[Please see first 1. Appendix A, which has been given priority over the remainder of the petition as of 26 April2004.] 3 April 2005

Luis A. ReyesExecutive Director for OperationsU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionBY EMAIL AS PER 10 CFR 2.206(a)

Dear Mr. Reyes:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, I request that all licenses allowing thepossession, transport, storage, or use of pyrophoric uranium munitionsbe modified to impose enforceable conditions on all such licenseesin order to rectify their misconduct as described below, and anyother corrective action as deemed proper.

The basis for this request is the gross negligence on the part ofthe licensees, as documented by the as yet undisputed facts setforth in NRC allegation number RI-2005-A-0035 below.

This is an exceptionally grave issue involving significant safetyand environmental issues. It is clear on the face of the allegationsthat a result materially different from the issuance of the existinglicenses would have been likely had uranyl nitrate fume emissionfrom uranium munitions been considered upon the initial applicationsfor the licenses allowing them.

Because this request involves the conduct of military functions,in accordance with 10 CFR 2.301, I ask that the Commission providean alternative procedure for adjudication allowing the immediateissuance of orders to protect the health of United States armedforces currently at risk of exposure to uranium munition combustionproducts. This request for an alternative procedure includes butis not limited to: foreshortening of the Commission's customarytime limits in accordance with 10 CFR 2.307(a), expedited issuanceof an initial order in accordance with 10 CFR 2.339(a), and/or theuse of expedited proceedings in accordance with 10 CFR sections2.1400 through 2.1407.

Please confirm receipt by return email with the case file numberassigned to this request. Thank you.

Sincerely,James Salsman

---- NRC ALLEGATION NUMBER RI-2005-A-0035 ----

16 March 2005 [as amended 18 April 2005]

Commissioner Nils DiazChairNuclear Regulatory Commissionand staff

Dr. Jofu Mishimaand colleagues

URANYL NITRATE ALLEGATION FACTS

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen:

This message is intended to clarify and supplement my "Allegationand Emergency Report" sent to the NRC on 12 March 2005. As yet therehas been no dispute of my allegations. However, my earlier messagewas somewhat difficult to read because it preserves the format ofseveral messages of included correspondence. This is the essenceof my allegations:

1. The primary U.S. scientist responsible for the study of depleteduranium munitions safety from no later than 1979 through at least1999, was Dr. Jofu Mishima, who has worked with several colleaguesat Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, under contract from theDepartment of the Army.

2. Dr. Mishima is an author of the following and related publications:

Parkhurst, M.A., J.R. Johnson, J. Mishima, and J.L. Pierce, "Evaluation of DU Aerosol Data: Its Adequacy for Inhalation Modeling," PNL-10903, Richland, WA: Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, December 1995

Gilchrist, R.L., J.A. Glissmyer, and J. Mishima, "Characterization of Airborne Uranium from Test Firings of XM774 Ammunition," PNL-2944, Richland, WA: Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, November 1979

Parkhurst, M.A., J. Mishima, and M.H. Smith, "Bradley Fighting Vehicle Burn Test," PNNL-12079, Richland, WA: Battelle Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, February 1999

3. In email correspondence this year, Dr. Mishima wrote that he wasunaware of the fact that uranium reacts with nitrogen at 700 deg.C.

4. Accordingly, Dr. Mishima indicated that he was unaware of anyattempt to detect uranyl nitrate in the combustion products of DU

ordnance by the Army. This is consistent with all of the publishedliterature and summaries of classified documents I have been ableto find describing the combustion products of uranium munitions.However, European scientists did detect uranyl ion in an enclosedburn last year: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvrad.2004.04.001

4.1. Quoting S. Cotton in _Lanthanides and Actinides_ (New York:Oxford University Press, 1991) page 127: "Aerial oxidation of anyuranium compound eventually results in the formation of a uranylcompound."

4.2. Quoting A. Pfister in Chapter 8, "The Chemical Toxicity ofUranium," of _Depleted Uranium: Sources, Exposure and Health Effects_(World Health Organization, Ionizing Radiation Unit, 2001 --http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/pub_meet/en/Depluranium4.pdf),page 103: "Until more information on the chemical form of uranium andDU in the environment is obtained, it would be prudent to assume thatit is in a soluble form (ICRP Type F)."

4.3. Thirty days after submission of this original allegation, having received no reply from any of the accused, or any contrary viewpoints from any of the dozens of other original recipients, I chose to post my petition and engage in a wide-ranging debate on the health physics-oriented internet mailing list RADSAFE. My posts to that e-mailing list and their replies are available here: http://radlab.nl/pipermail/radsafe/2005-April/date.htmlBecause of replies I received from the readers of RADSAFE, I now believe that the primary culprit in uranium combustion product fume toxicity resulting in chromosome damage as described by H. Schröder, et al. in Radiation Protection Dosimetry 103:211-220 (2003) -- http://rpd.oupjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/103/3/211-- and the 50% increase in birth defects among children fathered by February, 1991 Gulf War veterans as of 1999 described in the two peer-reviewed medical publications cited below, is primarily the UO3 oxide species, which is similar in solubility to uranyl nitrate, but light enough in density to waft away in the updraft from a munitions fire so as not likely to be detected in the open-air burns the licensees have been using (apparently exclusively.) The UO3 oxide species also clumps less readily than the other uranium oxides, which also serves to explain the fact that while the Gmelin Handbook and other actinide references claim UO3 comprises one fifth of uranium's aerial combustion products, the licensees have never detected it in their munitions burn tests.

4.4. Quoting the _Gmelin Handbuch der anorganischen Chemiek_, 8th edition, volume U-C2 (1978), page 118, <<Bei 1200 bis 1800 K verdampft festes U3O8 in Gegenwart von [molekularen] Sauerstoff zu gasfoermigem, vermutlich monomerem UO3.>> Translation: "At 1200 to 1800 degrees Kelvin, solid U3O8, in the presence of [molecular]

oxygen, evaporates into gaseous, probably monomolecular, UO3." Because the licensees safety tests have involved collecting combustion products in solely open-air uranium ordnance burns placed at the base of the munition fire, this explains why they have as yet not detected any of the expected UO3 oxide species.

4.5. Quoting the English translation of the _Gmelin Handbook_, 8thedition: "UO3 [is] solubilized with a half-life of less than two months in the lungs." (volume U-A7 (1982), page 304.) "The appearance potential [of UO2+] from UO2 [is 5 eV.]" (volume U-C5 (1986), pp. 276-8.)

5. The basic fact that uranium reacts with nitrogen gas at 700degrees Celsius has been published in scientific literature sinceat least the 1950s. Many introductory chemistry texts which mentionuranium point out that uranium reacts with most all of the elementsexcept the noble gases. The fact is well known in the nuclear powerindustry, which has been using airborne uranyl nitrate detectorsin places where uranium might react with air since at least the1970s. I have no reason to believe that Dr. Mishima or his associatesdeliberately suppressed the basic fact, and his apparently forthrightemail responses, and his reaction to the Salbu et al. paper linkedabove makes me think that he was actually, somehow, simply unawareof it. However, for anyone with responsibilities he and his colleaguesshouldered, there is absolutely no excuse for not knowing any factso vital to his specific research and general field of study. As alayman, it took me less than two days of library research to learnthe reaction temperature.

6. Uranyl nitrate has a very low melting point compared to any ofthe uranium oxides, and it has a very high vapor pressure, andprecipitates as a film. I haven't been able to determine exactlyhow long it stays dissolved in air under different atmosphericconditions yet.... Uranyl nitrate is much more poisonous than any of the oxides. The extent of the toxicities involved need to be determined.

7. Because of Dr. Mishima and his colleagues' omissions, essentially everything the U.S. government has ever asserted about the safety of pyrophoric DU munitions is invalid. Essentially allcontemporary uranium ordnance safety studies must be redone in orderto determine the extent of uranyl nitrate combustion productemissions.

8. The safety of uranium munitions must henceforth be established from combustion product collection in enclosed, rather than open-air ordnance burn tests. These tests must precisely quantify and qualify at least 99.99% of all uranium combustion products in terms of their chemical formulas, oxidation state, dissolution in air, density, and physical state.

9. The risk from uranium munitions' combustion product inhalationmust be quantified in formal statistical terms, including theexpected risk ratios and their confidence intervals under severalsets of circumstances involving different distances and exposurepatterns which would be expected for military personnel and civilians in and around the areas where uranium munitions may be used, for expected ailments including nephrotoxicity, lung cancer, bone cancer, brain cancer, leukocyte chromosome damage, gonad, sperm, and egg chromosome damage, and resulting congenital malformations in children of the exposed, and all other known ailments resulting from uraniumpoisoning, assuming exposures from direct inhalation, incidental ingestion, and groundwater contamination ingestion.

10. Until the safety risks of pyrophoric uranium munitions are determined accurately, their use should be suspended by all licensees allowed to possess, store, or transport such ordnance.

11. Because of the misconduct brought to light in this allegation, use of pyrophoric munitions without an accurate understanding of the risks involved will henceforth be considered a willful and reckless disregard for the safety of the potentially exposed.

12. Because A. C. Miller, et al., at the U.S. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute have described the toxicity of uranium poisoning apart from its nephrotoxicity as primarily a genotoxicity resulting in oxidative DNA damage from production of hydroxyl radicals -- J. Inorg. Biochem. v. 91 (2002) pp. 246-52:http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12121782&dopt=Abstract-- the licensees should be required to determine the safety andeffectiveness of antioxidant production stimulation therapy, in addition to, or instead of, chelator sequestration therapyfor the treatment of uranium poisoning. Antioxidant production stimulation preparations are available, e.g., as "Protandim," a botanical product from Lifeline Theraputics, Inc., of Denver --http://www.protandim.com/html/about_the_science/protandim_solution.htm-- containing extracts of milk thistle (_silybum marianum_) seed, ashwagandha (_withania somnifera_) root, _bacopa monnieri_ aerial part, and turmeric (_curcuma longa_) rhizome -- or, e.g., as "CMX-1152" a peptide chain of the ependymin protien -- http://www.ceremedix.com/pages/products.html -- available from CereMedix, Inc., of Boston. Please note that the genotoxicityof uranium explains its teratogenic properties cited at the end of the 10 CFR 2.206 petition of 3 April 2005 incorporating this allegation.

13. In a letter of 27 January 2005 to Ms. Sandy Silver, licenseeGeneral Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, enclosed an Information Paper with this statement: "scientific consensus is that remediation of sites where DU munitions were used

is generally unnecessary". In fact, there is no such consensus. That statement in the Information Paper is not supported by any scientific peer-reviewed medical literature. Moreover, the contrary is supported by several peer-reviewed medical publications, many of which are cited in the 10 CFR 2.206 petition of 3 April 2005 which incorporates this allegation. This false representation of a nonexistent scientific consensus is a very serious breach of the public trust by General Myers and his licensee organization. General Myers should be asked to publish a correction of his statement. If he or his designate(s) fail to do so within 45 daysof such a request, then General Myers' organization's licenses should be revoked.

14. The licensees should be required to determine the extent and method(s) of remediation necessary to mitigate the environmental toxicity resulting from the use of pyrophoric uranium munitions,including contaminations of soil, groundwater, streams and rivers,flora and fauna, dust accumulation near fauna and human habitats,and food chain components.

15. The licensees should be required to fully mitigate the environmental toxicity resulting from the use of pyrophoric uranium munitions.

16. Because James Salsman has not been compensated for the research, preparation, submission of these allegations, because of the public service Mr. Salsman has performed in raising these allegations with the appropriate authorities, and because Mr. Salsman is an individual with a net worth of not more than $2 million, he is entitled to compensation for the preparation and submission of the 10 CFR 2.206 petition of 3 April 2003, as amended incorporating this allegations, under the Equal Access to Justice Act, in accordance with 10 CFR 12.103(a)(3), upon proper application in accordance with 10 CFR 12, Subpart B.

