1 Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC Case Digest Facts: ImeldaRomualdez-Marcos,filedhercertificateof candidacyforthepositionofRepresentativeofLeyteFirstDistrict. OnMarch23,1995,privaterespondentCirilioMontejo,alsoa candidateforthesameposition,filedapetitionfordisqualification ofthepetitionerwithCOMELEConthegroundthatpetitionerdid notmeettheconstitutionalrequirementforresidency.OnMarch 29,1995,petitionerfiledanamendedcertificateofcandidacy, changing the entry of seven months to since childhood in item no. 8insaidcertificate.However,theamendedcertificatewasnot receivedsinceitwasalreadypastdeadline.Sheclaimedthatshe always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. The Second Division of the COMELEC with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution finding private respondents petition for disqualification meritorious. Issue: Whetherornotpetitionerlostherdomicileoforiginby operationoflawasaresultofhermarriagetothelatePresident Marcos. Held: For election purposes,residenceisusedsynonymously withdomicile.TheCourtupheldthequalificationofpetitioner, despiteherowndeclarationinhercertificateofcandidacythatshe hadresidedin thedistrict foronly7months,becauseofthe following:(a)aminorfollowsthedomicileofher parents; Taclobanbecamepetitionersdomicileoforiginby operationoflawwhenherfatherbroughtthefamilytoLeyte;(b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal orchange of domicile,abonafideintentionofabandoningtheformer residenceandestablishinganewone,andactswhichcorrespond withthepurpose;intheabsenceofclearandpositiveproofofthe concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue;(c)thewifedoesnotautomaticallygainthehusbands domicilebecausethetermresidenceinCivilLawdoesnotmean thesamethinginPoliticalLaw;whenpetitioner married President Marcosin1954,shekeptherdomicileoforigin andmerelygaineda newhome,notadomiciliumnecessarium;(d) evenassumingthatshegainedanewdomicileafterhermarriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died,heractsfollowingherreturntothecountryclearlyindicate thatshechoseTacloban,herdomicileoforigin,asherdomicileof choice. Morigo vs. People GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004 FACTS: LucioMorigoandLuciaBarretewereboardmatesinBohol. They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and variousexchangesofletters,theybecamesweethearts. Theygot married in 1990.Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted.In1992,MorigomarriedLumbago. Hesubsequentlyfileda complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there wasnomarriageceremony. Morigowasthenchargedwithbigamy andmovedforasuspensionofarraignmentsincethecivilcase pendingposedaprejudicialquestioninthebigamycase. Morigo pleadednotguiltyclaimingthathismarriagewithBarretewasvoid abinitio. Petitionercontentedhecontractedsecondmarriagein good faith. ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case. HELD:MorigosmarriagewithBarreteisvoidabinitioconsidering thattherewasnoactualmarriageceremonyperformedbetween thembyasolemnizingofficerinsteadtheyjustmerelysigneda marriagecontract. Thepetitionerdoesnotneedtofiledeclaration ofthenullityofhismarriagewhenhecontractedhissecond marriagewithLumbago. Hence,hedidnotcommitbigamyandis acquitted in the case filed. Ninal vs. Bayadog Case Digest Nial vs. Bayadog328 SCRA 122 Facts: PepitoNialwasmarriedtoTeodulfaBellonesonSeptember 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8monthsthereafteroronDecember24,1986,Pepitoand respondentNormaBayadoggotmarriedwithoutanymarriage license.Inlieuthereof,PepitoandNormaexecutedanaffidavit datedDecember11,1986statingthattheyhadlivedtogetheras husbandandwifeforatleast5yearsandwerethusexemptfrom securing a marriage license. AfterPepitosdeathonFebruary19,1997,petitionersfileda petitionfordeclarationofnullityofthemarriageofPepitoand Normaallegingthatthesaidmarriagewasvoidforlackofa marriage license. Issue: What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Ruling: The5-yearcommonlawcohabitationperiod,whichis counted back from the date ofcelebration ofmarriage, should be a periodoflegalunionhaditnotbeenfortheabsenceofthe marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before thedayofthemarriageanditshouldbeaperiodofcohabitation characterizedbyexclusivity-meaningnothirdpartywasinvolvedat any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken. Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouseshallbeillegalandvoid,subjectonlytotheexceptionin casesofabsenceorwherethepriormarriagewasdissolvedor annulled. In this case, at the time Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for atleast5yearspriortotheirweddingday.FromthetimePepitos firstmarriagewasdissolvedtothetimeofhismarriagewith respondent,onlyabout20monthshadelapsed.Pepitohada subsistingmarriageatthetimewhenhestartedcohabitingwith respondent.Itisimmaterialthatwhentheylivedwitheachother, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. 2 Thesubsistenceofthemarriageevenwherethereiswasactual severanceofthefilialcompanionshipbetweenthespousescannot makeanycohabitationbyeitherspousewithanythirdpartyas being one as husband and wife. Havingdeterminedthatthesecondmarriageinvolveinthiscaseis notcoveredbytheexceptiontotherequirementofamarriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. Manzano vs. Sanchez AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001 FACTS: HerminiaBorja-ManzanowasthelawfulwifeofthelateDavid ManzanohavingbeenmarriedonMay21,1966inSanGabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan.They had four children.On March 22, 1993,herhusbandcontractedanothermarriagewithLuzviminda PayaobeforerespondentJudge. Themarriagecontractclearly statedthatbothcontractingpartieswereseparatedthus, respondentJudgeoughttoknowthatthemarriagewasvoidand bigamous.He claims that whenhe officiated the marriage ofDavid andPayao,heknewthatthetwohadbeenlivingtogetheras husbandandwifeforsevenyearsasmanifestedintheirjoint affidavitthattheybothlefttheirfamiliesandhadnevercohabitor communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels. ISSUE: Whetherthesolemnizationofamarriagebetweentwo contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code. HELD: Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other.Considering that both parties has asubsistingmarriage,asindicatedintheirmarriagecontractthat theyarebothseparatedisanimpedimentthatwouldmaketheir subsequentmarriagenullandvoid. Justlikeseparation,freeand voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does notseverethetieofasubsistingpreviousmarriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. Republic vs. Dayot GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008 FACTS: JoseandFelisaDayotweremarriedatthePasayCityHallon November24,1986. Inlieuofamarriagelicense,theyexecuteda swornaffidavitthattheyhadlivedtogetherforatleast5years. On August1990,JosecontractedmarriagewithacertainRufina Pascual. TheywerebothemployeesoftheNationalStatisticsand CoordinatingBoard. FelisathenfiledonJune1993anactionfor bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office oftheOmbudsman. Ontheotherhand,Josefiledacomplainton July1993forannulmentand/ordeclarationofnullityofmarriage