Notes

Chapter 1

1 Philosophy of Law, third edition, cdited by Joel Fcinbcrgcr and Hyman Gross.

Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, California, 1986, H.L.A. Hart,

"Positivism and thc Scparation of Law and Morals", p. 71.

2 Ibidcm, p. 72.

3 Ibidem, p. 77.

4 Ibidcm, p. 81.

5 Ibidem, p. 72.

6 Ibidem, p. 82.

7 Ibidem, p. 82.

8 Hart's way of speaking of "sociology" is criticized; see e.g. Roger Coterrell, The

Politics of Jurisprudence. Butterworths, London 1989. Hart was rather quasi-sociologist.

9 There is a necessary link between law and morals as there is

between any political power and some kind of justification. What is

contingent is thc concrete kind of morals intertwined with a concrete legal system. But

even that implies a relative contingency. It would be incoherent to hold a Nazi political

power and c.1aboratc a democratic justification or to hold a democratic power and

elaborate a Nazi justification. Hence, in our cultural context. certain moral features of

law are expected by the officials and the population, at large. If those basic values are

not recognized and protected we cannot expect "fidelity" to law. It is orten said, in order

to support a legal positivist claim, that cven "bad" cars are cars, for examplc. But while

peoplc do not expcct cars to have a moral dimension, many peoplc do expect of law to

have it. If this is not thc case, a legal system "cxists" in a formal sense, that is, it

fulfils ccrtain formal features. At this lcvel of "cxistence", a Nazi regime exists as a

legal systcm such as a democratic systcm exists. At this formal level there is no

conceptual link between law and certain moral content. But, in so far as peoplc expect

that a legal system has certain moral contcnt, if it falls short of these requirements, we

are dealing with a legal systcm just in the formal sense. On the contrary, "fidelity to

law" is the usual (internal) attitude of the people to the legal system that includes these

basic moral values the population, at large, expect. Wc cxpect these basic values to be

"in" thc law, and that docs not prevent us from any moral criticism to the law. At least

in our context, what deserves fidelity and moral criticism is a legal system based, for

example, on the Rule of Law. As for a Nazi regime, we simply reject it. It deserves our

moral rcjection. Moral criticism is needed in order to "improve" the legal system that

CHAPTER 1 197

deserves fidelity, for example, the legal system based on the Rule of Law. To decide

whether law "is" or "is not" just according to formal features is not sufficient in our

context. People expect certain justificatory reasons and certain basic values in order to

give "fidelity". "Fidelity" is the second sense of existence of a legal system. I agree that

this second sense adds some difficulties because the "existence" of the law is no longer a

white-black problem, that is, to fulfil or not certain formal features. Nevertheless,

somebody has to decide that certain formal features are the privileged ones instead of the

material ones; somebody has to decide that formal features, in general, are the privileged

ones instead of the material ones, in general. Hence, we would not be dealing with an

exclusively descriptive approach. Although the positivist approach is clearer, it pays the

price of simplification, leaving aside certain moral features. But people have "fidclity"

not because of certain formal features alone. It seems unsound to construct (although

never starting from scratch) a complex normative set to guide and control our individual

and social behaviour, and exclude from it our basic moral values. 10 Ibidem, p. 82.

11 Ibidem, p. 82.

12 Ibidem, pp. 84-85.

13 Ibidem, p. 82.

14 Ibidem, p. 90. Lon Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to Law. A Replay to

Professor Hart."

15 Hart, H.L.A: The Concept of Law, Clarendon Law series, Oxford, 1979, p. 206.

16 Paramo, Juan.R: lIart y la Teorla AnaUtica del Derecho. Centro de Estudios

Constitucionalcs, Madrid, 1984, p. 345.

17 "Positivism and Fidelity to Law." p. 90.

18 Ibidem, p. 91.

19 Peczenik, Alcksander: On Law and Reason. Kluwer, London 1989, specially p. 74 and following.

20 "Positivism and Fidelity to Law." p. 92. 21 Ibidem, p. 94.

22 See footnote number 9.

23 Winch, Peter: The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy.

Routledge, London, 1988, pp. 127-128.

24 Winch, P: Ibidem, pp. 117-118.

198 NOTES

25 Pitkin, Hanna Fenichcl: Willgenstein and Justice. On the Significance of L.

Willgenstein for Social and Political Thought. University of California Press, 1972

(Wittgenstein, el lenguaje, la politica y la justicia, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales,

1984, p. 276).

26 Aarnio, Aulis: The Rational as Reasonable, Reidel, Dordrccht 1987, especially,

chapter IV.

27 Ota Weinberger/Neil MacCormick: An Institutional Theory of Law, 1986,

Reidel, London, pp. 90-91.

28 Winch, Peter: The Idea ... , p. 108-109.

29 "Positivism and Fidelity 10 Law." p. 95.

30 Ibidem, p. 95.

31 Guastini, Riccardo: Daile Fonti aile Norme, GiapicheIli, Torino, 1990, pp.

82-83.

32 Hart, H.L.A: The Concept of Law, p. 126.

33 "Positivism and Fidelity to Law", p. 105.

34 The two common kinds of criticism are: a) as a sociologist Hart was wrong

because there have been societies where the minimum contents have not been accepted;

and b) the framework conditions of the minimum content are moral ones. In a great deal

of literature: M.A. Catanneo, "11 diritto naturale nel pensiero di H.L.A. Hart", Rivista

internazionale di Filosofia del Diritlo, XLII (1965); Neil MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart,

London 1981; R. Cotcrell, ob. cit.; R.A. Duff, "Legal Obligation and the Moral Nature

of Law", Juridical Review, 1980, p. 61; J.P. Gibbs, "Definitions of Law and Empirical

Questions", Law and Society Review, 1968. 2, p. 429; P.M.S. Hacker and J. Raz,

Law, Morality and Society. Essays in Honor of H.L.A. Hart, Oxford, 1977; M.

Krygier, "The Concept of Law and Socieal Theory", Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,

1982, p. 155; Rolf Sartorius, "Hart's Concept of Law", in Robert Summers (ed.) More

Essays in Legal Philosophy, 1971; Robert S. Summers, "Professor H.L.A. Hart's

Concept of Law", Duke Law Journal, 1963, p. 629.

35 See footnote number 9.

CHAPTER 2 199

Chapter 2

1 Article published in Problemi di Teoria del Diritto, II Mulino, Bolonia, 1980.

2 Muguerza, Javier: La concepci6n ana Utica de lafilosofia, Alianza E., Madrid,

1974, p. 103.

3 LLed6, Emilio: Filosofia y Lenguaje, Ariel, Barcelona, 1970, p. 85.

4 Ruiz Miguel, Alfonso: Filosofia y Derecho en Norberto Bobbio~ Centro de

Estudios Constitucionalcs, Madrid, 1983, pp. 155, 156, 157.

5 Ibidem, p. 156.

6 Muguerza, Javier: La concepci6n ... op. cit., p. 104.

7Toulmin, Stephen: La Comprensi6n lIumana. 1., Alianza E., Madrid, 1977, pp.

75,77.

8 Ibidem, pp. 480, 481.

9 Bunge, Mario: Racionalidad y Realismo, Alianza E., Madrid, 1985, pp. 179,

180.

10 Blasco, Josep: Lenguaje, Filosofia y Conocimiento, Ariel, Barcelona, 1973,

p. 192.

11 Ferrater Mora, Jose: Indagaciones sobre el Lenguaje, Alianza E., Madrid, 1980,

p.212.

12 Pitkin, Hanna: Wittgenstein: el Lenguaje, la PoUtica y la Justicia, Centro de

Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1984, pp. 213, 215, 216, 217.

13 Camps, Victoria: Pragmatica del Lenguaje y Filosofia AnaUtica, cd. Peninsula,

Barcelona, 1976, p. 75.

200 NOTES

Chapter 3

1 Alexy, Robert: "Problems of discoursive rationality in Law", paper presented in

the 14th World Congress in Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, , Edinburgh,

1989, p. 4.

2 Aarnio, Aulis: "Taking rules seriously", paper presented in the 14th World

Congress in Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Edinburgh. 1989, p. 10.

3 Peczenik, Aleksander and Spector, Horacio: "A theory of moral ought sentences",

ARSP, (73), 1987, pp. 451 and ff.

4 Alexy, Robert: Teoria de la Argumentaci6n luridica. Centro de Estudios

Constitucionales, Madrid, 1989, p. 24l.

5 Alexy, Robert, "Problems ... " op. cit., p. 2.

6 Alexy, Robert, Teoria ... op. cit., p. 246.

7 Ibidem, pp. 244 and ff.

g Ibidem, p. 212.

