*Article 68 and 69 FC: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

Ilusorio vs BildnerG.R. No. 139789, July 19, 2001

Ponente: PARDO, J

Contributor: Naferteri S. KuitFacts: Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed a petition before the CA for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio. The petition was dismissed by the CA. Erlinda filed an appeal with the SC pursuing the custody of Potenciano. SC dismissed Erlindas appeal.

Erlinda filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating her arguments that have been resolved in the decision rendered by the SC.

One of the issues raised by Erlinda is that they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for each other as stated under Article XII of the 2987 Consitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not Potenciano should be compelled to live with Erlinda

Ruling: NO

The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium. Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972.We definedempathyas a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.Marital union is a two-way process.

Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amoremrespect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.*Article 87 FC: DONATION

Arcaba vs Tabancura

G.R. No. 146683, November 22, 2001

Ponente: MENDOZA, J

Contributor: Naferteri S. Kuit

Facts:

Spouses Francisco Comille and Zosima Montallana were registered owners of Lot 437-A which has total area of 418 sqm. After the death of the latter, Francisco gained Zosimas portion of the said lot through an extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights executed by the latters mother.

Franciscos asked his neice Leticia Bellosillo, and the latters cousin Luzviminda Paghacian, and herein petitioner Cirila Arcaba to take care of his house as well as the store insde.

Leticia claims that Francisco and Cirila are lovers. One of Franciscos nieces claims that Cirila is his mistress. Cirila, on the other hand, said that she is a mere helper.

Before Francisco died, the latter executed a Donation Inter Vivos in which he donated his house and a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150 sqm to Cirila.

Herein respondents, Franciscos nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged the Cirila is Franciscos common-law wife and the donation made by the latter is void under Article 87 of the FC.

RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. CA affirmed RTCs decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the donation executed by Francisco is void under Article 87 of the FC

Ruling: YESAt the very least, cohabitation ispublicassumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious.

Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time. It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.

Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses.Seigfredo Tabancura presented documents apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille. These documents show that Cirila saw herself as Francisco's common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last name. Similarly, in the answer filed by Francisco's lessees in "Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy," RTC Civil Case No.4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees referred to Cirila as "the common-law spouse of Francisco." Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law.*Article 105-133 FC: CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINSMunoz, Jr vs Carlos

G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010Ponente: BRION, J

Contributor: Naferteri S. Kuit

Facts:

A 77-sqm land was registered in the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos. The said land was covered by TCT 1427.

On April 6, 1989, Eliseo mortgaged TCT 1427 to GSIS, with Erlindas consent, to obtain a housing loan. The housing loan was successfully approved.

On July 14, 1993, the title (TCT1427) was transferred to the petitioner Francisco Munoz, Jr by virtue of Deed of Absolute Sale, executed by Erlinda for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo. Respondents asked for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale. They alleged that there was no sale but a mortgage.

Respondents presented before the RTC a scientific examination which shows that Eliseos signature was forged in the SPA.

Petitioner, on the other hand, presented evidence on the paraphernal nature of the subject lot. The latter claims that the lot is the sole owner of the lot, thus, Eliseos signature is immaterial and the sale is valid.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. The CA applying the second paragraph of Article 158of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun,held that the subject property, originally Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property, became conjugal property when it was used as collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject lot is conjugal

Ruling:

As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.

In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership.Pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from the community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse.The residential lot, therefore, is Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property.

SC said that CAs reliance on Article 158 of the CC and Calimlim-Canullas is misplaced.

As the respondents were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code, its provisions on conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to 189) should have governed their property relations. However, with the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1989, the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership of gains, including Article 158, have been superseded by those found in the Family Code (Articles 105 to 133). Thus, in determining the nature of the subject property, we refer to the provisions of the Family Code, and not the Civil Code, except with respect to rights then already vested.*Article 105-133 CC: CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS

Ayala Investments vs CA

G.R. No. 118305, February 12, 1998

Ponente: MARTINEZ, J

Contributor: Naferteri S. Kuit

Facts:

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300M from Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). The Executive Vice President of PBM, Alfredo Ching, herein private respondent, made himself jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay its load. AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and Alfredo. RTC ordered PBM and Alfredo to pay the loan with interests. RTC, pending appeal of the said civil case, issued a writ of execution of pending appeal.

Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr., Deputy Sheriff of Rizal and appointed sheriff in aforementioned civil case, caused the issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three (3) of their conjugal properties.

Private respondents filed a case of injuction to enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership.

The auction took place. AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the injunction case filed by private respondents on the ground that the same had been moot and academic. RTC denied the motion. RTC also declared the sale on execution null and void. CA affirmed RTCs decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the conjugal partnership of SPS Ching should be held liable Ruling: NOArticle 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of the family.Ching vs CA

G.R. No. 124642, February 23, 2004

Ponente: CALLEJO, SR. JContributor: Naferteri S. Kuit

Facts:

Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan ofP9M from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC).PBMCI Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed a promissory note for the said amount promising to pay on December 22, 1978. Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua, bound themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent ofP38M.ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI in the amount ofP13M.

The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. ABC filed a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI to collect theP12,612,972.88.

Meanwhile, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching.

Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment.She allegedinter aliathat the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines was established in 1974.Furthermore, the indebtedness covered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed by petitioner Alfredo Ching for the account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. She attached therewith a copy of her marriage contract with Alfredo Ching.

RTC ruled in favor of SPS Ching. CA set aside and assailed RTCs decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the conjugal partnership of SPS Ching is liable on the said account of PBMCIRuling: NO

For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses.In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husbands act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI.The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited.This is different from the situation where the husband borrows money or receives services to be used for his own business or profession.In theAyalacase, we ruled that it is such a contract that is one within the term obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The Court held in the same case that the rulings of the Court inCobb-PerezandG-Tractors, Inc.are not controlling because the husband, in those cases, contracted the obligation for his own business.In this case, the petitioner-husband acted merely as a surety for the loan contracted by the PBMCI from the private respondent.Francisco vs Gonzales

G.R. No. 177667, September 17, 2008

Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J

Contributor: Naferteri S. KuitFacts:

PetitionersCleodiaU. Francisco andCeamanthaU. Francisco are the minor children ofCleodualdoM. Francisco (Cleodualdo) and MicheleUriarteFrancisco (Michele). In a Partial Decision rendered by the RTC Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the Compromise Agreement entered into by couple was approved. In the Compromise Agreement, the conjugal home (Taal St. property) was transferred by way of a deed of donation to Cleodia and Ceamantha.Meanwhile, in a case for UnlawfulDetainerwith Preliminary Attachment filed by spouses Jorge C. Gonzales andPurificacionW. Gonzales (respondents) against GeorgeZoltanMatrai(Matrai) and Michele, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ordered Matraiand Michele to vacate the premises in Lanka Drive.

A notice of sale by execution was then issued by the sheriff covering a real property (Taal St. Property) in the name ofCleodualdoM. Francisco, married to Michele U. Francisco.

Petitioners' grandmother filed with the RTC an Affidavit of Third Party Claimand a Very Urgent Motion to Stop Sale by Executionbut this was denied.

Petitioners then filed a petition forcertiorariwith the CA.

Pending resolution by the CA, the RTC issued an Order datedJuly 8, 2005, granting respondents' petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title.

The CA dismissed the petition.

Petitioners argue that: xxx (3) the adjudged obligation of Michele in theejectmentcase did not redound to the benefit of the family.

Issue:

Whether or not the Taal property should be held liable for Michele and Matris obligation

Ruling: NOIt should be noted that the judgment debt for which the subject property was being made to answer was incurred by Michele and her partner, Matrai.Respondents allege that the lease of the property inLanka Driveredounded to the benefit of the family.By no stretch of one's imagination can it be concluded that said debt/obligation was incurred for the benefit of the conjugal partnership or that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the family.

In this case, Michele, who was then already living separately fromCleodualdo, rented the house inLanka Drivefor her andMatraisown benefit.In fact, when they entered into the lease agreement, Michele andMatraipurported themselves to be husband and wife. Respondents bare allegation that petitioners lived with Michele on the leased property is not sufficient to support the conclusion that the judgment debt against Michele andMatraiin theejectmentsuit redounded to the benefit of the family of Michele andCleodualdoand petitioners.

To hold the property inTaalSt.liable for the obligations of Michele andMatraiwould be going against the spirit and avowed objective of the Civil Code to give the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.

The RTC astonishingly ruled that Michele is now the owner of the property inasmuch asCleodualdoalready waived his rights over the property.Buado vs Nicol

G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009

Ponente: TINGA, J

Contributor: Edward Nerosa

Facts:

SPS Roberto and Venus Buado (petitioners) filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol with RTC of Bacoor, Cavite. Said action originated from Erlinda Nicols civil liability arising from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by petitioners. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages. The CA affirmed the decision.

RTC commanded that of the goods and chattels of the defendant Erlinda Nicol, or from her estates or legal heirs, you cause the sum in the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, representing the moral damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses and exemplary damages and the cost of suit of the plaintiff aside from your lawful fees on this execution and do likewise return this writ into court within sixty (60) days from date, with your proceedings endorsed hereon.

Finding Erlinda Nicols personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of Cavite.

On 20 November 1992, a notice of sheriffs sale was issued.

Two (2) days before the public auction sale on 28 January 1993, an affidavit of third-party claim from one Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff prompting petitioners to put up a sheriffs indemnity bond. The auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the highest bidder.

On 4 February 1993, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioners.

Issue:

Can the conjugal property of the spouses be subject to indemnity, even though the other spouse is stranger to the suit?

Ruling: No

In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character of the property must be taken into account.

Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership, with this contention, the Court did not agree.

There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Codeexplicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime orquasi-delictis chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.

Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.Pana vs Heirs of JuaniteG.R. No. 164201 December 10, 2012Ponente: ABAD, J

Contributor: Edward Nerosa

Facts:

The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others of murder before the RTC of Surigao City.Efren was acquitted but finding Melecia and another person was guilty as charged.

The RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, civil indemnity, moral damages and actual damages. The award of civil indemnity and moral damages were affirmed but the award for actual damages was deleted. The decision became final and executory

A notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued.

