political change in russia

8/3/2019 Political Change in Russia

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Alisa Lockwood, May 2010 1

'The patient is more dead than alive'1: Prospects for

political change in Russia

Introduction

A crisis...is needed to persuade members of the elite that the system isthreatening their own survival. Regrettably, no examples exist in Russian

history of preventive reform before a crisis hits.2

Although its full significance is still obscured by a settling veil of wildfire smoke, it is

becoming clear that the summer of 2010 is likely to mark a watershed in Russian politics. The

cracks in the 'power vertical' are beginning to show; the contradictions in the system appear

to be reaching a point of no return. This was the year that Medvedev publicly admitted he

had made no progress in the fight against corruption indeed, that his edicts were openly

ignored by the bureaucracy. This was the year that prominent media personality Leonid

Parfenov, holding his notes with shaking hands, made an acceptance speech at the Vlad

Listyev awards in which he criticised the lack of press freedom in Russia. This was the year

that the fires burning out of control around Moscow made it impossible to ignore the degree

of corruption and incompetency of the authorities, the year that the second Khodorkovsky

show-trial highlighted the malleability of the justice system, and the devastating terrorist

attack at Domodedovo Airport reaffirmed the governments failure to resolve problems in

the Caucasus. This was the year that saw a flare-up of civil society activism by the Khimki

Forest defenders, the Article 31 demonstrators, the nationalists on Manezhnaya Square, by

sports fishermen and automobile owners.

The commentary coming out of academia, think tanks, journalism, and online communities

increasingly centres on the approach of a transformative moment in Russian politics. It is

thus timely to investigate whether such a transformation is possible, and what form it is

likely to take towards greater democracy, or greater repression. In order to do so, we must

1 , variation on a popular saying.

2Shevtsova, Lilia.Medvedev's Potemkin modernization, Current History, October 2010 p 280


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start by looking into the past, at the roots of the current social, political and economic

conditions.

Soviet legacy

Attitudinal and structural constraints of the Soviet past

One of Russia's key socio-political problems is the fact that there was no distinct

rupture from the Soviet past. There was radical economic reform, certainly; but there was no

corresponding revolution of values, no attempt to address the harmful effects of the Soviet

system and the mentality it engendered, thus the system could not help but perpetuate

itself. To expect a generation brought up under communism to suddenly become democrats

and capitalists was optimistic at best. As Yana Gorokhovskaia concludes in her study of the

Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression and the 1992 trial of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "the lack of critical reflection has allowed for

continuity with the authoritarian past to subvert the establishment of democracy."3

With

most Russians lacking the free-market nous to participate in economic liberalisation, in the

1990s, wealth and assets were captured by those actors with the greatest resources:

criminals and state officials. Since it benefited both of these groups to collaborate in order to

maintain their gains, the roots of corruption were firmly entrenched from the outset. The

public was left with the feeling that it had been robbed by the elite, but importantly, in

collusion with the West, laying the foundation for mistrust of Western reform models. About

60% of Russians still regret the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, a figure that has been

more or less stable since 2006.4

This is perhaps not surprising, considering that Russia's experience of the USSR's collapse

was qualitatively different from that of other Soviet states. Whereas for former satellites,

independence was positively construed as liberation from a colonial yoke and assertion of

national identity, for Russia it represented a loss of imperial power and international

prestige. After the further humiliations and disappointments of the 1990s, the desire for a

3

Gorokhovskaia, Yana. From Soviet dictatorship to Russian dermo-cratia: Toward a theory of politicaljustice, Thesis, Carleton University, 2009.4

http://www.levada.ru/press/2011041103.html


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political order that restored national pride was understandable. Richard D Anderson carries

this logic a step further to assert an interesting thesis. Anderson takes the stance, unusual

for the academic literature on Russian democracy, that Putin and United Russia are elected

because they actually reflect most closely Russian socio-political conditions and the will ofthe electorate. Russian parties lack convincing ideologies that can attract supporters because

communism 'flattened' the political sphere in Russia and meant that subsequent parties

could not appeal to traditional leftist or rightist elements. At the same time, Russia's vast

territory and poor communications infrastructure increase the costs of recruiting voters.

Because of problems with ideology and recruitment, Russian political parties should be

small, elitist and susceptible to erosion of loyalties. Where recruiting citizens into parties is

not optimal behavior, parties composed of officials will dominate.5

Colton and Hale reach a similar conclusion in their in-depth study of the composition of the

Putin vote. While not denying that fraud and manipulation play a role, their analysis finds

that voting [for Putin] follows many patterns common to democracies...we should not lose

sight of the fact that Putin has also quite consistently garnered ballots through his

agreement with voters on some of the biggest issues of the day and [the qualities] he has

managed to project.6 The authors find that both Putin voters and the population as a whole

place Putin to the right of the political spectrum, and that he is overwhelmingly associated

with the continuation of market reforms when juxtaposed against a return to socialism.

Putin has also gained support from people who are moderately pro-Western. Thus, it is not

that the Soviet legacy yields an electorate which votes for a strong leader, but that

attitudinal and structural holdovers impose boundaries on political expression and increase

tolerance for single-party rule and anti-democratic behaviours by those in power.

Between mistrust and dependence

Another toxic holdover from Soviet times is the fact that the bureaucracy has

continued to be viewed as an instrument of personal advancement rather than service to

the nation. As Lilia Shevtsova of the Moscow Carnegie Center observes, the Russian system

5Anderson, Richard D., When the center can hold: The primacy of politics in shaping Russian

democracy, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, No 43 (2010), p 4056 Colton, Timothy J. and Henry E. Hale. The Putin vote: Presidential electorates in a hybrid regime,

Slavic Review, vo. 68, No. 3 (Fall, 2009), p 502


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today has only two ideas: national egotism and personal enrichment.7 When anti-

corruption campaigner Alexey Navalny referred to United Russia as a 'party of crooks and

thieves', 96.6% of 40,000 respondents to an online poll agreed with him.8 A more broadly

cross-cutting Levada-Center poll in April 2011 found the proportion agreeing with thisstatement to be much lower, but still appreciable at 30%, against 45% disagreeing.9

Moreover, a March 2011 poll showed that nearly 60% of Russians believe the main concerns

of the people currently in power were personal gain and the desire to hold onto their

position, while only 3% felt they cared about the well-being of ordinary citizens.10 This is

actually a slight improvement over 2006, suggesting that President Medvedev's anti-

corruption agenda, regardless of its achievements, has had an impact on public opinion.