9 Ibidem, p. 212.

10 Ibidem, p. 212.

11 Aarnio, Aulis: The Rational as Reasonable, Reidel, Dordrecht, , 1987, p. 217.

12 Elster, Jon: "La posibilidad de una polftica racional", in Leon Olive (ed.)

Racionalidad. Universidad Autonoma de Mexico, 1988, pp. 136, 137.

13 Peczenik, Aleksander: On Law and Reason, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1989, pp. 74

and ff.

14 Elster, Jon: op. cit., p. 138.

CHAPTER 4 201

1 MacCormick, Neil: Legal reasoning and legal theory, Clarendon Law series,

Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 61.

2 This chapter is mainly based on Professor MacCormick's famous work, Legal reasoning and legal theory. Professor Neil MacCormick kindly read through this chapter

and made important comments. Here, I have selected two of them. These points have

been identified in the text with the proper footnotes. Otherwise he has asked me to

make known that some of his views evolved in a similar way to the ones presented in

this chapter. Namely, the articles: "The limits of reason: a reply to Dr. Knud

Haakonssen", ARSP, Vol. 1981 LXVII/4; "Legal deduction,legal predicates and experts

systems", International Journal for the Semiotics of Law V/14, 1992; "Natural Law and

the Separation of Law and Morals", Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, would show that

evolution.

First MacCormick's comment: "If I can identify that rules R 1, R2, R3 ... Rn, are

rules of the system (because they satisfy c or b) then of course I can study the content of

the law of them. So I can know their content, though c or b have nothing themselves

to say about content."

Before answering that comment I would like to make more precise the difference

between "formal" and "material". Here, "formal" legal validity refers to a law correctly

enacted, in accordance to rules stipulating due procedure, although these can mean

several things beginning from formal legal logic to formal legal procedures. Here I refer

to the analysis made by Aulis Aarnio and Robert Summers (forthcoming paper on

forms and formalities). "Material" legal validity refers to the content of it.

Otherwise "Abstract" often, but not necessarily, means universal as in "treat like

cases alike", but "Material" refers to degrees of "Generality" a<; in "treat people according

to their merits" although once a level is decided you cannot reject the application of that

level to all members who are included in it, except justified exception which has to be,

once again, applied to a class of persons and/or situations.

Going back to MacCormick's comment I will write two examples in which it will

be clear, I hope, that one may not always know the content of the law even if one can

identify that rules Rl,R2,R3 ... Rn, are rules of the system because they satisfy other

legal requiremenL<;.

1). Suppose I know what the Rule of Recognition of a legal system is, and

suppose that there is no problem of interpretation of that Rule, or that any such a

202 NOTES

problem has been solved (I am not dealing here with the problem of "solved" problems

of intepretation). 1 can know the content of the law on a concrete subject. For example,

once are identified the rules and certain meaning content 1 know that in order to buy a

house, 1 have to do it through a public official if 1 want my purchase to have legal

effects on third parties.

2). The difference from case 1) may be that the rules in question have not been

properly completed or that they are written in a vague manner so that I cannot know, as

I can in case I), what the content of the law is. Otherwise, maybe certain precedents

are contested because it is not clear how the rule or rules that would form their ratio

decidendi should be formulated, or even if these rules are known, they may have

problems of interpretation not already solved.

Finally, if one abandons Austin's legal model for Hart's one, then a rather more

complicated situation arises. That is, one has the problem of identifying the Rule of

Recognition and its meaning which leads to problems of intepretation. This situation

would not be very complicated if all experts, all the time, agree about the meaning

content of the enacted law. Furthermore, if the Rule of Recognition - as the legal

sources in general - is not a clear cut discourse that can be clearly and precisely

discovered but something that is being built, inter alia, by legal experts, then we have

no undoubtful reference for knowing, at any time, what "is" the law.

It is commonly accepted that legislators cannot foresee everything and that legal

experts are a necessary aspect of the law as a working cultural-political device. But they

eannot properly fill the gaps without a commitment with, at least, the basic values of

the system, not only those expressly enacted but those that underlie the system itself.

Especially - although not only - in hard cases they have to deal with those

"underpinning reasons" that make the task of knowing in advance what the law "is" a

rather difficult task, at least from a practical point of view.

Of course, at the end something is accepted as law by somebody, because otherwise

we should have to say "there is no law at all". But the point is that in some cases 1 may

know in advance what the law is, but not in other cases. It docs not matter whether or

not I can identify the enacted law.

3 Kymlicka, Will: Contemporary Political Philosophy .. Clarendon Press, Oxford,

1990, p. 49, note 10.

4 MacCormick, Neil: op. cit., pp. 61,62.

CHAPTER 4 203

5 In this regard, sec Aleksander Peczenik: On law and reason, Kluwer, Dordrccht,

1989, pp. 250 and ff.

6 MacCormick, Neil: op. cit., p. 62.

7 Ibidem.

8 Winch, Peter: The idea of a social science and its relation to philosophy,

Routledge, London, 1988, p. 23. "A man's social relations with his fellows are

permeated with his ideas about reality. Indeed 'permeated' is hardly a strong enough

word; social relations are expressions of ideas about reality. In the Ibsen situations

which I just referred to, for example, it would be impossible to delineate the character's

attitudes to the people sorrounding him except in terms of his ideas about what they

think of him, what they have done in the past, what they are likely to do in the future,

and so on."

9 Aarnio, Aulis: On legal reasoning, Turku, 1977, pp. 212,122. "The judge or the

scholar active in legal science (legal dogmatics) is not an interpreter of the basic

valuations characteristic of 'legal norms' in any other sense than the one presented

above. His 'interpretative' task should not be understood to be such that the interpreter

finds the 'right' values from legal regulations or from other juridical material and then

makes his conclusions on the basis of the values thus discovered. Neither does he

evaluate things on the basis of his own private and subjective desires. The

administering of justice is not a matter of arbitrariness. Rather it should be said that the

frame inside which the judge argues lies in his culture itself. It is part of our common

world-picture. "

10 MacCormick, Neil: op. cit., p. 62.

11 In relation to acceptability as a criterion of validity, Aulis Aarnio says:

"However, axiological validity proves to be the most significant as far as the

justification is concerned. The justificatory basis of an interpretation is often consisted

of 'extra-legal' arguments, among them references to a certain value code .. , Systemic

validity, both in the internal and external sense, is only one of the preconditions of

acceptability. Efficacy, in tum, is one, but not the sole criterion of acceptability. But

even so, argumentation theory attempts to show, all things considered, what norms

should be accepted in a legal community if the matters are considered rationally. In this,

it always is a critical theory of law." The rational as reasonable, Reidel, Dordrecht,

1987, p. 46.

12 MacCormick, Neil: op. cit., p. 64.

204 NOTES

13 See Aulis Aamio, The rational ...• op. ciL, pp. 225 and ff. and Aleksander

Peczenik: The basis of legal justification. Lund, 1983, pp. 11 and ff.

14 MacCormick, Neil: II.LA. Hart. E.Amold, London, 1981, p. 39.

15 Ibidem, p. 161.

16 Ibidem, p. 39.

17 Ibidem.

18 MacCormick, Neil: Legal reasoning .... op. cit., p. 25.

19 Ibidem, p. 32.

20 Ibidem, p. 115.

21 In relationship to the existence of norms see J.W. Harris: Law and legal science.

Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, pp. 24 and ff.; Aleksander Peczenik: The basis ... , op.

cit., pp. 6 and ff.

22 Aarnio, Aulis: The rational ... op. cit., pp. 188 and ff.; 225 and ff.

23 Ibidem.

24 MacCormick, Neil: Legal reasoning ...• op. cit., p. 64.

25 Ibidem, p. 65.

26 As Aleksander Peczenik puts it: "I will not discuss the various interpretations of

this controversial expression but simply assume that the rule of law exists if legal

decisions are simultaneously predictable and morally acceptable." The basis ...• op. cit.,

page 78 and 168; in a similar sense, Stanley L. Paulson: 'Tcorie giuridiche c Rule of

Law' in Analisi e DiriUo 1992 a cura di Paolo Comanducci c Riccardo Guastini,

Giapichclli, Torino.

27 In this regard, Aulis Aamio says: "The underpinning reasons refer to matters

such as the acknowledgement of the necessary conditions of social order." "Criteria in

turn are not universal in respect of time and place. On the contrary, the criteria are

typefied by historical relativity. This is not due solely to the fact that human knowledge

of values varies with time and culture. The problem lies deeper. Values are not an

ontological entity which would exist regardless of the subjcct.". The rational.... op.

cit., pp. 37 and 204.

28 MacCormick, Neil and Summers, Robert: Interpreting statutes. A comparative

study. Darmouth, Aldrshot, 1991; pp. 91 and ff. (R.Alexy and D. Dreier); pp. 145 and

ff. (A. Aamio); pp. 227 and ff. (J. Wroblewsky); pp. 322 and ff. (A. Peczenik and G.