On April 3, 2002, petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia. On September 16, 2002 the RTC denied the motion.10 The spouses moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same on March 6, 2003.

Issue:

Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder caseRuling: YES

This refers to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether or not the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder case. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered. Those responsibilities are as follows:

Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered. No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.BA Finance vs CA

G.R. No. L-61464, May 28, 1988

Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., J

Contributor: Naferteri S. Kuit

Facts: Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the BA Finance in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as a representative of A&L Industries.

Augusto presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who managed the business and under whose name the said business was registered, purportedly authorized the husband to procure the loan and sign the promissory note.

When the obligation became due and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the same.

The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses were guilty of fraud consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment executed by and between the spouses and A. Soriano Corporation. The writ hereby prayed for was issued by the trial court and not contented with the order.

Lily filed her answer, alleging that although Augusto Yulo and she are husband and wife, the former had abandoned her and their five (5) children five (5) months before the filing of the complaint; that they were already separated when the promissory note was executed.

RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint of the petitioner. CA affirmed RTCs decision.

Issue:

Whether or not A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband as an administratorRuling:

A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said proprietorship was established during the marriage and assets were also acquired during the same. Hence, it is presumed that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband. However, for the property to be liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at the time he incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned his family and left their conjugal home. He likewise made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of the company to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, there must be the requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the spouses.The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto against his conjugal properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of attachment cannot be issued against the said properties.

Heirs of Ayuste vs CA

G.R. No. 118784, September 2, 1999Ponente: GONZAGA-REYES, J

Contributor: Naferteri S. Kuit

Facts:

Christina Ayuste married Rafael Ayuste.

The couple purchased on a parcel of land with an area of 180 square meters.

A deed of absolute sale was executed by Rafael Ayuste in favor of private respondent whereby the former sold the abovementioned parcel of land to the latter for P40K, which amount Rafael Ayuste acknowledge having received in the deed.Christinas signature was allegedly on the deed. After Rafael Ayustes death on October 13, 1989, Christina discovered that the title to the land in Lucena was missing. She learned from her employees about the sale of the house and lot by her husband to private respondent.

Christina filed a complaint with the RTC for the annulment of the sale, cancellation of the title issued in the name of private respondent. She also alleges that her signature on the deed of sale was forged and that her husband Rafael sold the property without her knowledge and consent.

RTC declared the Deed of Absolute Sale null and void.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts ruling by holding that Christina Ayustes right to bring an action for the annulment of the sale is barred by laches because of her failure to file it during the existence of the marriage in accordance with article 173 of the Civil Code.Issue:

Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the annulment of the contract of sale entered into by Rafael Ayuste Ruling: NOUnder the Civil Code, although the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership,he cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without his wifes consent,subject only to certain exceptions specified in the law. The remedy available to the wife in case her husband should dispose of their conjugal property without her consent is laid down in Article 173 of the Civil Code which states that-

The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property.Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.(emphasis supplied)

There is no ambiguity in the wording of the law.A sale of real property of the conjugal partnership made by the husband without the consent of his wife is voidable. The action for annulment must be brought during the marriage and within ten years from the questioned transaction by the wife. Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation there is room only for application.

The fact that Christina Ayuste only learned of the sale after the death of her husband is not material.We affirm public respondents ruling that registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds constitutes a notice to the whole world. Precisely, the purpose of the legislature in providing a system of registration is to afford a means of publicity so that persons dealing with real property may search the records and thereby acquire security against instruments the execution of which have not been revealed to them.Since the deed of sale was registered on March 5, 1987, Christina Ayuste is presumed to have constructive notice of the sale from such date.Heirs of Reyes vs Mijares

Ponente:

Contributor: Behnice Tesiorna

Facts:

Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960, but had been separated de facto since 1974. Sometime in 1984, Ignacia learned that on March 1, 1983, Vicente sold the subject property to respondent spouses Cipriano and Florentina Mijares for P40k.

Ignacia sent a letter to Sps Mijares demanding the return of her share in the lot. Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia filed on June 4, 1996 a complaint for annulment of sale against Sps. Mijares. The complaint included Vicente as one of the defendants.

In their answer, respondent spouses claimed that they are purchasers in good faith and that the sale was valid because it was duly approved by the court. Vicente Reyes, on the other hand, contended that what he sold to the spouses was only his share in the subject property, excluding the share of his wife, and that he never represented that the latter was already dead.

The RTC declared the sale void in its entirety in view of the absence of the wifes consent and ordered Vicente to reimburse Sps Mijares 110k.

The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. It ruled that notwithstanding the absence of Ignacias consent to the sale, the same must be held valid in favor of respondents because they were innocent purchasers for value. The CA set aside the RTC decision.

Petitioners filed the instant petition.

Issue:

1) What is the status of the sale of the subject property?

Ruling: VOIDABLEArticles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code, the governing laws at the time the assailed sale was contracted.

Pursuant to the provisions, the husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable. Indeed, in several cases the Court had ruled that such alienation or encumbrance by the husband is void. The better view, however, is to consider the transaction as merely voidable and not void. This is consistent with Article 173 of the Civil Code pursuant to which the wife could, during the marriage and within 10 years from the questioned transaction, seek its annulment.