Sincerely,James Salsman

---- additional commentary, excerpts, and references ----

It seems to me that since uranium will accumulate in testes, thisexplains the increase in birth defects observed in children fatheredby Gulf War veterans, several years after exposure. See, e.g.:

"Overall, the risk of any malformation among pregnancies reportedby men was 50% higher in Gulf War Veterans (GWV) compared withNon-GWVs" -- http://ije.oupjournals.org/cgi/content/full/33/1/74

"Infants conceived postwar to male GWVs had significantly higherprevalence of tricuspid valve insufficicieny (relative risk [RR],

2.7; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.1-6.6; p = 0.039) and aorticvalve stenosis (RR, 6.0; 95% CI, 1.2-31.0; p = 0.026) compared toinfants conceived postwar to nondeployed veteran males. Among infantsof male GWVs, aortic valve stenosis (RR, 163; 95% CI, 0.09-294; p= 0.011) and renal agenesis or hypoplasia (RR, 16.3; 95% CI, 0.09-294;p = 0.011) were significantly higher among infants conceived postwarthan prewar." --http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12854660&dopt=Abstract

Here are some quotes with their full citations from "A review ofthe effects of uranium and depleted uranium exposure on reproductionand fetal development," in Toxicology and Industrial Health, vol.17, pp. 180-191 (2001), which is temporarily at: http://www.bovik.org/du/reproduction-review-2001.pdf

"In rats, there is strong evidence of DU accumulation in tissuesincluding testes, bone, kidneys, and brain." Pellmar, T.C., Fuciarelli,A.F., Ejnik, J.W., Hamilton, M., Hogan, J., Strocko, S., Edmond,C., Mottaz, H.M. and Landauer, M.R. "Distribution of uranium inrats implanted with depleted uranium pellets," Toxicol Sci, vol.49, pp. 29-39 (1999.)

"Degenerative changes in the testes resulting in aspermia in thetestes and epididymis ... apparently a result of uranyl nitrate"Maynard, E.A., Downs, W.L. and Hodge, H.C., "Oral toxicity of uraniumcompounds," in Voegtlin, C. and Hodge, H.C., editors, Pharmacologyand Toxicology of Uranium, Volume 3 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953),pp. 1221-1369.

"uranium exposure causes morphologic changes in the rat testespossibly as the result of a uranium-induced autoimmune response....Average testes weight was significantly (P0.05) decreased in ratsexposed to uranyl nitrate.... Titers of testicular autoantibodieswere described as fairly high for rats with chronic exposure touranium and the authors relate this finding to the possibility thatthe observed testicular changes are an autoimmune response to proteinconfirmation changes as a result of uranium-protein interactions.Four other references are cited ... as evidence of an interactionbetween uranium and the testes or thyroid but are not reviewedhere." Malenchenko, A.F., Barkun, N.A. and Guseva, G.F., "Effectof uranium on the induction and course of experimental autoimmuneorchitis and thyroiditis," J Hyg Epidemiol Microbiol Immunol, vol.22, pp. 268-277 (1978.)

"The number of female mice impregnated successfully was significantlyreduced at all levels of uranium exposure as compared with negativecontrols." Hu, Q. and Zhu, S., "Induction of chromosomal aberrationsin male mouse germ cells by uranyl fluoride containing enriched

uranium," Mutat Res, vol. 244, pp. 209-214 (1990.)

Testicular injection with ... uranyl fluoride ... resulted in adose-dependent increase in chromosomal aberrations (i.e., DNAbreakage, SCEs) in spermatogonia, primary spermatocytes, and maturesperm of adult mice." Zhu, S.P., Hu, Q.Y. and Lun, M.Y., "Studieson reproductive toxicity induced by enriched uranium," Zhonghua YuFang Yi Xue Za Zhi, vol. 28, pp. 219-222 (1994.)

"existing data indicate that implanted DU translocates to the rodenttestes and ovary, the placenta, and fetus.... DU has been shown tobe genotoxic...." Benson, K.A., Evaluation of the health risks ofembedded depleted uranium (DU) shrapnel on pregnancy and offspringdevelopment, Annual Report No. 19981118065 (October 1998.) Thatquote also cites Pellmar, et al., as above, and A. Miller et al.,from the U.S. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, whosework can be found on MEDLINE.

[The paragraph amendment of 22 April 2005 has been withdrawn by petitioner, in recognition of the provisions of 22 U.S.C. 2778a.]

Appendix A of NRC 10 CFR 2.206 Petition of 3 April 2005, as Amended

26 April 2005

(1.0.) Introduction

This Appendix is part of a presentation intended for the NuclearRegulatory Commission Petition Review Board concerning the petition towhich it is appended, and as a guide to the NRC staff investigatingallegation number RI-2005-A-0035, which is incorporated within thepetition.

(1.1.) Terms

The following terms are used in this Appendix:

"AEA" and "Atomic Energy Act" are both used to mean Title 42, Chapter23 of the United States Code, sections 2011, et seq.

"Board" is used to mean the Petition Review Board of the NuclearRegulatory Commission, coordinated by the NRC Office of Nuclear MaterialSafety and Safeguards, with decision-making authority concerning thispetition.

"CFR" is used to mean the Code of Federal Regulations.

"Commission" and "NRC" are both used to mean the United States Nuclear

Regulatory Commission.

"Gross negligence" is used to mean willful and reckless negligence,including a willful and reckless disregard for due care of healthor safety.

"Hexavalent uranium" is used to mean uranium trioxide (UO3; also knownas uranyl oxide) in monomolecular (monomer) gas, solid particulate fume,or in other condensed or solid form, uranyl nitrate in gaseous vapor,mist, liquid, or other condensed or solid form, free uranyl ion, orany other form or compound of the uranium(VI) ion.

"Uranium munitions licensees" is used to mean the Department of the Army,other branches of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of HomelandSecurity, intelligence agencies, all as applicable, and all persons andorganizations, jointly and separately, who hold or have held, or includewith in their organization other individuals or organizations who holdor have held any NRC license for the use, storage, transportation,or possession of pyrophoric uranium munitions.

"Uranium munitions licenses" is used to mean the NRC licenses for thepossession, storage, transport, or use of pyrophoric uranium munitionsheld by uranium munitions licensees.

"USC" is used to mean the United States Code.

(1.2.) Purpose

This Appendix is intended as part of a presentation to the NRC Officeof Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, the Petition Review Boardassigned to this petition, and the uranium munitions licensees. It isintended to support, clarify, correct, and extend petitioner's 10 CFR2.206 petition of 3 April 2005, concerning gross negligence on the partof uranium munitions licensees, requested corrections in the form ofimmediate orders and license modifications imposing requirements withprovisions intended to enforce them.

This Appendix is also meant to serve as a guide to Commission staffinvestigating allegation number RI-2005-A-0035, which is incorporatedwithin the petition.

(1.3.) Scope

This petition requests immediate action to correct the alleged misconducton the part of uranium munitions licensees, for the protection ofthe heath and safety of people, including United States citizens andpersonnel, and the environment. This petition alleges gross negligenceand other serious misconduct including fraud, willful wrongdoing,and a serious breach of the public trust, on the part of uraniummunitions licensees and their officers, employees, contractors, and

agents. This petition requests specific and identical modifications toall NRC licenses for the use, storage, transportation, or possessionof pyrophoric uranium munitions, intended to correct uranium munitionslicensees' misconduct. This petition requests that all the provisionsmodifying said licenses be constructed with strict enforcement provisions,imposing substantial fines to fullest extent allowed by law, and immediatelicense suspensions or revocations if the uranium munitions licenseesdo not conform to the requirements of the corrective modificationsto their licenses within short lengths of time. This petition alsorequests the suspension of uranium munitions licenses as modifieduntil licensees become compliant with the provisions of the modifiedlicenses. Furthermore, this petition requests immediate and sustainedremediation and mitigation of conditions resulting from warfare andpeacetime activities. Finally, this petition requests optionally anyother corrective action as the Commission may deem proper.

(1.4.) Authorities

The Atomic Energy Act gives the Commission the power and discretionto impose any terms and conditions as necessary to protect publichealth and safety and the environment, upon any Commission licensee,in accordance with 43 USC 2233. The AEA also gives the Commission theauthority and full discretion to modify license terms and conditions uponany petitioner's request, in accordance with 43 USC 2237, 10 CFR 2.206,and 10 CFR 2.202.

The AEA also gives the Commission the authority and full discretion torevoke or suspend any license due to any false statement that wouldwarrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an originalapplication, or due to any violation of, or failure to observe theprovisions of, the AEA, including the mandatory protection of publichealth and safety and the environment, in accordance with 43 USC2336(a). Moreover, the courts have held that section of the AEA providingthat the Commission has the power to revoke any type of license it hasissued when there is a violation or a failure to observe any of the termsor provision of the AEA, invests the Commission with a continuing "police"power over the activity of its licensees (Cities of Statesville, etal. v. Atomic Energy Commission (1969) 441 F.2d 962, 974.) The courts havealso held that the Commission's stringent interpretation that knowledgeof falsity is not necessary for liability for making material falsestatements, that materiality should be judged by whether a reasonablestaff member should consider the information in question in doing hisjob, and that "material false statement" may appropriately be read toinsure that the Commission has access to true and full information,was consistent with the legislative history and with the Commission'sstatutory mandate to insure that the utilization of nuclear materialwill provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public(Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission(1978) 571 F.2d 1289, 1291.)

The AEA also gives the Commission the authority and full discretionto impose civil penalties against any "person" who violates anylicensing rule or order of the Commission, including fines of up to$100,000 per violation or $100,000 per day for continuing violations,in accordance with 43 USC 2282(a). Moreover, the AEA defines the term"person" to include any public institution, every Government agencyother than the Commission, and any of their representatives or agents,at 43 USC 2014(s). The AEA also gives the Commission the authority andfull discretion to require any licensee of byproduct material such asdepleted uranium, including any Federal agency, to undertake monitoring,maintenance, and emergency measures as are necessary to protect publichealth and safety and such other actions as the Commission deems necessaryto comply with standards to protect public health and safety and theenvironment from radiological and non-radiological hazards associatedwith byproduct material, in accordance with 43 USC 2113(b)(5). The AEAalso gives the Commission the authority and full discretion to apply forinjunction of violations or potential violations, including violationsof Commission orders, license modifications, and license suspensions orrevocations, in accordance with 43 USC 2280.

As of 1995, only one Federal Government NRC licensee had chosen tocontest a civil penalty imposed by the Commission. During 1989, ina case involving a spill of americium-241, the Air Force appealed theCommission's imposition a $102,500 fine to the Department of Justice. TheAir Force claimed that the authorization of civil penalties againstFederal Government NRC licensees by the AEA was unconstitutional. TheDepartment of Justice resolved the dispute in an unpublished memorandum,and the Air Force paid the full fine.

Uranium munitions licensees have, in the past, attempted to claimexemptions from regulation requiring remediation or mitigation ofcontamination and injuries resulting from wartime activities. There isno such exemption afforded by law or regulation. Even if exemptionsfrom regulation requiring remediation of contamination and injuriesresulting from wartime activities are afforded by law, regulation,or the discretion of the Commission, all of the misconduct alleged inthis petition took place in part during peacetime and in part within theUnited States ad U.S. territory within the jurisdiction of the Commission,where environmental remediation is still necessary. Moreover, UnitedStates Federal Government agencies are liable for the medical treatmentof many if not most of the uranium inhalation poisoning victims resultingfrom uranium munitions licensees' negligence, gross negligence, willfulmisconduct, and other wrongdoing.

(1.5.) Construction of Petitioner's Intent

This Appendix is intended by petitioner to be given priority over theremainder of the petition without superseding it. In that, if theCommission finds any discrepancy between the remainder of the petitionand this Appendix, then the provisions of this Appendix should be

construed as petitioner's actual intent. If, however, the Commissionfinds any assertion, request, or other construction in the remainder ofthe petition, which is not found, contradicted, specified, or otherwiseincluded in this Appendix, then that portion of the remainder of thepetition should be construed as petitioner's actual intent.

(1.6.) Severability

If any provision of this petition is found to be invalid or otherwiseinsufficiently supported by fact, regulation, or law, then the remainderof the petition without the invalid or insufficiently supported provisionor provisions should be construed as petitioner's actual intent, as ifthe petitioner had not included the invalid or insufficiently supportedprovision or provisions, and in light of any context that the invalidor insufficiently supported provision or provisions provide.

(1.7.) Disclaimer

Petitioner is not an attorney and this petition is not legal advice. Ifthe Commission or licensees require legal advice concerning this petition,then they should consult an attorney in coordination with an expertor experts having sufficient knowledge of the scientific and technicaltopics involved in this petition.