Bergholtz); pp. 347 and ff. (Z. Bankowski and N. MacCormick); pp. 422 and ff. (R.

Summers), etc.

CHAPTER 4 205

29 Wroblewski, Jerzy: Constitucion y teoria general de la interpretacion juridica, Cuademos Civitas, Madrid, 1985, especially pp. 42 and ff.

30 MacConnick, Neil: Legal reasoning ...• op. cit., pp. 138, 139.

31 Vemengo, Roberto: La interpretacionjuridica. UNAM, 1977, pp. 116 and ff.

32 MacCormick, Neil: Legal reasoning ...• op. cit. p. 138.

33 Ibidem, p. 56.

34 Ibidem, p. 115.

35 Ibidem, p. 138.

36 Ibidem, p. 65.

37 Ibidem, p. 64.

38 Ibidem, p. 138.

39 Ibidem, p. 139.

40 Ibidem, pp. 139,140.

41 Aamio, Aulis: The rational .... op. cit., pp. 217, 218.

42 MacCormick, Neil: 11.L.A. llart. op. cit., p. 39.

43 Second MacConnick's comment: "It is true that the Pope tells him. It is open

whether what is said about Peter is true or not. No, they are different statements and

have different truth-values as indicated".

What could be the goal - if any - of equating such different situations by means of

the label "truth-conditions"? For example, why should we equate through the

qualification of "true-false" the following situations: 1) It's raining; 2) According to that

legal system, Peter ought to behave as a good trader. Why we do not say that the first is

"true"or "false" whether or it is raining out there, and the second is "correct" or

"incorrect" according to contextual interpretation?

I think that legal positivists, in general, deny or refuse a normative concept of law

because they want to deal with "facts" and with "true-false". But, I believe that they

miss the basic point. A concept of law that completely lacks any normative sense just

could be of interest for an empirical sociologist, for example. In their "best", legal

positivists could do the task of an empirical sociologist. They just say they deal with

facts but - in any calle - arc facts different from "it's raining".

Law implies, at least in our culture, not only a complex social fact that can be

"scientifically" scrutinized but a normative system of obligation, prohibitions and

permissions by reference to which certain people ought to behave in certain ways. The

206 NOTES

task of a legal scholar (and judge) is to understand (to interprete) the content of the

system. And this is hermeneutics.

Otherwise, when MacCormick says that the "truth of a statement itself' it is a

truth of a particular system at a particular time it means that we just may know a

"concrete truth meaning content" after an interpretation of concrete laws of a legal

system at a particular time (q). Suppose that we all agree that the "true meaning" of a

given statement in (q) is (M}). According to which Rule of Recognition (or

interpretations of it) would the experts pass from the "true-meaning" (MJ) in (tt> to

another "true-meaning (M2) in (t2)?

Supposing that there is an enacted rule (what is very rare), it would be something

like: "change when it is due or when it is convenient".

Otherwise, if we accept an atemporal truth of the statement (a position denied by

MacCormick) it would collapse the social function of the legal rules of solving - within

a certain legal tradition - the changing conflicts of the society. Hence, if we accept a

contextual "truth of statement" we have the problems mentioned above, and so we may

have problems in identifying - especially in changing situations - what the "truth of

statement" can be, that is, what the law is. If MacCormick accepts that the "truth of the

statement itself" is contextual, that is, depends on a particular system at a particular

time, then a statement does not have a "true-meaning" in itself but depends on its

context which is a changing one. Otherwise, in "it's raining" the "truth of the statement

il'ielf' docs not depend on the context as in the former case.

Suppose now that "Peter was killed at 2 p.m."; then it is true that he died during

the afternoon. Here we have a physical problem of doctors' responsibility, if Peter died

at 2 p.m or 2.10 p.m. and a legal problem of the lawyers' responsibility, if the legal

concept of murder should be applied or not. Two skilful lawyers may reasonably

disagree about the latter but not about the former case, given certain conditions. Our

life would not be the same if we could reasonably discuss whether it is raining or

not. whether Peter died during the afternoon or not granted that he died at 2 p.m.

We take for granted certain empirical and analytical aspects. They are true or false

but not everything has the same features and requirements. Certain statements can be

supported by different reasons having similar weight such as "what Peter ought to do in

certain circumstances", but certain statements like "it is raining" and others, do not

admitt a reasonable balance of pro and con reasons. I would say that the "truth" that

CHAPTER 4 207

MacCormick is talking about is a "weak" truth because it is an hermeneutical one. It is

no longer a "truth" according to the correspondence theory of truth.

44 Baker, G.P. and Hacker, P.M.S: Language, sense and nonsense, Basil

BlackweIl, Oxford, 1986, p. 48; "The meaning of any expression is taken to be its

contribution to the truth-conditions of any sentence in which it occurs. But many

sentences are not expressions of anything that can be evaluated in the dimension of truth

and falsity. It would be nonsense to declare that what the sentence 'When was the battle

of Hastings fought?' or 'Turn out the light before you go to bed!' express is true or

false. Yet, if such sentences cannot be characterized as true or false, would it not follow

that it is a nonsense to speak of their truth conditions?"

45 MacCormick, Neil: Legal reasoning ...• op. cit., p. 91.

46 As Hilary Putnam puts it: "In the seventeenth century the similitude theory

began to be restricted, much as it had been by Aristotle. Thus Locke and Descartes held

that in the case of 'secondary' quality, such as color or a texture, it would be absurd to

suppose that that the property of the mental image is literally the same property as the

property of the physical thing. Locke was Corpuscularian, that is, an advocate of the

atomic theory of matter, and like a modem physicist he conceived that what answers to

the sensuous presented redness of my image of a red piece of cloth is not a simple

property of the cloth, but a very complex dispositional property or 'Power', namely the

Power to give rise to sensations of this particular kind ... Actually, some Locke

scholars today dispute this; but Locke docs say that there is a 'similitude' between the

idea and the object in the case of the primary qualities and that there is 'no similitude'

between the idea of red and warmth and the redness or warmth in the objecL." Reason.

truth and history, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 57,58.

47 MacCormick, Neil and Weinberger, Ota: An Institutional Theory of Law,

Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986, p. 102.

48 MacCormick, Neil: Legal reasoning ... op. cit., p. 56.

49 Ibidem, p. 227.

50 Ibidem, p. 62.

51 Ibidem, pp. 227,228.

52 Brown, Harold. I.: Rationality, Routledge, London, 1990; "All of this suggests

a very important feature of the concept of following a rule. It suggests that one has to

take into account not only the actions of the person whose behaviour is in question as

a candidate for the category of rule-following, but also the reactions of other people to

208 NOTES

what he docs .. .If there were a Platonic heaven that contained the meanings of words,

and to which we could refer to determine if our linguistic behaviour was correct, this

problem would be solved. Unfottunately, no such realm exists, and Wittgenstein

suggests that the required standard is provided by the body of people who use my

language. In other words, linguistic rules are essentially social rules; such rules exist

'in' the members of the society that use those rules, and would cease to exist if that

society went out of existence."

53 MacCormick, Neil: Legal reasoning ... op. cit .. , pp. 232, 233.

54 MacCormick, Neil and Weinberger, Ota: An Institutional theory ... op. cit.,

p.52.

55 Bayon, Juan Carlos: La normalividad del Derecho. Centro de Estudios

Constitucionales, Madrid, 1991, pp. 729 and ff.

56 MacCorm ick, Neil: Legal reasoning .. , op. cit., p. 115.

57 Ibidem, pp. 61, 62.

58 Ibidem, p. 62.

59 Ibidem, p. 105.

60 Guastini, Riccardo: Daile fonti aile norme. Giapichelli, Torino, 1990, pp. 112

and ff.

61 MacCormick, Neil: Legal reasoning ... op. cit., p. 233.

62 Bernstein, Richard J.: "From Hermeneutics to Praxis", in Philosophical

profiles. Polity Press, Oxford, 1986, pp. 96, 97. "The players are not subjects of a

play; instead play merely reaches presentation through players. Play has its own

rhythm, its own buoyancy, its distinctive to-and-fro movement. This mode of being of

play is what Gadamer takes to be charactristic of our relation with works of art, texts,

and indeed anything that is handed down to us. Gadamer introduces the concept of play

in order to highlight the subtle dialectical and dialogical relation that exists between the

interpreter and what he seeks to interpret. We misconceive this relation if we think that

we are merely subjects or spectators standing over and against what is objective and

what exists an sich."

63 Greenawalt, Kent: Law and objectivity. Oxford University Press, Oxford,

1992, p. 75. "Interpretation in the human sciences may be regarded as descriptive

because it aims to reveal what exists and occurs. This dichotomy has some significance,

but it is much less sharp than it appears at first glance ... the interpreter typically will

engage in some normative evaluation when aiming to provide a descriptive account, and

CHAPTER 4 209

his sense of empirical reality will influence whatever normative lessons he derives from

what he is interpreting. Third, an understanding of a culture's norms is not easily

separable from an understanding of its history and of other clements that are not

obviously normative."

