Journal of Contemporary ChinaNov97, Vol. 6 Issue 16, p551
ASSESSING POLITICAL SUPPORT IN CHINA : CITIZENS' EVALUATIONS OF
GOVERNMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY
Whether the Chinese Communist regime can maintain socio-political stability and survive the
potentially turbulent transition to the post-Deng Xiaoping era remains a serious question challenging
many China watchers. Assuming that political support is vital to the stability of any regime, the
authors seek to answer this question by examining two major components of political support ,
instrumental support (citizens' evaluations of governmental effectiveness) and affective support
(citizens' evaluations of governmental legitimacy). Using data collected from a public opinion survey
conducted in Beijing, China in late 1995, this study explores the levels of both affective support and
instrumental support , and the nature of the relationship between these two types of political support
in China today. The results of this study show that: (1) the current Chinese regime enjoys a
moderately high level of affective support and a slightly lower level of instrumental support ; (2) the
two types of political support are moderately correlated; and (3) the relationship between these two
types of support persists across key demographic groups. Based on these results, the authors conclude
that the current Chinese leadership has a good chance to maintain political stability in the post-Deng
era, while it will face severe challenges in substantially upgrading its current level of legitimacy by
solely relying upon improvements in governmental effectiveness in the short term.
The 1989 Tiananmen Incident signified a fundamental change in China's polity from totalitarian
order to authoritarian order.[1] Since then, the Chinese authoritarian regime has increasingly
tightened political control in an effort to maintain the 'stability of society'. At the same time, the
government has continued to promote economic restructuring and sustain a high economic growth
rate to bolster its own legitimacy. In spite of these efforts, the stability of the current regime remains
questionable in the eyes of many China watchers.[2] Because of the current authoritarian regime's
weakness (i.e. lack of strong ideology and party organization, and the death of the paramount leader
Deng Xiaoping), the study of China's political stability seems more imperative than ever.
Before 1989 most western observers of China were quite optimistic about the prospects of reform in
the PRC. However, after the Tiananmen Square crackdown, the mood among China scholars turned
overwhelmingly pessimistic. A well-known scholar of Chinese politics called the Chinese state
'erratic'.[3] The collapse of the Communist states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
further fueled pessimistic projections of China's political stability.[4] According to Avery Goldstein:
Prior to the late 1980s, scholars documented trends and changes, but did not question the continued
existence of the Communist regime. The events of 1989 in China and elsewhere shattered this
assumption and analysts embraced the task of diagnosing the condition of what most came to view as
moribund system. This sea change raised questions about the fate of the country's Communist
political elite and institutions. Whatever their present profile, that had not been on the agenda of
mainstream Chinese studies since the 1950s. Although scholars continue to disagree about the
probable life-span of the current regime, the disagreement now is usually about when, not whether,
fundamental political change will occur and what it will look like.[5]
Such pessimistic predictions for the stability of the post-Tiananmen regime are based upon the
conventional view that economic reforms in the PRC over the last decade have created social and
political forces that are seriously challenging the monopoly of power by the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP).[6] This view suggests that the inherent contradiction between economic transformation
and political rigidity has fundamentally undermined the 'legitimacy and effectiveness of the previous
state-socialist polity', and hence accelerated its political breakdown.[7] Or as Lucian Pye put it, 'the
combination of repression and economic difficulties was eroding the legitimacy of the regime'.[8]
The dramatic political upheavals of 1989 are considered to crystallize the legitimacy crisis of the
CCP. A large portion of the Chinese population is said to be discontent with the negative
consequences of the reforms, such as high inflation, the widening gap between rich and poor, and
lower job security,[9] although the country as a whole has experienced an unprecedented rate of
economic growth. As a result, the current 'Communist' party-state system is seen as at best fragile and
at worst doomed to collapse in the near future.[10]
This conventional view suggests that citizens' evaluation of the government's policies impact their
evaluation of the government's legitimacy. Together these two evaluations influence overall regime
stability. Theoretically it is assumed that citizens' evaluation of governmental policies is dynamically
linked to their evaluation of regime legitimacy. As one evaluation changes so does the other, with
implications for the stability and longevity of the existing political regime. We think that public
opinion data may help us better understand the dynamic inter-play of citizens' evaluations of
governmental effectiveness and legitimacy. In assessing this dynamic relationship we may be able to
gauge the stability of China's current political system.
Using data derived from a sample survey of Beijing residents, this study seeks to assess citizens'
evaluations of both governmental effectiveness and regime legitimacy. This assessment contributes to
our understanding of China's political stability. In this study, we will: (1) propose measures of
governmental effectiveness and legitimacy as two components of political support ; (2) examine
citizens' evaluations of these components of political support ; and (3) assess the nature of the
relationship between evaluations of governmental effectiveness and evaluations of regime legitimacy.
Theoretical foundations
It has long been argued by many political scientists that political support is vital to the stability of
any regime. Moreover, it is suggested that political support consists of two components--affective
support and instrumental support --which differ in the types of political attitudes they represent. The
dynamic relationship between the two types of support may well determine the political stability and
viability of a given regime.