wherehecontendedthathismarriagewithFelisawasashamand his consent was secured through fraud. ISSUE: WhetherornotJosesmarriagewithFelisaisvalid consideringthattheyexecutedaswornaffidavitinlieuofthe marriage license requirement. HELD: CAindubitablyestablishedthatJoseandFelisahavenotlived togetherforfiveyearsatthetimetheyexecutedtheirsworn affidavitandcontractedmarriage. JoseandFelisastartedliving togetheronlyinJune1986,orbarelyfivemonthsbeforethe celebrationoftheirmarriageonNovember1986. Findingsoffacts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court. Thesolemnizationofamarriagewithoutpriorlicenseisaclear violationofthelawandinvalidatesamarriage.Furthermore,the falsityoftheallegationintheswornaffidavitrelatingtotheperiod ofJoseandFelisascohabitation,whichwouldhavequalifiedtheir marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannotbeamereirregularity,foritreferstoaquintessentialfact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the partiesunderoath.Hence,JoseandFelisasmarriageisvoidab initio. Thecourtalsoruledthatanactionfornullityofmarriageis imprescriptible. Therighttoimpugnmarriagedoesnotprescribe and may be raised any time. Cosca vs. Palaypayon 237 SCRA 249 FACTS: The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), EdmundoB.Peralta(Interpreter1),RamonC.Sambo(ClerkII)and ApolloVillamora(ProcessServer). RespondentsareJudgeLucio PalaypayonJr.,thepresidingjudge,andNeliaB.Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II.All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur. ComplainantsallegedthatPalaypayonsolemnizedmarriageseven withouttherequisiteofamarriagelicense. Hence,thefollowing couples were able to get married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo &JulietaCarrido;EddieTerrobias&MariaGacer;RenatoGamay& Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya &GinaBismonte. Asaconsequence,themarriagecontractsofthe followingcouplesdidnotreflectanymarriagelicensenumber. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicatethedateofsolemnizationreasoningoutthatheallegedly hadtowaitforthemarriagelicensetobesubmittedbytheparties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony. Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement.According to him, he gave strict instructions to complainantSambotofurnishthecouplecopyofthemarriage contractandtofilethesamewiththecivilregistrarbutthelatter failedtodoso. Inordertosolvetheproblem,thespouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license andexecutingtheirmarriagecontract,acopyofwhichwasthen filedwiththecivilregistrar. Theotherfivemarriageswerenot illegallysolemnizedbecausePalaypayondidnotsigntheirmarriage contractsandthedateandplaceofmarriagearenotincluded. It wasallegedthatcopiesofthesemarriagecontractsareinthe custodyofcomplainantSambo. TheallegedmarriageofSelpo& Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were 3 notcelebratedbyhimsinceherefusedtosolemnizetheminthe absenceofamarriagelicenseandthatthemarriageofBocaya& Bismontewascelebratedevenwithouttherequisitelicensedueto the insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract. Anillegalsolemnizationofmarriagewaschargedagainstthe respondents. ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid. HELD: Bocaya&Besmontesmarriagewassolemnizedwithoutamarriage license along with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it was reallyJudgePalaypayonwhosolemnizedtheirmarriage. Bocaya declaredthattheywereadvisedbyjudgetoreturnafter10days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license.Theyalreadystartedlivingtogetherashusbandandwifeeven withouttheformalrequisite. Withrespecttothephotographs, judgeexplainedthatitwasasimulatedsolemnizationofmarriage andnotarealone. However,consideringthattherewerepictures fromthestartoftheweddingceremonyuptothesigningofthe marriage certificates in front of him.The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated. Ontheotherhand,JudgePalaypayonadmittedthathesolemnized marriagebetweenAbellano&Edralinandclaimeditwasunder Article34oftheCivilCodesothemarriagelicensewasdispensed withconsideringthatthecontractingpartiesexecutedajoint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost6yearsalready. However,itwasshowninthemarriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old.If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before they gotmarriedaswhatisstatedinthejointaffidavit,Abellanomust havebeenlessthan13yearsoldwhentheystartedlivingtogether which is hard to believe.Palaypayon should have been aware, as it ishisdutytoascertainthequalificationofthecontractingparties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement. Article4oftheFamilyCodepertinentlyprovidesthatinthe absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriagevoidabinitiowhereasanirregularityintheformal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable. REINELANTHONYB.DECASTRO,Petitioner,vs.ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, Respondent. Petitionerandrespondentmetandbecamesweetheartsin1991. Theyplannedtogetmarried,thustheyappliedforamarriage licensewiththeOfficeoftheCivilRegistrarofPasigCityin September1994.Theyhadtheirfirstsexualrelationsometimein October1994,andhadregularlyengagedinsexthereafter.When thecouplewentbacktotheOfficeoftheCivilRegistrar,the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through withtheplan,inlieuofamarriagelicense,theyexecutedan affidavitdated13March1995statingthattheyhadbeenliving together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got marriedonthesamedate,withJudgeJoseC.Bernabe,presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civilrites.Nevertheless,aftertheceremony,petitionerand respondentwentbacktotheirrespectivehomesanddidnotlive togetherashusbandandwife.Respondentfiledacomplaintfor supportagainstpetitionerbeforetheRegionalTrialCourt. Inher complaint,respondent alleged that she is married topetitionerand thatthelatterhasfailedonhisresponsibility/obligationto financially support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child. Petitionerdeniedthatheismarriedtorespondent,claimingthat their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent tosignthemarriagecontracttosaveherfromembarrassmentand possibleadministrativeprosecutionduetoherpregnantstate;and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before hegotmarried.Healsoaverredthattheyneverlivedtogetheras husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.Trialcourtruledthatthemarriagebetweenpetitionerand respondentisnotvalidbecauseitwassolemnizedwithouta marriagelicense.However,itdeclaredpetitionerasthenatural fatherofthechild,andthusobligedtogivehersupport.Petitioner elevatedthecasetotheCourtofAppeals,arguingthatthelower courtcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionwhen,onthebasisof mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child. ISSUES:First,whetherthetrialcourthadthejurisdictionto determinethevalidityofthemarriagebetweenpetitionerand respondent in an action for support and second. Anentthefirstissue,theCourtholdsthatthetrialcourthad jurisdictiontodeterminethevalidityofthemarriagebetween petitionerandrespondent.Thevalidityofavoidmarriagemaybe