petition, state ex rel. state auto property ins. v. hon ...procedural mstory of pertinent underlying...
TRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
0 [1 ~
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI ~ ~AR 2 02017 ~STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY RORY L PERRY n CLERK
INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHffiITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia Civil Action No ll-C-606) ~~
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq (designated counsel ofrecord) W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis WVa State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITmS bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull iii
QUESTIONS PRESENTED bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 1
STATEME-NT OF THE- CASEbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 1
PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 2
SUMMARY OF THE- ARGUMENT bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 5
STATEME-NT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION 10
ARGUMENTbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 10
Standard of Review bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 10
A The Circuit Court committed clear error in rmding CMD presented evidence that State Auto violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 11
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charlestonbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 12
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston 14
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act 16
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rued bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 16
D The Circuit Court erred in rmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach ofcontractbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 25
CONCLUSION bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 27
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Accord Wood v Carpenter 101 US 135 (1879) 20
Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165698 SE2d 638 (2010) 25
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 347 A2d 842 (1975) 13
Crawford v Taylor 138 W Va 207 75 SE2d 370 (1953) 10
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 (ColoApp2002) 11 1626
Evanston Ins Co v GAB Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 132 AD2d 180 (1987) 17 18
Evanston Ins Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 (ND TIL 1989) 17
Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 (SD W Va 2009) 25
Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188564 SE2d 398 (2001) 20
Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid Graffamp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 746 SE2d 568 (2013) 6 12
Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466566 SE2d 603 (2002) 82324
Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347443 A2d 163 (1982) 13
Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction Inc 194 WVa 309460 SE2d 444 (1995) 23 24
Highmark W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 655 SE2d 509 (2007) 6 12
iv
Humble Oil amp Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) ~ 20
1 W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69W Va 380 71 SE 391 (1911) 25
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 452 SE2d 63 (1994) 20
Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649 (1989) 25
Loudin v Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 middotWVa 34 716 SE2d 696 (2011) 11 1226
Merchants Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 179 A2d 505(1962) 13
Natl Union Fire Ins Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Illinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 (ND 111 1987) 17
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) 6 7 8 11 121621222326
Perdue v Hess 199 W Va 299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) 1920
Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash App 1989) 17
Sherwood Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 32 698 A2d 1078 (1996) 12 13
State el rei Brison v Kaufman 213 W Va 624 584 SE2d480 (2003) 15 16
State ex rei Allstate Ins v Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 (1998) 15
State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) 10 11
State ex rei Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) 10
v
State ex reI Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233 SE2d425 (1977) 10
State ex reI Vineyard v 0 Brien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) 10
State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968) 18
Stevens v Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) 1920
Williams v Precision Coil Inc 194 WVa 52459 SE2d 329 (1995) 6
Wilt v State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165506 SE2d 608 (1998) 721
Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d 731 (NDW Va 2012) 25
Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162597 SE2d 295 (2004) 20
Statutes
W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) 78 16 17 18 1921
West Virginia Code sect 33-11-1 to 10 21
West Virginia Code sect 53-1-1 1 10
West Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) 2021
Rules
Ru1e 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure 10
West Virginia Ru1e of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6) 2
Constitutional Provisions
Article VIII sect3 of the West Virginia Constitution 1
vi
OUESTIONSPRESENTED
A Whether pursuant to West Virginia law the Circuit Court erred in finding that CMD Plus Inc presented evidence that State Auto breached a common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
B Whether the Circuit Court erred in finding that CMD Plus Inc presented evidence that it had a claim under the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
C Whether pursuant to West Virginia law the Circuit Court erred in concluding that a breach of the duty to defend and a breach of the duty to indemnify constitute continuous torts
D Whether the Circuit Court erred in finding that CMD Plus Inc presented evidence to support aclaim for breach ofan insurance contract
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Petition arises out of a civil action now pending in the Circuit Court of Kanawha
County West Virginia before respondent The Honorable James C Stucky styled Barry G
Evans and Ann M Evans Plaintiffs v CMD Plus Inc a West Virginia Corporation C K Shah
Chandrakant N Shah and Kimberly S Shah Defendants and CMD Plus Inc a West Virginia
Corporation Third-Party Plaintiff v State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto
Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Third Party Defendant Civil
Action No II-C-606 This Petition for Writ of Prohibition is filed pursuant to Article VIII sect3
of the West Virginia Constitution granting this Court original jurisdiction in prohibition and
West Virginia Code sect 53-1-1 This Petition for Writ of Prohibition seeks reliefftom an Order
denying State Autos Motion for Summary Judgment
I
PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES
This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD Plus Inc that
caused earth to move and damage adjacent landowners property and the City of Charlestons
sewer line This case has a long and complex procedural history having been appealed to this
Court twice already and now for a third time App at 000277-000290 Each time the issues for
this Court to consider have been unique In a Memorandum Decision filed on June 142016
this Court found that CMD Plus Incs (hereinafter sometimes referred to as CMD) could
survive a motion to dismiss under West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) [d
However upon return of this case to Circuit Court the parties conducted additional discovery
As discussed below the new evidence exposes CMDs common law bad faith claims statutory
bad faith claims and breach ofcontract claims as wanting ofany supporting evidence
After this case was returned to Circuit Court CK Shah President of CMD testified at a
deposition on September 212016 App at 000314-000335 Mr Shah cleared up any questions
of fact with regard to whether State Auto met its duty to defend CMD
In March 2009 CMD was alerted by the downslope homeowners Barry G and Ann M
Evans (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Evanses) that there was damage to the
Evanses property related to the washout and slippage from the subject property so Mr Shah
(acting on behalf of CMD) contacted CMDs insurance carrier State Auto Mr Shah denied any
negligence during the construction activities on the subject property but nevertheless the
Evanses filed suit against CMD Mr Shah and Mr Shahs wife Kimberly Shah (hereinafter
sometimes referred to collectively as the Defendants) alleging nuisance trespass and
negligence Id at 000320 Mr Shah admitted that State Auto hired Attorney Dave Cook to
defend the Defendants against the claims brought by the Evanses [d at 000322 Mr Shah
2
denied any instances where Mr Cook failed to defend the lawsuit and he agreed that Mr Cook
did his job Id at 000329 Mr Shah acknowledged that in defense of the claims against the
Defendants Mr Cook answered the Complaint that was filed by the Evanses participated in
inspections defended Mr Shah at a deposition answered discovery filed by the Plaintiffs and
handled all the pre-trial filings Id at 000323-000326 Mr Shah testified that Mr Cook retained
Greg Boso as an expert to investigate the Evanses claim Id at 000326 Mr Shah admitted that
he was not required to pay anything for either Mr Cooks or Mr Bosos services Id at 000330
In fact Mr Shah admitted that he was not required to pay any costs associated with the litigation
commenced by the Evanses and that he and his company were defended professionally by Mr
Cook Id at 000331-000332
Mr Shahs testimony also resolved any genuine issues of fact regarding State Autos
duty to indemnify the Defendants for the claims brought by the Evanses Mr Shah admitted that
Mr Cook ultimately settled the Evanses claim based on the proceeds paid by State Auto Id at
000331 No judgment was ever entered against Mr Shah his wife or CMD Id Mr Shah
admitted that Mr Cook obtained a release of claims by the Evanses from all damage claims
including future claims related to the alleged slope failure and any of the incidents alleged in the
Evanses Civil Action No ll-C-606 Id at 00328
Mr Shah also cleared up any unresolved issues with regards to State Autos duty to
defend and indemnify the Defendants for the claims brought by the City of Charleston During
his deposition Mr Shah admitted that he was infonned of a potential problem at the back of his
property with the City of Charlestons sewer line by an engineer retained to investigate by State
Auto Daren Franck However he told Mr Franck that the sewer line was below the slip and
Mr Franck didnt need to worry about it App at 000318 Despite Mr Shahs assurances it
3
was subsequently discovered that there was ovulation to the sewer line ld While he did not
believe that ovulation constituted failure of the sewer line Mr Shah acknowledged that the
sewer line quickly became an issue after the initial slip He admitted to difficulty getting the
repairs completed because the City of Charleston insisted on repairs their way or the highway
ld at 000319
Ultimately the Charleston Sanitary Board asked Mr Shah to pay $44846 for damages to
the sewer line caused by the work CMD perfonned at the property located at Meadow Road ld
at 000334 Mr Shah admitted that it was his expectation that State Auto pay the full amount
and he admitted that State Auto ultimately paid approximately $5500000 to have the sewer line
relocated This amount included an additional $900000 for overrun costs ld at 000335
Regarding the claims asserted by the City of Charleston no judgment was ever entered against
Mr Shah his wife or CMD ld at 000332 Mr Shah admitted that Mr Cook prepared a
release of claims that absolved the Defendants of future liability related to damage to the sewer
line arising out of the construction activities at 6 Meadow Drive ld at 000326 As was the
case with the litigation involving the Evanses the Defendants were not required to pay any
money in conjunction with the settlement of the sewer line claim
Mr Shahs testimony resolved any outstanding issues regarding whether CMD asserted a
claim under its commercial liability policy CMD by its President Mr Shah was aware that
its policy was a liability policy only ld at 000317 In other words Mr Shah as President of
CMD understood that the policy did not cover repairs to property he owned By virtue of this
admission he acknowledged that the previously entered stipulation (Le CMD is not making an
indep~dent claim against State Auto seeking damages for any repairs alterations enhancements
4
maintenance restorations or replacements on the Shah or CMDs property) was correct insofar
as CMD had no claim for damages to its own property App at 00021 000317
Finally Mr Shahs testimony resolved any dispute of fact as to when he was aware of
State Autos alleged bad faith Even though Mr Shah admitted that State Auto provided legal
counsel and settled the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston Mr Shah still
believed that State Auto acted in bad faith regarding the handling of these claims Mr Shah
testified that he believed State Autos bad faith began September or October 2009 ld at
000333
Having resolved any genuine issues of fact regarding CMDs third party claims for
common law bad faith statutory bad faith and breach of contract (as well as the timeliness or
lack th~eof of the bad faith claims) State Auto moved for summary judgment on January 16
2017 App at 000291-347 The Court entertained arguments on this motion on February 8
2017 and the Court summarily denied State Autos motion at that time without explanation The
Court signed an Order prepared by CMDs counsel on March 2 2017 without any modifications
to counsels account of the facts law or conclusions ld at 00001-00010 It is from this Order
that State Auto seeks the instant Writ ofProhibition
Currently the Circuit Court has this case set for trial on May 1 2017 App at 000348
State Auto has filed contemporaneously with this Writ its Motion to Stay Proceedings in the
Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofWrit ofProhibition
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The instant issue submitted by this Writ of Prohibition is whether the Circuit Court
committed clear error in finding that CMD presented sufficient facts to survive summary
judgment The Circuit Court erred because CMD has presented no evidence to satisfy this
5
heightened standard SyI Pt2 of Williams v Precision Coil Inc 194 WVa 52459 SE2d
329 (1995)
With the standard for summary judgment in mind the Circuit Court committed clear
error in holding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for common law bad faith As
discussed below the duty to act in good faith and the contractual duties in the insurance policy
must coexist before a claim of bad faith can be maintained Since these duties must coexist
CMD must show evidence of a breach of the duty of good faith and the contractual duties See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) see also Gaddy
Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568
578 (2013) see also Highmark W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487492 655 SE2d 509 514
(2007)
The insurance contract at issue established two duties 1) the duty to defend and 2) the
duty to indemnify The Circuit Court committed clear error because CMD presented no
evidence that State Auto breached either the duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD for
the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston There is no dispute that State
Auto hired a competent attorney to represent CMDs interests This attorney successfully
negotiated a compromise of all the claims by the Evanses and the City of Charleston This
compromise included a full release from liability by both the Evanses and the City of Charleston
for all damages including future damages CMD was required to pay nothing to these parties
and nothing for the legal services it received
The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed evidence that State Auto met both
contractual duties simply expanded these duties to include obligations far beyond what was
contractually agreed upon The Circuit Court incorrectly held that failure to propose a remedy to
6
resolve the Evanses claim failure to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim
and failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by
the Evanses supported the conclusion that the contractual duties to defend and indemnify were
breached The Circuit Court has created new duties that were not contracted for and in effect
rewrote the insurance policy
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD presented evidence that it
had claims pursuant to W Va Code sect33-11-4(9) The undisputed facts show Mr Shah
agreed conceded and stipulated that the policy at issue provided no coverage for CMDs claims
and the evidence clearly establishes that CMD could never assert a loss claim under its liability
policy Moreover Mr Shah agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the Evanses and
the City ofCharleston
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error by
finding that more than one conclusion could be reached regarding the timeliness of CMDs
claims Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred
A one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law and statutory bad
faith claims SyI Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23
(2009) SyI Pt 1 Wilt v State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165506 SE2d 608 (1998) Mr
Shah admitted in his deposition that he believed State Autos actions in September and October
2009 were the beginning of the so called bad faith App at 000333 Fortunately this Court
need not rely exclusively on Mr Shahs memory to confirm this timeframe because counsel for
CMD was thorough enough to memorialize this conclusion in an October 28 2009 letter to State
7
Auto This letter advised State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos alleged failure to
promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no genuine dispute of
fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 This was the date from
which the one year statute of limitations began to run Yet CMD did not seek leave to file its
Third-Party Complaint until September 26 2011 nearly two years after the alleged bad faith
occurred and nearly one year after the statute oflimitations expired Even then CMDs motion
was not heard until January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20
2012 Thus it is clear that the statute oflimitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its
Third-Party Complaint
The Circuit Court again faced with indisputable evidence simply invented a new rule
holding that a bad faith breach of an insurance contract is a continuous tort The Circuit Court
completely dismissed this Courts holding in Noland insofar as this holding dealt with the duty to
defend In Syl Pt 5 of Noland this Court stated that in a first-party bad faith claim that is
based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002)
(Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute oflimitations begins to run
on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused
to defend him or her in an action Noland 686 SE2d 23 Thus any claims based on the
failure of the duty to defend (eg the alleged failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent
CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans) must have been filed by late October 2010
Further while it is noted that Noland dealt exclusively with the duty to defend the statute
of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty to indemnify Accordingly
the Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead ofNoland
8
in concluding that a claim ofbad faith breach of an insurance contract constitutes a continuing or
repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs claims that State Auto breached
its duty to indemnify do stem from a discrete occurrence in Oc~ober 2009 As discussed above
State Auto indemnified CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by
Mr Shahs own admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in October 2009 At that
moment the statute of limitations began to run
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify constitutes a continuous tort would cause
uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence the statute of limitations
would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer were to decline to indemnify
an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a bad faith claim at any time in the
future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be considered a continuous tort The
claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case) five years later 100 years later
etc because the statute would never run Such a result is irrational and the Circuit Court
committed clear error in its application of the statute of limitations to the facts of this specific
case
Finally the Circuit Court erred in concluding that CMD presented evidence to support its
breach of contract claims Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of
common law bad faith As discussed above there is no policy provision that CMD can point to
that State Auto in violation of its duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached
Because State Auto both defended and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation
under the COL Policy and bec~use the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to
its own property no evidence was presented of a breach of contract Accordingly permitting
this case to go forward on this claim was clear error
9
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION
Pursuant to Rule 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure oral argument
in this case is unnecessary because the principle issues in this case have been authoritatively
decided previously and the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in this brief and
the record on appeal If the Court determines that oral argument is necessary this case is
appropriate for a West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 argument and disposition by
memorandum decision
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
This Court has previously stated that [t]he writ of prohibition will issue only in clear
cases where the inferior tribunal is proceeding without or in excess ofjurisdiction SyI State
ex rei Vineyard v OBrien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) see also SyI Pt 1 Crawford
v Taylor 138 W Va 207 75 SE2d 370 (1953) (Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts
from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction or in which having jurisdiction
they are exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as a substitute for writ of error
appeal or certiorari) SyI Pt 2 State ex rei Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233
SE2d 425 (1977) (A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simply abuse of discretion
by a trial court It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such
jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers WVa Code 53-1-1)
This Court has defined the standard for issuance of a writ of prohibition where it is
claimed that the lower tribunal exceeds its legitimate powers State ex rei Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) (quoting SyI Pt 4 State ex rei
10
Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) This Court examines the following
factors
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means such as direct appeal to obtain the desired relief (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal (3) whether the lower tribunals order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4) whether the lower tribunals order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law and (5) whether the lower tribunals order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression
ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997raquo
This Court has held that [t]hese factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting
point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue Although all five
factors need not be satisfied it is clear that the third factor the existence of clear error as a
matter of law should be given substantial weight ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 Berger 483 SE2d
12)
A The Circuit Court committed clear error in rmding CMD presented evidence that State Auto violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
The Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment with respect to CMDs common
law bad faith claims because CMD presented no evidence that State Auto breached either the
duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed
evidence that State Auto met both duties simply expanded these duties to include requirements
far beyond what was contractually required
This Court has recognized that the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance
contract claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its
insured See Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009)
(quoting Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v
11
Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 WVa 34 716 SE2d 696 th 9 (2011) (quoting Noland 686
SE2d at 37) However the insurance company is not called upon to perform this duty until
some contractual duty imposed by the insurance policy has arisen Id While the contractual
duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related and both
must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id In other words claims for bad faith
and breach of an insurance contract are not separate and unique from one another and the
damages one can recover under each overlap See Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid
Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568 578 (2013) (holding that this Court
has declined to recognize an independent claim for a breach of the common law duty of good
faith and has instead held that such a claim sounds in breach of contract) see also Highmark
W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 492 655 SE2d 509 514 (2007) (holding that breaching
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action apart from
a breach ofcontract claim)
Thus to maintain a cause of action for common law bad faith a breach of the insurance
contract is a condition precedent In this case the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
establishes only two contractual obligations owed to CMD by State Auto the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify CMD has presented no evidence that either duty was breached
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Section I Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the policy states
we will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking those damages
Essentially within the context of an insurance contract the duty to defend is a covenant to
protect the insured from the expense of defending suits brought against him Sherwood
Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 3243698 A2d 1078 (1996) (quoting
12
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 409-10 347 A2d 842 851 (1975) The duty
to defend is a contractual right of control Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347 356 443 A2d 163
167 (1982) which is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment Merchants
Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 127 179 A2d 505 511 (1962) This is because the
outcome of the suit depends upon skill in investigation in negotiations for settlement and in the
conduct of the lawsuit Id
Under the terms of the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form State Auto made a
contractual promise to protect CMD from the expense of litigation and by virtue of the contract
State Auto had discretion as to how it met this duty Yet the Circuit Court redefined this duty
and essentially rewrote the insurance contract holding that
Additionally CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD throughout the claim process Such evidence includes that State Auto failed to properly investigate the claim failed to propose a remedy to resolve the Evans claim failed to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim and failed to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans This Court finds that the duty to defend and indemnify are not met merely by providing the insured with an attorney and ultimately obtaining a release ofthe insured
App at 00007 (emphasis supplied)
The Circuit Courts holding that the duty to defend [was not met by] merely by
providing the insured with an attorney oversimplifies what actually happened in this case
More importantly the Circuit Court erred because citing no authority it created a broader duty
to defend that what was contractually required The reason for the lack of authority cited is
simple there is no authority that requires State Auto to act as the Circuit Court outlined State
Auto had a contractual right of control over the defense of this claim and this is logical because
ultimately it was State Auto which was required to pay to settle the claims with the Evanses and
13
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 2: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITmS bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull iii
QUESTIONS PRESENTED bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 1
STATEME-NT OF THE- CASEbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 1
PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 2
SUMMARY OF THE- ARGUMENT bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 5
STATEME-NT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION 10
ARGUMENTbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 10
Standard of Review bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 10
A The Circuit Court committed clear error in rmding CMD presented evidence that State Auto violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 11
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charlestonbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 12
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston 14
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act 16
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rued bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 16
D The Circuit Court erred in rmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach ofcontractbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 25
CONCLUSION bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 27
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Accord Wood v Carpenter 101 US 135 (1879) 20
Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165698 SE2d 638 (2010) 25
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 347 A2d 842 (1975) 13
Crawford v Taylor 138 W Va 207 75 SE2d 370 (1953) 10
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 (ColoApp2002) 11 1626
Evanston Ins Co v GAB Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 132 AD2d 180 (1987) 17 18
Evanston Ins Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 (ND TIL 1989) 17
Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 (SD W Va 2009) 25
Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188564 SE2d 398 (2001) 20
Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid Graffamp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 746 SE2d 568 (2013) 6 12
Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466566 SE2d 603 (2002) 82324
Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347443 A2d 163 (1982) 13
Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction Inc 194 WVa 309460 SE2d 444 (1995) 23 24
Highmark W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 655 SE2d 509 (2007) 6 12
iv
Humble Oil amp Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) ~ 20
1 W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69W Va 380 71 SE 391 (1911) 25
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 452 SE2d 63 (1994) 20
Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649 (1989) 25
Loudin v Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 middotWVa 34 716 SE2d 696 (2011) 11 1226
Merchants Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 179 A2d 505(1962) 13
Natl Union Fire Ins Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Illinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 (ND 111 1987) 17
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) 6 7 8 11 121621222326
Perdue v Hess 199 W Va 299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) 1920
Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash App 1989) 17
Sherwood Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 32 698 A2d 1078 (1996) 12 13
State el rei Brison v Kaufman 213 W Va 624 584 SE2d480 (2003) 15 16
State ex rei Allstate Ins v Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 (1998) 15
State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) 10 11
State ex rei Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) 10
v
State ex reI Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233 SE2d425 (1977) 10
State ex reI Vineyard v 0 Brien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) 10
State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968) 18
Stevens v Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) 1920
Williams v Precision Coil Inc 194 WVa 52459 SE2d 329 (1995) 6
Wilt v State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165506 SE2d 608 (1998) 721
Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d 731 (NDW Va 2012) 25
Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162597 SE2d 295 (2004) 20
Statutes
W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) 78 16 17 18 1921
West Virginia Code sect 33-11-1 to 10 21
West Virginia Code sect 53-1-1 1 10
West Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) 2021
Rules
Ru1e 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure 10
West Virginia Ru1e of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6) 2
Constitutional Provisions
Article VIII sect3 of the West Virginia Constitution 1
vi
OUESTIONSPRESENTED
A Whether pursuant to West Virginia law the Circuit Court erred in finding that CMD Plus Inc presented evidence that State Auto breached a common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
B Whether the Circuit Court erred in finding that CMD Plus Inc presented evidence that it had a claim under the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
C Whether pursuant to West Virginia law the Circuit Court erred in concluding that a breach of the duty to defend and a breach of the duty to indemnify constitute continuous torts
D Whether the Circuit Court erred in finding that CMD Plus Inc presented evidence to support aclaim for breach ofan insurance contract
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Petition arises out of a civil action now pending in the Circuit Court of Kanawha
County West Virginia before respondent The Honorable James C Stucky styled Barry G
Evans and Ann M Evans Plaintiffs v CMD Plus Inc a West Virginia Corporation C K Shah
Chandrakant N Shah and Kimberly S Shah Defendants and CMD Plus Inc a West Virginia
Corporation Third-Party Plaintiff v State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto
Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Third Party Defendant Civil
Action No II-C-606 This Petition for Writ of Prohibition is filed pursuant to Article VIII sect3
of the West Virginia Constitution granting this Court original jurisdiction in prohibition and
West Virginia Code sect 53-1-1 This Petition for Writ of Prohibition seeks reliefftom an Order
denying State Autos Motion for Summary Judgment
I
PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES
This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD Plus Inc that
caused earth to move and damage adjacent landowners property and the City of Charlestons
sewer line This case has a long and complex procedural history having been appealed to this
Court twice already and now for a third time App at 000277-000290 Each time the issues for
this Court to consider have been unique In a Memorandum Decision filed on June 142016
this Court found that CMD Plus Incs (hereinafter sometimes referred to as CMD) could
survive a motion to dismiss under West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) [d
However upon return of this case to Circuit Court the parties conducted additional discovery
As discussed below the new evidence exposes CMDs common law bad faith claims statutory
bad faith claims and breach ofcontract claims as wanting ofany supporting evidence
After this case was returned to Circuit Court CK Shah President of CMD testified at a
deposition on September 212016 App at 000314-000335 Mr Shah cleared up any questions
of fact with regard to whether State Auto met its duty to defend CMD
In March 2009 CMD was alerted by the downslope homeowners Barry G and Ann M
Evans (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Evanses) that there was damage to the
Evanses property related to the washout and slippage from the subject property so Mr Shah
(acting on behalf of CMD) contacted CMDs insurance carrier State Auto Mr Shah denied any
negligence during the construction activities on the subject property but nevertheless the
Evanses filed suit against CMD Mr Shah and Mr Shahs wife Kimberly Shah (hereinafter
sometimes referred to collectively as the Defendants) alleging nuisance trespass and
negligence Id at 000320 Mr Shah admitted that State Auto hired Attorney Dave Cook to
defend the Defendants against the claims brought by the Evanses [d at 000322 Mr Shah
2
denied any instances where Mr Cook failed to defend the lawsuit and he agreed that Mr Cook
did his job Id at 000329 Mr Shah acknowledged that in defense of the claims against the
Defendants Mr Cook answered the Complaint that was filed by the Evanses participated in
inspections defended Mr Shah at a deposition answered discovery filed by the Plaintiffs and
handled all the pre-trial filings Id at 000323-000326 Mr Shah testified that Mr Cook retained
Greg Boso as an expert to investigate the Evanses claim Id at 000326 Mr Shah admitted that
he was not required to pay anything for either Mr Cooks or Mr Bosos services Id at 000330
In fact Mr Shah admitted that he was not required to pay any costs associated with the litigation
commenced by the Evanses and that he and his company were defended professionally by Mr
Cook Id at 000331-000332
Mr Shahs testimony also resolved any genuine issues of fact regarding State Autos
duty to indemnify the Defendants for the claims brought by the Evanses Mr Shah admitted that
Mr Cook ultimately settled the Evanses claim based on the proceeds paid by State Auto Id at
000331 No judgment was ever entered against Mr Shah his wife or CMD Id Mr Shah
admitted that Mr Cook obtained a release of claims by the Evanses from all damage claims
including future claims related to the alleged slope failure and any of the incidents alleged in the
Evanses Civil Action No ll-C-606 Id at 00328
Mr Shah also cleared up any unresolved issues with regards to State Autos duty to
defend and indemnify the Defendants for the claims brought by the City of Charleston During
his deposition Mr Shah admitted that he was infonned of a potential problem at the back of his
property with the City of Charlestons sewer line by an engineer retained to investigate by State
Auto Daren Franck However he told Mr Franck that the sewer line was below the slip and
Mr Franck didnt need to worry about it App at 000318 Despite Mr Shahs assurances it
3
was subsequently discovered that there was ovulation to the sewer line ld While he did not
believe that ovulation constituted failure of the sewer line Mr Shah acknowledged that the
sewer line quickly became an issue after the initial slip He admitted to difficulty getting the
repairs completed because the City of Charleston insisted on repairs their way or the highway
ld at 000319
Ultimately the Charleston Sanitary Board asked Mr Shah to pay $44846 for damages to
the sewer line caused by the work CMD perfonned at the property located at Meadow Road ld
at 000334 Mr Shah admitted that it was his expectation that State Auto pay the full amount
and he admitted that State Auto ultimately paid approximately $5500000 to have the sewer line
relocated This amount included an additional $900000 for overrun costs ld at 000335
Regarding the claims asserted by the City of Charleston no judgment was ever entered against
Mr Shah his wife or CMD ld at 000332 Mr Shah admitted that Mr Cook prepared a
release of claims that absolved the Defendants of future liability related to damage to the sewer
line arising out of the construction activities at 6 Meadow Drive ld at 000326 As was the
case with the litigation involving the Evanses the Defendants were not required to pay any
money in conjunction with the settlement of the sewer line claim
Mr Shahs testimony resolved any outstanding issues regarding whether CMD asserted a
claim under its commercial liability policy CMD by its President Mr Shah was aware that
its policy was a liability policy only ld at 000317 In other words Mr Shah as President of
CMD understood that the policy did not cover repairs to property he owned By virtue of this
admission he acknowledged that the previously entered stipulation (Le CMD is not making an
indep~dent claim against State Auto seeking damages for any repairs alterations enhancements
4
maintenance restorations or replacements on the Shah or CMDs property) was correct insofar
as CMD had no claim for damages to its own property App at 00021 000317
Finally Mr Shahs testimony resolved any dispute of fact as to when he was aware of
State Autos alleged bad faith Even though Mr Shah admitted that State Auto provided legal
counsel and settled the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston Mr Shah still
believed that State Auto acted in bad faith regarding the handling of these claims Mr Shah
testified that he believed State Autos bad faith began September or October 2009 ld at
000333
Having resolved any genuine issues of fact regarding CMDs third party claims for
common law bad faith statutory bad faith and breach of contract (as well as the timeliness or