(1.8.) Historical Note

In recognition of the provisions of 22 USC 2778a, petitioner'ssingle-paragraph petition amendment of 22 April 2005, concerning the defacto battlefield export of depleted uranium, was withdrawn on 24 April2005, and is replaced with this Appendix.

(2.0.) Evidence

Petitioner requests that the Commission find and take formal notice of thefollowing evidence drawn from the peer-reviewed and expository scientificand medical literature, news event reporting, and other sources, anddetermine independently its accuracy, relevance, and resulting authorityover the matters of this petition:

(2.1.) Aerial Combustion of Metallic Uranium Produces Hexavalent Uranium,Including About 20% of the Initial Uranium as Monomeric Uranium Trioxide

The <<Gmelin Handbuch der anorganischen Chemiek,>> 8th edition, includingits English translation, the "Gmelin Handbook of Inorganic Chemistry,"in its various sub-volumes of volume U (<<Uran>>/"Uranium"), includingthose pertaining to the general chemistry of uranium and the specificchemistry of the uranium-oxygen system, provides several phase diagramssuggesting that about one-fifth of metallic uranium oxidized in airor molecular oxygen gas becomes hexavalent uranium trioxide (UO3),also known as uranyl oxide, or uranium(VI) trioxide. The different

phase diagrams provided in the Gmelin handbooks and other authoritativeactinide chemistry reference books suggest substantially differentamounts of the original metallic uranium becomes UO3 when burned in air,but petitioner's best recollection is that they all were within a rangefrom 10% to 30%. Petitioner is of the firm opinion that the extent ofproduction of uranium trioxide and other forms of hexavalent uranium,if any, from aerial uranium ignition, must be determined empirically,for reasons which will become apparent in this Appendix.

R.J. Ackermann, R.J. Thorn, C. Alexander, and M. Tetenbaum, in "FreeEnergies of Formation of Gaseous Uranium, Molybdenum, and TungstenTrioxides," Journal of Physical Chemistry, vol. 64 (1960) pp. 350-5state within their abstract, "gaseous monomeric uranium trioxide isthe principal species produced by the reaction of U3O8 with oxygen."They indicate that this occurs at about 1000 degrees Celsius and above,below the temperatures reported elsewhere for pyrophoric uranium ordnancefires. By "monomeric," the authors clearly mean "monomolecular," andindicate that almost all such UO3 produced is in the gaseous state andcomprised of single molecules. Alexander was shown as affiliated withBattelle Memorial Institute in Columbus, OH, while Ackermann and Thornwere with Argonne National Laboratory in Lemont, IL.

The 1960 Ackermann et al. study is still considered authoritative, inthat the following recent peer-reviewed scientific publications citeit as an authority: K. Nakajima and Y. Arai, in "Mass-spectrometricinvestigation of UO{sub 3}(g)," J. Nucl. Mater., vol. 294, no. 3 (2001)pp. 250-255, which has been cited by other scientific publications atleast once. D.W. Green, "Relationship between spectroscopic data andthermodynamic functions; application to uranium, plutonium, and thoriumoxide vapor species," J. Nucl. Mater., vol. 88, no. 1 (1980) pp. 51-63,which has been cited by other scientific publications at least sixtimes. R.J. Ackermann and A.T. Chang, "Thermodynamic Characterization ofU3O8-Z Phase," J. Chem. Thermodyn., vol. 5, no. 6 (1973) pp. 873-890,which has been cited by other scientific publications at least thirtytimes. Four earlier peer-reviewed publications which cite the Ackermannet al. (1960) paper, which together have been cited at least 98 times,are provided with their full bibliographies on the internet at: http://www.bovik.org/du/2bibs.html

Simon Cotton, in his scholarly expository monograph entitled "Lanthanidesand Actinides," (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) on page 127writes, "Aerial oxidation of any uranium compound eventually results inthe formation of a uranyl compound."

B. Salbu, et al., in "Oxidation states of uranium in depleted uraniumparticles from Kuwait," Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, vol. 78,no. 2 (October 2004) pp. 125-135, found spectrographic evidence ofhexavalent uranium ions and UO3 particles in an enclosed pyrophoricuranium munitions burn.

Petitioner believes but has not direct evidence that trace quantities ofhexavalent uranyl nitrate will form from rapidly cooled uranium combustionproducts, especially in the presence of nitrogen-based explosive orpropellant combustion and limited ventilation, for example inside agun tube. For reference, according to the U.K. Ministry of Defense,the raw material in depleted uranium munitions is about 99% uranium-238.

The U.K. Ministry of Defense also discusses the production of UO3 (citing"Health and Environmental Consequences of Depleted Uranium Use in the USArmy," Technical Report, US Army Environmental Policy Institute, 1995)and gun barrel contamination at: http://www.mod.uk/issues/depleted_uranium/du_research/health_source.htm

(2.2.) Licensee Uranium Munitions Tests Have Never Detected HexavalentUranium, Including Uranium Trioxide (UO3)

Petitioner has been unable to find any documentation from U.S. sourcesdirectly confirming the detection of UO3 or any other form of hexavalenturanium.

According to the earliest report describing the composition ofpyrophoric uranium munitions combustion products obtained by petitioner,R.L. Gilchrist, J.A. Glissmyer, and J. Mishima, "Characterization ofAirborne Uranium from Test Firings of XM774 Ammunition," PNL-2944,Richland, WA: Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, November 1979. Inits summary (page ix), the resulting products were roughly estimatedas "2.4 kg of airborne DU" per firing of each 105-mm, APFSDS-T XM774tank penetrator round. The combustion products were described thusly,"About 75% of the airborne DU was U3O8, and 25% was UO2." Please notethat this proportion is consistent with the expected metallic aerialuranium combustion products of 20% UO2, 60% U3O8, and 20% UO3, exceptthat the uranium trioxide is missing.

The same proportion is repeated in subsequent publications, accordingto their unclassified summaries at: http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/du_ii/du_ii_tabl1.htmand: http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/du_ii/du_ii_tabl2.htmNo mention of "uranium trioxide" or "UO3" is made on either of thosesummary compilation pages.

The summary for M.A. Parkhurst, J.R. Johnson, J. Mishima, and J.L. Pierce,"Evaluation of DU Aerosol Data: Its Adequacy for Inhalation Modeling,"PNL-10903, Richland, WA: Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory,December 1995, states: "this study evaluated existing research data onthe characteristics of DU aerosols generated under various conditions,focusing on chemical composition, particle size, and solubility in lungfluid. The report summarizes more than 20 of Battelle's own studies and20 more studies conducted by other researchers. Although the researcherscited several areas as needing further research (e.g., resuspension

and particle size distribution), the researchers deemed the data'soverall quality adequate to conservatively estimate dispersion andhealth effects." No mention is made of the missing expected uraniumtrioxide. From February, 2005, through April, petitioner has beencorresponding through a series of about a dozen email messages with theauthors Drs. Mishima, Parkhurst, and Johnson. During that time none hasever claimed that any of their studies has ever detected the UO3 oxidespecies or any other form of hexavalent uranium.

The "Gmelin Handbook," vol. U-C1 (1977), page 98, states that the takingup of oxygen by U3O8, "is not infrequently ignored."

(2.3.) Licensee Uranium Munitions Tests Have Never Been Able To DetectMonomolecular Uranium Trioxide Gas, and Licensees Have Never Attemptedto Detect It

The reason that the uranium munitions licensees have never been able todetect UO3 is that it is almost entirely monomolecular (i.e., monomeric:Ackermann et al., 1960) but they have only been using particulate samplers(using HEPA-type filters) and cascade impactors (dust separators.) Noconsideration has apparently ever been made by uranium munitions licenseesof the existence of UO3 particles less than 0.003 microns in size.

Indeed, in J.A. Glissmeyer, J. Mishima, and J.A. Bamberger, "PrototypeFiring Range Air Cleaming System," 18th DoE Nuclear Airborne WasteManagement and Air Cleaning Conference Proceedings, August, 1984,pp. 846-872, on page 855 describes what they believed at the time to be,"the distribution with the largest fractions of small particles," listingthe smallest two categories as (1) particles less than 0.18 microns insize, 31% by mass, and (2) particles from 0.18 to 0.56 microns in size,14% by weight.

Clearly the uranium munitions licensees were never able to detect,and have never been able to detect monomolecular UO3.

According to the CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, Section F,"Characteristics of Particles and Particle Dispersoids," (fromC.E. Lapple, Stanford Research Institute Journal, vol.5 (1961) page95) the terminal gravitational settling velocity of particles lessthan 10 Angstroms in diameter such as monomeric UO3 (monomolecularuranium trioxide particle) in air at 25 degrees C. is less than 0.02microns/second, while the diffusion coefficient for such moleculesis between 0.2 and 0.05 cm^2/second, implying that few such particleswould have ever reached collectors placed at the base of fires, fromwhich updrafts from the heat of combustion would have removed them, andmost would have escaped any form of filtration collection. In contrast,a particle of 0.2 microns in diameter, which would be typical for the UO2and U3O8 oxide fumes, settles much faster, at about 4 microns/second,and diffuses much more slowly, at about 2x10^-6 cm^2/second (== 200microns^2/second.) These dispersion characteristics seem to provide

an adequate basis for the unexpectedly large exposure rates and thecorresponding symptoms seen in exposed populations.

Other reports in the peer-reviewed scientific literature have alsoignored the existence of monomolecular UO3 gas, e.g., . Mitsakou, et al.,"Modeling the Dispersion of Depleted Uranium Aerosol," Health Physics,vol. 84, no. 4 (2003) pp. 538-544, and R.E.J. Mitchel and S. Sunder,"Depleted Uranium Dust from Fired Munitions: Physical, Chemical andBiological Properties," Health Physics, vol. 87, no. 1 (2004), pp. 57-67;both indicate they measured no combustion products smaller than 0.5microns, and neither consider any form of hexavalent uranium at all.

(2.4.) Hexavalent Uranium, Including Uranium Trioxide, Poses a SubstantialNon-Radiological Hazard to Public Health, Safety, and the Environment

U.K. Materials Safety Data Sheets list all hexavalent compounds ofuranium, including uranium trioxide, as "very toxic by inhalation," "verytoxic by ingestion," and "with cumulative effects." That is the greatestcategory of toxicity (U.S. M.S.D.S. have fewer toxicity categories.)

The abstract of P.E. Morrow, et al., "Inhalation Studies of UraniumTrioxide," Health Physics, vol. 23 (1972), pp. 273-280, states:"inhalation studies with uranium trioxide (UO3) indicated that thematerial was more similar to soluble uranyl salts than to the so-calledinsoluble oxides ... UO3 is rapidly removed from the lungs, with mostfollowing a 4.7 day biological half time." This indicates that uraniumtrioxide is is as non-radiologically toxic as the most hazardous uraniumcompounds.

"Normal functioning of the kidney, brain, liver, and heart can beaffected by DU exposure" (E.S. Craft, et al., "Depleted and naturaluranium: chemistry and toxicological effects," Journal of Toxicologyand Environmental Health Part B, Critical Reviews, vol. 7, no. 4 (2004)pp. 297-317.)

The non-radiological heavy metal toxicity of uranium is a million timesworse than its radioactivity, with regard to certain aspects of biologicalpoisoning, including genetic damage. The abstract of A.C. Miller,et al., of the U.S. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute,"Depleted uranium-catalyzed oxidative DNA damage: absence of significantalpha particle decay," Journal of Inorganic Biochemistry, vol. 91, no. 1(2002) pp. 246-252, states: "Depleted uranium ... is both neoplasticallytransforming and genotoxic.... DU can generate oxidative DNA damage andcan also catalyze reactions that induce hydroxyl radicals.... chemicalgeneration of hydroxyl radicals was calculated to exceed the radiolyticgeneration by one million-fold."

