Policy Brief EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans in a Time of Uncertainty

SEPTEMBER 2016

Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group

Policy Brief EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans in a Time of Uncertainty1

1 Authors:FlorianBieberandMarkoKmezić Withcontributionsfrom:MilicaDelević,MarikaDjolai,Tobias

Flessenkemper,MilanNič,CorinaStratulat,andDaneTaleski

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Strategies for the Balkans in an Uncertain World

Inrecentmonths,Europehasmovedintogreatuncertainty.Thisuncertaintythreatens to unravel some of the pillars of stability on the European continentthathavebeeninplacefordecades.Whilesince2008theglobaleconomiccrisishasbrought instabilityandthreatenedeconomicandcurrencycollapseinEuropeinseveralwaves,thecurrentcrisisismoreprofoundanditsconsequencesarepotentiallyfurther-reaching.

The European Crisis

What is this crisis? It is foremost a crisis of liberal democracy and of compromise-baseddecision-makingandcooperationattheEuropean

level.Ratherthanviewingtheuncertaintyasaresultofaseriesofindividualdevelopmentsandevents,suchastheBrexitvoteintheUK,thepresidentialcandidacyofDonaldTrump,thenearsuccessofafar-rightcandidateinAustrianpresidentialelections,theincreaseinpopularityofanti-immigrantfarrightpartiesinEurope,theconsolidationofauthoritarianisminTurkey,frequentISIS-inspiredterroristactsinEurope,andxenophobicandanti-liberalgovernmentsfromtheBalticstotheBalkans,thesearepartofalargerpattern.

There isagroundswellof support forxenophobic,populistandanti-democratic parties and politicians from California to Ankara. Theirprogrammesanddemandsarecountry-specific,andtheabilitytoholdthemincheckdependsonthestrengthofinstitutionsandthestrategiesofliberaldemocraticforces.Therehasnotbeensuchabroadchallengetoliberal democracy in the most advanced and consolidated democracies since theendofWorldWarTwo.Historyisnotdeterministic,andthereisnoreasontobelievethatthechallengerswillsucceed,atleastnoteverywhere.However,thechallengeisrealanddangerous.Severalkeytestslieahead,suchastheU.S.presidentialelections,theFrenchpresidentialelectionsandthere-runoftheAustrianpresidentialelections,justtonameafew.Yet,

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establishedcertaintieshavecrumbled,leadingtotheUnitedStatesbeingconfronted with a presidential candidate who openly wants to mark and deny entrytopeoplebasedontheirreligionandbuildwallsagainstimmigrants,Austriaseeingnearly50%supportforacandidatefromthefarrightandgovernmentsinPolandandHungarydismantlingdemocraticinstitutions.TheBrexitvoteconstitutesthefirstpopulardecisionofamemberstatetoleavetheEU,resultinginthesecondlargesteconomyoftheEUleavingtheUnion,evenifthehowandwhenremainuncertain.

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The Ripple Effect: How the EU Crisis affects the Western Balkans

WesternEuropeandemocracieshavewell-developedcivilsocieties,strongpoliticalpartiesandestablishedmediathatcanprovidea

bulwarkagainstthesechallenges.Whethertheywillsucceedremainstobetested.However,theuncertaintyderivingfromthecurrentpoliticaldynamicsconstitutesagreaterriskincountrieswithoutsuchstructures.Forexample:

Democracies in Southeast Europe are more fragile. They have beenbackslidingfornearlyadecadeandanumberofcountriesaregovernedbysemi-authoritarian leaders whose commitment to democracy is lukewarm atbest.ThemaindrivingforcefordemocracyandreformhasbeenEUintegrationandtheclosecooperationwiththecountriesofWesternEuropethatprovide(andhavedonesofordecades)amodel,apartnerandagoalformanycitizens.Thisattractionhasbeenpowerful,yetitsabilitytoprovideanincentiveforcountriestoreform,tostrengthendemocraticinstitutionsandtoresultinreform-orientedliberaldemocraticgovernmentshasbeenlimitedatthebestoftimes—andnowisnotthebestoftimes.