While the terms 'affective' support and 'instrumental' support used here are borrowed directly from
Roy Macridis and Steven Burg,[11] the major theoretical ground work in this area has been laid by
many scholars.[12] In this large body of work, affective support is generally defined as the 'diffuse or
generalized attachments',[13] members of a polity have for the government and political system in
general. Affectire support is seen as a person's conviction that the political system conforms to
his/her moral or ethical principles about what is right in the political sphere.[14] Specifically, this
support encompasses affect for political authorities in general, for the values, norms, and institutions
of the regime, and for the political community.[15] Affective support is regarded by scholars as the
major component of the 'legitimacy' of the political system.[16] Affective support , as an entrenched
emotional attachment, takes a long time to form. It is influenced by ongoing socialization forces.
Once shaped, affective support establishes the foundation for the stability and viability of a given
political regime.[17]
Instrumental support refers to the population's evaluation of the 'actual performance of an incumbent
administration'. Defined by David Easton as 'specific' support , the instrumental support arises out of
the satisfaction that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and
performance of the political authorities'.[18] In contrast to affective support , instrumental support is
formed in a relatively short period of time, usually as the result of spontaneous responses to specific
policies of the incumbent regime. Depending on the response to governmental policies, instrumental
support can turn toward different directions quite swiftly. As Macridis and Burg suggest, this support
is more subject to rapid erosion than affective support with less influence on the overall political
stability and viability of a regime.
The theoretical relationships between affective and instrumental support and its impact upon political
stability were articulated by Lipset[19] and later tested by others in cross-national studies.[20] Lipset
and others offer a four-fold typology of political stability to illustrate the relationship between
affective support (legitimacy) and instrumental support (governmental effectiveness). As illustrated
in Figure 1, this typology suggests four conditions: (1) when both affective support and instrumental
support are high, a regime can maintain stability (cell 'a'); (2) when both affective support and
instrumental support are low, the stability of the regime will be seriously threatened (cell 'd'); (3)
when affective support is high and instrumental support is low, the threat to the stability of the
prevailing regime is small (cell 'b'); and (4) when affective support is low and instrumental support is
high, the regime remains stable but fragile (cell 'c'). For this last scenario, some analysts suggest that,
although the stability of a regime is potentially threatened by the possibility of social turmoil,
sustained 'instrumental support generated by positive regime performance can, with help of ongoing
socialization, be converted into affective support '[21] and hence the regime stability. This, according
to Macridis and Burg, explains the survival of many nondemocratic regimes.[22]
Clearly, this typology with four hypothesized scenarios, suggests that affective support is 'more
consequential for the stability of a political regime' than instrumental support .[23] One of the early
applications of this typology is Lipset's classic analysis of political stability of western industrial
democracies during the Great Depression. In his analysis, Lipset argues that such societies as
Germany, Austria, and Spain (which had low levels of legitimacy or affective support ) experienced
much higher rates of disruptive political protest and violence during the 1920s than did those
countries presumed to have higher levels of legitimacy.[24] The prevalence of affective support over
instrumental support has also been demonstrated in several more recent public opinion studies of
political support in such countries as Yugoslavia, Costa Rica, West Germany, and the US.[25] These
studies imply that: (1) high affective support provides a thick emotional 'cushion' upon which a
regime can rely when its stability would otherwise be threatened by low instrumental support ; and
(2) instrumental support can 'buy' stability as it can be gradually converted into affective support . In
summary, both affective support and instrumental support are dynamically linked with consequences
for the stability of any political regime.
Questions surrounding the stability of China's current political regime can be in part addressed
through the application of this theoretical model to the analysis of political support in that country
today. This study offers such an application.
Method and findings
Ten years ago, public opinion research as a tool to study socio-economic and political phenomena
was still a novel idea in the People's Republic of China . Before the early 1980s, public opinion
research was officially viewed as 'bourgeois pseudo-science' and deceptive 'accessory of Western
democratic politics'.[26] Variation, a concept at the very heart of survey research, did not fit into the
logic of conformity, the salient feature of the totalitarian rule under Mao. The political liberalization
and the administrative reform ushered in during the late 1970s and the early 1980s in post-Mao China
gradually put the emphasis on the scientific methods in the decision-making process. One of the
manifestations in the rationalization of the decision-making process was the introduction of public
opinion surveys in the early 1980s. In October 1986, the Public Opinion Research Institute (PORI),
the first of its kind in the PRC, was set up at the People's University in Beijing. Following the PORI,
a number of public opinion survey organizations emerged in various parts of the country and survey
subjects quickly spread into different areas.[27]
Since the mid-1980s, international social scientists, including overseas Chinese social scientists,
began to conduct survey research in collaboration with local Chinese social scientists. Most of the
collaborative surveys done since then have been in the area of sociology, while there are a few
surveys directly concerning such political subjects as political values and political participation.[28]
Most of these survey projects were done in different locales since obtaining nationwide probability
sample was both politically and practically difficult.[29] Even Tianjian Shi's nationwide survey on
political culture completed in 1990 did not include the region of Tibet due to a lack of qualified local
interviewers and inadequate transportation.[30]
The Beijing survey
Our Beijing survey is an additional attempt to tap into the political attitudes of ordinary Chinese
citizens. Since the population of our sample is the residents of Beijing, we do not intend to generalize
our findings to the rest of China . Nonetheless, we do believe that our findings are indicative and
illustrative of the mood of the general population in the PRC. Our sample site has two salient features
which are desirable for a case study on China's political stability. First, as the capital of the country,
Beijing is often viewed as a special place in the history of contemporary China , not paralleled by any
other cities in China . Significant historical events--such as the May 4th Movement, the Cultural
Revolution, and the 1989 Democracy Movement--all started in Beijing. The mood of Beijing
residents, therefore, is often looked at as the barometer of that of the country. Second, Beijing is the
cultural center of China and has the most developed education system in the country. Thus, Beijing
residents tend to be more informed of political events and issues than people elsewhere in China .
