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PLANNING BEYOND THE FETISH OF MODERN IDEOLOGYMICHAEL GUNDER aa Department of Planning , The University of Auckland , New ZealandPublished online: 15 Dec 2010.

To cite this article: MICHAEL GUNDER (1998) PLANNING BEYOND THE FETISH OF MODERN IDEOLOGY, Australian Planner, 35:2,66-74, DOI: 10.1080/07293682.1998.9657818

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MICHAEL GUNDER is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Planning, The University of Auchland, New Zealand.

PLANNING BEYOND THE FETISH OF MODERN IDEOLOGY A reply to Cuthbert

"Two people, if they truly wish to agree, must first have contradicted one another Truth is the daughter of debate and not that of sympathy" (Bachelard in Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992 p177)

T his is a reply to Cuthbert's arti- cle 'Trial by Facts - a riposte to Gunder and Fookes' in the Australian Planner 34(4).

Cuthbert argues that his article attempts "to demystify a piece of writing" 'Plan- ning School Programs in Australia and New Zealand' by Gunder and Fookes in the Australian Planner 34(1) "which tries hard to maintain an indefensible ideology of planning and planning education" (Cuthbert 1997, p213).

I thank Cuthbert for continuing the defence of the late Brian McLoughlin's polarised position on planning education. At best, within the university, McLoughlin (1994, p l l l l ) sought to banish planning to a "peripheral position within the broader field of political economy." At worst, McLoughlin (1994, pll2O) argued that planning theory, statutory process and praxis "can be taught quite adequate- ly and more honestly at a vocational col- lege level."

I also thank Cuthbert for his detailed critique of our article. Bravo, I think it is one of the best neo-Marxian deconstruc- tions of the planning profession

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Other commitments as Head of Department have prevented Tom Fookes from co -au tho r~ng this response to Cuthbert He has asked me to plck up the banner for both of us. Tom provlded useful comments on an earher draft and 1s In general agreement with the words and thoughts expressed In thls artlcle

published. It pulls all the main critical elements together in one coherent docu- ment. It is intellectually refreshing to renew this particular view of the world. If I were again a twenty year old student, the seductive logic of hidden exploitation by the 'capitals,' would have me manning the banicades of leftist debate.

Alas, that period of my life is long gone. I have experienced the real world oppression and ineptitude of socialism from Bulgaria to the 1980s Inner London Boroughs. I have worked for over a dozen socialist regimes and was for over three painful years a member of a workers co- operative. I have learned to pin my flag with the 'capitals', I am afraid. Though flawed because it accounts everything in exchange value and rewards want, ability, luck and hard work rather than human need, capitalism is the best we have got at the moment. I consider that planning has an important role in addressing its prob- lems, even a role in moving beyond the modem positions of capitalism or Marx- ism into a better epoch - whatever that may be.

1 disagree that modernist Marxist the- ory is the only way to remove ideological distortions from debate. This is because it is premised on an ideological framework that sees only one correct truth. I also believe that McLoughlin's stated position on planning education was largely a rhetorical trope.

Our article sought to use facts "to reflect and explain an underlying empiri- cal reality" of planning education and avoid the "price that must always be paid when facts of any case and their ideologi- cal reflections become disconnected." The

price to be paid, of course, is alienation from "the real opportunities that lie

1 before us" (Scott & Roweis 1977 p1117) - to use the words of what Cuthbert (1997 p214) asserts McLoughlin "himself

I considered the best critique of planning ever written." Finally, one must also thank

1 Cuthbert for the honesty of his ironic title - 'Trial by Facts' - for his ideologically based response to our previous empirical work.

I Our article was based on a survey of accredited education programs in Austral- asia. Its aim was to counter a range of

I rhetorical assertions, or ideological distor- tions - to use the Marxian nomenclature

about planning that we considered I - . dated, ~f ever valid. Central to these asser- tions was that planning education was essentially indoctrinating and socialising students into the profession (Reade

1 1987). Further, it was alleged that plan- ning programs provided students with lit- tle or no modem education in theoretical

I analysis and critical understanding of the world (McLoughlin 1994). The conse-

1 quence of this 'intellectual failure' was poor professional practice. While not test- ing the last assertion, our analysis of , empirical data showed the prior asser- tions to be false. Yet we recognised some

1 socialisation of students into the planning 1 profession within planning programs. I

suggest that this is vital to the success of j the discipline.

1 will set the cat among the pigeons and propose that the discipline of planning 1 and planning education promote an ideol- ogy of belief and mission. But it is not open to the historicity of political eco- nomic critique. Rather it is a disciplinary

1 belief-system, derived from a model of

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excellence in professional planning prac- tice that is predicated on moral and intel- lectual virtues as to what is good in mak- ing the world a better place. It is a practice which is always, and only, taking place in the constant now of the present moment drawing on past professional and personal experience as - we project our actions into the future (Heidegger 1962; MacIntyre 1981; Gadamer 1989; Bour- dieu 1990). This is a professional practice based on a set of virtues which can only be developed through experiential learn- ing, initially copying the best planning practice of experienced practitioners until these virtuous practices become habituat- ed in one's own excellence of practice. It is a practice that is based on virtues aimed at the development of prudence and wis- dom in coordinating human action within nature. A concept derived from the ethics of Aristotle (1975) and identified by Flyvb- jerg (1992) and Hillier (1995) as phronesis.

This paper will address the substantive parts of Cuthbert's defence of his ossifying theory of Marxian spatial political econo- my. It will then follow Cuthbert's format by first looking at the social nexus of plan- ning after Beauragardk (1991) abyss of postmodernity from the perspective of Fly- vbjerg's (1998) lost virtue of phronesis and his realrationalitat towards understanding the world. This will then establish a posi- tion from which to view planning from the perspective of the theory-practice gap. A discussion of planning education will fol- low drawing on Sandercock's (1997) insight that the education of planning stu- dents is really a form of ethical inquiry.