However, the preponderant view remains that state officials' own privileges, success and

career came before honest service to the public; only 22% consider them to be competent

specialists.

The Soviet mentality is manifest not only in the mistrust of the ruling elite, but also in a high

degree of dependence upon it, and a certain resigned acceptance of the state's

omnipotence. This results in the government being attributed proportionately greater

responsibility for economic success hence Putin's popularity in the post-2000 boom period

but likewise, inversely, for economic failure. Until recently, Putin has managed to

successfully embody a Soviet-esque reassuring paternalistic aspect of power, promoting

himself, as Sinikukka Saari observes, as a strong leader who reintroduced order, discipline,

and national pride.11 However, despite the accusations of autocracy levied at him by the

West, Putin has been a more permissive parent than his Soviet predecessors. Ivan Krastev

points out that Putin's authoritarianism is a 'vegetarian' one. While political repression

exists...it is fair to say that most Russians today are freer than in any other period of their

history.12 The social contract in Russia comes down to the following tacit agreement

7 Shevtsova, Lilia.Medvedev's Potemkin modernization, Current History(October 2010), p 280

8Ioffe, Julia. "Net Impact: One man's cyber-crusade against Russian corruption", The New Yorker, 4

April 2011. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/04/04/110404fa_fact_ioffe?currentPage=all9

http://www.levada.ru/press/2011050501.html10

http://www.levada.ru/press/2011040605.html11

Saari, Sinikukka. European democracy promotion in Russia before and after the 'colour' revolutions,

Democratization, Vol 16, No 4, August 2009 (p 740)12 Krastev, Ivan. Paradoxes of the new authoritarianism, Journal of Democracy, Vol 22, No 2 (April

2011), p 8.


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between rulers and ruled: 'We'll leave you alone if you leave us alone'. This works as long as

rulers deliver on expectations of economic and social progress, affirm Russia's place in the

world, and are perceived as effective. However, as both corruption and anti-democratic

transformations have become more blatant, while economic development stagnates, thetension between Medvedev's pro-modernisation, anti-corruption rhetoric, and reality, is not

going unnoticed by the public.

The end of the beginning: How the Kremlin set itself up to fail

Oligarchic capitalism and the stillborn project of Russian democracy

Although debate over Boris Yeltsin's legacy is polarized between those who blame

him for letting former Soviet states break away from Russia and selling off domestic industry

on the cheap, and those who admire him as great leader and reformer, the literature

broadly agrees that his commitment to democratization during the first years of his

presidency was genuine and remarkable. Equally however, the oligarch-backed elections of

1996, guided by the fear of a Communist return to power, were the first step towards the

suppression of Russia's democratic impulse: the basic features of the undemocratic

system...already began developing during the Yeltsin era...the crucial feature of this system

is that power is legitimized through elections that are 'managed' beforehand.13 In any case,

as David Rivera and others suggest, Yeltsin faced an almost impossible task in attempting to

create a stable foundation for Russian democracy, in the face of needing to perform several

Herculean tasks at once privatisation, democratisation, national unity, institution-

building).14 The absence of such a foundation (due to the failures of the 1996 election),

together with the disillusionment of the population (due to the 1998 financial crisis),

contributed to the ease of Putin's subsequent centralisation process.

This process accelerated towards the end of Putin's second term. The Rose Revolution in

Georgia took place in the same year (2003) as Duma elections in which liberal parties were

forced out, and which were widely criticised by observers while the Orange Revolution in

13

Saari p 739.14Rivera, David W. and Sharon Rivera. Yeltsin, Putin, and Clinton: Presidential leadership and Russian

democratization in comparative perspective, Perspectivevs on Politics, Vol 7, No 3 (September 2009), p 604


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Ukraine coincided with the 2004 presidential elections in Russia. The Kremlin explicitly and

implicitly blamed Western powers for backing these events. Putin even hinted that the

Beslan hostage-taking was instigated by Western forces. This rhetoric helped to justify

subsequent anti-democratic reforms that consolidated the power of the elite surroundingPutin. Electoral laws were introduced to increase the minimum vote threshold for a party to

be represented in the Duma from 5% to 7%; single-mandate seats were eliminated. Other

measures included harsher NGO regulation (Federal Law No. 18-FZ), changes to the

Federation Council, and to methods of selecting regional governors and mayors.

The elite which sought to preserve its position through these reforms, was not significantly

different from the one that had existed under Yeltsin. Although Putin swept the most

influential pro-Yeltsin oligarchs (Berezovsky, Gusinsky) out of the way in the early years of

his presidency, he cultivated a symbiotic relationship with others (Abramovich, Deripaska,

Mamut, Aven). Adam Bartnicki agrees that in the nineties, public, political and economic life

was dominated by oligarchs and interest groups related to them, which has seriously limited

the political subjectivity of the society...Putin's election to the presidency put a stop to the

oligarchy's spontaneous growth but not to the oligarchy itself.15 Oligarchic capitalism and

the clan-type power structure it engenders, in which the trinity of the state, big business and

organised crime form a mutually reinforcing bloc, is perhaps the main obstacle to

democratisation in Russia. Indeed, as a number of sources close to the Kremlin confirm,

there is no 'power vertical'. Rather, there are competing clans centred around the various

ministries and security agencies. In this context, Putin's role not quite as glamorous as that

of the absolutist autocrat has been to balance these interests and to ensure that none of

them grows too strong. It is this arrangement which engenders the other problems that are

normally pinpointed as the failings of Russian democracy: the weakness of institutions and

the rule of law, the unreliability of the legal system, the corruption of the bureaucracy.