Due to these factors, therefore, Beijing residents are often considered those of the best candidates for
survey research on political attitudes in the PRC.
Our public opinion survey was conducted in collaboration with the Public Opinion Research Institute
of People's University of China (PORI) in December of 1995. The data for this study were obtained
from a random sample of approximately 700 adults in the Beijing area. This probability sample was
derived from a multi-stage sampling process.[31] The underlying demographic characteristics of this
sample approximate those of the 1994 government census conducted in Beijing.[32] About equal
numbers of men and women appear in the sample, along with a full representation of age groups
ranging from 18 to 74 years of age. The education levels of the respondents range from elementary
education (12%), middle school education (36%), high school education (41%), to college degree
(12%). In terms of the respondents' residence, 58% were from the urban area of Beijing, 22% from
the suburbs, and 21% from rural areas of the Beijing region. In this sample, a variety of occupational
and income groups were also represented. Overall, this sample yielded a sampling error of about 3%,
with a response rate of 94%.
In the Beijing survey, respondents were asked to assess a variety of public policy issues, related to the
government performance, in such areas as controlling inflation, providing for the public welfare
(including medical care, job security, family planning, and housing), combating pollution etc. They
also provided assessments of their support for the current political regime in general. A series of
items measured key demographic and behavioral factors associated with each respondent.
Care was taken to minimize respondent effects and linguistic misinterpretations. The original
wording of our questionnaire was reviewed by the PORI to fit the Chinese social and cultural context
and to provide for seamless translation from English to Chinese. Respondents were offered
confidentiality and encouraged to provide answers that best captured their true feelings. In general,
circumstantial evidence suggests that Chinese respondents feel much freer to express their views in
such a public opinion survey as ours than typically assumed by the western media. This is in part
because to date the Chinese government has not effectively censored or regulated public opinion
research, as the result of much weakened grassroots party control and the lack of any official
regulations governing survey research.[33]
Measuring affective and instrumental support
To operationalize the 'multifaceted' concepts of affective support and instrumental support , several
scholars have created two indices, one tied to respondents' generalized evaluation of the political
system as a whole (affective support ), and the other linked to evaluation of the govemment's
performance in key policy areas (instrumental support ).[34] Both indices are composed of multi-
item indicators, capturing the essence and complexity of respondents' attitudes toward the two types
of political support . Drawing upon the indicators from these indices, we fashioned two sets of items
to fit the Chinese socio-political context.
To capture respondents' assessment of governmental effectiveness or instrumental support , we chose
eight items, linked to the following policy areas:
(1) Controlling inflation.
(2) Providing job security.
(3) Minimizing the gap between rich and poor.
(4) Improving housing conditions for all.
(5) Maintaining order in society.
(6) Providing adequate medical care for all.
(7) Providing welfare services to the needy.
(8) Combating pollution.
The relevancy of these policy areas to our Beijing sample was assessed by the authors in field
interviews conducted prior to the administration of this survey. The interviews indicated wide-spread
interest in each of these policy areas.
To capture respondents' assessment of affectire support or governmental legitimacy we chose six
items (or statements):
(1) I am proud to live under the current (socialist) political system.
(2) I have an obligation to support the current political system.
(3) I have respect for the political institutions in China today.
(4) I feel that the basic rights of citizens are (relatively well) protected.
(5) I believe that the courts in China guarantee a fair trial.
(6) I feel that my personal values are the same as those advocated by the govemment.
Specifically, items 1 and 6 are designed to detect the popular affect for the values/norms of the
regime. Items 2 and 3 are intended to tap into affect support derived from a respondent's generalized
feeling about political institutions and the current political system as a whole. Items 4 and 5 relate to
a person's evaluations of political authorities in terms of whether the authorities have functioned and
wielded their power in accordance with one's sense of fairness and basic interests.
To assess the reliability of these two sets of items for instrumental support and affective support , we
examined the inter-item correlations and reliability coefficients associated with the items in each set.
Our reliability analysis for the eight items chosen to measure instrumental support or policy
effectiveness shows that the inter-item correlations are generally moderate, ranging from 0.262 to
0.497. This set of eight items yields a reliability coefficient (alpha) of 0.84. Our reliability analysis
for the items chosen to measure affective support or governmental legitimacy shows that the inter-
item correlations are generally moderate, ranging from 0.223 to 0.538. This set of six items produces
a reliability coefficient (alpha) of 0.79. In sum, these results conform to our expectations for these
two sets of items: moderate inter-item correlations (no item correlating with a majority of others at
less than 0.3) and high overall reliability coefficients.
