political and policy basis - session 9 - the federal organization and policy

8/2/2019 Political and Policy Basis - Session 9 - The Federal Organization and Policy

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Session No. 9

Course: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency ManagementSession: The Federal Organization and Policy Time: 2 Hours

Objectives:By the conclusion of this session, students should be able to:

9.1 Explain the evolution of Federal emergencymanagement in the United States highlighting thecreation of FEMA.

9.2 Explain how the initial functions that were transferred

to FEMA and the original objectives placed on theagency led to the origin and creation of a number of political issues that continue today.

9.3 List the specific missions of FEMA and describe thesignificance and political implications of FEMA’scurrent policy of emphasizing mitigation measures.

9.4 Describe the organizational structure of FEMA andidentify some of the key politically appointedleadership positions within FEMA.

9.5 Summarize the implications of FEMA’s incorporationinto the Department of Homeland Security in theyears after the 9/11 terror attacks.

9.6 Furnish an overview of what the Post-HurricaneKatrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2007means to FEMA’s organization and management.

Scope This session canvasses the mission and organization of theU.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency. It describesthe organizational evolution of FEMA and the political issuesaffecting its organization at the outset of the Agency’screation. It examines in general terms FEMA’s coreorganization and functions. This session serves to tie thelaws, the President, and the Congress (as reviewed in the

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previous sessions) to an emergency managementorganizational context. The session also incorporates FEMAand executive branch re-organization first in the months andyears after the 9/11 attacks of 2001, and second re-organization that took place after Hurricane Katrina in 2005

and the Post-Hurricane Katrina Emergency ManagementReform Act of 2007.

ReferencesAssigned student reading:

Miskel, James. Disaster Response and HomelandSecurity. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International,2006. See Chapter 6, “Hurricane Katrina,” pages 91-108.

Sylves, Richard. Disaster Policy and Politics:

Emergency Management and Homeland Security.Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2008. See Chapter 3, pages 65-74.

Requirements The instructor will want to focus on the FEMA organizationand missions as related in the remarks. The instructor maywant students to examine the organization charts posted inthe objectives sections of this session. It provides a broadoverview of FEMA relations with a host of actors.

Remarks The U.S. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY wascreated in 1979 to provide a single point of accountabilityfor all Federal activities related to disaster mitigation andemergency preparedness, response, and recovery. Politicalfactors and policymakers did much to fashion FEMA’soriginal objectives, organizational make-up, and mission.From 1979 to 2003, FEMA operated as an independentfederal agency; meaning that it was not a component of anyFederal department and that its Director was immediatelyaccountable to the President. In 2003, under provisions of

the Homeland Security Act of 2002, FEMA was moved intothe Department of Homeland Security (DHS). To this day,there are disputes about whether or not FEMA’s loss of independent agency status and its incorporation into DHSwere good decisions. Regardless, FEMA’s organizationalexistence and design has always resulted from presidentialexecutive orders and laws enacted by Congress and thePresident. Public policymakers created FEMA in 1979,

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moved it into the Department of Homeland Security in 2003,and re-invigorated the agency in 2007.

Objective 9.1 Explain the evolution of Federal emergencymanagement in the United States highlighting the

creation of FEMA.

EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Session 7, “Disaster Laws,” detailed the evolution of themajor laws that constitute emergency management policy inthe United States. Arguably, modern era Federal emergencymanagement began after enactment of the Federal DisasterRelief Act of 1950. However, that measure did notautomatically set forth a coherent and integrated system for

administering that law and for managing subsequentdisaster laws and policies. Instead, for some thirty years,emergency management programs and policies werefashioned by disparate collections of federal agencies andoffices. This was in part because federal disaster laws andpresidential policies from 1950 to 1979 tolerated orsanctioned a parceling out of pieces of emergencymanagement jurisdiction. Disaster insurance was not judgedto be related to emergency management. Various federalagencies had jurisdiction over disasters caused by varioustypes of disaster agents. Emergency management was a

source of turf battles among departments like Commerce,Defense, Housing and Urban Development, and Transportation. All-hazards emergency management andintegrated emergency management did not catch on asappropriate ways to advance emergency management untilwell into the 1970s.