64 MacCormick, Neil: Legal reasoning ... op. cit., p. 234.

65 Ibidem, p. 234.

66 Ibidem, pp. 234,235.

67 Harris, l.W : Law and legal science, op. cit., p. 67. "Currently valid rules

(whether large scale or small scale) belong to momentary legal systems; principles,

policies, and other weight-bearing devices belong to non-momentary systems."

(Nevertheless, an important question is whether the legal system may work or not

without those 'devices' and whether the judges and the legal community, at large,

construct, apply and accept those devices as members of the legal system in ordcr to

bcttcr fulfilthcir task. If that is the case, thcy should be counted as valid members of a

momentary legal systcm and the legal scicnce should describe them so, and not only as

justificatory deviccs of a non-momentary legal systcm).

68 MacCormick, Neil: Legal reasoning ... op. cit., pp. 236, 237.

69 Ibidem, pp. 138, 139.

70 Ibidem, p. 62.

7! Ibidem, p. 194. (The italic is mine)

72 Ibidcm, p. 238.

73 Ibidem, pp. 239, 240.

74 Ibidcm, pp. 236, 237.

75 Ibidem, p. 237.

76 Ibidem, p. 242.

77 Ibidem, p. 194.

78 Ibidem, p. 62.

79 Ibidem, p. 246.

80 Ibidem, p. 248.

8! Ibidem, p. 242.

82 Ibidem, p. 248. (The italic is mine)

83 Ibidem, p. 250.

84 Ibidem, p. 251.

210 NOTES

85 Raz, Joseph: The concept of a legal system, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983,

pp. 213, 214. "Naturally questions of identification may turn on moral issues, as when

the question is which is the most just action. Clearly when this is the nature of the

question it belongs, by definition, to the deliberative stage. Only when the identification

of the required action does not depend on moral arguments does it belong to the

executive stage ... Only reasons binding on the courts in such a way, i.e. only

'executive' reasons, reasons the existence of which can be established without invoking

moral argumenL<;, are legal reasons."

(In my view, Raz's approach does not completely solve the problem of

identification. Inter alia, first: if these questions - the justest action - are unavoidable,

then, certain questions of identification are moral questions which seem to challenge his

'source thesis'; second: how to decide whether the identification of one action depends or

not on moral arguments; on moral arguments?; third: it can be disputable whether moral

arguments have been invoked or not; in that case, according to which criteria should we

solve the doubt?

Neither does J. W. Harris solve this problem of identification: "If a rule originating

in the debatable source stipulates duty X relating to topic Y, the legal scientist who is

asked for information about the law on the topic Y can do one of three things. First, he

may include in his description the existence of legal duty X; in that case, he has

included the source within the first blank of the fial. Second, he may exclude legal duty

X, having presupposed the exclusion of the source. Third, he may announce that no

description of the topic can, as things are, be offered with any certainty, but that one or

other of two descriptions would be correct depending on how the uncertainty as to the

source is resolved; he may then go on to advance arguments in favour of prescribing one

resolution. In so far as he offers a description, tentatively or with confidence, he

presupposes listed and ranked sources. The law he describes, the 'legal systcm' in the

sense of the 'present law', is identified by reference to such sources." Law and legal

science, op. cil., pp. 75, 76.

(I would say that this is a 'loaded question'. In the fIrst and second cases maybe we

are dealing with a yes-no answer (although not necessarily because ofaxiologigal gaps,

the time and the changing of circumstances), but the third case is diffcrent. In the former

two cases, no arguments were nceded to answer yes or no, at least for a certain time and

for certain mcmbers of the legal community (it does not maUer here whether there

were internalized-accepted arguments) but in the last case it was enough to look neither

CHAPTER 4 211

at the list of sources nor at the list of arguments (if any). Does it mean the same to

identify the law by reference to sources when the 'advanced arguments' are not 'in' the

sources? Are the limits always clear between the three cases? Are the posited sources

enough to solve this important problem? Do they solve any conflict between competing

interpretations?

86 MacCormick, Neil: Legal reasoning ... op. cit., p. 138.

87 Ibidem, p. 251.

88 Ibidem, p. 251.

89 MacCormick, Neil: liLA. lIart, op. cit., p. 38.

90 Aamio, Aulis: On legal reasoning, op. cit., p. 159: "Person A takes hold of a

window handle, turns it clockwise and moves the window on its hinges toward himself

until it does not tum any more. On the basis of the description we (obviously) say: A

opened a window. We understand A's behaviour as an act (an action with a result). This

was also a completed act; no circumstances obstructive to the result did tum up.

Understanding of this kind seems to be a precondition of placing a phenomenon within

the framework of explanation. If, however, someone is dissatisfied with our

characterization and says that the behaviour has not been correctly understood, we point

out for him the premises from which the behaviour 'follows'. In other words, we

explain A's behaviour teleologically."; Aleksander Peczenik, The basis ... , op. cit., p.

78 : "Legal reasoning is thus quasi-cognitive. One claims to base the conclusions on

the sources of the law but in fact there exists the following transformation: from

description of the sources one derives conclusions which do not follow deductively

unless one adds aditional non-analytic (material) premises, (substantive) reasons or

inference rules, corresponding to the evaluative (creative) component of legal

reasoning."; Rationality, (ed.) Bryan R. Wilson, Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, Steven

Lukes, "Some problems about rationality", pp. 212, 213: "One may conclude that our

beliefs are to be evaluated by both rational (1) and rational (2) criteria. Sometimes, as in

the case of religious beliefs, rational (1) truth criteria will not take the analysis very far.

Often rational (1) criteria of logic do not reveal anything positive about relations

between beliefs that are to be explicated in terms of 'provides a reason for'. Sometimes

rational (1) criteria appear less important than 'what the situation demands'. In all these

cases, rational (2) criteria are illuminating. But they do not make rational (1) criteria

dispensable ... Rational (1) and rational (2) criteria are necessary both to understand and

explain."

212 NOTES

91 MacCormick, Neil: Legal reasoning .... op. cit., p. 251.

92 Ibidem, p. 255.

93 Ibidem, p. 242.

94 Harris, J.W: Law and legal science. op. cit., pp. 75, 76.

95 MacCormick, Neil: Legal reasoning ...• _op. cit., p. 254.

96 Putnam, Hilary: Reason. truth and history. op. cit., p. 104; "It is tempting to

take the same line with rationality itself and to say that what determines whether a

belief is rational is not the norms of rationality of this or that culture, but an ideal theory of rationality, a theory which would give necessary and sufficient conditions for a

belief to be rational in the relevant circumstances in any possible world. Such a theory

would have to account for the paradigmatic examples of gold ... but what are the

chances that we can find powerful universal generalizations obeyed by all instances of

rationally justified belief?".

97 Bernstein, Richard. J: Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. Basil Blackwell,

Oxford, 1989, p. 57; "The shift from a model of rationality that searches for determinate

rules which can serve as necessary and sufficient conditions, to model of practical

rationality that emphasizes the role of exemplars and judgmental interpretation, is not

only characteristic of theory-choice but is a leitmotif that pervades all of Kuhn's

thinking about science."

98 MacCormick, Neil: Legal reasoning .... op. cit., p. 258.

99 Ibidem, p. 254.

100 Pcczenik, Alcksander: The basis .... op. cit., pp. 94, 95.

101 MacCormick, Neil: Legal reasoning ...• op. cit., pp. 270, 271. In this regard

he claims the following: "The argument from consistency require us not to tolerate the

presence in a legal system of two rules which controvert each other ... The argument

from coherence goes beyond even that, seeking not merely to avoid nat contradictions or

inconsistencies, but indeed to find a way of making sense of the system as a whole, by

making sense of branches of it at a time." (p.266).

102 Ibidem, p. 268.

103 Antifoundationalism and Practical Reasoning. Simpson, Evan (ed.) Academic

Printing and Publishing, Edmonton, 1987, pp. 204,205. "Let me therefore say that I

do adhere to and hereby commend a version of foundational ism (if that is what it is)

which insisl<; that: (a) there are some questions which are specifically philosophical in

the sense that they are crucial to a systematic understanding of our world and that

CHAPTER 4 213

anyone who purports to be a philosopher or to have a philosophy needs to have some

considered and discursively statable view about them. (b) one of the philosophical

questions is which other questions belong in the list (my list of such other questions

having been stated above). (c) These questions are of concern to all thoughful humans,

not only those who hold paid jobs as Lecturers in or Professors of Philosophy or

cognate disciplines. But (d) a large part of the most worthwile prior discourse upon

these and related questions have been carried on by recognized 'philosophers', and so a

study of their ideal) is of particular utility to anyone who wants to carry forward his or

her own thought or discourse upon them. (e) answers can be put forward persuasively

(rhetorically) and may be more or less plausible, never demonstrable with certainty.

