griffith military and politics of change guyana

The Military and the Politics of Change in GuyanaAuthor(s): Ivelaw L. GriffithSource: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Summer, 1991),pp. 141-173Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of MiamiStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/165833 .Accessed: 30/05/2011 17:23

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THE MiiITARY AND THE POLITICS OF CHANGE

IN GUYANA

by IVELAW L. GRIFFITH

THE DEATH OF FORBES BURNHAM in August 1985 and the passing of power to Hugh Desmond Hoyte have produced dramatic changes in Guyana, South America's only English-speaking republic. Some of these have involved: (1) privatization of the public sector, (2) abolition of overseas voting, (3) negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), (4) rapprochement with the United States, plus (5) an agreement that observers - including former PresidentJimmy Carter and representatives from the London-based Commonwealth Secretariat - are being invited to oversee the upcoming elections scheduled for either August or September 1991.

Precipitated by domestic and international pressures, these changes have taken place within the context of a change in regimes as well, in which one dominant leader, Forbes Burnham, has been succeeded by another equally dominant, Desmond Hoyte. Nevertheless, Guyana's institutional power center has remained unchanged. The People's National Congress (PNC) is still the dominant political force despite erosion of its popular support over the years, and it is still dedicated to maintaining its political hegemony. Because the military functioned as a central

Ivelaw L. Griffith is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Lehman College, New York City. He is editor of STRATEGY AND SECURITY IN THE CARIBBEAN (Praeger, 1991) and author of THE QUEST FOR SECURITY IN THE CARIBBEAN (M.E. Sharpe, forthcoming 1992). A different version of this article appears in STRATEGY AND SECURITY IN THE CARIBBEAN which was published September 1990.


IN GUYANA






IN GUYANA






IN GUYANA






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141 141 141 141 141

142 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS 142 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS 142 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS 142 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS 142 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

element in the exercise of PNC - and Burnham's - political power, it is both relevant and appropriate to examine what role the military has since played in Guyana's politics in the years following Burnham's death.

The "military" is used here in its collective sense, as referring to all those military and paramilitary institutions which combine to make up the security mechanism(s) of the country and its ruling elites. These fall under the umbrella agency known as the Disci-

plined Services of Guyana, whose key elements are the Guyana Defense Force (GDF), the Guyana People's Militia (GPM), the

Guyana National Service (GNS), and the Guyana Police Force

(GPF); in addition, the Disciplined Services also include the

Guyana Prisons Service and the National Guard Service. These agencies vary in their official missions. For example, the primary missions of the Guyana Defense Force (GDF) are to defend the national territory from foreign aggression and to help maintain internal order. The Guyana Police Force (GPF) maintains internal

security; the Guyana People's Militia (GPM) is in charge of civil defense and also serves to complement the GDF, if necessary, in

military defense. The Guyana National Service (GNS) was intended to serve several functions: to build "a new political con-

sciousness," to aid economic self-reliance programs, and to serve as an auxiliary to both the GDF and the GPM in military defense (for more on military roles, see Danns, 1982: chapters 3 and 5; Granger, 1975, 1985; Garcia Mufiiz, 1988: 131-61).

Guyana does not have a praetorian situation, in which military officers also play a major political role by virtue of their actual (or threatened) use of force. However, Guyana does fit Eric Nordlinger's "penetration model" of civilian control of the military under which

Civilian governors obtain loyalty and obedience by penetrating the armed forces with political ideas (if not fully developed ideologies) and political personnel. Throughout their careers, officers (and enlisted men) are intensively imbued with the civilian governors' political ideas. In the military academies, training centers, and mass-indoctrination meetings, and in the frequent discussions that take place within the smallest military units - at these times and places intensive efforts are made to shape the political beliefs of the military ... Along with the downward dissemination of political ideas, civilian













































GRIFFITH: MILITARY AND THE POLITICS OF CHANGE IN GUYANA 143 GRIFFITH: MILITARY AND THE POLITICS OF CHANGE IN GUYANA 143 GRIFFITH: MILITARY AND THE POLITICS OF CHANGE IN GUYANA 143 GRIFFITH: MILITARY AND THE POLITICS OF CHANGE IN GUYANA 143 GRIFFITH: MILITARY AND THE POLITICS OF CHANGE IN GUYANA 143

supremacy is maintained by the extensive use of controls, surveillance, and punishment ... Political penetration thereby turns the army into an officially recognized organ of the single ruling party (Nordlinger, 1977: 15, 17).

There has been both continuity and change in civilian-military relations between 1985 and 1991. One way to appreciate this is to look at some of the functions carried out by the military over the past 20 years. It has been used as an instrument of security in four main areas: (1) to ensure political security for the regime; (2) to defend the nation militarily; (3) to maintain economic security; and (4) to preserve diplomatic security. But in order to appreciate the context in which these role-areas have developed, it is important to make a preliminary comment on Burnham era politics.

BURNHAM ERA POLITICS

BURNHAM ERA POLITICS began in 1964 when Forbes Burnham, as leader of the People's National Congress party, became Premier in a coalition government, along with Peter D'Aguilar and the United Force (UF). Bumham's rise to power was occasioned by a combination of domestic and international factors.

Domestically, Guyana was in the throes of nationalist change, in which the two main political actors - Burnham himself and Cheddie Jagan of the People's Progressive Party (PPP) - advo- cated radically different political prescriptions. Both leaders prac- ticed racial politics, their parties being polarized along ethnic lines, with people of Indian descent supporting Jagan and those of African descent supporting Burnham.

Racial politics contributed to an anomaly in electoral representation. For instance, during the 1961 general elections (when Great Britain still functioned as colonial power), the PNC received 41% of the popular vote but secured only 11 legislative seats. At the same time, the People's Progressive Party, which received 42.6% of the vote, just a fraction more, secured 20 seats. The third party, the United Front, took 16.4% of the vote to secure a mere 4 seats. As a result, Burnham called for a change from the first-past- the-post voting system to one in which a party's representation in the legislature would more closely reflect its popular support. The British, still in control, acquiesced and subsequently changed to a


























system of proportional representation. Although its ostensible

purpose was to further representative justice, it also served to accommodate Burnham.

On the international side, both the United States and Britain considered Burnham the lesser of two evils, with Jagan as the other evil. An avowed Marxist with a dogmatic pro-Moscow stand, Jagan had served as Premier in 1953 (for 135 days) and again from 1957-1964. His then unorthodox sociopolitical prescriptions made both countries wary that his Marxist commitment could lead an

independent Guyana into the communist camp, and thus to a "second Cuba." Consequently, the British Guiana (Constitution) Order in Council was adopted (23 June 1964), which changed the nature and composition of the legislature and the system of voting, paving the way for Burnham's accession to power later that same

year (December 1964). Four years later, having led the country to

independence in 1966, Burnham and the PNC consolidated their

power by winning the general elections in 1968. The coalition with the UF was dissolved, and the PNC began a conscious policy of

transforming Guyana's political landscape (Despres, 1967; Jagan, 1966; Burnham, 1970; Hintzen, 1989).