Issue:

2.) Assuming that the sale is annullable, should it be annulled in its entirety or only with respect to the share of Ignacia?

Ruling: ANNULED IN ITS ENITERETYAnent the second issue, the trial court correctly annulled the voidable sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 in its entirety. In Bucoy v. Paulino, a case involving the annulment of sale with assumption of mortgages executed by the husband without the consent of the wife, it was held that the alienation or encumbrance must be annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is concerned. Although the transaction in the said case was declared void and not merely voidable, the rationale for the annulment of the whole transaction is the same thus The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wife's consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall prejudice the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in the statute.

Pelayo vs Perez

Ponente:

Contributor: Behnice TesiornaFacts: David Pelayo conveyed to Melki Perez (Perez) two parcels of agricultural land (the lots) situated in Panabo, Davao.

Loreza Pelayo (Loreza), wife of Pelayo, and another one whose signature is illegible witnessed the execution of the deed.

Perez thereupon asked Loreza to sign on the first and second pages of the deed but she refused, hence, he instituted the instant complaint for specific performance against her and her husband Pelayo.

In their Answer, the Sps Pelayo claimed that as the lots were occupied illegally by some persons against whom they filed an ejectment case. SPS Pelayo further allege that they and Perez just made it appear in the deed that the lots were sold to him in order to frighten said illegal occupants, with the intentional omission of Lorezas signature so that the deed could not be registered; and that the deed being simulated and bereft of consideration is void/inexistent.

Perez countered that the lots were given to him by defendant Pelayo in consideration of his services as his attorney-in-fact to make the necessary representation and negotiation with the illegal occupants-defendants in the ejectment suit.

Defendant Pelayo claimed that the deed was without his wife Lorezas consent, hence, in light of Art. 166 of the Civil Code it is null and void.

The trial court held that the deed was null and void and accordingly rendered judgment. Perez appealed to the CA.

The CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision.

Sps. Pelayo filed the instant petition arguing, among others, that the CA made a novel ruling that there was implied marital consent of the wife of petitioner David Pelayo.

Issue:

Was the Deed of Sale null and void for lack of marital consent?

Ruling: NO

Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either be express or implied. A wifes consent to the husbands disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or set forth in any particular document, so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent or approval was indeed given. In the present case, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the execution of said document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and consented to the sale.

Petitioners do not deny that Lorenza Pelayo was present during the execution of the deed of sale as her signature appears thereon. Neither do they claim that Lorenza Pelayo had no knowledge whatsoever about the contents of the subject document. Thus, it is quite certain that she knew of the sale of their conjugal property between her husband and respondent.

If Lorenza had any objections over the conveyance of the disputed property, she could have totally refrained from having any part in the execution of the deed of sale. Instead, Lorenza even affixed her signature thereto.

Moreover, Under Article 173, in relation to Article 166, both of the New Civil Code, which was still in effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract void ab initio but merely voidable. Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid until the court annuls the same and only upon an action brought by the wife whose consent was not obtained. In the present case, despite respondents repeated demands for Lorenza to affix her signature on all the pages of the deed of sale, showing respondents insistence on enforcing said contract, Lorenza still did not file a case for annulment of the deed of sale.

Aguete vs PNB

G.R. No. 170166 , April 6, 2011Ponente: CARPIO, JContributor: Naferteri S. KuitFacts:

SPS Jose A.RosandEstrellaAguetefiled a complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings takenthereunderagainst PNB Laoag Branch. Plaintiff-appelleeJose A.Rosobtained a loan ofP115Kfrom PNBLaoagBranch, Ros executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land with all the improvements.

Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB Laoagas the highest bidder. After the lapse of one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB LaoagBranch.

Plaintiff-appelleeEstrellaAguete claimed that she has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property. A complaint was filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA reversed the decision and granted PNBs appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property were null and void on the ground that the wife did not give her consent

Ruling: NOThere is no doubt that the property was acquired during Ros and Aguetes marriage. RosandAguetewere married on 16 January 1954, while the subject property was acquired in 1968.There is also no doubt thatRosencumbered the subject property when he mortgaged it for P115,000.00on 23 October 1974.PNBLaoagdoes not doubt thatAguete, as evidenced by her signature, consented toRos mortgage to PNB of the subject property. On the other hand,Aguetedenies ever having consented to the loan and also denies affixing her signature to the mortgage and loan documents.

The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable. In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule thatAguetegave her consent toRos encumbrance of the subject property.The documents disavowed byAgueteare acknowledged before a notary public, hence they are public documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged and certified as provided by law may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment beingprima facieevidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved.18The execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot be disproved by the mere denial of the alleged signer.19PNB was correct when it stated that petitioners omission to present other positive evidence to substantiate their claim of forgery was fatal to petitioners cause.20Petitioners did not present any corroborating witness, such as a handwriting expert, who could authoritatively declare thatAguetessignatures were really forged.

De Leon vs De Leon

Ponente:

Contributor: Lexi Singanon

Facts: Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell a 191.30 square-meter lot.Subsequently, on April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite.

PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio.Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 173677 was issued o in the name of Bonifacio, single.

Subsequently, Bonifacio, for P19K, sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas), petitioners herein.The conveying Deed of Sale did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. Three months after Bonifacios death, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale and had TCT No. 173677 canceled.