Nevertheless (f) some ordered and structured taking up of position, with a discursively

statable and defensible internal logic, is necessary to every serious engagement with the

questions."

(In relation to point (e) he settles too sharp distinctions between the different

realms of knowledge. As Mario Bunge puts it: "Moreover, the 'true science' is not more

defined as a true and undoubted knowledge (episteme), as opposed to the uncertain and

changeable opinion (doxa). The scientific knowledge is justified opinion, well-founded

opinion- but always opinion. If it is a sure knowledge, then it does not refer to the facts

but the form; and if it refers to the reality, is unsafe, perfectible and can be corrected."

Intuici6n y Raz6n, Tecnos, Madrid, 1986, pp. 40, 4l.)

104 Ibidem, p. 137.

105 Ibidem, p. 197.

106 Alexy, Robert: Teorfa de la argumentaci6n juridica, Centro de Estudios

Constitucionales, Madrid, 1989, pp. 170 and ff.

107 Aamio, Aulis: The rational ... , op. cit., p. 225; "The particular ideal audience

is defined through the use of two criteria. First of all, its members bind themselves to

the rules of rational discourse. In this respect, this type of audience resembles the type

just dealt with above. The difference lies in the fact that the memhers of the particular

audience have adopted common values. The audience is tied to a certain form of life, to

use a Wittgenstein phrase. This audience differs from the concrete audience in an

important respect. It is assumed that its members fulfil the condition of rationality. As

this demand is not normally adequate in respect of societal reality, it is thus specifically

a question of an ideal audience. However, it is not universal in the sense used by

Perelman, since there is no assumption of universal (objective) values lying hehind it.

214 NOTES

On the contrary, it meets another condition set by Perelman. An ideal particular

audience is culturally and socially determined."

108 MacCormick, Neil: Legal reasoning .... op. cit., p. 106; "The idea of a

'consistent' body of norms I use in a strict sense: however desirable on conscquentialist

grounds a given ruling might be, it may not be adopted if it is contradictory of some

valid and binding rule of the system ... 'Coherence' is intended in a looser sense."

109 Ayer, A.J: lIume. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 1986, page 37; "As is so

often the case with Hume, the Enquiry summarizes with greater elegance and clarity the

position for which the arguments are developed in the Treatise. In this instance, we are

told that 'it seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession,

to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before

the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our

perception, but would exist, though we and every sensible creature were absent or

annhilated'. (E 151) Hume goes on to ascribe this belief even to 'the animal creation'. In

relation to the universality of moral sentiments and natural virtues, Jose Martinez de

Pis6n, Justicia y orden politico en lIume. Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid,

1992, pp. 207 and ff; pp. 224 and ff, respectively.

110 Antifoundationalism and .... op. cit., p. 204.

111 Alexy, Robert: Teorla ...• op. cit., p. 164.

112 MacCormick. Neil: Legal reasoning .... op. cit., pp. 14. 15; "Argument'> in

practical context'> arc usually advanced in order to persuade; they arc aimed at a particular

audience with a view to persuading tha. audience to do something; they arc therefore in

some measure relative both to audience and to topic ... Underlying the practical aim of

persuasion there is, it appears to me, a function of justification at least ostensible

justification."; "Those who work within such a system persuade precisely by

convincing the relevant audience that there are reasons of overriding weight why X

ought to be done; or at least, by showing that there are good ostensibly justifying

reasons in addition to such other clements in the case as may appeal to unstated

prejudices and predispositions."

113 Ibidem, p. 258.

114 Brown, Harold. I: Rationality, op. cit., pp. 54, 58: "The thesis that rational

knowledge may be founded on propositions that are self-justifying without being self­

evident is known as 'modest foundationalism' ... Again a regress threatens. If, for

example, rational acceptance of a proof requires a metalogical proof, then I am going to

CHAPTER 4 215

need a higher-order proof that my metalogical proof is indeed a proof, and so on ... The

classical model of rationality requires that we either find a foundation in each case that is

not only justified, but that shows itself as justified, or give up any hope of achieving

rationality."

115 Berstein, Richard. J: Beyond Objectivism ... , op. ci l,., pp. 53, 240 (note 9);

"Despite those who claim that every time Kuhn has attempted to clarify his original

meaning he is in effect rewriting his own history or changing his mind, a sympathetic

reading of the Structure of Scientific Revolutions shows that Kuhn always intended to

dsitinguish forms of rational persuasion and argumentation that take place in scientific

communities from those irrational forms of persuasion that he has been accused of

endorsing."; "This is not to suggest that new paradigms triumph ultimately through

some mystical aesthetic ... But if a paradigm is ever to triumph it must gain some first

supporters, men who will develop it to the point where hardheaded arguments can be

produced and multiplied. And even those arguments, when they come, are not

individually decisive. Because scientists are reasonable men, one or another argument

will ultimately persuade many of them."

116A t;1: d t' I' 't 204 n l..Joun a zona lsm ... , op. CI ., p. .

117 Chisholm, Roderick. M: Theory of knowledge, Prentice-Hall International

Editions, New Jersey, 1989, p. 80; "The difficulty may be seen by contrasting two of

the principal uses of 'probable' - the statistical use and the relational use. Statements

in which 'probable is taken merely statistically are rewordings of statements about

statistical frequencies ... What do statements about statistical frequency tell us about the

justification of a belief?"

(It is not clear whether MacCormick support" the Humean idea that our beliefs in

scientific laws and theories are the result of mental habits due to observation of certain

repetitions when he claims that "Probabilities, not certainties, are all that humans can

find in matters of fact and of existence ... " - Antifoundationalism ... , op. cit., p. 203 -

and it is not clear whether he believes that the repetition of certain elements (facts,

rules, reasons, solutions) in certain ways creates the psychological state for claiming

that 'this is a very probable good justifying reason' in a new legal situation that

relevantly resemhles to the former one. If so, in 'hard cases' this psychological stale of

mind would be absent.)

118 Thomas, Stephen N: Practical reasoning in natural language, Prentice-Hall,

New Jersey, 1986, pp. 367,368,369.

216 NOTES

119 If 'probability' is understood as: inductive, probabilistic and presumptive,

MacCormick's concept of probability (according to his theoretical discourse) would be

the last one, which is typical of analogy. Nevertheless, the repetition of certain cases

may lead, through a subjective sense of probability, to an inductive generalization. This

may be MacCormick's c,ase; the repetition of certain justifying reasons with certain

solutions would bring about the following psychological occurrence: these 'justifying

reasons' have a higher level of probability than any other ones. But, if that is accepted,

how should we decide that new 'relevant' items 'normatively require' a new solution?

120 Toulmin, Stephen and others: An introduction to reasoning. MacMillan

Publishers, New York, 1984, p. 161; "We must be particularly cautious in dealing with

claims based solely upon statistical evidence, not because 'probability' has no place in

reasoning but because so many different kinds of correlations are present in any given

situation - only one of which might claim to be the one and only cause. Statistical

correlations have the same sort of relation to causal assertions that a series of points on

a graph have to the curve a scientist draws through them. Many different curves may be

used to link the points together, and we must have good outside reasons for choosing

one rather than another."

121 Brown, Harold. I: Rationality. op. cit., pp. 207, 208 and ff.; "For many

thinkers these disputes raise problems about the rationality of science, and indeed, the

classical model of rationality leaves little scope for disagreements in which we do not

have to conclude that at least one of the parties to the dispute is irrational. On that

model, all disagreements are analogous to those that occur when two individuals

disagree on the outcome of an arithmetic calculation. The rules for doing the calculation

are known, and there is no diputing these. Thus disagreement must occur either because

someone has made a computational error, or, if the dispute concerns a substantive

subject, because they disagree on what numbers should go into the calculation." ... "On

our new model of rationality, rational decisions require the existence of an intellectual

community, and any such community will be characterized by a substantial body of

shared ideas and beliefs" ... "At the same time, the scientists who are actually engaged

in a dispute will share many views that they derive from the wider culture in which they

live. In any given dispute these shared scientific and extra-scientific views can provide a

basis for rational discussion of the points at issue. Even in cases of radical scientific

change, local agreements can provide a sufficient basis for rational debate. Different

CHAPTER 4 217

local agreements will play this role in different cases, and there is no need to postulate

eternal, trans-scientific principles to account for the rationality of scientific disputes."

122 Toulmin, Stephen: An introduction ...• op. cit., p. 83; " ... we shall best

understand what gives practical argumentation its rational force and power only by

investigating how it serves the purposes both of specialized professional activities like

law and science and of our everyday non professional lives and 'common-sense' needs."