ThemainmagnetforchangeintheBalkanshasdramaticallyreduceditsintensity:

1. Since2008,ithaslostitseconomicattractionassomecountriesintheEUhavestruggledwiththeeconomiccrisis,high-debtandimpoverishment.

2. Since2010,theriseofViktorOrbaninHungary,theEUnolongerhasacredibleclaimthatmembershipcansafeguarddemocraticinstitutions.

3. Since2015,withthebadlypreparedresponseofEUmemberstotheinfluxofrefugeesandtheriseofbothanti-immigrantsentimentandthenumberofterroristattacksbyISIS-inspiredor-supportedindividualsorgroups,thesenseofstabilityandcertaintyintheEUhasalsodeclined.

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Thus,theEUnolongerprovidestheseemingcertaintiesofeconomicprosperityandevenconvergencewiththewealthiercountriesofEurope,theofferofdemocraticinstitutionsandtheirstability,andthecertaintyandpredictabilityofstabilitythatcitizensexperienced.

Consequently,thepreviousreasonsforaspiringtojointheEUandthusforimplementingaWesternEuropeanmodelofgovernance,economyandsocialorganisationnolongerappeartobeanobviouschoice,astheyusedto.Therelative(yetdeclining)supportforthisprojectintheWesternBalkanscanbeattributedtotwofactors:a)inertia,i.e.thecontinuedsupportforamodelthatmightnolongerexist,andb)theabsenceofanalternative,asotherrelevantpoliticalandeconomicactors(RussiaandTurkey)areunabletoofferacoherentmodeltoemulate—evenifaspectsoftheirsystemmightappealtoindividualseitherseekingmoreauthoritariansystemsofruleornostalgicallyimaginingkinshipwiththetwocountries.

It would be naïve to believe that these factors would prevail for a period sufficientlylongtoovercomethecurrentuncertainty.

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The Symbiosis of Eurosceptics and Balkan Authoritarians

NotonlyisthemagnetoftheEUweak,itisalsoself-isolating.WhilecurrentlytheformalmechanismsofEUenlargementandsupportfor

reformcontinuetofunction,atleastatatechnicallevel,theuncertaintyoutlinedaboveislikelytobringaboutafurtherweakeningoftheEUandespeciallyWesternEuropeangovernments’commitmenttoreformanddemocracyinSoutheastEurope.TheBrexitdiscussionwilltakeyearsandmaketheEUmuchmoreinward-looking.PotentialcopycatreferendamightmaketheBritishexitfromtheEUnotaone-offevent.Furthermore,thepotentialelectoralsuccessoffar-rightpartieswillhaveclearnegativerepercussions:itseemslikelythatpartiesthatopposetheEUandcertainlyrejectenlargementwillgaingreaterprominenceinseveralEUcountries.Wheretheydo,theywillusetheirpowertoslowdownorstopenlargementandsupporttotheWesternBalkans.Consideringwidespreadoppositiontoenlargement,suchapushagainstenlargementisunlikelytomeetmuchresistance.Eveniffar-rightpartiesfailtojoingovernments,mainstreampartiesarelikelytofeelunderpressuretoadoptsomeofthepoliciesofthefarright.Thus,EUmemberstatesarelikelytomovetowardsmoreEuroscepticandanti-enlargementpositions.

ThesymbioticrelationshipbetweenauthoritarianstrongmenoutsidetheEUandEuroscepticswithinitislikelytostrengthen.Bothfetishisesovereigntyandmajoritarianismoverconsensus-seekingandcross-nationalcompromise,botharelatentlyoropenlyxenophobicandtheyproveeachother’spoints:ForEurosceptics,authoritarianismoutsidetheEUisevidenceastowhyenlargementandcooperation(beyondrealpolitik)withcountriesinSoutheastEurope(includingTurkey)isamistake,whileitallowsauthoritarianleadersinSoutheastEuropetopromotenarrativesofrejectionandvictimhood.

