policy and ecosystem evolution abstract
TRANSCRIPT
Policy and Ecosystem Evolution
Paige Clayton* and Maryann Feldman**
*Georgia Institute of Technology
**University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Abstract: We consider how policy might vary over the life cycle of an innovative ecosystem.
This paper reviews the evidence on how ecosystems evolve over time as firms and institutions
develop. For each stage of ecosystem development, we identify a set of organizational logics
that prevail and present evidence about qualitative differences that characterize different stages.
Understanding the factors behind the path of development and the process of changing from one
phase to another is required for both theory development and policy advice. We argue that the
role of policy, either state or local, plays a pivotal but underappreciated role in the creation and
development of ecosystems. We differentiate between the role of sector-specific local policy and
the role of sector-neutral local policies. Rather than mutually exclusive, we explore the ways in
which the two policies may be used alternatively and complementarily in the different stages of
the development of an ecosystem.
Keyword: Entrepreneurial ecosystems; economic development; policy; life cycle
Acknowledgements: Funding from the Kauffman Foundation and the National Science
Foundation (NSF). Paper has benefitted from discussions with Elsie Echeverri-Carroll and from
participants at the 2020 annual Association for Public Policy & Management meeting.
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I. Introduction
Scholars have long noted the processes in the temporal evolution of innovative places,
defined alternatively as clusters, regional agglomerations or entrepreneurial ecosystems (Kenney
2000, Bresnahan & Gambardella 2004, Feldman & Braunerhjelm 2006, Storper et al. 2015,
Spigel 2017). While these constructs are differentiated by subtle nuances, the shared logic is that
co-located firms create innovation and new opportunities, and realize productivity gains, which
results in employment and shared prosperity. Governments around the world make massive
investment in an attempt to create innovative local economies, often without achieving the
desired result (Dewar 1998, Lerner 2010, Martin & Sunley 2003). Policy makers are often left to
make investments without an understanding of process in the academic literature.
The concept of entrepreneurial ecosystems offers a new interpretive lens to inform policy
that is fundamentally different from other related theories of local economic development. The
logic is that economic development can be best created by promoting new local firm formation,
which has the effect of generating new industries with growth potential and also can be more
democratic in sharing wealth broadly. Rather than emerging fully formed like Athena in Greek
mythology, entrepreneurial ecosystems result from a temporal development process, proceeding
through a series of stages. The requirements for firms and industry vary over this emergence
process (Clayton et al. 2020). Most powerfully, there is an opportunity to articulate a prescriptive
role for government policy, targeting specific policy instruments to different phases of the
development of an entrepreneurial ecosystem to increase their impact.
Policy, defined as a course of action adopted and pursued by a government, plays a
pivotal but underappreciated role in the development of innovative places. There is often a
search for best practices, which are uncritically adopted from other successful places without
sufficient consideration of the local context (Pfotenhauer 2019). Variation in the stages of
emergence of a local entrepreneurial ecosystem is an important consideration. Policy
prescriptions are typically based on fully functioning ecosystems without regard to local context:
the number of firms, the number and types of entrepreneurial support organizations, and the state
of the local labor market, among other factors. The appropriate policy response certainly varies.
For example, at the earliest stage the emphasis on supporting the start-up processes will have a
large impact, but as the ecosystem matures the need for human capital development, export
support, and access to growth capital will increase. Policies that are effective at one phase of
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ecosystem development may not only be ineffective at a different phase but may actually be
harmful and waste resources. To use public resources most effectively, we argue that policies
need to be calibrated to the specific context.
This paper examines economic development policy within the context of the temporal
development of geographic entrepreneurial ecosystems. We start by examining prior work on
ecosystem development, which concludes that ecosystems have distinct stages of development
and that policy plays a fundamental role in moving from one stage to the next. Rather than focus
on mature ecosystems, we focus on the ways that local economies emerge over time as
institutions and relationships develop, and firm density increases. For each stage of ecosystem
development, we identify a set of institutional logics that prevail and present evidence about
qualitative differences that characterize different stages. Understanding the factors behind the
path of development, the process of changing from one phase to another, and the role of policy in
this process is required for both theory development and policy advice.
This paper aims to make two contributions. First, we articulate a role for policy and for
government, more generally, as an agent of change in the process of forming an innovation
ecosystem. We advance a set of stages that a developing ecosystem might pass through,
predicated on the resource availability and firm density. Second, this paper provides a schema for
classifying government policy instruments, at the national, state and local level and considering
when specific policies might be most effective given an ecosystem’s phase of development and
dominant sector. While other recent work has attempted to ascribe ecosystem development to a
set of stages, the role of policy, specifically the transformative role of stage-specific policies, is
missing (Spigel et al. 2020).