lack th~eof of the bad faith claims) State Auto moved for summary judgment on January 16
2017 App at 000291-347 The Court entertained arguments on this motion on February 8
2017 and the Court summarily denied State Autos motion at that time without explanation The
Court signed an Order prepared by CMDs counsel on March 2 2017 without any modifications
to counsels account of the facts law or conclusions ld at 00001-00010 It is from this Order
that State Auto seeks the instant Writ ofProhibition
Currently the Circuit Court has this case set for trial on May 1 2017 App at 000348
State Auto has filed contemporaneously with this Writ its Motion to Stay Proceedings in the
Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofWrit ofProhibition
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The instant issue submitted by this Writ of Prohibition is whether the Circuit Court
committed clear error in finding that CMD presented sufficient facts to survive summary
judgment The Circuit Court erred because CMD has presented no evidence to satisfy this
5
heightened standard SyI Pt2 of Williams v Precision Coil Inc 194 WVa 52459 SE2d
329 (1995)
With the standard for summary judgment in mind the Circuit Court committed clear
error in holding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for common law bad faith As
discussed below the duty to act in good faith and the contractual duties in the insurance policy
must coexist before a claim of bad faith can be maintained Since these duties must coexist
CMD must show evidence of a breach of the duty of good faith and the contractual duties See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) see also Gaddy
Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568
578 (2013) see also Highmark W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487492 655 SE2d 509 514
(2007)
The insurance contract at issue established two duties 1) the duty to defend and 2) the
duty to indemnify The Circuit Court committed clear error because CMD presented no
evidence that State Auto breached either the duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD for
the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston There is no dispute that State
Auto hired a competent attorney to represent CMDs interests This attorney successfully
negotiated a compromise of all the claims by the Evanses and the City of Charleston This
compromise included a full release from liability by both the Evanses and the City of Charleston
for all damages including future damages CMD was required to pay nothing to these parties
and nothing for the legal services it received
The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed evidence that State Auto met both
contractual duties simply expanded these duties to include obligations far beyond what was
contractually agreed upon The Circuit Court incorrectly held that failure to propose a remedy to
6
resolve the Evanses claim failure to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim
and failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by
the Evanses supported the conclusion that the contractual duties to defend and indemnify were
breached The Circuit Court has created new duties that were not contracted for and in effect
rewrote the insurance policy
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD presented evidence that it
had claims pursuant to W Va Code sect33-11-4(9) The undisputed facts show Mr Shah
agreed conceded and stipulated that the policy at issue provided no coverage for CMDs claims
and the evidence clearly establishes that CMD could never assert a loss claim under its liability
policy Moreover Mr Shah agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the Evanses and
the City ofCharleston
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error by
finding that more than one conclusion could be reached regarding the timeliness of CMDs
claims Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred
A one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law and statutory bad
faith claims SyI Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23
(2009) SyI Pt 1 Wilt v State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165506 SE2d 608 (1998) Mr
Shah admitted in his deposition that he believed State Autos actions in September and October
2009 were the beginning of the so called bad faith App at 000333 Fortunately this Court
need not rely exclusively on Mr Shahs memory to confirm this timeframe because counsel for
CMD was thorough enough to memorialize this conclusion in an October 28 2009 letter to State
7
Auto This letter advised State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos alleged failure to
promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no genuine dispute of
fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 This was the date from
which the one year statute of limitations began to run Yet CMD did not seek leave to file its
Third-Party Complaint until September 26 2011 nearly two years after the alleged bad faith
occurred and nearly one year after the statute oflimitations expired Even then CMDs motion
was not heard until January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20
2012 Thus it is clear that the statute oflimitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its
Third-Party Complaint
The Circuit Court again faced with indisputable evidence simply invented a new rule
holding that a bad faith breach of an insurance contract is a continuous tort The Circuit Court
completely dismissed this Courts holding in Noland insofar as this holding dealt with the duty to
defend In Syl Pt 5 of Noland this Court stated that in a first-party bad faith claim that is
based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002)
(Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute oflimitations begins to run
on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused
to defend him or her in an action Noland 686 SE2d 23 Thus any claims based on the
failure of the duty to defend (eg the alleged failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent
CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans) must have been filed by late October 2010
Further while it is noted that Noland dealt exclusively with the duty to defend the statute
of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty to indemnify Accordingly
the Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead ofNoland
8
in concluding that a claim ofbad faith breach of an insurance contract constitutes a continuing or
repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs claims that State Auto breached
its duty to indemnify do stem from a discrete occurrence in Oc~ober 2009 As discussed above
State Auto indemnified CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by
Mr Shahs own admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in October 2009 At that
moment the statute of limitations began to run
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify constitutes a continuous tort would cause
uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence the statute of limitations
would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer were to decline to indemnify
an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a bad faith claim at any time in the
future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be considered a continuous tort The
claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case) five years later 100 years later
etc because the statute would never run Such a result is irrational and the Circuit Court
committed clear error in its application of the statute of limitations to the facts of this specific
case
Finally the Circuit Court erred in concluding that CMD presented evidence to support its
breach of contract claims Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of
common law bad faith As discussed above there is no policy provision that CMD can point to
that State Auto in violation of its duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached
Because State Auto both defended and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation
under the COL Policy and bec~use the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to
its own property no evidence was presented of a breach of contract Accordingly permitting
this case to go forward on this claim was clear error
9
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION
Pursuant to Rule 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure oral argument
in this case is unnecessary because the principle issues in this case have been authoritatively
decided previously and the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in this brief and
the record on appeal If the Court determines that oral argument is necessary this case is
appropriate for a West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 argument and disposition by
memorandum decision
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
This Court has previously stated that [t]he writ of prohibition will issue only in clear
cases where the inferior tribunal is proceeding without or in excess ofjurisdiction SyI State
ex rei Vineyard v OBrien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) see also SyI Pt 1 Crawford
v Taylor 138 W Va 207 75 SE2d 370 (1953) (Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts
from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction or in which having jurisdiction
they are exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as a substitute for writ of error
appeal or certiorari) SyI Pt 2 State ex rei Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233
SE2d 425 (1977) (A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simply abuse of discretion
by a trial court It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such
jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers WVa Code 53-1-1)
This Court has defined the standard for issuance of a writ of prohibition where it is
claimed that the lower tribunal exceeds its legitimate powers State ex rei Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) (quoting SyI Pt 4 State ex rei
10
Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) This Court examines the following
factors
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means such as direct appeal to obtain the desired relief (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal (3) whether the lower tribunals order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4) whether the lower tribunals order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law and (5) whether the lower tribunals order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression
ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997raquo
This Court has held that [t]hese factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting
point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue Although all five
factors need not be satisfied it is clear that the third factor the existence of clear error as a
matter of law should be given substantial weight ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 Berger 483 SE2d
12)
A The Circuit Court committed clear error in rmding CMD presented evidence that State Auto violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
The Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment with respect to CMDs common
law bad faith claims because CMD presented no evidence that State Auto breached either the
duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed
evidence that State Auto met both duties simply expanded these duties to include requirements
far beyond what was contractually required
This Court has recognized that the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance
contract claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its
insured See Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009)
(quoting Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v
11
Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 WVa 34 716 SE2d 696 th 9 (2011) (quoting Noland 686
SE2d at 37) However the insurance company is not called upon to perform this duty until
some contractual duty imposed by the insurance policy has arisen Id While the contractual
duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related and both
must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id In other words claims for bad faith
and breach of an insurance contract are not separate and unique from one another and the
damages one can recover under each overlap See Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid
Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568 578 (2013) (holding that this Court
has declined to recognize an independent claim for a breach of the common law duty of good
faith and has instead held that such a claim sounds in breach of contract) see also Highmark
W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 492 655 SE2d 509 514 (2007) (holding that breaching
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action apart from
a breach ofcontract claim)
Thus to maintain a cause of action for common law bad faith a breach of the insurance
contract is a condition precedent In this case the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
establishes only two contractual obligations owed to CMD by State Auto the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify CMD has presented no evidence that either duty was breached
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Section I Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the policy states
we will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking those damages
Essentially within the context of an insurance contract the duty to defend is a covenant to
protect the insured from the expense of defending suits brought against him Sherwood
Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 3243698 A2d 1078 (1996) (quoting
12
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 409-10 347 A2d 842 851 (1975) The duty
to defend is a contractual right of control Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347 356 443 A2d 163
167 (1982) which is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment Merchants
Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 127 179 A2d 505 511 (1962) This is because the
outcome of the suit depends upon skill in investigation in negotiations for settlement and in the
conduct of the lawsuit Id
Under the terms of the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form State Auto made a
contractual promise to protect CMD from the expense of litigation and by virtue of the contract
State Auto had discretion as to how it met this duty Yet the Circuit Court redefined this duty
and essentially rewrote the insurance contract holding that
Additionally CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD throughout the claim process Such evidence includes that State Auto failed to properly investigate the claim failed to propose a remedy to resolve the Evans claim failed to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim and failed to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans This Court finds that the duty to defend and indemnify are not met merely by providing the insured with an attorney and ultimately obtaining a release ofthe insured
App at 00007 (emphasis supplied)
The Circuit Courts holding that the duty to defend [was not met by] merely by
providing the insured with an attorney oversimplifies what actually happened in this case
More importantly the Circuit Court erred because citing no authority it created a broader duty
to defend that what was contractually required The reason for the lack of authority cited is
simple there is no authority that requires State Auto to act as the Circuit Court outlined State
Auto had a contractual right of control over the defense of this claim and this is logical because
ultimately it was State Auto which was required to pay to settle the claims with the Evanses and
13
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 3: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Accord Wood v Carpenter 101 US 135 (1879) 20
Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165698 SE2d 638 (2010) 25
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 347 A2d 842 (1975) 13
Crawford v Taylor 138 W Va 207 75 SE2d 370 (1953) 10
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 (ColoApp2002) 11 1626
Evanston Ins Co v GAB Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 132 AD2d 180 (1987) 17 18
Evanston Ins Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 (ND TIL 1989) 17
Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 (SD W Va 2009) 25
Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188564 SE2d 398 (2001) 20
Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid Graffamp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 746 SE2d 568 (2013) 6 12
Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466566 SE2d 603 (2002) 82324
Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347443 A2d 163 (1982) 13
Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction Inc 194 WVa 309460 SE2d 444 (1995) 23 24
Highmark W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 655 SE2d 509 (2007) 6 12
iv
Humble Oil amp Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) ~ 20
1 W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69W Va 380 71 SE 391 (1911) 25
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 452 SE2d 63 (1994) 20
Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649 (1989) 25
Loudin v Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 middotWVa 34 716 SE2d 696 (2011) 11 1226
Merchants Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 179 A2d 505(1962) 13
Natl Union Fire Ins Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Illinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 (ND 111 1987) 17
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) 6 7 8 11 121621222326
Perdue v Hess 199 W Va 299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) 1920
Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash App 1989) 17
Sherwood Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 32 698 A2d 1078 (1996) 12 13
State el rei Brison v Kaufman 213 W Va 624 584 SE2d480 (2003) 15 16
State ex rei Allstate Ins v Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 (1998) 15
State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) 10 11
State ex rei Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) 10
v
State ex reI Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233 SE2d425 (1977) 10
State ex reI Vineyard v 0 Brien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) 10
State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968) 18
Stevens v Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) 1920
Williams v Precision Coil Inc 194 WVa 52459 SE2d 329 (1995) 6
Wilt v State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165506 SE2d 608 (1998) 721
Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d 731 (NDW Va 2012) 25
Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162597 SE2d 295 (2004) 20
Statutes
W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) 78 16 17 18 1921
West Virginia Code sect 33-11-1 to 10 21
West Virginia Code sect 53-1-1 1 10
West Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) 2021
Rules
Ru1e 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure 10
West Virginia Ru1e of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6) 2
Constitutional Provisions
Article VIII sect3 of the West Virginia Constitution 1
vi
OUESTIONSPRESENTED
A Whether pursuant to West Virginia law the Circuit Court erred in finding that CMD Plus Inc presented evidence that State Auto breached a common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
B Whether the Circuit Court erred in finding that CMD Plus Inc presented evidence that it had a claim under the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
C Whether pursuant to West Virginia law the Circuit Court erred in concluding that a breach of the duty to defend and a breach of the duty to indemnify constitute continuous torts
D Whether the Circuit Court erred in finding that CMD Plus Inc presented evidence to support aclaim for breach ofan insurance contract
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Petition arises out of a civil action now pending in the Circuit Court of Kanawha
County West Virginia before respondent The Honorable James C Stucky styled Barry G
Evans and Ann M Evans Plaintiffs v CMD Plus Inc a West Virginia Corporation C K Shah
Chandrakant N Shah and Kimberly S Shah Defendants and CMD Plus Inc a West Virginia
Corporation Third-Party Plaintiff v State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto
Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Third Party Defendant Civil
Action No II-C-606 This Petition for Writ of Prohibition is filed pursuant to Article VIII sect3
of the West Virginia Constitution granting this Court original jurisdiction in prohibition and
West Virginia Code sect 53-1-1 This Petition for Writ of Prohibition seeks reliefftom an Order
denying State Autos Motion for Summary Judgment
I
PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES
This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD Plus Inc that
caused earth to move and damage adjacent landowners property and the City of Charlestons
sewer line This case has a long and complex procedural history having been appealed to this
Court twice already and now for a third time App at 000277-000290 Each time the issues for
this Court to consider have been unique In a Memorandum Decision filed on June 142016
this Court found that CMD Plus Incs (hereinafter sometimes referred to as CMD) could
survive a motion to dismiss under West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) [d
However upon return of this case to Circuit Court the parties conducted additional discovery
As discussed below the new evidence exposes CMDs common law bad faith claims statutory
bad faith claims and breach ofcontract claims as wanting ofany supporting evidence
After this case was returned to Circuit Court CK Shah President of CMD testified at a
deposition on September 212016 App at 000314-000335 Mr Shah cleared up any questions
of fact with regard to whether State Auto met its duty to defend CMD
In March 2009 CMD was alerted by the downslope homeowners Barry G and Ann M
Evans (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Evanses) that there was damage to the
Evanses property related to the washout and slippage from the subject property so Mr Shah
(acting on behalf of CMD) contacted CMDs insurance carrier State Auto Mr Shah denied any
negligence during the construction activities on the subject property but nevertheless the
Evanses filed suit against CMD Mr Shah and Mr Shahs wife Kimberly Shah (hereinafter
sometimes referred to collectively as the Defendants) alleging nuisance trespass and
negligence Id at 000320 Mr Shah admitted that State Auto hired Attorney Dave Cook to
defend the Defendants against the claims brought by the Evanses [d at 000322 Mr Shah
2
denied any instances where Mr Cook failed to defend the lawsuit and he agreed that Mr Cook
did his job Id at 000329 Mr Shah acknowledged that in defense of the claims against the
Defendants Mr Cook answered the Complaint that was filed by the Evanses participated in
inspections defended Mr Shah at a deposition answered discovery filed by the Plaintiffs and
handled all the pre-trial filings Id at 000323-000326 Mr Shah testified that Mr Cook retained
Greg Boso as an expert to investigate the Evanses claim Id at 000326 Mr Shah admitted that
he was not required to pay anything for either Mr Cooks or Mr Bosos services Id at 000330
In fact Mr Shah admitted that he was not required to pay any costs associated with the litigation
commenced by the Evanses and that he and his company were defended professionally by Mr
Cook Id at 000331-000332
Mr Shahs testimony also resolved any genuine issues of fact regarding State Autos
duty to indemnify the Defendants for the claims brought by the Evanses Mr Shah admitted that
Mr Cook ultimately settled the Evanses claim based on the proceeds paid by State Auto Id at
000331 No judgment was ever entered against Mr Shah his wife or CMD Id Mr Shah
admitted that Mr Cook obtained a release of claims by the Evanses from all damage claims
including future claims related to the alleged slope failure and any of the incidents alleged in the
Evanses Civil Action No ll-C-606 Id at 00328
Mr Shah also cleared up any unresolved issues with regards to State Autos duty to
defend and indemnify the Defendants for the claims brought by the City of Charleston During
his deposition Mr Shah admitted that he was infonned of a potential problem at the back of his
property with the City of Charlestons sewer line by an engineer retained to investigate by State
Auto Daren Franck However he told Mr Franck that the sewer line was below the slip and
Mr Franck didnt need to worry about it App at 000318 Despite Mr Shahs assurances it
3
was subsequently discovered that there was ovulation to the sewer line ld While he did not
believe that ovulation constituted failure of the sewer line Mr Shah acknowledged that the
sewer line quickly became an issue after the initial slip He admitted to difficulty getting the
repairs completed because the City of Charleston insisted on repairs their way or the highway
ld at 000319
Ultimately the Charleston Sanitary Board asked Mr Shah to pay $44846 for damages to
the sewer line caused by the work CMD perfonned at the property located at Meadow Road ld
at 000334 Mr Shah admitted that it was his expectation that State Auto pay the full amount
and he admitted that State Auto ultimately paid approximately $5500000 to have the sewer line
relocated This amount included an additional $900000 for overrun costs ld at 000335
Regarding the claims asserted by the City of Charleston no judgment was ever entered against
Mr Shah his wife or CMD ld at 000332 Mr Shah admitted that Mr Cook prepared a
release of claims that absolved the Defendants of future liability related to damage to the sewer
line arising out of the construction activities at 6 Meadow Drive ld at 000326 As was the
case with the litigation involving the Evanses the Defendants were not required to pay any
money in conjunction with the settlement of the sewer line claim
Mr Shahs testimony resolved any outstanding issues regarding whether CMD asserted a
claim under its commercial liability policy CMD by its President Mr Shah was aware that
its policy was a liability policy only ld at 000317 In other words Mr Shah as President of
CMD understood that the policy did not cover repairs to property he owned By virtue of this
admission he acknowledged that the previously entered stipulation (Le CMD is not making an
indep~dent claim against State Auto seeking damages for any repairs alterations enhancements
4
maintenance restorations or replacements on the Shah or CMDs property) was correct insofar
as CMD had no claim for damages to its own property App at 00021 000317
Finally Mr Shahs testimony resolved any dispute of fact as to when he was aware of
State Autos alleged bad faith Even though Mr Shah admitted that State Auto provided legal
counsel and settled the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston Mr Shah still
believed that State Auto acted in bad faith regarding the handling of these claims Mr Shah
testified that he believed State Autos bad faith began September or October 2009 ld at
000333
Having resolved any genuine issues of fact regarding CMDs third party claims for
common law bad faith statutory bad faith and breach of contract (as well as the timeliness or
lack th~eof of the bad faith claims) State Auto moved for summary judgment on January 16
2017 App at 000291-347 The Court entertained arguments on this motion on February 8
2017 and the Court summarily denied State Autos motion at that time without explanation The
Court signed an Order prepared by CMDs counsel on March 2 2017 without any modifications
to counsels account of the facts law or conclusions ld at 00001-00010 It is from this Order
that State Auto seeks the instant Writ ofProhibition
Currently the Circuit Court has this case set for trial on May 1 2017 App at 000348
State Auto has filed contemporaneously with this Writ its Motion to Stay Proceedings in the
Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofWrit ofProhibition
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The instant issue submitted by this Writ of Prohibition is whether the Circuit Court
committed clear error in finding that CMD presented sufficient facts to survive summary
judgment The Circuit Court erred because CMD has presented no evidence to satisfy this
5
heightened standard SyI Pt2 of Williams v Precision Coil Inc 194 WVa 52459 SE2d
329 (1995)
With the standard for summary judgment in mind the Circuit Court committed clear
error in holding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for common law bad faith As
discussed below the duty to act in good faith and the contractual duties in the insurance policy
must coexist before a claim of bad faith can be maintained Since these duties must coexist
CMD must show evidence of a breach of the duty of good faith and the contractual duties See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) see also Gaddy
Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568
578 (2013) see also Highmark W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487492 655 SE2d 509 514
(2007)
The insurance contract at issue established two duties 1) the duty to defend and 2) the
duty to indemnify The Circuit Court committed clear error because CMD presented no
evidence that State Auto breached either the duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD for
the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston There is no dispute that State
Auto hired a competent attorney to represent CMDs interests This attorney successfully
negotiated a compromise of all the claims by the Evanses and the City of Charleston This
compromise included a full release from liability by both the Evanses and the City of Charleston
for all damages including future damages CMD was required to pay nothing to these parties
and nothing for the legal services it received
The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed evidence that State Auto met both
contractual duties simply expanded these duties to include obligations far beyond what was
contractually agreed upon The Circuit Court incorrectly held that failure to propose a remedy to
6
resolve the Evanses claim failure to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim
and failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by
the Evanses supported the conclusion that the contractual duties to defend and indemnify were
breached The Circuit Court has created new duties that were not contracted for and in effect
rewrote the insurance policy
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD presented evidence that it
had claims pursuant to W Va Code sect33-11-4(9) The undisputed facts show Mr Shah
agreed conceded and stipulated that the policy at issue provided no coverage for CMDs claims
and the evidence clearly establishes that CMD could never assert a loss claim under its liability
policy Moreover Mr Shah agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the Evanses and
the City ofCharleston
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error by
finding that more than one conclusion could be reached regarding the timeliness of CMDs
claims Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred
A one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law and statutory bad
faith claims SyI Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23
(2009) SyI Pt 1 Wilt v State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165506 SE2d 608 (1998) Mr
Shah admitted in his deposition that he believed State Autos actions in September and October
2009 were the beginning of the so called bad faith App at 000333 Fortunately this Court
need not rely exclusively on Mr Shahs memory to confirm this timeframe because counsel for
CMD was thorough enough to memorialize this conclusion in an October 28 2009 letter to State
7
Auto This letter advised State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos alleged failure to
promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no genuine dispute of
fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 This was the date from
which the one year statute of limitations began to run Yet CMD did not seek leave to file its
Third-Party Complaint until September 26 2011 nearly two years after the alleged bad faith
occurred and nearly one year after the statute oflimitations expired Even then CMDs motion
was not heard until January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20
2012 Thus it is clear that the statute oflimitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its
Third-Party Complaint
The Circuit Court again faced with indisputable evidence simply invented a new rule
holding that a bad faith breach of an insurance contract is a continuous tort The Circuit Court
completely dismissed this Courts holding in Noland insofar as this holding dealt with the duty to
defend In Syl Pt 5 of Noland this Court stated that in a first-party bad faith claim that is
based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002)
(Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute oflimitations begins to run
on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused
to defend him or her in an action Noland 686 SE2d 23 Thus any claims based on the
failure of the duty to defend (eg the alleged failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent
CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans) must have been filed by late October 2010
Further while it is noted that Noland dealt exclusively with the duty to defend the statute
of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty to indemnify Accordingly
the Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead ofNoland
8
in concluding that a claim ofbad faith breach of an insurance contract constitutes a continuing or
repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs claims that State Auto breached
its duty to indemnify do stem from a discrete occurrence in Oc~ober 2009 As discussed above
State Auto indemnified CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by
Mr Shahs own admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in October 2009 At that
moment the statute of limitations began to run
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify constitutes a continuous tort would cause
uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence the statute of limitations
would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer were to decline to indemnify
an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a bad faith claim at any time in the
future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be considered a continuous tort The
claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case) five years later 100 years later
etc because the statute would never run Such a result is irrational and the Circuit Court
committed clear error in its application of the statute of limitations to the facts of this specific
case
Finally the Circuit Court erred in concluding that CMD presented evidence to support its
breach of contract claims Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of
common law bad faith As discussed above there is no policy provision that CMD can point to
that State Auto in violation of its duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached
Because State Auto both defended and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation
under the COL Policy and bec~use the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to
its own property no evidence was presented of a breach of contract Accordingly permitting
this case to go forward on this claim was clear error
9
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION
Pursuant to Rule 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure oral argument
in this case is unnecessary because the principle issues in this case have been authoritatively
decided previously and the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in this brief and
the record on appeal If the Court determines that oral argument is necessary this case is
appropriate for a West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 argument and disposition by
memorandum decision
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
This Court has previously stated that [t]he writ of prohibition will issue only in clear
cases where the inferior tribunal is proceeding without or in excess ofjurisdiction SyI State
ex rei Vineyard v OBrien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) see also SyI Pt 1 Crawford
v Taylor 138 W Va 207 75 SE2d 370 (1953) (Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts
from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction or in which having jurisdiction
they are exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as a substitute for writ of error
appeal or certiorari) SyI Pt 2 State ex rei Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233
SE2d 425 (1977) (A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simply abuse of discretion
by a trial court It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such
jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers WVa Code 53-1-1)
This Court has defined the standard for issuance of a writ of prohibition where it is
claimed that the lower tribunal exceeds its legitimate powers State ex rei Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) (quoting SyI Pt 4 State ex rei
10
Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) This Court examines the following
factors
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means such as direct appeal to obtain the desired relief (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal (3) whether the lower tribunals order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4) whether the lower tribunals order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law and (5) whether the lower tribunals order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression
ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997raquo
This Court has held that [t]hese factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting
point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue Although all five
factors need not be satisfied it is clear that the third factor the existence of clear error as a
matter of law should be given substantial weight ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 Berger 483 SE2d
12)
A The Circuit Court committed clear error in rmding CMD presented evidence that State Auto violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
The Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment with respect to CMDs common
law bad faith claims because CMD presented no evidence that State Auto breached either the
duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed
evidence that State Auto met both duties simply expanded these duties to include requirements
far beyond what was contractually required
This Court has recognized that the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance
contract claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its
insured See Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009)
(quoting Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v
11
Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 WVa 34 716 SE2d 696 th 9 (2011) (quoting Noland 686
SE2d at 37) However the insurance company is not called upon to perform this duty until
some contractual duty imposed by the insurance policy has arisen Id While the contractual
duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related and both
must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id In other words claims for bad faith
and breach of an insurance contract are not separate and unique from one another and the
damages one can recover under each overlap See Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid
Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568 578 (2013) (holding that this Court
has declined to recognize an independent claim for a breach of the common law duty of good
faith and has instead held that such a claim sounds in breach of contract) see also Highmark
W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 492 655 SE2d 509 514 (2007) (holding that breaching
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action apart from
a breach ofcontract claim)
Thus to maintain a cause of action for common law bad faith a breach of the insurance
contract is a condition precedent In this case the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
establishes only two contractual obligations owed to CMD by State Auto the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify CMD has presented no evidence that either duty was breached
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Section I Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the policy states
we will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking those damages
Essentially within the context of an insurance contract the duty to defend is a covenant to
protect the insured from the expense of defending suits brought against him Sherwood
Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 3243698 A2d 1078 (1996) (quoting
12
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 409-10 347 A2d 842 851 (1975) The duty
to defend is a contractual right of control Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347 356 443 A2d 163
167 (1982) which is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment Merchants
Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 127 179 A2d 505 511 (1962) This is because the
outcome of the suit depends upon skill in investigation in negotiations for settlement and in the
conduct of the lawsuit Id
Under the terms of the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form State Auto made a
contractual promise to protect CMD from the expense of litigation and by virtue of the contract
State Auto had discretion as to how it met this duty Yet the Circuit Court redefined this duty
and essentially rewrote the insurance contract holding that