ThisdynamicwillmeanforthecomingyearsthatEUenlargementandthereformsassociatedtherewithwillbecomeincreasinglyimplausibleandremote.GovernmentsinsideandoutsidetheEUwillmoveawayfromliberaldemocracy

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andexperimentwithalternativemodelsofauthoritarianism.Therewillbealevelofcooperationamonganti-EUgovernmentsandparties,yettheintensityofcooperationwillbeopportunisticandnotstrategic,astheirdomesticlegitimacyisnotbasedoncooperationandintegration.Thisislikelytobringaboutgreatertensionsandconflicts.Ifsemi-authoritarianregimesopenlyabandontheclaimtopursuereformsandEUintegration,theywillneednewsourcesoflegitimacy,whichislikelytodrawonnationalismandxenophobia.Thegreatestriskisthatthesetypesofgovernmentfindanewmodelofrulethatnolongermakesaclaimtoreforms,butopenlydefinesanalternativesourceoflegitimacy.Suchaformofgovernmentwouldbeauthoritarianinsubstance,incorporatingstrongelementsofplebiscitaryandmajoritariandecision-makingandoverrulinglegalandinstitutionalsafeguardsforminorities(political,ethnic,sexualorotherwise).

Theseforceswillnotbeunopposed.First,theWesternEuropeanmodelofgovernmenthasbeenresilientforover70yearsandofferedgreaterprosperityandstabilitytoitscitizensthananyothermodel.Thus,irrespectiveofinstitutionalandstructuralcrises,theattractionofthismodelislikelytoremain,evenifseverelychallengedinthecomingyears.Takingalong-termview,theemulationoftheWesternmodelofgovernmentandeconomyhasbeenastrongand(mostly)dominantcurrentinSoutheastEuropeansocietiesfornearlytwocenturies.Inaddition,therestrictionsonpersonalfreedoms and limited economic opportunities for most citizens of other modelsofgovernmentmeanthattherearecurrentlynoclearalternativesthatwouldholdbroadpopularsupport.

Thekeyfactoristime:HowlongwillthecrisisoftheEUandliberaldemocracypersistinthecoreEU?ThelongerthecrisisisongoingandchallengersareabletothreatenthekeypillarsoftheEuropeanpost-warorder,themorelikelyitwillbethatcountriesintheWesternBalkanswillslideintolong-termauthoritarianism.IftheEUisabletoovercomethecrisisposedbytheBrexitvoteandbyEuroscepticpartiesinthecomingyears,itcanreclaimitsroleinpromotingreformandenlargement.

AsthesourceandengineofcrisisisnotfoundintheWesternBalkans,thesolutionliesprimarilyintheEUitself.Yet,thecrisisalsohighlightsthatreform processes in the Western Balkans have to be driven from within as outsideactorsmightbeunableorunwillingtoplayadecisiverole.

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Conclusions and Recommendations

InordertopreventfurthererosionofreformanddemocraticgovernanceintheWesternBalkans,the“businessasusual”approachcannotwork.TheEUenlargementprocesshasbeenproceeding,evenwithwaningsupport in member states and more dubious commitment to reform by somegovernmentsintheWesternBalkans.TheabilityoftheEUtobrokersolutionstodisputescontinues,butitremainsunclearwhetheritwillsucceed,asneitherthecrisisinMacedonia,norincreasingtensionsinBosniaandHerzegovinahavebeenresolved.

ThereturntoasuccessfulprocessofdemocratizationandEUintegrationrequirestherecognitionthatitrequiresstrongerandbroaderdomesticconstituenciesofchangeandmorevigorousattentionbytheEUonthestateofdemocracy.