Difficulties with Cuthbert's riposte

The first difficulty with Cuthbert's posi- tion is his narrow definition of planning. He seems to regard it as a state lead statu- tory process for land use development with a goal of encouraging wealth accu- mulation by the capitalist class, a goal hid- den in society, and planning's real task is to both facilitate and obscure this exploitation of the working class. He further argues, like McLoughlin (19941, that the only answer to this role of planner as 'oppressor of the masses' is to enlighten and indoctrinate potential planners into neo-Marxian spatial political economy, before they can do 'liberal' harm. For Cuthbert (1997 p219) the only valid path, the only one way for planning to progress, is as a "coherent and effective political resistance against the worst

excesses of the capitalist world system." As Gunder and Fookes' (1997) made

clear and Cuthben acknowledges, I disagree with this definition. I follow Friedmann (1987) and see the discipline as a much wider activity that couples local and uni- versal knowledge to human action. This process can be undertaken in many differ- ent ways. It encompasses a wide range of human actions within nature as we seek to colonise the future; not just assisting resistance to power within an exchange- value based spatial political economy, i.e. capitalism. Planning's and experienced planners' key attribute is their ability to address particularity, uncertainty and complexity across a wide range of inter- related scientific, environmental, societal and cultural concerns. This is much wider than Cuthbert's focus on the statu-

i tory process of land use controls and rev-

, olutionary resistance. Yet Cuthbert, per- haps to defend his 'spatial' component of

I 'spatial political economy' and insistence I of materialism and exchange value as the

only way to see the world, appears unable to accept a wider range of alternative per- spectives w~thout labelling them ideology.

I Cuthbert is right in saying that humans have always planned and that the

I discipline of planning has only emerged , as a coherent profession within the con-

tingency that created modernity. Yet 1 dis- 1

agree with his assertion that there is "no 1 such coherence of purpose and action I within planning practice" (p215). As

Foucault (1977 to 1991c) has repeatedly I documented, there is a purpose to the dis- , ciplines created in the human sciences of

which planning is one (Lewi & Wickham 1996; Huxley 1997). This is the coherent

I purpose and action of encouraging biopower - the maximisation of totalised

I - individual human productivity for human

I happiness - through the application of 1 powerfinowledge in relationships facili-

tating governmentality. I As Huxley (1997, p l ) says in regard to

I Cuthbert's narrow perspective of plan- ning: "Viewed from a Foucaultian per- spective land-use regulation is one of the

1 capillaries of power around the gover- nance of population in space, in which

I planning is a framework of power and a I discourse of social control which creates

subjectivities and resistance." I agree that when this discourse is

I done poorly, or immorally, planning and

I the profession's power can be used to legitimise capitalist exploitation and the

I will of power (Castells 1978; Flyvbjerg 1998) or even racism and fascism by the

modern 'democratic' state (Yiftachel I 1995). Yet when applied virtuously it can i be an emancipatory discipline overcom-

ing oppression (Friedmann 1992). As I Young (1990) and Benhabib (1992) I argue, modem planning's - neo-Marxian

or liberal - greatest risk is its desire to I normalise, i.e. to negate difference or 1 diversity in seeking certainty of action

(Gunder 1996a). I The second dgiculty is how to argue

against Cuthbert's Marxist science espe- cially when it makes unarguable 'ideologi-

1 cally free' statements such as: "society will remain class divided and that on this

I basis commodity relations will prevail ... 1 Planning recodifies and intervenes in the

relations of production in order to perpet- I uate the capitalist state on behalf of the I various capitals" (Cuthbert 1997, p214).

A 'science' codified in the 19th centu- I ry. shown to have failed in all but North 1 Korea and Cuba in the 20th century and

one that is unlikely to address the issues ' of the 2lst century Moreover it has but I one way of seeing the world as it sought , its ideal of human oppression in the name

of equality (excluding party members) ! (endnote 1). A 'science' that excludes 1 human difference and diversity and

obscures the real issues of oppression I such as sexism, racism, ageism, disablism, 1 not to mention the environment, via an

obscuring ideology of material distribu- 1 tion (Young 1990). 1 Cuthbert (1997 p213) acknowledges

that we "may be correct on points of I detail", but regardless of facts he demands 1 that we should listen to his and the late

Brian McLouglin's greater arguments, or I rhetoric, regardless because it "has 1 infinitely greater substance and logic."I

prefer facts to rhetoric, thank you. My I position is consistent with CuthbertS and / McLoughlin's favourite authors of plan-

ning theory-Scott and Roweis (1977). I The relevant facts of recent history are 1 infinitely greater reasons to oppose Marxism.

Starting in 1968 these include the French I State's suppression of Marxist lead student

violence that was attempting to overthrow the democratically elected government;

I the acceptance by Deng in 1974 that 1 China's future belonged in a market econ-

omy; the fall of socialism and supply lead I economies, across most of East Europe 1 and Asia in 1989; and in 1998 that the

hereditary great leader of North Korea is 1 obese while his people starve. I could go

on. These are all facts, or as Cuthbert I would argue, mere 'points of detail.' I Gunder confesses he was once a neo-

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Marxist (endnote 2). In the heady days of the 1970s it was the way to play in provincial planning schools with the all- empowering curse of calling all others 'liberal.' He once even considered plan- ning to be derived from a paraphrasing of Castells (1978) view that planning was 'negotiation between the dominant actors/powers to reach agreement that was then legitimised by a planning docu- ment.' Yet here Gunder also added 'with the planner attempting to push the consen- sus towards the 'good" as identified by Forester (1989). 1 shall return to this point later as it forms the core of Cuth- bert's ideology of the profession. An ideol- ogy that seeks goodness in human affairs and hence axiomatically, i n Marxian science, must be a source of distortion as it mitigates class struggle by providing opportunities for life 'goods' that deflect the proletariat from revolution.