"There is strong evidence of DU accumulation in tissues includingtestes, bone, kidneys, and brain." (T.C. Pellmar, et al., "Distributionof uranium in rats implanted with depleted uranium pellets," Toxicol

Sci, vol. 49 (1999) pp. 29-39.) "Degenerative changes in the testesresulting in aspermia in the testes and epididymis ... apparently aresult of uranyl nitrate" (E.A. Maynard, et al., "Oral toxicity ofuranium compounds," in Voegtlin and Hodge, editors, Pharmacologyand Toxicology of Uranium, vol. 3 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953)pp. 1221-1369.) "Uranium exposure causes morphologic changes in therat testes.... Titers of testicular autoantibodies were describedas fairly high for rats with chronic exposure to uranium.... Fourother references are cited ... as evidence of an interaction betweenuranium and the testes or thyroid" (A.F. Malenchenko, et al., "Effectof uranium on the induction and course of experimental autoimmuneorchitis and hyroiditis," J. Hyg. Epidemiol. Microbiol. Immunol.,vol. 22 (1978) pp. 268-277.) "The number of female mice impregnatedsuccessfully was significantly reduced at all levels of uranium exposure"(Q. Hu and S. Zhu, "Induction of chromosomal aberrations in male mousegerm cells by uranyl fluoride containing enriched uranium," MutationResearch, vol. 244 (1990) pp. 209-214.) "Existing data indicate thatimplanted DU translocates to the rodent testes and ovary, the placenta,and fetus.... DU has been shown to be genotoxic...." (Benson, K.A.,"Evaluation of the health risks of embedded depleted uranium (DU) shrapnelon pregnancy and offspring development," Annual Report No. 19981118065.)

H. Schröder, et al., "Chromosome aberration analysis in peripherallymphocytes of Gulf war and Balkans war veterans," Radiation ProtectionDosimetry, vol. 103 (2003) pp. 211-220, indicates more than a 500%increase in chromosome damage among veterans who have served in warswhere pyrophoric uranium munitions were used.

"Overall, the risk of any malformation among pregnancies reported bymen was 50% higher in Gulf War Veterans (GWV) compared with Non-GWVs"(P. Doyle, et al., "Miscarriage, stillbirth and congenital malformationin the offspring of UK veterans of the first Gulf war," InternationalJournal of Epidemiology, vol. 33, no. 1 (2004) pp. 74-86.) "Infantsconceived postwar to male GWVs had significantly higher prevalenceof tricuspid valve insufficicieny (relative risk [RR], 2.7....) andaortic valve stenosis (RR, 6.0...) compared to infants conceivedpostwar to nondeployed veteran males. Among infants of male GWVs,aortic valve stenosis (RR, 163....) and renal agenesis or hypoplasia(RR, 16.3...) were significantly higher among infants conceived postwarthan prewar" (M.R. Araneta, et al., "Prevalence of birth defects amonginfants of Gulf War veterans in Arkansas, Arizona, California, Georgia,Hawaii, and Iowa, 1989-1993," Birth Defects Research, Part A, Clinicaland Molecular Teratology, vol. 67, no. 4 (2003) pp. 246-260)

"DU is a toxin that crosses the blood-brain barrier, producing behavioralchanges in male rats and lipid oxidation regardless of gender in as littleas 2 weeks in the rat." (W. Briner and J. Murray, "Effects of short-termand long-term depleted uranium exposure on open-field behavior and brainlipid oxidation in rats," Neurotoxicology and Teratololgy, vol. 27,no. 1 (2005) pp. 135-144.

The catalytic production of free radicals by uranium attacks proteinin addition to DNA. (H. Huang, et al., "Uranyl-peptide interactionsin carbonate solution with DAHK and derivatives," Inorganic Chemistry,vol. 44, no. 4 (2005) pp. 813-815.)

Uranium is known to accumulate in groundwater, streams, the food chain,and the ecosystem (S.C. Shepard, et al., "Derivation of ecotoxicitythresholds for uranium," Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, vol. 79,no. 1 (2005) pp. 55-83.)

Environmental uranium contamination is difficult to mitigate or remediate(B.P. Jackson, et al., "Application of Flow Field Flow Fractionation-ICPMSfor the Study of Uranium Binding in Bacterial Cell Suspensions,"Analytical Chemistry, vol. 77 (2005) pp. 1393-1397.)

(2.5.) Chelator Sequestration Therapy Is The Only Known Form ofTherapeutic Medical Treatment for Uranium Poisoning Victims

After an extensive literature search of the available medical meansof treating uranium poisoning, the only pertinent therapies of whichpetitioner was able to learn involved chelator sequestration. Chelatorsequestration is not always safe, and it is only effective if started soonafter heavy metal exposure and if sustained for a considerable lengthof time. Petitioner has collected a number of peer-reviewed scientificand medical publications concerning chelator sequestration therapy,and temporarily placed them, for critical and educational "fair use"purposes, in the directory located on the internet at: http://www.bovik.org/du

(2.6.) Antioxidant Production Stimulation Therapy Is New

Preparations intended to stimulate the production of a chordate's cellularantioxidant substances, intended for therapeutic defense against freeradical compounds including the hydroxyl ion, have recently been (over thepast two years) announced by at least two manufacturers. "Protandim,"a botanical product from Lifeline Therapeutics, Inc., of Denver,includes extracts of milk thistle (silybum marianum) seed, ashwagandha(withania somnifera) root, bacopa monnieri aerial part, and turmeric(curcuma longa) rhizome (www.protandim.com.) "CMX-1152," and relatedpeptides of the ependymin protein, are available from CereMedix, Inc.,of Boston (www.ceremedix.com.)

(2.7.) Incorporation by Reference of Uranium Munitions Licensees'Officer's Claim Concerning An Asserted Scientific Consensus Pertainingto Environmental Remediation

In a letter of 27 January 2005 to Ms. Sandy Silver, a representativeof an international open membership organization, licensee GeneralRichard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, enclosed an

Information Paper intended for the recipient's entire organization withthis statement: "scientific consensus is that remediation of siteswhere DU munitions were used is generally unnecessary." The letter andinformation paper were transcribed and are available on the internet here: http://radlab.nl/pipermail/radsafe/2005-April/001280.html

(3.0.) Requested Findings of Fact

Petitioner requests that the Commission find the following factualconclusions based on the evidence cited above:

(3.1.) Hexavalent Uranium Is a Product of Aerial Uranium Combustion

Petitioner requests that the Commission find the fact that hexavalentforms of uranium, including monomolecular uranium trioxide gas, areproduced when uranium metal is burned in air, and that the fact issupported by multiple publications from the peer-reviewed scientificliterature cited above, and that those publications are consideredaccurate and authoritative by recent peer-reviewed scientificpublications, and that the fact is not contradicted by any knownpublications.

(3.2.) Uranium Munitions Licensees Knew, or Should Have Known, thatHexavalent Uranium Is a Product of Aerial Uranium Combustion

Petitioner requests that the Commission find the fact that uraniummunitions licensees knew, or beyond any reasonable doubt should haveknown, that hexavalent uranium, including monomolecular uranium trioxidegas, is produced by the combustion of metallic uranium in air. Indetermining the accuracy of this fact, petitioner requests that theCommission consider the number of researchers who contributed to safetystudies of pyrophoric uranium munitions, their education, credentials,training, and responsibilities, the dates that the safety studies wereperformed, the dates that the underlying fact was published, the numberof publications available to the researchers which cited the underlyingfact, the number of science indexes available at the time which wouldhave assisted in learning the underlying fact, the access that theresearchers had by telephone and written communication to experts inthe field, and related factors.

(3.3.) Uranium Munitions Licensees Never Attempted to Detect or WereAble to Detect Hexavalent Uranium in Safety Studies of PyrophoricUranium Munitions

Petitioner requests that the Commission find the fact that uraniummunitions licensees to date have never attempted to detect, and werenever able to detect hexavalent uranium in the safety studies theyhave performed concerning pyrophoric uranium munitions. Petitionernotes that sworn testimony and/or subpoena of obscure documents may benecessary to fully determine the accuracy of this fact. In any case,

petitioner requests that the Commission consider the relatively slowterminal gravitational settling velocity, and the relatively rapiddiffusion coefficient, of monomeric UO3 particles, implying that fewsuch particles would ever reach collectors placed at the base of fires,from which updrafts from the heat of combustion would have removed them,and most would escaped any form of filtration collection.

(3.4.) Hexavalent Uranium Is Hazardous

Petitioner requests that the Commission find the fact that hexavalentforms of uranium including uranium trioxide gas, present a serious hazardto health, safety, and the environment, and that those hazards includepoisoning by ingestion and inhalation, contamination of groundwater,contamination of the food chain, and contamination of the ecosystem,and that the fact is supported by multiple publications from thepeer-reviewed scientific literature cited above, and that thosepublications are considered accurate and authoritative by recentpeer-reviewed scientific publications, and that the fact is notcontradicted by any known publications.

(3.5.) Uranium Munitions Licensees Knew, or Should Have Known, thatHexavalent Uranium Is Hazardous

Petitioner requests that the Commission find the fact that uraniummunitions licensees knew, or beyond any reasonable doubt shouldhave known, that hexavalent uranium, including uranium trioxide,presents a substantial danger to the health and safety of humans andthe environment. In determining the accuracy of this fact, petitionerrequests that the Commission consider the number of researchers whocontributed to safety studies of pyrophoric uranium munitions, theireducation, credentials, training, and responsibilities, the dates thatthe safety studies were performed, the dates that the underlying factwas published, the number of publications available to the researcherswhich cited the underlying fact, the number of science indexes availableat the time which would have assisted in learning the underlying fact,the access that the researchers had by telephone and written communicationto experts in the field, and related factors.

(3.6.) The Extent of the Risk Posed from Hexavalent Uranium fromPyrophoric Uranium Munitions Is Presently Unknown

Petitioner requests that the Commission find the fact that the extent ofthe risk posed from hexavalent uranium, including uranium trioxide gas,from pyrophoric uranium munitions is presently unknown, because therehave been no known studies of aerial uranium combustion to date whichhave considered the safety of any of its hexavalent uranium products.

(3.7.) Because Uranium Munitions Licensees Have Not Considered Effectsof Hexavalent Uranium, The Extent and Methods of Remediation Necessaryto Mitigate the Environmental Toxicity Resulting from Use of Pyrophoric

Uranium Munitions Is Presently Unknown

Petitioner requests that the Commission find the fact that theextent required for remediation and the best methods for mitigatingenvironmental hexavalent uranium contamination from pyrophoric uraniumordnance combustion products are at present unknown because there havebeen no studies by uranium munitions licensees or anyone else consideringsuch methods or the extent of remediation required.

(3.8.) Uranium Munitions Licensees Have Asserted a Scientific ConsensusExists That Remediation of Sites Where Pyrophoric Uranium Munitions WereUsed Is Generally Unnecessary

Petitioner requests that the Commission find the fact that JointChiefs of Staff Chair General Richard Myers is an executive officer of,and therefore a representative of, most if not all uranium munitionslicensees, and on 27 January 2005 asserted, "scientific consensus isthat remediation of sites where DU munitions were used is generallyunnecessary," and therefore uranium munitions licensees have assertedthat a scientific consensus exists that remediation of sites wherepyrophoric uranium munitions were used is generally unnecessary.

(3.9.) Known Safe and Effective Therapies for Uranium Poisoning PresentlyExclude Antioxidant Production Stimulation Therapy

Petitioner requests that the Commission find the fact that medicaltherapies as described in the peer-reviewed and expository medicalliterature as safe and effective for uranium poisoning (e.g., chelatorsequestration therapy) do not at present include treatment to stimulatean organism's cellular production of antioxidant substances.

(4.0.) Rules and Inferences from Definitions

Petitioner requests that the Commission notice and agree to the followingrules and inferences based on promulgated regulations, statutes, anddefinitions drawn from regulatory, legal, and reference authorities:

(4.1.) NRC Severity Level I Violations Include Those Which Cause ImmediateRisk or Danger to Safety or Health, or Release to the EnvironmentSubstantial Amounts of Toxic Materials Regulated by the Commission

According to the Commission's Enforcement Manual and Inspection Manual,severity level I violations include those which cause immediate riskto safety, or immediate danger to safety, or immediate risk to health,or immediate danger to health, or release to the environment substantialamounts of materials regulated by the commission which pose a radiologicalor non-radiological hazard.