123 Russell, Bertrand: lIistoria de la Filosofia Occidental. Vol 2, Espasa-Calpe,

Madrid, 1971, p. 295.

218 NOTES

Chapter 5

1 Buchanan, James. M: Liberty, market and state. Political economy in the 1980s.

New York University Press, 1985, p. 50.

2 Ibidem, p. 52.

3 Ibidem, p. 52.

4 Ibidem, p. 40.

5 Ibidem, pp. 34 and 35.

6 Ibidem, pp. 64 and 65.

7 Ibidem, p. 63.

8 Ibidem, pp. 61 and 62.

9 Ibidem, p. 63

10 Ibidem, pp. 63 and 64.

11 Ibidem, p. 65.

12 Ibidem, p. 66.

13 Ibidem, p. 74.

14 Ibidem, p. 75.

15 Ibidem, p. 76.

16 Ibidem, p. 76.

17 Ibidem, p. 99.

18 Ibidem, p. 100.

19 Ibidem, p. 167.

20 Ibidem, p. 85.

21 Ibidem, p. 190.

22 Ibidem, p. 191.

23 Ibidem, p. 237.

24 Ibidem, p. 238.

25 Ibidem, pp. 136 and 137.

CHAPTER 6 219

Chapter 6

I Bobbio, Norberto: Elliempo de los derechos, Sistema, Madrid 1991, p. 14.

2 Aarnio, Aulis: Lo racional como razonable, Centro de Estudios

Constitucionales, Madrid, 1991, p. 71.

3 Navarro, Pablo, E: La eficacia del Derecho, Centro de Estudios

Constitucionales, Madrid, 1990, p. 23. 4 Ibidem, p. 23. 5 Laporta, Francisco: "Sobre el concepto de dercchos humanos", Doxa 4, Alicante

1987, p. 35.

6 Bayon, Juan Carlos: La normalividad del Derecho. Centro de Estudios

Constitucionales, Madrid, 1991, pp. 363 and ff.

7 Bayon, Juan Carlos: "Los deberes positivos generales y su fundamentaci6n", ~ 3, Alicante, 1986, p. 54.

8 Bobbio, Norberto: op. cit, p. IS. 9 Perez Luno, Antonio: "Conceptos y concepcion de los derechos humanos", ~ 4, Alicante, 1987, p. 62.

10 Bayon, Juan Carlos: La normalividad ... op. cit., pp. 114 and ff.

11 Winch, Peter: The idea of a social science and ilS relalion 10 philosophy, Routledge, London, 1980, p. 18.

12 Toulmin, Stephen: Knowing and aCling, Collier MacMillan Publishers,

London 1976, p. 158.

13 Simon, Herbert: Reason in human af/airs, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p.13.

14 Ibidem, p. 20. IS Laporta, Francisco: "Respuesta a Perez Luno, Atienza y Ruiz Manero", Doxa

4, Alicante, 1987, p. 74.

16 Raz, Joseph: "Diriui e benessere individuale", Analisis e Dirillo 1991, a cura

de P. Comanduci e R. Guastini, Giapichelli, pp. 291,292.

17 Ibidem, p. 294.

18 Peczenik, Aleksander and Spector, Horacio: "A theory of moral-ought sentences", ARSP, 1987.

19 Alexy, Robert: Teoria de la argumenlaci6n juridica .. Centro de Estudios

Constitucionales, Madrid, 1989, p. 185 (traduccion de M. Atienza e I. Espejo).

220 NOTES

20 Nagel, Thomas: The view from nowhere, Oxford University Press, 1986,

p.155. 21 Simon, Herbert Reason... op. cit., p. 20.

22 Aamio, Aulis: Lo raciona/... cit. p. 134 and f.; Peczenik, Aleksander: The basis of legal justification. Lund 1983, p. 34 and f.

23 AlLhough the strategic racionality of the Prisioner's Dilema seems to be not as

good as the Tit for Tat strategy, any situation under deep asymmetry can render useless

(or spoil) any given strategy. Otherwise, the minimum warranted by zero-sum games

may result morally unacceptable. Summing up: without a certain level of symmetry of

the participants within a concrete situation, even cooperative games may tend to be

distorted in their optimal point of collusion, and non-zero-sum games may tend to be

distorted in their optimal beneficial effects for all players. In this respect Davis,

Morton: Introduccion a la teorta de los juegos. Alianza Universidad, Madrid, 1971;

Axelrod, Robert: La evolucion de la cooperacion. Alianza Universidad, Madrid, 1986;

Gomez-Pomar, Julio: Teorta y tecnicas de negociacion. Ariel, Barcelona, 1991.

CHAPTER 7 221

Chapter 7

1 Hart. H. L. A: The Concept of Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1961. p. 187.

It is not my aim lO refule Hart's criticism of Kelsen's claim lhal 'law can have any

content'. I think. on the conlrary. that Hart was right on this point. But. in so far as he

accepts some specific righL'> and duties implicit in 'nature' he is not any more a legal

positivist and his difference from Natural Law thinkers is very little except that he

focuses on survival. whal I claim.

2 Ibidem. p. 187.

3 Ibidem. p. 188.

4 Ibidem. p. 188.

5 Ibidem, p. 189.

6 Ibidem. p. 190.

7 Ibidem, pp. 190, 191.

8 Ibidem, p. 191.

9 Ibidem, p. 191.

10 Ibidem, p. 193.

11 Ibidem. p. 193.

12 Ibidem, p. 195.

13 Aristoleles: La Gran Moral a Eudemo, 5 cd. Austral. Madrid. 1972. pp. 32, 33,

126. 127.

14 Hume. David: An Inquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals, Ch. W. Hendel

(ed.) The library of liberal arts. Indianapolis. first edition. 1981, pp. 57. 58.

15 Ibidem. p. 61.

16 Ibidem. pp. 63.64.

17 Ibidem, pp. 93. 94.

18 Ibidem. p. 111.

19 Ibidem. p. 112.

20 Ibidem. pp. 130. 152.

21 Kant Manuel: Cr{tica de la Razon Practica, Austral. Madrid. 1975. p. 93.

22 Kant Manuel: Fundamentacion de la MetaJisica de las Costumbres, Austral.

Madrid. 1990. pp. 53. 54.

23 Ibidem. p. 85.

24 Ibidem. p. 88.

25 Ibidem. p. 106.

222 Noms

26 Cela Conde Camilo: "On the phylogeny of Human Morality (ten years later)",

Human Evolution. 1990, Vol. 5-N.2 (139-151).

27 Ayala, Francisco: Origen y Evolucion del J/ombre. Alianza Universidad,

Madrid, 1986, p. 172; other important contributions that basically coincide with the

former are: Waddington, C.H: The Ethical Animal. Allen and Unwin, London, 1960;

Lumsden, C.J. and Wilson E.O: Genes. Mind and Culture. The Coevolutionary

Process. Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press, 1981; Cela Conde, C: On Genes.

Gods and Tyrants. Reidel. Dordrecht, 1986; Mosterln, Jesus: Filosoffa de la Cultura.

Alianza Editorial. Madrid, 1993.

28 Rescher. Nicholas: Rationality. A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and the

Rationale of Reason. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, p. 215.

29 Mostedn, Jesus: Radonalidad y Acdon J/umana. Alianza Editorial, Madrid,

1978. p. 103.

30 Simon, Herbert: Reason in J/uman Affairs. Basil Blackwell. Oxford. 1983, pp.

72,73.

31 Ibidem. p. 105.

32 Popper, Karl: Objective Knowledge. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973. p. 117.

In a similar sense: Ayala, Francisco: Origen y evoludon del hombre. op. cit., espec.

pp. 164 and ff.; Popper, Karl and Lorenz Konrad: The future is open. Tusquets,

Barcelona, 1992, espec. pp. 72, 108, 110, 114, 115, 123. etc.; Ferrater Mora, Jose: De

La materia a la razon. Alianza editorial, Madrid, 1979, espcc. pp. 30 and ff .• 71 and ff.

33 Bayon, J.C: La normatividad del Derecho. Centro de Estudios Constitucionales,

Madrid, 1991; "If the subject wants to achieve those actions that, in net terms,

promote the global satisfaction of his plan of life, we can say that his "interests" are

precisely the "ultimate desires" and relatively lasting which together define this plan of

life. This supposes giving a subjective view of the interests of the subject. which is a

very polemic claim: for many, what the subject believe to be his interests docs not

necessarily coincide with his real interesL~. and only these and not the former. would be

authentic prudential Uustificatory) reasons for the action".(p. 99) ... " In the stratified

structure of the deliberation of the subject. what he considers his interests constitute a

metapreference in relationship to his desires; but, at the same time, what he considers to

be morally valuable constitute a metapreference in relationship to his interests ( and, a

fortiori in relationship to his desires). When saying that from the point of view of the

subject that a preference - of any level - satisfies the condition ceteris paribus what it

CHAPTER 7 223

is intended to say is that it is not "dominated", that is, that the subject has not any

practical negative atittude of higher level (a metapreference) towards her. Then, when

claiming that certain interest is for the subject a valid justificatory reason - that is, he

considers that the condition ceteris paribus has been fulfilled - it is claimed implicitely

that he considers that there is not any moral reason for not doing what he believes he is

interested in: the action is, for him, prudentially justified because of the presence of his

interest; and morally justified because of the absence of moral rea~ns for not doing it."

