EN BANC

[G. R. No. 156982.September 8, 2004]

NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION,petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT, JUANITO G. ESPINO, Director IV, NCR, Commission on Audit, and ERNESTO C. EULALIA, Resident Auditor, National Amnesty Commission.respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA,J.:

This petition for review[1]seeks to annul the two decisions of respondent Commission on Audit (COA)[2]dated July 26, 2001[3]and January 30, 2003,[4]affirming the September 21, 1998 ruling[5]of the National Government Audit Office (NGAO). The latter in turn upheld Auditor Ernesto C.Eulaliasorder disallowing the payment ofhonorariato the representatives of petitionersex officiomembers, per COA Memorandum No. 97-038.

Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347.The NAC is tasked toreceive,process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government asex officiomembers.[6]It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the threeex officiomembers turned over said responsibility to their representatives whowere paidhonorariabeginning December 12, 1994.However, on October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditorEulaliadisallowed on audit the payment ofhonorariato these representatives amounting toP255,750for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038. On September 1, 1998, the NGAO upheld the auditors order and notices of disallowance were subsequently issued to the following:[7]REPRESENTATIVESAMOUNT

1.CesarAverillaDepartment of National DefenseP2,500.00

2.Ramon Martinez

Department of National Defense73,750.00

3.CielitoMindaro,

Department of Justice18,750.00

4.PuritaDeynataDepartment of Justice62,000.00

5.Alberto Bernardo

Department of the Interior

And Local Government71,250.00

6.StephenVillaflorDepartment of the Interior and

Local Government26,250.00

7.ArtemioAspirasDepartment of Justice1,250.00P255,750.00Meanwhile, on April 28, 1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order No. 2 (the new Implementing Rules and Regulations of Proclamation No. 347), which was approved by then President Joseph Estrada on October 19, 1999.Section 1, Rule II thereof provides:

Section 1, CompositionThe NAC shall be composed of seven (7) members:

a) A Chairperson who shall beappointedby the President;

b) Three (3) Commissioners who shall beappointedby the President;

c) Three (3) Ex-officio Members

1. Secretary of Justice

2. Secretary of National Defense

3. Secretary of the Interior and Local Government

Theex officiomembers maydesignatetheirrepresentativesto the Commission. Said Representatives shall beentitled toper diems,allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by law.(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing before the COA the rulings of the resident auditor and the NGAO disallowing payment ofhonorariato theex officiomembers representatives, to no avail.

Hence, on March 14, 2003, the NAC filed the present petition, contending that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in:(1) implementing COA Memorandum No. 97-038 without the required notice and publication under Article 2 of the Civil Code;(2) invoking paragraph 2, Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution to sustain the disallowance ofhonorariaunder said Memorandum; (3) applying the Memorandum to the NACex officiomembers representatives who were all appointive officials with ranks below that of an Assistant Secretary; (4) interpreting laws and rules outside of its mandate and declaring Section 1, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 2 null and void, and (5) disallowing the payment ofhonorariaon the ground of lack of authority of representatives to attend the NAC meetings in behalf of theex officiomembers.[8]We hold that the position of petitioner NAC is against the law and jurisprudence. The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grantper diem,honorariaor any allowance whatsoever to the NACex officiomembers official representatives.

The Constitution mandates the Commission on Audit to ensure that the funds and properties of the government are validly, efficiently and conscientiously used. Thus, Article IX-D of the Constitution ordains the COA to exercise exclusive and broad auditing powers over all government entities or trustees, without any exception:

Section 2.(1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty toexamine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government,or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution;(b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by law of the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.

(2)The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, todefine the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods requiredtherefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, inexpensive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.Section 3.No lawshall be passedexempting any entityof the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds,from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.(Emphasis supplied).

It is in accordance with this constitutional mandate that the COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038 on September 19, 1997:

COMMISSION ON AUDIT MEMORANDUM NO.97-038

SUBJECT:Implementation of Senate Committee Report No. 509, Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations and Committee on Civil Service and Government Reorganization.

