Journal of Contemporary ChinaNov97, Vol. 6 Issue 16, p551

ASSESSING POLITICAL SUPPORT IN CHINA : CITIZENS' EVALUATIONS OF

GOVERNMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY

Whether the Chinese Communist regime can maintain socio-political stability and survive the

potentially turbulent transition to the post-Deng Xiaoping era remains a serious question challenging

many China watchers. Assuming that political support is vital to the stability of any regime, the

authors seek to answer this question by examining two major components of political support ,

instrumental support (citizens' evaluations of governmental effectiveness) and affective support

(citizens' evaluations of governmental legitimacy). Using data collected from a public opinion survey

conducted in Beijing, China in late 1995, this study explores the levels of both affective support and

instrumental support , and the nature of the relationship between these two types of political support

in China today. The results of this study show that: (1) the current Chinese regime enjoys a

moderately high level of affective support and a slightly lower level of instrumental support ; (2) the

two types of political support are moderately correlated; and (3) the relationship between these two

types of support persists across key demographic groups. Based on these results, the authors conclude

that the current Chinese leadership has a good chance to maintain political stability in the post-Deng

era, while it will face severe challenges in substantially upgrading its current level of legitimacy by

solely relying upon improvements in governmental effectiveness in the short term.

The 1989 Tiananmen Incident signified a fundamental change in China's polity from totalitarian

order to authoritarian order.[1] Since then, the Chinese authoritarian regime has increasingly

tightened political control in an effort to maintain the 'stability of society'. At the same time, the

government has continued to promote economic restructuring and sustain a high economic growth

rate to bolster its own legitimacy. In spite of these efforts, the stability of the current regime remains

questionable in the eyes of many China watchers.[2] Because of the current authoritarian regime's

weakness (i.e. lack of strong ideology and party organization, and the death of the paramount leader

Deng Xiaoping), the study of China's political stability seems more imperative than ever.

Before 1989 most western observers of China were quite optimistic about the prospects of reform in

the PRC. However, after the Tiananmen Square crackdown, the mood among China scholars turned

overwhelmingly pessimistic. A well-known scholar of Chinese politics called the Chinese state

'erratic'.[3] The collapse of the Communist states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union

further fueled pessimistic projections of China's political stability.[4] According to Avery Goldstein:

Prior to the late 1980s, scholars documented trends and changes, but did not question the continued

existence of the Communist regime. The events of 1989 in China and elsewhere shattered this

assumption and analysts embraced the task of diagnosing the condition of what most came to view as

moribund system. This sea change raised questions about the fate of the country's Communist

political elite and institutions. Whatever their present profile, that had not been on the agenda of

mainstream Chinese studies since the 1950s. Although scholars continue to disagree about the

probable life-span of the current regime, the disagreement now is usually about when, not whether,

fundamental political change will occur and what it will look like.[5]

Such pessimistic predictions for the stability of the post-Tiananmen regime are based upon the

conventional view that economic reforms in the PRC over the last decade have created social and

political forces that are seriously challenging the monopoly of power by the Chinese Communist

Party (CCP).[6] This view suggests that the inherent contradiction between economic transformation

and political rigidity has fundamentally undermined the 'legitimacy and effectiveness of the previous

state-socialist polity', and hence accelerated its political breakdown.[7] Or as Lucian Pye put it, 'the

combination of repression and economic difficulties was eroding the legitimacy of the regime'.[8]

The dramatic political upheavals of 1989 are considered to crystallize the legitimacy crisis of the

CCP. A large portion of the Chinese population is said to be discontent with the negative

consequences of the reforms, such as high inflation, the widening gap between rich and poor, and

lower job security,[9] although the country as a whole has experienced an unprecedented rate of

economic growth. As a result, the current 'Communist' party-state system is seen as at best fragile and

at worst doomed to collapse in the near future.[10]

This conventional view suggests that citizens' evaluation of the government's policies impact their

evaluation of the government's legitimacy. Together these two evaluations influence overall regime

stability. Theoretically it is assumed that citizens' evaluation of governmental policies is dynamically

linked to their evaluation of regime legitimacy. As one evaluation changes so does the other, with

implications for the stability and longevity of the existing political regime. We think that public

opinion data may help us better understand the dynamic inter-play of citizens' evaluations of

governmental effectiveness and legitimacy. In assessing this dynamic relationship we may be able to

gauge the stability of China's current political system.

Using data derived from a sample survey of Beijing residents, this study seeks to assess citizens'

evaluations of both governmental effectiveness and regime legitimacy. This assessment contributes to

our understanding of China's political stability. In this study, we will: (1) propose measures of

governmental effectiveness and legitimacy as two components of political support ; (2) examine

citizens' evaluations of these components of political support ; and (3) assess the nature of the

relationship between evaluations of governmental effectiveness and evaluations of regime legitimacy.

Theoretical foundations

It has long been argued by many political scientists that political support is vital to the stability of

any regime. Moreover, it is suggested that political support consists of two components--affective

support and instrumental support --which differ in the types of political attitudes they represent. The

dynamic relationship between the two types of support may well determine the political stability and

viability of a given regime.