Danilo and Vilma, Bonifacio and Anitas children, filed a Notice of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds to protect their rights over the subject property. Anita and her children alleged, among other things, that fraud attended the execution of the Deed of Sale and that subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show that he was still the owner of the parcel of land.

The Tarrosas averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property inasmuch as he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC.As further alleged, they were not aware of the supposed marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Anita and her children. The decision was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:

Whether or not the Deed of Sale valid

Ruling: NO

Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife.For the presumption to arise, it is not, asTan v. Court of Appeals[9]teaches, even necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership.Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal.In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal.

Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970.This full payment, to stress, was made more than two (2) years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968.In net effect, the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership to the property is, by law, presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. What is material is thetimewhen the property was acquired.

It cannot be over-emphasized that the 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the consequence of the husband alienating or encumbering any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. To a specific point, the sale of a conjugal piece of land by the husband, as administrator, must, as a rule, be with the wifes consent.Else, the sale is not valid.So it is that in several cases we ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife is voidab initio, absent any showing that the latter is incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like causes.

Heirs of Fernandez vs MingoaG.R. No. 146548, December 18, 2009Ponente: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J

Contributor: Edward NerosaFacts:The subject matter of the action is a parcel of land with an area of 520.50 square meters registered in the name of Domingo B. Hernandez, Sr. married to Sergia V. Hernandez.Later on, said TCT No. 107534 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 290121 was issued in favor of Melanie Mingoa.A complaintwas filed by herein petitioners, heirs of Domingo Hernandez, Sr., namely, SPS Sergia Hernandez and their surviving children, against the respondents herein, Dolores Camisura, Melanie Mingoa, Atty. Plaridel Mingoa, Sr. and all persons claiming rights under the latter, and the Quezon City Register of Deeds.

The petitioners asked for (a)the annulment and/or declaration of nullity of TCT No. 290121 including all its derivative titles, the Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Dolores Camisura,the SPA in favor of Plaridel Mingoa, Sr.,and the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate executed by Plaridel Mingoa, Sr. in favor of Melanie Mingoafor being products of forgery and falsification; and (b) the reconveyance and/or issuance to them (petitioners) by the Quezon City Register of Deeds of the certificate of title covering the subject property.

Respondents argue that: the claim or demand has been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; lack of cause of action; lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendants or over the subject or nature of the suit; and prescription.The RTC denied respondents motion to dismiss.

On the basis of a technicality, respondents appeal was dismissed.

The parties having failed to amicably settle during the scheduled pre-trial conference, the case proceeded to trial.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA reversed and set asisde RTCs decision. Hence, this petition.Issue:

Whether or not the land was validly transferredRuling: YESIt bears stressing that the subject matter herein involves conjugal property.Said property was awarded to Domingo Hernandez, Sr. in 1958.The assailed SPAs were executed in 1963 and 1964.Title in the name of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. covering the subject property was issued on May 23, 1966.The sale of the property to Melanie Mingoa and the issuance of a new title in her name happened in 1978.Since all these events occurred before theFamily Code took effect in 1988, the provisions of the New Civil Code govern these transactions.

The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wifes consent,may be annulled by the wife. (emphasis ours)

In succeeding cases, we held that alienation and/or encumbrance of conjugal property by the husband without the wifes consent is not null and void but merely voidable.

Indeed, in several cases the Court has ruled that such alienation or encumbrance by the husband is void.The better view, however, is to consider the transaction as merely voidable and not void.This is consistent with Article 173 of the Civil Code pursuant to which the wife could, during the marriage and within 10 years from the questioned transaction, seek its annulment.The fact that the Mingoa's were able to take actual possession of the subject property for such a long period without any form of cognizable protest from Hernandez, Sr. and the plaintiffs-appellees strongly calls for the application of the doctrine of laches.It is common practice in the real estate industry, an ocular inspection of the premises involved is a safeguard to the cautious and prudent purchaser usually takes, and should he find out that the land he intends to buy is occupied by anybody else other than the seller who is not in actual possession, it could then be incumbent upon the purchaser to verify the extent of the occupant's possessory rights.The plaintiffs-appellees asseverate that the award was made in favor of Hernandez, Sr. in 1958; full payment made in 1963; and title issued in 1966.It would thus be contrary to ordinary human conduct (and prudence dictates otherwise) for any awardee of real property not to visit and inspect even once, the property awarded to him and find out if there are any transgressors in his property.

Furthermore, Hernandez, Sr.'s inaction during his lifetime lends more credence to the defendants-appellants assertion that the said property was indeed sold by Hernandez, Sr. by way of the SPAs, albeit without the consent of his wife.xxx

In sum, the rights and interests of the spouses Hernandez over the subject property were validly transferred to respondent Dolores Camisura.Since the sale of the conjugal property by Hernandez, Sr. was without the consent of his wife, Sergia, the same is voidable; thus, binding unless annulled.Considering that Sergia failed to exercise her right to ask for the annulment of the sale within the prescribed period, she is now barred from questioning the validity thereof.And more so, she is precluded from assailing the validity of the subsequent transfers from Camisura to Plaridel Mingoa and from the latter to Melanie Mingoa.Therefore, title to the subject property cannot anymore be reconveyed to the petitioners by reason of prescription andlaches.The issues of prescription andlacheshaving been resolved, it is no longer necessary to discuss the other issues raised in this petition.