(4.2.) Failing to Detect a Hazardous Substance in a Safety Study,Resulting in Multiple NRC Severity Level I Violations, Constitutes

Negligence

Ballentine's Law Dictionary, citing Fort Smith Gas Co. v. Cloud, 75 F2d413, defines "negligence" as the violation of a duty to use care. Becausecare is required to study safety accurately, a lack of care in a safetystudy resulting in the failure to detect a hazardous substance, whichin turn results in multiple severity level I violations, constitutesnegligence.

(4.3.) Failing to Attempt to Detect a Substance Known, or Which ShouldHave Been Known, to be Hazardous, in a Safety Study when the HazardousSubstance is Known, or Should Have Been Known, to be a Product of theSubject of Study, Constitutes Willful Negligence

Ballentine's Law Dictionary, citing Spies v. United States, 317 US492, defines "willful" as voluntary instead of accidental. Therefore,voluntarily omitting any attempt to detect a substance known, or whichshould have been known, to be both hazardous and a product of the subjectof a safety study, constitutes willful negligence.

(4.4.) Failing to Detect a Substance Known, or Which Should Have BeenKnown, to be Hazardous in a Safety Study when the Hazardous Substanceis Known, or Should Have Been Known, to be a Product of the Subject ofStudy, Resulting in Multiple NRC Severity Level I Violations, ConstitutesReckless Negligence

Ballentine's Law Dictionary, citing State v. Custer, 129 Kan 381, defines"reckless" as a disregard for consequences under circumstances involvingdanger to life or safety of others. A failure to detect a substance known,or which should have been known, to be both hazardous and a product ofthe subject of a safety study causes that substance and its danger tobe disregarded.

(4.5.) Safety Studies Failing to Attempt to Detect Hazardous Productsof the Subject of Study Are Invalid

Ballentine's Law Dictionary, citing State ex rel. MacKenzie v. Casteel,110 Ind 174, defines "invalid" as having no efficacy. Because a safetystudy failing to attempt to detect, and thus failing to detect,a hazardous product of the subject of study is not effective forevaluating the actual safety of the subject of study, such studies aretherefore invalid.

(4.6.) Statements Based in Whole or in Part on Invalid Studies Are Invalid

As a basic matter of logical reasoning, any representation of, orinferences drawn from, an ineffective assertion of any kind is in turnineffective and thus invalid. Therefore, statements based in whole orin part on invalid studies are in turn invalid.

(4.7.) Licensees' Liabilities Can Not Be Determined Without Valid Studiesof the Safety of Hazardous Regulated Material to Which People Have BeenExposed, or Which Has Been Released to the Environment

Ballentine's Law Dictionary, citing Feil v. Coeur D'Alene, 23 Idaho32, defines "liability" as a legal responsibility to discharge someobligation. Because the extent of the responsibility to providepotential legal obligations including government claims for medicaltreatment of victims exposed to hazardous regulated material due tolicensee misconduct, and environmental remediation of regulated materialcontamination due to licensee misconduct, the extent of licensees'liabilities in cases of personnel exposure to hazardous regulatedmaterial or release of such material to the environment can not bedetermined without effective knowledge of the safety of such material,so valid safety studies are required to know the true extent of licenseeliabilities in such cases.

Please note here also that military licensees have no way to determinewhether the short-term tactical benefit of pyrophoric uranium munitionsoutweighs their long-term strategic drawbacks without accurate knowledgeof their safety. This has significant liability implications regardingthe conduct of warfare, which is beyond the scope of this petition.

(4.8.) Commission Liabilities Can Not Be Determined Without Valid Studiesof the Safety of Hazardous Regulated Material to Which People Have BeenExposed, or Which Has Been Released to the Environment

When it becomes incumbent upon the Commission to reevaluate the terms andconditions of licenses for hazardous regulated material to which peoplehave been exposed or which has been released into the environment, and forwhich it is apparent that no valid safety studies exist at present, thedefinition of "liability" given above implies that the Commission's legalresponsibility to discharge its regulatory obligations to protect publichealth and safety and the environment, as codified in the provisionsof the AEA, depends upon the extent of the danger posed by the releasedregulated substance. Therefore, valid safety studies are also requiredto evaluate Commission liabilities in such cases.

(4.9.) Licensees' Liabilities Can Not Be Determined Without Determinationof the Best Safe and Effective Medical Therapies for Treatment ofPoisoning by Hazardous Released Regulated Material

Because the extent of the expenditures required for medical treatmentof victims exposed to hazardous regulated material due to licenseemisconduct depends upon the safety, effectiveness, and availabilityof the best such treatments, the definition of "liability" given aboveimplies that licensees' legal responsibility to discharge compensatoryobligations depends upon the knowledge of the best available safe andeffective treatments for such victims. Therefore, the extent of licenseeliability for medical therapies for victims poisoned by such released

regulated hazardous material can not be known without knowledge of thebest such safe and effective therapies.

(4.10.) Licensees' Liabilities Can Not Be Determined Without Determinationof the Best Means of Environmental Remediation of Hazardous ReleasedRegulated Material

Because the extent of the expenditures required for environmentalremediation of regulated material contamination due to licenseemisconduct depends upon knowledge of the best means of such remediation,the definition of "liability" given above implies that licensees' legalresponsibility to discharge compensatory obligations depends upon theknowledge of the best means of such environmental remediation. Therefore,the extent of licensee liability for environmental remediation can notbe known without knowledge of the best means of environmental remediationof released regulated hazardous material.

(4.11.) A False Assertion May Serve to Protect against Allegations ofLiability and Potential Liabilities

The definition of "liability" above, as a legal responsibility todischarge some obligation, implies that if some entity liable orpotentially liable for some obligation is able to convince a person,who might make a claim upon the obligation, that no such obligationexists, then a false assertion made by the entity which convinces theperson that the obligation does not exist serves to protect the entityagainst allegations that the obligation exists and serves to protectagainst potential legal enforcement of the obligation. Therefore, afalse assertion may serve to protect against allegations of liabilityor potential liabilities.

(4.12.) An Intentionally False Assertion Serving to Protect AgainstAllegations of Liability or Potential Liabilities Is Fraudulent

Ballentine's Law Dictionary, citing 23 Am J2d Fraud Section 2, definesfraud as deception operating prejudicially on the rights of another,and so intended, by inducing him to part with some legal right. Becausea false assertion may serve to protect against enforcement of a legallyrequired obligation, that deceptive assertion operates prejudiciallyagainst anyone owed the obligation. And so if the assertion is intendedto induce them to part with their legal rights to obtain the benefits ofthe obligation and enforcement of the obligation, then the assertion isfraudulent. Therefore, such a false assertion serving to protect againstallegations of liability or potential liabilities, if intentionally made,is fraudulent.

(4.13.) A False Assertion Intentionally Made to Misrepresent the Safetyof Licensed Hazardous Material Is Willful Misconduct for Which a LicenseMay Be Revoked

Commission enforcement guidelines as specified in the NRC EnforcementManual define willful misconduct as intentional wrongdoing on the partof a licensee or its officers or agents, in violation of the AEA ora license provision. The AEA, at 43 USC 2336(a), specifies that if alicensee makes a false statement that would warrant the Commission torefuse to grant a license on an original application, then the licensemay be revoked. Because an intentional false misrepresentation of thesafety of licensed hazardous materials might warrant the commissionto refuse to grant a license on an original application, and becauseit constitutes a violation of the licensee's mandatory duty to protectpublic health and safety and the environment in accordance with the AEA,such an intentional misrepresentation is willful misconduct for whicha license may be revoked. In Cities of Statesville, et al. v. AtomicEnergy Commission (1969) 441 F.2d 962, at page 974, the Court held thatthe AEA at 43 USC 2336(a), providing that the Commission has the powerto revoke any type of license it has issued when there is a violation ora failure to observe any of the terms or provision of the AEA, investsthe Commission with a continuing "police" power over the activity ofits licensees. In Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. U. S. NuclearRegulatory Commission (1978) 571 F.2d 1289, at page 1291, the Court heldthat the Commission's stringent interpretation that knowledge of falsityis not necessary for liability for making material false statements,that materiality should be judged by whether a reasonable staff membershould consider the information in question in doing his job, and that"material false statement" may appropriately be read to insure that theCommission has access to true and full information, was consistent withthe legislative history and with the Commission's statutory mandate toinsure that the utilization of nuclear material will provide adequateprotection to the health and safety of the public.

(4.14.) A False Assertion Concerning a Licensee's Duty to Protect PublicHealth and Safety and the Environment Made for Fraudulent PurposesRepresents a Serious Breach of the Public Trust

Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law defines a "breach of trust"as a failure, by a trustee, to perform an obligation created bythe promise, duty, or law comprising the terms of a trust, withoutjustification. Agencies holding Commission licenses are entrusted witha public duty to perform the obligations created by their promiseto comply with the terms and conditions of their licenses, and theprovisions of the AEA law. That public duty includes refraining fromfalse statements that would warrant the Commission to refuse to granta license on an original application, and protection of public healthand safety and the environment. Willful failure of that public duty,such as intentional fraud on the part of a licensee, is consideredserious misconduct according to the NRC Enforcement Manual. Therefore,a false assertion concerning a licensee's duty to protect public healthand safety and the environment made for fraudulent purposes representsa serious breach of their public trust.

(4.15.) Negligence by Licensee Concerning the Safety of Hazardous MaterialRegulated by the Commission Allows the Commission to Order CorrectiveAction and Make Corrective Modifications to Licenses

The provisions of 43 USC 2113(b)(5), 43 USC 2233, 43 USC 2237, 10 CFR2.202, and 10 CFR 2.339(a), provide the Commission with the discretionaryauthority to order corrective action and make corrective modificationsto licenses in response to negligence by a licensee concerning the safetyof hazardous material regulated by the Commission.

(4.16.) Submission of Invalid Safety Studies by Licensee SupportingLicensee Positions in Response to Requests for Information from TheCommission Allows the Commission to Order Corrective Action and MakeCorrective Modifications to Licenses

The provisions of 43 USC 2113(b)(5), 43 USC 2233, 43 USC 2237, 10 CFR2.202, and 10 CFR 2.339(a), provide the Commission with the discretionaryauthority to order corrective action and make corrective modifications tolicenses in response to submission of invalid safety studies by licenseesin support of their positions in response to Commission queries. Pleasesee Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. U. S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission (1978) 571 F.2d 1289, at page 1291, as excerpted above.

(4.17.) Publication of Invalid Statements by Licensee Concerning theSafety of Hazardous Material Regulated by the Commission Allows theCommission to Order Corrective Action and Make Corrective Modificationsto Licenses

The provisions of 43 USC 2113(b)(5), 43 USC 2233, 43 USC 2237,10 CFR 2.202, and 10 CFR 2.339(a), provide the Commission with thediscretionary authority to order corrective action and make correctivemodifications to licenses in response to licensee publication ofinvalid statements concerning the safety of hazardous materialregulated by the Commission. Please see also Virginia Electric andPower Co. v. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1978) 571 F.2d 1289,at page 1291, as excerpted above.

(4.18.) The Necessity of Valid Safety Studies Required by Licensees toAvoid Commission and Licensee Liability, Allows the Commission to OrderCorrective Action and Make Corrective Modifications to Licenses

The provisions of 43 USC 2113(b)(5), 43 USC 2233, 43 USC 2237, 10 CFR2.202, and 10 CFR 2.339(a), provide the Commission with the discretionaryauthority to order corrective action and make corrective modificationsto licenses in response to the need for valid safety studies requiredto avoid additional Commission and licensee liabilities.

(4.19.) A False Assertion, Whether Fraudulent or Not, or WillfulMisconduct, or a Serious Breach of Public Trust, Concerning HazardousMaterials Regulated by The Commission, Allows the Commission to Order

Corrective Action and Make Corrective Modifications to Licenses

The provisions of 43 USC 2113(b)(5), 43 USC 2233, 43 USC 2237, 10 CFR2.202, and 10 CFR 2.339(a), provide the Commission with the discretionaryauthority to order corrective action and make corrective modifications tolicenses in response to a fraudulent assertion, willful misconduct, or aserious breach of the public trust on the part of a licensee concerningthe safety of hazardous material regulated by the Commission. Please seeVirginia Electric and Power Co. v. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission(1978) 571 F.2d 1289, at page 1291, and Cities of Statesville, etal. v. Atomic Energy Commission (1969) 441 F.2d 962, at page 974, asexcerpted above.