By dividing and constantly shifting emergency managementadministration among numerous departments and agencies,confusion and duplication of effort often ensued. Disasterpolicy fragmentation at the National level generated many

complaints and criticisms. The lack of leadership andcoordination was further complicated because responsibilityfor disaster relief at the Federal level seemed to bouncefrom one agency to another. For example, disasterassistance and relief activities moved from the Housing andHome Finance Administration in 1951, to the Federal CivilDefense Administration in 1953, to the Office of CivilDefense and Mobilization in 1958 to the Office of Emergency

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Planning (later renamed the Office of EmergencyPreparedness) in 1961. Finally in 1973, disaster relief wasdivided amongst three agencies, the Federal DisasterAssistance Administration, the Defense Civil PreparednessAgency, and the Federal Preparedness Agency. After the

passage of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, a comprehensiveset of public disaster assistance programs was in place,though too many vestiges of emergency management-relevant laws and programs remain diffused within theexecutive branch.

In August of 1977, President Carter asked the reorganizationstaff at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) tomake a comprehensive review of the matter. Thereorganization team concluded that:

“...the present Federal structure for preparingfor, responding to, and recovering from theeffects of major emergencies is in disarray. The study group identified many seriousdeficiencies: low visibility for emergencyplanning; duplication of programs andcontracts at the State and local level;confusion over jurisdiction andresponsibilities; lack of accountability belowthe Presidential level for policymaking andneeded management improvements” [U.S.

Congress, February 1979]

FEMA was established in response to these findings andrecommendations. Federal disaster assistance programswere to be unified and refashioned through ReorganizationPlan No. 3. The plan gave FEMA primary responsibility for:

1. Mobilizing Federal resources;

2. Coordinating Federal efforts with those of State and localgovernments; and

3. Managing the efforts of the public and private sectors indisaster responses.

Objective 9.2 Explain how the initial functions that weretransferred to FEMA and the original objectivesplaced on the agency led to the origin and creationof a number of political issues that continue today.

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Executive Order 12148 (1979), issued by President Carterfollowing the Congressional acceptance of ReorganizationPlan No. 3, delegated most of the authority granted to thePresident under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 to the

Director of FEMA. The following functions were transferredto FEMA:

CIVIL DEFENSE,

certain elements of NATIONAL EMERGENCYPREPAREDNESS FIRE PREVENTION and ASSISTANCE,

DISASTER RELIEF,

FLOOD INSURANCE,

EMERGENCY BROADCAST and WARNING,

EARTHQUAKE HAZARDS REDUCTION

DAM SAFETY.

Some important emergency management functions,however, were not transferred to FEMA, most notably theDISASTER LOAN PROGRAMS operated by the Small BusinessAdministration (SBA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Farmers Home Administration.

The four principal objectives that were identified byPresident Carter in a message accompanyingReorganization Plan No. 3 were the:

1. Establishment of a SINGLE ENTITY (FEMA), headed by anofficial directly responsible to the President, that wouldserve as the sole Federal agency responsible foranticipating, preparing for, and responding to major civilemergencies;

2. Development of an effective CIVIL DEFENSE system,integrated into the programs and operations of non-Federal entities, to improve communications,evacuations, warnings, evacuations, and publiceducation efforts to prepare citizens for a possible

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nuclear attack as well as for natural and accidentaldisasters (an ALL HAZARDS approach);

3. Reliance of Federal agencies to undertake emergencymanagement responsibilities as extensions of their

regular missions and on FEMA to coordinate theseresources;

4. Inclusion of Federal HAZARD MITIGATION activities,linked with State and local activities, for decision-makingabout preparedness and response functions.

Policy made in the late 1970s about FEMA’s responsibilityand organization continues to have ramifications today.First, the establishment of FEMA did not fully consolidate alldisaster and emergency functions and programs residing at

the Federal level. As mentioned, certain functions, such asthe disaster loan programs of the SBA and the USDA, werenot transferred to FEMA. Consequently, some competitionbetween Federal agencies with disaster and emergency jurisdiction continues to this day.

Second, is another political issue, the transfer of CIVILDEFENSE activities to FEMA and how important civil defensewould be within FEMA? If civil defense were to be under theumbrella of the new FEMA, President Carter had to assurethose involved in National security aspects of civil defense

(particularly nuclear attack) that their role and resourceswould not be diminished. In some respects, this nuclearattack, civil defense incorporation rekindled divisionsbetween civil defense (nuclear attack preparedness) anddomestic emergency management operations andpersonnel—a source of friction since the 1950s.