RE-INTRODUCE MEANING INTO THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS. The2004enlargementprocesswassuccessful,inter alia,becauseitincludedalargenumberofcountriesallcompetingtojointheEU.Thecurrentgradualistprocesslacksthisdynamic,andcountriesarenotindirectcompetition.Thisis why all the Western Balkan countries should be asked to draw up a action plansforChapters23and24afterascreeningexercise,leadingtotheiropeningassoonaspossible.Thisscenariowouldreplicatethesuccessofthevisaliberalisationprocess,asitwouldencouragefasterreforms,especiallytheestablishmentofaneffectiveruleoflawsystem,andincreasethedensityoftiesandlinkagesbetweentheEUanddomesticelitesintheWesternBalkans.Atthesametime,inorderfortheprocesstobesuccessful,theCommissionshouldsticktoadoptedprinciples,andnameproblemsinsteadofhidingthembehindambiguousstatements,ashasbeenparticularlythecaseinMacedonia.

EMPOWER DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN THE REGION. Western Balkan countries are predominantly characterised by traditional top-down illiberal powerstructures,wherebygovernmentsareatlibertytoinfluenceboth

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reformsandEUintegrationthroughasetofclientelisticnetworksand/ormethodsofmoreorlessopenpressure.Itisessentialtotransformthesenetworkssoastoincreasetheinfluenceofhorizontallystructuredagentsofchangeonpolicymaking(i.e.NGOs,civilsocietyorganisations,independentinvestigativejournalists,Ombudspersons,CommissionersforInformationofPublicImportanceandPersonalDataProtection,CommissionersforProtectionofEquality,localbusinesscommunities,etc.).Inaddition,effortsshouldbemadetosupportconstructivegrassrootsinitiativesintheregion.Civilsocietyempowermentshouldstrengthenexpertise,capacitiesandtechnicalorganisation,andprovideforregional(regionalOmbudspersonnetwork, regionalmediaoutlets suchas theN1TVwhichbroadcastssimultaneouslyinSerbia,CroatiaandBosniaandHerzegovina,etc.)andinternationalnetworkingpossibilities.Finally,EUofficialsshouldregularlyengageindirectcommunicationwithcitizens,asthiswillallowthecitizensto name and shame those elites who do not follow up on their declaratory supportforEUintegration.Thisbeingsaid,theCommitteeofRegionsandtheEuropeanEconomicandSocialCommitteeshouldalreadybegininvitingpermanentobserversfromlocalandregionalauthoritiesandthesectorsrepresentedintheESC.

LINK ENLARGEMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.EUaccessionisthemaindriverforeconomicdevelopmentintheWesternBalkans.Yet, thesocio-economicaspectofenlargementdoesnotseemtobeproperlyaddressedintheregion.Hence,theEUshouldprepareashortroadmapforeachoftheaspiringmemberstatesonwhattodoinordertoimprovetheinvestmentclimateafterconsultingwithlocalbusinessorganisationsandinternationaldonors.National-levelmeetingswithchambersofcommerceandEUandotherrelevantactorsshouldbeorganisedtodiscussimplementationofspecificEUdirectivesthatchangeandimprovebusinessconditions.

FOCUS ON EDUCATION AND INNOVATION. Particular attention should bededicatedtoinvestmentsineducation,skills,innovationandappliedresearch.Specialfocusshouldbeputoneffortstocreateapolicyframeworkforfacilitatingandfinanciallystimulatingthereturnofyoungscientistsfromtheregionwhoarestudyingabroad,aswellasonengagementwiththediaspora.AgoodexampleofthispracticecanbeseeninCroatia,where

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theGovernmentoftheRepublicofCroatiaisconductingaNEWFELPROfellowshipprojectthataimstoreversebraindrainbyencouragingoutstandingCroatianresearcherstoreturntoCroatia.Thisprojectisco-financedthroughtheMarieCurieprogramme.Inaddition,itisnecessarytolinkInstrumentforPre-AccessionAssistance(IPA)programmestovocationaltrainingandprojectsthatreduceyouthunemployment.Aspeciallineshouldbecreatedtofinanceappliedresearchintheregion.Currently,localuniversitiesandresearchcentresarenotcompetitivewiththeirEUcounterparts.Thiscanbeobservedinthemerehandfulofapplicationsforthe2016JeanMonnetProgrammecomingfromtheWesternBalkans.AftertheterminationoftheRRPPProgrammefinancedbytheSwissDevelopmentandCooperationAgency,therearenofundsofferedexclusivelytoresearchinstitutionsintheWesternBalkans.