After empirically establishing the reliability of these two sets of items measuring the two types of
political support , we formed two additive indices. The instrumental support index consists of the
eight items as identified above, which offers a collective profile of respondents' evaluation of
governmental effectiveness in different policy areas ( see Table 1). For each item. respondents were
asked to 'grade' governmental performance based on the grading scheme commonly used in China's
schools (a 5-point scale, raging from 1 through 5, where '1' stands for failure and '5' stands for
excellence). Table 1 shows the distribution of each item of the instrumental support index. The eight
items were then combined to form the final additive index of instrumental support , ranging from 8
(indicating very ineffective governmental performance) to 40 (indicating very effective governmental
performance}. Cases that included two or more missing values for any of the eight items were
eliminated from the additive index. The average score for this index was found to be 21.9 with a
standard deviation of 5.2 (see Table 1). This value is slightly below the midpoint of the scale (24)
which indicates a 'so so' evaluation of governmental performance.
This 'so so' evaluation confirms observations by other scholars who suggest some degree of
dissatisfaction with the current government's effectiveness in key policy areas.[35] In particular, our
respondents registered the lowest evaluations of governmental performance in two policies areas,
'controlling inflation' and 'minimizing the gap between rich and poor' (see Table 1). These policy
areas have all been considered to be most troublesome and persistent policy problems faced by the
Dengist regime since the late 1980s.[36] This finding also coincides with the result of an opinion
survey conducted by the PORI in Beijing in 1994, in which most respondents ranked inflation and the
gap between rich and poor as China's worst problems in need of an immediate governmental
solution.[37]
The affective support index consists of the six items as defined above, which offers a collective
profile of respondents' evaluation of the system legitimacy (see Table 2). Respondents were asked to
rate each of the six items on a 4-point scale where '1' indicates respondents' strong disagreement with
the item statement, and '4' indicates their strong agreement with the statement. The distribution of
each item of the affective support index is shown in Table 2. These six items were then combined to
form the final additive index of affective support , ranging from 6 (indicating the lowest level of
affective support ) to 24 (indicating the highest level of affective support ). Cases that included 2 or
more missing values for any of the six items were eliminated from this index. The average score for
this index was found to be 19.5 with a standard deviation of 2.6 (see Table 2). This value is above the
midpoint of the scale (15), which indicates that the respondents offered quite strong affective support
for the current regime. This finding corresponds to the results of an early survey in which a majority
of the respondents felt 'proud of the Chinese socialist state', and 'satisfied with the CCP's ultimate
goal'.[38]
This moderately high level of affective support may be linked to two factors. First, the CCP enjoys
'legitimacy by default'. Potential rivals to the CCP power have been discouraged or even repressed.
Therefore, as a China scholar pointed out, to many Chinese people, there does not seem to be any
viable political forces as alternatives to the current regime in that country.[39] Second, a majority of
the people may accept the 'stability first' argument advocated by the CCP. Using references to the
breakdown of socio-political order in many former Soviet republics and Eastern European countries
after the fall of communist regimes, the CCP has made relentless efforts to stress political stability as
a prerequisite for economic growth.[40] The post-Mao leadership has exploited the Chinese people's
fear of chaos (luan). This fear has resulted from more than a century of socio-political upheavals,
revolutions, and instabilities that brought about unspeakable suffering and loss of lives. The chaotic
Cultural Revolution for instance, is still very fresh in many people's minds. In fact, this sentiment was
evident in our own survey. When asked in which type of society they prefer to live--an orderly
society or a freer society that is prone to disruption--93% of our respondents chose to live in the
former. This finding is consistent with another study which found an acute fear of the consequences
of social chaos.[41] As one China scholar pointed out, the state's emphasis on political stabilization
has led many people 'both old and young, to conclude that China needs an authoritarian regime for
fast and stable economic growth'.[42]
Since the failure of the 1989 Tiananmen Democracy Movement, this kind of public sentiment has
also encouraged the revival of the so-called 'new authoritarianism' (xing quanwei zhuyi) which
blatantly advocates that only the centralized state led by a strong leadership (the CCP) is the best fit
for the Chinese society.[43] Before any other independent and powerful political forces emerge, most
Chinese people will still see the current authoritarian political regime led by the CCP as the only
hope for maintaining the social tranquillity, given their deeply-rooted cultural preference for reliance
on a central moral and political authority.[44] It is not unexpected, therefore, that about 97% of our
respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that they had an 'obligation to support [their] current
political system' (see Table 2).
The relationship between instrumental and affective support
To assess the relationship between instrumental support and affective support , we examined the
correlation between these indices. Based on the theoretical typology of political stability presented
earlier and our assessment of China's current political climate, we hypothesized a positive, moderate
correlation between our two additive indices of political support . As Table 3 shows, our results
confirm this expectation (r = 0.351). Respondents' evaluations of affective support and instrumental
support are indeed related, albeit not strongly. In this case relatively high levels of affective support
coincide with mediocre instrumental support . This finding implies a condition of political stability in
China today. That is, citizens consider the regime in general as legitimate, while they register some
concerns over the govemment's performance in certain key policy areas.
Although we have established the existence of a relationship between affective support and
instrumental support , an important question remains. Namely, does this relationship persist across
citizens who represent differing genders, ages, education levels, incomes, and places of residence?
Numerous scholars of post-Communist political systems in Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet
republics[45] as well as post-Mao China , suggest that individual political attitudes may be
influenced by these demographic factors. For example, some China scholars have demonstrated that
age has a significant impact on individuals' attitudes toward the political system and public policy.