The next section further explores the concept of ecosystems and provides a rational for
including policy as an instrumental mechanism. Section Three provides a schema for thinking
about policy at the national, state and local levels that are either sector neutral or sector specific,
and then provides a brief description for each policy. Section Four reviews the literature on
stages of development and provides a simple compilation of four primary phases. Section Five
then considers the juxtaposition of policy and stages to consider how different policy
mechanisms may either help or detract from that stage. The paper is populated throughout with
illustrative examples from different, international regions. Finally, we offer reflective
conclusions.
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II. Clusters versus Ecosystems: New Wine in New Bottles
The ecosystem concept originated with practitioners in the mid-1990s. Dissatisfied with
the policy options available to them, the ecosystem offers a biological metaphor and is
predicated on recognizing the importance of complexity, with non-linear and evolving
relationships (Isenberg 2010; Stam 2015; Spigel 2017).1 By definition, ecosystems are “a set of
interconnected entrepreneurial actors, institutions, entrepreneurial organizations and
entrepreneurial processes which formally and informally coalesce to connect, mediate and
govern the performance within the entrepreneurial environment,” (Mason & Brown, 2014, pp.
5). Bennet Harrison, writing in 1992, notes that scholars have attempted to interpret the spatial
clustering of economic activity using many different theoretical lenses, moving to a better and
more nuanced understanding. The initial conceptualization was the Italian industrial district
(Beccatini 2004), which was similar to the Marshallian industrial district (1920) but focused on
high value-added goods and included refinements of considering social and production
relationships. The concept of industrial clusters is attributed initially to the work of Michael
Porter (1990) and a significant literature has developed. The concept captured the imagination of
policy makers but has proven disappointing as the policy prescriptions have not yielded expected
results. Porter’s work has been criticized as being too simplistic and essentially static (Martin &
Sunley 2003; Swords 2013). Thus, there is a need for additional theoretical development,
specifically due to the realization that industrial agglomerations arise over time and the genesis
that endogenously builds resources.
The concept of entrepreneurial ecosystems differs from clusters in three primary ways.
First, clusters are bounded by one industry, technology or sector and are specific to a designated
value chain and a set of vertical related activities (Auerswald & Dani 2017). Entrepreneurial
ecosystems are defined across industries and consider the larger system that supports
entrepreneurship and innovation, without regard to a specific focus. There may be multiple
industrial clusters within an ecosystem and by defying sectoral designation, ecosystems can
accommodate the emergence of new technology fields at the convergence of different industrial
clusters.
1 See Malecki (2018) for a thorough overview of entrepreneurial ecosystems.
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Second, ecosystems reorient the discussion away from relationships between firms and
toward process and dynamic interactions. Clusters focus on relationships among firms, either at
the same point in the value chain (Beccatini 2004) or between suppliers and customers (Porter
1990). In contrast, entrepreneurial ecosystems focus on the environment, and place entrepreneurs
and entrepreneurship at the center of a set of resources and institutions (Auerswald & Dani 2017;
Spigel 2020). A notable limitation of cluster theory has been the inability to account for
heterogeneous growth trajectories of the same industry across different regions over the same
time periods (Martin & Sunley 2011). An ecosystem approach accounts for this heterogeneity by
addressing region-specific dynamics that can create this heterogeneity of outcomes noted in cross
sectional analysis of regional economies.
Third, as a final distinction from clusters, ecosystems better accommodate policy (Witt
2016). In the cluster formulation, policy was a background condition that was treated as
exogenous and operating only to define a static framework by which firms could interact (Porter
1990). Ecosystem development represents a shift from cluster reliance on following static and
deterministic interactions, with policy relegated to the background, to an ecosystem focus on
adaptability and adjustment enhanced by policy.
Ecosystems are complex adaptive systems (Martin & Sunley 2007). The boundary
between a complex adaptive system and its environment is neither fixed nor easy to identify,
making operational closure difficult. Complex adaptive systems are characterized by non-linear
dynamics because of complex feedbacks and self-reinforcing interactions among components.
Complex adaptive systems are also characterized by emergence and self-organization: there is a
tendency for macro-scale structures to emerge spontaneously out of individual (micro-scale)
component behaviors and interactions. This same process of self-organization imbues complex
systems with the potential to adapt. While much consideration has been given to external shocks,
it is equally possible for change to occur through co-evolutionary mechanisms, or as a response
to public policy initiatives.
