uncertainty levels.

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