In 1970 Guyana was declared a cooperative socialist republic (for evaluation of cooperative socialism, see Singh, 1972; Mars, 1978; Thomas, 1984). In what was billed as the beginning of "a

peaceful revolution," the ruling political elites launched several

major policy initiatives. The first was the nationalization of

foreign-owned property, in pursuit of what Burnham called "control of the commanding heights of the economy." By 1976, US, Canadian, and European control over the sugar and bauxite

industries, banking, drug manufacturing, imports, local trade, communications, as well as other areas, had all been transferred to the state. Former owners were compensated and agreements negotiated with them that provided for post-nationalization tech-

nology and licensing, among other things (See Shahabuddeen, 1981; Thomas, 1982 and 1988: 251-65).

A second initiative was designed to develop a cooperative sector of the economy and to ensure that this sector would dominate the state and private sectors in a tri-sectoral economic structure. Burnham explained what he had in mind:

Ours is not the first or only government in the developing world to place major emphasis on the use and develop-


































































ment of the cooperative as an instrument of development or in the thrust toward socialism. We, however, named Guyana a cooperative Republic to highlight the fact that the cooperative will be the principal institution for giving the masses the control of our economy, to emphasize the fact that we aim at making the cooperative sector the dominant sector, and that the cooperative is, and will be, the mechanism for making the little man a real man (Burnham, 1974: 9).

A thirdkey policy initiative was the Doctrine of Paramountcy. This doctrine, first announced at a special PNC congress in 1973, made the ruling party superordinate to all other institutions and

organizations in the country: the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government were all declared to be the "executive arm" of the PNC. Burnham further clarified the doctrine in 1975:

It is the Party that formulates policy on the basis of its ideology, strategy and tactics. It is the Party that mobilizes, educates and appeals to the people ... It is the Party that then selects the members of the political government to execute the former's policy ... (Burnham, 1975: 8).

Central to the pursuit of this doctrine was the creation of a

superagency called the Office of the General Secretary of the

People's National Congress and the Ministry of National Develop- ment (OGS-PNC-MND or ND). It was formed, in 1974, by fusing the PNC Secretariat with a government department and became both the centerpiece of the party's reorganization (begun in 1973) and the party's political nerve center. ND was responsible for a

variety of political functions: the political socialization of government officials and the party's indoctrination program; for organiz- ing mass rallies; for planning and implementation of the political campaigns for government offices, both national and local; and for PNC infiltration of all organizations, political, labor, and civic. Included in these tasks was intimidation and harassment of critics and the political opposition. Because the OGSPNCMND was also

responsible for the party's international relations, it was frequently in conflict with officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over

jurisdictional and operational matters. The latter resented the undue politicization of the Ministry, as well as a situation in which

they could be dictated to by "party comrades," many of whom were either novices, totally incompetent in international politics, or both.














































By Caribbean standards, Guyana has become increasingly militarized over the past two decades. The criteria by which this

process can be measured include the number and size of the

military and paramilitary agencies, the overt and unapologetic use of military agencies for political purposes, and the progressive increases in military expenditures - at least until recently (Danns, 1978, 1982; Garcia Mufiiz, 1988). Economic adversity has forced reductions in military spending and the size of some military agencies over the last four years. Even so, a recent study indicates that Guyana still claims one of Latin America's highest defense burdens. Out of a list of the 23 largest defense spenders in the

region in 1988, Guyana spent 14.6% of its gross national product (GNP) to support its military, making it second only to Nicaragua, which allotted 17.2% of its GNP for that purpose. Though Guyana was close to the bottom of the list in absolute amounts, still, as a

percentage of GNP, it ranked above Cuba, Brazil, Venezuela, Panama, Venezuela, and Jamaica. Guyana also ranked fifth for defense spending on a per capita basis [US$57.51, while Cuba ranked first [US$125] (LAWR, 1991: 8).

This militarization was not solely to meet actual and/or potential threats to the nation. Guyana is one of those Third World societies where political elites make little distinction between the

security of the nation and the security of their own political regime. As one Indian scholar observed:

In most Third World countries ... hypothetical threats and the responsibility to preserve law and order are only convenient arguments for extravagant militarization. The desire for prestige and the determination to stay in power have been, more often than not, the true incentives of many governments to build up armed forces and acquire unnecessarily sophisticated military hardware (Mehta, 1985: 17).

Territorial claims by Venezuela and Suriname once led to serious threats to the national security, especially in the mid-1960s and the early 1980s. Consequently the PNC did not have to resort to excuses to justify its military build-up; the justifications were

already there. Thus the role of the military in maintaining the

political security of the regime was derived from, and in the context of, the Doctrine of Paramountcy mentioned above. The

political role of the military was evident in a variety of ways: the


















































intimidation of political opponents; Forbes Burnham's donning of

military uniforms, and the use of the military to help subvert elections.

The role of the military, particularly the Defense Force and the Police Force, in undermining the electoral process at the behest of the ruling elites is well-known. At the time of the 1980 elections, a team of international observers strongly indicted the behavior of the military in their subsequent report to the effect that

The military presence in some areas was intimidating. The [ballot] boxes were collected by military personnel who prevented accredited officials of the opposition, some- times by force or the threat of force, from accompanying or following the boxes ... Military personnel refused accredited representatives of opposition parties access to the count at gun point in some cases (Latin American Bureau, 1984: 83).

The team concluded with a scathing commentary on democratic choice in Guyana and on the lengths to which the Burnham regime would go to further entrench itself.

We came to Guyana aware of the serious doubts ex- pressed about the conduct of previous elections there, but determined to judge these elections on their own merit and hoping that we should be able to say that the result was fair. We deeply regret that, on the contrary, we were obliged to conclude, on the basis of abundant and clear evidence, that the election was rigged massively and flagrantly. Fortunately, however, the scale of the fraud made it im- possible to conceal it either from the Guyanese public or the outside world. Far from legitimizing President Burham's assumption of his office, the events we witnessed confirm all the fears of Guyanese and foreign observers about the state of democracy in that country (Latin American Bureau, 1984: 83).

Military personnel were also transported around cities to

provide audiences at mass rallies where Burnham and other top PNC leaders spoke. This served several purposes. It allowed the

ruling party to pursue its political and doctrinal socialization of members of the military, a classical stratagem of the penetration model of militarized politics. As Nordlinger explains, "the result-

ing congruity between the political ideas of civilians and officers










































frequently removes a potential source of conflict between them"

(Nordlinger, 1977: 15). It also provided the party with a captive human pool with which to demonstrate an alleged mass support of the party and its policies. Further, it was a self-deception ploy used within the party. Party officials flaunted it as evidence of their ability to "mobilize the masses" and to maintain the fiction of personal support and loyalty to the predominant leader.