*Article 105-133 FC: CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS

Guiang vs CA

G.R. No. 125172,June 26, 1998Ponente: PANGANIBAN, JContributor:

Facts:

Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. Gildaand Judie Corpuz, with plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as vendee, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located in Barangay Gen. Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South Cotabato. Gilda and Judie Corpuz sold one-half portion of their lot to the defendants-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang.

Gilda Corpuz left for Manila sometime in June 1989.Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the remaining one-half portion including their house, of their homelot to defendants Guiangs.She wrote a letter to her mother informing her.She [Gilda Corpuz] replied that she was objecting to the sale.

However, in the absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz, defendant Judie Corpuz pushed through the sale of the remaining one-half portion. Transferor Judie Corpuzs children Junie and Harriet signed the document as witnesses.

Sometime on March 11, 1990, plaintiff returned home.

For staying in their house sold by her husband, plaintiff was complained against by defendant Luzviminda Guiang and her husband Antonio Guiang.

Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed an Amended Complaint against her husband Judie Corpuz and Petitioners-Spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang.The said Complaint sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her husband, null and void.

RTC ruled in favor of Gilda. CA affirmed RTCs decision.Issue:

Whether or not the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed

Ruling: NOThis being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly applied by the two lower courts.Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code, the trial court adroitly explained the amendatory effect of the above provision in this wise:

The legal provision is clear.The disposition or encumbrance is void.It becomes still clearer if we compare the same with the equivalent provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines.Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent.The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null and void.It is merely voidable.The offended wife may bring an action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance.Thus, the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:

Art. 173.The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property.Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.(n)

This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years x x x during [the] marriage to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code.It is thus clear that any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and void.

Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to by petitioners were perpetrated in the execution of the document embodying the amicable settlement.Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that barangay authorities made her sign said document through misrepresentation and coercion.[13]In any event, its execution does not alter the void character of the deed of sale between the husband and the petitioners-spouses, as will be discussed later.The fact remains that such contract was entered into without the wifes consent.

In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondents consent.To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements:(1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent,[14]the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.

Manalo vs Camaisa

G.R. No. 147978, January 23, 2002

Ponente: KAPUNAN, J

Contributor: Naferteri S. Kuit

Facts:

Petitioner was interested in buying the two properties so she negotiated for the purchase through a real estate broker, Mr.ProcesoEreno, authorized by respondent spouses.

Petitioner met with the vendors who turned out to be respondent spouses.Shemade a definite offer to buy the properties to respondentEdilbertoCamaisawith the knowledge and conformity of his wife, respondent NormaCamaisain the presence of the real estate broker.When petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties,Edilbertoassured her of his wifes conformity and consent to the sale.When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real estate broker atEdilbertosoffice for the formal affixing of Normas signature, she was surprised when respondent spouses informed her that they were backing out of the agreement.

Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against respondent spouses to compel respondent NormaCamaisato sign the contracts to sell.Respondent Norma F.Camaisafiled a Motion for Summary Judgmentasserting that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact on the basis of the pleadings and admission of the parties considering that the wifes written consent was not obtained in the contract to sell,the subject conjugal properties belonging to respondents; hence, the contract was null and void.

RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. CA affirmed RTCs decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the husband can dispose a conjugal property without his wifes written consent

Ruling:The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires thewritten consentof the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void.

The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur.

Petitioner is correct insofar as she alleges that if the written consent of the other spousecannot be obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give such authority if the same is warranted by the circumstances. However, it should be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124 is only resortedto in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated. In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the absence of such showing of the wifes incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought.

Homeowners Savings Bank vs Dailo

G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005Ponente: TINGA, JContributor: Naferteri S. Kuit

Facts:

Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot from a certain Sandra Dalida. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.

Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City.

The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.

Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the Regional Trial Court forNullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damagesagainst petitioner.

In the lattersAnswer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.

RTC rendered judgment against the petitioner. RTC declared all documents related to the transaction as null and void. CA affirmed RTCs decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the mortgage constituted by Marcelino is valid as to his undivided share

Ruling: NOIn applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.

Respondent and the late Marcelino.were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community orconjugal partnership of gains governed the property relationsbetween respondent and her late husband.With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 onConjugal Partnership of Gainsin the Family Code wasmade applicableto conjugal partnership of gainsalready established before its effectivityunless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.

The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner.The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership,where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance.Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 onConjugal Partnership of Gainsof the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.

The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.

Ravina vs Villa Abrille

G.R. No. 160708, October 16, 2009Ponente: QUISUMBING, Acting C.JContributor: Behnice Tesiorna

Facts:Respondent Mary Ann and Pedro Villa Abrille are married. They are married, who are also parties to this case.

In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-26471 (Lot 8).Through their joint efforts, they obtained a loan from DBP and built a house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot.

By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent.