While the terms 'affective' support and 'instrumental' support used here are borrowed directly from

Roy Macridis and Steven Burg,[11] the major theoretical ground work in this area has been laid by

many scholars.[12] In this large body of work, affective support is generally defined as the 'diffuse or

generalized attachments',[13] members of a polity have for the government and political system in

general. Affectire support is seen as a person's conviction that the political system conforms to

his/her moral or ethical principles about what is right in the political sphere.[14] Specifically, this

support encompasses affect for political authorities in general, for the values, norms, and institutions

of the regime, and for the political community.[15] Affective support is regarded by scholars as the

major component of the 'legitimacy' of the political system.[16] Affective support , as an entrenched

emotional attachment, takes a long time to form. It is influenced by ongoing socialization forces.

Once shaped, affective support establishes the foundation for the stability and viability of a given

political regime.[17]

Instrumental support refers to the population's evaluation of the 'actual performance of an incumbent

administration'. Defined by David Easton as 'specific' support , the instrumental support arises out of

the satisfaction that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and

performance of the political authorities'.[18] In contrast to affective support , instrumental support is

formed in a relatively short period of time, usually as the result of spontaneous responses to specific

policies of the incumbent regime. Depending on the response to governmental policies, instrumental

support can turn toward different directions quite swiftly. As Macridis and Burg suggest, this support

is more subject to rapid erosion than affective support with less influence on the overall political

stability and viability of a regime.

The theoretical relationships between affective and instrumental support and its impact upon political

stability were articulated by Lipset[19] and later tested by others in cross-national studies.[20] Lipset

and others offer a four-fold typology of political stability to illustrate the relationship between

affective support (legitimacy) and instrumental support (governmental effectiveness). As illustrated

in Figure 1, this typology suggests four conditions: (1) when both affective support and instrumental

support are high, a regime can maintain stability (cell 'a'); (2) when both affective support and

instrumental support are low, the stability of the regime will be seriously threatened (cell 'd'); (3)

when affective support is high and instrumental support is low, the threat to the stability of the

prevailing regime is small (cell 'b'); and (4) when affective support is low and instrumental support is

high, the regime remains stable but fragile (cell 'c'). For this last scenario, some analysts suggest that,

although the stability of a regime is potentially threatened by the possibility of social turmoil,

sustained 'instrumental support generated by positive regime performance can, with help of ongoing

socialization, be converted into affective support '[21] and hence the regime stability. This, according

to Macridis and Burg, explains the survival of many nondemocratic regimes.[22]

Clearly, this typology with four hypothesized scenarios, suggests that affective support is 'more

consequential for the stability of a political regime' than instrumental support .[23] One of the early

applications of this typology is Lipset's classic analysis of political stability of western industrial

democracies during the Great Depression. In his analysis, Lipset argues that such societies as

Germany, Austria, and Spain (which had low levels of legitimacy or affective support ) experienced

much higher rates of disruptive political protest and violence during the 1920s than did those

countries presumed to have higher levels of legitimacy.[24] The prevalence of affective support over

instrumental support has also been demonstrated in several more recent public opinion studies of

political support in such countries as Yugoslavia, Costa Rica, West Germany, and the US.[25] These

studies imply that: (1) high affective support provides a thick emotional 'cushion' upon which a

regime can rely when its stability would otherwise be threatened by low instrumental support ; and

(2) instrumental support can 'buy' stability as it can be gradually converted into affective support . In

summary, both affective support and instrumental support are dynamically linked with consequences

for the stability of any political regime.

Questions surrounding the stability of China's current political regime can be in part addressed

through the application of this theoretical model to the analysis of political support in that country

today. This study offers such an application.

Method and findings

Ten years ago, public opinion research as a tool to study socio-economic and political phenomena

was still a novel idea in the People's Republic of China . Before the early 1980s, public opinion

research was officially viewed as 'bourgeois pseudo-science' and deceptive 'accessory of Western

democratic politics'.[26] Variation, a concept at the very heart of survey research, did not fit into the

logic of conformity, the salient feature of the totalitarian rule under Mao. The political liberalization

and the administrative reform ushered in during the late 1970s and the early 1980s in post-Mao China

gradually put the emphasis on the scientific methods in the decision-making process. One of the

manifestations in the rationalization of the decision-making process was the introduction of public

opinion surveys in the early 1980s. In October 1986, the Public Opinion Research Institute (PORI),

the first of its kind in the PRC, was set up at the People's University in Beijing. Following the PORI,

a number of public opinion survey organizations emerged in various parts of the country and survey

subjects quickly spread into different areas.[27]

Since the mid-1980s, international social scientists, including overseas Chinese social scientists,

began to conduct survey research in collaboration with local Chinese social scientists. Most of the

collaborative surveys done since then have been in the area of sociology, while there are a few

surveys directly concerning such political subjects as political values and political participation.[28]

Most of these survey projects were done in different locales since obtaining nationwide probability

sample was both politically and practically difficult.[29] Even Tianjian Shi's nationwide survey on

political culture completed in 1990 did not include the region of Tibet due to a lack of qualified local

interviewers and inadequate transportation.[30]

The Beijing survey

Our Beijing survey is an additional attempt to tap into the political attitudes of ordinary Chinese

citizens. Since the population of our sample is the residents of Beijing, we do not intend to generalize

our findings to the rest of China . Nonetheless, we do believe that our findings are indicative and

illustrative of the mood of the general population in the PRC. Our sample site has two salient features

which are desirable for a case study on China's political stability. First, as the capital of the country,

Beijing is often viewed as a special place in the history of contemporary China , not paralleled by any

other cities in China . Significant historical events--such as the May 4th Movement, the Cultural

Revolution, and the 1989 Democracy Movement--all started in Beijing. The mood of Beijing

residents, therefore, is often looked at as the barometer of that of the country. Second, Beijing is the

cultural center of China and has the most developed education system in the country. Thus, Beijing

residents tend to be more informed of political events and issues than people elsewhere in China .