For better or worse, Federal emergency management hasbeen for many years involved with or interwoven with civildefense. This linkage was finally terminated in 1994 after agradual separation of domestic emergency management

from civil defense against nuclear attack. This separationbegan to take place in the 1960s. The U.S. Department of Defense was the institutional home of several Federalemergency management offices before FEMA’sestablishment. The Department of Defense (DOD) continuesto play a limited role in domestic emergencies anddisasters. The DOD also provides significant logisticalsupport in response to foreign disasters.

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Moreover, building the new FEMA with some offices gearedto do National security work and others tailored to addresshome-based disasters and emergencies, each often workingin isolation from the other, did little to advance an ALL-

HAZARD APPROACH to emergency management. State andFederal officials, through bodies like the National Governor’sAssociation, were at the time emphasizing the need to planfor disasters generically, rather than as separate incidenttypes or as unique events.

The formation of FEMA also spotlighted the significance of HAZARD MITIGATION and PREPAREDNESS and gave impetusto a PROACTIVE, rather than a REACTIVE, approach toemergency management. Instead of merely doing disasterrecovery work, emphasis was placed on keeping people out

of hazard-prone, high-risk areas through instruments suchas zoning laws, building codes, and land-use regulations. Ineffect, FEMA was challenged to encourage or induce localofficials and individuals to adopt policies that advanced thecause of disaster mitigation. The agency’s mitigation workopened up a perennial, highly charged conflict betweenFEMA and certain local officials, developers, and citizenswho expressed concern about federal encroachment in localland use authority and/or limitations on development. WhileFederal officials and FEMA attempt to get communities toproactively protect themselves through hazard mitigation

activities, many local officials, developers, and citizens oftentry to circumvent measures they consider restrictive andfinancially burdensome.

Owing to an initiative of President Clinton, from 1994through the end of the second-term Clinton administration,the FEMA director was accorded ex officio cabinet status inthe Clinton White. After President George W. Bush assumedoffice in 2001, this practice was discontinued.

Objective 9.3 List the specific missions of FEMA and describethe significance and political implications of FEMA’scurrent policy of emphasizing mitigation measures.

FEMA MISSIONS

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The following Executive Orders (E.O.) and laws provide boththe statutory foundation for FEMA and have been or aretoday largely responsible for its organization and structure.

• E.O. 12148, Federal Emergency Management

• E.O. 12656, Assignment of Emergency PreparednessResponsibilities

• E.O. 12919, National Defense Industrial ResourcesPreparedness

• National Security Act of 1947

• Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended

•Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and EmergencyAssistance Act of 1988, as amended

• Presidential Decision Directive-39 (On Americanterrorism policy)

• The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000

• The Homeland Security Act of 2002

•

The Post-Hurricane Katrina Emergency ManagementReform Act of 2007.

From 1979 to 2003, FEMA was a rather small independentagency with a full-time workforce of about 2,600. Itpossessed the capability to mobilize personnel from adisaster reserve force in times of emergency. FEMApromotes disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, andrecovery activities through its work with State and localemergency managers. The Agency also advancescomprehensive, all-hazards emergency management

activities.

Table 9.1 DIRECTOR OF FEMA TERMS OF OFFICE

Carter Administration:April 1, 1979-August 1979-------------------------------GordonVickeryActing FEMA Director and United States Fire Administrator

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September 1979-January 1981--------------------------John W.Macy, Jr. FEMA Director, Confirmed by Senate ________________________________________________________

Reagan Administration:February 1981-March 1981------------------------------Bud E.GallagherActing FEMA Director and Director Special Facility Berryville,VA

April-1981------------------------------------------------John C.McConnell Acting FEMA Director and Associate Director forPlans and Preparedness

May 1981-August 1985---------------------------------Louis O.

GuiffridaFEMA Director, Confirmed by Senate

September 1985-October 1985--------------------------Robert H.MorrisActing FEMA Director and Deputy Director

November 1985-June 1989---------------------------Julius W.Becton, Jr.FEMA Director, Confirmed by Senate ________________________________________________________

GHW Bush Administration: July 1989-May 1990---------------------------------------Robert H.MorrisActing FEMA Director and Deputy Director

June 1990-August 1990--------------------------------------Jerry JenningsActing FEMA Director and Deputy Director

September 1990-January 1993-----------------------Wallace E.