(p. ] 14) ... "Or the plan of life of a subject is permisible or not; if not, what he

considers to be his interest is not a valid reason for acting. But it is not for moral

reasons (because it does not satisfy the ceteris paribus conditions) not because it does

not coincide with a supposed real or objective interest." (pp. 122-]23) ... "in so far as

the interest of the subject are only reasons for acting if the ceteris paribus condition is

fulfilled, it can be claimed that a plan of life does not constitute valid justificatory

reason for action if it contravenes moral reasons." (p. 127)

34 Hart, op. cit. pp. 244, 245.

35 Rescher, Nicholas, op. cit., "Reason's task in relation to action is to provide

grounds for or against. And this means that any disconnection of reason from action is

quite mistaken. To see reason as irrelevant to action is to misinterpret it to the point of

caricature. An interesting and somewhat desperate move to trascend the gulf between

wants and inlCrcst<; - between 'what one wants' and 'what is good for one' ,. is represented

by Henry Sidgwick's influential proposal to equate..1be latter with what one would

want if - if one were fully informed, undistrubed by passion, painstaking in visualizing

consequences, etc. But such a stance is predicated on the highly questionable idea that

lack of information is the only impediment to appropiatc evaluation. Clearly, it is not

lack of information alone that prevents the monomaniac or the masichist from

evaluating matters arighr: Failures to assess means to ends are one thing, failures to

think sensibly about values and priorities another." ... " As this perspective indicates,

rationality involves two sorts of issue - means and ends. The rationality of means is a

matter of factual information alone - of what sorts of moves and measures lead

efficiently to objectives. But the rationality of ends is a maller not of information but of

legitimation. It is not settled just by factual inquiry, but involves evaluative judgement.

And both aspects are crucial: ends withour requisite means are frustrating, means

without suitable ends are unproductive and pointless. Accordingly, rationality has two

sides: an axiological (evaluative) concern for the appropiateness of ends and an

224 NOlES

instrumental (cognitive) concern for effectiveness and efficiency in their cultivation.

The conception of rationality fuses these two clements into one integral and well-co­

ordinated whole." (pp. 96,97,98.)

36 Elster, Jon: Tuercas y Tornillos, Gedisa, Barcelona, 1991, "In situations that

are unique, new and urgent like to fight a battle or to help the victim of a car accident,

either the costs or the benefits are highly uncertain. There is the risk to act too early

with very lillie information and the risk to delay so much that it is too late. If we were

able to say which is the biggest risk, but we have not any base to decide rationaly

whether we should take the risk to obtain this knowledge. Hence, we have to act, more

or less, arbitrarily. Betwccn these two extremes there used to be most of the situations

of daily life ... Because of I cannot expect to take an optimal decision I will have to

manage with one that be 'good enough'." (pp. 43, 44.)

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232 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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BmLIOGRAPHY 233

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234 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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INDEX

Aarnio, A ................................ 3, 6, 75, 79, 196, 200, 203, 204. Acceptability/Acceptance .............. 29, 69, 75, 83, 85, 94, 95, 99, 100,

101, 112, 116, 122, 123, 125, 156, 157, 158. Ackennan, B ........................... 1. Addressees .............................. 40, 42, 75,80,101,157. Alexy, R ................................. 76, 77, 78. Analytic ................................. 43, 50, 53, 56, Aquinas .................................. 172. Aristotle ................................. 179, 180, 181, 182. Audience ............................... .40, 47, 67, 79, 94, 95. Austin, J ................................. 131, 132. AyalaF .................................. 187.

Bayon J.C ............................... 161. Bentham ................................. 40,92, 101. Bernstein, R ............................ 208, 212. "Best" interpretation ................... 26, 28, 80, 121, 123, 125, 127,

128, 130, 131. Blasco J ................................. 58. Bobbio, N ............................... 155, 156, 160 .. Brown, H ............................... 207, 214, 216. Buchanan, J ............................. Chapter V. Bunge, M ............................... 199, 213.

Camps, V ............................... 62. Carnap, R ................ " ............. 57. Cela Conde C .......................... 186. Coherence/Consistency ................ 35, 36, 44, 53, 57, 64, 71, 72, 73,

74, 76, 77, 80, 81,91, 105, 106, 115, 128. Concepts ................................ 27, 29, 38, 41, 43, 54, 55, 60, 62,

71, 79, 162, 164, 180, 181. Content/Meaning ....................... 26, 27, 29, 35, 41,44, 45,53, 55,

75,77, 13~ 135, 137, 15~ 158, 159, 168, 170.

238 INDEX

Context. .................................. 32, 43,45, 52, 53, 59, 60, 62, 69, 76, 77, 80, 89, 94, 97, 98, 99, 104, 105, 120, 125, 127, 143, 156, 161, 164, 186, 187.

Correctness ............................. 64, 77, 78, 80, 131. Criteria of Recognition ................ 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 92, 93, 94, 95,

96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 122, 123, 125.

Chisholm R.M .......................... 215.

Democracy .............................. 141, 143, 144, 147, 155. Description .............................. 38, 39, 48, 57, 77, 80, 118, 123. Dworkin, R ............................. 125.

EfficiencylEfficacy ..................... 95, 147, 152, 156, 157, 159. Elster, J ................................. 200, 224. EthicsIMorals ........................... 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34,

35,39,41,42,43,46,47,62,185,188. External/lnternal Point of View ....... 26, 29, 37, 38, 40, 43, 44, 47, 48,

65, 73, 113, 123.

Ferrater Mora, J ........................ 59. Fidelity to Law ......................... 33, 38, 46, 47 .. Form of Life ........................... 66, 79, 80, 84, 103, 114, 126, 130,

131. Formal/Formalistic ..................... 25, 26, 27,30, 33, 34, 42, 45, 46,

48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 62, 64, 66, 69, 70, 74, 75, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 128, 130, 146, 167, 178, 179, 181, 186, 188.

Freedom/Equality ...................... 80, 95, 103, 108, 130, 139, 143, 146, 152, 157, 175, 176, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194.

Fuller, L. ................................ 25, 31, 32, 33, 35,36,37,38,39, 42,43,44,45,46,47.

Garzon Valdes, E ...................... 171.

INDEX 239

General Theory of Law ................ 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62.

Greenawalt, K .......................... 208. Guastini, R .............................. 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59,

60. Happiness ............................... 179, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 187,

188, 189, 190, 194, 195. Hard/Clear Cases ...................... 41, 45, 65,131,132. Harris, J.W. . .......................... 204, 209, 210, 212. Hart, H.L.A ............................ 25 to 48; 172 to 193. Hayek, F.A. . .......................... 144, 145, 148, 149. Henneneutic Point of View ........... 73, 87, 88, 89, 90, 113, 114, 117 .. Hobbes ................................. 194. Human Rights .......................... Chapter IV. Hume, D ................................ 132, 133, 134. Hutcheson, F. ......................... 192.

Individuals .............................. 39, 42, 48, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 151, 152, 159, 165, 166.

Interests ................................ .40, 41, 61, 78, 89, 108, 136, 138, 152, 167, 169, 171, 176, 180, 189, 190, 193.

Interpretation ............................ 25, 26, 31, 34, 35, 41, 43, 45, 64, 67, 81, 128, 152, 158, 159, 164, 165, 168, 171, 194.

Is-Ought.. ............................... 27, 28, 31,33,35,41,46,47,48, 55, 129, 173, 174, 180, 183, 184, 185.

Justice ................................... 26, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37,44,47, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 101, 112, 117, 126, 131, 153, 170.

Justification ............................. 27, 30, 32, 39, 51, 65, 68, 69, 72, 77, 85, 95, 96, 122, 126, 129, 132, 154, 158, 159, 160, 167,170, 171, 194.

Kant. ......................... , ........... 183, 184, 185, 186.

240 INDEX

Kelsen, H ............................... 38, 40, 55, 72. Kymlicka, W ........................... 82.

Language ................................ 39, 40, 41, 45, 47, 48, 57, 58, 59, 60,63,79,82,84, 101, 103, 104, 106, 110, 111, 134, 142, 167, 168, 171, 190, 191.

Law and Morals ........................ 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,39,41,42,43,44,46,47,172,173,174,176,179,190.