Within this context, the loyalty of the military was not just to the constitution, to the office of president, and to the ideals of sovereignty and territorial integrity but was given primarily to the paramount party and its predominant leader. While this was demanded by the party, it was also willingly granted by the military leadership. For example, in 1977 the then Chief-of-Staff of the Guyana Defense Force, speaking at the Second Biennial Congress of the PNC, on behalf of the Disciplined Services of Guyana, offered this pledge:

Comrade Leader, you have shown us the way. It is now for all of us who are interested in the revolution to show this in a tangible manner. We fulfill our security duties faithfully, because in doing so we are assured of the cooperation of the working class. We know that the road mapped out by the party and government is our road - the road the Disciplined Services will follow (cited in Danns, 1982: 175).

Thus, Burnham-era politics witnessed the transformation of Guyana's political profile. In the quest for political power and the pursuit of "socialist transformation," the PNC harassed critics, intimidated the opposition, and eliminated any major political threats [of which the best-known case is that of the murder of Walter Rodney, of the Working People's Alliance (WPA), in 1980]. Under Burnham, the electoral process was subverted, freedoms of speech and the press were curtailed, and the human rights situation deteriorated. The regime became progressively authoritarian as the predominance of Burnham became increasingly patent.1 It is against this backdrop that we can best assess the continuity and change in Guyana's civil-military relations since 1985.






















CONTINUITY AND CHANGE UNDER HOYTE

Regime Change

BURNHAM DIED in Georgetown, on 6 August 1985, shortly after

having undergone minor throat surgery performed by a team of Cuban and Guyanese doctors, led by Dr. Delfina Amaro Trapaga of Cuba. Several people observed the operation, including Burnham's wife, Viola, his daughter, Dr. Annabelle Bumham- Pollard, and Dr. Richard Van-West Charles, his Cuban-trained son-in-law and then Minister of Health, now a consultant with the Pan American Health Organization. Prime Minister and First Vice- President Hugh Desmond Hoyte, a member of the PNC's Central Committee was named as Burnham's successor at a joint meeting of the PNC Central Committee and the Cabinet within two hours of the president's death. Thus Hoyte became, simultaneously, leader of the PNC and president of the republic, passing over the

aging Ptolemy Reid, PNC Deputy Leader and former Prime Minis- ter, as well as Ranji Chandisingh, the General Secretary.

According to the constitution, elections were due within seven months of Hoyte's accession to the presidency. The new president, therefore, took the opportunity to "renew" the PNC man- date, under his stewardship, at elections held on 9 December 1985. In essence, those elections witnessed Guyana going through the motions of legitimacy without any real correlation between popular choice and political empowerment. Perry Mars put it this way:

Guyana's post-independence elections are increasingly less about choice or change of government than what appears to be a kind of national ritual in which contending parties dramatize their particular mobilization strategies. The ruling party demonstrates its peculiar style of "never losing," if not necessarily "winning," popular elections; opposition parties invariably experiment with different combination tactics aimed at least at demonstrating their popular appeal based on voter turnout at campaign meetings, rather than at the usually controversial polls. In this situation, the campaign is the thing, the elections a pre- dictable anticlimax (Mars, 1987: 29).


Regime Change







Regime Change







Regime Change







Regime Change







Under Guyana's electoral system, political parties compete for power under a system of proportional representation. Presidential and parliamentary elections are combined, and the leader of the party with the largest parliamentary representation becomes president. Elections for regional representatives in the National Assembly are held at the same time (Guyana, Constitution, 1980: Articles 60-80, pp. 160-62 and 177; James and Lutchman, 1984: 75-87). The 1985 elections were contested by 7 parties: the People's National Congress (PNC), the People's Progressive Party (PPP), the Working People's Alliance (WPA), the United Force (UF), the National Democratic Front (NDF), the People's Democratic Movement (PDM), and the Democratic Labor Move- ment (DLM). According to the declaration of the Elections Com- mission, the agency established under the constitution to supervise national elections, the PNC won 42 of the 53 National Assembly seats; the PPP, 8; the UF, 2; and the WPA, 1. The PNC was thus "returned" to power.

The failure of so many of the Burnham prescriptions and initiatives have presented the Hoyte government with strong demands for change. Generally, the demands have been for democratization of the polity, renewal of confidence in the general society, arrest and reversal of the economic decline, and foreign policy conduct commensurate with these and cognizant of the new climate of international politics. The Hoyte government has been engaged in a challenging, often dangerous, balancing act as it strives to accommodate internal and foreign pressures, hoping, in the process, to salvage some "gains" made earlier. Hoyte entered this "politics of preservative adaptation" more out of practical necessity than as a matter of conscious choice (Griffith, 1991b).

Initially, Hoyte appeared interested in continuing the Burnham program. He declared to the party congress, held a few weeks after Burnham's death, that:

His work was not completed when he died, but he left us precise guidelines for the continuation of that work. It must be the Party's mission, now and in the years ahead, to deepen the process and accelerate the pace of our development along the lines so clearly drawn by him. The leadership of the Party is pledged to continue his work. Our ultimate goal must be the same as his - creation of


















a socialist society in the Cooperative Republic of Guyana. We must reaffirm our commitment and rededicate ourselves to the pursuit of this objective (Hoyte, 1985: 7).

However, once Hoyte was in complete control of the ship of

state, it took him relatively little time to realize that the course set

by Burnham, to which he had been a principal adviser, was a disastrous one (Hoyte, 1979).2 As a result, though Hoyte has continued some of the previous programs and practices, there have been significant changes as well.

Regime Political Security

There has been continuity as well as change in the area of

regime political security. The military is still central to the

brokerage of power. It would have been unrealistic to expect that the military would alter its protection of the regime in power in

any fundamental way following Burnham's death. However, a

progressive decline in the economy in recent years has led to a certain tenuousness of the country's political fabric. Although the relative economic deprivation has not translated into dramatic mass violence, which is, to some extent, a tribute to PNC control of the instruments of coercion, there has been an alarming incidence of politically-organized, socially-driven protest. Strikes in the bauxite and sugar industries have led to violent demonstrations and arrests. There have been protests over stringent budgetary measures, and arson and vandalism in the sugar in-

dustry and in state-run commercial enterprises. Without the

military, the political power-brokers would have had cause to fear for the security of the regime. Nevertheless, while the Burnham- era mission of preserving the political security of the regime continues, there have been changes within the military and in the

politics of the country. Over the years since 1964, the PNC has enjoyed considerable

success in broadening the racial composition of both the party and the government. People of Indian descent were placed in influen- tial, or high-profile, positions. Some of them, like former PNC

General-Secretary and Vice-President Ranji Chandisingh, now Ambassador to Moscow, had defected from the PPP. Others - like Sase Narain, Speaker of the National Assembly, and Mohamed






























































Shahabuddeen, former Vice-President and Attorney-General, now World Court judge - had long been supporters of the PNC.

Yet, until recently, the one area where the PNC did not reach out

meaningfully to Guyanese of Indian descent was the military. The

military agencies long were dominated by people of African

descent, which situation was an important factor in the regime's security.