The Commission received a copy of Senate Committee Report No. 509 urging the Commission on Auditto immediately cause the disallowance of any payment of any form of additional compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple positions, and to effect the refund of any and all such additional compensation given to and received by the officials concerned, or their representatives, from the time of the finality of the Supreme Court ruling inCivil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretaryto the present.In the Civil Liberties Union case, theSupreme Court ruled that Cabinet Secretaries, their deputies and assistants may not hold any other office or employment. It declared Executive Order 284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to hold other offices in addition to their primary office and to receive compensationtherefor.The said decisionbecame final andexecutoryon August 19, 1991.In view thereof, all unit heads/auditors/team leaders of the national government agencies and government owned or controlled corporations which have effected payment of subject allowances, are directed to implement the recommendation contained in the subject Senate Committee Report by undertaking the following audit action:

1.On accounts that have not been audited and settled under certificate of settlements and balances on record from August 19, 1991 to present to immediately issue the Notices of disallowance and corresponding certificate of settlements and balances.2.On accounts that have been audited and settled under certificate of settlements and balances on record to review and re-open said accounts, issue the corresponding notices of disallowance, and certify a new balance thereon.It is understood that the re-opening of accounts shall be limited to those that were settled within the prescriptive period of three (3) years prescribed in Section 52 of P.D. 1445.3.On disallowances previously made on these accounts to submit a report on the status of the disallowances indicating whether those have been refunded/settled or have become final andexecutoryand the latest action taken by the Auditor thereon.

All auditors concerned shall ensure that all documents evidencing the disallowed payments are kept intact on file in their respective offices.

Any problem/issue arising from the implementation of this Memorandum shall be brought promptly to the attention of the Committee created under COA Officer Order No. 97-698 thru the Director concerned, for immediate resolution.

An initial report on the implementation of this Memorandum shall be submitted to the Directors concerned not later than October 31, 1997. Thereafter, a quarterly progress report on the status of disallowances made shall be submitted, until all the disallowances shall have been enforced.

The Committee created under COA Office Order No. 97-698, dated September 10, 1997, shall supervise the implementation of this Memorandum which shall take effect immediately and shall submit a consolidated report thereon in response to the recommendation of the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation and Committee on Civil Service and Government Reorganization.[9](Emphasis supplied)

Contrary to petitioners claim, COA Memorandum No.97-038 does not need, for validity andeffectivity, the publication required by Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2.Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in theOfficial Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

We clarified this publication requirement inTaadavs.Tuvera:[10][A]llstatutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for theireffectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a differenteffectivitydate is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.(Emphasis supplied.)

COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation or letter of instruction which does not need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an implementing rule or regulation of a statute but a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices and receiving double compensation.

Six years prior to the issuance of COA Memorandum No. 97-038, the Court had the occasion to categorically explain this constitutional prohibition inCivil Liberties Union vs.TheExecutive Secretary:[11]Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides as follows:

Sec. 13.The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

xxxxxxxxx[D]oesthe prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus:"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."

We rule in the negative.

xxxxxxxxxBut what is indeed significant is the fact thatalthough Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.xxxxxxxxxThus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. . . .xxxxxxxxxThe prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in anex-officiocapacity as provided by law and asrequiredby the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.xxxxxxxxx[T]he prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office."It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit Authority.

xxxxxxxxxTheex-officioposition being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows thatthe official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position.The reason is that these services arealready paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.xxxxxxxxxxxx[E]x-officio posts held by the executive official concerned without additional compensation as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of his office do not fall under the definition of "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition...(Emphasissupplied).

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, such as theCivil Liberties Uniondoctrine, form part of our legal system.[12]Supreme Court decisions assume the same authority as valid statutes.[13]The Courts interpretation of the law is part of that law as of the date of enactment because its interpretation merely establishes the contemporary legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.[14]COA Memorandum No. 97-038 does not, in any manner or on its own, rule against or affect the right of any individual, except those provided for under the Constitution. Hence, publication of said Memorandum is not required for it to be valid, effective and enforceable.

InCivil Liberties Union, we elucidated onthe two constitutional prohibitions against holding multiple positions in the government and receiving double compensation: (1) the blanket prohibition of paragraph 2, Section 7, Article IX-B on all government employees against holding multiple government offices, unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of their positions, and (2) the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII on the President and his official family from holding any other office, profession, business or financial interest, whether government or private, unless allowed by the Constitution.

The NACex officiomembers representatives who were all appointive officials with ranks below Assistant Secretary are covered by the two constitutional prohibitions.