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Table 2. Characterizations of Stages of Regional Ecosystem Development
Study Focus
No. of
Stages Components
Auerswald and Doni
(2017)
Adaptive Life Cycle 4 Exploitation; Conservation; Release; Reorganization
Cukier et al. (2016) Startup Ecosystem
Maturity Model
4 Nascent; Evolving; Mature; Self-sustainable
Feldman et al.
(2005); Feldman &
Francis (2006)
Entrepreneurs as Cluster
Life Cycle Sparks and
Shapers
3 Emergence; Formation/Development; Industry maturation
Harrington (2016) Development Centered
Scaling Model
4 Early years; Gaining momentum; Scaling; Self-sustaining
Mack & Mayer
(2016)
Evolutionary Model 4 Birth; Growth; Sustainment; Decline
Malecki (2018) Life Cycle Model No clear components offered, but sustainability is end
result; not decline; continually evolving
Mason & Brown
(2014)
Ecosystem Model 3 Emergence; Scale-up; Self-reinforcement
Mathews (1997) Evolutionary Stage Model 4 Preparatory; Seeding; Diffusion; Sustainability
Simmie & Martin
(2010)
Adaptive Cycle Model of
Regional Economic
Resilience
4 Reorganization and Restructuring; Exploitation and Growth;
Conservation; Decline and Release, repeat with
Reorganization and Restructuring, etc.
Startup Genome
(Gauthier et al.,
2017)
Ecosystem Lifecycle
Model
4 Activation; Globalization; Expansion; Integration
ter Wal (2013) Evolutionary Model 3 Emergence; Coherence - Intermediate Crisis; Growth
Clayton et al. (2020) Evolutionary Model 3 Emergence; Growth; Maturity
IV. Characterizing the Life Cycles of Regions
Martin and Sunley (2011) note the literature on the evolution of geographically-defined
industries is based on the concept of a life cycle. While this approach has limitations, it provides
a means to understand regional industrial change. Regional industrial evolution is an adaptive
process based on interactions at the local level yet there are stages or appreciable changes in the
growth trajectory as part of the emergence of a local agglomeration of entrepreneurial firms
(Clayton et al. 2020). Ideally any typology of ecosystem development focuses on dynamic
change within industries and places, with an emphasis on evolution towards a fully functioning
innovative infrastructure. The stages of the regional or ecosystem life cycle follow a biological
metaphor that is popularized in the product life cycle introduced by Abernathy and Utterback
(1978) with the simple extension of a geographic dimension. Table 1 provides a review of 13
prior studies that have attempted to characterize the stages of regional ecosystem development.
Each study has a different focus justified by its theoretical orientation.
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The similarities are striking: the regional life cycle process generally begins with a stage
of nascency, where the first signs of a new industry appear. The spark is an opportunity to which
entrepreneurs respond, perhaps a new scientific discovery, a technological advance, or a change
in the market. There is certainly an element of serendipity but for an industry to take hold there
needs to be high quality resources and infrastructure (Feldman & Francis 2003). For this first
stage, resources and access are critical. Tacit and sticky knowledge requires geographic
proximity and the ability to tap a variety of external sources of technical, market and financial
knowledge. While the vast majority of businesses start small and stay small, there are certain
firms that will seek to grow more quickly and be able to scale their operations. As these firms
grow, they will attract suppliers and skilled labor; an agglomeration begins to take hold.
The next stage is the take-off stage, when the number of related firms increases and the
ecosystem matures. Sometimes this period is split into two separate stages of emergence and
expansion. During these early stages, there is a high rate of new firm market entry and exit as
firms experiment with the new opportunity and learn from their collective mistakes. With the
low level of market concentration, the market share of individual firms is also volatile.
Ironically, the most successful clusters are associated with lower survival rates of new firms
(Stuart & Sorenson 2003). The logic is that the cluster is made more vibrant through this
evolving process, which suggests that efforts to save marginal firms are not likely to be
associated with higher innovativeness and growth of surviving firms. Rather than the efforts of
one entrepreneur, there is a need for collective action (Feldman et al. 2005).
During the take-off phase, certain places become known as hot or as the place to be for a
certain industry. Klepper (2010, p. 22) describes a process of agglomeration: if initial entrants
become an early leader of the industry, they become a source of spinoffs. And these spinoff firms
have an advantage of learning about the industry from their prominent incumbent and as a result
are more successful. As this process continues, overtime the share of the firms in the industries
and their output and profitability increase. Rather than a zero-sum game, in which the gains of
the spinoffs come at the expense of the parent, spinoffs develop new niches and related products.