For many Afro-Guyanese, their role in the empowerment of the PNC was part of a larger duty "to their people," to ensure that the PNC exerted political control over a society whose economic

power rested largely in the hands of the Indians. Changes were made after Burnham's demise however. In a move initiated by Hoyte, in 1988 Balram Raghubir became the first Police Commis- sioner of Indian descent; when his tenure ended (in July 1990), he was given a diplomatic appointment.3 When Major-General Norman McLean retired in February 1990, Colonel Joseph Singh, Director-General of the Guyana National Service for 8 years, became acting Chief-of-Staff of the Guyana Defense Forces with the rank of Brigadier-General, making him the first professional head of the armed forces of Indian descent.4

In 1990, President Hoyte made another significant appointment when he appointed (on 15 November) Commander-

Brigadier David Granger to the newly created position of National

Security Adviser to the President. In this post, Granger chairs the Central Intelligence Committee, which includes the GDF Chief-

of-Staff, the Police Commissioner, and the GNS Director-General. He also sits on several security-related bodies, including the National Defense Board, chaired by the President in his position as Commander-in-Chief. Granger is a graduate (1990) of the

University of Guyana, where he shared the coveted President's Medal (highest award to a graduating senior) and won 5 other

awards, including the Elsa Gouveia Medal of Excellence (best graduating senior in history) and the Guy L. DeWeever Prize

(best student of Guyanese history). One Guyanese observer has described the contemporary

political situation as "the politics of permanent fear" (Brotherson, 1988). However, few would deny that the Burnham-era situation of permanent fear has changed under Hoyte. David de Caires, staunch critic of the PNC and editor-in-chief of the independent newspaper Stabroek News, has acknowledged that





























































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The atmosphere of repression has lightened perceptibly and the style and language of politics were noticeably more responsive and less threatening ... Hoyte abolished overseas voting and the provisions for widespread proxy and postal voting ... Rabbi Washington, a notorious henchman of the Burnham regime, was prosecuted for murder. An independent newspaper has been permitted to open, and there has been no interference with it. Political harassment has virtually ended (de Caires, 1988: 194-95).

Human rights concerns in Guyana have centered mainly on political intimidation, police brutality, and electoral fraud. Military agencies have been involved in violations in all of these areas. One gets some idea of changes by comparing assessments of the

country's human rights profile during one of the Burnham years with a more recent time.

The US State Department survey for 1984 provides a marked contrast with that for 1989. Although there were no politically motivated killings in either year, in 1984 there were well-supported allegations that the police killed 16 individuals. As a result of

political and interest group pressure, manslaughter charges were brought against 2 policemen and an indictment of intentional murder was secured against another. While police harassment of regime opponents is not entirely a thing of the past, the incidence and outlandish nature of this kind of harassment have changed. Among the 1984 cases was the arrest, detention without charges, and interrogation of 5 persons alleged to have been involved in a plot to overthrow Burnham. One political leader, Paul Tennassee, of the Democratic Labor Movement, was given what had become standard treatment in the harassment department: detention at the

airport following a "tip" about an alleged infraction. Tennassee was held for 5 days, during which he was questioned about an assassination plot against Burnham. He was later charged with failing to list Guyana$40 on his currency declaration.

Two positive developments in 1989 were passage of the Police Complaints Authority Act and repeal of the 1966 National Security Act. The Police Complaints Authority Act came into being after

years of repeated allegations of police brutality by the Guyana Human Rights Association, Caribbean Rights, and other groups. It provides for the supervision of investigations into allegations of

































153 153 153 153 153


misconduct by, or illegality in, the police force. In 1990, the Police Complaints Authority, established under this Act, publicly con- demned police improprieties and completed investigations of 68, out of 256, complaints of police brutality. That same year, 5 police officers were charged with manslaughter in the death, some time earlier, of a suspect being held in custody (US-DOS, 1985: 558-67; 1990: 611-19; 1991: 646-54).

The National Security Act, while in force, permitted the detention, without charges and up to 3 months, of any person deemed to be acting "in any manner prejudicial to public safety or public order or the defense of Guyana." Though the National Security Act had never been applied, local groups demanded it be rescind- ed on grounds it provided legal justification for political vendettas. President Hoyte was also concerned to see it repealed since it cast a cloud over the country, damaging to its political reputation, which he was anxious to remove.

Opposition parties scored a political victory in April 1990 when the National Assembly proposed the Local Authorities (Elections) (Amendment) Bill. A key feature of this legislation, first proposed by the Working People's Alliance (WPA), is that it provides for a nonpartisan commission to supervise local government elections. Before 1990, the law assigned a government minister to supervise these elections, an arrangement the PNC had used to control local government positions. Another boon to the opposition - one applauded both locally and internationally - was legislation that sanctioned the use of international observers to oversee the national elections.

In May 1990, Prime Minister Hamilton Green placed before the National Assembly "The General Elections (Observers) Bill 1990." This legislation empowers the president to invite foreigners "for the purpose of observing the democratic process of the State as enshrined in the Constitution and, more specifically, the conduct of any election." While welcoming this development, opposition leaders criticized the power given to the president to name the observers. They also objected to provisions that make "uninvited observers" subject to arrest and imprisonment if convicted. The new law does something which would have been anathema to Burnham: it allows observers to examine the list of electors, enter polling places and ballot counting centers, interview the chairman of the Elections Commissions and other elections officials, and it


















requires elections officials to cooperate with international observers and comply with "any reasonable request" made by them. The law goes further. It confers diplomatic privileges and im- munities on observers and makes it an offense - punishable by a G$5,000 fine and an 18-month jail term - to interfere with, or impersonate, international observers.

Two months after the bill was proposed, President Hoyte announced that the Commonwealth Secretary-General had been invited to name a team of observers for the next general elections (Sunday Guardian, 1990; Gibson, 1990a; 1990b). He subsequently agreed to allow a team of observers from the United States, led by former President Jimmy Carter, from the Carter Center at Emory University in Atlanta (Georgia). Carter and other officials paid their first visit to Guyana in mid-October 1990, during which time Carter was able to extract from Hoyte an agreement for preliminary ballot counts at the polling places, something opposition parties had sought for several years (New York Carib News, 1990).

Since that first occasion, Carter Center officials have returned to Guyana on other visits, one of which included Prime Minister George Price, of Belize, as a representative of the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, a Carter Center affiliate. Leaders of the local opposition have lobbied for observers from the Carib- bean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) as well; and officials from the Caribbean Conference of Churches have sought to mount a separate team. So far both efforts have been futile. Hoyte argues that he had already encouraged the Common- wealth Secretary-General to include "a significant Caribbean representation" in his team of observers, and, indeed, monitoring teams from both the Carter Center and the Commonwealth Secretariat have included West Indians. Belize Prime Minister George Price and Dennis Smith, Chief Electoral Officer of Bar- bados, formed part of the Carter Center team that visited in April 1991; and Noel Lee, Jamaica's Director of Elections, and Joycelyn Lucas, Trinidad's elections chief, were part of a visiting Commonwealth team the same month (New York Carib News, 1991; Khan, 1991a; Persaud, 1991).