Also during 15 years of planning prac- tice Gunder realised that the world was a much more complex place than that codified by spatial political economy - Marxist or liberal. Furthermore, decon- struction and critique via critical theory only ripped down structures and dialogues; it did not build replacements.

In an age of contingency and post- structuralism, the neo-Marxist assertion that critique itself is ideologically free and can lead to valid theory is at best question- able if not unrealistic in its own layers of hermeneutic reflexivity (Giddens 1984). Cuthbert's asserted that our: "former arti- cle is characterised by [our] ambivalent stance in relation to spatial political econo- my. [We] do not demonstrate a commit- ment to its principles, nor do [we] access its logic and considerable explanatory power" (Cuthbert 1997 p214).

I have used neo-Marxian critique. It can give a useful, but blinkered, point to deconstruct historical political economy, but it can only show our past mistakes, not how we can provide good. Critical theory is based on categorising and juxta- posing historical facts, or texts, in a man- ner that allows the development of a model of the 'truth' free of capitalist dis- tortion and mythology. At best, these crit- ical methods in planning practice can be used only as a model to forecast the future by assuming that the past will repeat itself (so too liberal modernist models). This 'positivism' fails for a num- ber of reasons within planning practice for all but the simplest issues. A simple example will suffice. The neo-Marxist theorist assumes that the developer

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axiomatically seeks maximised profits, yet ego on the part of the developer to have the tallest, biggest or most beautiful development in , say, Melbourne or Auckland enters the equation.

Cuthbert (1997 p217) is wrong to allege that planning 'does not possess an autonomous social agenda of its own.' Planning has been and continues to be a discipline facilitating Foucault's capillary power/knowledge in seeking the meta- objectives of modern society and of the discipline or profession itself. This is via an all-encompassing process of normalisa- tion of people and nature through governmentality to maximise biopower in seeking modernist progress towards hap- piness (Foucault 1977, 1991c; Lewi & Wickham 1996; Ransom 1997). As Hux- ley (1997 p2) states in regards to Fou- cault's governmentality and biopower: "This aspect of planning practices is cap- tured neither by free market/libertarian critiques or justifications for planning, nor by political economidMarxian critiques, and still less by Habermasian-inspired prescriptions for communicative debate."

What is significant here, is that Fou- cault (1980, 1982) argues at length that the disciplines of practice, including plan- ning, and the application of power/ knowledge can be both productive and destructive. It is important to note that Foucault (1980) argued that power is not in itself repressive, that indeed the con- verse is a myth of modernity. Foucault argued that power relations, including biopower, can produce not just commodi- ties, but pleasure, knowledge and even truth. Here what needs to be considered is Foucault's (1977) questioning of 'what rules of right are implicated by the rela- tions of power in the production of dis- courses of truth?' (Kelly 1994 p378). For once we see 'truth as social practices, then the very notion of ideology becomes problematic' (Rabinow 1996 p35).

This will be discussed further below. I will also expand on our assertion that modern disciplines, like planning, are self-reproducing, a position superficially similar to Cuthbert's, but 1 suggest this may have social benefit.

Plannin : The social nexus a k ter Paris 1968 - realrationalitat

Cuthbert (1997 p214) begins the social nexus section of his paper by justifying the position of 'spatial political economy' from the planning literature. Except for

papers published by McLoughlin, all cita- tions range in age from 9 to over 20 years of age (from Harvey 1989 to Castells 1977). Cuthbert refers to these sources as 'the best minds of our generation.' That is a sad point in itself. As Ory (1989 p190) notes, Cuthbert's generation is "at the end of a great upward cycle" of leftist thought.

What of those who have emerged since? They are from both the left or the centre (few here on the right, I suspect) - Baum, Forester, Soja, Sager, Flyvbjerg, Hillier, Healey, Sandercock, not to forget 'multi-generational' Friedmann. And the best intellectual minds in the wider schools of political economy and philoso- phy, even those, with an initial preference for Marxism, discovered its pitfalls and moved on, e.g. Baudrillard, Bourdieu, Foucault, Giddens, even later Habermas (endnote 3). In the Australasian planning academy even Huxley (1997) has discov- ered the value and insight provided by post-structuralist analysis and Sandercock (1997) has disavowed her earlier support of spatial political economy

Cuthbert's neo-Marxist spatial political economy is but a relic of the 1970s state debate. A debate reflective of the sudden exposure of Marxian inability to address realpolitik as expressed by the Commu- nist Party support of the Gaullist state regime in the Paris revolt of 1968 (John- son 1972). A failure that deflected Europe's strongest thinkers into post- structuralism, hermeneutic, or what became postmodern philosophy (Fisera 1989; Ory 1989; Foucault 1994). And arguably the remaining Marxist intellects into a justification of continued class struggle, one predicated on consumption and the conservative defence of the socialist welfare state, rather than radical societal change and production (Giddens 1994; Ory 1989; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992).

Spatial political economy based on neo-Marxism is essentially a political doc- trine or materialist ideology in its own right. It is a rigid structure that obscures alternative ways of seeing (Heidegger 1977). Yet as Sandercock notes it only became an offshoot of planning education in the 1970s. I suggest, like Sandercock, that its time has passed. Just as Marxist science failed in 1968 to address realpol i t ik , Flyvbjerg (1995, 1998) is correct in his statement that modernistic theories of planning - liberal and Marxist - fail to address the realrationalitat that exists in daily, imperfect practice. Plan- ners are political actors using both hon-