Here it is assumed that the youth tend to be more 'critical' of government in general, and 'cynical'
toward Communist ideology than the older members of the society.[46] These scholars also argue
that gender may influence individuals' views on politics, since 'gender role' and its accompanying
social status have often been determined by the 'dominant ideology' and influenced by the
government policy.[47] As for the role of education, some students of Chinese politics suggest that
'the reservoir of confidence in the government among lesseducated Chinese may have helped the
authoritarian regime to survive'.[48] Place of residence is considered to be an important factor in
Chinese politics as rural residents are thought to be more supportive of the authoritarian regime than
those living in urban areas.[49] According to other studies of China's politics, income level is also
found to influence one's perception of governmental performance particularly in the areas of inflation
control, provisions of medical care, public housing and adequate pensions.[50] In sum, these various
studies suggest that key demographic factors may influence individuals' political attitudes. And these
demographic factors may further impact the relationship between citizens' evaluations of
governmental effectiveness (instrumental support ) and system legitimacy (affective support ).
To assess the potential impact of these key demographic factors upon the relationship between
affective support and instrumental support , we examined the correlation between our two political
support indices after controlling for the influence of respondents' age, education, income, gender, and
place of residence. The partial correlation coefficients, presented in Table 3, indicate the influence of
these demographic factors. Here we see that the original bi-variate correlation between affective
support and instrumental support persists after controlling for age, income, education level, gender
and place of residence both individually and collectively. Apparently these key demographic factors
exert little meaningful influence on the relationship between instrumental support and affective
support .[51] This finding converges with that of another cross-national study of political support ,
[52] which demonstrated weak impacts of similar demographic factors on the relationship between
the two types of political support . This means that the durability of this relationship extends beyond
the influence of demographic factors. In China , while demographic factors may in fact influence
respondents' evaluation of particular items captured in our indices and some other government
policies identified in the early studies, they appear not to influence, in any meaningful way, the
overall relationship of instrumental support and affective support .
Conclusion
Our survey sample analysis of public opinion and political attitudes in China today reveals several
important findings. First, support for China's current political regime can be measured by two
distinct dimensions of both affective support and instrumental support . Second, we find relatively
high levels of affective support accompanied by slightly lower levels of instrumental support .
Contrary to the conventional, more pessimistic predictions that suggest a fragile and unstable polity,
this finding shows that the CCP leadership as the prevailing regime in China continues to enjoy
political legitimacy, and hence is able to maintain the 'stability of the society'. Third, we find a
positive, moderately strong correlation between respondents' levels of affective support and
instrumental support , whereby citizens indicate some concern over the government's effectiveness
while considering the regime as indeed legitimate. Fourth, we find that the relationship between the
theoretically critical components of political support , namely affective support and instrumental
support , persist across key demographic lines. It appears that the CCP regime is legitimized by a
majority of our respondents in spite of demographic divisions and differences.
Our findings from this survey analysis have several important implications for the stability of the
post-Deng regime in the near future as well as the current incumbent government. Based upon
citizens' perceptions, China's current regime can survive the potentially turbulent transition to the
post-Deng era, given that its policy performance remains constant or better. The perceived
moderately high level of political legitimacy may provide 'a reservoir of diffuse support upon which
the system can draw when its stability would otherwise be threatened by dissatisfaction with
ineffective [governmental] performance'.[53] In China's case, the perceived level of affective support
(legitimacy) may be partially immune from the ineffectiveness of governmental performance in such
areas as 'controlling inflation' and 'minimizing the gap between rich and poor', at least in the short
term. This may indeed allow the current and post-Deng regimes to buy the critical time necessary to
accumulate political credibility. On the other hand, because the legitimacy is 'partially immune' from
spontaneous change in the evaluation of policy performance, the incumbent government cannot
substantially upgrade the current level of its legitimacy by solely relying on policy improvement in a
short period of time. Rather, in order to gain higher level of legitimacy, the regime must make
extraordinary and continuous efforts--not only in policy performance but in the socialization of the
regime's values--in the long run.
While this study presents important findings and their implications for China's political stability, it
provides only a snapshot of levels of political support and possibility of political stability in that
country today. And this study is limited to one point in time and local sample. It is hoped, however,
that future studies will provide critical replications of our study using longitudinal data and national
samples, along similar theoretical lines. Findings from these sorts of studies may provide more
complete understanding of political support and regime stability in China now and into the future.
[1] There is a theoretically and empirically significant distinction between totalitarianism and
authoritarianism as two different non-democratic orders. The former is characterized by a single
monolithic/effective party organization and a strong/unchallengeable official ideology, while the
latter is identified with a single leader or small group of leaders, weak or no party organization, and
fading or no official ideology. Thus, it has been argued that authoritarianism tends to be less effective
than totalitarianism in maintaining the stability of society. For a more complete discussion on the
distinction between authoritarianism and totalitarianism, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave:
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991 ),
pp. 12-13; Juan J. Linz, 'Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes', in Fred 1. Greenstein and Nelson W.
Polsby, eds, Macropolitical Theory, Vol. 3 of Handbook of Political Science (Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 175-190; and Roy C. Macridis and Steven L. Burg. Introduction to
Comparative Politics.' Regimes and Change (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), ohs 6-7.