Although one estimate maintains that 1,800 observers will be needed to monitor the elections, 300 seems a more realistic figure. Despite Hoyte's reluctance to entertain teams other than those from the Carter Center and Commonwealth Secretariat, several


















international groups plan to send contingents. Among them are the Caribbean Conference of Churches, Americas Watch, and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, an affiliate of the United States Democratic Party. On its April 1991 visit, the Commonwealth monitoring team, headed by David Peterson, former Premier of Ontario (Canada), found "widespread criticism and cynicism" regarding past elections,5 but "no evidence of any wholesale attempt to pervert the elections results or manipulate the electoral system." Rather, they found "a genuine desire and

attempt to make the system fully free, fair and transparent" (Khan, 1991b). Undoubtedly, the government's willingness to make con- cessions concerning the controversial Elections Commission contributed to the more positive atmosphere. Not only was the

composition of the Commission expanded from 5 members to 7, in order to permit more participation by the opposition, but Hoyte also replaced Commission chairman Sir Harold Bollers after he had adamantly refused to do so the previous month. The new chairman is Rudy Collins, former Guyanese diplomat and CARICOM official, the nominee of an opposition alliance called the Patriotic Coalition for Democracy.

Military Defense

The premier national defense agency is the Guyana Defense Force (GDF), organized in 1966 to defend Guyana's territory against claims which Venezuela and Suriname had been advanc-

ing since long before the country's independence.6 The GDF grew out of the Special Services Unit, a paramilitary group that had been

part of the pre-independence British Guiana Police Force. The

Guyana Defense Force grew from an estimated 750, in 1966, to about 5,000 at present writing. Basically, it functions as a ground force with air and maritime operations, all of which fall under an

integrated command headed by a chief-of-staff. During the Burnham years, the troop strength and operational structure ex-

panded; since the advent of the Hoyte regime, the Force has been cut back due to economic constraints. Because there is no in-

digenous arms manufacture, weapons come from outside the

country. Originally, a large amount was donated by Great Britain and the United States, but, over the years, as Guyana adopted




Military Defense












Military Defense












Military Defense












Military Defense










socialist and non-aligned postures, weapons, equipment, and training were provided by Cuba, North Korea, East Germany, and from such Commonwealth countries as India. In turn, Guyana has provided military training to several Commonwealth Caribbean countries.

Although the Defense Force is the centerpiece of the military defense establishment, the Guyana People's Militia (GPM) and the Guyana National Service (GNS) play important complementary roles. The GPM was established in 1976 to mobilize the population against US destabilization efforts and intimidation by Venezuela. It was given the mission - more politically hopeful than logisti- cally feasible - of making "every citizen a soldier" by training cross-sections of the nation in paramilitary skills and using the trainees as a GDF reserve for civil defense purposes. Financial difficulties, combined with improved relations with the United States and Venezuela since 1985, have led to a reduction in the size of the People's Militia from about 7,000 in 1977 to about 2,500 today.

The Guyana National Service (GNS), on the other hand, was created in 1973 to serve the twin goals of both defense and development and organized into several corps. The first of these corps, the Young Brigade, enrolls school children in the 8-14 age bracket and exposes them to agriculture, creative arts, and physi- cal education on weekends and during long school holidays. The National Cadet Corps is made up of students of 12-18 years, from secondary, technical, and vocational schools, who are given similar, but more intensive, training. The third entity, the New Opportunity Corps, targets children in reform schools. The fourth and "most important branch of the GNS" is the Pioneer Corps, which enlists young citizens between the ages of 18 and 25 for one year of training in paramilitary skills, agriculture, and the creative arts. Though enlistment in the Pioneer Corps is generally voluntary, it is a pre-requisite for admission to the University of Guyana and to specialized schools, such as the School of Agricul- ture, where education is free.7

The Special Service Corps was designed to allow professionals and people with special skills to undertake assignments, from 1-2 months, at other GNS agencies, but at full pay from their regular employers, whether in the public or private sector. At one time, a


















National Reserve Corps was also contemplated. As the Parliamen-

tary Paper on the subject explained This will be the last Corps to come into operation. It is envisaged that all groups of the Pioneer Corps will be given an opportunity to sign up as reservists to be on call for work in any area vital to the stability, security or productivity of the country. (Guyana. Parliament, 1973: 11).

Thus, the military defense role of the GNS was intended to be filled primarily by the Pioneer Corps and the National Reserve

Corps together, only the latter never really materialized. Various changes in both Guyana and Venezuela - changes in

leadership, changes in their mutual economic interests, and a climate encouraging peaceful settlement of disputes - have contributed to a new and productive cordiality between them

during the past six years. Nevertheless, the territorial dispute is yet to be settled.8 Venezuela still harbors advocates of the "military solution," and the dispute might still function as a lightning rod to deflect Venezuelan attention from pressing domestic crises. There is no doubt that Guyana's military is no match for the Venezuelan

military, nor that Guyana's security capability pales by com-

parison. Guyana is a much smaller country: it encompasses only 214,969 square kilometers compared to the 912,050 of Venezuela.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the total armed forces of Guyana number only 8,950 while those of Venezuela number 71,000 (IISS, 1990). The disparity carries

through on every level: Guyana's population is 815,000 compared to Venezuela's 19 million; and in 1988, Guyana's GNP per capita was US$380 as opposed to US$3,230 for Venezuela. Moreover, Venezuela - unlike Guyana - has an army with light and medium tanks, a navy with submarines and frigates, and an air force with US-made F-16 fighter planes and French-made Mirage combat aircraft (Europa World Yearbook, 1989).

Failure to resolve the territorial dispute plus the disparities in

security capability between the two countries in and of themselves

provide ample justification for Guyana's security forces to continue their pursuit of a military defense role. Altering or abandon-

ing this role would be both politically suicidal for any regime, whether PNC or other, and psychologically demoralizing for the nation at large. It should also be remembered that Guyana still has


























































another unsettled territorial dispute: with Suriname over territory in the New River Triangle, in Guyana's eastern region (Guyana Ministry of External Affairs, 1969; Pollard, 1977). Here, the countries are more evenly matched. Guyana's security capability compares well with that of Suriname. The latter is smaller than

Guyana in every way: its area is only 163,265 square kilometers; its population is 395,000; and its armed forces number 3,000. Only Suriname's per capita GNP - US$2,360 - is larger (Europa World Yearbook, 1989; IISS, 1990). Finally, the GDF and the GPF demonstrated their superior capability over the Surinamese forces in 1966 and 1967, following clashes along the Guyana-Suriname border.