Medvedev is the 'front man' who gives the system a liberal veneer, without fundamentally

challenging it.

15 Bartnicki, Adam A. Simulated democracy and the free market in Russia, Baltic Journal of Law and

Politics, Vol 2, No 1 (2010), p 4.


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Economic and political control: The sine qua non of the Putin regime

Several conditions must be met in order for the current elite to perpetuate itself. The

state must retain control of the financial and energy sectors, because this enables the

Kremlin to keep the oligarchs in check by holding the purse-strings, and also provides therevenue streams to maintain the loyalty of key power brokers. However, such an

arrangement is obviously irreconcilable with any purported 'modernisation', indeed, the

monopoly of power by the state over the economy has been one of the main reasons why

Russia returns to authoritarian modes of government (consider for instance the demise of

the New Economic Policy and the rise of Stalin). Afanasyev calls this a neopatrimonial

regime ofprivate-state patronage within which the private and the state elements do not

confront one another but merge together. Patron-client practices, connections, and

networks supplement, reformat, and replace public institutions.16 This is evident, for

instance, from the appointment of the children of Kremlin heavyweights on the boards of

state companies: Boris Kovalchuk at Inter RAO UES, Alexander Ivanov and Peter Fradkov at

Vneshekonombank, Sergei Ivanov at Sogaz, Denis Bortnikov at VTB, Dmitry Patrushev at

Rosselkhozbank.17 The son of St Petersburg Governor Valentina Matvienko, Sergei, went

from VP of Bank St Petersburg to general director at VTB-Development, while at the same

time owning a private company with the wonderfully apt name ZAO Imperia (Empire). Under

such circumstances, Medvedev's symbolic act of removing top state officials from board

membership, rings distinctly hollow.

Second, the state must strike a balance between control and appeasement of alternative

centres of influence in the regions, particularly in the North Caucasus. On the one hand, the

Kremlin has the prerogative to appoint regional governors while on the other hand,

Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov to all intents and purposes extorts money from the

Kremlin, in the form of huge budget transfers, knowing that his position is buttressed by the

loyalty of his private army, the Kadyrovtsy, who were nominally reorganised into Interior

Ministry battalions in 2006.

16 Afanasyev, Mikhail. The quality of the state Russia's chief problem, Russian Politics and Law, Vol

47, No 4 (July-August 2009) p 6317 : , Vedomosti(13 May 2011)

http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/260152/nashe_blagorodie
http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/260152/nashe_blagorodiehttp://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/260152/nashe_blagorodiehttp://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/260152/nashe_blagorodie


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Thirdly, hostile political forces must be kept on a short leash, such that real opposition does

not materialise. Various commentators agree that the elite knows it will not survive under

conditions of political competition: the rhetoric of modernization so far has not changed

the principles on which the Russian system is built. The Kremlin's new tactics, instead ofexpanding freedoms for society, only try to co-opt civil society and the opposition and

discredit any viable alternative to established power.18 In fact, these tactics are not even

very new: as Luke March shows, the practise of 'managed opposition' the creation by the

Kremlin of a left-leaning parastatal parties to absorb competition has been present since

1995 and Rybkin's Nash dom-Rossiia, through to Rodina and Just Russia. Limited

competition acts as an antidote to the centralized and bureaucratic tendencies of a single

ruling party...while co-opting opposition elites into regime-sanctioned activity and

marginalizing extra-systemic opposition. Overall, it bolsters regime stability by reducing

(particularly electoral) unpredictability.19 March suggests that Putin's sojourn in Dresden

enabled him to witness firsthand the 'Dresden party system' which involved the ruling party

heading a 'popular front' of non-communist parties.

The use of the term 'popular front' takes on a special resonance now that Putin, in the lead-

up to Duma elections, has created yet another Kremlin chimera, the National Front. The

movement is meant to renew the cadre composition of United Russia, to open the way for

new ideas, to attract civil society the youth, womens, veterans organizations, business

circles, trade unions and all people who are not indifferent to solving the most important

questions of the nations development,20 and in theory allowing independent candidates,

unaffiliated with United Russia, to stand. The population, however, will not be duped: 29%

of Russians surveyed by Levada-Centre believed that the National Front had been created to

guarantee United Russia more votes in the elections, while a further 28% felt that its

purpose was to shore up United Russia's declining popularity. When presented with the

question, against whom this project was directed, the preponderant answer was against no

18 Shevtsova, Lilia.Medvedev's Potemkin modernization, Current History(October 2010) p 276; see also

Graeme Robertson op cit.19

March, Luke. Managing opposition in a hybrid regime: Just Russia and parastatal opposition, Slavic

Review, Vol 68 No 3 (Fall 2009) p 507.20 : , United Russia official

website, 6 May 2011 (http://www.er.ru/er/rubr.shtml?111552)
http://www.er.ru/er/rubr.shtml?111552http://www.er.ru/er/rubr.shtml?111552http://www.er.ru/er/rubr.shtml?111552http://www.er.ru/er/rubr.shtml?111552


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one, it is yet another stillborn bureaucratic creation (26%) while the response against the

extra-systemic opposition came a close second (21%).21

Simultaneously with the management of opposition, the passivity of the electorate needs to

be assured through selective intimidation of agents of change, such as NGOs and journalists;

through the discreditation of the West; and the co-optation of youth (e.g. via Nashior its

predecessor, Iduschiie vmeste). Analysing the manipulation of civil society under Putin,

Graeme Robertson concurs that Brezhnev-style pre-emptive detention and harassment are

the two primary weapons in the regime's arsenal against social movements. He writes that

Putin's second term saw a major redesign of state-society relations, as the regime sought to

more closely integrate civil society groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) into

the state. The result is a strengthening of groups with a non-political or pro-state orientation

and the isolation of more adversarial groups22

Over-promising and under-performing

This system would be perfectly self-reinforcing , as the rather

colourful businessman Dmitry Potapenko intoned, to the chagrin of a panel on corruption in

Moscow in May 2011

23

if not for one fatal flaw. Under Putin's breed of electoralauthoritarianism, elections are a double-edged sword: they are a source of both regime

weakness (instability and unpredictability) and strength (legitimacy, mobilization), and this

precise balance constantly changes.24 Elections mean that incumbents must be particularly

vigilant about maintaining unity within the elite, and importantly, must still seek a certain

degree of public approval, to defend against being unseated by a rival faction exploiting

popular discontent. The Putin presidency hitched its legitimacy to the rising star of oil-fuelled

economic growth and political stability; as well, to a lesser extent, as nationalism and

Russia's international Great Power status. Then Medvedev shifted the discourse towards the

modernisation of the economy and the fight against corruption.