This is a critical juncture, representing the point when the cluster can solidify its lead. This is
also the point at which public policy can play the most decisive role in creating conditions
conducive to entrepreneurial endeavors and the success of existing small businesses.
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Life cycle theorists generally consider a subsequent period of maturing growth when an
industry is still strong with a stable growth rate. As industries mature, their knowledge base is
codified and more oriented toward process innovation and incremental product innovation. The
opportunities for local growth are lower unless there is the start of a new product line or new
technological trajectory. For this stage, the emphasis is on sustaining the local technological
advantage while encouraging the exploration and pursuit of new opportunities to diversify the
local economy.
Many studies include decline as a final stage. Ideally, if managed by policy, this decline
phase can be averted. Some of those clusters that have averted the final stage through
diversification include turbine manufacturers in Denmark (Karnoe & Garud 2012), who were
able to literally innovate and turn their airplane turbines on their side to meet the demand for
wind power. Akron redefined itself as a center for polymer research based on scientific research
from corporate R&D labs working with the University of Akron (Mudambi et al. 2016). Decline
is not inevitable, and continued investments in education and public goods can reinvent
industries within cities (Glaeser 2005). In this way, the regional industrial life cycle begins anew,
and the cycle restarts, emphasizing factors and investment important in the initial stage.
Rather than propose a new model of regional industrial life cycle development, we aim
to synthesize existing models in a way that will allow us to structure stage specific policy advice
that can be applied across a variety of regions interested in expanding local industrial dynamism
through entrepreneurship. In so doing, we adopt three-phase model: (1) nascency (2) take-off,
and (3) maturity. We do not include decline as a final stage because while we find the biological
metaphor informative for orienting regional development, we do not believe in a literal
application. Including decline as part of an ecosystem life cycle seemingly proscribes in an
inevitability rather than allowing for reinvention and resilience. A local economy facing a
declining industrial sector often results from factors outside of its control, such as international
trade or corporate strategy. Often these shocks are impossible to predict and their impact can be
devastating. Policy to address decline requires the full economic development toolkit (Blakely &
Leigh 2013) and is beyond the present analysis. We omit this stage from our consideration.
The stages of ecosystem emergences provide a framework for consideration of local
policy aimed towards building an emerging local entrepreneurial ecosystem. Rather than
focusing on policies that directly impact entrepreneurs, the concept of entrepreneurial ecosystem
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focuses on the inter-related nature of all of the elements in the local economy. The objective for
policy and government investment is to move the emerging local industry to the next stage of
development. Considering life cycle stage as an essential element of local context provides a
diagnostic tool.
Table 2. Ecosystem Policies by Sector and Level
High Level: National
Mid-Level:
State
Immediate Level:
Local Government
Sector
Neutral
Policies
Public Inputs
Infrastructure
Education Policy
Intellectual Property Policy
Research investment
Public Inputs
University research initiatives
designed to upgrade capacity
Education expenditures
Non-compete agreements
Public Inputs
Education expenditures
Market-Based
R&D tax credit
Small Business Innovative
Research (SBIR) program
Market-Based
Research parks
Relocation incentives
Export/market support
R&D tax credit
Market Based
Relocation incentives
Expansion incentives
Financing subsidies
Place-making investments
Sector
Specific
Policies
Public Inputs
Research consortium
Antitrust actions
Public Inputs
Creation of industry support
Organizations
University research initiatives
designed to specific sectors
Targeted training programs
Public Inputs
Targeted community college
educational programs
Fostering social
capital/networks
Market-Based Market-Based
Enterprise and emerging
technology investment funds
Market-Based
Shared facilities for start-ups
and expansion
Compiled by the Authors.
III. Ecosystem Policy Mix
Studies of regional innovative ecosystems consider a variety of factors, such as industry
mix and the quality and availability of resources (Greenwald & Stigliz 2013, Moretti 2012),
types of institutions and social capital (Carlino & Kerr 2014) and the presence of local regional
champions and entrepreneurial capital (Feldman & Zoller 2016). There is surprising little
discussion of the effect of policy instruments on the development of industries and the creation
of agglomerations in places. Witt (2016) argues that an evolutionary perspective can make a
difference for economic policy advice due to the fact that problems are framed differently. Many
studies evaluate the impact of a specific government policies. For example, there is significant
consideration of R&D tax credits or government R&D programs but surprising little consensus
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(David & Hall 2000). Most studies are based on cross sections that compare regions at different
stages of their development, and it is not surprising that different conclusions are reached.
Shifting the analysis to consider stages of development provides a more defensible base upon
which to design and implement policy.