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esty and deceit, rationalisation, and other of phronesis (prudent, practical wisdom of fessional bodies and this is why they are means to address power and political the particular and complex under uncer- so important to disciplines such as plan- influence while they themselves experi- tainty) guiding the other intellectual ning. Here Maclntyre's (1997 p128) defi- ence treachery, victimisation and anxiety virtues of episteme (scientific knowledge) nition of a virtue is helpful (his italics): (Baum 1995). How is it in this environ- and techne (craft) coupled to moral "A virtue is an acquired human quality the ment that planners manage to a t criteria virtues of what is good is the most appro- possession of and exercise of which tends to for their actions beyond that of just sur- vival against power defined rationality

priate means for making judgement in enable us to achieve those goods which are planningpraxis (doing). internal to practices and the lack of which

and reality (Flyvbjerg 1998)? It certainly This challenges the view that 'plan- effectively prevents us from achieving any is not done by simply whistling the ning' is a technological activity simply suchgoods." 'Internationale'! applying techne through praxis with only How does one decide good practice

Since Beauregard (1991) alluded that the politicians concerned about applying from bad? Unlike Cuthbert, I suggest that the modem planner was like Nietzsche's judgement to decision making. Planners , RAPI and NZPl have an important role, (1966) circus performer balancing above are inherently political (Baum 1995). but like Cuthbert I consider that the the abyss of Motley Cow's blindness to Indeed, all agents of social action are self- academy should monitor and critique the postmodernity, planning's academic . interested and directed by their experi- Institutes' effectiveness in promoting this defenders have sought to differentiate 1 ences within their own fields of action. good practice (endnote 4). planning and its practitioners from the Planners in particular, do "what he or she As MacIntyre (1981 p178) states in two dead-end streams of modernist social 'has to do"' without posing it explicitly as regard to generation of community goods 'truth' proposed by Marxist and liberal a goal (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992 through professional practice: "[G]oods Buman sciences' (Soja 1997). The con- 1 p128). Planners by their very definition can only be achieved by subordinating cept of progressive phronesis originated by have highly developed intellectual and ourselves to the best standard so far Flyvbjerg (1992) and expanded by Hillier practical abilities in effecting action for achieved, and that entails subordinating (1995) is one non-modernist way to theo- what they define as 'good.' After all, this is ourselves within the practice in our rela- I rise about planning praxis. Moreover it is where planning's expertise lies, if one tionship to other practitioners. We have a practice based model of planning that accepts Friedmann's (1987) and my defi- to learn to recognise what is due to encourages many ways to practice which nition of the discipline. I whom; we have to be prepared to take do not inherently seek the normalisation I Planning actions generally seek to whatever self-endangering risks are of difference and diversity. And as Aristo- achieve social, environmental and related demanded along the way; and we have to tle (1975) philosophised, it is especially beneficial ends (eg wealth creation, well listen carefully to what we are told about effective in dealing with the particularity functioning cities and ecosystems, con- ' our own inadequacies and to reply with of managing property or the governing of cern for future generations). Here, I sug- the same carefulness for the facts." a state. gest that planners also morally seek to This is the central justification for pro-

protect the well-being of individuals, fessional institutions. As 'the' institution Planning: A virtuous discipline communities and environments adversely of the practitioners, RAP1 and NZPl have of normalising control affected by actions perceived as necessary legitimacy in setting the norms of 'excel-

to achieve the wider common good. A lent practice,' providing the minimum An 'ideology' of virtuous practice is per- neo-Aristotelian approach to concepts of / standards of membership and mentoring haps unfathomable to modernist academ- 1 both external 'goods' (eg wealth creation new practitioners to an acceptable level of ic theorists who have lacked opportuni- without exploitation) and internal 'goods' good practice. As a basis for this ethics of ties for experiential learning in planning (eg excellence of practice; relationship to practice, the institutes play a critical role practice (Maclntyre 1997; Harris 1997). environment) of the individuals con- in accrediting planning education pro- Yet for most readers of this journal this cerned in any action is observed and grams. This point escapes Cuthbert concept of virtuous practice to achieve given appropriate consideration in virtu- because in his critical political economy the 'good' is unquestioned, axiomatic I ous practice (MacIntyre 1997). This latter there is no room for a normative concept common sense. A common sense that concept of internal 'goods,' perhaps best of the 'good,' only distorting ideology most practitioners take for granted, once articulated by Gadamer (1989), is often obscuring the one universal truth towards acquired, and academic theorists general- overlooked in theoretical studies of achievement of the ideal of communist ly ignore. Yet this professional common 1 instrumental planning under modernity. utopia. This is an oxymoron if ever I sense is a developed and honed intellectu- As Forester (1994) suggests it involves , heard one! a1 virtue that sets planning apart from consideration of each affected individual's If RAPI and NZPI bid up practitioner other modernist disciplines. Planning internal and interrelationships with the wages by restricting formal entry into the education and practice's 'ideology' is to community and environment for their discipline based on an equitable require- create and support this judgement and achievement of happiness and 'the good ment of knowledge and experience - so the other moral and intellectual virtues life.' Hence it defies ready quantification be it. It is a pity that our wages are low that it draws on when science and other by totalising modem categories of liberal compared to other professions. I know of aspects of modernist rationality fail. social or Marxian 'science.' no planner with a salary of more than

Planning is particularly concerned , Defining what is 'good' is central to $100,000 per year in NZ (except for a few with issues with high levels of complexity, our debate and leaves considerable scope being paid for senior management skills, uncertainty and uniqueness. Like Flyvb- for distortion. I will argue that defining or hypothetically those that are exploiting jerg (1992) and Hillier (1995) I suggest this excellence of practice, or virtuous the value-added of their employees - to that the co-ordinating intellectual virtue 1 practice, is the central implicit role of pro- 1 use Cuthbert's terminology). Why is this

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the case when individual members of the medical profession and its institutions can, according to Cuthbert (1997 p215) make ten times this amount?