StickneyFEMA Director, Confirmed by Senate ________________________________________________________

Clinton Administration:February 1993-March 1993----------------------------William C. TidballActing FEMA Director and Chief of Staff

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April 1993-January 2001-------------------------------------James L.Witt FEMA Director, Confirmed by the Senate ________________________________________________________

GW Bush Administration:February 2001-March 1, 2003------------------------Joseph M.Allbaugh FEMA Director, Confirmed by Senate

April 15, 2003-September 12, 2005-------------------Michael D.BrownUnder Secretary for the Emergency Preparedness andResponse Directorate, Department of Homeland Security

September 12, 2005-January 21, 2009-----------------R. DavidPaulison

DHS Under Secretary for Federal Emergency Management __________________________________________________________ Obama Administration

January 21, 2009-May 12, 2009-------------------------- Nancy L.WardDHS Acting Under Secretary for Federal EmergencyManagement

May 19, 2009 to present---------------------------------------CraigFugate

DHS Under Secretary for Federal Emergency Management ___________________________________________________________

FEMA is headed by a Director appointed by the Presidentand the Agency reports directly to that Office. At thiswriting, FEMA’s Director is Craig Fugate (See Table 9.1). As aresult of his many years working in State and localemergency management, Mr. Fugate was well aware of theAgency’s strengths and weaknesses before PresidentObama appointed him as Director.

FEMA’s specific MISSION GOALS are to:

1. Create an emergency management partnership withother Federal agencies, State and local governments,voluntary organizations, and the private sector to betterserve customers;

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2. Establish, in concert with FEMA’s partners, a Nationalemergency management system that is comprehensive,risk-based, and all-hazards in approach;

3. Make hazard mitigation the foundation of the National

emergency management system;

4. Provide a rapid and effective response to, and recoveryfrom, disaster; and

5. Strengthen State and local emergency management.

As a consequence of its legislated mission, FEMA is taskedwith responding to any accidental, natural, or conflict-induced hazard or threat which causes or may causesubstantial injury or harm to the population or substantial

damage to, or loss of, property. In effect, it embodies anALL-HAZARDS APPROACH to emergency management.

Owing to the magnitude of Hurricane Andrew’sdestructiveness and the positive publicity the United Statesmilitary received for its early deployment to that disaster,some lawmakers proposed assigning to an office of the DODprimary emergency management responsibility—andsimultaneously terminating FEMA. Those proposals wereconsidered and rejected.

By early 1995, Mr. Witt’s vision for FEMA was to strive for a“Partnership for a Safer Future for America.” Thatpartnership was to include the universe of FEMAstakeholders. The vision called for an informed publicdedicated to protecting their families, homes, workplaces,communities, and livelihoods from the impacts of disasters.Builders and developers would construct hazard-resistantstructures located out of harm’s way. Governments andprivate organizations would set forth plans, compilenecessary resources, and rigorously train and exercise for

disaster responses. Communities would prepare and plan forrecovery and reconstruction BEFORE disaster strikes.

Central to Mr. Witt’s vision was an increased emphasisplaced on MITIGATION ACTIVITIES. FEMA had housed acollection of modest mitigation programs prior to Mr. Witt’sregime, but he had made mitigation the foundation of emergency management and the primary goal of the

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Agency. The reasoning was that mitigation activities andstrategies may substantially reduce the impact of disastersand, in some cases, prevent disasters altogether. FEMA nowallocates up to 15 percent of all disaster assistance funds ina declared disaster to State and local long-term mitigation

efforts. FEMA officials have gone on record as saying:

“Mitigation must become a recognizedNational priority. Although mitigation makesgood sense, often it is not a priority forcommunities. Establishing mitigation as aprimary foundation for emergencymanagement will decrease demands forresponse to disasters. Buildings, homes, andinfrastructure that are built better, withstandhazards better. This means less destruction,

less loss of life, less personal and economichardship. This also means a reduction inoutlays for disaster assistance by Federal,State, and local governments for rebuildingcommunities and businesses.” [Gore,September 1993.]

Regardless of the Statement, there is irrefutableevidence that the costs of disasters since 1989 haverisen dramatically. Moreover, “the jury is still out”on whether mitigation will decrease demands for

Federal response to disasters.

Through highlighting mitigation efforts and securing moreprogram resources, FEMA can substantially enhance itscapacity and presence in intergovernmental relations on acontinuous basis, rather than merely after a disaster.Whether such invigorated FEMA mitigation efforts willproduce adequate State and local responses, however, is ahighly charged political issue. Local officials sometimesrationalize that they have little to gain from mitigationefforts if, in the event of a disaster, the State and Federal

Governments will pay for the lion’s share of their localdisaster losses. Moreover, mitigation efforts have tocompete with the far more alluring concerns of economicgrowth and development on the local level. With localofficials, developers, and citizens often viewing mitigationefforts as restrictions on personal freedom and as financiallycostly, mitigation efforts are bound to remain a politically-charged issue.

