Iowa State University

From the SelectedWorks of Abdi M. Kusow

1994

Peace and stability in Somalia: problems andprospectsAbdi M. Kusow, Wayne State University

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/abdi_kusow/4/

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Ufahamu: A Journal of African StudiesUCLA

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Title:Peace and Stability in Somalia: Problems and Prospects

Journal Issue:Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, 22(1-2)

Author:Kusow, Abdi M.

Publication Date:1994

Permalink:http://eprints.cdlib.org/uc/item/77v83159

Local Identifier:international_asc_ufahamu_16717

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2S

PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOMALIA:PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTSl

Abdi M. Kusow

The purpose of this article is to examine the root causes of thecurrent civil scire in Somalia, and to suggest possible tentative socio­political reconstruction modes. By reconstruction, we mean theintroduction of alternative socia-political models which are appropriate10 Ihe current linguistic and clan realities of the country. However,before any future reconstructions are anempted. it is very imponam thatwe understand the causes of the current crisis. This will also help futureSomali leaders avoid repeating past mistakes. It must be noted,however, that the recommendations of the author are tentative and areintended to provide a basic guideline. These recommendations mustnevenheless be seen as strong and realistic guidelines upon which futurepolitical formations can be based.

It is argued thai the causes of the current civil strife and Iheresulting famine in Somalia are far deeper than "Warlordism,"2 It is inlarge measure attributed to the traditional mode of production of thesociety at large-that is both pastoralism and agropastoralism.governmental policies that have neglected rural Somalia overapproximately the past 20 years, and a rising critical consciousnesswhich at the same time resulted in heightened clan consciousness overthe past 15 years,3 It is suggested that since past forms ofgovernments, national integration models such as detribalization, andthe invention of Somali nationalism have all failed, the only optionremaining for the people is tQ create a decentralized federal system ofgovernment based on semi "semi-regional autonomy,"

Introduction

Scholarship in Somali studies, especially dealing with the cultureof the people. has exaggerated the homogeneity of the country withoutextensive investigation of the cultural intricacies of the society, Thus.historians. anthropologists, and successive Somali governments alikefailed to recognize the cultural. socioeconomic, and ecologicaldifferences among the people, Rather, they took Somali nationalism as agiven and concentrated more on how the colonial powers divided theSomali nation into five different colonial zones,4

26 UFAHAMU

This portrayal of the Somali nation has painted a picture foruncritical students of Somali srudies and Somali tntelleclUals in whichthe slightest hint of civil war remained inconceivable.5 Yet Somalia iscurrently experiencing one of the worst civil wan in the modem historyof the country. In a recent article. I. M. Lewis expresses thiscontradiction in the following manner: "The Somali case seemed atindependence (in 1960) very differenL Nationalism was already pan oftheir heritage and their problem was not that of nalion·building. butextending national statehood outside the frontien of the Somali Republic(fonned by the Union of the British and Italian SomaJiland) to embracethe remaining portions of lhe nation in Djibouti. Ethiopia and Kenya.Thus. at home, they seemed to possess an exemplary mono-culturalnationhood...."6 Lewis goes on to say. "Hindsight highlights the factthat although the Somalis had. prior to their coloniaJ partition. a strongsense of cultural nationalism. they did nOI consUlUle a single politicalunit...., What Lewis may have observed in 1960 could have probablybeen a very well aniculated Darood nationalism dressed as Somalinationalism., rather than a tnIe Somali nationalism.

In reality, the mono-culture or nomadic culture which Lewis andthose who supponed his perspective speak about is mainly from thenonhem pan of the country. This area is also the focus of Lewis'swork. A PlulorlJl DemocrlJCJ, (published in 1961).' Mostimportantly, contrary to the weU-publici.tt.d myth, the Somali people aredivided in two distinctly different groups. These are the twO Rewinagropastonilistic (Digit and Mirifle) groups on the one hand and the fournomadic groups (Hawiye, Dir, Darood, and lsaq) on the other. Thefirst group speaks the Rewin language. while the later speaks theNorthern Somali language. These two languages differ to the sameextent as Spanish and Portuguese. Even within the nomadic group, theHawiye, the largest clan within the nomadic is sociocultura11y differentfrom the rest because of its settled tradition. There is also a largenumber of irrigation flUmers along the Jubba and ShabeUe rivers whoare referred to as Africans. This classification makes one wonder whatcontinent the Somalis belong to.