Mary Ann and their children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and Attorneys Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunctionagainst Pedro and the Sps. Ravina in the RTC of Davao City.During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina testified that they bought the house and lot from Pedro, and that her husband, petitioner Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles when they bought the property.RTC: Ruled in favour of Mary Ann. CA: Modified the ruling. Lot 8 is declared VALID. Lot 7 is declared NULL and VOID.Issue:

Whether or not the sale executed by Pedro is validRuling: NO

The lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.

Petitioners bare assertion would not suffice to overcome the presumption that TCT No. T-88674, acquired during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.

The sale concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code and is governed by Art 124 which treats such disposition to be VOID if done:

(a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouses inability, the authority of the court.(b) Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.

Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without Mary Anns consent.

Fuentes vs Roca

G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010Ponente: ABAD, JContributor: Behnice Tesiorna

Facts:Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City. On October 11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title transferred to his name.

Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent. As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized Rosarios affidavit in Zamboanga City. On January 11, 1989 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses.

Eight years later in 1998, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul the Deed of Sale and reconvey the property on the ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was not attained and that her signature was a mere forgery.

RTC: Ruled in favour of Sps Fuentes. CA: CA reversed the RTC decision. Issue:

Was Rosarios signature forged?

Ruling: YES.

The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent had been forged. For, if the signature were genuine, the fact that she gave her consent to her husbands sale of the conjugal land would render the other issues merely academic.Issue:

Whether or not the sale is valid

Ruling: NO.

Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code.

In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husbands sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouses written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription.

Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mothers (his wifes) written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.

Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that applies to the transaction as the CA held, Article 173 provides that the wife may bring an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale. It did not yet prescribe.

Beumer vs BeumerG.R. No. 195670. December 3, 2012Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, JContributor: Edward NerosaFacts:

Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, were married. Their marriage was subsequently declared by the RTC the nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership.

In defense, Avelina averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage. She claims that she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance. During trial Willem testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. RTC ruled that in their conjugal partnership must be dissolved, all the parcels of land to respondent as her paraphernal properties must be awarded to Avelina; the tools and equipment in favor of petitioner as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties.

Willem appealed to the CA averring that the properties awarded to Avelina were purchased by him, and it was only named after his wife because of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership. He is willing to only get reimbursement of the money he purchased for those properties and the other he waived it to his ex-wife. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Issue:

Is William entitled for reimbursement?Ruling: NO.The Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.

Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution, to wit: Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads: Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. *Article 143 FC: REGIME OF SEPARATION OF PROPERTYMaquilan vs MaquilanG.R. NO. 155409, June 8, 2007Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, JContributor: Edward Nerosa

Facts:

Virgilio and Dita private respondent are spouses Petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latters paramour.Both the private respondent and her paramour were convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer an imprisonment.

Private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages in which Virgilio and Dita had an agreement.Virgilio prayed for the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement and the reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement by the respondent judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the Compromise Agreement.

The respondent Judge denied the aforementioned motion. Displeased, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order, but the same was denied.The petitioner filed a Petition forCertiorariand Prohibition with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. CA dismissed the Petition for lack of merit.The CA held, among others, that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery does notipso factodisqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property.

Issue:

Whether a spouse convicted of either concubinage or adultery, can still share in the conjugal partnershipRuling: YES

Virgilio contends that the Compromise Agreement is void because it circumvents the law that prohibits the guilty spouse, who was convicted of either adultery orconcubinage, from sharing in the conjugal property.Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, the petitioner argues that her share should be forfeited in favor of the common child under Articles 43(2)and 63of the Family Code. These contentions of the petitioner is untenable, Article 43 is the effect when the absentee spouse reappeared under Article 42 while article 63 is the effect of legal separation. Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval.The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law.This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending.However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code.

*Article 147-148 FC: PROPERTY REGIMES OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE OR UNDER A VOID MARRIAGE

Valdes vs RTCG.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996Ponente: VITUG, J

Contributor: Naferteri S. KuitFacts:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC granted the petition. It also directed Antonio and Consuelo to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common propertiesas defined byArticle 147of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions ofArticles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code.

Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code.

She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage."

In his recourse to this Court, petitioner Antonio submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be held controlling. He argues that Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychologically incapacitated; and assumingarguendothat Article 147 applies to marriages declared voidab initioon the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.

Issue:

Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code is applicable in the case at barRuling: YES

Article 147 of the Family Code is applicable in marriages declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to thelegal capacityof a party to contract marriage,i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38"7of the Code.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union isprima faciepresumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household."8Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that

(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by actintervivoshis or her share in co-ownership property, without consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and

(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation9or declaration of nullity of the marriage.

The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43,13relates only, by its explicit terms, tovoidablemarriages and, exceptionally, tovoidmarriages under Article 4014of the Code,i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.Buenaventura vs CA

G.R. No. 127358, March 31, 2005Ponente: AZCUNA, JContributor: Naferteri S. Kuit

Facts:

On July 4, 1979, Noel Buenaventura married Isabel Lucia Singh. On July 12, 1992, Noel filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, which he later amended and stated that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated.On July 31, 1995, RTC declared the marriage between Noel Buenaventura and Isabel Lucia Singh null and void. The RTC ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property, among others.CA, on the other hand said that since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared voidab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Issue:

Whether or not Article 147 of the FC is the applicable property regime in the case at barRuling: YES

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the courta quoshould, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.Abing vs Waeyan

G.R. No. 146294, July 31, 2006Ponente: GARCIA, JContributor: Behnice Tesiorna

Facts:

John Abing and Juliet Waeyan cohabited from 1986-1995 as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, they bought a 2-storey residential house. Consequent to the purchase, the tax declaration of the 2-storey house was transferred in the name of Juliet.