LawlLegal System ..................... 25 to 37; 44 to 49; 70 to 78; 82 to 99; 103 to 123; 125, 127, 131, 154, 155, 159, 191, 192, 193, 194.

Legal Certainty ......................... 26, 30, 36, 69, 70, 72, 120. Legal Positivism ........................ 25, 28, 36, 80, 121, 122, 130, 132,

134. Legal ScholarslLegal Dogmatics ..... 55, 56, 57, 64, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72,

73, 74, 75, 76, 80, 94. Legitimacy ............................. .48, 95, 100, 101, 174. Logic ..................................... 26, 35, 36, 39, 46, 57, 58, 59, 60,

61,67, 68, 102, 113, 128, 130, 143, 144, 145, 146, 155, 176, 182. Lukes, S ................................. 211. LLed6, E ................................ 54.

MacCormick, N ........................ 39, 47, 73, 82-92, 94, 96, 98-134. Market ................................... 135-153. Meaningless Taboos ................... 31, 33, 48. Method .................................. 33, 38, 40, 41, 62, 80, 89, 120,

124, 142, 194. "Minimum Content" ................... 30-32, 34, 42, 48, 129, 173, 176,

177. Mosterin, 1 .............................. 189. Muguerza, 1 ............................. 51.

Nagel, Th ............................... 169. Natural Law Doctrines ................. 172, 173, 191. Navarro, P.E ........................... 156.

INDEX 241

Needs .................................... 38, 43,82,84,111,118,143,144, 149,152,168,172,178,179,183,184,190-192 ..

Newman, I. ............................ 77.

Obedience ............................... 47, 49, 65-67, 86, 108, 156, 158, 178, 194.

Odegard, D .............................. 130. Officials ................................. 28, 37, 47, 49. Ontology ................................ 56,59. Optimization ............................ 65, 69.

Paramo, J.R. . .......................... 34. Peczenik, A ............. ................ 128, 197,200, 203, 204. Perelman, Ch ........................... 74, 79, 131, 132. Perez Lufio, A ....... ................... 161. Pitkin, H ................................ 40, 60. Politics ................................... 32, 62, 135, 136, 140, 142, 144-

146, 152. Popper, K ............................... 38, 191. Practical Reason ...................... 90, 127, 128, 133, 183, 185. Precedents ............................... 26, 35,46, 64, 71, 72, 74, 76, 87,

98, 108, 109, 119. Precision ................................ 52, 67, 71, 73, 75, 80. Principles ................................ 25, 28-30, 37,43,45-47,64,66,

67, 71, 83, 85, 87, 97, 98, 100, 102, 110-112, 114-119, 122, 131, 144, 147, 148, 156, 170.

Purpose .................................. 28, 31, 32, 38, 40, 41, 43, 60, 89, 104-106, 117, 121, 127, 128, 134, 142, 145, 146, 172, 173, 180,

184, 185, 192. Putnam, H .............................. 207, 212.

Quine, W.V ............................. 56,58.

242 INDEX

Rationality/Reason ..................... 25, 26, 28-31, 33, 34, -37-41, 51, 57, 64, 66-76, 78-83, 85-87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95-97, 100, 102, 105, 106, 108, 109, 111-114, 117-119, 122, 126-129, 130-134, 138, 142, 150, 152, 172-178, 181-186, 188-195.

Rawls, 1 ................................. 194. Raz, 1 .................................... 198, 209. Reichenbach, H ........................ 56, 58. Rescher, N .............................. 189. Ross, A .................................. 72. Ruiz Miguel, A ......................... 54, 55, 140. Rule of Law ........................... .47, 65, 66, 82-84, 95-97, 99, 110,

111,115-117,122,124,127,130,176,179. Rule/Criteria of Recognition .......... 27, 36-38, 64, 69, 70, 82-84, 86,

87,92-102,106-112,114-117,122,123,125,128,130,131. Rules ..................................... 25, 26, 28-32, 34, 36, 37, 41, 45-

47, 58, 60, 70, 71, 82-85, 87, 92-95, 97-103, 106, 108-112, 115, 117, 118, 120, 122, 124, 131, 146, 148, 149, 151.

Russell, B ............................... 53, 58, 134.

Simon, H .............................. 163, 169, 190. Smith, A ............................... 151. Society ................................... 30, 31,45,57,61, 66, 67, 75, 83,

84, 100, 102, 103, 107, 109, 119, 125, 142, 147, 149, 151-153, 155,166,172,175,176,179,180,190,192.

Socrates ................................ 129. Stuart Mill, 1 .......................... 189. Survival. ................................ 30, 31, 32, 44, 80, 137, 151, 172-

174, 176-179, 182, 183, 187-191.

Toulmin, S ............................. 57, 162. True/False ............................... 26-28, 30-32, 35, 38, 44, 46, 50-

52,59,61,64,78,79,88,91,102,104-107,109,112,115,117, 123, 126-128, 132, 133, 139-141, 143.

INDEX 243

Underpinning Reasons ................ 83, 85-87,95-102,115-117,119, 123, 125.

Validity .................................. 25-27,95, 98,100,101,108-111, 119, 122, 155-157.

ValueslEvaluations ..................... 26, 27, 34,55, 65, 68, 71, 72, 75, 76, 80, 81, 84-87, 89-91,95,97, 102, 103, 108, 113-116, 118, 119,124,128, l30, l31, l34, 136, l37, l39-141, 145, 152.

Waluchow, W .......................... l31. Weber, M ............................... 40. Weinberger, 0 ......................... 41. Winch, P ............................... 38, 40, 43.

Law and Philosophy Library

1. E. Bulygin, J.-L. Gardies and I. Niiniluoto (eds.): Man, Law and Modem Forms of Life. With an Introduction by M.D. Bayles. 1985 ISBN 90-277-1869-5

2. W. Sadurski: Giving Desert Its Due. Social Justice and Legal Theory. 1985 ISBN 90-277-1941-1

3. N. MacCormick and O. Weinberger: An Institutional Theory of Law. New Approaches to Legal Positivism. 1986 ISBN 90-277-2079-7

4. A. Aamio: The Rational as Reasonable. A Treatise on Legal Justification. 1987 ISBN 90-277-2276-5

5. M.D. Bayles: Principles of Law. A Normative Analysis. 1987 ISBN 90-277-2412-1; Pb: 90-277-2413-X

6. A. Soeteman: Logic in Law. Remarks on Logic and Rationality in Normative Reasoning, Especially in Law. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0042-4

7. C.T. Sistare: Responsibility and Criminal Liability. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0396-2 8. A. Peczenik: On Law and Reason. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0444-6 9. W. Sadurski: Moral Pluralism and Legal Neutrality. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0565-5

10. M.D. Bayles: ProceduralJustice. Allocating to Individuals. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0567-1 11. P. Nerhot (ed.): Law, Interpretation and Reality. Essays in Epistemology, Hermeneutics and

Jurisprudence. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0593-0 12. A.W. Norrie: Law, Ideology and Punishment. Retrieval and Critique of the Liberal Ideal of

Criminal Justice. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1013-6 13. P. Nerhot (ed.): Legal Knowledge and Analogy. Fragments of Legal Epistemology, Her-

meneutics and Linguistics. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1065-9 14. O. Weinberger: Law, Institution and Legal Politics. Fundamental Problems of Legal Theory

and Social Philosophy. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1143-4 15. J. Wr6blewski: The Judicial Application of Law. Edited by Z. Bankowski and N. MacCor-

mick. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1569-3 16. T. Wilhelms son: Critical Studies in Private Law. A Treatise on Need-Rational Principles in

Modem Law. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1659-2 17. M.D. Bayles: Hart's Legal Philosophy. An Exa nination. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1981-8 18. D.W.P. Ruiter: Institutional Legal Facts. Legal Powers and their Effects. 1993

ISBN 0-7923-2441-2 19. 1. Schonsheck: On Criminalization. An Essay in the Philosophy of the Criminal Law. 1994

ISBN 0-7923-2663-6 20. R.P. Malloy and 1. Evensky (eds.): Adam Smith and the Philosophy of Law and Economics.

1994 ISBN 0-7923-2796-9 21. Z. Bankowski, I. White and U. Hahn (eds.): Informatics and the Foundations of Legal

Reasoning. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3455-8 22. E. Lagerspetz: The Opposite Mirrors. An Essay on the Conventionalist Theory of Institutions.

1995 ISBN 0-7923-3325-X 23. M. van Hees: Rights and Decisions. Formal Models of Law and Liberalism. 1995

ISBN 0-7923-3754-9 24. B. Anderson: "Discovery" in Legal Decision-Making. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3981-9 25. S. Urbina: Reason, Democracy, Society. A Study on the Basis of Legal Thinking. 1996

ISBN 0-7923-4262-3

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