Due to these factors, therefore, Beijing residents are often considered those of the best candidates for

survey research on political attitudes in the PRC.

Our public opinion survey was conducted in collaboration with the Public Opinion Research Institute

of People's University of China (PORI) in December of 1995. The data for this study were obtained

from a random sample of approximately 700 adults in the Beijing area. This probability sample was

derived from a multi-stage sampling process.[31] The underlying demographic characteristics of this

sample approximate those of the 1994 government census conducted in Beijing.[32] About equal

numbers of men and women appear in the sample, along with a full representation of age groups

ranging from 18 to 74 years of age. The education levels of the respondents range from elementary

education (12%), middle school education (36%), high school education (41%), to college degree

(12%). In terms of the respondents' residence, 58% were from the urban area of Beijing, 22% from

the suburbs, and 21% from rural areas of the Beijing region. In this sample, a variety of occupational

and income groups were also represented. Overall, this sample yielded a sampling error of about 3%,

with a response rate of 94%.

In the Beijing survey, respondents were asked to assess a variety of public policy issues, related to the

government performance, in such areas as controlling inflation, providing for the public welfare

(including medical care, job security, family planning, and housing), combating pollution etc. They

also provided assessments of their support for the current political regime in general. A series of

items measured key demographic and behavioral factors associated with each respondent.

Care was taken to minimize respondent effects and linguistic misinterpretations. The original

wording of our questionnaire was reviewed by the PORI to fit the Chinese social and cultural context

and to provide for seamless translation from English to Chinese. Respondents were offered

confidentiality and encouraged to provide answers that best captured their true feelings. In general,

circumstantial evidence suggests that Chinese respondents feel much freer to express their views in

such a public opinion survey as ours than typically assumed by the western media. This is in part

because to date the Chinese government has not effectively censored or regulated public opinion

research, as the result of much weakened grassroots party control and the lack of any official

regulations governing survey research.[33]

Measuring affective and instrumental support

To operationalize the 'multifaceted' concepts of affective support and instrumental support , several

scholars have created two indices, one tied to respondents' generalized evaluation of the political

system as a whole (affective support ), and the other linked to evaluation of the govemment's

performance in key policy areas (instrumental support ).[34] Both indices are composed of multi-

item indicators, capturing the essence and complexity of respondents' attitudes toward the two types

of political support . Drawing upon the indicators from these indices, we fashioned two sets of items

to fit the Chinese socio-political context.

To capture respondents' assessment of governmental effectiveness or instrumental support , we chose

eight items, linked to the following policy areas:

(1) Controlling inflation.

(2) Providing job security.

(3) Minimizing the gap between rich and poor.

(4) Improving housing conditions for all.

(5) Maintaining order in society.

(6) Providing adequate medical care for all.

(7) Providing welfare services to the needy.

(8) Combating pollution.

The relevancy of these policy areas to our Beijing sample was assessed by the authors in field

interviews conducted prior to the administration of this survey. The interviews indicated wide-spread

interest in each of these policy areas.

To capture respondents' assessment of affectire support or governmental legitimacy we chose six

items (or statements):

(1) I am proud to live under the current (socialist) political system.

(2) I have an obligation to support the current political system.

(3) I have respect for the political institutions in China today.

(4) I feel that the basic rights of citizens are (relatively well) protected.

(5) I believe that the courts in China guarantee a fair trial.

(6) I feel that my personal values are the same as those advocated by the govemment.

Specifically, items 1 and 6 are designed to detect the popular affect for the values/norms of the

regime. Items 2 and 3 are intended to tap into affect support derived from a respondent's generalized

feeling about political institutions and the current political system as a whole. Items 4 and 5 relate to

a person's evaluations of political authorities in terms of whether the authorities have functioned and

wielded their power in accordance with one's sense of fairness and basic interests.

To assess the reliability of these two sets of items for instrumental support and affective support , we

examined the inter-item correlations and reliability coefficients associated with the items in each set.

Our reliability analysis for the eight items chosen to measure instrumental support or policy

effectiveness shows that the inter-item correlations are generally moderate, ranging from 0.262 to

0.497. This set of eight items yields a reliability coefficient (alpha) of 0.84. Our reliability analysis

for the items chosen to measure affective support or governmental legitimacy shows that the inter-

item correlations are generally moderate, ranging from 0.223 to 0.538. This set of six items produces

a reliability coefficient (alpha) of 0.79. In sum, these results conform to our expectations for these

two sets of items: moderate inter-item correlations (no item correlating with a majority of others at

less than 0.3) and high overall reliability coefficients.