Additionally CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD throughout the claim process Such evidence includes that State Auto failed to properly investigate the claim failed to propose a remedy to resolve the Evans claim failed to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim and failed to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans This Court finds that the duty to defend and indemnify are not met merely by providing the insured with an attorney and ultimately obtaining a release ofthe insured
App at 00007 (emphasis supplied)
The Circuit Courts holding that the duty to defend [was not met by] merely by
providing the insured with an attorney oversimplifies what actually happened in this case
More importantly the Circuit Court erred because citing no authority it created a broader duty
to defend that what was contractually required The reason for the lack of authority cited is
simple there is no authority that requires State Auto to act as the Circuit Court outlined State
Auto had a contractual right of control over the defense of this claim and this is logical because
ultimately it was State Auto which was required to pay to settle the claims with the Evanses and
13
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 4: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Humble Oil amp Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) ~ 20
1 W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69W Va 380 71 SE 391 (1911) 25
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 452 SE2d 63 (1994) 20
Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649 (1989) 25
Loudin v Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 middotWVa 34 716 SE2d 696 (2011) 11 1226
Merchants Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 179 A2d 505(1962) 13
Natl Union Fire Ins Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Illinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 (ND 111 1987) 17
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) 6 7 8 11 121621222326
Perdue v Hess 199 W Va 299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) 1920
Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash App 1989) 17
Sherwood Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 32 698 A2d 1078 (1996) 12 13
State el rei Brison v Kaufman 213 W Va 624 584 SE2d480 (2003) 15 16
State ex rei Allstate Ins v Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 (1998) 15
State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) 10 11
State ex rei Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) 10
v
State ex reI Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233 SE2d425 (1977) 10
State ex reI Vineyard v 0 Brien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) 10
State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968) 18
Stevens v Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) 1920
Williams v Precision Coil Inc 194 WVa 52459 SE2d 329 (1995) 6
Wilt v State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165506 SE2d 608 (1998) 721
Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d 731 (NDW Va 2012) 25
Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162597 SE2d 295 (2004) 20
Statutes
W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) 78 16 17 18 1921
West Virginia Code sect 33-11-1 to 10 21
West Virginia Code sect 53-1-1 1 10
West Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) 2021
Rules
Ru1e 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure 10
West Virginia Ru1e of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6) 2
Constitutional Provisions
Article VIII sect3 of the West Virginia Constitution 1
vi
OUESTIONSPRESENTED
A Whether pursuant to West Virginia law the Circuit Court erred in finding that CMD Plus Inc presented evidence that State Auto breached a common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
B Whether the Circuit Court erred in finding that CMD Plus Inc presented evidence that it had a claim under the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
C Whether pursuant to West Virginia law the Circuit Court erred in concluding that a breach of the duty to defend and a breach of the duty to indemnify constitute continuous torts
D Whether the Circuit Court erred in finding that CMD Plus Inc presented evidence to support aclaim for breach ofan insurance contract
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Petition arises out of a civil action now pending in the Circuit Court of Kanawha
County West Virginia before respondent The Honorable James C Stucky styled Barry G
Evans and Ann M Evans Plaintiffs v CMD Plus Inc a West Virginia Corporation C K Shah
Chandrakant N Shah and Kimberly S Shah Defendants and CMD Plus Inc a West Virginia
Corporation Third-Party Plaintiff v State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto
Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Third Party Defendant Civil
Action No II-C-606 This Petition for Writ of Prohibition is filed pursuant to Article VIII sect3
of the West Virginia Constitution granting this Court original jurisdiction in prohibition and
West Virginia Code sect 53-1-1 This Petition for Writ of Prohibition seeks reliefftom an Order
denying State Autos Motion for Summary Judgment
I
PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES
This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD Plus Inc that
caused earth to move and damage adjacent landowners property and the City of Charlestons
sewer line This case has a long and complex procedural history having been appealed to this
Court twice already and now for a third time App at 000277-000290 Each time the issues for
this Court to consider have been unique In a Memorandum Decision filed on June 142016
this Court found that CMD Plus Incs (hereinafter sometimes referred to as CMD) could
survive a motion to dismiss under West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) [d
However upon return of this case to Circuit Court the parties conducted additional discovery
As discussed below the new evidence exposes CMDs common law bad faith claims statutory
bad faith claims and breach ofcontract claims as wanting ofany supporting evidence
After this case was returned to Circuit Court CK Shah President of CMD testified at a
deposition on September 212016 App at 000314-000335 Mr Shah cleared up any questions
of fact with regard to whether State Auto met its duty to defend CMD
In March 2009 CMD was alerted by the downslope homeowners Barry G and Ann M
Evans (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Evanses) that there was damage to the
Evanses property related to the washout and slippage from the subject property so Mr Shah
(acting on behalf of CMD) contacted CMDs insurance carrier State Auto Mr Shah denied any
negligence during the construction activities on the subject property but nevertheless the
Evanses filed suit against CMD Mr Shah and Mr Shahs wife Kimberly Shah (hereinafter
sometimes referred to collectively as the Defendants) alleging nuisance trespass and
negligence Id at 000320 Mr Shah admitted that State Auto hired Attorney Dave Cook to
defend the Defendants against the claims brought by the Evanses [d at 000322 Mr Shah
2
denied any instances where Mr Cook failed to defend the lawsuit and he agreed that Mr Cook
did his job Id at 000329 Mr Shah acknowledged that in defense of the claims against the
Defendants Mr Cook answered the Complaint that was filed by the Evanses participated in
inspections defended Mr Shah at a deposition answered discovery filed by the Plaintiffs and
handled all the pre-trial filings Id at 000323-000326 Mr Shah testified that Mr Cook retained
Greg Boso as an expert to investigate the Evanses claim Id at 000326 Mr Shah admitted that
he was not required to pay anything for either Mr Cooks or Mr Bosos services Id at 000330
In fact Mr Shah admitted that he was not required to pay any costs associated with the litigation
commenced by the Evanses and that he and his company were defended professionally by Mr
Cook Id at 000331-000332
Mr Shahs testimony also resolved any genuine issues of fact regarding State Autos
duty to indemnify the Defendants for the claims brought by the Evanses Mr Shah admitted that
Mr Cook ultimately settled the Evanses claim based on the proceeds paid by State Auto Id at
000331 No judgment was ever entered against Mr Shah his wife or CMD Id Mr Shah
admitted that Mr Cook obtained a release of claims by the Evanses from all damage claims
including future claims related to the alleged slope failure and any of the incidents alleged in the
Evanses Civil Action No ll-C-606 Id at 00328
Mr Shah also cleared up any unresolved issues with regards to State Autos duty to
defend and indemnify the Defendants for the claims brought by the City of Charleston During
his deposition Mr Shah admitted that he was infonned of a potential problem at the back of his
property with the City of Charlestons sewer line by an engineer retained to investigate by State
Auto Daren Franck However he told Mr Franck that the sewer line was below the slip and
Mr Franck didnt need to worry about it App at 000318 Despite Mr Shahs assurances it
3
was subsequently discovered that there was ovulation to the sewer line ld While he did not
believe that ovulation constituted failure of the sewer line Mr Shah acknowledged that the
sewer line quickly became an issue after the initial slip He admitted to difficulty getting the
repairs completed because the City of Charleston insisted on repairs their way or the highway
ld at 000319
Ultimately the Charleston Sanitary Board asked Mr Shah to pay $44846 for damages to
the sewer line caused by the work CMD perfonned at the property located at Meadow Road ld
at 000334 Mr Shah admitted that it was his expectation that State Auto pay the full amount
and he admitted that State Auto ultimately paid approximately $5500000 to have the sewer line
relocated This amount included an additional $900000 for overrun costs ld at 000335
Regarding the claims asserted by the City of Charleston no judgment was ever entered against
Mr Shah his wife or CMD ld at 000332 Mr Shah admitted that Mr Cook prepared a
release of claims that absolved the Defendants of future liability related to damage to the sewer
line arising out of the construction activities at 6 Meadow Drive ld at 000326 As was the
case with the litigation involving the Evanses the Defendants were not required to pay any
money in conjunction with the settlement of the sewer line claim
Mr Shahs testimony resolved any outstanding issues regarding whether CMD asserted a
claim under its commercial liability policy CMD by its President Mr Shah was aware that
its policy was a liability policy only ld at 000317 In other words Mr Shah as President of
CMD understood that the policy did not cover repairs to property he owned By virtue of this
admission he acknowledged that the previously entered stipulation (Le CMD is not making an
indep~dent claim against State Auto seeking damages for any repairs alterations enhancements
4
maintenance restorations or replacements on the Shah or CMDs property) was correct insofar
as CMD had no claim for damages to its own property App at 00021 000317
Finally Mr Shahs testimony resolved any dispute of fact as to when he was aware of
State Autos alleged bad faith Even though Mr Shah admitted that State Auto provided legal
counsel and settled the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston Mr Shah still
believed that State Auto acted in bad faith regarding the handling of these claims Mr Shah
testified that he believed State Autos bad faith began September or October 2009 ld at
000333
Having resolved any genuine issues of fact regarding CMDs third party claims for
common law bad faith statutory bad faith and breach of contract (as well as the timeliness or
lack th~eof of the bad faith claims) State Auto moved for summary judgment on January 16
2017 App at 000291-347 The Court entertained arguments on this motion on February 8
2017 and the Court summarily denied State Autos motion at that time without explanation The
Court signed an Order prepared by CMDs counsel on March 2 2017 without any modifications
to counsels account of the facts law or conclusions ld at 00001-00010 It is from this Order
that State Auto seeks the instant Writ ofProhibition
Currently the Circuit Court has this case set for trial on May 1 2017 App at 000348
State Auto has filed contemporaneously with this Writ its Motion to Stay Proceedings in the
Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofWrit ofProhibition
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The instant issue submitted by this Writ of Prohibition is whether the Circuit Court
committed clear error in finding that CMD presented sufficient facts to survive summary
judgment The Circuit Court erred because CMD has presented no evidence to satisfy this
5
heightened standard SyI Pt2 of Williams v Precision Coil Inc 194 WVa 52459 SE2d
329 (1995)
With the standard for summary judgment in mind the Circuit Court committed clear
error in holding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for common law bad faith As
discussed below the duty to act in good faith and the contractual duties in the insurance policy
must coexist before a claim of bad faith can be maintained Since these duties must coexist
CMD must show evidence of a breach of the duty of good faith and the contractual duties See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) see also Gaddy
Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568
578 (2013) see also Highmark W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487492 655 SE2d 509 514
(2007)
The insurance contract at issue established two duties 1) the duty to defend and 2) the
duty to indemnify The Circuit Court committed clear error because CMD presented no
evidence that State Auto breached either the duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD for
the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston There is no dispute that State
Auto hired a competent attorney to represent CMDs interests This attorney successfully
negotiated a compromise of all the claims by the Evanses and the City of Charleston This
compromise included a full release from liability by both the Evanses and the City of Charleston
for all damages including future damages CMD was required to pay nothing to these parties
and nothing for the legal services it received
The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed evidence that State Auto met both
contractual duties simply expanded these duties to include obligations far beyond what was
contractually agreed upon The Circuit Court incorrectly held that failure to propose a remedy to
6
resolve the Evanses claim failure to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim
and failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by
the Evanses supported the conclusion that the contractual duties to defend and indemnify were
breached The Circuit Court has created new duties that were not contracted for and in effect
rewrote the insurance policy
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD presented evidence that it
had claims pursuant to W Va Code sect33-11-4(9) The undisputed facts show Mr Shah
agreed conceded and stipulated that the policy at issue provided no coverage for CMDs claims
and the evidence clearly establishes that CMD could never assert a loss claim under its liability
policy Moreover Mr Shah agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the Evanses and
the City ofCharleston
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error by
finding that more than one conclusion could be reached regarding the timeliness of CMDs
claims Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred
A one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law and statutory bad
faith claims SyI Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23
(2009) SyI Pt 1 Wilt v State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165506 SE2d 608 (1998) Mr
Shah admitted in his deposition that he believed State Autos actions in September and October
2009 were the beginning of the so called bad faith App at 000333 Fortunately this Court
need not rely exclusively on Mr Shahs memory to confirm this timeframe because counsel for
CMD was thorough enough to memorialize this conclusion in an October 28 2009 letter to State
7
Auto This letter advised State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos alleged failure to
promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no genuine dispute of
fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 This was the date from
which the one year statute of limitations began to run Yet CMD did not seek leave to file its
Third-Party Complaint until September 26 2011 nearly two years after the alleged bad faith
occurred and nearly one year after the statute oflimitations expired Even then CMDs motion
was not heard until January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20
2012 Thus it is clear that the statute oflimitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its
Third-Party Complaint
The Circuit Court again faced with indisputable evidence simply invented a new rule
holding that a bad faith breach of an insurance contract is a continuous tort The Circuit Court
completely dismissed this Courts holding in Noland insofar as this holding dealt with the duty to
defend In Syl Pt 5 of Noland this Court stated that in a first-party bad faith claim that is
based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002)
(Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute oflimitations begins to run
on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused
to defend him or her in an action Noland 686 SE2d 23 Thus any claims based on the
failure of the duty to defend (eg the alleged failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent
CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans) must have been filed by late October 2010
Further while it is noted that Noland dealt exclusively with the duty to defend the statute
of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty to indemnify Accordingly
the Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead ofNoland
8
in concluding that a claim ofbad faith breach of an insurance contract constitutes a continuing or
repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs claims that State Auto breached
its duty to indemnify do stem from a discrete occurrence in Oc~ober 2009 As discussed above
State Auto indemnified CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by
Mr Shahs own admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in October 2009 At that
moment the statute of limitations began to run
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify constitutes a continuous tort would cause
uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence the statute of limitations
would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer were to decline to indemnify
an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a bad faith claim at any time in the
future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be considered a continuous tort The
claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case) five years later 100 years later
etc because the statute would never run Such a result is irrational and the Circuit Court
committed clear error in its application of the statute of limitations to the facts of this specific
case
Finally the Circuit Court erred in concluding that CMD presented evidence to support its
breach of contract claims Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of
common law bad faith As discussed above there is no policy provision that CMD can point to
that State Auto in violation of its duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached
Because State Auto both defended and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation
under the COL Policy and bec~use the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to
its own property no evidence was presented of a breach of contract Accordingly permitting
this case to go forward on this claim was clear error
9
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION
Pursuant to Rule 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure oral argument
in this case is unnecessary because the principle issues in this case have been authoritatively
decided previously and the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in this brief and
the record on appeal If the Court determines that oral argument is necessary this case is
appropriate for a West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 argument and disposition by
memorandum decision
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
This Court has previously stated that [t]he writ of prohibition will issue only in clear
cases where the inferior tribunal is proceeding without or in excess ofjurisdiction SyI State
ex rei Vineyard v OBrien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) see also SyI Pt 1 Crawford
v Taylor 138 W Va 207 75 SE2d 370 (1953) (Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts
from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction or in which having jurisdiction
they are exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as a substitute for writ of error
appeal or certiorari) SyI Pt 2 State ex rei Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233
SE2d 425 (1977) (A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simply abuse of discretion
by a trial court It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such
jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers WVa Code 53-1-1)
This Court has defined the standard for issuance of a writ of prohibition where it is
claimed that the lower tribunal exceeds its legitimate powers State ex rei Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) (quoting SyI Pt 4 State ex rei
10
Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) This Court examines the following
factors
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means such as direct appeal to obtain the desired relief (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal (3) whether the lower tribunals order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4) whether the lower tribunals order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law and (5) whether the lower tribunals order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression
ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997raquo
This Court has held that [t]hese factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting
point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue Although all five
factors need not be satisfied it is clear that the third factor the existence of clear error as a
matter of law should be given substantial weight ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 Berger 483 SE2d
12)
A The Circuit Court committed clear error in rmding CMD presented evidence that State Auto violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
The Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment with respect to CMDs common
law bad faith claims because CMD presented no evidence that State Auto breached either the
duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed
evidence that State Auto met both duties simply expanded these duties to include requirements
far beyond what was contractually required
This Court has recognized that the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance
contract claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its
insured See Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009)
(quoting Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v
11
Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 WVa 34 716 SE2d 696 th 9 (2011) (quoting Noland 686
SE2d at 37) However the insurance company is not called upon to perform this duty until
some contractual duty imposed by the insurance policy has arisen Id While the contractual
duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related and both
must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id In other words claims for bad faith
and breach of an insurance contract are not separate and unique from one another and the
damages one can recover under each overlap See Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid
Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568 578 (2013) (holding that this Court
has declined to recognize an independent claim for a breach of the common law duty of good
faith and has instead held that such a claim sounds in breach of contract) see also Highmark
W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 492 655 SE2d 509 514 (2007) (holding that breaching
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action apart from
a breach ofcontract claim)
Thus to maintain a cause of action for common law bad faith a breach of the insurance
contract is a condition precedent In this case the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
establishes only two contractual obligations owed to CMD by State Auto the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify CMD has presented no evidence that either duty was breached
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Section I Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the policy states
we will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking those damages
Essentially within the context of an insurance contract the duty to defend is a covenant to
protect the insured from the expense of defending suits brought against him Sherwood
Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 3243698 A2d 1078 (1996) (quoting
12
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 409-10 347 A2d 842 851 (1975) The duty
to defend is a contractual right of control Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347 356 443 A2d 163
167 (1982) which is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment Merchants
Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 127 179 A2d 505 511 (1962) This is because the
outcome of the suit depends upon skill in investigation in negotiations for settlement and in the
conduct of the lawsuit Id
Under the terms of the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form State Auto made a
contractual promise to protect CMD from the expense of litigation and by virtue of the contract
State Auto had discretion as to how it met this duty Yet the Circuit Court redefined this duty
and essentially rewrote the insurance contract holding that
Additionally CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD throughout the claim process Such evidence includes that State Auto failed to properly investigate the claim failed to propose a remedy to resolve the Evans claim failed to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim and failed to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans This Court finds that the duty to defend and indemnify are not met merely by providing the insured with an attorney and ultimately obtaining a release ofthe insured
App at 00007 (emphasis supplied)
The Circuit Courts holding that the duty to defend [was not met by] merely by
providing the insured with an attorney oversimplifies what actually happened in this case
More importantly the Circuit Court erred because citing no authority it created a broader duty
to defend that what was contractually required The reason for the lack of authority cited is
simple there is no authority that requires State Auto to act as the Circuit Court outlined State
Auto had a contractual right of control over the defense of this claim and this is logical because
ultimately it was State Auto which was required to pay to settle the claims with the Evanses and
13
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 5: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
State ex reI Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233 SE2d425 (1977) 10
State ex reI Vineyard v 0 Brien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) 10
State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968) 18
Stevens v Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) 1920
Williams v Precision Coil Inc 194 WVa 52459 SE2d 329 (1995) 6
Wilt v State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165506 SE2d 608 (1998) 721
Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d 731 (NDW Va 2012) 25
Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162597 SE2d 295 (2004) 20
Statutes
W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) 78 16 17 18 1921
West Virginia Code sect 33-11-1 to 10 21
West Virginia Code sect 53-1-1 1 10
West Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) 2021
Rules
Ru1e 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure 10
West Virginia Ru1e of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6) 2
Constitutional Provisions
Article VIII sect3 of the West Virginia Constitution 1
vi
OUESTIONSPRESENTED
A Whether pursuant to West Virginia law the Circuit Court erred in finding that CMD Plus Inc presented evidence that State Auto breached a common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
B Whether the Circuit Court erred in finding that CMD Plus Inc presented evidence that it had a claim under the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
C Whether pursuant to West Virginia law the Circuit Court erred in concluding that a breach of the duty to defend and a breach of the duty to indemnify constitute continuous torts
D Whether the Circuit Court erred in finding that CMD Plus Inc presented evidence to support aclaim for breach ofan insurance contract
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Petition arises out of a civil action now pending in the Circuit Court of Kanawha
County West Virginia before respondent The Honorable James C Stucky styled Barry G
Evans and Ann M Evans Plaintiffs v CMD Plus Inc a West Virginia Corporation C K Shah
Chandrakant N Shah and Kimberly S Shah Defendants and CMD Plus Inc a West Virginia
Corporation Third-Party Plaintiff v State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto
Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Third Party Defendant Civil
Action No II-C-606 This Petition for Writ of Prohibition is filed pursuant to Article VIII sect3
of the West Virginia Constitution granting this Court original jurisdiction in prohibition and
West Virginia Code sect 53-1-1 This Petition for Writ of Prohibition seeks reliefftom an Order
denying State Autos Motion for Summary Judgment
I
PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES
This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD Plus Inc that
caused earth to move and damage adjacent landowners property and the City of Charlestons
sewer line This case has a long and complex procedural history having been appealed to this
Court twice already and now for a third time App at 000277-000290 Each time the issues for
this Court to consider have been unique In a Memorandum Decision filed on June 142016
this Court found that CMD Plus Incs (hereinafter sometimes referred to as CMD) could
survive a motion to dismiss under West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) [d
However upon return of this case to Circuit Court the parties conducted additional discovery
As discussed below the new evidence exposes CMDs common law bad faith claims statutory
bad faith claims and breach ofcontract claims as wanting ofany supporting evidence
After this case was returned to Circuit Court CK Shah President of CMD testified at a
deposition on September 212016 App at 000314-000335 Mr Shah cleared up any questions
of fact with regard to whether State Auto met its duty to defend CMD
In March 2009 CMD was alerted by the downslope homeowners Barry G and Ann M
Evans (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Evanses) that there was damage to the
Evanses property related to the washout and slippage from the subject property so Mr Shah
(acting on behalf of CMD) contacted CMDs insurance carrier State Auto Mr Shah denied any
negligence during the construction activities on the subject property but nevertheless the
Evanses filed suit against CMD Mr Shah and Mr Shahs wife Kimberly Shah (hereinafter
sometimes referred to collectively as the Defendants) alleging nuisance trespass and
negligence Id at 000320 Mr Shah admitted that State Auto hired Attorney Dave Cook to
defend the Defendants against the claims brought by the Evanses [d at 000322 Mr Shah
2
denied any instances where Mr Cook failed to defend the lawsuit and he agreed that Mr Cook
did his job Id at 000329 Mr Shah acknowledged that in defense of the claims against the
Defendants Mr Cook answered the Complaint that was filed by the Evanses participated in
inspections defended Mr Shah at a deposition answered discovery filed by the Plaintiffs and
handled all the pre-trial filings Id at 000323-000326 Mr Shah testified that Mr Cook retained
Greg Boso as an expert to investigate the Evanses claim Id at 000326 Mr Shah admitted that
he was not required to pay anything for either Mr Cooks or Mr Bosos services Id at 000330
In fact Mr Shah admitted that he was not required to pay any costs associated with the litigation
commenced by the Evanses and that he and his company were defended professionally by Mr
Cook Id at 000331-000332
Mr Shahs testimony also resolved any genuine issues of fact regarding State Autos
duty to indemnify the Defendants for the claims brought by the Evanses Mr Shah admitted that
Mr Cook ultimately settled the Evanses claim based on the proceeds paid by State Auto Id at
000331 No judgment was ever entered against Mr Shah his wife or CMD Id Mr Shah
admitted that Mr Cook obtained a release of claims by the Evanses from all damage claims
including future claims related to the alleged slope failure and any of the incidents alleged in the
Evanses Civil Action No ll-C-606 Id at 00328
Mr Shah also cleared up any unresolved issues with regards to State Autos duty to
defend and indemnify the Defendants for the claims brought by the City of Charleston During
his deposition Mr Shah admitted that he was infonned of a potential problem at the back of his
property with the City of Charlestons sewer line by an engineer retained to investigate by State
Auto Daren Franck However he told Mr Franck that the sewer line was below the slip and
Mr Franck didnt need to worry about it App at 000318 Despite Mr Shahs assurances it
3
was subsequently discovered that there was ovulation to the sewer line ld While he did not
believe that ovulation constituted failure of the sewer line Mr Shah acknowledged that the
sewer line quickly became an issue after the initial slip He admitted to difficulty getting the
repairs completed because the City of Charleston insisted on repairs their way or the highway
ld at 000319
Ultimately the Charleston Sanitary Board asked Mr Shah to pay $44846 for damages to
the sewer line caused by the work CMD perfonned at the property located at Meadow Road ld
at 000334 Mr Shah admitted that it was his expectation that State Auto pay the full amount
and he admitted that State Auto ultimately paid approximately $5500000 to have the sewer line
relocated This amount included an additional $900000 for overrun costs ld at 000335
Regarding the claims asserted by the City of Charleston no judgment was ever entered against
Mr Shah his wife or CMD ld at 000332 Mr Shah admitted that Mr Cook prepared a
release of claims that absolved the Defendants of future liability related to damage to the sewer
line arising out of the construction activities at 6 Meadow Drive ld at 000326 As was the
case with the litigation involving the Evanses the Defendants were not required to pay any
money in conjunction with the settlement of the sewer line claim
Mr Shahs testimony resolved any outstanding issues regarding whether CMD asserted a
claim under its commercial liability policy CMD by its President Mr Shah was aware that
its policy was a liability policy only ld at 000317 In other words Mr Shah as President of
CMD understood that the policy did not cover repairs to property he owned By virtue of this
admission he acknowledged that the previously entered stipulation (Le CMD is not making an
indep~dent claim against State Auto seeking damages for any repairs alterations enhancements
4
maintenance restorations or replacements on the Shah or CMDs property) was correct insofar
as CMD had no claim for damages to its own property App at 00021 000317
Finally Mr Shahs testimony resolved any dispute of fact as to when he was aware of
State Autos alleged bad faith Even though Mr Shah admitted that State Auto provided legal
counsel and settled the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston Mr Shah still
believed that State Auto acted in bad faith regarding the handling of these claims Mr Shah
testified that he believed State Autos bad faith began September or October 2009 ld at
000333
Having resolved any genuine issues of fact regarding CMDs third party claims for
common law bad faith statutory bad faith and breach of contract (as well as the timeliness or
lack th~eof of the bad faith claims) State Auto moved for summary judgment on January 16
2017 App at 000291-347 The Court entertained arguments on this motion on February 8
2017 and the Court summarily denied State Autos motion at that time without explanation The
Court signed an Order prepared by CMDs counsel on March 2 2017 without any modifications
to counsels account of the facts law or conclusions ld at 00001-00010 It is from this Order
that State Auto seeks the instant Writ ofProhibition
Currently the Circuit Court has this case set for trial on May 1 2017 App at 000348
State Auto has filed contemporaneously with this Writ its Motion to Stay Proceedings in the
Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofWrit ofProhibition
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The instant issue submitted by this Writ of Prohibition is whether the Circuit Court
committed clear error in finding that CMD presented sufficient facts to survive summary
judgment The Circuit Court erred because CMD has presented no evidence to satisfy this
5
heightened standard SyI Pt2 of Williams v Precision Coil Inc 194 WVa 52459 SE2d
329 (1995)
With the standard for summary judgment in mind the Circuit Court committed clear
error in holding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for common law bad faith As
discussed below the duty to act in good faith and the contractual duties in the insurance policy
must coexist before a claim of bad faith can be maintained Since these duties must coexist
CMD must show evidence of a breach of the duty of good faith and the contractual duties See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) see also Gaddy
Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568
578 (2013) see also Highmark W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487492 655 SE2d 509 514
(2007)
The insurance contract at issue established two duties 1) the duty to defend and 2) the
duty to indemnify The Circuit Court committed clear error because CMD presented no
evidence that State Auto breached either the duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD for
the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston There is no dispute that State
Auto hired a competent attorney to represent CMDs interests This attorney successfully
negotiated a compromise of all the claims by the Evanses and the City of Charleston This
compromise included a full release from liability by both the Evanses and the City of Charleston
for all damages including future damages CMD was required to pay nothing to these parties
and nothing for the legal services it received
The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed evidence that State Auto met both
contractual duties simply expanded these duties to include obligations far beyond what was
contractually agreed upon The Circuit Court incorrectly held that failure to propose a remedy to
6
resolve the Evanses claim failure to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim
and failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by
the Evanses supported the conclusion that the contractual duties to defend and indemnify were
breached The Circuit Court has created new duties that were not contracted for and in effect
rewrote the insurance policy
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD presented evidence that it
had claims pursuant to W Va Code sect33-11-4(9) The undisputed facts show Mr Shah
agreed conceded and stipulated that the policy at issue provided no coverage for CMDs claims
and the evidence clearly establishes that CMD could never assert a loss claim under its liability
policy Moreover Mr Shah agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the Evanses and
the City ofCharleston
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error by
finding that more than one conclusion could be reached regarding the timeliness of CMDs
claims Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred
A one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law and statutory bad
faith claims SyI Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23
(2009) SyI Pt 1 Wilt v State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165506 SE2d 608 (1998) Mr
Shah admitted in his deposition that he believed State Autos actions in September and October
2009 were the beginning of the so called bad faith App at 000333 Fortunately this Court
need not rely exclusively on Mr Shahs memory to confirm this timeframe because counsel for
CMD was thorough enough to memorialize this conclusion in an October 28 2009 letter to State
7
Auto This letter advised State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos alleged failure to
promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no genuine dispute of
fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 This was the date from
which the one year statute of limitations began to run Yet CMD did not seek leave to file its
Third-Party Complaint until September 26 2011 nearly two years after the alleged bad faith
occurred and nearly one year after the statute oflimitations expired Even then CMDs motion
was not heard until January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20
2012 Thus it is clear that the statute oflimitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its
Third-Party Complaint
The Circuit Court again faced with indisputable evidence simply invented a new rule
holding that a bad faith breach of an insurance contract is a continuous tort The Circuit Court
completely dismissed this Courts holding in Noland insofar as this holding dealt with the duty to
defend In Syl Pt 5 of Noland this Court stated that in a first-party bad faith claim that is
based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002)
(Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute oflimitations begins to run