For in depth discussion on the transition from totalitarianism to authoritarianism since the Cultural
Revolution in China , among others, see Jie Chen and Peng Deng, China Since the Cultural
Revolution: From Totalitarianism to Authoritarianism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995).
[2] See, for example, Jack Goldstone, 'The coming Chinese collapse', Foreign Policy 99, (1995), pp.
43-48.
[3] See Lucian Pye, 'China : erratic state, frustrated society', Foreign Affairs 69, (1990), pp. 65-74.
[4] See Stephen M. Young, 'Post-Tiananmen Chinese politics and the prospects for democratization',
Asian Survey 35, (1995), pp. 652-687.
[5] Avery Goldstein, 'Trends in the study of political elites and institutions in the PRC', The China
Quarterly 139, (1994), p. 714.
[6] See Tony Saich, 'The search for civil society and democracy in China ', Current History: The
People's Republic of China 93, (1994), pp. 260-272; David Shambaugh, 'Losing control: the erosion
of state authority in China ', Current History: The People's Republic of China 92, (1993), pp. 253-
259; Goldstone, 'The coming Chinese collapse'.
[7] Gordon White, Riding the Tiger: The Politics of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 12.
[8] Lucian W. Pye, China : An Introduction, 4th edn (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), p.
371.
[9] See Joe C. B. Leung, 'The political economy of unemployment and unemployment insurance in
the People's Republic of China ', International Social Work 38, (1995), pp. 139-149; Jie Chen and
Peng Deng, China Since the Cultural Revolution: From Totalitarianism to Authoritarianism
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), chs 3-4.
[10] For example, a report by the Agency France Press Report even predicted that 'In years, at the
soonest a few and at the latest between ten and twenty, the country will move from economic
collapse to political break-up, ending with its disintegration'. See John Fitzgerald, 'Reports of my
death have been greatly exaggerated', in David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds. China
Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regisrealism (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 22.
[11] Roy C. Macridis and Steven L. Burg, Introduction to Comparative Politics: Regimes and Change
(New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991 ), pp. 8-12.
[12] See David Easton, 'An Approach to the analysis of political systems', Worm Politics 9, (1957),
pp. 383-400; David Easton, A System's Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wily, 1965); David
Easton, 'A reassessment of the concept of political support Britistsh Journal of Political Science 5,
(1975), pp. 435-457: Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Some social requisites of democracy: economic
development and political legitimacy', American Political Science Review 53, 11959), pp. 69-105;
Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five
Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Edward N. Muller and Thomas O. Jukam, 'On
the meaning of political support ', American Political Science Review 77, 11977), pp. 1561-1595;
Edward N. Muller and Carol J. Williams,' Dynamics of political support -alienation', Comparative
Political Studies 13, 11980), pp. 33-59; Edward N. Muller, Thomas O. Jukam and Mitchell A.
Seligson, 'Diffuse political support and antisystem political behavior: a comparative analysis',
American Journal of Political Science 26, 11982), pp. 240-264; Steven L. Burg and Michael L.
Berbaum, 'Community, integration, and stability in multinational Yugoslavia', American Political
Science Review 83, 11989), pp. 535-554: and Steven E. Finkel, Edward N. Muller and Mitchell
Seligson, 'Economic crisis, incumbent performance and regime support : a comparison of
longitudinal data from West Germany and Costa Rica', British Journal of Political Science 19,
(1989), pp, 329-351.
[13] Macridis and Burg, Introduction to Comparative Politics, p :8.
[14] Muller, Jukam and Seligson, p. 241.
[15] Muller and Jukam, pp. 1565-1573.
[16] See, for example, Arthur H. Miller, 'In search of regime legitimacy', in Arthur H. Miller,
William M. Reisinger and Vicki L. Hesli, eds, Public Opinion and Regime Change (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1993), pp. 95-123; Mitchell A. Seligson and Edward N. Muller, 'Democratic
stability and economic crisis: Costa Rica, 1978-1983', International Studies Quarterly 31, 11991), pp.
301-326; Easton (1065): Lipset (1959).
[17] Macridis and Burg, pp. 9-10.
[18] Easton, 'A reassessment', p. 437.
[19] See Lipset, 'Some social requisites of democracy'.
[20] See Muller and Jukam, 'On the meaning of political support '; Muller and Williams, 'Dynamics
of political support -alienation'; Muller, Jukam and Seligson, Diffuse political support '; and Burg
and Berbaum, 'Community'.
[21] Macridis and Burg, p. el.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Muller and Jukam, 'On the meaning', p. 1563.
[24] See Lipset, 'Some social requisites of democracy.
[25] See Muller and Jukam. 'On the meaning': Muller, Jukam and Seligson, 'Diffuse political support
'; Burg and Berbaum, 'Community'.
[26] Guoming Yu and Xiayang Liu, Zhongguo Minvi Yanjiu [Research of Public Opinion in China ]
(Beijing, China : People's University Press, 1994), p. 15.
[27] See ibid.
[28] See Melanie Manion, 'Survey research in the study of contemporary China : learning from local
samples', The China Quarterly 139, (1994), pp. 742-765.
[29] For examples of local survey, see ibid.