If Cuthbert's assertion that planners hide capitalist superprofit from the masses is true, surely we would expect to make more than biological technicians who only save human lives. But we do not even come close. This suggests that profession- al planning institutes are providing some- thing else to society, something that reduces our spoils as capitalist running dogs. 1 suggest it is the moral direction the institutes force on practitioners who may be open to capitalist temptation. They do this through accredited educa- tion that requires an ethical component, peer pressure, public awards for excellence and ultimately sanction against unethical practice. In addition, the institutes provide a structure of limited power to help mem- bers maintain ethical standards in the face of dominant agents of power.

This setting of standards of excellence and limited professional empowerment are rarely discussed in planning theory, particularly theory predicated on modem seeking of efficiency. Yes, the institutes are self-reproducing, but this institutional maintenance is one of ensuring ethical direction in good practice reflecting soci- ety's dominant normative goals and val- ues.

And, no doubt if Cuthbert responds to this article, he will say that this is exactly the problem. He will allege that this is the case because he truly believes that 'capitals' obscure the 'fact' of capitalist global exploitation to deform society's normative goals. He will also say from a position of equity, that professionals who have stud- ied and work hard in a discipline, be it medicine or planning, lack the ability and right to set norms of good practice without the overt blessing of the uneducated and inexperienced masses on which they practice. Further, he believes that his crit- ical theories of spatial political economy can undistort this global conspiracy 1 do not agree with this worldview, although I suggest that theory, including critical theory, can play a role in setting new 'goods and societal goals.

Planning: Theory is not reality

Much of Cuthbert's reference to our paper in his section on the reality of theory remains allusive to me, or, at best, taken out of context. Let us assume that both sets of bullets on the right column of page

best critic of planning ever written." specific theoretical category (Strohmayer Might I also quote Strohmayer (1993 1993). Yet in this difference may lie the p327) here: "Is it enough to acknowledge essence of the problem and its resolution.

I that 'how' we write influences whether or As Gadamer (1989 p454) notes the real

217 are only attributed as quotations of fails in its ability to assist planning prac- our original text due to editorial error. tice as the practitioner acts in the moment

Cuthbert has woven bits and pieces of of the now towards a new particularity ! text to construct his position, sometimes . that generally does not fully present itself

not our argument will succeed without recognizing furthermore that rhetoric is not something added to the truth of a statement but indistinguishable from any such truth?"

Since our paper was written a new debate has commenced in the planning literature in regards to the planning theo- ry-practice gap and is based on a response to Hillier's (1995) article on 'common sense' by Alexander (1996). Hillier (1995) argued that phronesis is important in understanding planning practice and could even provide a new theoretical model of planning and the teaching of planning education. Alexander argued that phronesis cannot be part of a rational

, theory of planning. Responses in reply to Alexander have been taken up by Hams (1997) and Allmendinger and Tewdwr- Jones (1997) critiquing the weaknesses of Alexander's Kantian position, but also asserting that a gap between planning theory and practice can, or does, exist

1 depending on definitions used. I suggest a gap must always exist

between the two as only an ideal theory

using material out of context or interpret- ing it literally when a concept was pre- sented ironically, e.g. Colman's reference to 'value free' theory. Unlike Cuthbert, 1

can explain all particulars of practice, yet as 1 have implied before, there are no uni- versal ideals. At best the gap can be nar- rowed through increased understanding and even bridged through alternative per- spectives, but it will always exist in mod- ernistic debate. Further, the actual pro- cess of categorising particularity into generality of category to allow theoretical modelling removes all components of dif- ference from the real particular (Derrida 1988; Strohmayer 1993). ~ Finally, critical theory can only decon- struct and model the past. This has value

1 in providing knowledge and is particular- ly useful in planning education. But it

or closely fit a critical theoretical model. And this is more the norm than the excep- tion. At best critical theory can suggest a course of action for commonly occumng

risk of modem theory is in the hands of its theorists who have an intellectual 'will to dominate what exists' regardless of what is lost in the process.

Cuthbert (1997 p217) asserts that our previous article was "wholly atheoretical, and arguably anti-theoretical." This is incorrect. I value theory, but in its place. As Bohman (1997 p182) states theory at best provides opportunities for "different historical possibilities" of cultural and disciplinary change because: "a theory expresses a coherent and compelling vision of the world. In doing so, it 'trans- forms the representation of the social world as well as the world itself' to the extent that it 'renders possible practices that refer to the transformed representa- tion' [Bourdieu 1991 ~1291 . This modest

wish to use this section constructively situations. It does not sit well with the rather than simply destructively in weav- particularity of everyday practice. ing a new rhetorical web. To show the Most importantly, especially for the power of selected quotation, and as the inexperienced practitioner, the use of any only rebuttal, I wish to tongue in cheek theory, without the tempering of phronesis suggest that Cuthbert (1997 p214) con- runs the risk of imprudently stripping sidered Cunder and Fookes (1997) "the away difference so that an issue will fit a

way of speaking of cultural change does

i not see the theorist as the centre, con- structivist role in radical transformation. Rather, the theorist has a role in commu- nicating and articulating alternatives, some of which may bind future action and some of which may not. On this communicative and practically orientated account, new representations are not seen as itself constitutive of social change, but only as enabling agents to construct alternative practices themselves."

Yet concern over the very concept of a theory-practice gap is unnecessarily dual- istic. Only those that suffer Bernstein's (1983) 'Cartesian anxiety' require a closure. Cuthbert appears to be in this modernist camp. The incommensurability

I of the two should continue to provide intellectual delight as scholars seek better theoretical understanding for knowledge itself and the teaching of planning. And at the same time practitioners seek improved forms of practice in responding

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to a constantly changing world and the theoretical explanations that academics put forth.

In light of this debate this article has one focus on this theory-practice gap. At odds with Alexander (1997) it advances both Flyvbjerg's (1992) and Hillier's (1995) positions by suggesting that understanding phronesis can form one new theoretical bridge explaining another generic dimension of practice. This gap between theory and particular practice can be reduced further via an understand- ing of neo-Aristotelian virtues and onto- logical hermeneutics and the rejection of the enlightenment's seeking of ideal truth (or ideal theory). The latter's inherent fail- ure to be achievable confirms a perpetual gap between a theoretical model of reality and reality itself!