Third World nations like Guyana do not maintain military defense agencies only because they may have hegemonic designs or to provide a credible defense. These forces also carry a symbolic value. Guyana's military will continue to have a military defense role, even in the absence of specific threats, because the political elites are highly aware of the symbols of sovereignty. Guyana's military forces - the GDF, the GPM, and the GNS - are important symbols of the national will to defend the country's sovereignty, even in the face of severe limitations of capability and powerful antagonists. What may change is the operational use of this role: the manner in which force deployments are made, the sources of arms and military assistance, and with whom joint military exercises are held. To some extent, this has already begun, especially in relations with the United States.

Economic and Diplomatic Security

Another role-area assigned to Guyana's military is that of economic security. Designating the Guyana Defense Force "the

people's army" was intended, in part, to indicate that the army would play multiple roles. Forbes Burnham made it clear to the GDF, in 1970, that "while standing ready to carry out the two

primary tasks of assisting civilian authorities and defending the borders, [the GDF] must be an army ... identified, and identifiable, with the community." Part of this identification was to be through the practical application of manpower, as well as technical and






























organizational skills, to the areas of economic development and community-building.

To this end, military agencies constructed roads, schools, airstrips and parks, and developed and maintained agricultural projects. Building economic security often assumed an explicitly political form. The GDF and the GNS, in particular, have been used as scab labor during industrial disputes. This was both to shore up the economic position of the industries and to bolster the political position of the government. There is, however, another aspect of the link between the economic and the political missions in that the government uses the military to help fulfill political promises of economic improvement in a cost-efficient manner, allowing it to deploy resources elsewhere.

Burnham-era politics and international factors beyond Guyana's control created the foundations for the economic decline that has become precipitous in recent years. For example, in 1980, rice production in 1980 was 256 thousand tons; in 1985, 236 thousand tons; and in 1988, 225 thousand tons. In 1980, sugar output was 3,831 thousand tons; in 1985,3,270 thousand tons; and in 1988, it was down to 2,870 thousand tons. The 1980 bauxite production was 3,052 thousand tons; by 1985, this had plunged to only 2,206 thousand tons. However, it climbed slightly to 2,785 thousand tons in 1988. These figures help to explain Guyana's huge foreign debt: in 1980, this was only US$448 million; which grew, in 1986, to US$1,477 million; and, finally, grew still more - to US$1,700 million - by 1988. In the 1982-89 time period, Guyana was able to record growth in its annual per capita GDP only once, and that was in 1984 - with 0.3%. From 1980 to 1989, the cumulative variation of per capita GDP stood at -33.1% (ECLAC, 1989).

Guyana, now the second poorest country in the Hemisphere after Haiti, presently finds itself in dire economic straits by admission of its own political and technical managers. In presenting the 1991 Budget, on 20 February 1991, Finance Minister Carl Greenidge stated:

Comrade Speaker, we had set ourselves certain specific goals and targets in 1990. Real GDP was expected to grow by some 3.1%, as a result of increased agricultural and mining production ... In reality, bauxite production was very disappointing. The industry produced 15% less than






















its target and generated 22% less revenue than forecast ... Sugar output fell to 130,000 tons, a mere 76% of the original target. This represented an all-time low ... Rice production, the lowest in 14 years, also fell some 400/o below the target and 34% below the output achieved in 1989 ... There was a 30%/ decline in the output of livestock, reflecting decreased production of poultry and eggs ... As a result of all these factors, GDP, instead of rising, actually fell by some 3.5% (Guyana. Parliament, 1991: 8-10).

Economic decline made for political volatility as citizens

responded to economic deprivation with demonstrations, strikes, arson, and vandalism, both as individuals and in organized groups. For example, in the sugar industry alone, a total of 224,417 man- hours were lost in 1990 as a result of industrial and political actions

(Guyana. Parliament, 1991: 10). Such a situation impels resort to

every potentially useful stratagem to help keep the economy afloat. The military, especially the GDF and the GNS, are prime candidates in the search for such measures. Indeed, in 1977 and 1978, they were used to good effect as scabs to break politically-motivated strikes in the sugar industry. Using the military in the interest of economic security therefore comes as no surprise.

Post-Burnham elites seem to have found a new role for the

military: that of diplomatic security. This purpose is suggested by the consistency with which detachments from the GDF and the GPF have recently been used as instruments of foreign policy. In

September 1988, a contingent of 30 soldiers with special skills were sent, along with aircraft and supplies, to Jamaica to aid in the devastation left in the wake of Hurricane Gilbert; in 1989, a

joint-services detachment, with GDF, GPM and GNS personnel, was sent to the Eastern Caribbean following the destructive trail of Hurricane Hugo; and, from June 1989 to April 1990, a 30-man detachment from the GPF was dispatched to Namibia as part of the United Nations Special Monitoring Force.

Further, a 31-member Joint Services Relief Task Force, com-

posed of servicemen from the GDF, the GPM, and the GNS, was sent to Montserrat, from February-April 1990, to build 32 houses and repair a school, in a follow-up to a previous mission in 1989. In August 1990, a 40-member contingent from the GDF's First

Infantry Battalion, and led by Captain Andrew Pompey, spent two weeks in Trinidad in the wake of an attempted coup d'etat which


















































took place at the end of July and beginning of August. Officers from Guyana's Defense Force joined with security detachments from Jamaica and member countries of the Regional Security System (RSS) to establish security in Trinidad at that troubling time (Barbados Advocate, 1988; Guyana Chronicle, 1989, 1990b; New

Nation, 1990).

Guyana has pursued an active foreign policy only the past 20

years, particularly within CARICOM, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth, and in certain avenues of the United Nations (Gill, 1977; Jackson, 1981; Griffith 1981b; Fauriol, 1984; Brother- son, 1989; Braveboy-Wagner, 1989). It could be argued that

Guyana's participation in the Namibia Monitoring Force was a

logical and natural continuation of its work in the United Nations Council for Namibia, of which it was once president. One might also contend that the security assistance to other Caribbean countries only reflects Guyana's well-known commitment to

regionalism. However, military assistance was never central to the

country's foreign policy in the past. This is not to suggest that

military assistance has never been offered, or given, to other countries. For instance, Trinidad was offered - but declined

military assistance in 1970, during its time of military crisis. The

Bishop government was given military and technical assistance, and Dominica received military assistance during the tenure of Patrick John. These were, however, different in scope and ap- parent intent than the present pattern.

The current pattern is part of larger foreign policy shifts that have taken place since the death of Burnham (Hoyte, 1986).9 There has been a rapprochement with the United States, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and with the World Bank. The number and frequency of Hoyte's visits to the United States since 1985 stands in marked contrast to Burnham's disdain of that

country, as evidenced by his refusal even to transit there during trips abroad. There has been a marked improvement in relations with contiguous states: Brazil, Surinam and Venezuela. In striking contrast to the Guyana-Venezuela hostility of the 1960s and early 1980s was Guyana's sponsorship, in 1989, of Venezuelan mem-

bership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), affording a dramatic change from its previous obstruction (with good reason) of such a move. Venezuela later reciprocated by sponsoring Guyana for full membership in the Organization of American


Nation, 1990).














Nation, 1990).














Nation, 1990).