(4.20.) Any Severity Level I Violation on the Part of a Licensee Allowsthe Commission to Impose Strict Enforcement Measures Including SubstantialFines and Conditions Under Which Licenses Will Be Suspended or Revoked

The provisions of 43 USC 2233, 43 USC 2237, 43 USC 2282(a), 43 USC2336(a), and 10 CFR 2.202, provide the Commission with the discretionaryauthority to impose strict enforcement measures and civil penaltiesincluding fines of up to $100,000 per violation or $100,000 per day inthe case of a continuing violation, in response to a severity level Iviolations on the part of a licensee. Please see Cities of Statesville,et al. v. Atomic Energy Commission (1969) 441 F.2d 962, at page 974,as excerpted above.

(4.21.) Any Gross Negligence or Willful Misconduct on the Part of aLicensee Allows the Commission to Impose Strict Enforcement MeasuresIncluding Substantial Fines and Conditions Under Which Licenses Will BeSuspended or Revoked

The provisions of 43 USC 2233, 43 USC 2237, 43 USC 2282(a), 43 USC2336(a), and 10 CFR 2.202, provide the Commission with the discretionaryauthority to impose strict enforcement measures and civil penaltiesincluding fines of up to $100,000 per violation or $100,000 per day in thecase of a continuing violation, in response to gross negligence or willfulmisconduct on the part of a licensee. Please see Cities of Statesville,et al. v. Atomic Energy Commission (1969) 441 F.2d 962, at page 974, andVirginia Electric and Power Co. v. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission(1978) 571 F.2d 1289, at page 1291, as excerpted above.

(5.0.) Requested Conclusions

Petitioner requests that the Commission find the following conclusionsin accordance with the facts, rules, and definitions from authoritiesas cited above:

(5.1.) Each Incident of Human Inhalation or Ingestion of SignificantQuantities of Hexavalent Uranium Constitutes a NRC Severity LevelI Violation

Petitioner requests that uranium munitions licensees be required todocument each incident when and where significant quantities of hexavalenturanium was or may have been ingested or inhaled, and that each suchincident be recognized as a severity level I violation by the Commission.

(5.2.) Each Incident of Release to the Environment of SignificantQuantities of Hexavalent Uranium Constitutes a NRC Severity LevelI Violation

Petitioner requests that uranium munitions licensees be requiredto document each incident when and where significant quantities ofhexavalent uranium was or may have been released to the environment,and that each such incident be recognized as a severity level I violationby the Commission.

(5.3.) Because Uranium Munitions Licensees Never Detected HexavalentUranium, and Because Hexavalent Uranium Is Hazardous, and BecauseLicensees Failure to Recognize the Danger Resulted in Multiple NRCSeverity Level I Violations, Uranium Munitions Licensees Were Negligent

Petitioner requests that the Commission find the uranium munitionslicensees, individually and jointly negligent for their multiple severitylevel I violations involving hexavalent uranium, because the licenseesnever detected it or recognized its danger.

(5.4.) Because Uranium Munitions Licensees Knew, or Should Have Known,that Hexavalent Uranium Is Hazardous, and Because They Knew, or ShouldHave Known, that Hexavalent Uranium Is a Product of Aerial UraniumCombustion, and Because They Never Attempted to Detect Hexavalent Uraniumin Safety Studies of Pyrophoric Uranium Munitions, Their NegligenceWas Willful

Petitioner requests that the Commission find the uranium munitionslicensees willfully negligent for their multiple severity level Iviolations involving hexavalent uranium, because the licensees neverattempted to detect it, even though they knew, or should have known,that it was both hazardous and a product of uranium combustion.

(5.5.) Because Uranium Munitions Licensees Knew, or Should Have Known,that Hexavalent Uranium Is Hazardous, and Because They Knew, or ShouldHave Known, that Hexavalent Uranium Is a Product of Aerial UraniumCombustion, and Because Their Failure to Detect Hexavalent Uranium inSafety Studies of Pyrophoric Uranium Munitions Resulted in MultipleNRC Severity Level I Violations, Uranium Munitions Licensees' WillfulNegligence Was Reckless

Petitioner requests that the Commission find the uranium munitionslicensees recklessly and willfully negligent for their multiple severitylevel I violations involving hexavalent uranium, because the licensees

failed to detect it, even though they knew, or should have known, thatit was both hazardous and a product of uranium combustion.

(5.6.) All Studies Performed by Uranium Munitions Licensees Concerningthe Safety of Pyrophoric Uranium Munitions to Date Are Invalid

There have been no safety studies performed by uranium munitions licenseeswhich detected, attempted to detect, or were able to detect hexavalenturanium. Even if there have been such studies performed, they havenot been cited, quoted, or described in any publications or publishedsummaries of unpublished studies of uranium munitions licensees. Even ifsuch studies have been performed and referenced by uranium munitionslicensees, other studies which did not detect, attempt to detect, orwere able to detect, hexavalent uranium have been referenced by uraniummunitions licensees as authoritative in most if not all of their pertinentpublications and summaries of pertinent unpublished material. Moreover,hexavalent uranium is of very serious if not paramount importance inthe evaluation of the safety of any aerial uranium fire.

Therefore, petitioner requests that the Commission find that all thestudies performed by uranium munitions licensees concerning the safetyof pyrophoric uranium munitions to date are invalid.

(5.7.) All Statements Concerning the Safety of Pyrophoric UraniumMunitions Based in Whole or in Part on Safety Studies Performed by UraniumMunitions Licensees, Which They Presently Publish Willfully, Are Invalid

Uranium munitions licensees have publish and continue to publish, inprint, on CD-ROM, and on the internet, hundreds of documents citing theirinvalid safety studies of pyrophoric uranium munitions. Uranium munitionslicensees have produced more than a dozen such publications in the pastyear alone, and regularly refer to them as if they were authoritative,accurate, and valid studies.

As a basic matter of logical reasoning, any representation of, orinferences drawn from, an invalid assertion of any kind is in turninvalid. Therefore, petitioner requests that the Commission find invalidall statements concerning the safety of pyrophoric uranium munitionsbased in whole or in part on any invalid safety studies, including allthose performed by uranium munitions licensees to date.

(5.8.) The Hazard Posed by Hexavalent Uranium from Pyrophoric UraniumMunitions Combustion Is Exceptionally Grave Issue Involving SignificantSafety and Environmental Issues.

Petitioner requests that the Commission find that due of the toxicity,solubility, dispersion, and slow settling of hexavalent uranium producedby pyrophoric uranium munitions, its hazard is an exceptionally graveissue involving significant safety and environmental issues.

(5.9.) A Result Materially Different from the Issuance of ExistingUranium Munitions Licenses Would Have Been Likely Had Hexavalent UraniumEmissions Been Considered Upon the Initial Applications for UraniumMunitions Licenses

Petitioner requests that the Commission find that, because uraniummunitions licensees have thus far substantially misrepresented the safetyof pyrophoric uranium munitions, it is reasonable to conclude that hadthe Commission known the true risks of pyrophoric uranium munitions uponthe original application for licenses, the Commission likely would havenot issued the existing uranium munitions licenses without substantialand restrictive modification, if at all.

(5.10.) Valid Studies of the Safety of Pyrophoric Uranium MunitionsMust Be Performed As Soon As Possible to Avoid Commission and AdditionalLicensee Liabilities

Petitioner requests that the Commission find that valid studies of thesafety of pyrophoric uranium munitions must be accurately performed assoon as possible, so that additional licensee and commission liabilitiesmight be avoided.

(5.11.) The Best Safe and Effective Medical Therapies for UraniumPoisoning Must Be Determined As Soon As Possible to Avoid AdditionalLicensee Liabilities

Petitioner requests that the Commission find that determination of thebest safe and effective therapies be made as soon as possible, so thatadditional licensee liabilities might be avoided.

(5.12.) The Best Means of Remediation for Hexavalent Uranium and RelatedEnvironmental Contamination Must Be Determined As Soon As Possible toAdditional Licensee Liabilities

Petitioner requests that the Commission find that determination ofthe best means of environmental remediation for hexavalent uranium andrelated contamination be made as soon as possible, so that additionallicensee liabilities might be avoided.

(5.13.) Remediation for Hexavalent Uranium and Related EnvironmentalContamination Must Be Performed As Soon As Possible to AdditionalLicensee Liabilities

Petitioner requests that the Commission find that environmental hexavalenturanium and related contamination be mitigated and remediated as soonas possible, so that additional licensee liabilities might be avoided.

(5.14.) Uranium Munitions Licensees' Assertion of a Scientific Consensus,That Remediation of Sites Where Pyrophoric Uranium Munitions Were UsedIs Generally Unnecessary, Is False

Petitioner requests that the Commission find that uranium munitionslicensees' officer was incorrect when, on 27 January 2005, he assertedthat, "scientific consensus is that remediation of sites where DUmunitions were used is generally unnecessary."

(5.15.) Uranium Munitions Licensees' False Assertion of a ScientificConsensus Concerning Site Remediation Served To Protect Licensees fromAllegations of Liability and Potential Liabilities

Petitioner requests that the Commission find that uranium munitionslicensees' officer served to protect licensees from allegations ofliability and potential liability with his false assertion of a scientificconsensus concerning site remediation of 27 January 2005.

(5.16.) Because Uranium Munitions Licensees' False Assertion of aScientific Consensus Concerning Site Remediation Was Intentional, ItWas Fraudulent

Petitioner requests that the Commission find that uranium munitionslicensees' officer's false assertion of a scientific consensus concerningsite remediation of 27 January 2005 serving to protect against allegationsof liability or potential liabilities was made intentionally and thereforefraudulently.

(5.17.) Uranium Munitions Licensees' False Assertion of a ScientificConsensus Concerning Site Remediation Was Made During Licensee andCommission Deliberations on Remediation Actions Required for JeffersonProving Ground and Other Sites, and Was Therefore Willful MisconductFor Which a License May Be Revoked

Petitioner requests that the Commission find that uranium munitionslicensees' officer's false and fraudulent assertion of a scientificconsensus concerning site remediation of 27 January 2005 was madeduring the present time of continuing uranium munitions licensee andCommission deliberations concerning the remediation actions requiredat Jefferson Proving Ground and other contaminated sites, and was madeto willfully misrepresent the safety of Commission-licensed hazardousmaterial contamination, and was therefore willful misconduct for whicha license may be revoked in accordance with 43 USC 2336(a).

(5.18.) Uranium Munitions Licensees' False Assertion of a ScientificConsensus Concerning Site Remediation Is a Serious Breach of TheirPublic Trust

Petitioner requests that the Commission find that uranium munitionslicensees' officer's false and fraudulent assertion of a scientificconsensus concerning site remediation of 27 January 2005 concerneduranium munitions licensees' duty to protect public health and safety,and therefore represented a serious breach of their public trust.

(5.19.) Uranium Munitions Licensees' Negligence Requires CorrectiveAction and Corrective Modifications to Uranium Munitions Licenses.

Petitioner requests that the Commission find that the uranium munitionslicensees' negligence concerning the safety of pyrophoric uraniummunitions requires corrective action, and the imposition of modificationsto their licenses, in order to correct their negligence.

(5.20.) Uranium Munitions Licensees' Gross Negligence Requires CorrectiveAction, and Allows the Imposition of Corrective Modifications to UraniumMunitions Licenses, With Strict Enforcement Measures

Petitioner requests that the Commission find that uranium munitionslicensees' gross negligence requires corrective action, and the impositionof modifications to their licenses, in order to correct their negligence,in addition to the imposition of substantial fines and conditionssuspending or revoking the licenses in case of delay or insufficientcompliance with the corrective requirements on the part of the licensees.

(5.21.) Uranium Munitions Licensees' Submission of Invalid SafetyStudies in Response to NRC Requests for Information Requires CorrectiveAction, and Allows the Imposition of Corrective Modifications to UraniumMunitions Licenses

Petitioner requests that the Commission find that the uranium munitionslicensees' submission of invalid studies concerning the safety ofpyrophoric uranium munitions, provided in response to the Commission'squeries regarding D. Rokke's 2.206 petition in October and November,2000, requires corrective action, and the imposition of correctivemodifications to uranium munitions licenses.