After empirically establishing the reliability of these two sets of items measuring the two types of

political support , we formed two additive indices. The instrumental support index consists of the

eight items as identified above, which offers a collective profile of respondents' evaluation of

governmental effectiveness in different policy areas ( see Table 1). For each item. respondents were

asked to 'grade' governmental performance based on the grading scheme commonly used in China's

schools (a 5-point scale, raging from 1 through 5, where '1' stands for failure and '5' stands for

excellence). Table 1 shows the distribution of each item of the instrumental support index. The eight

items were then combined to form the final additive index of instrumental support , ranging from 8

(indicating very ineffective governmental performance) to 40 (indicating very effective governmental

performance}. Cases that included two or more missing values for any of the eight items were

eliminated from the additive index. The average score for this index was found to be 21.9 with a

standard deviation of 5.2 (see Table 1). This value is slightly below the midpoint of the scale (24)

which indicates a 'so so' evaluation of governmental performance.

This 'so so' evaluation confirms observations by other scholars who suggest some degree of

dissatisfaction with the current government's effectiveness in key policy areas.[35] In particular, our

respondents registered the lowest evaluations of governmental performance in two policies areas,

'controlling inflation' and 'minimizing the gap between rich and poor' (see Table 1). These policy

areas have all been considered to be most troublesome and persistent policy problems faced by the

Dengist regime since the late 1980s.[36] This finding also coincides with the result of an opinion

survey conducted by the PORI in Beijing in 1994, in which most respondents ranked inflation and the

gap between rich and poor as China's worst problems in need of an immediate governmental

solution.[37]

The affective support index consists of the six items as defined above, which offers a collective

profile of respondents' evaluation of the system legitimacy (see Table 2). Respondents were asked to

rate each of the six items on a 4-point scale where '1' indicates respondents' strong disagreement with

the item statement, and '4' indicates their strong agreement with the statement. The distribution of

each item of the affective support index is shown in Table 2. These six items were then combined to

form the final additive index of affective support , ranging from 6 (indicating the lowest level of

affective support ) to 24 (indicating the highest level of affective support ). Cases that included 2 or

more missing values for any of the six items were eliminated from this index. The average score for

this index was found to be 19.5 with a standard deviation of 2.6 (see Table 2). This value is above the

midpoint of the scale (15), which indicates that the respondents offered quite strong affective support

for the current regime. This finding corresponds to the results of an early survey in which a majority

of the respondents felt 'proud of the Chinese socialist state', and 'satisfied with the CCP's ultimate

goal'.[38]

This moderately high level of affective support may be linked to two factors. First, the CCP enjoys

'legitimacy by default'. Potential rivals to the CCP power have been discouraged or even repressed.

Therefore, as a China scholar pointed out, to many Chinese people, there does not seem to be any

viable political forces as alternatives to the current regime in that country.[39] Second, a majority of

the people may accept the 'stability first' argument advocated by the CCP. Using references to the

breakdown of socio-political order in many former Soviet republics and Eastern European countries

after the fall of communist regimes, the CCP has made relentless efforts to stress political stability as

a prerequisite for economic growth.[40] The post-Mao leadership has exploited the Chinese people's

fear of chaos (luan). This fear has resulted from more than a century of socio-political upheavals,

revolutions, and instabilities that brought about unspeakable suffering and loss of lives. The chaotic

Cultural Revolution for instance, is still very fresh in many people's minds. In fact, this sentiment was

evident in our own survey. When asked in which type of society they prefer to live--an orderly

society or a freer society that is prone to disruption--93% of our respondents chose to live in the

former. This finding is consistent with another study which found an acute fear of the consequences

of social chaos.[41] As one China scholar pointed out, the state's emphasis on political stabilization

has led many people 'both old and young, to conclude that China needs an authoritarian regime for

fast and stable economic growth'.[42]

Since the failure of the 1989 Tiananmen Democracy Movement, this kind of public sentiment has

also encouraged the revival of the so-called 'new authoritarianism' (xing quanwei zhuyi) which

blatantly advocates that only the centralized state led by a strong leadership (the CCP) is the best fit

for the Chinese society.[43] Before any other independent and powerful political forces emerge, most

Chinese people will still see the current authoritarian political regime led by the CCP as the only

hope for maintaining the social tranquillity, given their deeply-rooted cultural preference for reliance

on a central moral and political authority.[44] It is not unexpected, therefore, that about 97% of our

respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that they had an 'obligation to support [their] current

political system' (see Table 2).

The relationship between instrumental and affective support

To assess the relationship between instrumental support and affective support , we examined the

correlation between these indices. Based on the theoretical typology of political stability presented

earlier and our assessment of China's current political climate, we hypothesized a positive, moderate

correlation between our two additive indices of political support . As Table 3 shows, our results

confirm this expectation (r = 0.351). Respondents' evaluations of affective support and instrumental

support are indeed related, albeit not strongly. In this case relatively high levels of affective support

coincide with mediocre instrumental support . This finding implies a condition of political stability in

China today. That is, citizens consider the regime in general as legitimate, while they register some

concerns over the govemment's performance in certain key policy areas.

Although we have established the existence of a relationship between affective support and

instrumental support , an important question remains. Namely, does this relationship persist across

citizens who represent differing genders, ages, education levels, incomes, and places of residence?

Numerous scholars of post-Communist political systems in Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet

republics[45] as well as post-Mao China , suggest that individual political attitudes may be

influenced by these demographic factors. For example, some China scholars have demonstrated that

age has a significant impact on individuals' attitudes toward the political system and public policy.