Contrary to Harris (19971, 1 suggest that this planning theory-practice gap is crossable via bridges in many ways but generally only in one direction. And importantly this is always as a bridge over a perhaps narrowing, but never closing gap of understanding. From my obviously biased opinion, it is from the direction of first acquiring substantial knowledge of experiential practice through doing plan- ning. Only then can this knowledge be categorised and simplified into the abstraction of theory (Dewey 1929). As Harris's (1997 p799) questioned rhetorically: "[clan theorists really know more about practitioners than themselves?"

Cuthbert (1997 p217) questioned why Gunder and Fookes (1997) crudely dif- ferentiated between 'academic programs as design orientated or theory orientated' based on their faculty location. The above argument on the theory-practice gap helps to explain why and Gadamer (1989) offers a key insight. He asks how do we define beauty and aesthetics in art. His answer is - through the concept of play and phronesis. The synthesis of aes- thetic design for the truth is predicated on human play for the good. "Is there no knowledge in art? Does not the experi- ence of art contain a claim of truth which is certainly different from that of science, but just as certainly is not inferior to it? And is not the task of aesthetics precisely to ground the fact that the experience (Erfahrung) of art is a mode of knowledge of a unique kind, certainly different from that sensory knowledge which provides science with the ultimate data from which it constructs the knowledge of nature, and certainly different from all moral ratio- nal knowledge, and indeed all conceptual

' knowledge - but still knowledge, i.e. con- 1 veying truth?" (Gadamer 1989 pp97-98).

Design orientated faculties have a 1 greater propensity to implicitly, if not

explicitly, acknowledge this modernist 1 irrationality, for how else can they predi-

I cate their design goal of agreed aesthetic correctness except as good play

I Gadamer's practice based approach of bringing beauty and truth into existence is

I consistent with my argument about the relationship of the role play of good prac-

I tice in planning. Only here the game is 1 also one of language, rather than just art,

for understanding and agreeing moral and 1 epistemic knowledge of the good. This

contrasts with the modernist logic of I . . rationality based on theories and models I of reality to positively predict and enframe

the future outcomes of current action. I Design, by its aesthetic nature, has the 1 potential to be unbounded and unen-

framed by instrumental language and its I imbedded structures (ideology) of norma- l tive values, such as the modernist desire

to seek efficiency at the price of beauty. 1 While theory is helpful to ensure that a 1 building will not fall over, theory cannot

address the aesthetics of the building I because the sublime is unquantifiable, , nor can theory disenframe itself from 'sci-

entific' language and its rational modem I logic of efficiency. I suggest that while I theory makes one kind of bounded con-

tribution to knowledge, understanding I and action; it is not the only one used by I planning practitioners in synthesising

complexity and particularity. Hence the I reason why Gunder and Fookes (1997)

differentiated between planning programs I . m design and theory faculties.

I Planning: Education

I as ethical inquiry 1

I agree with Cuthbert that a significant 1 amount of the core third of planning edu- I cation identified in our previous article is

an indoctrination and socialisation process / into the discipline of planning. I also agree

that this core is set largely by each plan- 1 ning department and is reflective of the I strengths and interests of its staff. But this

prescription is reinforced by the perceived I need for institutional accreditation. Has , any university tested the impact of loosing

accreditation on their enrolment numbers? 1 Most of Cuthbert's colleagues are

geographers. His postcript implies that I only three of his departmental colleagues

have degrees in planning. Consequently 1 ' am not surprised that he and the majority

! of his colleagues have difficulty in under- 1 standing the profession and good plan-

ning practice - accreditation not with- 1 standing. They remain in the grasp of

geographical theories of the generic cate- ' gorisable world, rather than the messy / particularity of action. As Majone (1989

pp21-22) noted in the wider context of 1 policy analysis, from whlch planning can

I represent one subset: "Policy analysts [and planners] of the decisionist persua-

/ sion would like to project the image of technical, nonpartisan problem solvers

I who map out the alternatives open to the / policy maker and evaluate their conse-

quences by means of mathematical mod- / els or other objective techniques of analy- 1 sis. The analyst's job is only to determine

the best means to achieve given goals. He 1 must be neutral about ends, since discus-

sion of goals and values is necessarily I subjective and unscientific."

/ "This image of the analyst's art is grossly misleading. I would like to sug-

1 gest a more accurate one. The policy ana- l lyst is a producer of policy arguments,

more similar to a lawyer - a specialist in / legal arguments - than to an engineer or a

scientist. His basic skills are not algorith- I mica1 but argumentative: the ability to I probe assumptions critically, to produce

and evaluate evidence, to keep many I threads in hand, to draw an argument

from many disparate sources, to commu- I nicate effectively. He recognizes that to I say anything of importance in public

policy requires value judgements, which I must be explained and justified, and is I willing to apply his skills to any topic

relevant to public discussion." I Unlike geographers in their 'clean'

world of theory, I suggest that these I messy skills and abilities require develop- I ment at the core of planning education.

For planners to be communicative and I have greatest worth to society they must

inherently be policy analysts in the public I sphere of debate. They may work for 1 institutions, they may work with groups

within communities, but what use are 1 planners unless they have the skills and

practical ability to add something of value 1 to the discourse. In modernity the plan- 1 ner's perceived 'value added' has been

technological knowledge (liberal perspec- 1 tive) or distortion (Cuthbert's Marxist

perspective). As Friedmann (1973) point- ed out 21 years ago - it has never been

1 that simple. Yet the real value of policy analysts and planners has been as com-

1 municators and facilitators of choice (Majone 1989).