CLOSELY MONITOR THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY.Seriousbackslidingintermsofdemocracyandfreedomofthemediacanbeobservedthroughouttheregionoverthepastfewyears.Yet,theEUhasremainedrathersilentonsuchdevelopments,evenwhenconfrontedwithconcreteevidence,asinthecaseofthewiretappingscandalinMacedonia.WhiletheEUcontinuestofocusonthesmartdesignofformalinstitutions,itseemsthatitisalsowillingtoshortchangethestateofdemocracyforthesakeofotherreasons,mostnotablythestabilityoftheregion.However,ifthingscontinueastheyare,thenanOrban-likeBalkanswouldresultnotonlyinlessdemocracybutalsoinlessstabilityascanpresentlybeobservedinBosniaandHerzegovina.TheEUneedstofocusonmonitoringtheaspiringmembersontheirpathstostableandprosperousdemocraciesgovernedbytheruleoflaw.Itshouldalsopaygreaterattentiontothewholeforestandnotjustthetreesalongtheway.ThisissueshouldberegularlyaddressedinannualprogressreportsasanewchapterfocusingoncoreCopenhagencriteria.Moreover,theEuropeanFundamentalRightsAgencycouldexpanditsscopeofworktocoverallthe(potential)candidatecountriesbymeansofregularassessmentonspecificlegalandpoliticalmeasuresconcerningdemocracypromotion.Finally,itisveryimportantthattheEUcontinuestouselocalexpertiseinthismatter.Collaborationwithcrediblecivilsocietyorganisationsfromtheregionshouldbefurtherinstitutionalisedviaregularchannelsofcommunication,forexamplethroughcommissioningregular‘shadow’reportsonthestateofdemocracy.

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IPA. Firstofall,bearinginmindtheeconomicdisparitybetweentheWesternBalkansandtheEU,itisnecessarytoincreaseIPAfunding.Togetherwiththebeneficiaries,theEuropeanParliamentandCommissionshouldfine-tunethelistofpriorityprojectsandinstitutionstobefunded.CivilsocietyshouldbeincludedinthemonitoringoftheimplementationofIPA-fundedprojects.

A particular focus of the IPA mechanisms should be directed towards strengthening the expertise, capacities, technical organisation andindependenceofpreviouslylistedcredibleregulatoryagenciesandcivilsocietyactors.Inadditiontocontinuingsupportforregionallyestablishedbodies,suchastheRCC,theSouth-EastEuropeanCooperationProcess(SEECP),theRegionalSchoolofPublicAdministration(ReSPA),etc.,IPAfundsshouldalsofosterthecreationofregionalandinternationalnetworksofdemocracypromoters(i.e.,regionalnetworkofanti-corruptionagencies,regionalnetworkofOmbudspersons,etc.).

Second,IPAfundsshouldfocusonprojectsthathaveaneconomicmultipliereffect.Thisincludesinvestmentsinthequalityofregionalinfrastructure(railways,highwaysandrenewableenergy),asnotedinthe2015WesternBalkansConnectivityAgenda.Mostoftheseprojectsareextremelyexpensive,andthisiswhytheEUandthebeneficiarycountriesshouldcoordinatetheseinvestmentswithgrantsandloansofotherinternationaldonors,aswellastheunusedIPAIIfunds.Suchcoordinatedeffortswillbebetterabletohelpefficientlycompletepriorityinfrastructureprojects.

Third,theEUshouldenhancethetrainingofpublicofficials,particularlythoseatthelocalandregionallevels,foreffectivemanagementofpre-accessionassistance.ItshouldalsolowerthecriterianecessaryforregionalcivilsocietyactorstobidonEUfunds.