on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused
to defend him or her in an action Noland 686 SE2d 23 Thus any claims based on the
failure of the duty to defend (eg the alleged failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent
CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans) must have been filed by late October 2010
Further while it is noted that Noland dealt exclusively with the duty to defend the statute
of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty to indemnify Accordingly
the Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead ofNoland
8
in concluding that a claim ofbad faith breach of an insurance contract constitutes a continuing or
repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs claims that State Auto breached
its duty to indemnify do stem from a discrete occurrence in Oc~ober 2009 As discussed above
State Auto indemnified CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by
Mr Shahs own admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in October 2009 At that
moment the statute of limitations began to run
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify constitutes a continuous tort would cause
uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence the statute of limitations
would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer were to decline to indemnify
an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a bad faith claim at any time in the
future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be considered a continuous tort The
claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case) five years later 100 years later
etc because the statute would never run Such a result is irrational and the Circuit Court
committed clear error in its application of the statute of limitations to the facts of this specific
case
Finally the Circuit Court erred in concluding that CMD presented evidence to support its
breach of contract claims Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of
common law bad faith As discussed above there is no policy provision that CMD can point to
that State Auto in violation of its duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached
Because State Auto both defended and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation
under the COL Policy and bec~use the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to
its own property no evidence was presented of a breach of contract Accordingly permitting
this case to go forward on this claim was clear error
9
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION
Pursuant to Rule 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure oral argument
in this case is unnecessary because the principle issues in this case have been authoritatively
decided previously and the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in this brief and
the record on appeal If the Court determines that oral argument is necessary this case is
appropriate for a West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 argument and disposition by
memorandum decision
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
This Court has previously stated that [t]he writ of prohibition will issue only in clear
cases where the inferior tribunal is proceeding without or in excess ofjurisdiction SyI State
ex rei Vineyard v OBrien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) see also SyI Pt 1 Crawford
v Taylor 138 W Va 207 75 SE2d 370 (1953) (Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts
from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction or in which having jurisdiction
they are exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as a substitute for writ of error
appeal or certiorari) SyI Pt 2 State ex rei Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233
SE2d 425 (1977) (A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simply abuse of discretion
by a trial court It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such
jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers WVa Code 53-1-1)
This Court has defined the standard for issuance of a writ of prohibition where it is
claimed that the lower tribunal exceeds its legitimate powers State ex rei Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) (quoting SyI Pt 4 State ex rei
10
Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) This Court examines the following
factors
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means such as direct appeal to obtain the desired relief (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal (3) whether the lower tribunals order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4) whether the lower tribunals order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law and (5) whether the lower tribunals order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression
ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997raquo
This Court has held that [t]hese factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting
point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue Although all five
factors need not be satisfied it is clear that the third factor the existence of clear error as a
matter of law should be given substantial weight ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 Berger 483 SE2d
12)
A The Circuit Court committed clear error in rmding CMD presented evidence that State Auto violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
The Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment with respect to CMDs common
law bad faith claims because CMD presented no evidence that State Auto breached either the
duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed
evidence that State Auto met both duties simply expanded these duties to include requirements
far beyond what was contractually required
This Court has recognized that the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance
contract claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its
insured See Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009)
(quoting Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v
11
Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 WVa 34 716 SE2d 696 th 9 (2011) (quoting Noland 686
SE2d at 37) However the insurance company is not called upon to perform this duty until
some contractual duty imposed by the insurance policy has arisen Id While the contractual
duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related and both
must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id In other words claims for bad faith
and breach of an insurance contract are not separate and unique from one another and the
damages one can recover under each overlap See Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid
Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568 578 (2013) (holding that this Court
has declined to recognize an independent claim for a breach of the common law duty of good
faith and has instead held that such a claim sounds in breach of contract) see also Highmark
W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 492 655 SE2d 509 514 (2007) (holding that breaching
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action apart from
a breach ofcontract claim)
Thus to maintain a cause of action for common law bad faith a breach of the insurance
contract is a condition precedent In this case the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
establishes only two contractual obligations owed to CMD by State Auto the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify CMD has presented no evidence that either duty was breached
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Section I Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the policy states
we will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking those damages
Essentially within the context of an insurance contract the duty to defend is a covenant to
protect the insured from the expense of defending suits brought against him Sherwood
Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 3243698 A2d 1078 (1996) (quoting
12
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 409-10 347 A2d 842 851 (1975) The duty
to defend is a contractual right of control Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347 356 443 A2d 163
167 (1982) which is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment Merchants
Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 127 179 A2d 505 511 (1962) This is because the
outcome of the suit depends upon skill in investigation in negotiations for settlement and in the
conduct of the lawsuit Id
Under the terms of the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form State Auto made a
contractual promise to protect CMD from the expense of litigation and by virtue of the contract
State Auto had discretion as to how it met this duty Yet the Circuit Court redefined this duty
and essentially rewrote the insurance contract holding that
Additionally CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD throughout the claim process Such evidence includes that State Auto failed to properly investigate the claim failed to propose a remedy to resolve the Evans claim failed to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim and failed to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans This Court finds that the duty to defend and indemnify are not met merely by providing the insured with an attorney and ultimately obtaining a release ofthe insured
App at 00007 (emphasis supplied)
The Circuit Courts holding that the duty to defend [was not met by] merely by
providing the insured with an attorney oversimplifies what actually happened in this case
More importantly the Circuit Court erred because citing no authority it created a broader duty
to defend that what was contractually required The reason for the lack of authority cited is
simple there is no authority that requires State Auto to act as the Circuit Court outlined State
Auto had a contractual right of control over the defense of this claim and this is logical because
ultimately it was State Auto which was required to pay to settle the claims with the Evanses and
13
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 6: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
OUESTIONSPRESENTED
A Whether pursuant to West Virginia law the Circuit Court erred in finding that CMD Plus Inc presented evidence that State Auto breached a common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
B Whether the Circuit Court erred in finding that CMD Plus Inc presented evidence that it had a claim under the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
C Whether pursuant to West Virginia law the Circuit Court erred in concluding that a breach of the duty to defend and a breach of the duty to indemnify constitute continuous torts
D Whether the Circuit Court erred in finding that CMD Plus Inc presented evidence to support aclaim for breach ofan insurance contract
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Petition arises out of a civil action now pending in the Circuit Court of Kanawha
County West Virginia before respondent The Honorable James C Stucky styled Barry G
Evans and Ann M Evans Plaintiffs v CMD Plus Inc a West Virginia Corporation C K Shah
Chandrakant N Shah and Kimberly S Shah Defendants and CMD Plus Inc a West Virginia
Corporation Third-Party Plaintiff v State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto
Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Third Party Defendant Civil
Action No II-C-606 This Petition for Writ of Prohibition is filed pursuant to Article VIII sect3
of the West Virginia Constitution granting this Court original jurisdiction in prohibition and
West Virginia Code sect 53-1-1 This Petition for Writ of Prohibition seeks reliefftom an Order
denying State Autos Motion for Summary Judgment
I
PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES
This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD Plus Inc that
caused earth to move and damage adjacent landowners property and the City of Charlestons
sewer line This case has a long and complex procedural history having been appealed to this
Court twice already and now for a third time App at 000277-000290 Each time the issues for
this Court to consider have been unique In a Memorandum Decision filed on June 142016
this Court found that CMD Plus Incs (hereinafter sometimes referred to as CMD) could
survive a motion to dismiss under West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) [d
However upon return of this case to Circuit Court the parties conducted additional discovery
As discussed below the new evidence exposes CMDs common law bad faith claims statutory
bad faith claims and breach ofcontract claims as wanting ofany supporting evidence
After this case was returned to Circuit Court CK Shah President of CMD testified at a
deposition on September 212016 App at 000314-000335 Mr Shah cleared up any questions
of fact with regard to whether State Auto met its duty to defend CMD
In March 2009 CMD was alerted by the downslope homeowners Barry G and Ann M
Evans (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Evanses) that there was damage to the
Evanses property related to the washout and slippage from the subject property so Mr Shah
(acting on behalf of CMD) contacted CMDs insurance carrier State Auto Mr Shah denied any
negligence during the construction activities on the subject property but nevertheless the
Evanses filed suit against CMD Mr Shah and Mr Shahs wife Kimberly Shah (hereinafter
sometimes referred to collectively as the Defendants) alleging nuisance trespass and
negligence Id at 000320 Mr Shah admitted that State Auto hired Attorney Dave Cook to
defend the Defendants against the claims brought by the Evanses [d at 000322 Mr Shah
2
denied any instances where Mr Cook failed to defend the lawsuit and he agreed that Mr Cook
did his job Id at 000329 Mr Shah acknowledged that in defense of the claims against the
Defendants Mr Cook answered the Complaint that was filed by the Evanses participated in
inspections defended Mr Shah at a deposition answered discovery filed by the Plaintiffs and
handled all the pre-trial filings Id at 000323-000326 Mr Shah testified that Mr Cook retained
Greg Boso as an expert to investigate the Evanses claim Id at 000326 Mr Shah admitted that
he was not required to pay anything for either Mr Cooks or Mr Bosos services Id at 000330
In fact Mr Shah admitted that he was not required to pay any costs associated with the litigation
commenced by the Evanses and that he and his company were defended professionally by Mr
Cook Id at 000331-000332
Mr Shahs testimony also resolved any genuine issues of fact regarding State Autos
duty to indemnify the Defendants for the claims brought by the Evanses Mr Shah admitted that
Mr Cook ultimately settled the Evanses claim based on the proceeds paid by State Auto Id at
000331 No judgment was ever entered against Mr Shah his wife or CMD Id Mr Shah
admitted that Mr Cook obtained a release of claims by the Evanses from all damage claims
including future claims related to the alleged slope failure and any of the incidents alleged in the
Evanses Civil Action No ll-C-606 Id at 00328
Mr Shah also cleared up any unresolved issues with regards to State Autos duty to
defend and indemnify the Defendants for the claims brought by the City of Charleston During
his deposition Mr Shah admitted that he was infonned of a potential problem at the back of his
property with the City of Charlestons sewer line by an engineer retained to investigate by State
Auto Daren Franck However he told Mr Franck that the sewer line was below the slip and
Mr Franck didnt need to worry about it App at 000318 Despite Mr Shahs assurances it
3
was subsequently discovered that there was ovulation to the sewer line ld While he did not
believe that ovulation constituted failure of the sewer line Mr Shah acknowledged that the
sewer line quickly became an issue after the initial slip He admitted to difficulty getting the
repairs completed because the City of Charleston insisted on repairs their way or the highway
ld at 000319
Ultimately the Charleston Sanitary Board asked Mr Shah to pay $44846 for damages to
the sewer line caused by the work CMD perfonned at the property located at Meadow Road ld
at 000334 Mr Shah admitted that it was his expectation that State Auto pay the full amount
and he admitted that State Auto ultimately paid approximately $5500000 to have the sewer line
relocated This amount included an additional $900000 for overrun costs ld at 000335
Regarding the claims asserted by the City of Charleston no judgment was ever entered against
Mr Shah his wife or CMD ld at 000332 Mr Shah admitted that Mr Cook prepared a
release of claims that absolved the Defendants of future liability related to damage to the sewer
line arising out of the construction activities at 6 Meadow Drive ld at 000326 As was the
case with the litigation involving the Evanses the Defendants were not required to pay any
money in conjunction with the settlement of the sewer line claim
Mr Shahs testimony resolved any outstanding issues regarding whether CMD asserted a
claim under its commercial liability policy CMD by its President Mr Shah was aware that
its policy was a liability policy only ld at 000317 In other words Mr Shah as President of
CMD understood that the policy did not cover repairs to property he owned By virtue of this
admission he acknowledged that the previously entered stipulation (Le CMD is not making an
indep~dent claim against State Auto seeking damages for any repairs alterations enhancements
4
maintenance restorations or replacements on the Shah or CMDs property) was correct insofar
as CMD had no claim for damages to its own property App at 00021 000317
Finally Mr Shahs testimony resolved any dispute of fact as to when he was aware of
State Autos alleged bad faith Even though Mr Shah admitted that State Auto provided legal
counsel and settled the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston Mr Shah still
believed that State Auto acted in bad faith regarding the handling of these claims Mr Shah
testified that he believed State Autos bad faith began September or October 2009 ld at
000333
Having resolved any genuine issues of fact regarding CMDs third party claims for
common law bad faith statutory bad faith and breach of contract (as well as the timeliness or
lack th~eof of the bad faith claims) State Auto moved for summary judgment on January 16
2017 App at 000291-347 The Court entertained arguments on this motion on February 8
2017 and the Court summarily denied State Autos motion at that time without explanation The
Court signed an Order prepared by CMDs counsel on March 2 2017 without any modifications
to counsels account of the facts law or conclusions ld at 00001-00010 It is from this Order
that State Auto seeks the instant Writ ofProhibition
Currently the Circuit Court has this case set for trial on May 1 2017 App at 000348
State Auto has filed contemporaneously with this Writ its Motion to Stay Proceedings in the
Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofWrit ofProhibition
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The instant issue submitted by this Writ of Prohibition is whether the Circuit Court
committed clear error in finding that CMD presented sufficient facts to survive summary
judgment The Circuit Court erred because CMD has presented no evidence to satisfy this
5
heightened standard SyI Pt2 of Williams v Precision Coil Inc 194 WVa 52459 SE2d
329 (1995)
With the standard for summary judgment in mind the Circuit Court committed clear
error in holding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for common law bad faith As
discussed below the duty to act in good faith and the contractual duties in the insurance policy
must coexist before a claim of bad faith can be maintained Since these duties must coexist
CMD must show evidence of a breach of the duty of good faith and the contractual duties See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) see also Gaddy
Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568
578 (2013) see also Highmark W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487492 655 SE2d 509 514
(2007)
The insurance contract at issue established two duties 1) the duty to defend and 2) the
duty to indemnify The Circuit Court committed clear error because CMD presented no
evidence that State Auto breached either the duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD for
the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston There is no dispute that State
Auto hired a competent attorney to represent CMDs interests This attorney successfully
negotiated a compromise of all the claims by the Evanses and the City of Charleston This
compromise included a full release from liability by both the Evanses and the City of Charleston
for all damages including future damages CMD was required to pay nothing to these parties
and nothing for the legal services it received
The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed evidence that State Auto met both
contractual duties simply expanded these duties to include obligations far beyond what was
contractually agreed upon The Circuit Court incorrectly held that failure to propose a remedy to
6
resolve the Evanses claim failure to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim
and failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by
the Evanses supported the conclusion that the contractual duties to defend and indemnify were
breached The Circuit Court has created new duties that were not contracted for and in effect
rewrote the insurance policy
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD presented evidence that it
had claims pursuant to W Va Code sect33-11-4(9) The undisputed facts show Mr Shah
agreed conceded and stipulated that the policy at issue provided no coverage for CMDs claims
and the evidence clearly establishes that CMD could never assert a loss claim under its liability
policy Moreover Mr Shah agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the Evanses and
the City ofCharleston
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error by
finding that more than one conclusion could be reached regarding the timeliness of CMDs
claims Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred
A one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law and statutory bad
faith claims SyI Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23
(2009) SyI Pt 1 Wilt v State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165506 SE2d 608 (1998) Mr
Shah admitted in his deposition that he believed State Autos actions in September and October
2009 were the beginning of the so called bad faith App at 000333 Fortunately this Court
need not rely exclusively on Mr Shahs memory to confirm this timeframe because counsel for
CMD was thorough enough to memorialize this conclusion in an October 28 2009 letter to State
7
Auto This letter advised State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos alleged failure to
promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no genuine dispute of
fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 This was the date from
which the one year statute of limitations began to run Yet CMD did not seek leave to file its
Third-Party Complaint until September 26 2011 nearly two years after the alleged bad faith
occurred and nearly one year after the statute oflimitations expired Even then CMDs motion
was not heard until January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20
2012 Thus it is clear that the statute oflimitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its
Third-Party Complaint
The Circuit Court again faced with indisputable evidence simply invented a new rule
holding that a bad faith breach of an insurance contract is a continuous tort The Circuit Court
completely dismissed this Courts holding in Noland insofar as this holding dealt with the duty to
defend In Syl Pt 5 of Noland this Court stated that in a first-party bad faith claim that is
based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002)
(Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute oflimitations begins to run
on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused
to defend him or her in an action Noland 686 SE2d 23 Thus any claims based on the
failure of the duty to defend (eg the alleged failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent
CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans) must have been filed by late October 2010
Further while it is noted that Noland dealt exclusively with the duty to defend the statute
of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty to indemnify Accordingly
the Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead ofNoland
8
in concluding that a claim ofbad faith breach of an insurance contract constitutes a continuing or
repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs claims that State Auto breached
its duty to indemnify do stem from a discrete occurrence in Oc~ober 2009 As discussed above
State Auto indemnified CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by
Mr Shahs own admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in October 2009 At that
moment the statute of limitations began to run
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify constitutes a continuous tort would cause
uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence the statute of limitations
would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer were to decline to indemnify
an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a bad faith claim at any time in the
future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be considered a continuous tort The
claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case) five years later 100 years later
etc because the statute would never run Such a result is irrational and the Circuit Court
committed clear error in its application of the statute of limitations to the facts of this specific
case
Finally the Circuit Court erred in concluding that CMD presented evidence to support its
breach of contract claims Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of
common law bad faith As discussed above there is no policy provision that CMD can point to
that State Auto in violation of its duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached
Because State Auto both defended and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation
under the COL Policy and bec~use the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to
its own property no evidence was presented of a breach of contract Accordingly permitting
this case to go forward on this claim was clear error
9
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION
Pursuant to Rule 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure oral argument
in this case is unnecessary because the principle issues in this case have been authoritatively
decided previously and the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in this brief and
the record on appeal If the Court determines that oral argument is necessary this case is
appropriate for a West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 argument and disposition by
memorandum decision
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
This Court has previously stated that [t]he writ of prohibition will issue only in clear
cases where the inferior tribunal is proceeding without or in excess ofjurisdiction SyI State
ex rei Vineyard v OBrien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) see also SyI Pt 1 Crawford
v Taylor 138 W Va 207 75 SE2d 370 (1953) (Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts
from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction or in which having jurisdiction
they are exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as a substitute for writ of error
appeal or certiorari) SyI Pt 2 State ex rei Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233
SE2d 425 (1977) (A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simply abuse of discretion
by a trial court It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such
jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers WVa Code 53-1-1)
This Court has defined the standard for issuance of a writ of prohibition where it is
claimed that the lower tribunal exceeds its legitimate powers State ex rei Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) (quoting SyI Pt 4 State ex rei
10
Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) This Court examines the following
factors
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means such as direct appeal to obtain the desired relief (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal (3) whether the lower tribunals order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4) whether the lower tribunals order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law and (5) whether the lower tribunals order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression
ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997raquo
This Court has held that [t]hese factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting
point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue Although all five
factors need not be satisfied it is clear that the third factor the existence of clear error as a
matter of law should be given substantial weight ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 Berger 483 SE2d
12)
A The Circuit Court committed clear error in rmding CMD presented evidence that State Auto violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
The Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment with respect to CMDs common
law bad faith claims because CMD presented no evidence that State Auto breached either the
duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed
evidence that State Auto met both duties simply expanded these duties to include requirements
far beyond what was contractually required
This Court has recognized that the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance
contract claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its
insured See Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009)
(quoting Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v
11
Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 WVa 34 716 SE2d 696 th 9 (2011) (quoting Noland 686
SE2d at 37) However the insurance company is not called upon to perform this duty until
some contractual duty imposed by the insurance policy has arisen Id While the contractual
duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related and both
must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id In other words claims for bad faith
and breach of an insurance contract are not separate and unique from one another and the
damages one can recover under each overlap See Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid
Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568 578 (2013) (holding that this Court
has declined to recognize an independent claim for a breach of the common law duty of good
faith and has instead held that such a claim sounds in breach of contract) see also Highmark
W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 492 655 SE2d 509 514 (2007) (holding that breaching
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action apart from
a breach ofcontract claim)
Thus to maintain a cause of action for common law bad faith a breach of the insurance
contract is a condition precedent In this case the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
establishes only two contractual obligations owed to CMD by State Auto the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify CMD has presented no evidence that either duty was breached
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Section I Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the policy states
we will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking those damages
Essentially within the context of an insurance contract the duty to defend is a covenant to
protect the insured from the expense of defending suits brought against him Sherwood
Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 3243698 A2d 1078 (1996) (quoting
12
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 409-10 347 A2d 842 851 (1975) The duty
to defend is a contractual right of control Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347 356 443 A2d 163
167 (1982) which is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment Merchants
Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 127 179 A2d 505 511 (1962) This is because the
outcome of the suit depends upon skill in investigation in negotiations for settlement and in the
conduct of the lawsuit Id
Under the terms of the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form State Auto made a
contractual promise to protect CMD from the expense of litigation and by virtue of the contract
State Auto had discretion as to how it met this duty Yet the Circuit Court redefined this duty
and essentially rewrote the insurance contract holding that
Additionally CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD throughout the claim process Such evidence includes that State Auto failed to properly investigate the claim failed to propose a remedy to resolve the Evans claim failed to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim and failed to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans This Court finds that the duty to defend and indemnify are not met merely by providing the insured with an attorney and ultimately obtaining a release ofthe insured
App at 00007 (emphasis supplied)
The Circuit Courts holding that the duty to defend [was not met by] merely by
providing the insured with an attorney oversimplifies what actually happened in this case
More importantly the Circuit Court erred because citing no authority it created a broader duty
to defend that what was contractually required The reason for the lack of authority cited is
simple there is no authority that requires State Auto to act as the Circuit Court outlined State
Auto had a contractual right of control over the defense of this claim and this is logical because
ultimately it was State Auto which was required to pay to settle the claims with the Evanses and
13
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 7: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES
This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD Plus Inc that
caused earth to move and damage adjacent landowners property and the City of Charlestons
sewer line This case has a long and complex procedural history having been appealed to this
Court twice already and now for a third time App at 000277-000290 Each time the issues for
this Court to consider have been unique In a Memorandum Decision filed on June 142016
this Court found that CMD Plus Incs (hereinafter sometimes referred to as CMD) could
survive a motion to dismiss under West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) [d
However upon return of this case to Circuit Court the parties conducted additional discovery
As discussed below the new evidence exposes CMDs common law bad faith claims statutory
bad faith claims and breach ofcontract claims as wanting ofany supporting evidence
After this case was returned to Circuit Court CK Shah President of CMD testified at a
deposition on September 212016 App at 000314-000335 Mr Shah cleared up any questions
of fact with regard to whether State Auto met its duty to defend CMD
In March 2009 CMD was alerted by the downslope homeowners Barry G and Ann M
Evans (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Evanses) that there was damage to the
Evanses property related to the washout and slippage from the subject property so Mr Shah
(acting on behalf of CMD) contacted CMDs insurance carrier State Auto Mr Shah denied any
negligence during the construction activities on the subject property but nevertheless the
Evanses filed suit against CMD Mr Shah and Mr Shahs wife Kimberly Shah (hereinafter
sometimes referred to collectively as the Defendants) alleging nuisance trespass and
negligence Id at 000320 Mr Shah admitted that State Auto hired Attorney Dave Cook to
defend the Defendants against the claims brought by the Evanses [d at 000322 Mr Shah
2
denied any instances where Mr Cook failed to defend the lawsuit and he agreed that Mr Cook
did his job Id at 000329 Mr Shah acknowledged that in defense of the claims against the
Defendants Mr Cook answered the Complaint that was filed by the Evanses participated in
inspections defended Mr Shah at a deposition answered discovery filed by the Plaintiffs and
handled all the pre-trial filings Id at 000323-000326 Mr Shah testified that Mr Cook retained
Greg Boso as an expert to investigate the Evanses claim Id at 000326 Mr Shah admitted that
he was not required to pay anything for either Mr Cooks or Mr Bosos services Id at 000330
In fact Mr Shah admitted that he was not required to pay any costs associated with the litigation
commenced by the Evanses and that he and his company were defended professionally by Mr
Cook Id at 000331-000332
Mr Shahs testimony also resolved any genuine issues of fact regarding State Autos
duty to indemnify the Defendants for the claims brought by the Evanses Mr Shah admitted that
Mr Cook ultimately settled the Evanses claim based on the proceeds paid by State Auto Id at
000331 No judgment was ever entered against Mr Shah his wife or CMD Id Mr Shah
admitted that Mr Cook obtained a release of claims by the Evanses from all damage claims
including future claims related to the alleged slope failure and any of the incidents alleged in the
Evanses Civil Action No ll-C-606 Id at 00328
Mr Shah also cleared up any unresolved issues with regards to State Autos duty to
defend and indemnify the Defendants for the claims brought by the City of Charleston During
his deposition Mr Shah admitted that he was infonned of a potential problem at the back of his
property with the City of Charlestons sewer line by an engineer retained to investigate by State
Auto Daren Franck However he told Mr Franck that the sewer line was below the slip and
Mr Franck didnt need to worry about it App at 000318 Despite Mr Shahs assurances it
3
was subsequently discovered that there was ovulation to the sewer line ld While he did not
believe that ovulation constituted failure of the sewer line Mr Shah acknowledged that the
sewer line quickly became an issue after the initial slip He admitted to difficulty getting the
repairs completed because the City of Charleston insisted on repairs their way or the highway
ld at 000319
Ultimately the Charleston Sanitary Board asked Mr Shah to pay $44846 for damages to
the sewer line caused by the work CMD perfonned at the property located at Meadow Road ld
at 000334 Mr Shah admitted that it was his expectation that State Auto pay the full amount
and he admitted that State Auto ultimately paid approximately $5500000 to have the sewer line
relocated This amount included an additional $900000 for overrun costs ld at 000335
Regarding the claims asserted by the City of Charleston no judgment was ever entered against
Mr Shah his wife or CMD ld at 000332 Mr Shah admitted that Mr Cook prepared a
release of claims that absolved the Defendants of future liability related to damage to the sewer
line arising out of the construction activities at 6 Meadow Drive ld at 000326 As was the
case with the litigation involving the Evanses the Defendants were not required to pay any
money in conjunction with the settlement of the sewer line claim
Mr Shahs testimony resolved any outstanding issues regarding whether CMD asserted a
claim under its commercial liability policy CMD by its President Mr Shah was aware that
its policy was a liability policy only ld at 000317 In other words Mr Shah as President of
CMD understood that the policy did not cover repairs to property he owned By virtue of this
admission he acknowledged that the previously entered stipulation (Le CMD is not making an
indep~dent claim against State Auto seeking damages for any repairs alterations enhancements
4
maintenance restorations or replacements on the Shah or CMDs property) was correct insofar
as CMD had no claim for damages to its own property App at 00021 000317
Finally Mr Shahs testimony resolved any dispute of fact as to when he was aware of
State Autos alleged bad faith Even though Mr Shah admitted that State Auto provided legal
counsel and settled the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston Mr Shah still
believed that State Auto acted in bad faith regarding the handling of these claims Mr Shah
testified that he believed State Autos bad faith began September or October 2009 ld at
000333
Having resolved any genuine issues of fact regarding CMDs third party claims for
common law bad faith statutory bad faith and breach of contract (as well as the timeliness or
lack th~eof of the bad faith claims) State Auto moved for summary judgment on January 16
2017 App at 000291-347 The Court entertained arguments on this motion on February 8
2017 and the Court summarily denied State Autos motion at that time without explanation The
Court signed an Order prepared by CMDs counsel on March 2 2017 without any modifications
to counsels account of the facts law or conclusions ld at 00001-00010 It is from this Order
that State Auto seeks the instant Writ ofProhibition
Currently the Circuit Court has this case set for trial on May 1 2017 App at 000348
State Auto has filed contemporaneously with this Writ its Motion to Stay Proceedings in the
Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofWrit ofProhibition
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The instant issue submitted by this Writ of Prohibition is whether the Circuit Court
committed clear error in finding that CMD presented sufficient facts to survive summary
judgment The Circuit Court erred because CMD has presented no evidence to satisfy this
5
heightened standard SyI Pt2 of Williams v Precision Coil Inc 194 WVa 52459 SE2d
329 (1995)
With the standard for summary judgment in mind the Circuit Court committed clear
error in holding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for common law bad faith As
discussed below the duty to act in good faith and the contractual duties in the insurance policy
must coexist before a claim of bad faith can be maintained Since these duties must coexist
CMD must show evidence of a breach of the duty of good faith and the contractual duties See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) see also Gaddy
Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568
578 (2013) see also Highmark W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487492 655 SE2d 509 514
(2007)
The insurance contract at issue established two duties 1) the duty to defend and 2) the
duty to indemnify The Circuit Court committed clear error because CMD presented no
evidence that State Auto breached either the duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD for
the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston There is no dispute that State
Auto hired a competent attorney to represent CMDs interests This attorney successfully
negotiated a compromise of all the claims by the Evanses and the City of Charleston This
compromise included a full release from liability by both the Evanses and the City of Charleston
for all damages including future damages CMD was required to pay nothing to these parties
and nothing for the legal services it received
The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed evidence that State Auto met both
contractual duties simply expanded these duties to include obligations far beyond what was
contractually agreed upon The Circuit Court incorrectly held that failure to propose a remedy to
6
resolve the Evanses claim failure to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim
and failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by
the Evanses supported the conclusion that the contractual duties to defend and indemnify were
breached The Circuit Court has created new duties that were not contracted for and in effect
rewrote the insurance policy
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD presented evidence that it
had claims pursuant to W Va Code sect33-11-4(9) The undisputed facts show Mr Shah
agreed conceded and stipulated that the policy at issue provided no coverage for CMDs claims
and the evidence clearly establishes that CMD could never assert a loss claim under its liability
policy Moreover Mr Shah agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the Evanses and
the City ofCharleston
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error by
finding that more than one conclusion could be reached regarding the timeliness of CMDs
claims Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred
A one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law and statutory bad
faith claims SyI Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23
(2009) SyI Pt 1 Wilt v State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165506 SE2d 608 (1998) Mr
Shah admitted in his deposition that he believed State Autos actions in September and October
2009 were the beginning of the so called bad faith App at 000333 Fortunately this Court
need not rely exclusively on Mr Shahs memory to confirm this timeframe because counsel for
CMD was thorough enough to memorialize this conclusion in an October 28 2009 letter to State
7
Auto This letter advised State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos alleged failure to
promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no genuine dispute of
fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 This was the date from
which the one year statute of limitations began to run Yet CMD did not seek leave to file its
Third-Party Complaint until September 26 2011 nearly two years after the alleged bad faith
occurred and nearly one year after the statute oflimitations expired Even then CMDs motion
was not heard until January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20
2012 Thus it is clear that the statute oflimitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its
Third-Party Complaint
The Circuit Court again faced with indisputable evidence simply invented a new rule
holding that a bad faith breach of an insurance contract is a continuous tort The Circuit Court
completely dismissed this Courts holding in Noland insofar as this holding dealt with the duty to
defend In Syl Pt 5 of Noland this Court stated that in a first-party bad faith claim that is
based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002)
(Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute oflimitations begins to run
on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused
to defend him or her in an action Noland 686 SE2d 23 Thus any claims based on the
failure of the duty to defend (eg the alleged failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent
CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans) must have been filed by late October 2010
Further while it is noted that Noland dealt exclusively with the duty to defend the statute
of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty to indemnify Accordingly
the Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead ofNoland
8
in concluding that a claim ofbad faith breach of an insurance contract constitutes a continuing or
repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs claims that State Auto breached
its duty to indemnify do stem from a discrete occurrence in Oc~ober 2009 As discussed above
State Auto indemnified CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by
Mr Shahs own admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in October 2009 At that
moment the statute of limitations began to run
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify constitutes a continuous tort would cause
uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence the statute of limitations
would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer were to decline to indemnify
an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a bad faith claim at any time in the
future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be considered a continuous tort The
claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case) five years later 100 years later
etc because the statute would never run Such a result is irrational and the Circuit Court
committed clear error in its application of the statute of limitations to the facts of this specific
case
Finally the Circuit Court erred in concluding that CMD presented evidence to support its
breach of contract claims Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of
common law bad faith As discussed above there is no policy provision that CMD can point to
that State Auto in violation of its duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached
Because State Auto both defended and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation
under the COL Policy and bec~use the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to
its own property no evidence was presented of a breach of contract Accordingly permitting
this case to go forward on this claim was clear error
9
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION
Pursuant to Rule 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure oral argument
in this case is unnecessary because the principle issues in this case have been authoritatively
decided previously and the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in this brief and
the record on appeal If the Court determines that oral argument is necessary this case is
appropriate for a West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 argument and disposition by
memorandum decision
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
This Court has previously stated that [t]he writ of prohibition will issue only in clear
cases where the inferior tribunal is proceeding without or in excess ofjurisdiction SyI State
ex rei Vineyard v OBrien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) see also SyI Pt 1 Crawford
v Taylor 138 W Va 207 75 SE2d 370 (1953) (Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts
from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction or in which having jurisdiction
they are exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as a substitute for writ of error
appeal or certiorari) SyI Pt 2 State ex rei Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233
SE2d 425 (1977) (A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simply abuse of discretion
by a trial court It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such
jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers WVa Code 53-1-1)
This Court has defined the standard for issuance of a writ of prohibition where it is
claimed that the lower tribunal exceeds its legitimate powers State ex rei Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) (quoting SyI Pt 4 State ex rei
10
Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) This Court examines the following
factors
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means such as direct appeal to obtain the desired relief (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal (3) whether the lower tribunals order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4) whether the lower tribunals order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law and (5) whether the lower tribunals order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression
ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997raquo
This Court has held that [t]hese factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting
point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue Although all five
factors need not be satisfied it is clear that the third factor the existence of clear error as a
matter of law should be given substantial weight ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 Berger 483 SE2d
12)
A The Circuit Court committed clear error in rmding CMD presented evidence that State Auto violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
The Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment with respect to CMDs common
law bad faith claims because CMD presented no evidence that State Auto breached either the
duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed
evidence that State Auto met both duties simply expanded these duties to include requirements
far beyond what was contractually required
This Court has recognized that the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance
contract claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its
insured See Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009)
(quoting Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v
11
Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 WVa 34 716 SE2d 696 th 9 (2011) (quoting Noland 686
SE2d at 37) However the insurance company is not called upon to perform this duty until
some contractual duty imposed by the insurance policy has arisen Id While the contractual
duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related and both
must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id In other words claims for bad faith
and breach of an insurance contract are not separate and unique from one another and the
damages one can recover under each overlap See Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid
Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568 578 (2013) (holding that this Court
has declined to recognize an independent claim for a breach of the common law duty of good
faith and has instead held that such a claim sounds in breach of contract) see also Highmark
W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 492 655 SE2d 509 514 (2007) (holding that breaching
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action apart from
a breach ofcontract claim)
Thus to maintain a cause of action for common law bad faith a breach of the insurance
contract is a condition precedent In this case the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
establishes only two contractual obligations owed to CMD by State Auto the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify CMD has presented no evidence that either duty was breached
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Section I Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the policy states
we will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking those damages
Essentially within the context of an insurance contract the duty to defend is a covenant to
protect the insured from the expense of defending suits brought against him Sherwood
Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 3243698 A2d 1078 (1996) (quoting
12
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 409-10 347 A2d 842 851 (1975) The duty
to defend is a contractual right of control Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347 356 443 A2d 163
167 (1982) which is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment Merchants
Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 127 179 A2d 505 511 (1962) This is because the
outcome of the suit depends upon skill in investigation in negotiations for settlement and in the
conduct of the lawsuit Id
Under the terms of the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form State Auto made a
contractual promise to protect CMD from the expense of litigation and by virtue of the contract
State Auto had discretion as to how it met this duty Yet the Circuit Court redefined this duty
and essentially rewrote the insurance contract holding that
Additionally CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD throughout the claim process Such evidence includes that State Auto failed to properly investigate the claim failed to propose a remedy to resolve the Evans claim failed to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim and failed to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans This Court finds that the duty to defend and indemnify are not met merely by providing the insured with an attorney and ultimately obtaining a release ofthe insured
App at 00007 (emphasis supplied)
The Circuit Courts holding that the duty to defend [was not met by] merely by
providing the insured with an attorney oversimplifies what actually happened in this case
More importantly the Circuit Court erred because citing no authority it created a broader duty
to defend that what was contractually required The reason for the lack of authority cited is
simple there is no authority that requires State Auto to act as the Circuit Court outlined State
Auto had a contractual right of control over the defense of this claim and this is logical because
ultimately it was State Auto which was required to pay to settle the claims with the Evanses and
13
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 8: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
denied any instances where Mr Cook failed to defend the lawsuit and he agreed that Mr Cook
did his job Id at 000329 Mr Shah acknowledged that in defense of the claims against the
Defendants Mr Cook answered the Complaint that was filed by the Evanses participated in
inspections defended Mr Shah at a deposition answered discovery filed by the Plaintiffs and
handled all the pre-trial filings Id at 000323-000326 Mr Shah testified that Mr Cook retained
Greg Boso as an expert to investigate the Evanses claim Id at 000326 Mr Shah admitted that
he was not required to pay anything for either Mr Cooks or Mr Bosos services Id at 000330
In fact Mr Shah admitted that he was not required to pay any costs associated with the litigation
commenced by the Evanses and that he and his company were defended professionally by Mr
Cook Id at 000331-000332
Mr Shahs testimony also resolved any genuine issues of fact regarding State Autos
duty to indemnify the Defendants for the claims brought by the Evanses Mr Shah admitted that
Mr Cook ultimately settled the Evanses claim based on the proceeds paid by State Auto Id at
000331 No judgment was ever entered against Mr Shah his wife or CMD Id Mr Shah
admitted that Mr Cook obtained a release of claims by the Evanses from all damage claims
including future claims related to the alleged slope failure and any of the incidents alleged in the
Evanses Civil Action No ll-C-606 Id at 00328
Mr Shah also cleared up any unresolved issues with regards to State Autos duty to
defend and indemnify the Defendants for the claims brought by the City of Charleston During
his deposition Mr Shah admitted that he was infonned of a potential problem at the back of his
property with the City of Charlestons sewer line by an engineer retained to investigate by State
Auto Daren Franck However he told Mr Franck that the sewer line was below the slip and
Mr Franck didnt need to worry about it App at 000318 Despite Mr Shahs assurances it
3
was subsequently discovered that there was ovulation to the sewer line ld While he did not
believe that ovulation constituted failure of the sewer line Mr Shah acknowledged that the
sewer line quickly became an issue after the initial slip He admitted to difficulty getting the
repairs completed because the City of Charleston insisted on repairs their way or the highway
ld at 000319
Ultimately the Charleston Sanitary Board asked Mr Shah to pay $44846 for damages to
the sewer line caused by the work CMD perfonned at the property located at Meadow Road ld
at 000334 Mr Shah admitted that it was his expectation that State Auto pay the full amount
and he admitted that State Auto ultimately paid approximately $5500000 to have the sewer line
relocated This amount included an additional $900000 for overrun costs ld at 000335
Regarding the claims asserted by the City of Charleston no judgment was ever entered against
Mr Shah his wife or CMD ld at 000332 Mr Shah admitted that Mr Cook prepared a
release of claims that absolved the Defendants of future liability related to damage to the sewer
line arising out of the construction activities at 6 Meadow Drive ld at 000326 As was the
case with the litigation involving the Evanses the Defendants were not required to pay any
money in conjunction with the settlement of the sewer line claim
Mr Shahs testimony resolved any outstanding issues regarding whether CMD asserted a
claim under its commercial liability policy CMD by its President Mr Shah was aware that
its policy was a liability policy only ld at 000317 In other words Mr Shah as President of
CMD understood that the policy did not cover repairs to property he owned By virtue of this
admission he acknowledged that the previously entered stipulation (Le CMD is not making an
indep~dent claim against State Auto seeking damages for any repairs alterations enhancements
4
maintenance restorations or replacements on the Shah or CMDs property) was correct insofar
as CMD had no claim for damages to its own property App at 00021 000317
Finally Mr Shahs testimony resolved any dispute of fact as to when he was aware of
State Autos alleged bad faith Even though Mr Shah admitted that State Auto provided legal
counsel and settled the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston Mr Shah still
believed that State Auto acted in bad faith regarding the handling of these claims Mr Shah
testified that he believed State Autos bad faith began September or October 2009 ld at
000333
Having resolved any genuine issues of fact regarding CMDs third party claims for
common law bad faith statutory bad faith and breach of contract (as well as the timeliness or
lack th~eof of the bad faith claims) State Auto moved for summary judgment on January 16
2017 App at 000291-347 The Court entertained arguments on this motion on February 8
2017 and the Court summarily denied State Autos motion at that time without explanation The
Court signed an Order prepared by CMDs counsel on March 2 2017 without any modifications
to counsels account of the facts law or conclusions ld at 00001-00010 It is from this Order
that State Auto seeks the instant Writ ofProhibition
Currently the Circuit Court has this case set for trial on May 1 2017 App at 000348
State Auto has filed contemporaneously with this Writ its Motion to Stay Proceedings in the
Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofWrit ofProhibition
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The instant issue submitted by this Writ of Prohibition is whether the Circuit Court
committed clear error in finding that CMD presented sufficient facts to survive summary
judgment The Circuit Court erred because CMD has presented no evidence to satisfy this
5
heightened standard SyI Pt2 of Williams v Precision Coil Inc 194 WVa 52459 SE2d
329 (1995)
With the standard for summary judgment in mind the Circuit Court committed clear
error in holding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for common law bad faith As
discussed below the duty to act in good faith and the contractual duties in the insurance policy
must coexist before a claim of bad faith can be maintained Since these duties must coexist
CMD must show evidence of a breach of the duty of good faith and the contractual duties See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) see also Gaddy
Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568
578 (2013) see also Highmark W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487492 655 SE2d 509 514
(2007)
The insurance contract at issue established two duties 1) the duty to defend and 2) the
duty to indemnify The Circuit Court committed clear error because CMD presented no
evidence that State Auto breached either the duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD for
the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston There is no dispute that State
Auto hired a competent attorney to represent CMDs interests This attorney successfully
negotiated a compromise of all the claims by the Evanses and the City of Charleston This
compromise included a full release from liability by both the Evanses and the City of Charleston
for all damages including future damages CMD was required to pay nothing to these parties
and nothing for the legal services it received
The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed evidence that State Auto met both
contractual duties simply expanded these duties to include obligations far beyond what was
contractually agreed upon The Circuit Court incorrectly held that failure to propose a remedy to
6
resolve the Evanses claim failure to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim
and failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by
the Evanses supported the conclusion that the contractual duties to defend and indemnify were
breached The Circuit Court has created new duties that were not contracted for and in effect
rewrote the insurance policy
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD presented evidence that it
had claims pursuant to W Va Code sect33-11-4(9) The undisputed facts show Mr Shah
agreed conceded and stipulated that the policy at issue provided no coverage for CMDs claims
and the evidence clearly establishes that CMD could never assert a loss claim under its liability
policy Moreover Mr Shah agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the Evanses and
the City ofCharleston
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error by
finding that more than one conclusion could be reached regarding the timeliness of CMDs
claims Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred
A one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law and statutory bad
faith claims SyI Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23
(2009) SyI Pt 1 Wilt v State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165506 SE2d 608 (1998) Mr
Shah admitted in his deposition that he believed State Autos actions in September and October
2009 were the beginning of the so called bad faith App at 000333 Fortunately this Court
need not rely exclusively on Mr Shahs memory to confirm this timeframe because counsel for
CMD was thorough enough to memorialize this conclusion in an October 28 2009 letter to State
7
Auto This letter advised State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos alleged failure to
promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no genuine dispute of
fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 This was the date from
which the one year statute of limitations began to run Yet CMD did not seek leave to file its
Third-Party Complaint until September 26 2011 nearly two years after the alleged bad faith
occurred and nearly one year after the statute oflimitations expired Even then CMDs motion
was not heard until January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20
2012 Thus it is clear that the statute oflimitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its
Third-Party Complaint
The Circuit Court again faced with indisputable evidence simply invented a new rule
holding that a bad faith breach of an insurance contract is a continuous tort The Circuit Court
completely dismissed this Courts holding in Noland insofar as this holding dealt with the duty to
defend In Syl Pt 5 of Noland this Court stated that in a first-party bad faith claim that is
based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002)
(Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute oflimitations begins to run
on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused
to defend him or her in an action Noland 686 SE2d 23 Thus any claims based on the
failure of the duty to defend (eg the alleged failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent
CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans) must have been filed by late October 2010
Further while it is noted that Noland dealt exclusively with the duty to defend the statute
of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty to indemnify Accordingly
the Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead ofNoland
8
in concluding that a claim ofbad faith breach of an insurance contract constitutes a continuing or
repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs claims that State Auto breached
its duty to indemnify do stem from a discrete occurrence in Oc~ober 2009 As discussed above
State Auto indemnified CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by
Mr Shahs own admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in October 2009 At that
moment the statute of limitations began to run
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify constitutes a continuous tort would cause
uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence the statute of limitations
would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer were to decline to indemnify
an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a bad faith claim at any time in the
future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be considered a continuous tort The
claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case) five years later 100 years later
etc because the statute would never run Such a result is irrational and the Circuit Court
committed clear error in its application of the statute of limitations to the facts of this specific
case
Finally the Circuit Court erred in concluding that CMD presented evidence to support its
breach of contract claims Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of
common law bad faith As discussed above there is no policy provision that CMD can point to
that State Auto in violation of its duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached
Because State Auto both defended and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation
under the COL Policy and bec~use the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to
its own property no evidence was presented of a breach of contract Accordingly permitting
this case to go forward on this claim was clear error
9
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION
Pursuant to Rule 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure oral argument
in this case is unnecessary because the principle issues in this case have been authoritatively
decided previously and the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in this brief and
the record on appeal If the Court determines that oral argument is necessary this case is
appropriate for a West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 argument and disposition by
memorandum decision
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
This Court has previously stated that [t]he writ of prohibition will issue only in clear
cases where the inferior tribunal is proceeding without or in excess ofjurisdiction SyI State
ex rei Vineyard v OBrien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) see also SyI Pt 1 Crawford
v Taylor 138 W Va 207 75 SE2d 370 (1953) (Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts
from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction or in which having jurisdiction
they are exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as a substitute for writ of error
appeal or certiorari) SyI Pt 2 State ex rei Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233
SE2d 425 (1977) (A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simply abuse of discretion
by a trial court It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such
jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers WVa Code 53-1-1)
This Court has defined the standard for issuance of a writ of prohibition where it is
claimed that the lower tribunal exceeds its legitimate powers State ex rei Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) (quoting SyI Pt 4 State ex rei
10
Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) This Court examines the following
factors
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means such as direct appeal to obtain the desired relief (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal (3) whether the lower tribunals order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4) whether the lower tribunals order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law and (5) whether the lower tribunals order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression
ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997raquo
This Court has held that [t]hese factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting
point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue Although all five
factors need not be satisfied it is clear that the third factor the existence of clear error as a
matter of law should be given substantial weight ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 Berger 483 SE2d
12)
A The Circuit Court committed clear error in rmding CMD presented evidence that State Auto violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
The Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment with respect to CMDs common
law bad faith claims because CMD presented no evidence that State Auto breached either the
duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed
evidence that State Auto met both duties simply expanded these duties to include requirements
far beyond what was contractually required
This Court has recognized that the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance
contract claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its
insured See Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009)
(quoting Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v
11
Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 WVa 34 716 SE2d 696 th 9 (2011) (quoting Noland 686
SE2d at 37) However the insurance company is not called upon to perform this duty until
some contractual duty imposed by the insurance policy has arisen Id While the contractual
duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related and both
must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id In other words claims for bad faith
and breach of an insurance contract are not separate and unique from one another and the
damages one can recover under each overlap See Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid
Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568 578 (2013) (holding that this Court
has declined to recognize an independent claim for a breach of the common law duty of good
faith and has instead held that such a claim sounds in breach of contract) see also Highmark
W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 492 655 SE2d 509 514 (2007) (holding that breaching
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action apart from
a breach ofcontract claim)
Thus to maintain a cause of action for common law bad faith a breach of the insurance
contract is a condition precedent In this case the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
establishes only two contractual obligations owed to CMD by State Auto the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify CMD has presented no evidence that either duty was breached
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Section I Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the policy states
we will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking those damages
Essentially within the context of an insurance contract the duty to defend is a covenant to
protect the insured from the expense of defending suits brought against him Sherwood
Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 3243698 A2d 1078 (1996) (quoting
12
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 409-10 347 A2d 842 851 (1975) The duty
to defend is a contractual right of control Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347 356 443 A2d 163
167 (1982) which is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment Merchants
Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 127 179 A2d 505 511 (1962) This is because the
outcome of the suit depends upon skill in investigation in negotiations for settlement and in the
conduct of the lawsuit Id
Under the terms of the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form State Auto made a
contractual promise to protect CMD from the expense of litigation and by virtue of the contract
State Auto had discretion as to how it met this duty Yet the Circuit Court redefined this duty
and essentially rewrote the insurance contract holding that
Additionally CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD throughout the claim process Such evidence includes that State Auto failed to properly investigate the claim failed to propose a remedy to resolve the Evans claim failed to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim and failed to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans This Court finds that the duty to defend and indemnify are not met merely by providing the insured with an attorney and ultimately obtaining a release ofthe insured
App at 00007 (emphasis supplied)
The Circuit Courts holding that the duty to defend [was not met by] merely by
providing the insured with an attorney oversimplifies what actually happened in this case
More importantly the Circuit Court erred because citing no authority it created a broader duty
to defend that what was contractually required The reason for the lack of authority cited is
simple there is no authority that requires State Auto to act as the Circuit Court outlined State
Auto had a contractual right of control over the defense of this claim and this is logical because
ultimately it was State Auto which was required to pay to settle the claims with the Evanses and
13
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 9: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
was subsequently discovered that there was ovulation to the sewer line ld While he did not
believe that ovulation constituted failure of the sewer line Mr Shah acknowledged that the
sewer line quickly became an issue after the initial slip He admitted to difficulty getting the
repairs completed because the City of Charleston insisted on repairs their way or the highway
ld at 000319
Ultimately the Charleston Sanitary Board asked Mr Shah to pay $44846 for damages to
the sewer line caused by the work CMD perfonned at the property located at Meadow Road ld
at 000334 Mr Shah admitted that it was his expectation that State Auto pay the full amount
and he admitted that State Auto ultimately paid approximately $5500000 to have the sewer line
relocated This amount included an additional $900000 for overrun costs ld at 000335
Regarding the claims asserted by the City of Charleston no judgment was ever entered against
Mr Shah his wife or CMD ld at 000332 Mr Shah admitted that Mr Cook prepared a
release of claims that absolved the Defendants of future liability related to damage to the sewer
line arising out of the construction activities at 6 Meadow Drive ld at 000326 As was the
case with the litigation involving the Evanses the Defendants were not required to pay any
money in conjunction with the settlement of the sewer line claim
Mr Shahs testimony resolved any outstanding issues regarding whether CMD asserted a
claim under its commercial liability policy CMD by its President Mr Shah was aware that
its policy was a liability policy only ld at 000317 In other words Mr Shah as President of
CMD understood that the policy did not cover repairs to property he owned By virtue of this
admission he acknowledged that the previously entered stipulation (Le CMD is not making an
indep~dent claim against State Auto seeking damages for any repairs alterations enhancements
4
maintenance restorations or replacements on the Shah or CMDs property) was correct insofar
as CMD had no claim for damages to its own property App at 00021 000317
Finally Mr Shahs testimony resolved any dispute of fact as to when he was aware of
State Autos alleged bad faith Even though Mr Shah admitted that State Auto provided legal
counsel and settled the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston Mr Shah still
believed that State Auto acted in bad faith regarding the handling of these claims Mr Shah
testified that he believed State Autos bad faith began September or October 2009 ld at
000333
Having resolved any genuine issues of fact regarding CMDs third party claims for
common law bad faith statutory bad faith and breach of contract (as well as the timeliness or
lack th~eof of the bad faith claims) State Auto moved for summary judgment on January 16
2017 App at 000291-347 The Court entertained arguments on this motion on February 8
2017 and the Court summarily denied State Autos motion at that time without explanation The
Court signed an Order prepared by CMDs counsel on March 2 2017 without any modifications
to counsels account of the facts law or conclusions ld at 00001-00010 It is from this Order
that State Auto seeks the instant Writ ofProhibition
Currently the Circuit Court has this case set for trial on May 1 2017 App at 000348
State Auto has filed contemporaneously with this Writ its Motion to Stay Proceedings in the
Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofWrit ofProhibition
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The instant issue submitted by this Writ of Prohibition is whether the Circuit Court
committed clear error in finding that CMD presented sufficient facts to survive summary
judgment The Circuit Court erred because CMD has presented no evidence to satisfy this
5
heightened standard SyI Pt2 of Williams v Precision Coil Inc 194 WVa 52459 SE2d
329 (1995)
With the standard for summary judgment in mind the Circuit Court committed clear
error in holding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for common law bad faith As
discussed below the duty to act in good faith and the contractual duties in the insurance policy
must coexist before a claim of bad faith can be maintained Since these duties must coexist
CMD must show evidence of a breach of the duty of good faith and the contractual duties See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) see also Gaddy
Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568
578 (2013) see also Highmark W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487492 655 SE2d 509 514
(2007)
The insurance contract at issue established two duties 1) the duty to defend and 2) the
duty to indemnify The Circuit Court committed clear error because CMD presented no
evidence that State Auto breached either the duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD for
the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston There is no dispute that State
Auto hired a competent attorney to represent CMDs interests This attorney successfully
negotiated a compromise of all the claims by the Evanses and the City of Charleston This
compromise included a full release from liability by both the Evanses and the City of Charleston
for all damages including future damages CMD was required to pay nothing to these parties
and nothing for the legal services it received
The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed evidence that State Auto met both
contractual duties simply expanded these duties to include obligations far beyond what was
contractually agreed upon The Circuit Court incorrectly held that failure to propose a remedy to
6
resolve the Evanses claim failure to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim
and failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by
the Evanses supported the conclusion that the contractual duties to defend and indemnify were
breached The Circuit Court has created new duties that were not contracted for and in effect
rewrote the insurance policy
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD presented evidence that it
had claims pursuant to W Va Code sect33-11-4(9) The undisputed facts show Mr Shah
agreed conceded and stipulated that the policy at issue provided no coverage for CMDs claims
and the evidence clearly establishes that CMD could never assert a loss claim under its liability
policy Moreover Mr Shah agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the Evanses and
the City ofCharleston
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error by
finding that more than one conclusion could be reached regarding the timeliness of CMDs
claims Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred
A one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law and statutory bad
faith claims SyI Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23
(2009) SyI Pt 1 Wilt v State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165506 SE2d 608 (1998) Mr
Shah admitted in his deposition that he believed State Autos actions in September and October
2009 were the beginning of the so called bad faith App at 000333 Fortunately this Court
need not rely exclusively on Mr Shahs memory to confirm this timeframe because counsel for
CMD was thorough enough to memorialize this conclusion in an October 28 2009 letter to State
7
Auto This letter advised State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos alleged failure to
promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no genuine dispute of
fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 This was the date from
which the one year statute of limitations began to run Yet CMD did not seek leave to file its