Here it is assumed that the youth tend to be more 'critical' of government in general, and 'cynical'

toward Communist ideology than the older members of the society.[46] These scholars also argue

that gender may influence individuals' views on politics, since 'gender role' and its accompanying

social status have often been determined by the 'dominant ideology' and influenced by the

government policy.[47] As for the role of education, some students of Chinese politics suggest that

'the reservoir of confidence in the government among lesseducated Chinese may have helped the

authoritarian regime to survive'.[48] Place of residence is considered to be an important factor in

Chinese politics as rural residents are thought to be more supportive of the authoritarian regime than

those living in urban areas.[49] According to other studies of China's politics, income level is also

found to influence one's perception of governmental performance particularly in the areas of inflation

control, provisions of medical care, public housing and adequate pensions.[50] In sum, these various

studies suggest that key demographic factors may influence individuals' political attitudes. And these

demographic factors may further impact the relationship between citizens' evaluations of

governmental effectiveness (instrumental support ) and system legitimacy (affective support ).

To assess the potential impact of these key demographic factors upon the relationship between

affective support and instrumental support , we examined the correlation between our two political

support indices after controlling for the influence of respondents' age, education, income, gender, and

place of residence. The partial correlation coefficients, presented in Table 3, indicate the influence of

these demographic factors. Here we see that the original bi-variate correlation between affective

support and instrumental support persists after controlling for age, income, education level, gender

and place of residence both individually and collectively. Apparently these key demographic factors

exert little meaningful influence on the relationship between instrumental support and affective

support .[51] This finding converges with that of another cross-national study of political support ,

[52] which demonstrated weak impacts of similar demographic factors on the relationship between

the two types of political support . This means that the durability of this relationship extends beyond

the influence of demographic factors. In China , while demographic factors may in fact influence

respondents' evaluation of particular items captured in our indices and some other government

policies identified in the early studies, they appear not to influence, in any meaningful way, the

overall relationship of instrumental support and affective support .

Conclusion

Our survey sample analysis of public opinion and political attitudes in China today reveals several

important findings. First, support for China's current political regime can be measured by two

distinct dimensions of both affective support and instrumental support . Second, we find relatively

high levels of affective support accompanied by slightly lower levels of instrumental support .

Contrary to the conventional, more pessimistic predictions that suggest a fragile and unstable polity,

this finding shows that the CCP leadership as the prevailing regime in China continues to enjoy

political legitimacy, and hence is able to maintain the 'stability of the society'. Third, we find a

positive, moderately strong correlation between respondents' levels of affective support and

instrumental support , whereby citizens indicate some concern over the government's effectiveness

while considering the regime as indeed legitimate. Fourth, we find that the relationship between the

theoretically critical components of political support , namely affective support and instrumental

support , persist across key demographic lines. It appears that the CCP regime is legitimized by a

majority of our respondents in spite of demographic divisions and differences.

Our findings from this survey analysis have several important implications for the stability of the

post-Deng regime in the near future as well as the current incumbent government. Based upon

citizens' perceptions, China's current regime can survive the potentially turbulent transition to the

post-Deng era, given that its policy performance remains constant or better. The perceived

moderately high level of political legitimacy may provide 'a reservoir of diffuse support upon which

the system can draw when its stability would otherwise be threatened by dissatisfaction with

ineffective [governmental] performance'.[53] In China's case, the perceived level of affective support

(legitimacy) may be partially immune from the ineffectiveness of governmental performance in such

areas as 'controlling inflation' and 'minimizing the gap between rich and poor', at least in the short

term. This may indeed allow the current and post-Deng regimes to buy the critical time necessary to

accumulate political credibility. On the other hand, because the legitimacy is 'partially immune' from

spontaneous change in the evaluation of policy performance, the incumbent government cannot

substantially upgrade the current level of its legitimacy by solely relying on policy improvement in a

short period of time. Rather, in order to gain higher level of legitimacy, the regime must make

extraordinary and continuous efforts--not only in policy performance but in the socialization of the

regime's values--in the long run.

While this study presents important findings and their implications for China's political stability, it

provides only a snapshot of levels of political support and possibility of political stability in that

country today. And this study is limited to one point in time and local sample. It is hoped, however,

that future studies will provide critical replications of our study using longitudinal data and national

samples, along similar theoretical lines. Findings from these sorts of studies may provide more

complete understanding of political support and regime stability in China now and into the future.

[1] There is a theoretically and empirically significant distinction between totalitarianism and

authoritarianism as two different non-democratic orders. The former is characterized by a single

monolithic/effective party organization and a strong/unchallengeable official ideology, while the

latter is identified with a single leader or small group of leaders, weak or no party organization, and

fading or no official ideology. Thus, it has been argued that authoritarianism tends to be less effective

than totalitarianism in maintaining the stability of society. For a more complete discussion on the

distinction between authoritarianism and totalitarianism, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave:

Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991 ),

pp. 12-13; Juan J. Linz, 'Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes', in Fred 1. Greenstein and Nelson W.

Polsby, eds, Macropolitical Theory, Vol. 3 of Handbook of Political Science (Reading, MA:

Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 175-190; and Roy C. Macridis and Steven L. Burg. Introduction to

Comparative Politics.' Regimes and Change (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), ohs 6-7.