Finally,inmanagingIPAfunding,theEUshouldproposethe‘moreformore’principlewherebyitwouldprovidearegionalpotofmoneyfromwhichWesternBalkancountrieswouldbeabletodrawfundsonacompetitivebasis.

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About the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group TheBalkansinEuropePolicyAdvisoryGroup(BiEPAG)isaco-operationinitiativeoftheEuropeanFundfortheBalkans(EFB)andCentrefortheSoutheastEuropeanStudiesoftheUniversityofGraz(CSEES)withtheaimtopromotetheEuropeanintegrationoftheWesternBalkansandtheconsolidationofdemocratic,opencountriesintheregion.BiEPAGiscomposed by prominent policy researchers from the Western Balkans and widerEuropethathaveestablishedthemselvesfortheirknowledgeandunderstandingoftheWesternBalkansandtheprocessesthatshapetheregion.CurrentmembersoftheBiEPAGare:FlorianBieber,DimitarBechev,MilicaDelević,DaneTaleski,DejanJović,MarkoKmezić,LeonMalazogu,CorinaStratulat,MarikaDjolai,JovanaMarović,NikolaosTzifakis,NatashaWunsch,SrđanCvijić,NikolaDimitrov,MirnaVlašićFeketija,MilanNičandVedranDžihić.

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About the European Fund for the Balkans TheEuropeanFund for theBalkans is a joint initiative ofEuropeanfoundations that envisions, runs and supports initiatives aimed atstrengtheningdemocracy,fosteringEuropeanintegrationandaffirmingtheroleoftheWesternBalkansinaddressingEurope’semergingchallenges.

Theup-to-dateprogrammestrategyisbasedonthreeoverarchingareas–CapacityDevelopment,PolicyDevelopmentandRegionalCooperation-andchannelledviaflagshipprogrammesandselectedprojects,complementedwithasetofactionsarisingfromEFB’sregionalidentityasarelevantplayerinitsfieldsoffocus.

Theirsynergeticeffectsarefocussedoncontinuous“Europeanisation”ofthe policies and practices of the Western Balkans countries on their way toEUaccession,throughmergingoftheregion’ssocialcapacitybuildingwithpolicyplatformdevelopment,andacultureofregionalcooperation.

Contact: IGOR BANDOVIĆ SeniorProgrammeManager,European Fund for the Balkans igor.bandovic@balkanfund.org+381(0)69626465European Fund for the Balkans Resavska35,11000Belgrade,SerbiaPhone/Fax:+381(0)113033662www.balkanfund.org

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About the Centre for Southeast European Studies, University of Graz TheCentreforSoutheastEuropeanStudieswassetupinNovember2008followingtheestablishmentofSoutheastEuropeasastrategicpriorityattheUniversityofGrazin2000.TheCentreisaninterdisciplinaryandcross-facultyinstitutionforresearchandeducation,establishedwiththegoaltoprovidespacefortherichteachingandresearchactivitiesattheuniversityonandwithSoutheastEuropeandtopromoteinterdisciplinarycollaboration.Sinceitsestablishment,thecentrealsoaimedtoprovideinformation and documentation and to be a point of contact for media andthepublicinterestedinSoutheastEurope,intermsofpolitical,legal,economicandculturaldevelopments.Aninterdisciplinaryteamoflawyers,historians,andpoliticalscientistsworkingattheCentrehascontributedtoresearchonSoutheastEurope,throughnumerousarticles,monographsandotherpublications.Inaddition,thecentreregularlyorganizesinternationalconferencesandworkshopstopromotecuttingedgeresearchonSoutheastEurope.

Contact: UNIV.-PROF. DR. FLORIAN BIEBER ProfessorofSoutheastEuropeanStudiesflorian.bieber@uni-graz.at+43/316/3806822CentreforSoutheastEuropeanStudies,UniversityofGraz,Schubertstrasse21A-8010Grazwww.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at

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