collaterallyattacked.However,otherthanforpurposesof remarriage,nojudicialactionisnecessarytodeclareamarriagean absolutenullity.Forotherpurposes,suchasbutnotlimitedto determinationofheirship,legitimacyorillegitimacyofachild, settlementofestate,dissolutionofpropertyregime,oracriminal caseforthatmatter,thecourtmaypassuponthevalidityof marriageeveninasuitnotdirectlyinstitutedtoquestionthesame solongasitisessentialtothedeterminationofthecase.Thisis without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such needarises,afinaljudgmentofdeclarationofnullityisnecessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause is the basis ofafinaljudgmentdeclaringsuchpreviousmarriagevoidinArticle 40oftheFamilyCodeconnotesthatsuchfinaljudgmentneednot be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. Thefalsityoftheaffidavitcannotbeconsideredasamere irregularityintheformalrequisitesofmarriage.Thelawdispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wifeforacontinuousandunbrokenperiodofatleastfiveyears beforethemarriage.Theaimofthisprovisionistoavoidexposing thepartiestohumiliation,shameandembarrassmentconcomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage duetothepublicationofeveryapplicantsnameforamarriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation toprotect;infact,therewasnocohabitationatall.Thefalse affidavitwhichpetitionerandrespondentexecutedsotheycould pushthroughwiththemarriagehasnovaluewhatsoever;itisa merescrapofpaper.Theywerenotexemptfromthemarriage 4 licenserequirement.Theirfailuretoobtainandpresentamarriage license renders their marriage void ab initio. Tenchavez vs Escano 15 SCRA 355 FACTS: 27yearsoldVicentaEscanowhobelongtoaprominentFilipino FamilyofSpanishancestrygotmarriedonFeburary24,1948with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before CatholicchaplainLt.MoisesLavares. Themarriagewasa culmination ofthelove affair ofthe couple and was duly registered inthelocalcivilregistry. AcertainPacitaNoelcametobetheir match-makerandgo-betweenwhohadanamorousrelationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying.Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas parents.HoweveraftertranslatingthesaidlettertoVicentasdad,he disagreedforanewmarriage. Vicentacontinuedleavingwithher parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila. Vicentaappliedforapassportindicatingthatshewassingleand whenitwasapprovedsheleftfortheUnitedStatesandfileda complaintfordivorceagainstPastorwhichwaslateronapproved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada.She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. VicentamarriedRussellLeoMoran,anAmerican,inNevada andhasbegottenchildren. SheacquiredcitizenshiponAugust8, 1958. PetitionerfiledacomplaintagainstVicentaandherparents whomheallegedtohavedissuadedVicentafromjoiningher husband. ISSUE: WhetherthedivorcesoughtbyVicentaEscanoisvalidand binding upon courts of the Philippines. HELD: CivilCodeofthePhilippinesdoesnotadmitdivorce. Philippine courtscannotgiverecognitiononforeigndecreesofabsolute divorcebetweenFilipinocitizensbecauseitwouldbeaviolationof theCivilCode. Suchgrantwouldarisetodiscriminationinfavorof richcitizenswhocanafforddivorceinforeigncountries. The adulterousrelationshipofEscanowithherAmericanhusbandis enoughgroundsforthelegalseparationprayedbyTenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married.AforeigndivorcebetweenFilipinossoughtanddecreedisnot entitledtorecognitionneitheristhemarriageofthedivorcee entitledtovalidityinthePhilippines. Thus,thedesertionand securingofaninvaliddivorcedecreebyonespouseentitledthe other for damages. WHEREFORE,thedecisionunderappealisherebymodifiedas follows; (1)Adjudgingplaintiff-appellantPastorTenchavezentitledtoa decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao; (2)Sentencingdefendant-appelleeVicentaEscaotopayplaintiff-appellantTenchaveztheamountofP25,000fordamagesand attorneys' fees; (3)SentencingappellantPastorTenchaveztopaytheappellee, MamertoEscaoandtheestateofhiswife,thedeceasedMena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees. ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. AND RICHARD UPTON, respondents. No. L-68470.October 8, 1985. Facts: PetitionerAliciaReyesVanis citizenof thePhilippineswhileprivate respondentRichardUptonisacitizenof theUnitedStates,were marriedon1972at Hongkong.On1982,theygotdivorcedin Nevada,UnitedStates;andthepetitionerremarriedtoTheodore Van Dorn. OnJuly8,1983,privaterespondentfiled suitagainst petitioner, asking that the petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and be declared with right to manage the conjugalproperty.Petitionermovedtodismissthecaseonthe groundthatthecauseofactionisbarredbypreviousjudgementin the divorceproceeding beforeNevadaCourtwhererespondent acknowledgedthattheyhadnocommunityproperty.Thelower court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines, that the Divorce Decree has no bearinginthecase.Respondentaversthat DivorceDecree abroad cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines. Issue: (1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them. (2)WhetherornotRichardUptonmayasserthisrighton conjugal properties. Held: AstoRichardUptonthedivorceisbindingonhimasan American Citizen.AsheisboundbytheDecisionofhisowncountrysCourt, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before saidCourtfromassertinghisrightovertheallegedconjugal property. Only Philippine Nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to our concept ofpublicpolicyandmorality.AliciaReyesunderour Nationallaw is stillconsideredmarriedtoprivaterespondent.However,petitioner shouldnotbeobligedtolivetogetherwith,observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue tobeoneofherheirswithpossiblerightstoconjugal property. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653 FACTS: 5 ImeldaM.Pilapil,aFilipinocitizen,wasmarriedwithprivate respondent,ErichEkkehardGeiling,aGermannationalbeforethe Registrar ofBirths, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal RepublicofGermany. TheyhaveachildwhowasbornonApril20, 1980andnamedIsabellaPilapilGeiling. Conjugaldisharmony eventuatedinprivaterespondentandheinitiatedadivorce proceedingagainstpetitionerinGermanybeforetheSchoneberg LocalCourtinJanuary1983.Thepetitionerthenfiledanactionfor legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983. The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the groundoffailureofmarriageofthespouses. Thecustodyofthe child was granted to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery beforetheCityFiscalofManilaallegingthatwhilestillmarriedto Imelda,latterhadanaffairwithWilliamChiaasearlyas1982and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioneron the groundofadulteryeventhoughtheyarenolongerhusbandand wife as decree of divorce was already issued. HELD: Thelawspecificallyprovidedthatinprosecutionforadulteryand concubinage,thepersonwhocanlegallyfilethecomplaintshould betheoffendedspouseandnobodyelse. Thoughinthiscase,it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtainedavaliddivorceinhiscountry,theFederalRepublicof Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in