Despite the popular assumption that the Somali people were anation before the arrival of the colonial powers, Somali societyconsisted of several distinct lein, language and economic communities.It can even be postulated that at one time, the ancestors of the six majorclan families occupied discrete territories within which much of theirhistory and sense of identity evolved. Somali clan politics in the paStalso indicate a clear segmentation of political authority whereby eachclan had its own tribal leader. Even though some or all of these clanleadm have expanded beyond their lineage lJU, it is doubtful that they

KUSOW 27

have controlled mote than one or two c1ans.9 Even the indigenousgovernment after the independence (in 1960), despite its legitimateaumority and strong nationalistic will. was never able to reach itssubjectS across lhe land except through the clan cruefs. An even moreperplexing situation is how the society and its socioeconomic cullurc:was characterized. especially in relation to the distinction betweennomadism and agriculture. For example, the Rewin (Digil and Mirifle),who are largely portrayed as agriculturalists. are no less nomadic thanthe rest of the country. The lower Shabelle. and the Upper and LowerJubba regions where the predominam population are of these two clans,can be considered half nomadic and half settled. For inSWlce, the Bayregion, considered to have the greatest potential in Somalia forintensification and expansion of agriculture, holds at the same time thehighest number of livestock of any region in the counay.10 On theother hand. the assumption that northern pans of Somalia are the centerof the Somali pastoral economy is no longer true for two main reasons.rUSt, due to desertification and other ecological problems in the nonh,the number of livestock that the land can hold is decreasing, while thenumber of livestock is multiplying faster in the southern regions.Second, over the past 15·20 years, the number of nomadic irrunigtaIllsto the urban areas of the south has doubled, creating what Said Samatatreferred to as the "urban nomad. "It Third, the majority of the Hawiyeclan can be categorized more accurately as agropastoralists rather thanpure nomads. The northern region has only served as a trading post forlivestock exportations from all pans of the country. Funhennore, theresults of the 1957 census indicated that the population or the Rewin andHawiye were far greater than the rest of the popuiation. 12 Other sourcesindicate also that the southern regions hold the largest number oflivestock in the country. This may lead one to question the populationsize of the so-called nonhero nomadic groups, the size of livestock inthat area, and the relevance of the nomadic culture as the national ctiltureof the nation.

The Rewin Speakers

The Rewin clan families (Digil and Mirifle) comprise roughly40% of the population and are two of the six major Somali clan families.These two clans are socio-culturally and linguistically different from theother four groups. Socio--culturally, they practice agro-pastoralism--amixture of nomadism and dry-land farming. Geographically, theyoccupy the land south of the Shabelle River. Linguistically, they speakthe May language as opposed to Maxarir~.13 Unlike their northern

28 UFAHAMU

brothers, except the southern Hawiye clans including the AbgaJ andothers like the Biimal. they are settled communities and depend on theirlabor for survival. In fact, along with the so-called Bantu groups andthe above mentioned Southern Hawiye clans, they have created thebread basket of the country. Nevertheless. they have been extremelysubordinated over the past 3O-4Q years both politically and culturally.Their language and culture have been suppressed. The imemalionalcommunities were given the impression that Somalia. unlike any othercounby in Africa. is virtually homogenous. with almost all the peoplespealcing the same language. However, in truth 40% of the people arelinguistically and socio-culturally distinct from the rest. To give ageneral idea about the differences in language. let me quote onc of theforemost anthropologists on the Hom of Africa: "The widest dialectdifference is between the speech of the northern pastoralists and theDigit and Rahanwayn agriculturalists. These differ much to the sameextent as Ponuguese and Spanish, yet since many of its speakers arealso familiar with the standard Somali, the extent of this distinctsouthern dialect does not alter the fact that from Jibouti Republic toGarissa on the Tana River in Kenya standard Somali provides a singlechannel of communication"I" This statement correctly points out theextent of differences between the two languages. Yet it fails torecognize that the majority of the Rewin speakers live in me rural areasand therefore can not speak the cenual language. In fact, when agovernment official goes to the south for official visit. he or she musthire a translator.

The BllITe regime (1969-1990) further subordinated this groupboth politically and culturally. In 1990, BllITe's troops fleeing fromMogadishu desuoyed the southern cities including Baidoa andBardheere. They also indiscriminately wiped out rural villages.confiscating people's property and killing men between the ages of 15and 30. Later, General Aideed.'s militia/clan finished off everything leftby Siyyad Barre, to a point where the people could no longer sustainthemselves. As late as September 13. 1992, the number of deaths wasestimated to be more than 50 a day. The main reasons for this uagedyare that Aideed's clan. who conuolled the highways leading to thesouthern cities. refused to allow food to pass through to the Rewin clansbecause of their cultural and linguistic differences and that Aideedwanted to starve them so mat he could acquire their land. Moreover,Aideed. has refused to allow any foreign intervention mainly for politicalreasons. Aideed feared that once foreign troops arrived he would loseconuol over the area; this appears to have happened following UnitedStates intervention.