For in depth discussion on the transition from totalitarianism to authoritarianism since the Cultural

Revolution in China , among others, see Jie Chen and Peng Deng, China Since the Cultural

Revolution: From Totalitarianism to Authoritarianism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995).

[2] See, for example, Jack Goldstone, 'The coming Chinese collapse', Foreign Policy 99, (1995), pp.

43-48.

[3] See Lucian Pye, 'China : erratic state, frustrated society', Foreign Affairs 69, (1990), pp. 65-74.

[4] See Stephen M. Young, 'Post-Tiananmen Chinese politics and the prospects for democratization',

Asian Survey 35, (1995), pp. 652-687.

[5] Avery Goldstein, 'Trends in the study of political elites and institutions in the PRC', The China

Quarterly 139, (1994), p. 714.

[6] See Tony Saich, 'The search for civil society and democracy in China ', Current History: The

People's Republic of China 93, (1994), pp. 260-272; David Shambaugh, 'Losing control: the erosion

of state authority in China ', Current History: The People's Republic of China 92, (1993), pp. 253-

259; Goldstone, 'The coming Chinese collapse'.

[7] Gordon White, Riding the Tiger: The Politics of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China (Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 12.

[8] Lucian W. Pye, China : An Introduction, 4th edn (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), p.

371.

[9] See Joe C. B. Leung, 'The political economy of unemployment and unemployment insurance in

the People's Republic of China ', International Social Work 38, (1995), pp. 139-149; Jie Chen and

Peng Deng, China Since the Cultural Revolution: From Totalitarianism to Authoritarianism

(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), chs 3-4.

[10] For example, a report by the Agency France Press Report even predicted that 'In years, at the

soonest a few and at the latest between ten and twenty, the country will move from economic

collapse to political break-up, ending with its disintegration'. See John Fitzgerald, 'Reports of my

death have been greatly exaggerated', in David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds. China

Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regisrealism (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 22.

[11] Roy C. Macridis and Steven L. Burg, Introduction to Comparative Politics: Regimes and Change

(New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991 ), pp. 8-12.

[12] See David Easton, 'An Approach to the analysis of political systems', Worm Politics 9, (1957),

pp. 383-400; David Easton, A System's Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wily, 1965); David

Easton, 'A reassessment of the concept of political support Britistsh Journal of Political Science 5,

(1975), pp. 435-457: Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Some social requisites of democracy: economic

development and political legitimacy', American Political Science Review 53, 11959), pp. 69-105;

Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five

Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Edward N. Muller and Thomas O. Jukam, 'On

the meaning of political support ', American Political Science Review 77, 11977), pp. 1561-1595;

Edward N. Muller and Carol J. Williams,' Dynamics of political support -alienation', Comparative

Political Studies 13, 11980), pp. 33-59; Edward N. Muller, Thomas O. Jukam and Mitchell A.

Seligson, 'Diffuse political support and antisystem political behavior: a comparative analysis',

American Journal of Political Science 26, 11982), pp. 240-264; Steven L. Burg and Michael L.

Berbaum, 'Community, integration, and stability in multinational Yugoslavia', American Political

Science Review 83, 11989), pp. 535-554: and Steven E. Finkel, Edward N. Muller and Mitchell

Seligson, 'Economic crisis, incumbent performance and regime support : a comparison of

longitudinal data from West Germany and Costa Rica', British Journal of Political Science 19,

(1989), pp, 329-351.

[13] Macridis and Burg, Introduction to Comparative Politics, p :8.

[14] Muller, Jukam and Seligson, p. 241.

[15] Muller and Jukam, pp. 1565-1573.

[16] See, for example, Arthur H. Miller, 'In search of regime legitimacy', in Arthur H. Miller,

William M. Reisinger and Vicki L. Hesli, eds, Public Opinion and Regime Change (Boulder:

Westview Press, 1993), pp. 95-123; Mitchell A. Seligson and Edward N. Muller, 'Democratic

stability and economic crisis: Costa Rica, 1978-1983', International Studies Quarterly 31, 11991), pp.

301-326; Easton (1065): Lipset (1959).

[17] Macridis and Burg, pp. 9-10.

[18] Easton, 'A reassessment', p. 437.

[19] See Lipset, 'Some social requisites of democracy'.

[20] See Muller and Jukam, 'On the meaning of political support '; Muller and Williams, 'Dynamics

of political support -alienation'; Muller, Jukam and Seligson, Diffuse political support '; and Burg

and Berbaum, 'Community'.

[21] Macridis and Burg, p. el.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Muller and Jukam, 'On the meaning', p. 1563.

[24] See Lipset, 'Some social requisites of democracy.

[25] See Muller and Jukam. 'On the meaning': Muller, Jukam and Seligson, 'Diffuse political support

'; Burg and Berbaum, 'Community'.

[26] Guoming Yu and Xiayang Liu, Zhongguo Minvi Yanjiu [Research of Public Opinion in China ]

(Beijing, China : People's University Press, 1994), p. 15.

[27] See ibid.

[28] See Melanie Manion, 'Survey research in the study of contemporary China : learning from local

samples', The China Quarterly 139, (1994), pp. 742-765.

[29] For examples of local survey, see ibid.