[30] See Andrew J. Nathan and Tianjian Shi, 'Cultural requisites for democracy in China : findings
from a survey', Daedalus 122, (1993), pp. 95-123.
[31] Seven urban districts and rural counties were randomly chosen after the first stage of sampling.
Five Juweihui (residential neighborhoods) or cunming weiyuanhui (villages) were randomly chosen
after the 'second stage of sampling. The third stage of random sampling produced a sample of 20
households from each of the five residential neighborhoods or villages of the seven urban districts or
rural counties. One individual was chosen randomly from each household as the interviewee at the
final stage of sampling. In comparison of our sample and the 1990 Beijing census by the government,
the sampling error of this survey is less than 2% for gender and less than 3% for age.
[32] See Gary M. Bennett, China : Facts & Figures. Annual Handbook (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic
International Press, 1995).
[33] For example, even some western journalists were surprised with the fact that when interviewed
by the media, average Chinese people could express their opinions contradictory to official
propaganda without much fear. See 'Many don't want to see a fight between mainland and Taiwan',
Shijie Ribao [World Journal], (15 March 1996).
[34] See Muller, Jukam and Seligson, 'Diffuse political support ', pp. 336-337 and 346-347; and
Muller and Jukam, 'On the meaning of political support ', pp. 1565 1567
[35] See Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China : From Revolution through Reform (New York: W.
W. Norton & Company, 1995): Chen and Deng, China Since the Cultural Revolution; Jie Chen, 'The
impact of reform on the party and ideology in Chin;,'. tjournal of Contemporary China 9(19955), pp.
23-34; Leung, 'The political economy'.
[36] See Lieberthal, Governing China , pp. 269-273: Chen and Deng, China Since the Cultural
Revolution, pp. 113-118.
[37] Yu and Liu, pp. 85-87.
[38] Yongnian Zheng, 'Development and democracy: are they compatible in China ?', Political
Science Quarterly 109, (1994), p. 244; Alfred L. Chan and Paul Nesbitt-Larking, 'Critical citizenship
and civil society in contemporary China ', Canadian Journal of Political Science 28, (1995 ), pp. 293-
309,
[39] Yang Zhong, 'Legitimacy crisis and legitimization in China '. Journal of Contemporary, Asia 26,
(1996), pp. 201-220.
[40] See ibid.
[41] Lijun Qiao and Tianze Chen, China Cannot Afford Chaos (Beijing, China : Chinese Party
School Press, 1994), pp. iii-v.
[42] Zheng, 'Development and democracy', p. 235.
[43] See Ma Shu Yun, 'The rise and fall of neo-authoritarianism in China ', China Information 5,
(1991), pp. 1-19; Perry Link, Evening Chats in Beijing: Probing China's Predicament (New York: W.
W. Norton, 1992); Barry Soutman, 'Sirens of the strongman: neo-authoritarianism in recent Chinese
political theory', The China Quarterly 129, (1992), pp. 72-102; and Richard Baum, Burying Mao:
Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 238-
239.
[44] For a detailed discussion on the Chinese political culture, see Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of
Chinese Politics (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1992); and Tang
Tsou, 'Back from the brink of revolutionary--"feudal" totalitarianism', in Victor Nee and David
Mozingo. eds, State and Society in Contemporary China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1083)
[45] See Ada Finifter and Ellen Michiewicz, 'Redefining the political system of the USSR: mass
support for political change', American Political Science Review 86, (1992), pp. 857-874; Raymond
Duch, 'Tolerating economic reform: popular support for transition to free market in the former Soviet
Union', American Political Science Review 87, (1993), pp. 580-608; Richard Rose and William
Mishler, 'Mass reaction to regime change in Eastern Europe: polarization or leaders and laggards',
British Journal of Political Science 24, (1994), pp. 159-181; David Mason, 'Attitudes towards the
market and political participation in the postcommunist states', Slavic Review 54, (1995), pp. 385-
406; Arthur H. Miller. William Reisinger and Vicki Hesli, 'Understanding political change in post-
Soviet societies: a further commentary on Finifter and Mickiewicz', American Political Science
Review 90, (1996), pp. 135-166; Ada Finifter, 'Attitudes toward individual responsibility and
political reform in former Soviet Union', American Political Science Review 90, (1996), pp. 138-
152.
[46] Chan and Nesbitt-Larking, 'Critical citizenship and civil society'; and Stanley Rosen, 'Students
and the state in China : the crisis in ideology and organization', in Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, ed.,
State and Society in China : The Consequences of Reform (Bolder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 167-
191.
[47] Jean Lock, 'The effect of ideology in gender role definition: China as a case study', Journal of
Asian and African Studies 24, (1989), pp. 228-238: and Wen-Lang Li, 'Changing status of women in
the PRC', in Shao-chuan Leng, ed., Changes in China : Party, State, and Society (New York:
University Press of America, 1989), pp. 201-223.
[48] Nathan and Shi, 'Cultural requisites', p. 111
[49] See Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1994), p. 2; Mark Selden, 'The social origins and limits of the democracy
movement', in Roger V. Des Forges, Luo Ning and Wu Yen-bo, eds, Chinese Democracy and the
Crisis of 1989: Chinese and American Reflections (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1993), p. 125: and Andrew Nathan, China's Crisis.' Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for
Democracy (New york:New York: Columbia University Pres 1990), pp. 199-120.