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Objective 9.4 Describe the organizational structure of FEMAand identify some of the key politicallyappointed leadership positions within FEMA.

FEMA ORGANIZATION

For the most part, FEMA is organized functionally on the fourphases of emergency management: mitigation,preparedness, response and recovery. Specifically, FEMAcomprises five Directorates: MITIGATION; PREPAREDNESS, TRAINING AND EXERCISES; RESPONSE AND RECOVERY;OPERATIONS SUPPORT; and INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYSERVICES. It also includes the U.S. Fire Administration andthe Federal Insurance Administration.

FEMA’s current organizational structure is presented below. The gray boxes represent “staff” positions that assist theAdministrator. The yellow boxes (lighter gray if color copy isnot available) are “line” units of FEMA.

Table 9.2 FEMA Organization Chart

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Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, FEMAOrganization Chart. http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/org_chart.pdf

June 11, 2009.

FEMA is geographically divided into ten standard FederalRegions and each Regional Office of FEMA is directed by apolitically appointed Regional Director. FEMA’s jurisdictioncovers all 50 States and the District of Columbia. Other jurisdictions eligible to request Presidential Declarations of major disaster and emergency are: the trust territories of American Samoa, Guam, and the Virgin Islands; and, thecommonwealths of Northern Mariana Islands and Puerto

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Rico. Under a Compact of Free Association (1995), theFederated States of Micronesia and the Republic of theMarshall Islands now function as independent Nations andmay no longer apply for Presidential Disaster Declarations,as they were allowed to do (and did) from 1953 to 1995.

Also noteworthy is the 1994 decision of the Republic of Palau, which also won Presidential Disaster Declarations inthe past. It agreed, in exchange for a $15 million grant fromthe United States, to end its eligibility to request PresidentialDisaster Declarations. [Kite, July 31, 1997.]

Table 9.3 FEMA Region Operations by State Grouping, withRegion Office Headquarters Cities.

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, FEMARegion Operations. http://www.fema.gov/about/regions/index.shtm

last accessed June 11, 2009.

State officials count on the FEMA Regional Office in theirarea to support on-going Federal-State emergencymanagement projects, and FEMA regional personnel aremade available to help in damage assessment after adisaster. Ordinarily, States and localities are expected toperform a pre-assessment of damage before the State asksFEMA’s Regional Director to undertake with them aPRELIMINARY DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (PDA). PDAs arecomprised of Federal, State, and local officials with adesignated Federal leader. Once all parties come to an

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agreement on the PDA, it is submitted to the FEMA regionaloffice.

Thus, the Regional Offices play a crucial role in Federal andState emergency management relations. In addition to

engaging in routine operations, FEMA Regional Directors,upon receipt of a Governor’s request and upon completionof a damage assessment, prepare a REGIONAL SUMMARYAND, REGIONAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION. Theregional summary contains only factual information whilethe regional analysis and recommendation contains opinionsand recommendations for the President.

FEMA also operates the National Emergency Training Center(NETC), which is composed of the National Fire Academyand the Emergency Management Institute. The former deals

directly and specifically with fire-fighting professionals,including hazardous materials training. The latter servesother emergency personnel through developing, monitoring,and delivering training in all categories of emergency anddisaster threats to communities, including radiologicalemergency training and terrorism.

A political issue which continues to hamper FEMA’sorganizational structure and effectiveness is that of politicalappointees. As mentioned in Session 7, “Legislative PoliticalIssues and Disasters,” the National Academy of Public

Administration (NAPA) and the U.S. General AccountingOffice (GAO) have alleged that FEMA has too many politicalappointees (over 30) for its size. The ten FEMA RegionalDirectors and eight other top FEMA officials are politicallyappointed. However, only FEMA’s Director, AssociateDirector, Directorate heads, Federal InsuranceAdministration Director, and Fire Service Academy leaderrequire Senate confirmation of their appointments. Fiveseparate Senate committees, each with different programinterests, must act to confirm most of these appointees. Theresult is that these appointees may not necessarily owe

their allegiance to the Director of FEMA, but instead tocertain lawmakers, Senate committees, and influentialclientele groups of FEMA. Compounding the problem hasbeen the caustic media reports that FEMA has been apolitical dumping ground for “spoils system” politicalappointees who are unqualified for the duties of theirpositions—a claim made before 1993. (Schneider, 1995, p.163.)