[30] See Andrew J. Nathan and Tianjian Shi, 'Cultural requisites for democracy in China : findings

from a survey', Daedalus 122, (1993), pp. 95-123.

[31] Seven urban districts and rural counties were randomly chosen after the first stage of sampling.

Five Juweihui (residential neighborhoods) or cunming weiyuanhui (villages) were randomly chosen

after the 'second stage of sampling. The third stage of random sampling produced a sample of 20

households from each of the five residential neighborhoods or villages of the seven urban districts or

rural counties. One individual was chosen randomly from each household as the interviewee at the

final stage of sampling. In comparison of our sample and the 1990 Beijing census by the government,

the sampling error of this survey is less than 2% for gender and less than 3% for age.

[32] See Gary M. Bennett, China : Facts & Figures. Annual Handbook (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic

International Press, 1995).

[33] For example, even some western journalists were surprised with the fact that when interviewed

by the media, average Chinese people could express their opinions contradictory to official

propaganda without much fear. See 'Many don't want to see a fight between mainland and Taiwan',

Shijie Ribao [World Journal], (15 March 1996).

[34] See Muller, Jukam and Seligson, 'Diffuse political support ', pp. 336-337 and 346-347; and

Muller and Jukam, 'On the meaning of political support ', pp. 1565 1567

[35] See Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China : From Revolution through Reform (New York: W.

W. Norton & Company, 1995): Chen and Deng, China Since the Cultural Revolution; Jie Chen, 'The

impact of reform on the party and ideology in Chin;,'. tjournal of Contemporary China 9(19955), pp.

23-34; Leung, 'The political economy'.

[36] See Lieberthal, Governing China , pp. 269-273: Chen and Deng, China Since the Cultural

Revolution, pp. 113-118.

[37] Yu and Liu, pp. 85-87.

[38] Yongnian Zheng, 'Development and democracy: are they compatible in China ?', Political

Science Quarterly 109, (1994), p. 244; Alfred L. Chan and Paul Nesbitt-Larking, 'Critical citizenship

and civil society in contemporary China ', Canadian Journal of Political Science 28, (1995 ), pp. 293-

309,

[39] Yang Zhong, 'Legitimacy crisis and legitimization in China '. Journal of Contemporary, Asia 26,

(1996), pp. 201-220.

[40] See ibid.

[41] Lijun Qiao and Tianze Chen, China Cannot Afford Chaos (Beijing, China : Chinese Party

School Press, 1994), pp. iii-v.

[42] Zheng, 'Development and democracy', p. 235.

[43] See Ma Shu Yun, 'The rise and fall of neo-authoritarianism in China ', China Information 5,

(1991), pp. 1-19; Perry Link, Evening Chats in Beijing: Probing China's Predicament (New York: W.

W. Norton, 1992); Barry Soutman, 'Sirens of the strongman: neo-authoritarianism in recent Chinese

political theory', The China Quarterly 129, (1992), pp. 72-102; and Richard Baum, Burying Mao:

Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 238-

239.

[44] For a detailed discussion on the Chinese political culture, see Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of

Chinese Politics (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1992); and Tang

Tsou, 'Back from the brink of revolutionary--"feudal" totalitarianism', in Victor Nee and David

Mozingo. eds, State and Society in Contemporary China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1083)

[45] See Ada Finifter and Ellen Michiewicz, 'Redefining the political system of the USSR: mass

support for political change', American Political Science Review 86, (1992), pp. 857-874; Raymond

Duch, 'Tolerating economic reform: popular support for transition to free market in the former Soviet

Union', American Political Science Review 87, (1993), pp. 580-608; Richard Rose and William

Mishler, 'Mass reaction to regime change in Eastern Europe: polarization or leaders and laggards',

British Journal of Political Science 24, (1994), pp. 159-181; David Mason, 'Attitudes towards the

market and political participation in the postcommunist states', Slavic Review 54, (1995), pp. 385-

406; Arthur H. Miller. William Reisinger and Vicki Hesli, 'Understanding political change in post-

Soviet societies: a further commentary on Finifter and Mickiewicz', American Political Science

Review 90, (1996), pp. 135-166; Ada Finifter, 'Attitudes toward individual responsibility and

political reform in former Soviet Union', American Political Science Review 90, (1996), pp. 138-

152.

[46] Chan and Nesbitt-Larking, 'Critical citizenship and civil society'; and Stanley Rosen, 'Students

and the state in China : the crisis in ideology and organization', in Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, ed.,

State and Society in China : The Consequences of Reform (Bolder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 167-

191.

[47] Jean Lock, 'The effect of ideology in gender role definition: China as a case study', Journal of

Asian and African Studies 24, (1989), pp. 228-238: and Wen-Lang Li, 'Changing status of women in

the PRC', in Shao-chuan Leng, ed., Changes in China : Party, State, and Society (New York:

University Press of America, 1989), pp. 201-223.

[48] Nathan and Shi, 'Cultural requisites', p. 111

[49] See Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1994), p. 2; Mark Selden, 'The social origins and limits of the democracy

movement', in Roger V. Des Forges, Luo Ning and Wu Yen-bo, eds, Chinese Democracy and the

Crisis of 1989: Chinese and American Reflections (Albany: State University of New York Press,

1993), p. 125: and Andrew Nathan, China's Crisis.' Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for

Democracy (New york:New York: Columbia University Pres 1990), pp. 199-120.