Further complicating policy discussions is the reality that countries have multiple levels
of governments including local, regional, state, national or federal, with many other
organizations actively taking an interest in policy decisions and outcomes. Table 2 provides a
categorizing of policy instruments along two dimensions: jurisdiction and sector orientation.
Jurisdiction reflects different levels of government that form the multiple layers of overlapping
policies. Flanagan et al. (2011) consider how these different levels of jurisdiction align to form a
credible, comprehensive and coherent policy mix. The idealized case has policy aligned between
jurisdictions, but there are examples where the different levels of policies work at cross-
purposes. For example, national programs promote entrepreneurship, yet individual states have
non-compete agreements that limit the ability of former employees to start new firms (Marx
2011).
We add the additional dimension of public inputs versus market-based policy
instruments. We further differentiate between sector-neutral policies and policies targeted to
build specific sectors. Foray (2019) argues that sector-neutral policies have deployed programs
and instruments to support innovation without any pre-determination of the domains, sectors or
technologies that would benefit. In contrast, sector-specific policies aim to modernize of an older
industry or accelerate innovation to solve certain grand societal problems. Other sector-neutral
state policy initiatives include research parks, university research initiatives designed to upgrade
capacity, education policy, and export/foreign market support. State-level sector-specific policies
include the creation of industry and entrepreneurial support organizations, enterprise and
emerging technology investment funds, university research initiatives that support specific
sectors, and targeted training programs to grow the level of local human capital in a specific
sector.
The national government is not an active builder of local entrepreneurial ecosystems, but
federal policies indirectly impact on and support ecosystem development. Dixit (2009)
enumerates the importance of country level governance for a properly functioning market
economy. Good national governance is associated with property rights, contract enforcement,
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and collective action. When property rights protection is weak, individuals have a disincentive to
engage in entrepreneurial activity.
Federal policies which are sector-neutral include general infrastructure development,
R&D tax credits and grants, and the Small Business Administration’s SBIR and STTR grants
and I-Corps program. Sector-specific policies include the development of research consortium,
such as Sematech or ARPA-E, and antitrust actions. These policies are not place-specific, yet
when combined with local policies they can help nurture an environment conducive to
innovation and start-ups.
States also create policies and invest to develop the economies with their boundaries.
Bartik (1991) advances the argument that sub-national economic development policies can
significantly affect the growth of a state or metropolitan area and benefit the overall national
economy. Since the 1970s, governors have become more active in economic development,
experimenting with a variety of different programs and policies (Coburn 1995). The idea of
fiscal federalism argues that states and local governments are closer to understanding the
specific context and the needs of their citizens. While the stance of state governments has been
characterized by waves with different orientations, from “smoke-stack chasing” to innovation
and entrepreneurship, Lowe and Feldman (2018) advance the argument that these economic
development strategies present different tools that might be meaningfully combined. Viewed
differently, the emphasis may reflect different temporal priorities: in the 1970s industrial
recruitment was grounded in the primacy of manufacturing and large establishments, while the
more recent emphasis has shifted to reflect changing national priorities. Two points are salient.
Industrial recruitment is still actively practiced, even as its negative consequences are widely
recognized (e.g., Good Jobs First). Second, state policies may extend and augment national
policies, yet these policies often rapidly diffuse and are adopted by states until their coverage is
essentially national. For example, many states have matching funds for federal R&D grants
(Feldman & Lanahan 2015, Lanahan 2016). The program started in North Carolina in 2006 and
as of 2013, 45 states had adopted the program.
Of all levels of jurisdiction, local government and non-profits have the greatest focus and
incentive to support the development of their own ecosystem. Peterson (1981) emphasizes that
the American decentralized federalist system orients policy at the local level to be pro-business.
The funding structure of cities is dependent on the health of the local economy, which provides
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the basis for tax revenues. Peterson argues that this reliance drives local policies and create a
systematic bias towards stimulating economic activity and promoting investments that make for
an attractive business location. Too often the definition of an attractive business climate has
been interpreted as reducing factor costs in production processes. Cities adopt these policies to
reduce their costs relative to other cities, for example providing subsidies for firms’ ‘tax
abatements and below market land costs’ (Erickson 1987). This view of favorable business
climate does not seem to resonate with structural economic change that favors amenities and
agglomeration economies (Christopherson & Clark 2007). A new localism is emerging that
focuses on innovation capacity and transaction costs rather than solely focusing on the cost of
the factors of production.
At the local level, sector-neutral policies also include expansion incentives, financing
subsidies, and place-making investments that are open to all firms. Sector-specific initiatives
include targeted community college educational programs, developing shared facilities for start-
ups, such as clean-rooms, and prototype productions, and fostering networks and social capital
through local government-sponsored events.