Third-Party Complaint until September 26 2011 nearly two years after the alleged bad faith
occurred and nearly one year after the statute oflimitations expired Even then CMDs motion
was not heard until January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20
2012 Thus it is clear that the statute oflimitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its
Third-Party Complaint
The Circuit Court again faced with indisputable evidence simply invented a new rule
holding that a bad faith breach of an insurance contract is a continuous tort The Circuit Court
completely dismissed this Courts holding in Noland insofar as this holding dealt with the duty to
defend In Syl Pt 5 of Noland this Court stated that in a first-party bad faith claim that is
based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002)
(Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute oflimitations begins to run
on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused
to defend him or her in an action Noland 686 SE2d 23 Thus any claims based on the
failure of the duty to defend (eg the alleged failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent
CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans) must have been filed by late October 2010
Further while it is noted that Noland dealt exclusively with the duty to defend the statute
of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty to indemnify Accordingly
the Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead ofNoland
8
in concluding that a claim ofbad faith breach of an insurance contract constitutes a continuing or
repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs claims that State Auto breached
its duty to indemnify do stem from a discrete occurrence in Oc~ober 2009 As discussed above
State Auto indemnified CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by
Mr Shahs own admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in October 2009 At that
moment the statute of limitations began to run
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify constitutes a continuous tort would cause
uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence the statute of limitations
would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer were to decline to indemnify
an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a bad faith claim at any time in the
future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be considered a continuous tort The
claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case) five years later 100 years later
etc because the statute would never run Such a result is irrational and the Circuit Court
committed clear error in its application of the statute of limitations to the facts of this specific
case
Finally the Circuit Court erred in concluding that CMD presented evidence to support its
breach of contract claims Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of
common law bad faith As discussed above there is no policy provision that CMD can point to
that State Auto in violation of its duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached
Because State Auto both defended and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation
under the COL Policy and bec~use the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to
its own property no evidence was presented of a breach of contract Accordingly permitting
this case to go forward on this claim was clear error
9
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION
Pursuant to Rule 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure oral argument
in this case is unnecessary because the principle issues in this case have been authoritatively
decided previously and the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in this brief and
the record on appeal If the Court determines that oral argument is necessary this case is
appropriate for a West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 argument and disposition by
memorandum decision
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
This Court has previously stated that [t]he writ of prohibition will issue only in clear
cases where the inferior tribunal is proceeding without or in excess ofjurisdiction SyI State
ex rei Vineyard v OBrien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) see also SyI Pt 1 Crawford
v Taylor 138 W Va 207 75 SE2d 370 (1953) (Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts
from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction or in which having jurisdiction
they are exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as a substitute for writ of error
appeal or certiorari) SyI Pt 2 State ex rei Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233
SE2d 425 (1977) (A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simply abuse of discretion
by a trial court It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such
jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers WVa Code 53-1-1)
This Court has defined the standard for issuance of a writ of prohibition where it is
claimed that the lower tribunal exceeds its legitimate powers State ex rei Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) (quoting SyI Pt 4 State ex rei
10
Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) This Court examines the following
factors
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means such as direct appeal to obtain the desired relief (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal (3) whether the lower tribunals order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4) whether the lower tribunals order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law and (5) whether the lower tribunals order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression
ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997raquo
This Court has held that [t]hese factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting
point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue Although all five
factors need not be satisfied it is clear that the third factor the existence of clear error as a
matter of law should be given substantial weight ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 Berger 483 SE2d
12)
A The Circuit Court committed clear error in rmding CMD presented evidence that State Auto violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
The Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment with respect to CMDs common
law bad faith claims because CMD presented no evidence that State Auto breached either the
duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed
evidence that State Auto met both duties simply expanded these duties to include requirements
far beyond what was contractually required
This Court has recognized that the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance
contract claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its
insured See Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009)
(quoting Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v
11
Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 WVa 34 716 SE2d 696 th 9 (2011) (quoting Noland 686
SE2d at 37) However the insurance company is not called upon to perform this duty until
some contractual duty imposed by the insurance policy has arisen Id While the contractual
duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related and both
must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id In other words claims for bad faith
and breach of an insurance contract are not separate and unique from one another and the
damages one can recover under each overlap See Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid
Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568 578 (2013) (holding that this Court
has declined to recognize an independent claim for a breach of the common law duty of good
faith and has instead held that such a claim sounds in breach of contract) see also Highmark
W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 492 655 SE2d 509 514 (2007) (holding that breaching
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action apart from
a breach ofcontract claim)
Thus to maintain a cause of action for common law bad faith a breach of the insurance
contract is a condition precedent In this case the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
establishes only two contractual obligations owed to CMD by State Auto the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify CMD has presented no evidence that either duty was breached
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Section I Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the policy states
we will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking those damages
Essentially within the context of an insurance contract the duty to defend is a covenant to
protect the insured from the expense of defending suits brought against him Sherwood
Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 3243698 A2d 1078 (1996) (quoting
12
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 409-10 347 A2d 842 851 (1975) The duty
to defend is a contractual right of control Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347 356 443 A2d 163
167 (1982) which is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment Merchants
Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 127 179 A2d 505 511 (1962) This is because the
outcome of the suit depends upon skill in investigation in negotiations for settlement and in the
conduct of the lawsuit Id
Under the terms of the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form State Auto made a
contractual promise to protect CMD from the expense of litigation and by virtue of the contract
State Auto had discretion as to how it met this duty Yet the Circuit Court redefined this duty
and essentially rewrote the insurance contract holding that
Additionally CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD throughout the claim process Such evidence includes that State Auto failed to properly investigate the claim failed to propose a remedy to resolve the Evans claim failed to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim and failed to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans This Court finds that the duty to defend and indemnify are not met merely by providing the insured with an attorney and ultimately obtaining a release ofthe insured
App at 00007 (emphasis supplied)
The Circuit Courts holding that the duty to defend [was not met by] merely by
providing the insured with an attorney oversimplifies what actually happened in this case
More importantly the Circuit Court erred because citing no authority it created a broader duty
to defend that what was contractually required The reason for the lack of authority cited is
simple there is no authority that requires State Auto to act as the Circuit Court outlined State
Auto had a contractual right of control over the defense of this claim and this is logical because
ultimately it was State Auto which was required to pay to settle the claims with the Evanses and
13
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 10: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
maintenance restorations or replacements on the Shah or CMDs property) was correct insofar
as CMD had no claim for damages to its own property App at 00021 000317
Finally Mr Shahs testimony resolved any dispute of fact as to when he was aware of
State Autos alleged bad faith Even though Mr Shah admitted that State Auto provided legal
counsel and settled the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston Mr Shah still
believed that State Auto acted in bad faith regarding the handling of these claims Mr Shah
testified that he believed State Autos bad faith began September or October 2009 ld at
000333
Having resolved any genuine issues of fact regarding CMDs third party claims for
common law bad faith statutory bad faith and breach of contract (as well as the timeliness or
lack th~eof of the bad faith claims) State Auto moved for summary judgment on January 16
2017 App at 000291-347 The Court entertained arguments on this motion on February 8
2017 and the Court summarily denied State Autos motion at that time without explanation The
Court signed an Order prepared by CMDs counsel on March 2 2017 without any modifications
to counsels account of the facts law or conclusions ld at 00001-00010 It is from this Order
that State Auto seeks the instant Writ ofProhibition
Currently the Circuit Court has this case set for trial on May 1 2017 App at 000348
State Auto has filed contemporaneously with this Writ its Motion to Stay Proceedings in the
Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofWrit ofProhibition
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The instant issue submitted by this Writ of Prohibition is whether the Circuit Court
committed clear error in finding that CMD presented sufficient facts to survive summary
judgment The Circuit Court erred because CMD has presented no evidence to satisfy this
5
heightened standard SyI Pt2 of Williams v Precision Coil Inc 194 WVa 52459 SE2d
329 (1995)
With the standard for summary judgment in mind the Circuit Court committed clear
error in holding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for common law bad faith As
discussed below the duty to act in good faith and the contractual duties in the insurance policy
must coexist before a claim of bad faith can be maintained Since these duties must coexist
CMD must show evidence of a breach of the duty of good faith and the contractual duties See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) see also Gaddy
Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568
578 (2013) see also Highmark W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487492 655 SE2d 509 514
(2007)
The insurance contract at issue established two duties 1) the duty to defend and 2) the
duty to indemnify The Circuit Court committed clear error because CMD presented no
evidence that State Auto breached either the duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD for
the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston There is no dispute that State
Auto hired a competent attorney to represent CMDs interests This attorney successfully
negotiated a compromise of all the claims by the Evanses and the City of Charleston This
compromise included a full release from liability by both the Evanses and the City of Charleston
for all damages including future damages CMD was required to pay nothing to these parties
and nothing for the legal services it received
The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed evidence that State Auto met both
contractual duties simply expanded these duties to include obligations far beyond what was
contractually agreed upon The Circuit Court incorrectly held that failure to propose a remedy to
6
resolve the Evanses claim failure to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim
and failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by
the Evanses supported the conclusion that the contractual duties to defend and indemnify were
breached The Circuit Court has created new duties that were not contracted for and in effect
rewrote the insurance policy
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD presented evidence that it
had claims pursuant to W Va Code sect33-11-4(9) The undisputed facts show Mr Shah
agreed conceded and stipulated that the policy at issue provided no coverage for CMDs claims
and the evidence clearly establishes that CMD could never assert a loss claim under its liability
policy Moreover Mr Shah agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the Evanses and
the City ofCharleston
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error by
finding that more than one conclusion could be reached regarding the timeliness of CMDs
claims Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred
A one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law and statutory bad
faith claims SyI Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23
(2009) SyI Pt 1 Wilt v State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165506 SE2d 608 (1998) Mr
Shah admitted in his deposition that he believed State Autos actions in September and October
2009 were the beginning of the so called bad faith App at 000333 Fortunately this Court
need not rely exclusively on Mr Shahs memory to confirm this timeframe because counsel for
CMD was thorough enough to memorialize this conclusion in an October 28 2009 letter to State
7
Auto This letter advised State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos alleged failure to
promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no genuine dispute of
fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 This was the date from
which the one year statute of limitations began to run Yet CMD did not seek leave to file its
Third-Party Complaint until September 26 2011 nearly two years after the alleged bad faith
occurred and nearly one year after the statute oflimitations expired Even then CMDs motion
was not heard until January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20
2012 Thus it is clear that the statute oflimitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its
Third-Party Complaint
The Circuit Court again faced with indisputable evidence simply invented a new rule
holding that a bad faith breach of an insurance contract is a continuous tort The Circuit Court
completely dismissed this Courts holding in Noland insofar as this holding dealt with the duty to
defend In Syl Pt 5 of Noland this Court stated that in a first-party bad faith claim that is
based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002)
(Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute oflimitations begins to run
on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused
to defend him or her in an action Noland 686 SE2d 23 Thus any claims based on the
failure of the duty to defend (eg the alleged failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent
CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans) must have been filed by late October 2010
Further while it is noted that Noland dealt exclusively with the duty to defend the statute
of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty to indemnify Accordingly
the Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead ofNoland
8
in concluding that a claim ofbad faith breach of an insurance contract constitutes a continuing or
repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs claims that State Auto breached
its duty to indemnify do stem from a discrete occurrence in Oc~ober 2009 As discussed above
State Auto indemnified CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by
Mr Shahs own admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in October 2009 At that
moment the statute of limitations began to run
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify constitutes a continuous tort would cause
uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence the statute of limitations
would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer were to decline to indemnify
an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a bad faith claim at any time in the
future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be considered a continuous tort The
claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case) five years later 100 years later
etc because the statute would never run Such a result is irrational and the Circuit Court
committed clear error in its application of the statute of limitations to the facts of this specific
case
Finally the Circuit Court erred in concluding that CMD presented evidence to support its
breach of contract claims Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of
common law bad faith As discussed above there is no policy provision that CMD can point to
that State Auto in violation of its duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached
Because State Auto both defended and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation
under the COL Policy and bec~use the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to
its own property no evidence was presented of a breach of contract Accordingly permitting
this case to go forward on this claim was clear error
9
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION
Pursuant to Rule 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure oral argument
in this case is unnecessary because the principle issues in this case have been authoritatively
decided previously and the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in this brief and
the record on appeal If the Court determines that oral argument is necessary this case is
appropriate for a West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 argument and disposition by
memorandum decision
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
This Court has previously stated that [t]he writ of prohibition will issue only in clear
cases where the inferior tribunal is proceeding without or in excess ofjurisdiction SyI State
ex rei Vineyard v OBrien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) see also SyI Pt 1 Crawford
v Taylor 138 W Va 207 75 SE2d 370 (1953) (Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts
from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction or in which having jurisdiction
they are exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as a substitute for writ of error
appeal or certiorari) SyI Pt 2 State ex rei Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233
SE2d 425 (1977) (A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simply abuse of discretion
by a trial court It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such
jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers WVa Code 53-1-1)
This Court has defined the standard for issuance of a writ of prohibition where it is
claimed that the lower tribunal exceeds its legitimate powers State ex rei Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) (quoting SyI Pt 4 State ex rei
10
Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) This Court examines the following
factors
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means such as direct appeal to obtain the desired relief (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal (3) whether the lower tribunals order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4) whether the lower tribunals order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law and (5) whether the lower tribunals order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression
ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997raquo
This Court has held that [t]hese factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting
point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue Although all five
factors need not be satisfied it is clear that the third factor the existence of clear error as a
matter of law should be given substantial weight ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 Berger 483 SE2d
12)
A The Circuit Court committed clear error in rmding CMD presented evidence that State Auto violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
The Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment with respect to CMDs common
law bad faith claims because CMD presented no evidence that State Auto breached either the
duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed
evidence that State Auto met both duties simply expanded these duties to include requirements
far beyond what was contractually required
This Court has recognized that the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance
contract claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its
insured See Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009)
(quoting Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v
11
Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 WVa 34 716 SE2d 696 th 9 (2011) (quoting Noland 686
SE2d at 37) However the insurance company is not called upon to perform this duty until
some contractual duty imposed by the insurance policy has arisen Id While the contractual
duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related and both
must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id In other words claims for bad faith
and breach of an insurance contract are not separate and unique from one another and the
damages one can recover under each overlap See Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid
Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568 578 (2013) (holding that this Court
has declined to recognize an independent claim for a breach of the common law duty of good
faith and has instead held that such a claim sounds in breach of contract) see also Highmark
W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 492 655 SE2d 509 514 (2007) (holding that breaching
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action apart from
a breach ofcontract claim)
Thus to maintain a cause of action for common law bad faith a breach of the insurance
contract is a condition precedent In this case the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
establishes only two contractual obligations owed to CMD by State Auto the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify CMD has presented no evidence that either duty was breached
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Section I Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the policy states
we will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking those damages
Essentially within the context of an insurance contract the duty to defend is a covenant to
protect the insured from the expense of defending suits brought against him Sherwood
Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 3243698 A2d 1078 (1996) (quoting
12
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 409-10 347 A2d 842 851 (1975) The duty
to defend is a contractual right of control Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347 356 443 A2d 163
167 (1982) which is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment Merchants
Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 127 179 A2d 505 511 (1962) This is because the
outcome of the suit depends upon skill in investigation in negotiations for settlement and in the
conduct of the lawsuit Id
Under the terms of the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form State Auto made a
contractual promise to protect CMD from the expense of litigation and by virtue of the contract
State Auto had discretion as to how it met this duty Yet the Circuit Court redefined this duty
and essentially rewrote the insurance contract holding that
Additionally CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD throughout the claim process Such evidence includes that State Auto failed to properly investigate the claim failed to propose a remedy to resolve the Evans claim failed to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim and failed to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans This Court finds that the duty to defend and indemnify are not met merely by providing the insured with an attorney and ultimately obtaining a release ofthe insured
App at 00007 (emphasis supplied)
The Circuit Courts holding that the duty to defend [was not met by] merely by
providing the insured with an attorney oversimplifies what actually happened in this case
More importantly the Circuit Court erred because citing no authority it created a broader duty
to defend that what was contractually required The reason for the lack of authority cited is
simple there is no authority that requires State Auto to act as the Circuit Court outlined State
Auto had a contractual right of control over the defense of this claim and this is logical because
ultimately it was State Auto which was required to pay to settle the claims with the Evanses and
13
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 11: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
heightened standard SyI Pt2 of Williams v Precision Coil Inc 194 WVa 52459 SE2d
329 (1995)
With the standard for summary judgment in mind the Circuit Court committed clear
error in holding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for common law bad faith As
discussed below the duty to act in good faith and the contractual duties in the insurance policy
must coexist before a claim of bad faith can be maintained Since these duties must coexist
CMD must show evidence of a breach of the duty of good faith and the contractual duties See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) see also Gaddy
Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568
578 (2013) see also Highmark W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487492 655 SE2d 509 514
(2007)
The insurance contract at issue established two duties 1) the duty to defend and 2) the
duty to indemnify The Circuit Court committed clear error because CMD presented no
evidence that State Auto breached either the duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD for
the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of Charleston There is no dispute that State
Auto hired a competent attorney to represent CMDs interests This attorney successfully
negotiated a compromise of all the claims by the Evanses and the City of Charleston This
compromise included a full release from liability by both the Evanses and the City of Charleston
for all damages including future damages CMD was required to pay nothing to these parties
and nothing for the legal services it received
The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed evidence that State Auto met both
contractual duties simply expanded these duties to include obligations far beyond what was
contractually agreed upon The Circuit Court incorrectly held that failure to propose a remedy to
6
resolve the Evanses claim failure to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim
and failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by
the Evanses supported the conclusion that the contractual duties to defend and indemnify were
breached The Circuit Court has created new duties that were not contracted for and in effect
rewrote the insurance policy
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD presented evidence that it
had claims pursuant to W Va Code sect33-11-4(9) The undisputed facts show Mr Shah
agreed conceded and stipulated that the policy at issue provided no coverage for CMDs claims
and the evidence clearly establishes that CMD could never assert a loss claim under its liability
policy Moreover Mr Shah agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the Evanses and
the City ofCharleston
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error by
finding that more than one conclusion could be reached regarding the timeliness of CMDs
claims Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred
A one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law and statutory bad
faith claims SyI Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23
(2009) SyI Pt 1 Wilt v State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165506 SE2d 608 (1998) Mr
Shah admitted in his deposition that he believed State Autos actions in September and October
2009 were the beginning of the so called bad faith App at 000333 Fortunately this Court
need not rely exclusively on Mr Shahs memory to confirm this timeframe because counsel for
CMD was thorough enough to memorialize this conclusion in an October 28 2009 letter to State
7
Auto This letter advised State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos alleged failure to
promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no genuine dispute of
fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 This was the date from
which the one year statute of limitations began to run Yet CMD did not seek leave to file its
Third-Party Complaint until September 26 2011 nearly two years after the alleged bad faith
occurred and nearly one year after the statute oflimitations expired Even then CMDs motion
was not heard until January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20
2012 Thus it is clear that the statute oflimitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its
Third-Party Complaint
The Circuit Court again faced with indisputable evidence simply invented a new rule
holding that a bad faith breach of an insurance contract is a continuous tort The Circuit Court
completely dismissed this Courts holding in Noland insofar as this holding dealt with the duty to
defend In Syl Pt 5 of Noland this Court stated that in a first-party bad faith claim that is
based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002)
(Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute oflimitations begins to run
on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused
to defend him or her in an action Noland 686 SE2d 23 Thus any claims based on the
failure of the duty to defend (eg the alleged failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent
CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans) must have been filed by late October 2010
Further while it is noted that Noland dealt exclusively with the duty to defend the statute
of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty to indemnify Accordingly
the Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead ofNoland
8
in concluding that a claim ofbad faith breach of an insurance contract constitutes a continuing or
repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs claims that State Auto breached
its duty to indemnify do stem from a discrete occurrence in Oc~ober 2009 As discussed above
State Auto indemnified CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by
Mr Shahs own admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in October 2009 At that
moment the statute of limitations began to run
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify constitutes a continuous tort would cause
uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence the statute of limitations
would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer were to decline to indemnify
an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a bad faith claim at any time in the
future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be considered a continuous tort The
claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case) five years later 100 years later
etc because the statute would never run Such a result is irrational and the Circuit Court
committed clear error in its application of the statute of limitations to the facts of this specific
case
Finally the Circuit Court erred in concluding that CMD presented evidence to support its
breach of contract claims Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of
common law bad faith As discussed above there is no policy provision that CMD can point to
that State Auto in violation of its duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached
Because State Auto both defended and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation
under the COL Policy and bec~use the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to
its own property no evidence was presented of a breach of contract Accordingly permitting
this case to go forward on this claim was clear error
9
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION
Pursuant to Rule 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure oral argument
in this case is unnecessary because the principle issues in this case have been authoritatively
decided previously and the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in this brief and
the record on appeal If the Court determines that oral argument is necessary this case is
appropriate for a West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 argument and disposition by
memorandum decision
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
This Court has previously stated that [t]he writ of prohibition will issue only in clear
cases where the inferior tribunal is proceeding without or in excess ofjurisdiction SyI State
ex rei Vineyard v OBrien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) see also SyI Pt 1 Crawford
v Taylor 138 W Va 207 75 SE2d 370 (1953) (Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts
from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction or in which having jurisdiction
they are exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as a substitute for writ of error
appeal or certiorari) SyI Pt 2 State ex rei Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233
SE2d 425 (1977) (A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simply abuse of discretion
by a trial court It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such
jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers WVa Code 53-1-1)
This Court has defined the standard for issuance of a writ of prohibition where it is
claimed that the lower tribunal exceeds its legitimate powers State ex rei Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) (quoting SyI Pt 4 State ex rei
10
Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) This Court examines the following
factors
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means such as direct appeal to obtain the desired relief (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal (3) whether the lower tribunals order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4) whether the lower tribunals order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law and (5) whether the lower tribunals order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression
ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997raquo
This Court has held that [t]hese factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting
point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue Although all five
factors need not be satisfied it is clear that the third factor the existence of clear error as a
matter of law should be given substantial weight ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 Berger 483 SE2d
12)
A The Circuit Court committed clear error in rmding CMD presented evidence that State Auto violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
The Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment with respect to CMDs common
law bad faith claims because CMD presented no evidence that State Auto breached either the
duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed
evidence that State Auto met both duties simply expanded these duties to include requirements
far beyond what was contractually required
This Court has recognized that the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance
contract claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its
insured See Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009)
(quoting Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v
11
Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 WVa 34 716 SE2d 696 th 9 (2011) (quoting Noland 686
SE2d at 37) However the insurance company is not called upon to perform this duty until
some contractual duty imposed by the insurance policy has arisen Id While the contractual
duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related and both
must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id In other words claims for bad faith
and breach of an insurance contract are not separate and unique from one another and the
damages one can recover under each overlap See Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid
Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568 578 (2013) (holding that this Court
has declined to recognize an independent claim for a breach of the common law duty of good
faith and has instead held that such a claim sounds in breach of contract) see also Highmark
W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 492 655 SE2d 509 514 (2007) (holding that breaching
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action apart from
a breach ofcontract claim)
Thus to maintain a cause of action for common law bad faith a breach of the insurance
contract is a condition precedent In this case the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
establishes only two contractual obligations owed to CMD by State Auto the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify CMD has presented no evidence that either duty was breached
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Section I Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the policy states
we will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking those damages
Essentially within the context of an insurance contract the duty to defend is a covenant to
protect the insured from the expense of defending suits brought against him Sherwood
Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 3243698 A2d 1078 (1996) (quoting
12
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 409-10 347 A2d 842 851 (1975) The duty
to defend is a contractual right of control Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347 356 443 A2d 163
167 (1982) which is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment Merchants
Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 127 179 A2d 505 511 (1962) This is because the
outcome of the suit depends upon skill in investigation in negotiations for settlement and in the
conduct of the lawsuit Id
Under the terms of the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form State Auto made a
contractual promise to protect CMD from the expense of litigation and by virtue of the contract
State Auto had discretion as to how it met this duty Yet the Circuit Court redefined this duty
and essentially rewrote the insurance contract holding that
Additionally CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD throughout the claim process Such evidence includes that State Auto failed to properly investigate the claim failed to propose a remedy to resolve the Evans claim failed to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim and failed to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans This Court finds that the duty to defend and indemnify are not met merely by providing the insured with an attorney and ultimately obtaining a release ofthe insured
App at 00007 (emphasis supplied)
The Circuit Courts holding that the duty to defend [was not met by] merely by
providing the insured with an attorney oversimplifies what actually happened in this case
More importantly the Circuit Court erred because citing no authority it created a broader duty
to defend that what was contractually required The reason for the lack of authority cited is