Nation, 1990).














States (OAS), which was granted 8 January 1991. There has been a renewal of harmonious relations with CARICOM states, beginning with Desmond Hoyte's meeting (in 1986) with other Carib- bean leaders in Mustique, just off St. Vincent.

Guyana's relations with the Soviet Union and Cuba have cooled. President Hoyte waited two years before acting upon Fidel Castro's 1987 invitation to visit Cuba, finally making a stopover (26-30January 1989) while en route to Venezuela for the inauguration of Carlos Andres Perez. The two leaders used the occasion to smooth some of the rough edges in the relations between their countries, and, in a gesture of good will, Hoyte was invested with the Jose Marti Award. Prime Minister Hamilton Green had more extensive talks with Castro and other Cuban officials during a two-week visit to Cuba in late November, early December, of 1990. Curiously enough, the Soviets made a radical departure from their previous posture on the country's domestic politics. In November 1990, for the first time, they publicly called for free and fair elections in Guyana while endorsing electoral reforms introduced by Hoyte.'o This obviously reflects their own political and economic "new thinking."

Another innovation is giving military officials diplomatic assignments. In April 1990, Colonel Carl Morgan, the Commandant of the Guyana People's Militia, was named Ambassador to Suri- name. The following month (May), Police Commissioner Balram Raghubir was named High Commissioner to India, effective July 1990. Employing the military to pursue an altered foreign policy agenda allows the regime to emphasize cooperative relations in a way that reflects well on its own image. At one and the same time, it develops (or strengthens) the bonds of friendship between Guyana and other nations, secures commendation for Guyana as a nation that offers humanitarian assistance to others despite its own difficulties, and makes a positive political gesture to the Caribbean and the international community." This is precisely what the Chief-of-Staffofthe Guyana Defense Force hoped would happen. When BrigadierJoe Singh addressed the troops at Camp Stephenson (3 August 1990) shortly before their departure for Port-of-Spain on the Trinidad mission, he emphasized, among the things, the need for them not only "to be good ambassadors of Guyana, but also of the GDF."














The Caribbean is a critical target area because CARICOM can

provide the much-desired political support Guyana needs in

dealing with the Suriname and Venezuela claims, among other

things. In addition, CARICOM states - especially Barbados, St.

Vincent, and Trinidad - have recently become vital to Guyana's efforts at maintaining economic viability. On 30 November 1990, St. Vincent made a major US$7 million investment in Guyana's rice

industry through CARICOM Rice Mills Limited. For two consecu- tive years, CARICOM protected Guyana's EEC (European Econ- omic Community) sugar quota, which had been jeopardized by shortfalls in production.

During his speech on the budget (28 March 1990), Finance Minister Carl Greenidge gave another example of CARICOM

support. Complementary assistance was also to be provided by way of rescheduled interest relief on debt. In this regard, the contribution of Trinidad and Tobago is worthy of special mention for, as Guyana's largest creditor and a developing country, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago led the way, literally and figuratively, in January 1989, by agreeing to extend to Guyana very favorable terms, worth some US$53.1 million. The contribution of Trinidad and Tobago was supported by that of other members of the CARICOM Multilateral Clearing Facility (CMCF). The value of their assistance was roughly US$7.8 million (Guyana. Parliament, 1990: 7-8).

The United States also occupies a critical position as a source of potential investment and aid. Guyana's privatization has al-

ready attracted the interest of several US companies. The Virginia- based Reynolds Metals Company, which had left Guyana after nationalization in the 1970s, resumed operations in the bauxite

industry following a deal with the government in May 1989. Atlantic Tele Network, of the US Virgin Islands, acquired an 80% interest in the state-owned Guyana Telecommunications Corpora- tion in December 1990. And negotiations are underway with the California-based Leucadia Power Company for a 600/o holding in the Guyana Electricity Corporation. While US imports from

Guyana declined between 1986 and 1988, largely due to declines in production, exports to Guyana increased during that time: from US$47 million in 1986; to US$60 million in 1987; and, finally, to US$67 million in 1988.


















































Over the years, US bilateral aid to Guyana - which stood at US$0.9 million in 1985, the year of Burnham's death - has increased: from US$3 million in 1986; to US$5 million in 1987; and to US$8 million in 1988. In 1990, Guyana received US$6 million under PL-480, the food assistance program (Guyana. Parliament, 1991: 84; Griffith, 1991b: 24). Moreover, Guyana, which had been excluded from the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) ever since its inception in 1982, was admitted as a beneficiary in 1988. The United States is also part of the Guyana Support Group, which helps Guyana obtain relief from its international debt and gain access to economic assistance. Although US disbursements to Guyana, as part of the Group, have been disappointing, all concerned acknowledge the critical role that country plays. Guyana can ill afford to invite any return of that US hostility which proved so politically and economically harmful in the 1970s.

Within the context of this altered foreign policy agenda, the Guyana Defense Force has begun to collaborate with the US military. This collaboration has involved reciprocal visits between officials from both armed forces - General Fred Woerner (of the US Southern Command in Panama) visited Guyana in July 1988; Guyana's then Chief-of-Staff, Major General Norman McLean visited US Southern Command Headquarters in October 1988, among other visits by top GDF officials - and joint military exercises, including one with the US Army 44th Medical Brigade in March 1989 (Guyana Chronicle, 1988; New York Carib News, 1989).

Prior to 1988, there had been only minimal contact between the GDF and the US military. For example, there were no military sales to Guyana from 1982 to 1987. Between 1984 and 1988, Guyana received no assistance under the US International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Prior to 1989, the last time Guyana had secured IMET assistance had been in 1983, and then only for 10 places. This is compared with 22 for Barbados; 19 for Belize; 73 forJamaica; and 20 for the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). The 1989 IMET assistance proposal was: Guyana - 4; Bahamas - 17; Barbados - 13; Belize - 22; Jamaica - 56; Trinidad and Tobago - 10; and OECS - 67 (US-DOD, 1988).

The United States hopes that the shift in Guyana's policies will facilitate renewed contacts with the Guyana military, ultimately to


















pursue its own security interests. This much is clear from Pentagon submissions to Congress in 1988.

The IMET program tentatively proposed for Guyana would improve the professional military skills of the Guyana Defense Force (GDF) and enhance the GDF awareness and observance of human rights. We would like to restart the program at the earliest opportunity. This would give us important access to the GDF and enable us to impart and reinforce shared values such as respect for civilian rule and human rights. It would also discourage the GDF from seeking military assistance and/or training from the Soviet bloc (US-DOD, 1988: 176).

CONCLUSION

RECENT STUDIES on Third World military-political relations have stressed disengagement by the military and democratization of the polity - in some places as political desires, in others as welcome accomplishments. Within the last decade, the military has withdrawn from political control in Paraguay, Burma, Argen- tina, Chile, and South Korea, to name just a few. In most of these

places, democratization has proceeded with relatively little political fallout (Welch, 1987; Diamond, 1988). These twin concepts -

disengagement and democratization - are best analyzed in situa- tions where military-political relations are praetorian in nature.