An important thing to take away from this overview is that no policy is sufficient and not
all policies are necessary. Unlike cluster theory which tried to prescribe a specific mix of factors
that should be present for a cluster to emerge, ecosystem theory is less deterministic and takes a
more holistic view. Coherence and diversity are the guiding factors when considering the
appropriate policy mix. An additional factor we introduce in the next section that also must be
considered, though, is time.
V. Policy over the Regional Life Cycle
The Republic of Korea provides an accessible example of the temporal staging of
economic development policy (Weiss 2011). From the 1950s to mid-1970s, the initial focus on
the production of relatively simple labor-intensive goods provides a local substitute for imports.
In the second stage, from the late 1970s through the 1980s, the focus shifted towards more
capital-intensive activities and the development of industries such as chemicals, shipbuilding and
steel that could be exported. In the third stage, from 1990 to the present, the emphasis shifted
towards higher value-added and knowledge-intensive activities. The different emphases of policy
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over this 60-year period reveal the promise and the challenges at various stages of
industrialization.
There are other examples of countries experimenting with policies to accomplish specific
objectives needed at a specific time. Avnimelech & Teubal (2006) analyze the emergence of the
Israeli venture capital industry and the co-evolution with the technology sector. Most prominent
was the Yozma program, which was designed to jump-start a domestic venture capital industry
and then to phase out as the industry developed. The logic was that developing the industry
required subsidies to induce investment, but once an entrepreneurial ecosystem developed
government funds were no longer needed. In contrast, Witt (2016) argues that continued
subsidies may prevent owners in the industry to reorient, diversify, innovate, or search for
relocating their resources. The subsidy reduces the competitive pressures and eliminates
incentives to innovate or search for new business opportunities. The competitive situation of the
subsidized industry keeps on worsening and the policy of subsidy payments sooner or later
becomes unsustainable. One notable example is the American steel industry, which collapsed in
the 1980s. The logic extends: the state of Washington had an R&D tax credit from 1995 to 2014.
Over that 20-year time period, small home-grown companies such as Microsoft and Amazon
grew to become tech giants. Other tech companies, such as Google and Facebook, were attracted
to the area due to the benefits of location in the technology agglomeration. The subsidy had
served its purpose (Parkhurst 2012) and was dropped despite significant opposition from the
business community.
These examples illustrate the usefulness of time as an orienting logic for understanding
the mechanisms behind ecosystem creation and the role of policy. Next, we consider the three
phases, objectives for industry emergence and examples of policies. We take the stance that the
local industrial structures in many places have now collapsed. Our discussion will focus more
broadly on the development of an entrepreneurial ecosystem. Since federal policy is ubiquitous,
our focus is more on local and state policy. Yet we acknowledge that at the earlier stage of
development, places will not have tax revenue to allow them to make investment and federal
programs are needed.
Phase I: Nascency
In Phase I, the earliest stage, the objective of policy is best focused toward capacity
building. There are multiple examples of entrepreneurs who started firms in locations where an
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industry did not develop for various reasons (Leslie & Kargan 1996). The ecosystem might be
ill-prepared, or the local culture was not accommodating. Appropriate and sufficiently supplied
infrastructure serves to improve access to markets, reduce unit cost of production and generate
consumer surplus. Infrastructure investments reduce costs of consumption, improve the general
quality of life, and attract private investment. Human capital is also a category of infrastructure
and influences the productivity of other factors of production. These are the necessary first
investment opportunities.
The focus in Phase I should be relatively sector-agnostic in building up infrastructure and
capacity and the human capital stock. For better or worse, it is nearly impossible, as with any
complex system, to identify which firms and technologies will succeed in advance. This argues
against the practice of picking winners but suggests the utility of investing in capacity to see
which entrepreneurs will be able to scale their firms. Because high-growth firms in an economic
ecosystem can only be identified in hindsight, entrepreneurial development programs are
generally not limited to high-growth entrepreneurs. There is little point in trying to attract
venture capital at this point—it will not come and even if they come they will be disappointed
unless there is sufficient deal flow. Policy should instead focus on developing services sectors—
the financial and legal backbone required as the basis for future development. Investments in
universities and a focus on industrial recruitment of large facilities make sense for this early
stage.
This is also a phase at which national investment is critically important for both its
magnitude and the legitimacy it entails. For a place that is struggling, there is limited opportunity
to rise up. Federal policies such as infrastructure investment and research grants have
demonstrated results much greater than the relatively small amount spent on the program would
suggest (Furman 2016). For example, the National Science Foundation (NSF) Established
Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR) and the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) Institutional Development Award (IDeA) program are designed to effect lasting
improvements in a state's or region's research infrastructure, R&D capacity and hence, its
national R&D competitiveness. The goal is to stimulate R&D in regions that normally do not get
government funding.