21http://www.levada.ru/press/2011051901.html

22Robertson, Graeme B. Protest, civil society, and regime in Putin's Russia, Slavic Review, Vol 68, No 3

(Fall 2009) p 53123

Center 'Memorial', Moscow.24 March, Luke et al. Responses: Political science, democracy and authoritarianism, Slavic Review,Vol

68, No 3 (Fall 2009), p 554


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Over the past year, these sources of legitimacy have begun to work against the regime.

Despite grand projects and promises, the state apparatus is becoming blatantly inadequate

to changing social needs and to the challenges of national development.25 Putin's much-

vaunted stability is increasingly resembling stagnation: even as oil prices rise to record highs,Russians' standard of living is falling,26 and levels of capital flight are soaring, reaching $30

billion in the first quarter of 2011.27

Most Russians now believe that the 1999 war in

Chechnya should not have been fought, that the federal authorities have little control over

the republic, and that civilian deaths in anti-terrorist operations in Chechnya are

unjustified.28

In a survey asking Russians to evaluate Putin and Medvedev's strengths, the

proportion of respondents finding Putin to be honest and non-corrupt to be fell from 24% in

2008 to 8% in February 2011.29 Indeed, on almost all indicators, the perception of Putin's

strengths returned to levels reported in 2000, when he was a virtually unknown figure. Over

the past two years, Russians' confidence in his erudition, professionalism, intellect and

capability fell 20%, while belief in his charm and consistency on political questions fell 17%.

Tellingly, both Putin and Medvedev's worst quality was , alltalk and no action reaching 16% for Putin (from 7% in 2008) and 21% for Medvedev (from

5%).

Why isn't our society significantly improving? Why is this possible inour country? Why are the laws ineffective, while corruption

flourishes, budget funds are stolen, there are bombings, skinhead

riots, the innocent are convicted, federal programmes are unfulfilled,

GLONASS satellites fall out of the sky, the death rate rises, tens of

thousands are killed in car accidents, inflation makes savings

worthless, millions of people are out of work, millions live below the

poverty line, billions of roubles are sent abroad, juvenile and

recidivist crime rates are increasing, prison conditions are inhuman,

roads collapse, palaces are built on nature reserves...and hundreds of

similar questions. Who will answer? We came to terms with these

circumstances in the 1990s, when the country lived on credit, theSoviet legacy left many problems, there were no normal laws, no

money for salaries or pensions. But why does all this remain today,

25

26 Russians' standard of living fell 3.4% YoY in March 2011. Goble, Paul. Despite rising oil prices,

Russians' standard of living is falling, Eurasia Review, 27 April 2011 (http://www.eurasiareview.com/despite-rising-oil-prices-russians-standard-of-living-is-falling-analysis-27042011/)27

Some estimate that this figure could be just half of the total being moved out in fraudulent or informal

ways. Englund, Will. Russian investors parking billions abroad despite oil revenue, strengthening ruble,Washington Post, 27 May 2011 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russian-investors-parking-billions-

abroad-despite-oil-revenue-strengthening-ruble/2011/05/27/AG3rqxCH_story.html)28http://www.levada.ru/press/2010033002.html

http://www.eurasiareview.com/despite-rising-oil-prices-russians-standard-of-living-is-falling-analysis-27042011/http://www.eurasiareview.com/despite-rising-oil-prices-russians-standard-of-living-is-falling-analysis-27042011/http://www.eurasiareview.com/despite-rising-oil-prices-russians-standard-of-living-is-falling-analysis-27042011/http://www.eurasiareview.com/despite-rising-oil-prices-russians-standard-of-living-is-falling-analysis-27042011/http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russian-investors-parking-billions-abroad-despite-oil-revenue-strengthening-ruble/2011/05/27/AG3rqxCH_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russian-investors-parking-billions-abroad-despite-oil-revenue-strengthening-ruble/2011/05/27/AG3rqxCH_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russian-investors-parking-billions-abroad-despite-oil-revenue-strengthening-ruble/2011/05/27/AG3rqxCH_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russian-investors-parking-billions-abroad-despite-oil-revenue-strengthening-ruble/2011/05/27/AG3rqxCH_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russian-investors-parking-billions-abroad-despite-oil-revenue-strengthening-ruble/2011/05/27/AG3rqxCH_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russian-investors-parking-billions-abroad-despite-oil-revenue-strengthening-ruble/2011/05/27/AG3rqxCH_story.htmlhttp://www.eurasiareview.com/despite-rising-oil-prices-russians-standard-of-living-is-falling-analysis-27042011/http://www.eurasiareview.com/despite-rising-oil-prices-russians-standard-of-living-is-falling-analysis-27042011/


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why is our life not significantly improved, why does the human being,

his life, health, rights and freedoms not concern the bureaucrat..?30

Sergei Levin, Lawyer and former Legal VP at OAO Vostok

Moreover, despite Medvedev's anti-corruption campaign, Russia has been slipping

backwards on most indicators. Probably the most detailed source of analysis of the success

or otherwise of anti-corruption measures introduced in 2008-2009, is the GRECO report for

2010.31

The report finds that since 2007, Russia has implemented only 9 of GRECO's initial 26

recommendations in full (including anti-corruption strategy, improving law enforcement

coordination and recruitment of prosecutors, ethics training, guidelines for tax authorities).