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Objective 9.5 Summarize the implications of FEMA’sincorporation into the Department of Homeland Security in the years after the 9/11 terror

attacks

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 resulted inprofound changes in U.S. public policy. In public policyanalysis language, the attacks represented the ultimatefocusing event (See Birkland, 1997); it impelled thepresident, Congress, and a host of other governmentofficials to craft and enact laws, policies and proceduresaffecting domestic preparedness, response, and“consequence management” for terror attacks. The federalgovernment also responded to the events of 9/11 bycreating the Department of Homeland Security. The

President’s issuance of homeland security directives and theAdministration’s development of new preparedness andcrisis management programs, profoundly reformulated U.S.disaster policy (Tierney 2005). The 9/11/01 terror attacks on the U.S. homeland inducedCongress and the president to enact new laws, establish anew federal department incorporating some 22 agenciesincluding the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA), and to create new administrative arrangements.Major events in U.S. history have often triggered majorchanges in the governmental process (Truman 1951). The

creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) wasone of the largest federal reorganizations since President Truman created the Department of Defense in 1947. DHSincorporated all or part of twenty-two federal agencies, fortydifferent federal entities, and approximately 180,000employees (Tierney 2005).

On March 1, 2003, FEMA’s existence as an independentexecutive branch administrative agency ended. That dayFEMA Director Joseph Allbaugh resigned. Michael Brown wasnamed Acting Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness

and Response (EP&R) within DHS. On April 15, 2003, MichaelBrown was sworn in as Under Secretary for EmergencyPreparedness and Response without Senate confirmation.On August 4, 2003, Brown issued a memorandum to allEP&R staff authorizing the use of the term FEMA and FederalEmergency Management Agency. In this period there weremany who concluded that FEMA as an agency was about todissolve within DHS. Many of its top leaders either resigned

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or were moved to other positions within the newdepartment, positions often quite removed from their old jobs in the old FEMA. At the time, Under Secretary Brownand others perhaps appreciated that the FEMA acronym andold agency name had “brand value” that it might be a

mistake to give up.

The 9/11 disaster, as in many disasters, further centralizedauthority. The president has developed new forms of emergency management authority for his office. Homelandsecurity laws as implemented by DHS have demandedbroad-ranging state and local conformity to federal disasterplanning and response. Owing to the 9/11/01 terror attacks,homeland security and presidential declaration authority areprimarily national security instruments and secondarilyinstruments of conventional emergency management.

Moreover, these changes have significantly increased therange of presidential authority. The fact that major disastersand emergencies of any type are now subsumed under therubric “incidents of national significance” suggests thatemergency management is very much a concern of nationalsecurity. Emergency managers must today work shoulderto shoulder with military authorities in a realm of “civilsecurity” (Haddow and Bullock 2003). Law enforcement hasalso had a very major impact on how homeland security andemergency management is to proceed.

U.S. homeland security policy makers have engaged inmassive government planning efforts aimed fundamentallyat a broad pool of federal, state, and local disasterresponders. Since 9/11/01, the president and federal agencyofficials have largely steered homeland security policy.Congress has provided them some new authority andregular infusions of funding for purposes set forth in law andpolicy. Homeland security policy manifests itself as acolossal intergovernmental, multi-agency, multi-missionenterprise fueled by widely distributed, but often highlyconditional, federal program grants to state and local

governments. Planning in homeland security is more thansimply reorganization or realignment of existing functions; itis a formal embodiment of the federal government’s officialresponse to the 9/11/01 terror attacks.

In U.S. homeland security, terrorism trumps all. Federalemergency management as currently constituted addressesnon-terror disasters and emergencies as a sub-category of

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“domestic incident,” in which the definitive incident of noteis the terror attack on the United States in September 2001.Domestic terrorist attack involving a weapon of massdestruction was included as a new type of “hazard.” Thosewho designed the organizational framework of DHS

expected that it would eliminate duplication within the bevyof federal terrorism preparedness programs that existedbefore and shortly after the 9/11/01 attacks.

Below is an organization chart of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Table 9.4 U.S. Department of Homeland SecurityOrganization Chart

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Source U.S. Department of Homeland Security, OrganizationCharts, located athttp://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0644.shtm Lastaccessed June 11, 2009.