First, the NACex officiomembers representatives are not exempt from the general prohibition because there is no law or administrative order creating a new office or position and authorizing additional compensationtherefor.

Sections 54 and 56 of the Administrative Code of 1987 reiterate the constitutional prohibition against multiple positions in the government and receiving additional or double compensation:

SEC. 54.Limitation on Appointment.(1) No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

xxxxxxxxx(3) Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

xxxxxxxxxSEC. 56.Additional or Double Compensation.--No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law nor accept without the consent of the President, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind form any foreign state.

Pensions and gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation.

RA 6758, the Salary Standardization Law, also bars the receipt of such additional emolument.

The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere designation from theex officiomembers who were themselves also designated as such.

There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office; a designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.[15]Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position.The legal basis of an employees right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position,[16]and not a mere designation.

Second, theex officiomembers representatives are also covered by the strict constitutional prohibition imposed on the President and his official family.

Again, inCivil Liberties Union,we held that cabinet secretaries, including their deputies and assistants, who hold positions inex officiocapacities, are proscribed from receiving additional compensation because their services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to their principal offices. Thus, in the attendance of the NAC meetings, theex officiomembers were not entitled to, and were in fact prohibited from, collecting extra compensation, whether it was calledper diem, honorarium,allowance or some other euphemism. Such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.

Furthermore, inde la Cruz vs. COA[17]andBitoniovs. COA,[18]we upheldCOAsdisallowance of the payment ofhonorariaandper diemsto the officers concerned who sat asex officiomembers or alternates. The agent, alternate or representative cannot have a better right than his principal, theex officiomember. The laws, rules, prohibitions or restrictions that cover theex officiomember apply with equal force to his representative. In short, since theex officiomember is prohibited from receiving additional compensation for a position held in anex officiocapacity, so is his representative likewise restricted.

The Court also finds that the re-opening of the NAC accounts within three years after its settlement is withinCOAsjurisdiction under Section 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, promulgated on June 11, 1978:

SECTION 52.Opening and revision of settled accounts.(1) At any time before the expiration of three years after the settlement of any account by an auditor, the Commission maymotupropioreview and revise the account or settlement andcertifya new balance.

More importantly, the Government is neverestoppedby the mistake or error on the part of its agents.[19]Erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not preclude subsequent corrective application of the statute.

In declaring Section 1, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 2s. 1999 null and void, the COA ruled that:

Petitioner further contends that with the new IRR issued by the NAC authorizing the ex-officio members to designate representatives to attend commission meetings and entitling them to receive per diems, honoraria and other allowances, there is now no legal impediment since it was approved by the President. This Commission begs to disagree. Said provision in the new IRR is null and void for having been promulgated in excess of its rule-making authority. Proclamation No. 347, the presidential issuance creating the NAC, makes no mention that representatives of ex-officio members can take the place of said ex-officio members during its meetings and can receive per diems and allowances. This being the case, the NAC, in the exercise of its quasi-legislative powers, cannot add, expand or enlarge the provisions of the issuance it seeks to implement without committing an ultraviresact.[20]We find that, on its face, Section 1, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 2 is valid, as it merely provides that:

The ex officio members may designate their representatives to the Commission. Said Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by law. (Emphasis supplied).

The problem lies not in the administrative order but how the NAC and the COA interpreted it.

First, the administrative order itself acknowledges that payment of allowances to the representatives must be authorized by the law, that is, the Constitution, statutes and judicial decisions. However, as already discussed, the payment of such allowances is not allowed, prohibited even.

Second, the administrative order merely allows theex officiomembers to designate their representatives to NAC meetings but not to decide for them while attending such meetings. Section 4 of the administrative order categorically states:

Decisions of the NAC shall be arrived at by a majority vote in a meeting where there is a quorum consisting of at least four members.

Thus, although the administrative order does not preclude the representatives from attending the NAC meetings, they may do so only as guests or witnesses to the proceedings. They cannot substitute for theex officiomembers for purposes of determining quorum, participating in deliberations and making decisions.

Lastly, we disagree withNACsposition that the representatives arede factoofficers and as such are entitled to allowances, pursuant to our pronouncement inCivil Liberties Union:

where there is nodejureofficer, ade factoofficer, who in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensation attached to the office.