thePhilippinesinsofarasheisconcerned. Thus,underthesame considerationandrationale,privaterespondentisnolongerthe husbandofpetitionerandhasnolegalstandingtocommencethe adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. Republic vs. Orbecido Case Digest Republic vs. Orbecido 472 SCRA 114 Facts: OnMay24,1981,CiprianoOrbecidoIIIandLadyMyros VillanuevaweremarriedinLam-an, Ozamis City andwereblessed withasonandadaughter.In1986,LadyMyrosleftforthe U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000,respondent Orbecidolearned fromhisson whowaslivingwithhiswifeintheStatesthathiswifehad remarriedafterobtainingherdivorcedecree.Thereafter,hefileda petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par.2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code. Havingnoopposition,onMay15,2002,theRegionalTrial Court ofZamboanga del Sur granted the petition ofthe respondent and allowed him to remarry. The Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. Inviewofthat,petitionerfiledthispetitionforreviewoncertiorari oftheDecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourt.Hereinpetitionerraised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case. Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2). Ruling: Article26par.2oftheFamilyCodeonlyappliestocase where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are aFilipinocitizenandaforeigner.Theinstantcaseisonewhereat the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen andsubsequentlyobtainedadivorcegrantinghercapacityto remarry,andindeedsheremarriedanAmericancitizenwhile residinginthe U.S.A. Therefore,the2ndpar.ofArt.26doesnot apply to the instant case. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at thetimeofthecelebrationofthemarriage,buttheircitizenshipat thetimeavaliddivorceisobtainedabroadbythealienspouse capacitating the latter to remarry. Inthiscase,whenCiprianoswifewasnaturalizedasan Americancitizen,therewasstillavalidmarriagethathasbeen celebratedbetweenherandCipriano.Asfatewouldhaveit,the naturalizedalienwifesubsequentlyobtainedavaliddivorce capacitatinghertoremarry.Clearly,thetwinrequisitesforthe application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. ThusCipriano,thedivorcedFilipinospouse,shouldbeallowedto remarry. However,sinceCiprianowasnotabletoproveasfacthis wifes naturalization he is still barred from remarrying. Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents. G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003 Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen, a Filipina, on 11 December 1980 in Hamburg, Gemany.Early 1981, the marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. They had two daughters, Carolyne and Alexandria Kristine. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati on 28 August 1996. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondent but was again denied by the trial court. In 1997, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father. It was June 14, 1999 when public respondent issued an order granting the petitioners motion to dismiss, but was partially set aside on September 1999 for the purpose of tackling issues regarding property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. Petitioner assailed for the trial courts lack of jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. Issue: 6 Whether or not the Philippine courts can determine the legal effects of a decree of divorce from a foreign country. Held: Yes. Our courts can determine the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as those concerning with support and custody of the children. In this case, the decree did not touch as to who the offending spouse was. The trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education of the best interests of the children. After all, the childs welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolyne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Garcia vs. Recio Case Digest Garcia vs. Recio G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 Facts: Article26;Therespondent,RederickRecio,aFilipinowas marriedtoEdithaSamson,anAustraliancitizen,inRizalin1987. Theylivedtogetherashusbandandwifein Australia.In1989,the Australianfamilycourtissuedadecreeofdivorcesupposedly dissolvingthemarriage.In1992,respondentacquiredAustralian citizenship.In1994,hemarriedGraceGarcia,aFilipina,herein petitioner,inCabanatuan City.Intheirapplicationformarriage license,respondentwasdeclaredassingleandFilipino.Since October1995,theylivedseparately,andin1996whilein Australia, theirconjugalassetsweredivided.In1998,petitionerfiled ComplaintforDeclarationofNullityofMarriageonthegroundof bigamy,claimingthatshelearnedoftherespondentsformer marriageonlyinNovember.Ontheotherhand,respondentclaims thathetoldpetitionerofhispriormarriagein1993,beforethey weremarried.Respondentalsocontendedthathisfirstmarriage wasdissolvedbyadivorceadecreeobtainedin Australia in1989 andhence,hewaslegallycapacitatedtomarrypetitionerin1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the groundofthedivorceissuedin Australia asvalidandrecognizedin the Philippines.Hence,thispetitionwasforwardedbeforethe Supreme Court. Issue: Whetherornotrespondenthaslegalcapacitytomarry Grace Garcia. Ruling: InmixedmarriagesinvolvingaFilipinoandaforeigner, Article26oftheFamilyCodeallowstheformertocontracta subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad bythealienspousecapacitatinghimorhertoremarry.Adivorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in thePhilippines, provideditisconsistentwiththeirrespectivelaws.Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading itmustprovethedivorceasafactanddemonstrateitsconformity totheforeignlawallowingit.Inthiscase,thedivorcedecree between the respondent and Samsonappearstobeauthentic,issuedbyanAustralianfamily court.Although,appearanceisnotsufficient,andcompliancewith therulesonevidenceregardingallegedforeignlawsmustbe demonstrated,thedecreewasadmittedonaccountofpetitioners failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was notregisteredintheLocalCivilRegistryofCabanatuanCity,notto itsadmissibility.RespondentclaimsthattheAustraliandivorce decree,whichwasvalidlyadmittedasevidence,adequately establishedhislegalcapacitytomarryunderAustralianlaw.Even afterthedivorcebecomesabsolute,thecourtmayundersome foreignstatutes,stillrestrictremarriage.Respondentalsofailedto producesufficientevidenceshowingtheforeignlawgoverninghis status.Togetherwithotherevidencessubmitted,theydont absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry. CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS Case Digest GERBERT CORPUZ VS. DAISYLYN STO. TOMASG.