(5.22.) Uranium Munitions Licensees' Continued Willful Publication ofInvalid Statements Concerning the Safety of Pyrophoric Uranium MunitionsRequires Corrective Action, and Allows the Imposition of CorrectiveModifications to Uranium Munitions Licenses, With Strict EnforcementMeasures

Petitioner requests that the Commission find that uranium munitionslicensees' continued willful publication of invalid statements andassertions concerning the safety of pyrophoric uranium munitionsrequires corrective action, imposition of corrective modificationsto their licenses, and imposition of substantial fines and conditionssuspending or revoking the licenses in case of delay or insufficientcompliance with the corrective modifications on the part of the licensees.

(5.23.) The Necessity of Valid Studies of the Safety of PyrophoricUranium Munitions to Be Performed As Soon As Possible Requires ImmediateCorrective Action, and Allows the Imposition of Corrective Modificationsto Uranium Munitions Licenses

Petitioner requests that the Commission find that the necessity forimmediate production of valid studies concerning the safety of pyrophoricuranium munitions, requires immediate corrective action and the impositionof corrective modifications to uranium munitions licenses.

(5.24.) Uranium Munitions Licensees' Severity Level I Violations RequireImmediate Corrective Action, and Allows the Imposition of CorrectiveModifications to Uranium Munitions Licenses, With Strict EnforcementMeasures

Petitioner requests that the Commission find that uranium munitionslicensees' severity level I violations require corrective action,imposition of corrective modifications to their licenses, and impositionof substantial fines and conditions suspending or revoking the licenses incase of delay or insufficient compliance with the corrective modificationson the part of the licensees.

(5.25.) Uranium Munitions Licensees' Willful Misconduct Requires ImmediateCorrective Action, and Allows the Imposition of Corrective Modificationsto Uranium Munitions Licenses, With Strict Enforcement Measures

Petitioner requests that the Commission find that uranium munitionslicensees' willful misconduct requires corrective action, imposition ofcorrective modifications to their licenses, and imposition of substantialfines and conditions suspending or revoking the licenses in case of delayor insufficient compliance with the corrective requirement modificationson the part of the licensees.

(6.0.) Requested Immediate Actions

Petitioner requests that the Commission issue orders for immediate actionas follows:

(6.1.) In Accordance with 10 CFR 2.339(a), Petitioner Requests that theCommission Order Immediate Valid Studies of the Safety of PyrophoricUranium Munitions by Uranium Munitions Licensees, Imposing SubstantialFines and License Suspension or Revocation Contingent Upon InsufficientLicensee Action or Delay

Petitioner requests that the Commission, in accordance with 10 CFR2.339(a), order uranium munitions licensees to immediately, and withoutdelay, accurately determine the risk to health and safety of any andall known forms of inhalation and ingestion exposure to pyrophoricuranium munitions' combustion products, including hexavalent uranium,and all risks associated with the release of hexavalent uranium intothe environment.

Petitioner further requests that uranium munitions licensees be orderedto quantify the expected risk ratios and their confidence intervals under

several sets of circumstances involving different distances and exposurepatterns which would be expected for military personnel and civiliansin and around the areas where uranium munitions may be used, for eachexpected ailment including nephrotoxicity, lung cancer, particulate lungdamage, bone cancer, brain cancer, leukocyte chromosome damage, gonad,sperm, and egg chromosome damage, and resulting congenital malformationsin children of the exposed, and all other known ailments resulting fromuranium poisoning, assuming exposures from direct inhalation, incidentalingestion, and groundwater contamination ingestion.

Petitioner further requests that the Commission include within itsimmediate order provisions imposing a fine of $100,000 per day contingentupon any delay on the part of uranium munitions licensees in complyingwith this order, and upon the Commission's determination of insufficientaction on the part of the licensees to comply with this order.

(6.2.) In Accordance with 10 CFR 2.339(a), Petitioner Requests that theCommission Order Immediate Determination of the Best Safe and EffectiveMedical Therapies for Uranium Poisoning by Uranium Munitions Licensees,Imposing Substantial Fines and License Suspension or Revocation ContingentUpon Insufficient Licensee Action or Delay

Petitioner requests that the Commission, in accordance with 10 CFR2.339(a), order uranium munitions licensees to immediately, and withoutdelay, accurately determine the best safe and effective medical therapiesfor uranium poisoning victims.

Because the U.S. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute hasdescribed the toxicity of uranium poisoning apart from its nephrotoxicityas including genotoxicity resulting in oxidative DNA damage fromthe catalytic production of hydroxyl radicals (A.C. Miller, et al.,J. Inorg. Biochem. vol. 91 (2002) pp. 246-52), petitioner further requeststhat uranium munitions licensees be ordered to immediately determine thesafety and effectiveness of antioxidant production stimulation therapy,in addition to, or instead of, chelator sequestration therapy, for thetreatment of uranium poisoning. (Antioxidant production stimulationpreparations currently available for study include "Protandim," abotanical product from Lifeline Therapeutics, Inc., of Denver (whichcontains extracts of milk thistle (silybum marianum) seed, ashwagandha(withania somnifera) root, bacopa monnieri aerial part, and turmeric(curcuma longa) rhizome), and "CMX-1152," and related peptides of theependymin protein, from CereMedix, Inc., of Boston.)

Petitioner further requests that the Commission include within itsimmediate order provisions imposing a fine of $100,000 per day contingentupon any delay on the part of uranium munitions licensees in complyingwith this order, and upon the Commission's determination of insufficientaction on the part of the licensees to comply with this order.

(6.3.) In Accordance with 10 CFR 2.339(a), Petitioner Requests that the

Commission Order Immediate Determination of the Best Means for Remediationof Sites Where Pyrophoric Uranium Munitions Were Used by Uranium MunitionsLicensees, Imposing Substantial Fines and License Suspension or RevocationContingent Upon Insufficient Licensee Action or Delay

Petitioner requests that the Commission, in accordance with 10 CFR2.339(a), order uranium munitions licensees to immediately, and withoutdelay, accurately determine the best means for environmental remediationof sites where pyrophoric uranium munitions were burned, or where theircombustion products could have reached groundwater, plant, or animallife. Petitioner further requests that uranium munitions licenseesbe ordered to immediately determine the extent and best methods ofremediation necessary to mitigate the environmental toxicity resultingfrom the use of pyrophoric uranium munitions, including contaminationsof soil, groundwater, streams and rivers, flora and fauna, metallicor ceramic uranium dust including hexavalent uranium accumulationnear fauna and human habitats, and food chain components. Petitionerfurther requests that the Commission include within its immediate orderprovisions imposing a fine of $100,000 per day contingent upon any delayon the part of uranium munitions licensees in complying with this order,and upon the Commission's determination of insufficient action on thepart of the licensees to comply with this order.

(6.4.) In Accordance with 10 CFR 2.339(a), Petitioner Requests that theCommission Order Immediate Remediation of Sites Where Pyrophoric UraniumMunitions Were Used by Uranium Munitions Licensees, Imposing SubstantialFines and License Suspension or Revocation Contingent Upon InsufficientLicensee Action or Delay

Petitioner requests that the Commission, in accordance with 10 CFR2.339(a), order uranium munitions licensees to immediately, andwithout delay, mitigate and remediate the environmental contaminationof sites where pyrophoric uranium munitions were burned, or wheretheir combustion products could have reached groundwater, plant, oranimal life. Petitioner further requests that licensees be ordered toimmediately and fully remediate all environmental toxicity resulting fromthe use of pyrophoric uranium munitions. Petitioner further requests thatthe Commission include within its immediate order provisions imposinga fine of $100,000 per day contingent upon any delay on the part ofuranium munitions licensees in complying with this order, and upon theCommission's determination of insufficient action on the part of thelicensees to comply with this order.

(6.5.) In Accordance with 10 CFR 2.339(a), Petitioner Requests thatthe Commission Order Immediate Publication of Corrections to InvalidStatements Concerning the Safety of Pyrophoric Uranium Munitions byUranium Munitions Licensees, Imposing Substantial Fines and LicenseSuspension or Revocation Contingent Upon Insufficient Licensee Actionor Delay

Petitioner requests that the Commission, in accordance with 10 CFR2.339(a), order uranium munitions licensees to immediately, and withoutdelay, publish corrections to all invalid statements concerning the safetyof pyrophoric uranium munitions, and the environmental contaminationfrom hexavalent uranium and other products of such munitions, publishedor asserted by uranium munitions licensees. Petitioner further requeststhat the Commission include within its immediate order provisionsimposing a fine of $100,000 per day contingent upon any delay on thepart of uranium munitions licensees in complying with this order, andupon the Commission's determination of insufficient action on the partof the licensees to comply with this order.

(6.6.) In Accordance with 10 CFR 2.339(a), Petitioner Requests that theCommission Order Immediate Publication of Corrections to the Assertion ofa Scientific Consensus Exists That Remediation of Sites Where PyrophoricUranium Munitions Were Used Is Generally Unnecessary, Imposing SubstantialFines and License Suspension or Revocation Contingent Upon InsufficientLicensee Action or Delay

Petitioner requests that the Commission, in accordance with 10 CFR2.339(a), order uranium munitions licensees to immediately, andwithout delay, publish corrections to their officer's false, willful,and fraudulent assertion of 27 January 2005 that, "scientific consensusis that remediation of sites where DU munitions were used is generallyunnecessary." Petitioner further requests that the Commission includewithin its immediate order provisions imposing a fine of $100,000 perday contingent upon any delay on the part of uranium munitions licenseesin complying with this order, and upon the Commission's determinationof insufficient action on the part of the licensees to comply withthis order.

(7.0.) Requested Modifications to Licenses

Petitioner requests the following corrective modifications to all uraniummunitions licenses:

(7.1.) Petitioner Requests that the Commission Modify All Licensesfor the Possession, Storage, Transport, or Use of Pyrophoric UraniumMunitions to Require Valid Studies of the Safety of Pyrophoric UraniumMunitions by Uranium Munitions Licensees, Imposing Substantial Fines andLicense Suspension or Revocation Contingent Upon Insufficient LicenseeCompliance or Delay

Petitioner requests that the Commission modify all uranium munitionslicenses to require continuing up-to-date determination of the riskto health and safety of any and all known forms of inhalation andingestion exposure to pyrophoric uranium munitions' combustion products,including hexavalent uranium, and all risks associated with the release ofhexavalent uranium into the environment, including quantification of theexpected risk ratios and their confidence intervals under several sets

of circumstances involving different distances and exposure patternswhich would be expected for military personnel and civilians in andaround the areas where uranium munitions may be used, for each expectedailment including nephrotoxicity, lung cancer, particulate lung damage,bone cancer, brain cancer, leukocyte chromosome damage, gonad, sperm, andegg chromosome damage, and resulting congenital malformations in childrenof the exposed, and all other presently known or subsequently discoveredailments resulting from uranium poisoning, assuming exposures from directinhalation, incidental ingestion, and groundwater contamination ingestion.

Petitioner further requests that the Commission include provisions withinthose corrective license modifications imposing a fine of $100,000 perday contingent upon any delay on the part of uranium munitions licenseesin complying with any part of their licenses, and upon the Commission'sdetermination of insufficient action on the part of the licensees tocomply with this order.

(7.2.) Petitioner Requests that the Commission Modify All Licensesfor the Possession, Storage, Transport, or Use of Pyrophoric UraniumMunitions to Require Determination of the Best Safe and Effective MedicalTherapies for Uranium Poisoning by Uranium Munitions Licensees, ImposingSubstantial Fines and License Suspension or Revocation Contingent UponInsufficient Licensee Compliance or Delay

Petitioner requests that the Commission modify all uranium munitionslicenses to require continuing up-to-date determination of the best safeand effective medical therapies for uranium poisoning victims. Petitionerfurther requests that the Commission include provisions within thosecorrective license modifications imposing a fine of $100,000 per daycontingent upon any delay on the part of uranium munitions licensees incomplying with any part of their licenses, and upon the Commission'sdetermination of insufficient action on the part of the licensees tocomply with any part of their licenses.