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In our previous article we suggested McLouglin (1994) argued for a pro- that a continued alliance between the gram of tertiary education at this level of

facilitating the nurture of 'poets' and 'philosophers' by groups in communi-

planning profession via the RAP1 and urban and societal understanding but he ties who can bring forth new emanci- NZPI accreditation process and the failed to go beyond a 'modernist' political patory traditions to nature, the 'other' diverse range of planning programs may economy. 'Modern' political economy is and even to 'capital'; and be crucial to ensuring the successful con- but a first year starting point and case ensuring that consideration of tinuation of the profession as we enter the studies and story telling (regardless of 2lst century. I expand this statement to McLouglin 1994) are equally important

environmental and social morality is central to debate until new traditions

reduce Cuthbert's reliance on ideology for ways to create understanding (Mandel- reflective of these social imperatives his agreement with it. baum 1991; Forester 1994). predominate in each group or commu-

This alliance should have two strategic components in planning education. The first component draws on academic knowledge from the university and

phronesis cannot be taught as theory. It nity's lifeworld (endnote 5). must be learnt from experience (Aristotle Of course, one must not speak too 1975; Alexander 1996). Development of loudly of this agenda to modem ears e.g. this intellectual virtue is central to effec- , Cuthbert, or they will judge you irra-

tional. Friedmann (1993, 1996), as usual, suggests a pragmatic way forward 'Towards a non-Euclidean mode of plan- ning'. He outlines seven generic planning skills and understandings appropriate for conversion into studios and courses to produce a complete program with due emphasis on discourse skills and ethics. This structure can accommodate my sug-

ensures provision of opportunities for tive planning praxis. If planning phronesis experiential learning within. This aca- can only be learnt through experience demic and experiential learning develops then planning students must have experi- an understanding of the complex world ence of personal poiesis (making) and and also allow opportunities for student praxis (doing). This requires exposure to praxis that enhances achievement of phronesis within recently graduated plan- ners. To do so the teaching of "planning must be approached as an ethical

stories and case studies on how planning occurs in the world, then studio or field work with real groups and communities on real issues. Of course the latter requires

inquiry"(Sandercock 1997 p91). The sec- ond component draws from the institu- tion a pragmatic understanding of good

appropriate professional supervision and gestions, while retaining legitimacy under the institutes have role to play here. the gaze of the 'modern' positivistic aca-

For the teaching of planning theory I demic administrator or Associate Dean. practice in the forums, arenas and courts / suggest introducing students to Foucault's These include: where planning practice occurs (Bryson (1980, 1991c) worldview of capillary . the history, theory and contemporary and Crosby 1995). 1 suggest that mentors power/knowledge exposed through practice of planning; should act as practitioner role models. genealogy, 'governmentality' and particularly, . quantitative methods;

Like Cuthbert 1 argue for an emanci- Flyvbjerg's (1998) excellent 'narratology.' spatial analysis and GIs; patory planning practice. Yet unlike Also Heidegger's (1962, 1977) concepts of communication, group work & rhetoric; Cu thbert I argue for a practice that 'authenticity,' 'community' and 'enframe- . negotiation and mediation; empowers individuals, groups and com- ment' and Gadamer's (1989) 'fusion of . program and project evaluation; and munity and draws them in to civic debate not because it is just more meaningless resistance to oppression, but because it can achieve results. This practice should promote an ethic of care to nature and

horizon' are important alternative percep- professional ethics (Friedmann 1996 tions for understanding. These presents pp99-100). means to critique modem planning theory For the NZ context with its legal med- and develop personal ontological perspec- dling in the planning process I would add tives and values in regard to the environ- , categories for 'law', and 'environment and

humanity via a broadening and re-accep- ment and society. Once students have tance of the importance of moral and adopted these concepts, they need to dis- intellectual virtues within good planning cuss morality; ethics and the potential practices. This is a style of neo-pragmatic risks attached to any meta-narratives that planning praxis rooted in aspects of might replace global capitalism, be they

ecology.' Under theory and practice I would advocate a much wider discussion of critical theory, hermeneutics, power and 'how the world works in general.' Of course Friedmann's proposal and my sug-

Dewey's pragmatics where intelligence is deep ecological or other. Heidegger's gested modifications to it are but one way the ability "to grasp situations as process- es-in-context" (Alexander 1995 p85).

To foster it, it is necessary to create understanding within the student during planning education prior to commencing professional practice, This requires develop- ing the student's imagination. One way to

involvement with National Socialism forward into the next century. Cuthbert provides a useful means to do this. may wish to note the word 'planning'

The values of modernity still domi- appears only once in the above categories. nates in our society and they are likely to Similarly, Sandercock's (1997 p92) in the perceivable future. As such, most proposal for a planning education predi- planning students becoming practitioners cated on "six literacies - technical, analyt- will continue to work instrumentally in, ical, multi- or cross-cultural, ecological

do so is to introduce students to the con- or for, efficient causality driven organisa- and design" also gives a positive structure cepts of Heidegger and his students; Fou- tions. In late modernity 1 suggest that a provided one includes sufficient commu- cault; ecofeminism's ethics of care; and pragmatic approach to virtue based nicative skills within it. postmodern critique, then provide studio praxis, coupled to a critical understanding Innes makes a critical point in regards opportunities to test and play with these or powerAnowledge relationships, will be to developing a future direction for plan- concepts of ethical enquiry. Here Dewey's an effective form of planning practice. ning education: "We, as a profession, must transactive pragmatism can form "a peda- This writer even hopes that this form of be far more intentional about preparing gogy of communicative action" where praxis by practitioners has the potential to our students for the 2 ls t century and human and nature are one and education is effect social change by: helping them to build on the unique capa- creative imagination (Biesta 1995 p279). . promoting local democratic action by bilities of this [communicative] field. The

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modernist vision of practice - that is, 'rational' planning with its emphasis on quantitative analysis, neutral expertise, and the provision of answers for decision makers - has never been planners' greatest comparative strength. Engineers, public policy analysts, and economists have always done these tasks better and believed in them more. Planners, while they also have these analytic skills, use them far less often than their communica- tive abilities, as every survey of practicing planners has shown" (Innes 1997 p227).