In 1991, Julia left for Korea for overseas employmentIn 1992, the 2-storey house underwent renovation. To it was annexed a new structure which housed a sari-sari store. This new structure and the sari-sari store thereat are the properties involved in this case.

In 1994, Juliet returned from Korea and continued to live with John. She managed the sari-sari store while John worked as a mine employee.

In 1995, their relationship went sour. Hence, they decided to partition their properties. For the purpose, they executed on October 7, 1995 a Memorandum of Agreement. Under their unsigned agreement, John shall leave the couples' dwelling with Juliet paying him the amount of P428,870 representing John's share in all their properties. On the same date October 7, 1995 Juliet paid John the sum of P232,397.66 by way of partial payment of his share, with the balance of P196,472.34 to be paid by Juliet in twelve monthly installment beginning November 1995.

Juliet failed to pay the balance. John demanded of her to vacate the annex structure housing the sari-sari store. Juliet refused, prompting John to file an ejectment suit against.

In his complaint, John alleged that he alone spent for the renovation of their house with his exclusive funds and money he borrowed from relatives. Juliet averred that the original house was renovated thru their common funds and that the structure annexed thereto was merely an attachment, hence the same pertained to both of them in common.

MTC: Ruled in favor of John. Juliet appealed. RTC affirmed the MTC decision. Juliet appealed to the CA. CA: Reversed the RTC and MTC decision. Hence, John filed instant petition.Issue: Does the subject property pertain to the exclusive ownership of John?Ruling: NOOther than John's bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and money he borrowed from his relatives, spent for the construction of the annex structure, evidence is wanting to support such naked claim. There is a paucity of evidence, testimonial or documentary, to support petitioner's self-serving allegation that the annex structure which housed the sari-sari store was put up thru his own funds and/or money borrowed by him. Sure, petitioner has in his favor the tax declaration covering the subject structure. In this connection, Article 147 of the Family Code is instructive. It reads:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in common "in equal shares." Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.

The fact that they were unable to sign the MoA does not affect its binding effect between them.

Metrobank vs Pascual

G.R. No. 163744, February 29, 2008Ponente: VELASCO, JR., JContributor: Behnice TesiornaFacts:

Respondents Nicholson (Nelson) Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on Jan 19, 1985. During their marriage, Florencia bought from Sps Sering a 250-sqm lot with a 3-door apartment standing thereon. Consequently, the TCT of the lot was cancelled and transferred to the name of Florencia, married to Nelson Pascual.

In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art 36. Their marriage was declared null and avoid for Nelsons psych incapacity. In the same decision, the RTC ordered the dissolution and liquidation of ex-spouses CPG. Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate ways without liquidating their conjugal partnership.

In 1997, Florencia together with Sps Oliveros obtained a P58M loan from Metobank. To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including one involving the lot covered by TCT No. 156283 (3-door apartment). Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the loan were a copy of TCT No. 156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a document denominated as "Waiver" that Nicholson purportedly executed on April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia, covered the conjugal properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentally include the lot in question.

Due to the failure of Florencia and Sps Oliveros to pay their loan, Metrobank initiated foreclosure proceedings on the properties. Subsequently, Metrobank caused the publication of the notice of sale. On Jan 21, 200, Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder.

Nelson filed on June 28, 2000 before the RTC in Makati a complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property. In it, Nelson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal in nature, was mortgaged without his consent.

Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim alleged that the disputed lot, being registered in Florencias name, was paraphernal. Metrobank also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith.Nicholson counters that the mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does not automatically result in a regime of complete separation when it is shown that there was no liquidation of the conjugal assets.Issue:

Does termination of the conjugal property regime ipso facto end the nature of conjugal partnership?Ruling: NOWhile the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership. This conclusion holds true whether we apply Art. 129 of the Family Code on liquidation of the conjugal partnerships assets and liabilities which is generally prospective in application, or Section 7, Chapter 4, Title IV, Book I (Arts. 179 to 185) of the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains. For, the relevant provisions of both Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal properties before a regime of separation of property reigns.

In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the former spouses, where:

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.

Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobanks right, as mortgagee and as the successful bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2 undivided portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in question, Metrobank may ask for the partition of the lot and its property rights "shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to [the bank] in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Dino vs DinoG.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011Ponente: CARPIO, JContributor: Lexi SinganonFacts:

Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad Dio were married on 14 January 1998 before MayorVergelAguilar of LasPiasCity.

Petition filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petitioner. In the same decision RTC stated that the decree shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the FC. Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.RTC granted the motion and stated that the decree shall be issued after liquidation,, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Art. 147 of the FC.Issue: Shall a decree of absolute nullity of marriage only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family CodeRuling: NOThe Court has ruled inValdes v. RTC, that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,8such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1.The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;

2.They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and

3.Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147