As President Medvedev himself has admitted,32 anti-corruption measures have not yielded

the expected outcomes, and corruption has in fact worsened. This is witnessed by Russia's

declining rating on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (154th

in 2010

from 146th), numerous media reports on corrupt officials,33 the near-doubling in size of the

average bribe in 2010, the inefficacy of measures such as the declaration of officials'

incomes, and so on. For example, as the most recent income declarations showed in March

2011, the wives of officials make suspiciously large amounts of money.34 Transparency

International Russia postulates that the increase in bribe costs since Medvedev launched his

campaign partly reflects the increasing risk of bribe-taking, and partly state officials'

motivation to take as much as possible while they still can.

Government procurement is a particularly problematic area: some 3 trillion roubles (3% of

GDP) are lost from the state budget annually, sometimes even siphoned from fictitious

projects created specifically to line the pockets of officials. The courts system also continues

to suffer from corruption, bias and undue state influence. The Bertelsmann Foundation's

30 Facebook note, May 2011. www.facebook.com/notes/-/---

---/14389994234851431

Group of States Against Corruption,

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/GrecoRC1&2(2010)2_RussianFederation_EN

.pdf32

Dmitry Medvedev admits Russia has made no progress in fighting corruption, The Telegraph, 14 July2010 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7891236/Dmitry-Medvedev-admits-

Russia-has-made-no-progress-in-fighting-corruption.html)33

See e.g. Top Russian police official arrested on $46 mln fraud charges, RIAN, 21 January 2011(http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110121/162237576.html )34

http://www.bfm.ru/articles/2011/04/11/kremlevskie-zheny-zarabatyvajut-za-dvoih.html#text
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7891236/Dmitry-Medvedev-admits-Russia-has-made-no-progress-in-fighting-corruption.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7891236/Dmitry-Medvedev-admits-Russia-has-made-no-progress-in-fighting-corruption.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7891236/Dmitry-Medvedev-admits-Russia-has-made-no-progress-in-fighting-corruption.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7891236/Dmitry-Medvedev-admits-Russia-has-made-no-progress-in-fighting-corruption.htmlhttp://en.rian.ru/russia/20110121/162237576.htmlhttp://en.rian.ru/russia/20110121/162237576.htmlhttp://en.rian.ru/russia/20110121/162237576.htmlhttp://en.rian.ru/russia/20110121/162237576.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7891236/Dmitry-Medvedev-admits-Russia-has-made-no-progress-in-fighting-corruption.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7891236/Dmitry-Medvedev-admits-Russia-has-made-no-progress-in-fighting-corruption.html


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2010 Transformation Index report for Russia finds that "official accusations of corruption are

still perceived as public relations campaigns inspired by political power struggles. The judicial

prosecution of corruption charges has improved neither in quantitative nor in qualitative

terms. Accordingly, there are no indications that corruption in Russia has been reduced inrecent years".35

Thus far there has been a willingness to tolerate corruption in the name of stability, but this

pay-off cannot be maintained indefinitely. Corruption is impeding Russia's economic

development both in terms of modernisation and investment, and in the absence of high oil

prices, there is a risk of systemic collapse. Corruption seriously affects the ability of the state

to function effectively and implement policy. When Medvedev noted the lack of

improvement in corrupt practises in 2010, he also complained that officials were simply not

following his orders, referring to the 'sabotage' of key national projects. This shows that

progress is very unlikely to come from the top down in the near term. It is thus most likely

that corruption will continue to be the dry rot at the heart of the federal power structure

during the next presidency, increasing the probability of the system eventually imploding

under the weight of its own inefficacy.

'Tightening the screws'

The growing dissonance between rhetoric and reality is leading Russians such as

lawyer Sergei Levin (inset, above) to become disillusioned and cynical, not only towards

malfunctioning state institutions which has always been more or less the case36 but also

towards Putin, Medvedev and United Russia. In this context, faced with internal disorder and

external loss of support, the regime has one of two options: towards change, or towards

greater ossification. The words of one contributor to an online forum discussing the

narrowing of civil liberties in Russia express a common sentiment:

The population of our country is in some measure not the same one that existed

in 2008. People's consciousness is changing, they are more likely to evaluate [the

political situation] with lucidity. I remember such a 'blossoming of consciousness'

twice in my lifetime: the first at the end of the 1980s, which ended with a change

of political regime, and the second in 1993, which ended with the siege of the

35

http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/159.0.html?&L=136 See e.g. Gerritts, Andre W.M. Exploring democracy in the Russian Federation: political regime, public

opinion and international assistance, Contemporary Politics, Vol 16, No 1 (March 2010) p 47


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overlooks a key fact: the rapidly growing deligitimisation of the government and declining

trust towards Medvedev, Putin and United Russia. National and regional surveys have shown

that since July 2010, the political consciousness of the Russian population has undergone

radical and unexpected changes. In the first place, between May 2009 and March 2011, thelevel of trust in Medvedev, Putin, and United Russia fell appreciably, which the authors

interpret as a sign that the political system as a whole is perceived as less legitimate:

May 2009 March 2010 March 2011 Change

. Trust rating (%)

Medvedev 58 58 49 - 9

Putin 71 65 56 - 15

United Russia (vote rating) 56 50 45 - 11

B. Mistrust rating (%)Medvedev 12 13 18 + 6

Putin 9 12 17 + 8

KPRF+LDPR+SR (vote

rating)17 22 24 + 7

C. Balance (trust minus mistrust)

Medvedev 46 45 31 - 15

Putin 62 53 39 - 23

United Russia/

KPRF+LDPR+SR

(correlation of vote

ratings)