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010 FACTS: GerbertCorpuzwasaformerFilipinocitizenwhoacquired CanadiancitizenshipthroughnaturalizationonNov.2000.On,Jan. 182005,hemarriedaFilipinanamedDaisylynSto.Tomas.Dueto workandotherprofessionalcommitments,GerbertleftforCanada soonaftertheirwedding.HereturnedtothePhilippinessometime inApril2005tosurpriseherwifebutwasshockedtodiscoverthat Daisylynwashavinganaffairwithanotherman.Hurtand disappointed,GerbertwentbacktoCanadaandfiledapetitionfor divorce and was granted. Twoyearsafter,GerbertfellinlovewithanotherFilipina.Inhis desiretomarryhisnewFilipinafiance,GerbertwenttoPasigCity CivilRegistryOfficeandregisteredtheCanadiandivorcedecreeon theirmarriagecertificate.Despiteitsregistration,anNSOofficial informedGerbertthattheirmarriagestillexistsunderPhilippine Law;andtobeenforceable,theforeigndivorcedecreemustbe judicially recognized by a Philippine court. Gerbertfiledapetitionforjudicialrecognitionofforeigndivorce and/ordeclarationofmarriageasdissolved,withtheRTC.Daisylyn offered no opposition and requested for the same prayer. RTCdeniedGerbertspetitioncontendingthatArt.26(2)applies only to Filipinos and not to aliens. Gerbert appealed by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whethertheregistrationoftheforeigndivorcedecreewas properly made. HELD: SupremeCourtheldinthenegative.Article412oftheCivil Codedeclaresthatnoentryinacivilregistershallbechangedor corrected,withoutjudicialorder.TheRulesofCourtsupplements Article412oftheCivilCodebyspecificallyprovidingforaspecial remedialproceedingbywhichentriesinthecivilregistrymaybe judicially cancelled or corrected.Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be compliedwithbeforeajudgment,authorizingthecancellationor correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. MARCOS V. MARCOS Facts 7 Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they hadfivechildren.Allegingthatthehusbandfailedtoprovide materialsupporttothefamilyandhaveresortedtophysicalabuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and voidunderArt.36whichwashoweverreversedbyCA. Issues Whetherpersonalmedicalorpsychologicalexaminationofthe respondentbyaphysicianisarequirementforadeclarationof psychologicalincapacity.Whetherthetotalityofevidencepresentedinthiscaseshow psychologicalincapacity. Held Psychologicalincapacityasagroundfordeclaringthenullityofa marriage, maybe established by the totality ofevidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.AlthoughthisCourtissufficientlyconvincedthat respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may haveresortedtophysicalabuseandabandonment,thetotalityof his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on hispart.Thereisabsolutelynoshowingthathisdefectswere alreadypresentattheinceptionofthemarriageorthattheyare incurable.Verily,thebehaviorofrespondentcanbeattributedto the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a periodofmorethansixyears.Itwasduringthisperiodthathe becameintermittentlydrunk,failedtogivematerialandmoral support,andevenleftthefamilyhome.Thus,hisalleged psychologicalillnesswastracedonlytosaidperiodandnottothe inceptionofthemarriage.Equallyimportant,thereisnoevidence showingthathisconditionisincurable,especiallynowthatheis gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare thedissolutionofthemarriageforfailureofthepetitionertoshow that the allegedpsychological incapacity is characterized bygravity, juridicalantecedenceandincurabiltyandforherfailuretoobserve the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina. Nilda Navales vs Reynaldo Navales Article 36: Psychological Incapacity In1986,NildaandReynaldometinalocalbarwhereNildawasa waitress. Because of his fear that Nilda may be wed to an American, Reynaldo proposed to Nilda and they got married in 1988. Reynaldo is aware that Nilda hasan illegitimate child out of wedlock. The 1st year of their marriage went well until Nilda began to work when she neglectedsomeofherdutiesasawife.Shelaterworkedasagym instructorandaccordingtoReynaldosallegations;herjobmakes her flirt with her male clients. She also drives home with other guys eventhoughReynaldowouldbetheretofetchher.Shealso projectedherselfassingle.Andsherefusedtohaveachildwith Reynaldo because that would only destroy her figure. Reynaldo then filed a petition to have their marriage be annulled. He presented her cousinasawitnessthatattestedthatNildawasflirtingwithother guysevenwithReynaldospresence.Reynaldoalsopresentedthe findings of a psychologist who concluded that based on Nildas acts, Nilda is a nymphomaniac, who has a borderline personality, a social deviant,analcoholic,and sufferingfromanti-socialpersonality disorder,amongothers,whichillnessesareincurableandarethe causes of Nildas psychological incapacity to perform her marital role aswifetoReynaldo.NildaonherpartattackedReynaldos allegations. She said that it is actually Reynaldo who is a womanizer andthatinfactshehasfiledacaseofconcubinageagainsthim which was still pending. She also said that she only needs the job in order to support herself because Reynaldo is not supporting her. She alsoshowedproofthatsheprojectedherselfasamarriedwoman and that she handles an aerobics class which is exclusive tofemales only. The RTC and the CA ruled in favor of Reynaldo. ISSUE: WhetherthemarriagebetweenReynaldoandNildaisnull and void on the ground of Nildas psychological incapacity. HELD: Thepetitionmustbegrantedbecause theStates participation in this case is wanting. There were no other pleadings, motions,orpositionpapersfiledbythePublicProsecutororOSG; andnocontrovertingevidencepresentedbythembeforethe judgment was rendered.And even if the SC would consider the case basedonthemerits,thepetitionwouldstillbegranted.Theacts presentedbyReynaldobythemselvesareinsufficienttoestablisha psychologicalormentaldefectthatisserious,incurableorgraveas contemplatedbyArticle36oftheFamilyCode.Article36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations.Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.Indeed, irreconcilable differences,sexualinfidelityorperversion,emotionalimmaturity andirresponsibility,andthelike,donotbythemselveswarranta finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may onlybeduetoapersonsrefusalorunwillingnesstoassumethe essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule. The SC also finds the finding of the psychological expert to be insufficient to prove the PI of Nilda. Thetestimoniespresentedbypeopletheexpertinterviewedwere not concretely established as the fact as to how those people came up with their respective information was not as well shown. There is noproofaswellthatNildahadhadsexwithdifferentguysa condition for nymphomia. There being doubt as to Nildas PI the SC ruled that this case be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage. Te vs. Te GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009 FACTS: Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college.Initially, he was attracted to Rowenas close friend but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which happened in January 1996.It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering that he was young and jobless.Her persistence, however, made him relent.They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket. They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage license.Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle.After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents.Edwards parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and 8 demanded that they have a separate abode.In June 1996, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways. AfterfouryearsinJanuary2000,Edwardfiledapetitionforthe annulmentofhismarriagetoRowenaonthebasisofthelatters psychological incapacity. ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity. HELD: The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. Indeed,petitioner,afflictedwithdependentpersonalitydisorder, cannotassumetheessentialmaritalobligationsoflivingtogether, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, forheisunabletomakeeverydaydecisionswithoutadvicefrom others,andallowsotherstomakemostofhisimportantdecisions (suchaswheretolive). Asclearlyshowninthiscase,petitioner followed everything dictated tohim by the persons aroundhim.He isinsecure,weakandgullible,hasnosenseofhisidentityasa person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life. As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disordermakesherunabletoassumetheessentialmarital obligationsonaccountforherdisregardintherightsofothers,her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendencytoblameothers. Moreover,asshowninthiscase, respondentisimpulsiveanddomineering;shehadnoqualmsin manipulatingpetitionerwithherthreatsofblackmailandof committing suicide. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void. Case Digest on PEOPLE V. MENDOZA (Bigamy) Arturo Mendoza and Jovita de Asis were married on Aug. 5, 1936 in Marikina. While the marriage was still subsisting, Mendoza got married to Olga Lema in Manila on May 14, 1941. de Asis died on Feb. 2, 1943. Then, Mendoza contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna on Aug. 19, 1949. He was sued and convicted of bigamy for the second marriage. ISSUE: WON Mendoza is liable for bigamy? HELD:No. Acquitted. RATIO: 1. Sec. 29, Marriage Law Act 3613: Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void unless first marriage has been annulled, dissolved or first spouse has been absent for 7 consecutive years without news if he/she is still alive. Judicial declaration of nullity is only necessary for third case. THUS, HIS MARRIAGE WITH LEMA IS NULL AND VOID WITHOUT NEED FOR JUDICIAL DECLARATION. 2.Third marriage was contracted after the death of the first spouse, thus not bigamous. Wiegel vs Sempio-Dy Wiegel vs. Sempio-Dy 143 SCRA 449 FACTS: Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978.Lilia was married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972.Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latters former marriage.Having been allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contents that the first marriage is null and void.Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their marriage. ISSUE: Whether Karls marriage with Lilia is void. HELD: It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force because it will not be void but merely voidable.Such marriage is valid until annulled.Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her first husband.Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void.Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before he can remarry.Accordingly, Karl and Lilias marriage are regarded void under the law. Domingo vs CA Domingo vs. CA 226 SCRA 572 FACTS: Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.She did not know that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969.She came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her.Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto.The latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous.On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of 9 remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage. HELD: The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage.However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same.With this, the said person is freed from being charged with bigamy. When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.Soledads prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.Hence, the petitioners suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless.The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. CASE DIGEST ON ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES For more case digests visit http://www.pinaylawyer.com case digest, case digests, supreme court case digests, supreme court case digest, pinaylawyer.com, www.pinaylawyer.com, case digest, case digest of, case digest on, supreme court case digest, supreme court case digests CASE DIGEST ON ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES [243 SCRA 32 (1995)] - F: This is an administrative complaint filed by Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against J. Brillantes, Presiding Judge of MTC, Mla. It was alleged in the complaint that Brillantes has been cohabiting w/ Yolanda De Castro (w/ whom Atienza had 2 children) when he (Brillantes) was already married to one Zenaida Ongkiko w/ whom he has 5 children. xxx Resp. denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having 5 children w/ her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony, the same was not valid for lack of marriage license. The second marriage bet. the two also lacked the required license. He claims that when he married De Castro in LA, California, he believed, in all GF and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single bec. his first marriage was solemnized w/o a license. HELD: Under the FC, there must be a judicial decl. of the nullity of a previous marriage bef. a party thereto can enter into a 2nd marriage. (Art. 40.) Art. 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the FC regardless of the date of the first marriage. Said art. is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance w/ the NCC or other laws." (Art. 256, FC.) This is particularly true w/ Art. 40 w/c is a rule of procedure. Resp. has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Art. 40 to his case. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.Bobis vs Bobis Case Digest Imelda Marbella-Bobis (petitioner), vs. Isagani D. Bobis (respondent) Facts: Respondent was married to the petitioner on January 25, 1996. Unknown to the petitioner, her other half has contracted his first marriage with a Maria Dulce B. Javier on October 21, 1985 and has not been nullified. The respondent once again entered into marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.A case of bigamy was filed against the respondent on the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, consequently he initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a license. Respondent has filed a motion to suspend the trial and has been granted. Petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration but has been denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a question to a criminal case for bigamy RULING No, respondents subsequent declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a question to a criminal case for bigamy. During the time when he contracted his second marriage, he was considered already considered as a married man even if it was a marriage without a marriage license. Article 40 of the Family Code, which has already been promulgateSd on his second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before the respondent could have married for the second time. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It is not for the parties, especially the accused to determine if his first marriage was null or void, but of a court. The respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage in order to escape the bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is also void due to the absence of judicial declaration of nullity of the first. Thus, the decision in the civil action has been reversed and may proceed with the criminal case. Mercado vs Tan Mercado vs. Tan 337 SCRA 122 FACTS: Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know.Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva.The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void. ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the former marriage. 10 HELD: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted.One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void. In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case.Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated.He contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity.The fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.Morigo vs People Morigo vs. People GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004 FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol.They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts.They got married in 1990.Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted.In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago.He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony.Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio.Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith. ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case. HELD: Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract.The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago.Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed. JARILLIO V. PEOPLEG.R. No. 164435, [June 29, 2010] DOCTRINE:Hewhocontractsasecondmarriagebeforethejudicialdeclaration ofnullity ofthe first marriage assumes the risk ofbeingprosecuted for bigamy. FACTS: OnNovember1979,theaccusedVictoriaS.Jarillo,beingpreviously unitedinlawfulmarriagewithRafaelM.Alocilloin1974,and withoutthesaidmarriagehavingbeenlegallydissolved,contracted a second marriage withEmmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered in 1999. Onthesameyear,EmmanuelUy(2nd husband)filedagainstthe appellantacivilcaseforannulmentofmarriagebeforetheRTC. Parenthetically,Jarillofiledfordeclarationofnullityoftheir marriage against Alocillo in 2000. For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her marriage to Alocillo wasnullandvoidbecauseAlocillowasallegedlystillmarriedtoa certainLorettaTillmanatthetimeofthecelebrationoftheir marriage;(2)hermarriagestobothAlocilloandUywerenulland voidforlackofavalidmarriagelicense;and(3)theactionhad prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as1978. Notwithstandingherdefenses,theRTCfoundJarilloguilty forthecrimeofbigamyin2001andwassentencedtosuffer imprisonment of six years to ten years of prision mayor. OnappealtotheCA,petitionersconvictionwasaffirmed.Itheld thatpetitionercommittedbigamywhenshecontractedmarriage withEmmanuelSantosUybecause,atthattime,hermarriageto Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. Thisbeingso,thepresumptionis,herpreviousmarriagetoAlocillo wasstillexistingatthetimeofhermarriagetoUy.TheCAalso struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioners contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978. Inthemeantime,theRTCrenderedadecisionin2003,declaring petitioners1974marriagetoAlocillonullandvoidabinitioonthe groundofAlocillospsychologicalincapacity.Saiddecisionbecame finalandexecutory.Inhermotionforreconsideration,petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. ISSUE:W/NCAcommittedareversibleerrorinaffirmingtheconvictionof Jarilloforthecrimeofbigamydespitethesuperveningproofthat her marriage to Alocillo had been declared void. HELD:No. Jarillos conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequentjudicialdeclarationofnullityof hermarriagetoAlocillo cannotbeconsideredavaliddefenseinthecrimeofbigamy.The momentpetitionercontractedasecondmarriagewithoutthe previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime ofbigamywasalreadyconsummated.Underthelaw,amarriage, evenonewhichisvoidorvoidable,shallbedeemedvaliduntil declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to[privatecomplainant]hadnobearinguponthedeterminationof petitionersinnocenceorguiltinthecriminalcaseforbigamy, becauseallthatisrequiredforthechargeofbigamytoprosperis 11 that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Withoutajudicialdeclarationofnullityofthefirstmarriage,itis presumed to be subsisting. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that the guilty party entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. Cario vs Cario Case Digest Susan Nicdao Cario vs. Susan Yee Cario GR No. 132529 FACTS: SPO4 Santiago CArio marriedpetitioner SusanNicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cario also married respondent Susan Yee.In1988,SPO4Cariobecamebedriddenduetodiabetesand tuberculosis,anddiedonNovember23,1992,underthecareof SusanYeewhospentforhismedicalandburialexpenses.Both Susansfiledclaimsformonetarybenefitsandfinancialassistance fromvariousgovernmentagenciespertainingtothedeceased. NicdaowasabletocollectP146,000fromMBAI,PCCVI, commutation,NAPOLCOMandPag-ibig,whileYeereceivedatotal of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance. OnDecember14,1993,Yeefiledforcollectionofmoney againstNIcdao,prayingthatNicdaobeorderedtoreturntoherat leastone-halfoftheP146,000NIcdaohadcollected.Forfailingto file her answer, Nicdao was declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place duringthesubsistenceofandwithoutfirstobtainingajudicial declarationofnullityofthemarriagebetweenNicdaoandCario. Butsheclaimedgoodfaith,havingnoknowledgeoftheprevious marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herselfasthewifeofthedeceased.YeesubmittedthatCarios marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the required marriage license. ISSUES: 1.Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void; 2.Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage. HELD:UnderArticle40oftheFamilyCode,thenullityofa previousmarriagemaybeinvokedforpurposesofremarriageon thebasissolelyofafinaljudgmentdeclaringsuchmarriagevoid. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought tobeinvokedforpurposesofcontractingasecondmarriage,the solebasisacceptableinlaw,forsaidprojectedmarriagetobefree fromlegalinfirmity,isafinaljudgmentdeclaringtheprevious marriagevoid.However,forpurposesotherthanremarriage,no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such asbutnot limited to the determination of heirship,legitimacyorillegitimacyofachild,settlementofestate, dissolutionofpropertyregime,oracriminalcaseforthatmatter, thecourtmaypassuponthevalidityofmarriageevenafterthe death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity ofsaidmarriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriageofpetitionerandthedeceasedwassolemnizedin1969,a validmarriagelicenseisarequisiteofmarriage,andtheabsence therof,subjecttocertainexceptions,rendersthemarriagevoidab initio. Itdoesnotfollow,however,thatsincethemarriageof Nicdaoandthedeceasedwasvoidabinitio,thedeathbenefits would now be awarded to Yee.To reiterate, under Article 40 ofthe FamilyCode,forpurposesofremarriage,theremustbeaprior judicialdeclarationofthenullityofapreviousmarriage,though void,beforeapartycanenterintoasecondmarriage;otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property. Republic vs Nolasco Republic vs. Nolasco 220 SCRA 20 FACTS: Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman.He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England.After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months.It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique.They got married in January 1982.Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province.In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left.Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janets whereabouts.He did so by securing another seamans contract going to London.He wrote several letters to the bar where they first met but it was all returned.Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death of Janet. ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead? HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Nolascos efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another contract.More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife. Republic vs CA Republic vs. CA GR No. 159614, December 9, 2005 FACTS: Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late in February 1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents house but was not there and even inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-laws house and learned that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. He then sought help from the Barangay Captain. For sometime, Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver and during his free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In June 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to the 12 local police station and an alarm notice was issued. He also reported the disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in March 2001 for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife. ISSUE: Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead. HELD: The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition with RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other than the Barangay Captain. He even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to corroborate his testimony. He also failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced his credibility had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and seek help of the local police authorities and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in RTC. Valdez vs Republic Valdez vs. Republic GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009 FACTS: Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971.She gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy.They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any money.In March 1972, the latter left their house.Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parents home.3 years have passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect.It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since.Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985.Virgilios application for naturalization in US was denied because petitioners marriage with Sofio was subsisting.Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. HELD: The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofios death is necessary because Civil Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only needed.Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid. 13 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995 IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.: A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community." 3 Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4 RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months. On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7 On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that: [T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9 Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that: When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12 On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held: 14 Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa. Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa. This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive. From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit. To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case ofAlialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election. Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error. xxx xxx xxx Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission. xxx xxx xxx Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent 15 has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution. In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban. This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood. In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile. Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila. It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood." To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15 In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated: 16 After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18 On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19 In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition. On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief. Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into two general areas: I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections. II. The Jurisdictional Issue a) Prior to the elections Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code. b) After the Elections Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections. I. Petitioner's qualification A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction. Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently. Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly: There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile. For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally 17 emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit: Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence? Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29 xxx xxx xxx Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence. Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile. Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside? Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30 In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32 In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months? It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and