[50] Yu and Liu, Research of Public Opinion, pp. 42-77.
[51] In addition to assessing the impact of respondents' age, education, income, gender, and place of
residence on the relationship between affective and instrumental support , we also examined the
impact of these factors on these two types of support . Separate multiple regressions were run using
age, education, income, gender, and place of residence as predictors of both affective and
instrumental support . The multiple regressions revealed very small correlations between the set of
chosen predictors and the two types of support (R(2)= 0.05-0.07). Here again it appears that none of
the key demographic factors explored vary with either affective or instrumental support .
[52] Finkel, Muller and Seligson. 'Economic crisis, incumbent performance and regime support ', p.
345.
[53] Easton A System's Analysis, pp. 273-274.
Table 1
Distribution of instrumental
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Very
poor Poor So so Good
% % % %
Instrumental variables (N) (N) (N) (N)
1. Controlling inflation 11.4 37.1 38.7 9.5
(77) (251) (262) (64)
2. Providing job security 5.7 26.9 53.8 10.2
(38) (179) (358) (68)
3. Minimizing the gap between
rich and poor 16.7 44.0 28.7 6.3
(112) (296) (193) (42)
4. Improving housing conditions
for all people 8.8 30.0 42.6 13.7
(59) (201) (286) (92)
5. Maintaining order in society 8.7 29.4 40.0 13.6
(59) (199) (271) (92)
6. Providing adequate medical
care for all people 5.8 25.0 45.1 18.3
(39) (169) (305) (124)
7. Providing welfare services
to the needy 3.8 18.8 48.9 20.7
(25) (124) (323) (137)
8. Combating pollution 11.1 35.8 31.6 14.2
(75) (243) (214) (96)
(5)
Very
good Total
% % Mean Standard
Instrumental variables (N) (N) score deviation
1. Controlling inflation 3.4 100 2.564 0.931
(23) (677)
2. Providing job security 3.5 100 2.788 0.833
(23) (666)
3. Minimizing the gap between
rich and poor 4.3 100 2.375 0.976
(29) (672)
4. Improving housing conditions
for all people 4.9 100 2.760 0.964
(33) (671)
5. Maintaining order in society 8.3 100 2.833 1.041
(56) (677)
6. Providing adequate medical
care for all people 5.8 100 2.933 0.944
(39) (676)
7. Providing welfare services
to the needy 7.9 100 3.101 0.923
(52) (661)
8. Combating pollution 7.4 100 2.709 1.075
(50) (678)
Index of instrumental 21.9 5.22
(623)
Table 2
Distribution of affective
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Strongly Strongly
disagree Disagree Agree agree
% % % %
Affective variables (N) (N) (N) (N)
1. I am proud to live under
the current
(socialist) system 0.9 3.7 41.6 53.8
(6) (25) (281) (363)
2. I feel an obligation to
our current
system 0.0 2.5 35.3 62.2
(0) (17) (238) (420)
3. I respect the
institutions in today 1.3 5.5 48.3 44.9
(9) (37) (325) (302)
4. I think the basic rights of
citizens are (relatively well)
protected by the Chinese
system 1.9 1.4 62.8 23.9
(13) (77) (425) (162)
5. (In general), I think the
courts in guarantee
a fair trial 3.6 14.2 66.0 16.2
(24) (95) (443) (109)
6. I believe that my personal
values are the same as those
(advocated by the government)
of our system 1.8 18.2 61.0 19.0
(12) (122) (408) (127)
Total
% Mean Standard
Affective variables (N) score deviation
1. I am proud to live under
the current
(socialist) system 100 3.483 0.615
(675)
2. I feel an obligation to
our current
system 100 3.597 0.540
(675)
3. I respect the
institutions in today
100 3.367 0.650
(673)
4. I think the basic rights of
citizens are (relatively well)
protected by the Chinese
system 100 3.087 0.650
(677)
5. (In general), I think the
courts in guarantee
a fair trial 100 2.949 0.667
(671)
6. I believe that my personal
values are the same as those
(advocated by the government)
of our system 100 2.972 0.666
(669)
Index of Affective 19.6 2.59
(660)
Table 3
Partial correlation coefficients: affective and
instrumental ; controlling for age, gender,
income, education, and place of residence
Variables Correlation coefficients
Affective
and instrumental
r = 0.351*
Controlling for: r = Mean SD
Age 0.354* 43.8 14.3
Gender 0.351* 1.50 0.50
Income 0.342* 584.5 368.8
Education 0.351* 2.51 0.87
Place of residence 0.345* 1.30 0.45
All of the above 0.340*
*p < 0.001
DIAGRAM: Figure 1. Propositions about the relationships between affective support and instrumental
support .
Authors thank David Alperin, Jihong Zhao, and anonymous referees for their critical and insightful
comments on early versions of this article.
By JIE CHEN, YANG ZHONG, JAN HILLARD AND JOHN SCHEB*
*Jie Chen and Jan Hillard teach in the Department of Science at University of Wisconsin, River
Falls. Yang Zhong and John Scheb teach in the Department of Science at University of Tennessee,
Knoxville. The opinion survey reported and analyzed in this article was supported by faculty research
grants from the University of Wisconsin, River Falls and the University of Tennessee, Knoxville.