Ade factoofficer derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. (He is) one who is in possession of an office and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent be not a mere volunteer.[21]The representatives cannot be consideredde factoofficers because they were not appointed but were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled to something their own principals are prohibited from receiving. Neither can they claim good faith, given the express prohibition of the Constitution and the finality of our decision inCivil Liberties Unionprior to their receipt of such allowances.

WHEREFOREthe petition is herebyDISMISSEDfor lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE,Petitioner,vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO,J.:A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a married couple.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution2dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llaves (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.

Factual Antecedents

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.4In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced.

Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamanos wife, and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos legitimate children with Zorayda,5filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint6alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:

11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted the same while his prior marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being declared as "divorced" has no factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;

11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one contracted under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus covered by this law;7Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the court for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4, 1995,8and again, another 15 days9or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted.10Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss11on February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latters disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano.12Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts.

The trial court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity.13Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 acertioraripetition with this Court questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA14which was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.

During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since there can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented their evidence. When it was Estrellitas turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such purpose15were postponed mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings16in view of the CAs temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing the case.17Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated September 30, 1996.18Estrellita then elevated the appellate courts judgment to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.19Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her evidence on June 26, 1997.20As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to July 9, 1997.21The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a postponement.22Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case for decision,23reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.24On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City,25stating as one of the reasons that as sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated August 24, 1998,26we denied Estrellitas motion for reconsideration27with finality.

A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.28Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita as voidab initiofor being bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.29The court said:

A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of his first marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the late Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of the second marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an acceptable method of terminating the effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.30Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In her appeal,31Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as

the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her to file her answer after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry her as his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zoraydas lack of legal standing to question the validity of her marriage to the deceased.

In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,32the CA held that Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be heard but simply ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse of around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition forcertiorariwith the higher courts since, as an independent and original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.

As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamanos wife and, hence, the injured party in the senators subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.

In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33the CA denied Estrellitas Motion for Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the additional errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public prosecutors report on the existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court34and Article 48 of the Family Code35will not invalidate the trial courts judgment as the proceedings between the parties had been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been joined before the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellitas refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellitas allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its judgment way prior to our remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity of Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano.

The Parties Respective Arguments

Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity to file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the validity of her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias36laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial courts assurance that the proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever action the High Court will take on her petition questioning the RTCs jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.37She also questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as the latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased.38Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because only the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CAs reasoning and stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an original action for certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main action before the RTC.

As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol Gen says that this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit that obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents legal standing to challenge the validity of Estrellitas purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any proper interested party may attack directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right to file the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.

Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.

IssuesThe issues that must be resolved are the following:

1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts judgment, even though the latter was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting for the Supreme Courts final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due process; and c) the public prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;

2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous; and

3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellitas marriage declared void ab initio.

Our RulingEstrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and her pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the RTC of Quezon City.

Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. She was never declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her interest.

Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40to justify the suspension of the period to file an answer and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition forcertiorariquestioning the validity of the denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellitas basis for her argument, to wit:

However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to Dismiss, instead of filing an Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section 4],the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rulesbut in no case less than five (5) days computed from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x x41(Emphasis supplied.)

Estrellita obviously misappreciatedMacias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial court is mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it. Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should the issue of the propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate courts. InMacias,the trial court failed to observe due process in the course of the proceeding of the case because after it denied the wifes motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even when, under the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for extension of time to file an answer.

Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of."42Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case."43In fact, the trial court respected the CAs temporary restraining order and only after the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.

Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous requests for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side of the story. Neither should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor should it wait for its records to be remanded back to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.

The Public Prosecutor issued a report as

to the non-existence of collusion.

Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)44also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to determine whether there is collusion between the parties:

Sec. 9.Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.

Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the required report,45which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,46wherein he attested that there could be no collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private respondents.

Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,47the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.48The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.49The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.50Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,52the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."53Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise provided:

Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.

It has been held that:

The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Codes enactment.54An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:

A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.

Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.

Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.

Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines,55Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section 2(a)56thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.

Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.

In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner,viz:

(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.57Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.

The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.

Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the subsequent marriage.1wphi1But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003.58Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage in November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.60Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective rights which include striking down bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued on September 13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.