simple there is no authority that requires State Auto to act as the Circuit Court outlined State
Auto had a contractual right of control over the defense of this claim and this is logical because
ultimately it was State Auto which was required to pay to settle the claims with the Evanses and
13
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 12: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
resolve the Evanses claim failure to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim
and failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by
the Evanses supported the conclusion that the contractual duties to defend and indemnify were
breached The Circuit Court has created new duties that were not contracted for and in effect
rewrote the insurance policy
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD presented evidence that it
had claims pursuant to W Va Code sect33-11-4(9) The undisputed facts show Mr Shah
agreed conceded and stipulated that the policy at issue provided no coverage for CMDs claims
and the evidence clearly establishes that CMD could never assert a loss claim under its liability
policy Moreover Mr Shah agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the Evanses and
the City ofCharleston
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error by
finding that more than one conclusion could be reached regarding the timeliness of CMDs
claims Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred
A one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law and statutory bad
faith claims SyI Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23
(2009) SyI Pt 1 Wilt v State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165506 SE2d 608 (1998) Mr
Shah admitted in his deposition that he believed State Autos actions in September and October
2009 were the beginning of the so called bad faith App at 000333 Fortunately this Court
need not rely exclusively on Mr Shahs memory to confirm this timeframe because counsel for
CMD was thorough enough to memorialize this conclusion in an October 28 2009 letter to State
7
Auto This letter advised State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos alleged failure to
promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no genuine dispute of
fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 This was the date from
which the one year statute of limitations began to run Yet CMD did not seek leave to file its
Third-Party Complaint until September 26 2011 nearly two years after the alleged bad faith
occurred and nearly one year after the statute oflimitations expired Even then CMDs motion
was not heard until January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20
2012 Thus it is clear that the statute oflimitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its
Third-Party Complaint
The Circuit Court again faced with indisputable evidence simply invented a new rule
holding that a bad faith breach of an insurance contract is a continuous tort The Circuit Court
completely dismissed this Courts holding in Noland insofar as this holding dealt with the duty to
defend In Syl Pt 5 of Noland this Court stated that in a first-party bad faith claim that is
based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002)
(Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute oflimitations begins to run
on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused
to defend him or her in an action Noland 686 SE2d 23 Thus any claims based on the
failure of the duty to defend (eg the alleged failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent
CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans) must have been filed by late October 2010
Further while it is noted that Noland dealt exclusively with the duty to defend the statute
of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty to indemnify Accordingly
the Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead ofNoland
8
in concluding that a claim ofbad faith breach of an insurance contract constitutes a continuing or
repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs claims that State Auto breached
its duty to indemnify do stem from a discrete occurrence in Oc~ober 2009 As discussed above
State Auto indemnified CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by
Mr Shahs own admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in October 2009 At that
moment the statute of limitations began to run
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify constitutes a continuous tort would cause
uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence the statute of limitations
would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer were to decline to indemnify
an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a bad faith claim at any time in the
future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be considered a continuous tort The
claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case) five years later 100 years later
etc because the statute would never run Such a result is irrational and the Circuit Court
committed clear error in its application of the statute of limitations to the facts of this specific
case
Finally the Circuit Court erred in concluding that CMD presented evidence to support its
breach of contract claims Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of
common law bad faith As discussed above there is no policy provision that CMD can point to
that State Auto in violation of its duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached
Because State Auto both defended and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation
under the COL Policy and bec~use the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to
its own property no evidence was presented of a breach of contract Accordingly permitting
this case to go forward on this claim was clear error
9
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION
Pursuant to Rule 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure oral argument
in this case is unnecessary because the principle issues in this case have been authoritatively
decided previously and the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in this brief and
the record on appeal If the Court determines that oral argument is necessary this case is
appropriate for a West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 argument and disposition by
memorandum decision
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
This Court has previously stated that [t]he writ of prohibition will issue only in clear
cases where the inferior tribunal is proceeding without or in excess ofjurisdiction SyI State
ex rei Vineyard v OBrien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) see also SyI Pt 1 Crawford
v Taylor 138 W Va 207 75 SE2d 370 (1953) (Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts
from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction or in which having jurisdiction
they are exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as a substitute for writ of error
appeal or certiorari) SyI Pt 2 State ex rei Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233
SE2d 425 (1977) (A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simply abuse of discretion
by a trial court It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such
jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers WVa Code 53-1-1)
This Court has defined the standard for issuance of a writ of prohibition where it is
claimed that the lower tribunal exceeds its legitimate powers State ex rei Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) (quoting SyI Pt 4 State ex rei
10
Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) This Court examines the following
factors
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means such as direct appeal to obtain the desired relief (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal (3) whether the lower tribunals order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4) whether the lower tribunals order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law and (5) whether the lower tribunals order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression
ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997raquo
This Court has held that [t]hese factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting
point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue Although all five
factors need not be satisfied it is clear that the third factor the existence of clear error as a
matter of law should be given substantial weight ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 Berger 483 SE2d
12)
A The Circuit Court committed clear error in rmding CMD presented evidence that State Auto violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
The Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment with respect to CMDs common
law bad faith claims because CMD presented no evidence that State Auto breached either the
duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed
evidence that State Auto met both duties simply expanded these duties to include requirements
far beyond what was contractually required
This Court has recognized that the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance
contract claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its
insured See Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009)
(quoting Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v
11
Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 WVa 34 716 SE2d 696 th 9 (2011) (quoting Noland 686
SE2d at 37) However the insurance company is not called upon to perform this duty until
some contractual duty imposed by the insurance policy has arisen Id While the contractual
duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related and both
must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id In other words claims for bad faith
and breach of an insurance contract are not separate and unique from one another and the
damages one can recover under each overlap See Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid
Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568 578 (2013) (holding that this Court
has declined to recognize an independent claim for a breach of the common law duty of good
faith and has instead held that such a claim sounds in breach of contract) see also Highmark
W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 492 655 SE2d 509 514 (2007) (holding that breaching
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action apart from
a breach ofcontract claim)
Thus to maintain a cause of action for common law bad faith a breach of the insurance
contract is a condition precedent In this case the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
establishes only two contractual obligations owed to CMD by State Auto the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify CMD has presented no evidence that either duty was breached
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Section I Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the policy states
we will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking those damages
Essentially within the context of an insurance contract the duty to defend is a covenant to
protect the insured from the expense of defending suits brought against him Sherwood
Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 3243698 A2d 1078 (1996) (quoting
12
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 409-10 347 A2d 842 851 (1975) The duty
to defend is a contractual right of control Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347 356 443 A2d 163
167 (1982) which is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment Merchants
Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 127 179 A2d 505 511 (1962) This is because the
outcome of the suit depends upon skill in investigation in negotiations for settlement and in the
conduct of the lawsuit Id
Under the terms of the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form State Auto made a
contractual promise to protect CMD from the expense of litigation and by virtue of the contract
State Auto had discretion as to how it met this duty Yet the Circuit Court redefined this duty
and essentially rewrote the insurance contract holding that
Additionally CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD throughout the claim process Such evidence includes that State Auto failed to properly investigate the claim failed to propose a remedy to resolve the Evans claim failed to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim and failed to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans This Court finds that the duty to defend and indemnify are not met merely by providing the insured with an attorney and ultimately obtaining a release ofthe insured
App at 00007 (emphasis supplied)
The Circuit Courts holding that the duty to defend [was not met by] merely by
providing the insured with an attorney oversimplifies what actually happened in this case
More importantly the Circuit Court erred because citing no authority it created a broader duty
to defend that what was contractually required The reason for the lack of authority cited is
simple there is no authority that requires State Auto to act as the Circuit Court outlined State
Auto had a contractual right of control over the defense of this claim and this is logical because
ultimately it was State Auto which was required to pay to settle the claims with the Evanses and
13
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 13: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Auto This letter advised State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos alleged failure to
promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no genuine dispute of
fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 This was the date from
which the one year statute of limitations began to run Yet CMD did not seek leave to file its
Third-Party Complaint until September 26 2011 nearly two years after the alleged bad faith
occurred and nearly one year after the statute oflimitations expired Even then CMDs motion
was not heard until January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20
2012 Thus it is clear that the statute oflimitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its
Third-Party Complaint
The Circuit Court again faced with indisputable evidence simply invented a new rule
holding that a bad faith breach of an insurance contract is a continuous tort The Circuit Court
completely dismissed this Courts holding in Noland insofar as this holding dealt with the duty to
defend In Syl Pt 5 of Noland this Court stated that in a first-party bad faith claim that is
based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002)
(Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute oflimitations begins to run
on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused
to defend him or her in an action Noland 686 SE2d 23 Thus any claims based on the
failure of the duty to defend (eg the alleged failure to hire an independent lawyer to represent
CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans) must have been filed by late October 2010
Further while it is noted that Noland dealt exclusively with the duty to defend the statute
of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty to indemnify Accordingly
the Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead ofNoland
8
in concluding that a claim ofbad faith breach of an insurance contract constitutes a continuing or
repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs claims that State Auto breached
its duty to indemnify do stem from a discrete occurrence in Oc~ober 2009 As discussed above
State Auto indemnified CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by
Mr Shahs own admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in October 2009 At that
moment the statute of limitations began to run
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify constitutes a continuous tort would cause
uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence the statute of limitations
would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer were to decline to indemnify
an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a bad faith claim at any time in the
future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be considered a continuous tort The
claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case) five years later 100 years later
etc because the statute would never run Such a result is irrational and the Circuit Court
committed clear error in its application of the statute of limitations to the facts of this specific
case
Finally the Circuit Court erred in concluding that CMD presented evidence to support its
breach of contract claims Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of
common law bad faith As discussed above there is no policy provision that CMD can point to
that State Auto in violation of its duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached
Because State Auto both defended and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation
under the COL Policy and bec~use the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to
its own property no evidence was presented of a breach of contract Accordingly permitting
this case to go forward on this claim was clear error
9
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION
Pursuant to Rule 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure oral argument
in this case is unnecessary because the principle issues in this case have been authoritatively
decided previously and the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in this brief and
the record on appeal If the Court determines that oral argument is necessary this case is
appropriate for a West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 argument and disposition by
memorandum decision
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
This Court has previously stated that [t]he writ of prohibition will issue only in clear
cases where the inferior tribunal is proceeding without or in excess ofjurisdiction SyI State
ex rei Vineyard v OBrien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) see also SyI Pt 1 Crawford
v Taylor 138 W Va 207 75 SE2d 370 (1953) (Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts
from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction or in which having jurisdiction
they are exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as a substitute for writ of error
appeal or certiorari) SyI Pt 2 State ex rei Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233
SE2d 425 (1977) (A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simply abuse of discretion
by a trial court It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such
jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers WVa Code 53-1-1)
This Court has defined the standard for issuance of a writ of prohibition where it is
claimed that the lower tribunal exceeds its legitimate powers State ex rei Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) (quoting SyI Pt 4 State ex rei
10
Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) This Court examines the following
factors
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means such as direct appeal to obtain the desired relief (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal (3) whether the lower tribunals order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4) whether the lower tribunals order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law and (5) whether the lower tribunals order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression
ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997raquo
This Court has held that [t]hese factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting
point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue Although all five
factors need not be satisfied it is clear that the third factor the existence of clear error as a
matter of law should be given substantial weight ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 Berger 483 SE2d
12)
A The Circuit Court committed clear error in rmding CMD presented evidence that State Auto violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
The Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment with respect to CMDs common
law bad faith claims because CMD presented no evidence that State Auto breached either the
duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed
evidence that State Auto met both duties simply expanded these duties to include requirements
far beyond what was contractually required
This Court has recognized that the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance
contract claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its
insured See Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009)
(quoting Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v
11
Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 WVa 34 716 SE2d 696 th 9 (2011) (quoting Noland 686
SE2d at 37) However the insurance company is not called upon to perform this duty until
some contractual duty imposed by the insurance policy has arisen Id While the contractual
duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related and both
must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id In other words claims for bad faith
and breach of an insurance contract are not separate and unique from one another and the
damages one can recover under each overlap See Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid
Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568 578 (2013) (holding that this Court
has declined to recognize an independent claim for a breach of the common law duty of good
faith and has instead held that such a claim sounds in breach of contract) see also Highmark
W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 492 655 SE2d 509 514 (2007) (holding that breaching
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action apart from
a breach ofcontract claim)
Thus to maintain a cause of action for common law bad faith a breach of the insurance
contract is a condition precedent In this case the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
establishes only two contractual obligations owed to CMD by State Auto the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify CMD has presented no evidence that either duty was breached
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Section I Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the policy states
we will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking those damages
Essentially within the context of an insurance contract the duty to defend is a covenant to
protect the insured from the expense of defending suits brought against him Sherwood
Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 3243698 A2d 1078 (1996) (quoting
12
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 409-10 347 A2d 842 851 (1975) The duty
to defend is a contractual right of control Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347 356 443 A2d 163
167 (1982) which is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment Merchants
Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 127 179 A2d 505 511 (1962) This is because the
outcome of the suit depends upon skill in investigation in negotiations for settlement and in the
conduct of the lawsuit Id
Under the terms of the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form State Auto made a
contractual promise to protect CMD from the expense of litigation and by virtue of the contract
State Auto had discretion as to how it met this duty Yet the Circuit Court redefined this duty
and essentially rewrote the insurance contract holding that
Additionally CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD throughout the claim process Such evidence includes that State Auto failed to properly investigate the claim failed to propose a remedy to resolve the Evans claim failed to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim and failed to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans This Court finds that the duty to defend and indemnify are not met merely by providing the insured with an attorney and ultimately obtaining a release ofthe insured
App at 00007 (emphasis supplied)
The Circuit Courts holding that the duty to defend [was not met by] merely by
providing the insured with an attorney oversimplifies what actually happened in this case
More importantly the Circuit Court erred because citing no authority it created a broader duty
to defend that what was contractually required The reason for the lack of authority cited is
simple there is no authority that requires State Auto to act as the Circuit Court outlined State
Auto had a contractual right of control over the defense of this claim and this is logical because
ultimately it was State Auto which was required to pay to settle the claims with the Evanses and
13
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 14: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
in concluding that a claim ofbad faith breach of an insurance contract constitutes a continuing or
repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs claims that State Auto breached
its duty to indemnify do stem from a discrete occurrence in Oc~ober 2009 As discussed above
State Auto indemnified CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by
Mr Shahs own admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in October 2009 At that
moment the statute of limitations began to run
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify constitutes a continuous tort would cause
uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence the statute of limitations
would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer were to decline to indemnify
an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a bad faith claim at any time in the
future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be considered a continuous tort The
claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case) five years later 100 years later
etc because the statute would never run Such a result is irrational and the Circuit Court
committed clear error in its application of the statute of limitations to the facts of this specific
case
Finally the Circuit Court erred in concluding that CMD presented evidence to support its
breach of contract claims Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of
common law bad faith As discussed above there is no policy provision that CMD can point to
that State Auto in violation of its duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached
Because State Auto both defended and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation
under the COL Policy and bec~use the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to
its own property no evidence was presented of a breach of contract Accordingly permitting
this case to go forward on this claim was clear error
9
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION
Pursuant to Rule 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure oral argument
in this case is unnecessary because the principle issues in this case have been authoritatively
decided previously and the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in this brief and
the record on appeal If the Court determines that oral argument is necessary this case is
appropriate for a West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 argument and disposition by
memorandum decision
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
This Court has previously stated that [t]he writ of prohibition will issue only in clear
cases where the inferior tribunal is proceeding without or in excess ofjurisdiction SyI State
ex rei Vineyard v OBrien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) see also SyI Pt 1 Crawford
v Taylor 138 W Va 207 75 SE2d 370 (1953) (Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts
from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction or in which having jurisdiction
they are exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as a substitute for writ of error
appeal or certiorari) SyI Pt 2 State ex rei Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233
SE2d 425 (1977) (A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simply abuse of discretion
by a trial court It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such
jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers WVa Code 53-1-1)
This Court has defined the standard for issuance of a writ of prohibition where it is
claimed that the lower tribunal exceeds its legitimate powers State ex rei Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) (quoting SyI Pt 4 State ex rei
10
Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) This Court examines the following
factors
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means such as direct appeal to obtain the desired relief (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal (3) whether the lower tribunals order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4) whether the lower tribunals order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law and (5) whether the lower tribunals order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression
ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997raquo
This Court has held that [t]hese factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting
point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue Although all five
factors need not be satisfied it is clear that the third factor the existence of clear error as a
matter of law should be given substantial weight ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 Berger 483 SE2d
12)
A The Circuit Court committed clear error in rmding CMD presented evidence that State Auto violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
The Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment with respect to CMDs common
law bad faith claims because CMD presented no evidence that State Auto breached either the
duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed
evidence that State Auto met both duties simply expanded these duties to include requirements
far beyond what was contractually required
This Court has recognized that the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance
contract claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its
insured See Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009)
(quoting Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v
11
Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 WVa 34 716 SE2d 696 th 9 (2011) (quoting Noland 686
SE2d at 37) However the insurance company is not called upon to perform this duty until
some contractual duty imposed by the insurance policy has arisen Id While the contractual
duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related and both
must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id In other words claims for bad faith
and breach of an insurance contract are not separate and unique from one another and the
damages one can recover under each overlap See Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid
Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568 578 (2013) (holding that this Court
has declined to recognize an independent claim for a breach of the common law duty of good
faith and has instead held that such a claim sounds in breach of contract) see also Highmark
W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 492 655 SE2d 509 514 (2007) (holding that breaching
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action apart from
a breach ofcontract claim)
Thus to maintain a cause of action for common law bad faith a breach of the insurance
contract is a condition precedent In this case the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
establishes only two contractual obligations owed to CMD by State Auto the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify CMD has presented no evidence that either duty was breached
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Section I Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the policy states
we will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking those damages
Essentially within the context of an insurance contract the duty to defend is a covenant to
protect the insured from the expense of defending suits brought against him Sherwood
Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 3243698 A2d 1078 (1996) (quoting
12
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 409-10 347 A2d 842 851 (1975) The duty
to defend is a contractual right of control Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347 356 443 A2d 163
167 (1982) which is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment Merchants
Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 127 179 A2d 505 511 (1962) This is because the
outcome of the suit depends upon skill in investigation in negotiations for settlement and in the
conduct of the lawsuit Id
Under the terms of the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form State Auto made a
contractual promise to protect CMD from the expense of litigation and by virtue of the contract
State Auto had discretion as to how it met this duty Yet the Circuit Court redefined this duty
and essentially rewrote the insurance contract holding that
Additionally CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD throughout the claim process Such evidence includes that State Auto failed to properly investigate the claim failed to propose a remedy to resolve the Evans claim failed to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim and failed to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans This Court finds that the duty to defend and indemnify are not met merely by providing the insured with an attorney and ultimately obtaining a release ofthe insured
App at 00007 (emphasis supplied)
The Circuit Courts holding that the duty to defend [was not met by] merely by
providing the insured with an attorney oversimplifies what actually happened in this case
More importantly the Circuit Court erred because citing no authority it created a broader duty
to defend that what was contractually required The reason for the lack of authority cited is
simple there is no authority that requires State Auto to act as the Circuit Court outlined State
Auto had a contractual right of control over the defense of this claim and this is logical because
ultimately it was State Auto which was required to pay to settle the claims with the Evanses and
13
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 15: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION
Pursuant to Rule 18(a) of the West Virginia Rules ofAppellate Procedure oral argument
in this case is unnecessary because the principle issues in this case have been authoritatively
decided previously and the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in this brief and
the record on appeal If the Court determines that oral argument is necessary this case is
appropriate for a West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 argument and disposition by
memorandum decision
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
This Court has previously stated that [t]he writ of prohibition will issue only in clear
cases where the inferior tribunal is proceeding without or in excess ofjurisdiction SyI State
ex rei Vineyard v OBrien 100 WVa 163 130 SE 111 (1925) see also SyI Pt 1 Crawford
v Taylor 138 W Va 207 75 SE2d 370 (1953) (Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts
from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction or in which having jurisdiction
they are exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as a substitute for writ of error
appeal or certiorari) SyI Pt 2 State ex rei Preacher v Sencindiver 160 WVa 314 233
SE2d 425 (1977) (A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simply abuse of discretion
by a trial court It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such
jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers WVa Code 53-1-1)
This Court has defined the standard for issuance of a writ of prohibition where it is
claimed that the lower tribunal exceeds its legitimate powers State ex rei Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co v Wilson 236 WVa 228 778 SE2d 677 (2015) (quoting SyI Pt 4 State ex rei
10
Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) This Court examines the following
factors
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means such as direct appeal to obtain the desired relief (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal (3) whether the lower tribunals order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4) whether the lower tribunals order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law and (5) whether the lower tribunals order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression
ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997raquo
This Court has held that [t]hese factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting
point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue Although all five
factors need not be satisfied it is clear that the third factor the existence of clear error as a
matter of law should be given substantial weight ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 Berger 483 SE2d
12)
A The Circuit Court committed clear error in rmding CMD presented evidence that State Auto violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
The Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment with respect to CMDs common
law bad faith claims because CMD presented no evidence that State Auto breached either the
duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed
evidence that State Auto met both duties simply expanded these duties to include requirements
far beyond what was contractually required
This Court has recognized that the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance
contract claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its
insured See Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009)
(quoting Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v
11
Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 WVa 34 716 SE2d 696 th 9 (2011) (quoting Noland 686
SE2d at 37) However the insurance company is not called upon to perform this duty until
some contractual duty imposed by the insurance policy has arisen Id While the contractual
duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related and both
must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id In other words claims for bad faith
and breach of an insurance contract are not separate and unique from one another and the
damages one can recover under each overlap See Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid
Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568 578 (2013) (holding that this Court
has declined to recognize an independent claim for a breach of the common law duty of good
faith and has instead held that such a claim sounds in breach of contract) see also Highmark
W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 492 655 SE2d 509 514 (2007) (holding that breaching
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action apart from
a breach ofcontract claim)
Thus to maintain a cause of action for common law bad faith a breach of the insurance
contract is a condition precedent In this case the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
establishes only two contractual obligations owed to CMD by State Auto the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify CMD has presented no evidence that either duty was breached
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Section I Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the policy states
we will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking those damages
Essentially within the context of an insurance contract the duty to defend is a covenant to
protect the insured from the expense of defending suits brought against him Sherwood
Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 3243698 A2d 1078 (1996) (quoting
12
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 409-10 347 A2d 842 851 (1975) The duty
to defend is a contractual right of control Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347 356 443 A2d 163
167 (1982) which is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment Merchants
Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 127 179 A2d 505 511 (1962) This is because the
outcome of the suit depends upon skill in investigation in negotiations for settlement and in the
conduct of the lawsuit Id
Under the terms of the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form State Auto made a
contractual promise to protect CMD from the expense of litigation and by virtue of the contract
State Auto had discretion as to how it met this duty Yet the Circuit Court redefined this duty
and essentially rewrote the insurance contract holding that
Additionally CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD throughout the claim process Such evidence includes that State Auto failed to properly investigate the claim failed to propose a remedy to resolve the Evans claim failed to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim and failed to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans This Court finds that the duty to defend and indemnify are not met merely by providing the insured with an attorney and ultimately obtaining a release ofthe insured
App at 00007 (emphasis supplied)
The Circuit Courts holding that the duty to defend [was not met by] merely by
providing the insured with an attorney oversimplifies what actually happened in this case
More importantly the Circuit Court erred because citing no authority it created a broader duty
to defend that what was contractually required The reason for the lack of authority cited is
simple there is no authority that requires State Auto to act as the Circuit Court outlined State
Auto had a contractual right of control over the defense of this claim and this is logical because
ultimately it was State Auto which was required to pay to settle the claims with the Evanses and
13
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 16: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997) This Court examines the following
factors