[50] Yu and Liu, Research of Public Opinion, pp. 42-77.

[51] In addition to assessing the impact of respondents' age, education, income, gender, and place of

residence on the relationship between affective and instrumental support , we also examined the

impact of these factors on these two types of support . Separate multiple regressions were run using

age, education, income, gender, and place of residence as predictors of both affective and

instrumental support . The multiple regressions revealed very small correlations between the set of

chosen predictors and the two types of support (R(2)= 0.05-0.07). Here again it appears that none of

the key demographic factors explored vary with either affective or instrumental support .

[52] Finkel, Muller and Seligson. 'Economic crisis, incumbent performance and regime support ', p.

345.

[53] Easton A System's Analysis, pp. 273-274.

Table 1

Distribution of instrumental

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Very

poor Poor So so Good

% % % %

Instrumental variables (N) (N) (N) (N)

1. Controlling inflation 11.4 37.1 38.7 9.5

(77) (251) (262) (64)

2. Providing job security 5.7 26.9 53.8 10.2

(38) (179) (358) (68)

3. Minimizing the gap between

rich and poor 16.7 44.0 28.7 6.3

(112) (296) (193) (42)

4. Improving housing conditions

for all people 8.8 30.0 42.6 13.7

(59) (201) (286) (92)

5. Maintaining order in society 8.7 29.4 40.0 13.6

(59) (199) (271) (92)

6. Providing adequate medical

care for all people 5.8 25.0 45.1 18.3

(39) (169) (305) (124)

7. Providing welfare services

to the needy 3.8 18.8 48.9 20.7

(25) (124) (323) (137)

8. Combating pollution 11.1 35.8 31.6 14.2

(75) (243) (214) (96)

(5)

Very

good Total

% % Mean Standard

Instrumental variables (N) (N) score deviation

1. Controlling inflation 3.4 100 2.564 0.931

(23) (677)

2. Providing job security 3.5 100 2.788 0.833

(23) (666)

3. Minimizing the gap between

rich and poor 4.3 100 2.375 0.976

(29) (672)

4. Improving housing conditions

for all people 4.9 100 2.760 0.964

(33) (671)

5. Maintaining order in society 8.3 100 2.833 1.041

(56) (677)

6. Providing adequate medical

care for all people 5.8 100 2.933 0.944

(39) (676)

7. Providing welfare services

to the needy 7.9 100 3.101 0.923

(52) (661)

8. Combating pollution 7.4 100 2.709 1.075

(50) (678)

Index of instrumental 21.9 5.22

(623)

Table 2

Distribution of affective

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Strongly Strongly

disagree Disagree Agree agree

% % % %

Affective variables (N) (N) (N) (N)

1. I am proud to live under

the current

(socialist) system 0.9 3.7 41.6 53.8

(6) (25) (281) (363)

2. I feel an obligation to

our current

system 0.0 2.5 35.3 62.2

(0) (17) (238) (420)

3. I respect the

institutions in today 1.3 5.5 48.3 44.9

(9) (37) (325) (302)

4. I think the basic rights of

citizens are (relatively well)

protected by the Chinese

system 1.9 1.4 62.8 23.9

(13) (77) (425) (162)

5. (In general), I think the

courts in guarantee

a fair trial 3.6 14.2 66.0 16.2

(24) (95) (443) (109)

6. I believe that my personal

values are the same as those

(advocated by the government)

of our system 1.8 18.2 61.0 19.0

(12) (122) (408) (127)

Total

% Mean Standard

Affective variables (N) score deviation

1. I am proud to live under

the current

(socialist) system 100 3.483 0.615

(675)

2. I feel an obligation to

our current

system 100 3.597 0.540

(675)

3. I respect the

institutions in today

100 3.367 0.650

(673)

4. I think the basic rights of

citizens are (relatively well)

protected by the Chinese

system 100 3.087 0.650

(677)

5. (In general), I think the

courts in guarantee

a fair trial 100 2.949 0.667

(671)

6. I believe that my personal

values are the same as those

(advocated by the government)

of our system 100 2.972 0.666

(669)

Index of Affective 19.6 2.59

(660)

Table 3

Partial correlation coefficients: affective and

instrumental ; controlling for age, gender,

income, education, and place of residence

Variables Correlation coefficients

Affective

and instrumental

r = 0.351*

Controlling for: r = Mean SD

Age 0.354* 43.8 14.3

Gender 0.351* 1.50 0.50

Income 0.342* 584.5 368.8

Education 0.351* 2.51 0.87

Place of residence 0.345* 1.30 0.45

All of the above 0.340*

*p < 0.001

DIAGRAM: Figure 1. Propositions about the relationships between affective support and instrumental

support .

Authors thank David Alperin, Jihong Zhao, and anonymous referees for their critical and insightful

comments on early versions of this article.

By JIE CHEN, YANG ZHONG, JAN HILLARD AND JOHN SCHEB*

*Jie Chen and Jan Hillard teach in the Department of Science at University of Wisconsin, River

Falls. Yang Zhong and John Scheb teach in the Department of Science at University of Tennessee,

Knoxville. The opinion survey reported and analyzed in this article was supported by faculty research

grants from the University of Wisconsin, River Falls and the University of Tennessee, Knoxville.