On February 28, 2003, President Bush issued the publicationof Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5conceived in 2002. Its purpose was, “To enhance the abilityof the United States to manage domestic incidents byestablishing a single, comprehensive national incidentmanagement system.” Sections 3 and 4 explained the

marriage of conventional disaster management andterrorism consequence management. Section (4) asserts,“The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federalofficial for domestic incident management. Pursuant to theHomeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary is responsiblefor coordinating Federal operations within the United Statesto prepare for, respond to, and recover from terroristattacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. TheSecretary shall coordinate the Federal Government’sresources utilized in response to or recovery from terroristattacks, major disasters, or other emergencies if and when

any one of the following four conditions applies:

(1) a Federal department or agency acting under its ownauthority has requested the assistance of the Secretary;

(2) the resources of State and local authorities areoverwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested bythe appropriate State and local authorities;

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(3) more than one Federal department or agency hasbecome substantially involved in responding to the incident;or

(4) the Secretary has been directed to assume responsibilityfor managing the domestic incident by the President.”

Table 1: The National Response Plan’s definition of anIncident of National Significance.

• A federal department or agency acting under its ownauthority has requested the assistance of the Secretary of Homeland Security.

• The resources of state and local authorities areoverwhelmed and federal assistance has been requested bythe appropriate state and local authorities, such as in majordisasters and emergencies (covered by the Stafford Act) orcatastrophic incidents.

• More than one federal department or agency hasbecome substantially involved in responding to an incident,as in conditions of credible threats, indications or warningsof imminent terrorist attack, acts of terrorism directeddomestically against the people, property environment, or

political or legal institutions of the United States or itsterritories or possessions – or threats or incidents related tohigh-profile, large scale events that present targets such asNational Special Security Events (NSSEs) and other specialevents as determined by the Secretary of HomelandSecurity, in coordination with other federal departments oragencies.

• The Secretary of Homeland Security has been directedto assume responsibility for managing a domestic incidentby the president (Haddow and Bullock 2006, 98-99).

Objective 9.6 Furnish an overview of what the Post-HurricaneKatrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2007 means to FEMA’s organization and

management.

FEMA is the only agency within DHS encharged specificallywith reducing the losses associated with non-terrorism-

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related disasters, lost significant visibility and financial andhuman resources in the reorganization. As a small agencywithin a massive bureaucracy, its activities becameovershadowed by much larger and better-funded entitieswithin DHS.

“Hurricane Katrina in 2005 demonstrated that the vision of further

unification of functions and reorganization could not address the problems

FEMA had previously faced. The "Final Report of the Select BipartisanCommittee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane

Katrina", released February 15, 2006 by the U.S. Government Printing

Office, revealed that federal funding to states for “all hazards” disaster preparedness needs was not awarded unless the local agencies made the

purposes for the funding a “just terrorism” function. Emergency

management professionals testified that funds for preparedness for naturalhazards were given less priority than preparations for counter terrorism

measures. Testimony also expressed the opinion that the mission to mitigatevulnerability and prepare for natural hazard disasters before they occurred

had been separated from disaster preparedness functions, making the nationmore vulnerable to known hazards, like hurricanes.

On the FEMA home page there is a tab on the top of the page labeled“About Us.” This page opens up a page stating the FEMA mission, The

primary mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency is “to

reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards,including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters,

by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive

emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response,recovery, and mitigation.” (FEMA)

Supplement Considerations

American homeland security policy is being simultaneouslyformulated, adopted, and implemented vis-à-vis homelandsecurity presidential directives and through the actions of federal, state, and local homeland security and emergencymanagement officials. Much can be learned about howemergency management functions are conceived by

policymakers and carried out by administrators from thestudy of federal, state, and local organization for emergencymanagement.

Much of the history of Federal emergency management canbe gleaned from studying the organizations entrusted withits policy implementation and from the internalorganizational framework, or division of labor, within FEMA

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over time. From 2003 until 2007, natural hazardsemergency planning was diminished in the sense thatFEMA’s absorption into a massive new federal bureaucracywith a counter-terrorism mission fashioned FEMA into a“shadow” of its former self. Every time DHS underwent a

reorganization aimed at integrating its inherited legacyagencies and programs into a more coherent whole, thevestiges of FEMA were parsed or splintered anew.

Moreover, a host of new interests now reside in DHS andmany of these new homeland security “players” know littleor nothing about emergency management. These interestsoften behave as political pressure groups that work toadvance their interest in bureaucratic competitions.Members of the natural hazards community who aresupportive of FEMA now face considerable challenges from

these new pressure groups.