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means such as direct appeal to obtain the desired relief (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal (3) whether the lower tribunals order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4) whether the lower tribunals order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law and (5) whether the lower tribunals order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression
ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 State ex rei Hoover v Berger 199 WVa 12 483 SE2d 12 (1997raquo
This Court has held that [t]hese factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting
point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue Although all five
factors need not be satisfied it is clear that the third factor the existence of clear error as a
matter of law should be given substantial weight ld (quoting Syl Pt 4 Berger 483 SE2d
12)
A The Circuit Court committed clear error in rmding CMD presented evidence that State Auto violated its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
The Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment with respect to CMDs common
law bad faith claims because CMD presented no evidence that State Auto breached either the
duty to defend or the duty to indemnify CMD The Circuit Court when faced with undisputed
evidence that State Auto met both duties simply expanded these duties to include requirements
far beyond what was contractually required
This Court has recognized that the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance
contract claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its
insured See Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009)
(quoting Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v
11
Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 WVa 34 716 SE2d 696 th 9 (2011) (quoting Noland 686
SE2d at 37) However the insurance company is not called upon to perform this duty until
some contractual duty imposed by the insurance policy has arisen Id While the contractual
duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related and both
must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id In other words claims for bad faith
and breach of an insurance contract are not separate and unique from one another and the
damages one can recover under each overlap See Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid
Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568 578 (2013) (holding that this Court
has declined to recognize an independent claim for a breach of the common law duty of good
faith and has instead held that such a claim sounds in breach of contract) see also Highmark
W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 492 655 SE2d 509 514 (2007) (holding that breaching
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action apart from
a breach ofcontract claim)
Thus to maintain a cause of action for common law bad faith a breach of the insurance
contract is a condition precedent In this case the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
establishes only two contractual obligations owed to CMD by State Auto the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify CMD has presented no evidence that either duty was breached
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Section I Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the policy states
we will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking those damages
Essentially within the context of an insurance contract the duty to defend is a covenant to
protect the insured from the expense of defending suits brought against him Sherwood
Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 3243698 A2d 1078 (1996) (quoting
12
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 409-10 347 A2d 842 851 (1975) The duty
to defend is a contractual right of control Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347 356 443 A2d 163
167 (1982) which is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment Merchants
Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 127 179 A2d 505 511 (1962) This is because the
outcome of the suit depends upon skill in investigation in negotiations for settlement and in the
conduct of the lawsuit Id
Under the terms of the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form State Auto made a
contractual promise to protect CMD from the expense of litigation and by virtue of the contract
State Auto had discretion as to how it met this duty Yet the Circuit Court redefined this duty
and essentially rewrote the insurance contract holding that
Additionally CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD throughout the claim process Such evidence includes that State Auto failed to properly investigate the claim failed to propose a remedy to resolve the Evans claim failed to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim and failed to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans This Court finds that the duty to defend and indemnify are not met merely by providing the insured with an attorney and ultimately obtaining a release ofthe insured
App at 00007 (emphasis supplied)
The Circuit Courts holding that the duty to defend [was not met by] merely by
providing the insured with an attorney oversimplifies what actually happened in this case
More importantly the Circuit Court erred because citing no authority it created a broader duty
to defend that what was contractually required The reason for the lack of authority cited is
simple there is no authority that requires State Auto to act as the Circuit Court outlined State
Auto had a contractual right of control over the defense of this claim and this is logical because
ultimately it was State Auto which was required to pay to settle the claims with the Evanses and
13
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 17: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
Natl Liab amp Fire Ins Co 228 WVa 34 716 SE2d 696 th 9 (2011) (quoting Noland 686
SE2d at 37) However the insurance company is not called upon to perform this duty until
some contractual duty imposed by the insurance policy has arisen Id While the contractual
duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related and both
must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id In other words claims for bad faith
and breach of an insurance contract are not separate and unique from one another and the
damages one can recover under each overlap See Gaddy Engg Co v Bowles Rice McDavid
Graff amp Love LLP 231 WVa 577 587 746 SE2d 568 578 (2013) (holding that this Court
has declined to recognize an independent claim for a breach of the common law duty of good
faith and has instead held that such a claim sounds in breach of contract) see also Highmark
W Va Inc v Jamie 221 WVa 487 492 655 SE2d 509 514 (2007) (holding that breaching
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action apart from
a breach ofcontract claim)
Thus to maintain a cause of action for common law bad faith a breach of the insurance
contract is a condition precedent In this case the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
establishes only two contractual obligations owed to CMD by State Auto the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify CMD has presented no evidence that either duty was breached
1 The undisputed facts show that State Auto defended the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Section I Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the policy states
we will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking those damages
Essentially within the context of an insurance contract the duty to defend is a covenant to
protect the insured from the expense of defending suits brought against him Sherwood
Brands Inc v Hartford Acc and Indemnity Co 347 Md 3243698 A2d 1078 (1996) (quoting
12
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 409-10 347 A2d 842 851 (1975) The duty
to defend is a contractual right of control Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347 356 443 A2d 163
167 (1982) which is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment Merchants
Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 127 179 A2d 505 511 (1962) This is because the
outcome of the suit depends upon skill in investigation in negotiations for settlement and in the
conduct of the lawsuit Id
Under the terms of the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form State Auto made a
contractual promise to protect CMD from the expense of litigation and by virtue of the contract
State Auto had discretion as to how it met this duty Yet the Circuit Court redefined this duty
and essentially rewrote the insurance contract holding that
Additionally CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD throughout the claim process Such evidence includes that State Auto failed to properly investigate the claim failed to propose a remedy to resolve the Evans claim failed to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim and failed to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans This Court finds that the duty to defend and indemnify are not met merely by providing the insured with an attorney and ultimately obtaining a release ofthe insured
App at 00007 (emphasis supplied)
The Circuit Courts holding that the duty to defend [was not met by] merely by
providing the insured with an attorney oversimplifies what actually happened in this case
More importantly the Circuit Court erred because citing no authority it created a broader duty
to defend that what was contractually required The reason for the lack of authority cited is
simple there is no authority that requires State Auto to act as the Circuit Court outlined State
Auto had a contractual right of control over the defense of this claim and this is logical because
ultimately it was State Auto which was required to pay to settle the claims with the Evanses and
13
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 18: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
Brohawn v Transamerica Ins Co 276 Md 396 409-10 347 A2d 842 851 (1975) The duty
to defend is a contractual right of control Griggs v Bertram 88 NJ 347 356 443 A2d 163
167 (1982) which is vitally connected with the obligation to pay the judgment Merchants
Indemnity Corp v Eggleston 37 NJ 114 127 179 A2d 505 511 (1962) This is because the
outcome of the suit depends upon skill in investigation in negotiations for settlement and in the
conduct of the lawsuit Id
Under the terms of the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form State Auto made a
contractual promise to protect CMD from the expense of litigation and by virtue of the contract
State Auto had discretion as to how it met this duty Yet the Circuit Court redefined this duty
and essentially rewrote the insurance contract holding that
Additionally CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD throughout the claim process Such evidence includes that State Auto failed to properly investigate the claim failed to propose a remedy to resolve the Evans claim failed to promptly and appropriately approve and resolve the claim and failed to hire an independent lawyer to represent CMDs interests in the litigation filed by the Evans This Court finds that the duty to defend and indemnify are not met merely by providing the insured with an attorney and ultimately obtaining a release ofthe insured
App at 00007 (emphasis supplied)
The Circuit Courts holding that the duty to defend [was not met by] merely by
providing the insured with an attorney oversimplifies what actually happened in this case
More importantly the Circuit Court erred because citing no authority it created a broader duty
to defend that what was contractually required The reason for the lack of authority cited is
simple there is no authority that requires State Auto to act as the Circuit Court outlined State
Auto had a contractual right of control over the defense of this claim and this is logical because
ultimately it was State Auto which was required to pay to settle the claims with the Evanses and
13
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 19: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
the City ~f Charleston Thus the manner in which it chose to defend this claim does not
demonstrate failure to satisfy the duty to defend because neither CMD nor Mr Shah was
required to pay anything to settle this claim
Further contrary to the Circuit Courts holding State Auto did not merely provide an
attorney At all times during the pendency of the underlying litigation by the Evanses State
Auto defended CMD State Auto also defended CMD against the claims brought by the City of
Charleston In his deposition Mr Shah admitted that State Auto retained Dave Cook to defend
CMD in the law suit brought by the Evanses App at 000329 Mr Shah admitted that Dave
Cook did his job ld Neither CMD nor Mr Shah were required to pay anything to Mr Cook
and they were not required to pay expenses associated with Mr Cooks defense of the litigation
instituted against CMD ld at 000331-000332 Likewise CMD and Mr Shah were not
required to pay for any ofthe legal services Mr Cook perfonned in defending CMD against the
claims brought by the City of Charleston ld at 000326
To extend State Autos duty to defend in the manner defined by the Circuit Court would p
in effect be to rewrite the Policy CMD has presented no evidence that State Auto failed to
provide a defense or failed to pay for said defense Thus the Court erred in finding that State
Auto breached its common-law duty to defend the claims brought by the Evanses and the City of
Charleston
2 The undisputed facts show that State Auto indemnified CMD for the claims brought the Evanses and the City of Charleston
Like the duty to defend the Circuit Court has created an obligation to indemnify that
exceeds the contractual requirements by finding this duty is not met by ultimately obtaining a
release of the insured App at 00008 Again the Court cites no authority for this conclusion
and this is because there is no authority for this conclusion This duty is unambiguously defined
14
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 20: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
in the contract Under Section I - Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability the
insuring agreement obligates State Auto to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because ofbodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies There is no dispute that Slate Auto paid those sums CMD became legally obligated to
pay as damages because ofproperty damage
Litigation in the underlying matter was resolved by settlement Pursuant to the terms of
that settlement State Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by the Evanses against CMD while
securing a complete release of CMD from all liability relating to the allegations contained in the
Evanses Complaint During his deposition Mr Shah admitted that no judgment was entered
against CMD and no settlement was negotiated wherein payment was demanded of CMD
Likewise the underlying matter with the City of Charleston was resolved with State Auto paying
$5500000 to relocate the sewer line that was damaged during the slippage event Again Mr
Shah admitted that no judgment was entered against CMD and no settlement was negotiated
wherein payment was demanded ofCMD Dave Cook assisted in securing a complete release of
CMD from all liability relating to the damages to the sewer line
Since CMD did not have to pay money out of pocket to resolve either the matter with the
Evanses or the City of Charleston CMD cannot as a matter of law show that State Auto
breached its duty to indemnify it for sums it was legally obligated to pay Therefore the Court
erred in finding that CMD presented evidence that this duty was breached
The Circuit Court found that an excess judgment against the insured is not required to
maintain a bad faith action by an insured against its own insurer for failing to use good faith in
settling a claim brought against the insured App at 00007 see also State ex rei Allstate Ins v
Gaughan 203 W Va 358 508 SE2d 76 86 (1998) but see State el rei Brison v Kaufman
15
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 21: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
213 W Va 624 584 SE2d 480490 (2003) (noting that a first-party bad faith action may arise
as a result of the insurers failure to use good faith in settling a lawsuit by a third-party the
insured hanned resulting in an excess judgment against the insured) Even though an
excess judgment is not required to show common law bad faith it is clear that the liability policy
does not provide for the recovery of first party losses As discussed above this Court has held
that [w ]hile the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties they are related and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224 WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 37 (2009) (quoting
Daugherty v Allstate Ins Co 55 P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002) Here there was no
contractual obligation to indemnify CMD beyond the duty to pay those sums that CMD became
legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage Since the contractual duty and
the duty to act in good faith both must exist simultaneously to maintain a cause of action they
must likewise both be breached to maintain the same As discussed above State Auto paid all of
the sums CMD was legally required to pay under the contract Accordingly the Court
committed clear error because there is no dispute of fact that the contractual duty to indemnify
was satisfied
B The Circuit Court committed clear error in fmding CMD presented evidence that it had a claim under West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
The Circuit Court committed clear error in finding that CMD is a first-party claimant and
has a cause of action for State Autos alleged violations of sect33-11-4(9) in settling claims that
CMD became legally obligated to pay App at 00008 State Aut9 acknowledges that this
Court has held that CMD could state a claim for violations of the West Virginia UTPA
Inasmuch as a private cause of action exists for violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) and CMD alleged in its third-party complaint violations of W Va Code sect 33-11-4(9) we find that
16
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 22: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
CMD set forth sufficient infonnation to outline the elements of a statutory bad faith claim
Id Under this Courts holding CMD could assert a claim if it presented facts that it had a
claim However the undisputed facts show that CMD could not assert a claim in the context of
the cited provisions of the West Virginia UTPA 111 denying State Autos Motion for Summary
Judgment the Circuit Court ignored the plain language of the statute with respect to the specific
facts of this case Quite simply even if CMD can be a first party claimant under the West
Virginia UTPA the cited provisions are not applicable to CMDs claims
The undisputed facts show Mr Shah agreed and conceded that the policy at issue
provided no coverage for CMDs claims and the evidence clearly establishes that this could
never be a loss claim Moreover he agreed that the claims in this matter belonged to the
Evanses and the City of Charleston The Subsections of WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9) relied upon
by CMD are subsection (9)(b) and subsection (9)(t) In the context of a liability insurance
policy subsections (9)(b) and (9)(t) are designed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-related
damages from an insured and not designed to protect the insured
Subsection (9)(b) pertains to communications with respect to claims and subsection
(9)(t) pertains to settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear In the
context of a liability insurance policy the tenn claim is used in its common (and common
sense) usage an effort by a third party to recover money from the insured See Evanston Ins
Co v Sec Assur Co 715 F Supp 1405 1412 (ND m 1989) (quoting Natl Union Fire Ins
Co ofPittsburgh Pa v Contl Rlinois Corp 673 F Supp 300 307 n17 (ND lll 1987) A
[c]laim ordinarily means a demand on the insured for damages resulting from the insureds
alleged negligent act or omission Safeco Title Ins Co v Gannon 774 P2d 30 33 (Wash
App 1989) A claim must relate to an assertion of legally cognizable damage and must be a
17
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 23: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
type ofdemand that can be defended settled and paid by the insurer Evanston Ins Co v GAB
Bus Services Inc 521 NYS2d 692 695 132 AD2d 180 (1987)
In the context of the commercial genera1liability insurance policy issued by State Auto to
CMD the claims at issue in subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are the demands upon CMD by Mr
and Mrs Evans and by the Charleston Sanitary Board for compensation for the damages
resulting from CMDs alleged negligent act or 9mission Hence to the extent State Auto failed
to act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims or failed to
effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements of claims in this case the UTP A protects
only the efforts by Mr and Mrs Evans and the Charleston Sanitary Board to recover legally
cognizable damages from CMD by way of State Autos liability policy As the insured protected
by the liability policy CMD could make no type of demand that could be defended settled and
paid by State Auto Moreover CMD stipulated in the pleadings in this case that CMD was not
even making an independent claim Accordingly CMDs claims for violations of subsection
(9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 cannot be supported under the law and the
undisputed facts of this case
The third subsection of WVa Code sect 33-11-4 relied upon by CMD is subsection (9)(g)
That subsection prohibits an insurer from [ c ]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the insureds when the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) This
section has no application to a liability insurance policy In West Virginia where the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting
to the rules of interpretation Syl Pt 2 State v Elder 152 WVa 571 165 SE2d 108 (1968)
18
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 24: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
Under the commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto CMD was entitled to
two things a defense against a liability claim from a third party and indemnification of any
damages (within policy limits) due to the third party as a result of CMDs alleged negligent act or
omission WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g) only applies to claims for amounts and there is no
authority suggesting CMD had a right to recover amounts due under the State Auto policy
Consequently the Circuit Court erred in denying summary judgment on CMDs claims under
WVa Code sect 33-11-4(9)(g)
The Circuit Court committed clear error because the undisputed facts show that CMD did
not have a claim under its insurance policy and thus the cited provisions of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act are inapplicable
C The Circuit Court committed clear error by concluding there was evidence that CMDS common law bad faith allegations and violations of the West Virgihia Unfair Trade Practices Act were timely rIled
The undisputed facts show that neither CMDs common law claims for bad faith nor its
statutory bad faith claims were timely filed and the Circuit Court committed clear error in
reaching its conclusion regarding the timeliness of CMD s claims
This Court has addressed in depth the issues underling the statute of limitations and how
strictly this rule is to be applied Statutes of limitations impose very strict temporal requirements
within which a cause ofaction must be initiated See eg Syl pt 2 Perdue v Hess 199 W Va
299 484 SE2d 182 (1997) (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the
institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) Syl pt 1 in part Stevens v
Sounders 159 W Va 179220 SE2d 887 (1975) (Statutes oflimitation are statutes of repose
and the legislative purpose is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time[]) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz v Palmer 211 W Va 188
19
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 25: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
564 SE2d 398 (2001) Failure to file a lawsuit within such time periods usually results in the
dismissal of the action as having been untimely filed Wright v Myers 215 W Va 162 597
SE2d 295 (2004)
Statutes of limitations provide certainty for litigants and promote judicial economy See
eg SyI pt 2 Perdue 199 W Va 299 (The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to
require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time) SyI pt 4 Humble Oil amp
Ref Co v Lane 152 W Va 578 165 SE2d 379 (1969) (Statutes of limitation are statutes of
repose the object of which is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time) In other words [s ]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose and the legislative purpose
is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time such statutes represent a
statement of public policy with regard to the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative power SyI pt 1 Stevens 159 W Va 179 (superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Frantz 211 W Va 188) Accord Woody Carpenter 101
US 135 139 (1879) (Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in
the law They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence They promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs An important public policy lies at their
foundation They stimulate to activity and punish negligence)
It is for these reasons that this Court has strictly enforced the temporal requirements for
filing causes of action in the courts of this State By strictly enforcing statutes of limitations
we are both recognizing and adhering to the legislative intent underlying such provisions
Johnson v Nedeff 192 WVa 260 265 452 SE2d 63 (1994)
Regarding the specific statute of limitations in this case allegationS for common law bad
faith are governed by a one year statute of limitations In Noland this Court held that the one
20
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 26: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
year statute of limitations contained in W Va Code sect 55-2-12(c) (1959) (Repl Vol 2008)
applies to a common law bad faith claim Syl Pt 5 Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 224
WVa 372 686 SE2d 23 (2009) In Syl Pt 5 ofNoland this Court stated that in a first-party
bad faith claim that is based upon an insurers refusal to defend and is brought under W Va
Code sect 33-11-4(9) (2002) (Repl Vol 2006) andor as a common law bad faith claim the statute
of limitations begins to run on the claim when the insured knows or reasonably should have
known that the insurer refused to defend him or her in an action Id This Court has held that a
one year statute of limitations also applies to a statutory bad faith claim See Syl Pt 1 Wilt v
State Auto Mut Ins Co 203 WVa 165 506 SE2d 608 (1998) (Claims involving unfair
settlement practices that arise under the Unfair Trade Practices Act West Virginia Code sect 33-11shy
1 to 10 (1996 amp Supp1997) are governed by the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in West
Virginia Code sect55-2-12(c) (1994)) CMDs allegations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act are supported by the same factual contentions upon which it based its common law
bad faith claims and thus a one year statute of limitations applies to both CMDs common law
and statutory bad faith claims
Mr Shahs deposition testimony resolves any genuine issue of fact as to whether CMDs
claims are time barred Mr Shah believed State Autos actions in September and October 2009
were the beginning ofthe so called bad faith
Q By September of 2009 October 2009 you felt that - -that there was something going on with State Auto that was - -what
A This is when I filed theres beginning ofbad - bad faith
A That was the beginning ofthe bad faith
21
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 27: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
App at 000333 Because of this supposed bad faith counsel for CMD drafted a correspondence
to State Auto on October 282009 advising State Auto of damages resulting from State Autos
alleged failure to promptly and properly handle the claim App at 00064 Thus there was no
genuine dispute of fact that CMD was aware of its alleged bad faith claim in October 2009 Yet
CMD did not seek leave to file its Third-Party Complaint until September 262011 nearly two
years after the alleged bad faith occurred Even then CMDs motiop was not heard until
January 2012 and the Third-Party Complaint was not filed until March 20 2012 Thus it is
clear that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time CMD filed it its Third-Party
Complaint
Faced with this clear evidence that the s~tute of limitations the Circuit Court simply
chose to ignore the law
18 The Court further finds that neither CMDs allegations of common law bad faith or violations of the UTP A are timeshybarred
19 Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002)
20 In this case CMD has put forth evidence which shows that State Autos improper claim handling was continual and repeated through the filing of the Third-Party Complaint Notably CMD has introduced testimony of CK Shah which tends to show that State Autos bad faith conduct was ongoing and was not limited to when the claim was first submitted in 2009
App at 00009 The Circuit Court flatly ignored this Courts holding in Noland in so far as the
duty to defend is concerned 686 SE2d 23 ( statute oflimitations begins to run on the claim
when the insured knows or reasonably should have known that the insurer refused to defend him
22
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 28: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
or her in an action) As discussed above the Circuit Court found that CMD presented evidence
that State Auto breached both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify but the well settled
law and undisputed facts show that any allegations based on the breach of the duty to defend are
clearly time barred This is clear error
In Noland this Court specifically stated that its holding was only applicable to the duty to
defend However the statute of limitations should apply with equal force with regard to the duty
to indemnify To hold otherwise would in effect make the statute of limitations illusory The
Circuit Courts reliance on Graham v Beverage 211 WVa 466 566 SE2d 603 (2002) is
misplaced That case dealt with property owners who suffered continuous physical damages due
to the construction of the infiltration system and the continuing wrongful conduct of the
defendants in negligently failing to take action with regard to correcting the alleged inadequacies
of that system This led to continuous injuries to the property because the property continued to
suffer damage long after the construction of the infiltration system was completed Graham 211
WVa 466
In contrast where there is one discernable injurious event the statute of limitations
begins to toll at that the time of the discovery of that injury This Court explained this distinction
by contrasting the facts of the Graham case with Halls Park Motel Inc v Rover Construction
Inc 194 WVa 309 460 SE2d 444 (1995) In that case the plaintiff complained about the
negligent construction of a lift station which caused damage to the plaintiffs real property This
Court determined in Halls Park Motel that although the construction caused continuous
increased injuries to the plaintiffs property the cause of the injuries was a discrete and
completed act of negligent commission not [ ] a continuing negligent act of omission
23
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 29: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
Graham 211 WVa at 466566 SE2d at 603 (quoting Halls Park Motel 194 WVa at 313
460 SE2d at 448)
It is counterintuitive that the Circuit Court would rely on Graham instead of Noland or
Halls Park Motel in concluding that a claim of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
constitutes a continuing or repeated injury Contrary to the Circuit Courts finding CMDs
claims that State Auto breached its duty to indemnify do stem from a so-called discrete
occurrence in SeptemberOctober 2009 Mr Shah made it clear during his deposition that this
was when he discovered the supposed bad faith As discussed above State Auto indemnified
CMD but even assuming a breach of this duty could be identified by Mr Shahs own
admissions CMD knew of the alleged bad faith in SeptemberOctober 2009 Thus his claim
must have been filed within one year of this discovery
To hold that the breach of the duty to indemnify in regards to a bad faith claim constitutes
a continuous tort would cause uncertainty for litigants and hamper judicial economy In essence
the statute of limitations would have no force of law whatsoever For example if an insurer
were to decline to an indemnify an insured for claim bought against it the insured could bring a
bad faith claim at any time in the future because the continued refusal to indemnify would be
considered a continuous tort The claim could be brought two years later (as in the instant case)
five years later 100 years later etc because the statute would never run Such a result is
irrational and the Circuit Court committed clear error in its application of the statute of
limitations
24
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 30: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
D The Circuit Court erred in fmding that CMD presented evidence to support a claim for breach of contract
The Court erred in concluding that
CMD has put forth evidence that State Auto failed to properly defend and indemnify CMD under the Insurance Policy The Court also finds that CMD has put forth evidence to show that State Auto violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breached its insurance contract with CMD
App at 00009-00010
To establish a breach of contract a party must establish four elements (1) that a valid
enforceable contract exists (2) that the plaintiff has performed under the contract (3) that the
defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract and (4) that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result of a breach See Executive Risk Indem Inc v Charleston
Area Med Ctr Inc 681 F Supp 2d 694 714 (SD W Va 2009) (stating the four elements to
establish a breach of contract) see also Wittenberg v Wells Fargo Bank NA 852 F Supp 2d
731 749 (NDW Va 2012) (In West Virginia the elements of breach of contract are (1) a
contract exists between the parties (2) a defendant failed to comply with a term in the contract
and (3) damage arose from the breach) The breach or violation of the contract must be
material or in other words the alleged breaching party must fail to do something which he is
bound to do according to the contract that is so important and central to the ~ntract that it
defeats the very purpose of the contract J W Ellison Son amp Co v Flat Top Grocery Co 69 W
Va 380 71 SE 391 (WVa 1911) Kesner v Lancaster 180 W Va 607 378 SE2d 649
(WVa 1989) see also See Benson v AJR Inc 226 WVa 165 698 SE2d 638 650 31 IER
Cases 684 (2010) CMD cannot establish a material breach of the contract under the facts ofthis
case
25
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 31: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
Fundamentally this claim by CMD is duplicative of its allegations of common law bad
faith As explained previously the duty at issue in a bad faith breach of insurance contract
claim is the insurance companys duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured See
Noland v Virginia Ins Reciprocal 686 SE2d 23 37 (W Va 2009) (quoting Daugherty v
Allstate Ins Co SS P3d 224 228 (ColoApp2002raquo see also Loudin v Nat I Liab amp Fire Ins
Co 716 SE2d 696 fn 9 (W Va 2011) (quoting Noland 686 SE2d at 37) While the
contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct duties they are related
and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim Id As discussed in detail
above CMD can point to no provision in the COL Policy that has been materially breached by
State Auto that has resulted in damage to CMD
There is no policy provision that CMD can point to that State Auto in violation of its
duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with CMD breached Because State Auto both defended
and indemnified CMD throughout the underlying litigation under the COL Policy and because
the COL Policy provides no coverage to CMD for damages to its own property no evidence was
presented of a breach of contract and permitting this case to go forward on this claim was clear
error
26
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 32: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
III f
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court issue a show cause why the Court should not grant this Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and reverse the Circuit Courts Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance
Companys Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed_--=-~----~~~___-__
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State Bar LD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
27
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 33: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
VERIFICATON
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
The undersigned deposes and says that the contents of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHmITION are true to the best ofhis infonnation and belief and to the extent they
are based upon infonnation and belief he believes them to be true
--V$---Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 William P Margelis Esq WVa State BarLD 10530 TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA to wit
Subscribed and sworn to before me by William P Margelis on this the ~ay of
March 2017
OffiCIAL SEAL Carrie S Rose
Notary PubliC State of West Virginia
My Commission Expires April 13 2021 18 lossie lone Notary Public
Mor antown WV ~6508
My commission expires atJaayof tlpoi Zamp~
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 34: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
-----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex reI STATE AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANIES dba STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY an Ohio company
Petitioner
v Docket No
THE HONORABLE JAMES C STUCKY Judge of the Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia and CMD PLUS INC a West Virginia Corporation
Respondents
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHmITION
(Circuit Court ofKanawha County West Virginia
Civil Action No l1-C-606)
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
1
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 35: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
j
PETITIONERS CERTIFICATION OF APPENDIX
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company through its undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the contents
in the appendix are true and accurate copies of items contained in the record of the lower
tribunal Further Petitioner certifies that the appendix as a whole is sufficient to permit the
Court to fairly consider the questions presented in the petition
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 36: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
APPENDIX OF EXlJlBITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure with respect to that certain Writ of Prohibition filed contemporaneously herewith
does hereby state that the following portions of the record have been determined by the
Petitioner to be necessary as to a determination of the issues raised in the Notice ofAppeal
1 Order Denying State Auto Property amp Casualty Insurance Companys Motion for Summary Judgment 00001
2 Petition for Writ ofProhibition (December 22015) 00011
3 Appendix to Petition for Writ ofProhibition00046
4 Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies DBA State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County West Virginia Pending Resolution ofProhibition000245
5 CMDs Plus Incs Response in Objection to Petitioner State Auto Property and Casualty Companys Motion to Stay Proceedings 000252
6 Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofProhibition000258
7 State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision No 15shy1178 (filed June 14 2016)000277
8 Third Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support ofThird Party Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 000291
9 Scheduling Order CiviL 000348
10 Certified Copy ofDocket Sheet 000349
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 37: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/37.jpg)
t
Respectfully submitted this 16th day ofMarch 2017
Counsel for Petitioner State Auto Property Insurance Companies dba State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company an Ohio company Petitioner
Trevor K Taylor Esq w Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq w Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529
![Page 38: petition, State ex rel. State Auto Property Ins. v. Hon ...PROCEDURAL mSTORY OF PERTINENT UNDERLYING ISSUES . This case stems from the home construction activities performed by CMD](https://reader033.vdocuments.site/reader033/viewer/2022041608/5e35f3699dd4616d8f15aa5f/html5/thumbnails/38.jpg)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March 2017 true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Appendix were served via United States
Mail in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the following
The Honorable James C Stucky Kanawha County Judicial Building Po Box 2351 111 Court Street Charleston WV 25301 304-357-0364
Charles M Johnstone II Esq Sarah A Stewart Esq David Dobson Esq JOHNSTONE amp GABHART LLP 1125 Virginia St E PO Box 313 Charleston WV 25301
Charles T Miller Esq Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney 301 Virginia St East Charleston WV 25301
~~Signed ~~-------Trevor K Taylor Esq W Va State Bar LD 8862 ttaylortaylorlawofficewvcom William P Margelis Esq W Va State Bar LD 10530 wmargelistaylorlawofficewvcom TAYLOR LAW OFFICE 34 Commerce Drive Suite 201 Morgantown WV 26501 304-225-8529