39 28 21 - 18

Secondly, the report presents a series of quotes from focus groups run by the CSR in various

cities. Notably, the phrase "the people are being taken for fools" ( )

is heard with increasing frequency. Moreover,

The view that the situation in the country is improving, prevalent over the past 10years, has all but disappeared from discussion;

Personal trust towards the 'tandem', and the fear of a 'third candidate' wreakingundesirable political havoc, have both significantly decreased over the last 8 months;

Medvedev is perceived as a puppet who is not worth voting for; Putin's role in creating stability is still acknowledged, but this stability is now seen as

maintained at the cost of a corrupt system that does not serve the people's interests;

http://www.csr.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=307%3A2011-03-28-16-38-

10&catid=52%3A2010-05-03-17-49-10&Itemid=219&lang=ru
http://www.csr.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=307%3A2011-03-28-16-38-10&catid=52%3A2010-05-03-17-49-10&Itemid=219&lang=ruhttp://www.csr.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=307%3A2011-03-28-16-38-10&catid=52%3A2010-05-03-17-49-10&Itemid=219&lang=ruhttp://www.csr.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=307%3A2011-03-28-16-38-10&catid=52%3A2010-05-03-17-49-10&Itemid=219&lang=ruhttp://www.csr.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=307%3A2011-03-28-16-38-10&catid=52%3A2010-05-03-17-49-10&Itemid=219&lang=ruhttp://www.csr.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=307%3A2011-03-28-16-38-10&catid=52%3A2010-05-03-17-49-10&Itemid=219&lang=ru


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Negative judgments about Putin have appeared, having been virtually nonexistentuntil recently; and

Much of Putin's loyal electorate would cease to support him if he returns to thepresidency, as he would be perceived as betraying the 'honest game' (chestnaya igra)attributed to the tandem, and acting solely out of a desire for power.

The legitimacy of either candidate is thus likely to suffer further if they should run in the

presidential elections. According to the authors, if the downward trend in approval ratings

continues, and no measures are undertaken to "reset trust" ( ) in the

political system, the resultant political crisis could exceed that of the late 1990s and

approach the situation at the end of the 1980s. Their vision of the potential mechanisms andaggravating factors of the crisis is summarised below.

Mechanisms of the crisis

1) Reverse conformism. The conformism of political

views in Russia can serve the opposition as much as it

currently serves those in power.

2) Urban opposition. Opposition support will reach

critical mass in Moscow and other large cities by theautumn, and this sentiment will spread thanks to the

dominance of the media by urban centres.

3) Loss of moral and ideological leadership. Policies

and platforms proposed by existing authorities (such

as United Russia), no matter how objectively well-

founded they might be, will be treated with

scepticism and cynicism simply because they emanate

from de-legitimised institutions.

4) Parliamentary and presidential elections. Elections

do not serve as a mode of dialogue between thegovernment and the people, enabling the restoration

of trust; rather, due to their illegitimacy, they may

become one of the means by which the crisis will

spread.

5) Proliferation of protest movements. Given low

support for the authorities, even the smallest

grievance can turn into protest action, and such

protests will be almost impossible to contain use offorce will only de-legitimise the authorities further.

6) Degradation of economic policy. An unpopular

government will be unable to implement effective

Risks precipitating the crisis

1) Weakness of formal opposition, leading to the

creation of spontaneous opposition movements,

which however are unlikely to be well organised,

competent, or constructive, due to the constraints of

the current system, thus failing to offer an alternative.

2) Growth of political extremism, including

nationalism.

3) 'Ukrainisation' of political life, whereby the political

opposition attempts to gain support via economic

populism, harmful to the economy, leading to

frequent economic and political crises. However,

populism is less likely to succeed in Russia due to

lower poverty levels and a developed urban middle

class.

4) Destabilisation of the North Caucasus. Any acuteescalation of the situation in the North Caucasus will

deal a potentially fatal blow to the existing political

system.

5) Prolongation of the crisis. The political crisis may

become drawn out over ten years or more, as has

been the case with past crises in the Soviet space,

creating a 'lost decade' for Russia's economic

development.


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economic policy, leading to macroeconomic

instability, inflation, capital flight, et al.

The report concludes, similarly to the 12th expert group which recommends gradual de-

centralisation and democratisation, that the only way to avoid a crisis is by transforming the

political system. The goal of such transformation primarily via greater plurality and

narrower presidential powers should be to restore trust, in order to guarantee socio-

economic reforms and sustainable economic development in the coming 5-10 years.

Public opinion and poor performance

Although the CSR's forecasts should be viewed with a critical eye they are to some

extent alarmist they are also based on measurably real trends. United Russia's

performance in the March 2011 regional elections was much worse than in the 2007

parliamentary elections. Despite winning 70% of seats in 12 regional legislatures, it only

received a majority of votes in three of these, and its best showing was in Dagestan, where

vote-counting is notoriously non-transparent. Opposition parties LDPR and the Communists

made vote share gains of 173% and 185% respectively compared to the previous elections,

in contrast to United Russia's effective loss of 15%.39

Moreover, Russians are sceptical with regards to the upcoming elections. In answer to the

question "Do the forthcoming Duma elections interest you", only 7% answered 'definitely

yes', 33% agreed somewhat, 37% disagreed somewhat, and 18% strongly disagreed. Some

57% of Russians felt that the elections would actually be a fight between bureaucratic clans

for access to the state budget rather than true national elections; 54% believed that the

authorities would decide who won seats in the Duma, and 50% believed the elections would

take place by 'dirty' methods. The percentage of individuals who expected that the Duma

elections would lead to changes that will improve life in Russia were split roughly equally,

with 'no' exceeding 'yes' by 8%. When asked To what degree do regular elections make the

government execute the will of ordinary people? 25% said they have no effect

39http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/dmitri-oreshkin/putin%E2%80%99s-national-front-lifebelt-

for-sinking-regime
http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/dmitri-oreshkin/putin%E2%80%99s-national-front-lifebelt-for-sinking-regimehttp://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/dmitri-oreshkin/putin%E2%80%99s-national-front-lifebelt-for-sinking-regimehttp://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/dmitri-oreshkin/putin%E2%80%99s-national-front-lifebelt-for-sinking-regimehttp://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/dmitri-oreshkin/putin%E2%80%99s-national-front-lifebelt-for-sinking-regimehttp://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/dmitri-oreshkin/putin%E2%80%99s-national-front-lifebelt-for-sinking-regimehttp://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/dmitri-oreshkin/putin%E2%80%99s-national-front-lifebelt-for-sinking-regime