Few can deny that since 2002 state and local emergencymanagement has enjoyed a windfall of federal assistancethat has provided training, equipment, funding for large-scale and more realistic exercises and drills, facilitation of planning, etc. So far unexplored is the possibility thatstates, owing to pressures from federal authorities, havepassed through to localities more funding and resourcesthan they otherwise would have were it not for federalhomeland security funding initiatives. Natural hazards

emergency planning is still embedded in the NRP and NIMS.It is difficult to imagine how the nation could have organizedfor future terror attacks, possibly involving weapons of massdestruction, without revamping its system of emergencymanagement at the same time. Responders to naturaldisasters and emergencies will most likely be many of thesame people expected to respond to the destructiveconsequences of a terror attack.

Many scholars of political science maintain that decisionsabout which organizations are empowered to carry out a

public policy are inherently political decisions. Likewise,decisions about the design of a government agency, FEMAbeing one, involve managerial, organizational, and politicaldecisions. Studying emergency management from anorganizational perspective is both illuminating andinsightful.

Endnotes

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Birkland, Thomas A. After Disaster: Agenda Setting,Public Policy, and Focusing Events. Washington, D.C.:Georgetown University Press, 1997.

"Federal Emergency Management Agency." FEMA. 18 Sept.

2008. U.S Department of HomeLand Security: FEMA. 1 Dec.2008 http://http://www.fema.gov .

"Federal Emergency Management Agency." FederalEmergency Management Agency. 7 June 2008.Answers.com. 9 Dec. 2008 http://www.answers.com/topic/federal-

emergency-management-agency-of-the-united-states .

Gore, Al, “Federal Emergency Management Agency –Accompanying Report of the National Performance Review(NPR)” Series: “From Red Tape to Results: Creating a

Government That Works Better and Costs Less”(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Office of the Vice President, September 1993):25.

Haddow, George D. and Bullock, Jane A. Introduction toEmergency Management. 3nd Edition. New York:Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008.

Kite, Roy, Federal Emergency Management Agency,Emergency Management Institute, telephone interview on July 31, 1997.

Miskel, James. Disaster Response and HomelandSecurity. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International,2006.

Schneider, Saundra K., “Considering Recommendations forChange,” Flirting with Disaster: Public Management inCrisis Situations. (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995):163.

Sylves, Richard. Disaster Policy and Politics :Emergency Management and Homeland Security.

Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2008.

Tierney, K. (2005). Recent Developments in U.S. HomelandSecurity Policies and Their Implications for the Managementof Extreme Events. Boulder, CO: Natural Hazards Researchand Applications Center, Institute of Behavioral Science,University of Colorado at Boulder.

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http://http//www.fema.gov

http://www.answers.com/topic/federal-emergency-management-agency-of-the-united-states


http://http//www.fema.gov





Truman, D. B. (1951). The Governmental Process. New York: Knopf.

U.S. Congress, U.S. Senate, and Committee onGovernmental Affairs (Edmund Muskie) “Reorganization Plan

No. 3 of 1978, Establishing a New Independent Agency, TheFederal Emergency Management Agency,” Series: “CourseMaterial” (Battle Creek, Mich.: Defense Civil PreparednessAgency, Staff College, February 1979).

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, FEMAOrganization Chart. http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/org_chart.pdf

June 11, 2009.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, FEMA RegionOperations. http://www.fema.gov/about/regions/index.shtm Last

accessed June 11, 2009.

U.S. House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan CommitteetoInvestigate the Preparation for and Response to HurricaneKatrina,“Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee toInvestigate the Preparation for and Response to HurricaneKatrina,” released February 15, 2006.

Waugh, W. L., Jr. (2003). Terrorism, Homeland Security and

the National Emergency Management Network, PublicOrganization Review no. 3, 373-385.

Helpful Links

"Federal Emergency Management Agency." FEMA. 18 Sept.2008. U.S Department of HomeLand Security: FEMA. 1 Dec.2008 http://http://www.fema.gov .

"Federal Emergency Management Agency." FederalEmergency Management Agency. 7 June 2008.Answers.com. 9 Dec. 2008 http://www.answers.com/topic/federal-

emergency-management-agency-of-the-united-states .

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Organization Charts,located athttp://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0644.shtm Last accessed June 11, 2009.

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http://www.fema.gov/about/regions/index.shtm



http://http/www.fema.gov








http://http/www.fema.gov






U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, FEMA Organization Chart.


U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, FEMA RegionOperations. http://www.fema.gov/about/regions/index.shtm





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