(7.3.) Petitioner Requests that the Commission Modify All Licenses for thePossession, Storage, Transport, or Use of Pyrophoric Uranium Munitions toRequire Determination of the Best Means for Remediation of Sites WherePyrophoric Uranium Munitions Were Used by Uranium Munitions Licensees,Imposing Substantial Fines and License Suspension or Revocation ContingentUpon Insufficient Licensee Compliance or Delay

Petitioner requests that the Commission modify all uranium munitionslicenses to require continuing up-to-date determination of the bestmeans for environmental remediation of sites where pyrophoric uraniummunitions were burned, or where their combustion products could havereached groundwater, plant, or animal life, including the extent and bestmethods of remediation necessary to mitigate the environmental toxicityresulting from the use of pyrophoric uranium munitions, such as thecontamination of soil, groundwater, streams and rivers, flora and fauna,hexavalent uranium and other uranium metal or ceramic dust accumulation

near fauna and human habitats, and food chain components. Petitionerfurther requests that the Commission include provisions within thosecorrective license modifications imposing a fine of $100,000 per daycontingent upon any delay on the part of uranium munitions licensees incomplying with any part of their licenses, and upon the Commission'sdetermination of insufficient action on the part of the licensees tocomply with any part of their licenses.

(7.4.) Petitioner Requests that the Commission Modify All Licenses for thePossession, Storage, Transport, or Use of Pyrophoric Uranium Munitionsto Require Remediation of Sites Where Pyrophoric Uranium Munitions WereUsed by Uranium Munitions Licensees, Imposing Substantial Fines andLicense Suspension or Revocation Contingent Upon Insufficient LicenseeCompliance or Delay

Petitioner requests that the Commission modify all uranium munitionslicenses to require continuing up-to-date mitigation and remediationof the environmental contamination of sites where pyrophoric uraniummunitions were burned, or where their combustion products couldhave reached groundwater, plant, or animal life, including full andimmediate remediation of all environmental toxicity resulting fromthe use of pyrophoric uranium munitions. Petitioner further requeststhat the Commission include provisions within those corrective licensemodifications imposing a fine of $100,000 per day contingent upon anydelay on the part of uranium munitions licensees in complying withany part of their licenses, and upon the Commission's determination ofinsufficient action on the part of the licensees to comply with any partof their licenses.

(7.5.) Petitioner Requests that the Commission Modify All Licenses for thePossession, Storage, Transport, or Use of Pyrophoric Uranium Munitions toRequire Publication of Valid Studies Concerning the Safety of PyrophoricUranium Munitions by Uranium Munitions Licensees, Imposing SubstantialFines and License Suspension or Revocation Contingent Upon InsufficientLicensee Compliance or Delay

Petitioner requests that the Commission modify all uranium munitionslicenses to require publication of accurate and valid studies of thesafety of pyrophoric uranium munitions, including all health, safety, andenvironmental implications of their use, storage, accidental combustion,and transport. Petitioner further requests that the Commission includeprovisions within those corrective license modifications imposing a fineof $100,000 per day contingent upon any delay on the part of uraniummunitions licensees in complying with any part of their licenses, andupon the Commission's determination of insufficient action on the partof the licensees to comply with any part of their licenses.

(7.6.) Petitioner Requests that the Commission Modify All Licenses for thePossession, Storage, Transport, or Use of Pyrophoric Uranium Munitions toRequire Licensees to Refrain From Making Any Willful False or Fraudulent

Statements Concerning Pyrophoric Uranium Munitions, Imposing SubstantialFines and License Suspension or Revocation Contingent Upon InsufficientLicensee Compliance

Petitioner requests that the Commission modify all uranium munitionslicenses to require that uranium munitions licensees, and all of theirofficers, agents, personnel, and contractors refrain from making anywillful false or fraudulent statements concerning pyrophoric uraniummunitions or their health, safety, or environmental impact. Petitionerfurther requests that the Commission include provisions within thosecorrective license modifications imposing a fine of $100,000 per daycontingent upon any delay on the part of uranium munitions licensees incomplying with any part of their licenses, and upon the Commission'sdetermination of insufficient action on the part of the licensees tocomply with any part of their licenses.

(8.0.) Requested Penalties and Optional Other Action

Petitioner requests the imposition of substantial penalties and finesand other action as the Commission may deem proper, as corrective actionsand as a deterrent to future misconduct:

(8.1.) Petitioner Requests the Commission Impose Substantial Fines UponUranium Munitions Licensees Because of Their Multiple Severity Level IViolations, Gross Negligence, Willful Misconduct, Fraudulent Assertions

Petitioner requests that the Commission fine uranium munitions licensees$100,000 per each identified incident of all severity level I violations,each incident of gross negligence, each incident of willful misconduct,and each identified fraudulent assertion concerning the safety ofdepleted uranium munitions or related environmental contamination,or $100,000 per day for any such identified continuing violation(s).

(8.2.) Petitioner Requests the Commission Immediately Suspend the Licensesof Uranium Munitions Licensees Because of Their Multiple Severity LevelI Violations, Negligence, Gross Negligence, Willful Misconduct and FalsePublications, Fraudulent Assertions, Until Such Time as They Become inCompliant with Licenses as Modified

Petitioner requests all uranium munitions licenses be suspendedimmediately until such time as the licensees become compliant with theprovisions of their correctively modified licenses, due to their multipleseverity level I violations, their negligence, their gross negligence,their willful misconduct, their false statements and publicationsconcerning the safety of pyrophoric uranium munitions and fraudulentassertions involving safety or contamination.

(8.3.) Petitioner Requests that the Commission Impose SubstantialFines and Suspend or Revoke the Licenses of Uranium Munitions LicenseesImmediately If in the Future They Become Noncompliant with Their Licenses

as Modified After The Licenses Have Been Suspended Once

Petitioner requests that every corrective modification to all uraniummunitions licenses include provisions effecting the immediate impositionof a fine of $100,000 per each violation, or $100,000 per day for anycontinuing violation, and immediate license suspension or revocation forany violation, if in the future the licensees become out of compliancewith any provision of their modified licenses after any license has beensuspended one or more times.

(8.4.) Requests for Any Other Corrective Action as the Board orCommission May Deem Proper

Because petitioner is not privy to the details of each licensee'ssituation, each license, each safety study of pyrophoric uraniummunitions, each human inhalation and ingestion exposure, each release ofhexavalent uranium into the environment, or the response of the uraniummunitions licensees to this petition, etc., petitioner further requests any other corrective action deemed proper by the Board or Commission, asthe Board or Commission sees fit.

(9.) Request for Alternative Procedure

Because this request involves the conduct of military functions, inaccordance with 10 CFR 2.301, petitioner requests that the Commissionprovide an alternative procedure for adjudication allowing the immediateissuance of orders to protect the public health and safety and theenvironment, including the health and safety of those currently at riskof exposure to hexavalent uranium. This request for an alternativeprocedure includes but is not limited to: foreshortening of theCommission's customary time limits in accordance with 10 CFR 2.307(a),expedited issuance of initial orders in accordance with 10 CFR 2.339(a),and/or the use of expedited proceedings such as those specified in 10CFR sections 2.1400 through 2.1407, and any other adjudication procedurethat the Commission may deem proper.

(10.) Questions and Certification

Petitioner would be happy to answer questions concerning this petition,and may be reached by telephone at 650.793.0162 or by email tojames@bovik.org.

I, James Salsman, petitioner, certify under penalty of perjury that theforgoing is true and correct.

---- Appendix B: Additional Message from Pre-Petition Review Presentation ----

Subject: air concentration for uranium compound inhalation limitsDate: Wed, 04 May 2005 14:02:31 -0700From: James Salsman <james at bovik.org>To: Tom Essig <THE at nrc.gov>, Joe DeCicco <JXD1 at nrc.gov>

[Dear Mr. DeCicco: I am appending this message to my copyof the petition, and I ask that you distribute it to thePetition Review Board and the licensees. Thank you.Sincerely, James Salsman]

Dear Mr. Essig:

Thank you for your questions during the 2.206 pre-petition review presentation today. If I understood the last one correctly,you asked for my assessment of the current regulations forsoluble uranium compound inhalation, as specified in 10 CFR20.1201(e) and footnote 3 of appendix B to part 20. Inparticular, you asked for peer-reviewed medical or scientificarticles pertaining to the proper way to determine suchvalues when chemical toxicity rather than radioactivity isthe primary hazard, as is the case with depleted uranium.

10 CFR 20.1201(e) states, "In addition to the annual doselimits, the licensee shall limit the soluble uranium intakeby an individual to 10 milligrams in a week in considerationof chemical toxicity (see footnote 3 of appendix B to part 20)."

Footnote 3 is about eight paragraphs and a 7 x 8 table, at:http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part020/appb/footnotes.html#3

The Specific Activity chemical toxicity equivalence fordepleted uranium is given in Footnote 3 as 3.6*10^-7 curies pergram of elemental uranium, or 0.36 microcuries per gram.

The tables for Uranium-238 Inhalation Occupational Values -- at:http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part020/appb/Uranium-238.html-- specify:

Class D (e.g. uranyl nitrate): 1 microcurie "Bone Surf"(?) (2 microcurie) annual limit on intake 6*10^-10 microcuries/milliliter derived air concentration

Class W (e.g. uranium trioxide): 0.8 microcurie annual limit on intake 3*10^-10 microcuries/milliliter derived air concentration

Class Y (e.g. UO2 or U3O8): 0.04 microcurie annual limit on intake 2*10^-11 microcuries/milliliter derived air concentration

My first question would be, why do these regulations allow moresoluble compounds than insoluble compounds? It seems clear thatthey were designed to address only the radiological hazard ofuranium, and not the heavy metal toxicity, which is known to beabout six orders of magnitude worse. In practice, the solublecompounds are far more toxic than the insoluble compounds. Thisshould indicate that the long half-life uranium isotope regulationstandards need to be completely revised.

In any case, as they stand today, an annual inhalation of morethan two grams of uranium is allowed. Given that the LD50/30 ofuranyl nitrate (which has considerably less uranyl ion per unit of

mass than uranium trioxide) is 2.1 mg/kg in rabbits, 12.6 mg/kg indogs, 48 mg/kg in rats, and 51 mg/kg in guinea pigs and albino mice(Gmelin Handbook of Inorganic Chemistry, 8th edition, Englishtranslation (1982), vol. U-A7, pp. 312-322,) two grams of UO3 seemsvery likely to comprise a fatal dose for a 200 pound human.

Therefore, those values seem much too high. I fear that they werederived in order to avoid immediate kidney failure only, withoutregard to reproductive toxicity. And I do not believe they werederived with sufficient care to avoid allowing lethal exposures.Even 10 CFR 20.1201(e)'s explicit limit to 10 mg/day of solubleuranium compounds (or about half a gram per year) seems likely toallow substantial kidney damage and certain reproductive toxicity.

This urine study calculates an average initial lung burdens of0.34 milligrams elemental uranium for those with isotopic signatures consistent with exposure to depleted uranium in what I believewere symptomatic exposure victims:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=12943033

HOWEVER: That study is almost certainly flawed, as it assumes auranium compound biological half-time of 3.85 years in the lungs.I am operating under the assumption that the primary mode ofuranium toxicity involves much greater solubility. I predictthat monomeric uranium trioxide will turn out to be absorbedmore rapidly in the mammalian lung than uranyl nitrate, becauseof its monomolecular gas nature, and not merely about as rapidlyas the studies of granular uranium trioxide by P.E. Morrow, etal. ("Inhalation Studies of Uranium Trioxide," Health Physics,vol. 23 (1972), pp. 273-280) indicate. Therefore, even Class Dmay not be appropriate for monomolecular uranium trioxide gas.

I believe the correct way to determine these values, to accountfor the reproductive toxicity, is probably to measure resultingmutations of mammalian peripheral lymphocytes, such as wasdone in this study of Gulf War I veterans:http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=11765683

... and similarly performed by H. Schroeder, A. Heimers,R. Frentzel-Beyme, A. Schott and W. Hoffmann ("Chromosomeaberration analysis in peripheral lymphocytes of Gulf war andBalkans war veterans," Radiation Protection Dosimetry, vol. 103(2003) pp. 211-220), the full text of which is temporarily at: http://www.bovik.org/du/chromosome-abberations.pdfwith some overview PowerPoint slides at: http://www.bovik.org/du/chromosome-abberations.ppt

Please let me know if I can help in any other way to answer thisor any other questions you may have.

Sincerely,James Salsman

---- end of petition NRC Exec. Dir. for Ops. ----