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whatsoever, 31% that they had an insignificant impact, 32% to some degree, and only 8%

significantly although these figures have remained roughly stable since 2000.40

Perhaps the most telling indicator of a profound fatigue and disillusionment with thepolitical situation is the fact that during the past year, the proportion of Russians who would

rather vote neither for Putin nor Medvedev has risen to 25%, nearly the same percentage as

would vote for Putin himself.

Who would you like to see as a candidate in the 2012 presidential elections?

June 2010 Sept 2010 Dec 2010 March 2011

Dmitry Medvedev 14 14 17 18

Vladimir Putin 30 31 29 27

Both 21 19 19 16

Neither 19 19 18 25

No response 16 16 17 14

Source:http://www.levada.ru/press/2011041304.html

Such sentiments are both echoed and encouraged by non-state-owned media, in an

increasingly impudent way. The business magazine Kommersant-Vlast'advertises itself in

Moscow with big billboards reading "Vlast': Power you can trust" implying that the other

power, at the Kremlin, cannot be trusted. The new publication Moskovskiye Novosti

launched a promotional campaign under the slogan "We tell it like it is" (

). The advertising posters displayed pointed quotations such as Thank

God I always loved my country in its own interests, and not my own, or A large empire, like

a large pie, is most easily gnawed around the edges. They were promptly taken down by

the authorities as was an enormous image hung by opposition activists on a bridge across

from the Kremlin, which showed Khodorkovsky and Putin (behind bars) with the message

Time to switch places.

Even in the state-sanctioned realm, there have been signs of dissent, as when TV host Leonid

Parfenov made his famous subversive speech to a room full of the stars of state-run

television and representatives of the Kremlin: Behind every broadcast you can clearly see

http://www.levada.ru/press/2011041304.htmlhttp://www.levada.ru/press/2011041304.htmlhttp://www.levada.ru/press/2011041304.htmlhttp://www.levada.ru/press/2011041304.html


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the goals and strategies of the government. For a federal channel reporter, top authorities

are not people who make news; they are his boss' bosses. But then a reporter becomes

not a journalist, but an official.41 People seem to be discovering that they can speak their

minds, that in doing so they overcome their fears, and that these fears become lesssignificant. A 2011 Levada-Centre study of the status of civil society organisations in Russia,

based on interviews with their leaders, while largely pessimistic, ended on a positive note:

that the view among the new generation was that things should not be left as they are, that

there is in a sense a moral imperative to act.42 The internet is also allowing people who

might otherwise remain passive, to participate in political activism anonymously. A good

example of this is anti-corruption campaigner Alexey Navalny's RosPil website43, where the

public can report suspicious government tenders. RosPil claims to have already uncovered

1.6 billion RUR worth of shady deals since the site was set up this year.

Potential for unrest

That said, there are still factors which would appear to militate against political

change coming from below. One of these is Russians' stereotypical apathy and reluctance to

go out into the streets. In surveys regarding the likelihood of unrest in local communities,

70-80% of individuals consistently say they are unlikely to participate in protests or strikes.

On the other hand, the perceived probability of political protest is at its highest since 2006

(23% believing it quite likely), and the evaluation of the probability of protests against falling

living standards and defending rights is also highest (28%), though over 60% still consider

protests unlikely. Among residents of Moscow and other large cities this assessment of the

probability of protests rises to 37%, yet Muscovites are the least likely to participate (88%

against), as are people with higher education (77%). The demographics most likely to

participate are youth (24-39), and residents of small towns and villages.44

However, these responses are not set in stone. Russians have been apathetic in part because

the chaos of the 1990s made them run in terror towards stability at any cost, but under the

41 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1547888

42 Volkov, Denis. , Levada-Center(February 2011). This view was

also expressed by Elena Panfilova of Transparency International at the above-noted panel on corruption at

Memorial.43www.rospil.info

http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1547888http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1547888http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1547888


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right circumstances, they are entirely capable of seeking change through direct action.

Highlighting the thousands that attended Dissenters' Marches in 2007, and the 2,900 other

protests that took place that year with 800,000 attendees in total, Graeme Robertson

concludes that the resilience of political protest despite the Putin regime's efforts is oftenoverlooked.45 If the collective action websitewww.ikd.ruis to be believed, between 2,000-

6,000 people participate in various protests across Russia each month, on such diverse issues

as environmentalism, civil rights, consumer rights, social welfare, small business, and others.

Some authors suggest that Russians also equivocate between democracy and public order:

not only does their support for economic 'rights' and public order far exceed their backing

of civil rights...many Russians believe in the ideal of democracy and still back their

authoritarian government.46 This would imply that there is a rather high threshold to be

overcome before the Russian population is willing to disturb order and stability in favour of

democratisation. However, Russians' preference for order may be overestimated; it is worth

noting that surveys show political preferences durably favouring social-democratic values

over authoritarianism.

Political persuasion April 2005 April 2011

Communist (it is most important to defend class interests,

state ownership of the means of production)

17 18

Socialist and social-democratic (the state should guarantee

social welfare under market economy conditions)

39 40

Agrarian (stimulating agricultural development is of primary

importance)

21 19

Russian nationalist-patriotic (the interests of the Russian

people are primordial)

14 12

Liberal (in favour of reinforcing private property rights and

development of the market economy)

12 12

"Strong hand" regime (all power should be in the hands of a

strong political leader)

22 18

Other/No response 14 13

Source:http://www.levada.ru/press/2011042801.html

Another factor which would seem to operate in favour of the current regime is that Russians

perceive their material circumstances as improving since Putin came to power. The

proportion of respondents evaluating their family's material situation as 'average' has risen

45Robertson, op cit, p 537.