Planning education is unique in pro- viding a base from which students can develop communicative skills and lay the foundations for phronesis in later practice, even if it is opaque in its delivery. Program accreditation has the potential to ensure a consistent 'coat rail' of core professional training, praxis, ethics, market awareness and academic standards on which to hang both wider academic understanding and diversity in planning education. This must also include a base from which stu- dents can draw on in later practice for communicative and practical judgement as they "concern themselves with, linking knowledge and collective action" (Helling & Sawicki 1997 p288).

The second component of alliance between the institutes and the universities concerns the real world needs of practice and employment and was addressed com- prehensively in our prior paper. In brief, planning will only have a role if it can pro- vide benefit as defined by the dominant norms and institutions of society It can do so by facilitating civic debate though this can be counter to dominant wishes. This is another reason why strong professional institutes are required to represent the collective view of the profession to the wider society as to what is good practice and why it is impor- tant. On the basic level of the needs of the job market, we argued that the planning graduate in a market-led society, such as present day NZ, needs a range of pragmat- ic and adaptable abilities similar to those

Our article proposed, like Sandercock (1997), that an increasing place for plan- ning practice may be outside that of the state, working not just for corporate clients, but in and on behalf of different groups or communities of interest. I con- clude that existing planning and local gov- ernment related legislation, at least in NZ (Gunder 1996a), fosters a framework in which this advocacy role and civic debate, itself, can emerge more strongly to reflect and empower groups within communities, not just Cuthbert's transnationals.

Conclusion

Modernist fetish of ideological duality. Only one way Marxist: Other

Marxist: Liberal Liberal: Other

but no room for Other: Other

as these will not allow the duality to be categorised.

Giddens (1994 p253) notes that we now live in a "world where there are many others; but also where there are no other." This produces an obligation for all disciplines, including planning, to have a post-traditional global ethics that recog- nises "the sanctity of human life and the universal right to happiness and self-actu- alisation - coupled to the obligation to promote cosmopolitan solidarity and an attitude of respect towards non-human agencies and being, present and future."

1 suggest that the world has moved on, at least in the university, to rejection of duality - either/or. Gunder sees himself as a moral anarchist with a tendency towards male agreement with the values of ecofeminism. He does not believe in Kantian deontological ethical duty or the universality of the rights of 'man'. Hence by definition he cannot be a liberal. Yet in Cuthbert's (1997 p219) worldview where: "the frequent hidden agendas of capital-

Further, 1 suggest for those who wish to continue theorising from the academy that

1 there are more comprehensive models of social normalisation and action than I . c r ~ t ~ c a l spatial political economy. These

1 include Foucault's (1991~) model of social control in governmentality; Giddens

1 (1984) theory of spatial structurdagency; and particularly Bourdieu's (1990, 1991;

I Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) reflexive 1 sociology of practice.

The latter should be of interest to 1 Cuthbert if he is really seeking ideologi-

cally free understanding - ideal truth. It is I a modernist approach that strives to 1 achieve ascetic freedom from all senti-

ment on the part of the academic theorist 1 by avoiding and disavowing any and all

form of social action. Here, the reflexive I struggle on the part of the theorist to I achieve indifference, parts the veil of all

ideology and illusion in achieving dis- I course mastery (Rabinow 1996). I Bourdieu's ascetic freedom is not for

me. This author believes in sentiment, I care and the inability to achieve ultimate 1 modernist truth in social agency. Thus

give me scope for action please. If Niet- I zsche is correct and the power of compre- 1 hensive "knowledge kills action; action

requires the veils of illusion" - I prefer to 1 accept that risk (Nietzsche in Flyvbjerg

1998 p182). I Yes. I agree with Cuthben (1997 p219) 1 that the academy's obligation are "first and

foremost to society, not the profession." I But 1 also suggest that we academics do 1 not lock ourselves u p in our towers

ignoring the real world of uncertainty, I particularity and complexity that provides I colour and marvel in the world. These are

the differences that theory can never fully I address or comprehend as planners 1 practice agency for the good.

/ ENDNOTES 1. No doubt Cuthbert will respond, like Castells

( (1996) that what we are talking about is 'statism' or Mantist-Leninism, not true Marxism. Like Giddens

1 (1994). the current Director of the London School - identified above to do traditional planning ism operate outside of individual and kience that Curhben

considers so significant, I disagree with Castells and tasks - luckily, many of which are central consciousness. and d o not need our 1 consider one and the same, to effective communications. approval to operate." ( 2. Gunderk (1981) Masters thesis explored the role

Senior practitioners engaging as mentors I All must be liberal that disagree with of the state in response to Japanese exploitation to new graduates are useful in developing his Marxist gaze, if not also sheep, swim- 1 of British Columbia's coal reserves from a critical

real world practice, especially if the institute I ming in the illusio sea of false conscious- neO-Manian perspective'

develops a formal mentoring framework for I ness and self congratulation. 1 3. See Habermas (1996). particularly his discussion of civil society

graduate development towards achievement I am afraid that illusion is the case for 1 4. In my case see Gunder 1995. 1996b. of full Institute members hi^ (a Drocess. ' all actors in society and I suazest that that

s . . - under consideration in NZ). the delusion is greatest with the I 5 . Note, 1 have intentionally not used Kant's

1 deontic concept of 'justice' here, but morality in the Complementing this, planning must that wish to theorise towards social action non-~hrist,an sense of [he term,

assert new roles for their practitioners both 1 without experiencing Flyvbjerg's (1995, / in and outside of public sector institutions. 1998) realrationalitat within practice.

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