At the state level, relocation incentives, expansion incentives, university research
initiatives, and education policy are paramount during the capacity building and nascency phase.
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For example, the state of North Carolina reorganized its university system in the 1930s to first
consolidate to create institutions with national distinctions. It then reorganized in 1971 to bring
more institutions under the system to extend the reach of higher education to less developed
regions of the state (Williams 2006). The state of Georgia made extensive efforts to build a
competitive university system from a very weak foundation. An important element of the state’s
program is the Georgia Research Alliance (GRA), a public-private partnership that spent $242
million in state funds and $65 million in private funds during the 1990s, in an effort to foster
economic development by developing and leveraging the research capabilities of the research
universities” (Lambright 2000). The GRA established a consortium of universities that would
work together to build research and innovative capacity and, ultimately, to promote
commercialization and the formation of start-up firms.
At the local level, relocation and expansion incentives, as well as place-making
investments (i.e., developing the services sector) and education programs are also important in
Phase I. The successful attraction of large, technically-oriented corporate research and
manufacturing operations will immediately generate employment. There will be an opportunity
for suppliers to locate nearby. Consider the automobile industry, which has relocated from
Michigan to the American South, with all the suppliers following along. This process can also be
started with homegrown firms. The best example maybe Bentonville Arkansas, home of
Walmart. While complaints about Walmart’s business practices on main street business are well
known (Quinn 2000; Bonanno & Goetz 2012), Walmart has built an industrial agglomeration in
northwest Arkansas, which is the company headquarters.
During Phase I, policymakers should be scanning the landscape and should have a good
understanding of regional assets and capabilities. They should be ready to move policies into the
next stage when there is an indication of emergence. The initial spark will differ from region to
region, and serendipity will be involved. The role of policy is to ready the region—help access
resources that will be required for the spark to take hold.
Phase II: Take-Off
In Phase II, entrepreneurial activity is gaining traction and the motivating role of policy is
to clear a development path for start-ups, provide a soft landing for failed attempts, and encourage
labor mobility. At this point there is growing momentum, and increased recognition in the
national and local press. Policy can capitalize on this momentum. There is a possibility that
15
activity could leave another region, if resources are inadequate. Matti et al. (2017) focus on the
emergence of the wind energy sector in Spain and the multilevel government’s role in providing
market signals and financial support and mechanisms to support the emerging industry. Learning
by doing is a big feature at this stage. National and state policies are implemented at the local
level: while regions and local authorities did not have much input in the formulation of policy,
they were responsible for implementation (Matti et al. 2017: 667).
Local and state policy should focus on continued and strategic attraction of large
multinationals–significant investment by large firms headquartered elsewhere who recognize the
benefits of the local agglomeration–can help with labor mobility and strengthen networks. The
accumulation of knowledge externalities and human capital in clusters of innovative firms is the
engine of endogenous regional growth (Lucas 1988, McCann & Ortega-Argilés 2013, Romer
1986). This churn signals that the place has become established.
The role of policy in this early part of Phase II begins to become less pronounced than in
Phase I. Local and state policy should help firms find new markets, fill gaps in seed finance, and
ramp up “emergence” phase programs including fostering social networks. Broader strategies for
attracting and retaining talented people by enhancing the quality of life, like the investment in its
creative community of Austin, Texas, may also have important consequences for entrepreneurship
(Watson 2001). Policy makers should take broad view to assess weaknesses in ecosystem that
could impede further expansion and identify and support a regional champion or anchor
organization.
As Phase II continues, a period of self-organization and expanded growth takes place.
Beacons from Phase I lead to period of expansion. Arthur (1990) provides a model of regional
development described as self-reinforcing expertise: geographic variance in technical progress
exists because regions with innovative activity develop specialized resources that are critical to
the next phase of innovation. Government intervention is less important at this stage, and the
successful policies which have helped bring the ecosystem to this point can be retracted.
The source of start-ups changes: in the early development of the high-tech economy in the
city, most new entrepreneurs had previous experience working for a large company or for the
university. As these entrepreneurial firms grow, they open training opportunities to potential
entrepreneurs. The spawning of founders from large high-tech firms has been an important factor
in the growth of technology-based entrepreneurial systems in the high-tech regions such as the
16
Research Triangle (Clayton et al. 2019, Donegan et al. 2019), Silicon Valley (Burton et al.