46Gerritts, op cit, p 41.
http://www.idk.ru/http://www.idk.ru/http://www.idk.ru/http://www.levada.ru/press/2011042801.htmlhttp://www.levada.ru/press/2011042801.htmlhttp://www.levada.ru/press/2011042801.htmlhttp://www.levada.ru/press/2011042801.htmlhttp://www.idk.ru/


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consistently every year, from 44% in 2000 to 60% in 2011, while the number evaluating it as

very bad has fallen consistently, from 51% in 2000, to 27% in 2011. 47 Why would people

want to protest against a system from which they have benefited? Yet the same poll that

asked about material well-being, found that respondents' mood has been worsening. Askedto evaluate their mood in the past few days, 52% said that they were in a normal state of

mind (against 61% in 2010, 57% in 2008, 46% in 2000), while 25% were stressed (23% in

2010, 22% in 2008, 35% in 2000), and just 7% were in excellent spirits (10% in 2010, 12%

2008, 5% in 2000). Some 57% agreed that life is hard, but can be tolerated (53% in 2010,

51% in 2000); 21% felt that things were not too bad (29% in 2010, 11% in 2000), and 18%

that it was impossible to tolerate our calamitous situation any longer (from a low of 12% in

2008, 32% in 2000). Moreover, the percentage viewing Russia's economic situation as bad or

very bad reached 37% (34% in 2010, 24% in 2008, from 73% in 2000).

This presents us with a curious paradox. Perceived living standards are rising, while

contentment and approval ratings are falling. One possible explanation is that an

appreciable number of Russians are attaining a level of middle-classness at which they feel

that the authorities are more of a hindrance than a nuisance that corruption and

stagnation actively detract from their potential to achieve the life they want. Indeed, an

online survey by the Jobs.ru website found that Russians with an income greater than 50,000

RUR per month were least likely to vote for Putin (24%); similarly, only 25% of men would

vote for him, and men were also most likely to favour an opposition candidate. 48 Valeria

Kasmara of the Higher School of Economics explains the results as follows: Men with decent

earnings suffer from elevated expectations which they cannot realise. They are highly

adaptable, confident, and believe they can achieve more. However, in the current situation,

they are forced to remain at a certain level...they are not afraid of change, but their energy

has nowhere to go.49


48

, Finam.info, (20 July 2010)http://www.finam.info/need/news2352100001/default.asp49

Ibid.
http://www.finam.info/need/news2352100001/default.asphttp://www.finam.info/need/news2352100001/default.asphttp://www.finam.info/need/news2352100001/default.asp


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Conclusions

Constitutional Court adviser and director of the Higher School of Economics programme oncorporate entrepreneurship, Vladimir Pastukhov, has written an excellent article titled

Perestroika Second edition, in which he postulates that Russia has been in a state of

more or less permanent revolution and counterrevolution over the last century, if not

longer.50 His view is that the Kremlin's 'modernisation' project is a revolution analogous to

Gorbachev's perestroika, following the violent counterrevolution of the 1990s and early

2000s. Perestroika was a failure, and Russia has returned essentially to the point at which it

started in the 1980s: Gosplan is replaced by the FSB and MVD, the 'political economy of

socialism' by the 'police-economy of capitalism'. History remained unsatisfied...it had not

achieved its goals. The question of Russia's historical future remains open, and therefore a

new perestroika can at any moment float upwards in the order of the day.51 Political

conditions are lagging ever further behind Russians' social and economic aspirations, and

this contradiction must almost inevitably be redressed. An appreciable segment of the elite,

not directly affiliated with security structures, has, Pastukhov believes, tired of sitting on a

powder-keg in a system whose primary rule is the lack of any rules. Even the silovikiprefer to

keep their money in countries governed by the rule of law. The new reality can no longer be

described in the terms of the 'police-economy'. The main thing is that this contradiction has

arisen. The rest is a matter of time...on this objectively gloomy background, a hidden

mobilisation of elites is taking place. Not one of these components separately, nor all of

them together, seems capable of change. But add a catalyst, and everything will change

instantly.52

This catalyst could be a drop in oil prices, an economic crisis, or a wave of mass protest, but

the deciding factor is likely to be the will of those at the top. Melville, after conducting

several joint studies regarding the circumstances conducing to democracy in Russia,

concludes that actors are more important than structural constraints : political actors are in

50Pastukhkov, V.B. " - : ,

Polis, No2 (2011)51Ibid. p 23

52Ibid. p 26


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principle capable of overcoming 'structural' limitations and constructing democratic

institutions and practise in 'unfavourable' conditions53 Gerritts, for his part, feels that

significant competition could either develop from competition between regime-party

formations...semi-oppositional parties...or, more probably, emerge from divisions among orwithin regime-parties, mobilized by different segments of the ruling elite.54

The course of Russian history is notoriously difficult to predict, and many an academic

reputation has been lost in the attempt. There are numerous complexities at play, the

majority of them taking place behind closed doors. If Putin is re-elected, the system may, for

a time, continue in the direction of greater authoritarianism, a 'tightening of the screws',

parasitic bureaucracy and an oligarchy that siphons Russia's wealth abroad but all this

means is that the correction will ultimately be more dramatic. Alternatively, the elite may

heed warnings and choose the path of gradual reform under Medvedev or similar, but this

too will involve a period of instability as the whole system is corrupt from top to bottom, and

any partial reforms carry the risk of challenge and collapse. The fact remains that social and

political conditions are tilting towards change, that a generational shift is on the horizon, and

that Russia stands today at the crossroads between self-destruction and rebirth. As

Pastukhov writes, " -- ".

53

Melville, A. Yu. / : ?, (19 June2010), p 7654

Gerritts, op cit, p 36

political change in russia

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