As was shown above, Guyana does not fit the praetorian model. Thus, in Guyana, it becomes more appropriate to talk about the need for "depoliticization" and democratization than about "disengagement" and democratization. Because of

Guyana's circumstances, initiatives to depoliticize and democratize have to come from the civilian political elites, not from the military. Such initiatives have direct implications for some of the role-areas discussed above. For one, the role of maintaining the regime's political security would have to be abandoned.

However, such initiatives are not incompatible with the roles of

military defense and economic security. Some of the ruling elites are aware that new initiatives are not

merely desirable but necessary for the country's economic

recovery and its political stability. It is partly this recognition that accounts for the changes under Desmond Hoyte. Hoyte himself



CONCLUSION












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acknowledged this in an interview marking his fifth anniversary in power (Stabroek News, 1990a). Nevertheless, other members of the ruling elite seem prepared to sacrifice these considerations in their effort to maintain the political status quo. Guyana's new direction offers hope that it will merely be a matter of time before those interested in full depolitization of the military and democratization of society win over those dedicated to Burnham's agenda and initiatives, even in the unlikely event of a PNC victory in the forthcoming elections.

ACRONYMS

CARICOM .......... Caribbean Common Market CMCF .................. CARICOM Multilateral Clearing Facility DLM .................... Democratic Labor Movement EEC...................... European Economic Community GDF..................... Guyana Defense Force GNS .................. Guyana National Service GPF ..................... Guyana Police Force GPM .................... Guyana People's Militia IMET.................... (US) International Military and TrainingProgram IMF ........ ... International Monetary Fund NDF ....... .. National Democratic Front OGSPNCMND..... Office of the General Secretaryu of the People's

National Congress and the Ministry of Na- tional Development (or ND = National Development)

PDM .................... People's Democratic Movement PNC ..................... People's National Congress PPP ...................... People's Progressive Party UF........................ United Force WPA..................... Working People's Alliance


ACRONYMS





ACRONYMS





ACRONYMS





ACRONYMS





NOTES 1. For example, Bumham's birthdays became major national events.

Some employees of state agencies were obliged to contribute to the purchase of birthday gifts, and their attendance at rallies where he spoke was often compulsory.

2. Hoyte was then a member of the Central Committee, Legal Adviser to the General Secretary, and Minister of Economic Development and Cooperatives.

3. His successor, Laurie Lewis, of African descent, acted until January 1991 when he was confirmed in the post retroactive to 1 August 1990.

4. Generally, there was a perception in some quarters that Hoyte was partisan to people of Indian descent. This led him to be called "Desmond Persaud," since the surname Persaud is common among Indians.

5. For very cynical, critical reports on recent national elections, see UK-PHRG (1981), UK-PHRG/AW (1985), and Americas Watch (1990).

6. Although the Guyana Defense Force (GDF) was legally created on 22 May 1966, its operational birthday - 1 November 1965 - is the one traditionally observed. The GDF celebrated its 25th anniversary in 1990 with a week-long program of events.

7. The government plans to abandon free education from September 1991 onwards with the imposition of tuition at the University of Guyana and other institutions of higher education.

8. In 1990, the Good Offices Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General held discussions with the Venezuelan Foreign Minis- ter Reinaldo Figueredo Planchart and with Guyanese Foreign Minister RashleighJackson. [The latter resigned on 26 November 1990, following the indictment of his son, Martin, for possession of narcotics.] The UN Representative is Alister McIntyre, a former Secretary-General of CARICOM and a former Assistant Secretary-General of the UN and now Vice-Chancellor of the University of the West Indies. His role is to help the parties decide upon a peaceful means for resolving the dispute (for a discussion of the dispute, see Griffith, 1981a; and Braveboy-Wagner, 1984).

9. The winds of change blowing across parts of the world make studies on changes in foreign policy both practically necessary and theoretically challenging. For some useful theoretical analyses and case studies, see Boyd and Hopple (1987). Hermann (1990) contributes to the theoretical debate, and Griffith (1991b) provides a theoretically-based study on Guyana.

10. Soviet Ambassador to Guyana Mikhail Sobolev made the state- ment on 7 November 1990 while toasting the 73rd anniversary of the













































GRIFFITH: MILITARY AND THE POLITICS OF CHANGE IN GUYANA 169

Soviet 1917 revolution at a reception in Georgetown, the capital of Guyana (Stabroek News, 1990b).

11. See, for example, the Guyana Chronicle(1990a) where the GDF in particular, and Guyana in general, are showered with praise by Montserrat's Chief Minister John Osborne and other top officials.

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BOYD, G. and G. HOPPLE (eds.) (1987) Political Change and Foreign Policies. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, J. (1989) The Caribbean in World Affairs. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

(1984) The Venezuela-Guyana Border Dispute. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

BROTHERSON Jr., F. (1989) "The Foreign Policy of Guyana 1970-1985: Burnham's Search for Legitimacy." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 31, 3 (Fall): 3-36.

(1988) "The Politics of Permanent Fear: Guyana's Authoritarian- ism in the Anglophone Caribbean." Caribbean Affairs 1, 3 (July-Sep- tember): 57-76.

BURNHAM, F. (1975) Toward the Socialist Revolution. Georgetown, Guyana: People's National Congress.

(1974) Declaration of Sophia. Georgetown, Guyana: People's National Congress.

(1970) A Destiny to Mold. London, England: Longman's Publish- ing.

DANNS, G. (1982) Domination and Power in Guyana. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

(1978) "Militarization and Development: An Experiment in Nation-Building." Transition 1, 1: 23-41.

DE CAIRES, D. (1988) "Guyana after Burnham: A New Era? or is President Hoyte Trapped in the Skin of the Old PNC?" Caribbean Affairs 1, 1 (January-March): 183-98.

DESPRES, L. (1967) Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in Guyana. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.





Americas Watch.


















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DIAMOND, L. (1988) Democracy in Developing Countries. Boulder, CO:

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Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (1989) Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean.

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FAURIOL, G. (1984) Foreign Policy Behavior of Caribbean States. Lan- ham, MD: University Press of America.

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GIBSON, C. (1990a) "Elections Observers for Guyana." New York Carib News (12 June): 4.

(1990b) "Elections Observers for Guyana." New York Carib News (17 July): 5.

GILL, H. (1977) "Domestic Political Competition and Foreign Policy: Guyana's Changing Relationship with the Communist World, with

Special Reference to Cuba, China and the Soviet Union," pp. 347-385 in Leslie Manigat (ed.) The Caribbean Yearbook of International Relations. St. Augustine, Trinidad: University of West Indies, Institute of International Relations.

GRANGER, D. (1985) Defend and Develop: A Short History of the Defense Forces of Guyana. Georgetown, Guyana: Guyana Defense Force.

(1975) The New Road: A Short History of the Guyana Defense Force. Georgetown, Guyana: Guyana Defense Force.

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