2002), and Austin (Echeverri-Carroll & Oden 2016). Thus, new entrepreneurs may not have
worked for a large firm but have worked for a fast-growing firm, learning the art of creating new
businesses. Agglomeration economies really build up now and are due to organizational
reproduction and inheritance. There is a role for institutions, government, and human agency.
The community of entrepreneurs now becomes a source of knowledge on how to create
and grow a successful firm. How do we observe this? There is a critical mass of second-
generation spawns and the building of institutions based on trust. For-profit ESOs emerge that
partner with public organizations and build social capital, and as Granovetter (1985: 490) pointed
out, extends beyond “pure economic motives” and can “become overlaid with social content that
carries strong expectations of trust and abstention from opportunism” (Granovetter 1985: 490).
Trust in a local economy is important because it facilitates inter-organizational cooperation and
reduces transaction costs associated with monitoring the behavior of others (Poppo & Zenger
2002, Zaheer & Venkatraman 1995). Entrepreneurs and other local champions, therefore, begin to
build institutions and define institutional logics. Entrepreneurial recycling begins as entrepreneurs
recycle the human and other capital they acquired while building their firms back into the
ecosystem. The ecosystem experiences enhance efficiencies both in firm successes and failures.
Social networks are now very dense.
Phase III: Maturity
In Phase III, the ecosystem has long been recognized as legitimate by external
stakeholders and growth processes are self-reinforcing as long as there is reinvention and renewal.
Maturity has been reached when the ecosystem can withstand an economic downturn and there
exists a high degree of labor market thickness (Feldman et al. 2005). Resources are established.
The role for state and local policy is to continue to implement and build off of federal
efforts, prevent stagnation and decline, and look for ways to renew growth either in the dominant
or complementary sectors. Another role is to monitor the sustainability of current practices by
industry and the ecosystem and work to make sure there are not inequitable power dynamics
within the ecosystem which could prevent a diversity of individuals and ideas from percolating
through the system. Jane Jacobs (1961) describes that when the distribution of power in a city or
region becomes restricted to a relatively small number of human agents, long-term economic
evolution and development prospects will be harmed. Jacobs argued that the narrow power base
17
existing in cities such as New York in the 1950s and 1960s was a cause of urban and regional
decline, and it is likely that the broadened distribution of power across wider networks of agency
within such cities has led to their very rejuvenation and heightened rates of economic
development. It is local and state policy makers prerogative to monitor power dynamics and
inclusivity, and make adjustments as needed.
VII. Reflective Conclusions
The contemporary emphasis on innovation and entrepreneurship as a source of economic
growth redefines a role for government and provides a rationale for public policy and public
investment. Innovation comprises the complex and multifaceted process under which creativity
leads to practical application, commercialization, and ultimately economic and societal gain.
Considerable effort has been put toward understanding the process of innovation and identifying
the factors that increase economic growth and prosperity for a region. While there is a broad
consensus that innovation serves as an integral catalyst in leading the trajectory of an economy
and even society forward, the emphasis in economic development policy has unfortunately
remained on traditional attraction and retention incentives, often directed at specific businesses.
This is largely a zero‐sum game with little or no broader effects for economic development. In
addition, local governments tend to do more of the same policies over time, adding incremental
changes to preexisting strategies, rather than a wholesale reconsideration of their investment
strategy. There is much to gain by a new look at advances in the academic literature. Further
work could consider archetypes of places to further calibrate policy responses and help build
vibrant economies.
The model we put forward offers intuitive policy ideas to policymakers. Too often, policy
has simply tried to mimic successful industrial clusters, focused primarily on industrial
specialization, and targeted at a core industry such as biotech or information and communication
technology. Policies to build a local industrial cluster often fail due to lack of understanding of
the context and history of the location. Successful industrial agglomerations are socially
constructed and take a long time to realize their potential. Given this reality, we argue that
policymakers should consider the stage of development of the entrepreneurial ecosystem as an
important element of context to help guide investment decisions. Whether initiatives should be
sector-focused or sector-neutral should also be considered. By better understanding the stage of
18
emergence, policymakers can better consider how to overcome disadvantages and reinforce
advantages.
From these simple steps we hope to increase the dialogue around policy initiatives, which
all too often now is dominated by incentives, leaving other instruments unused. Economic
development requires a portfolio approach and a full and complete toolbox to provide for
widespread prosperity. Our work focuses on the U.S. context and further work could add
typologies of places. Another salient dimension is the urban and rural distinction as well as
consideration of the demographic and labor force characteristics of population of a place. Our
context is more applicable to the developed counties. Further work might adapt this framework
for places in developing countries.
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