KUSOW 29

The socioeconomic mode of production in Somalia can begenerally divided into pastoralism in the nonh and agropastoralism inthe south. small pockets of fishing along the coastal areas. and irrigationfarming along the Jubba and Shabelle rivers. Traditionally. bothpastoralism and agropastoralism have not been well-organized,productive activities. panly due 10 a lack of modem technology. and theconstant migrant nature of pastoralism that did not allow any organizeddevelopment. In the plains south of the Shabelle river. whereagropatoralism has been the dominant mode of production. bothpastoralism and dry-land farming remain part-time occupations. Peopleconstantly shift between dry-land fanning and pastoralism depending onthe season and the rainfall in the area. thereby complicating any kind oforganized, sustained, long·tenn development. State developmentpolicies do not help either. Since 1960. development stracegiS!S haveshifted their focus several times from draft animals to agriculturalintensification through extension activities back to the introduction ofdraft animals. An even bigger problem is the incorrect ways in whichlocal producers have been characterized as either pure farmers or purenomads. 1.5 As a result. there has never been any integrated andappropriate developmem that considered the constant shift of the peoplebetween dry-land fannin$ and pastoralism.

Pure pastoralism IS even less conducive to modem development.Its productive sphere does not include the concept of productivity as ameasurement of active physical work. As Rabi pointed out. "Thenomad lives with his herds. These are born. grow up. and reproduce allalone. The task of the shepherd is basically limited to watching overthem and occasionally giving them some supplementary care."16Furthennore, due to the harsh climatic situation of the country. thenomad spends most of his time not in productive activity but on puresurvival. thus making him unable to accumulate materials for futureconsumption and invesunent. It is also said that the nomadic groupsdespise anything related to physical work. including farming, metalworking, and so forth. This twin dilemma of not appreciating and evendespising the concept of productive work and the punishingunpredictable environment that does not allow the nomad to progressoften force him to invent ingenious ways-some of them iIlegal-.:-toensure security and survival. As Deriye pointed out, 'The traditionallooting of stoCk which used to underlie IOOSt tribal conflicts can be cited

30 UFAHAMU

as a resort to this form of extra-legality just as misappropriation ofpublic funds is another. mOTC refined manifestation of the samephenomenon in modern times."!7 The result has been anoverwhelming number of people receiving incomes either illegally orthrough outright donations from fortunate clan members or the statewithout necessarily contributing any labor in exchange. This problemwas further exacerbated by the meager resources available to Somaliindividuals. Consequently, the majority of the Somali population weredrawn to the state because, even in diminished circumstances. itremained a major source of spoils and the only available channel forgetting what little there was to get. Furthermore, the past 30 years ofindependence did nOI alter the socia-economic dependency of thesociety. Thus, virtually every single clan has constantly been engagedin stale politics by seeking to influence the distribution of developmentresources in their favor. The resull has been an increase in the numberof people who chose dependency on the state over productive labor witha well-elaborated culture that despises productive worle:.

Ironically, though, this concepl of seeking profit withoUicontributing any productive labor was carried over to the public SCClor.Both higher and lower level public officials alike spenl moSt of theirtime planning ways in which they could misappropriate public funds toa point where any official who did not misappropriale public funds wasconsidered incompelent. Moreover, an unholy alliance belween publicofficials and large business owners was established based on kinshiplies, funher eroding the business elhics of the market. A studyconducted by the Somali Institute of Development, Administration, andManagemem reported that those with political connections had an easierlime imponing goods and oblaining hard currency. Those withoutpolitical ties faced difficulties importing goods and obtaining hardcurrency. This illegal collaboration between governmenl officials andthe so-called "connccled" is demonstrated by the following practices alSomali pons of entry: the elimination of much of what is owed in taxesthrough incomplete invoices, the reduction of Ihe COSI of items whichresulled in lower customs, Ihe declaration of lesser quanlilies, andconcealing ilems in unlabeled packages. 18 As a result of these activities,four large social groups emerged: I) a large number of (tribally­connected) public officials who acquired their income bymisappropriating public funds, 2) a large number of (lribally-connCCled)business owners who because of their clan relationship with publicofficials became wealthy, and 3) a large nwnbet of people who, becauseof their clan relationship with govemmenl, were put illegally onto thegovernment's pay roll without necessarily conlributing any productivelabor, and 4) a disproponionately large number of deprived masses.

KUSOW 31

The result has been a stratification based on clan and its relation to thestate.

Clanism and Social Stratification

Despite the general assumption that the Somali society isegalitarian and thus classless, clan stratification has been part of theSomali society at least since independence. Class or social stratificationin the Marxist sense means a category of people of roughly equivalentstatus in an unequal society. The members of the higher class enjoygreater access to the society's wealth and other resources. Similarly,c1anism in Somalia is a system of stratification whereby the members ofthe clan in power assume the role of the bourgeois class and thus availthemselves of a greater share of the resources. The class of anindividual in Somalia is detennined by his or her membership and/oraffiliation to the clan that is in power at any particular time. The onlydifference between social stratification in the west and in Somali societyis that, whereas in the west, the higher social class groups are moreestablished and thus more stable, the Somali clan stratification is notstable. Again, whereas in the west, social stratification is determined bythe economic condition and the educational levels of the group­racial/ethnic stratification notwithstanding-the Somali stratification isbased on the group's relation to the state which is usually achieved byforce. Thus, because this status is achieved through force, a newbourgeois class appears approximately every ten or so years. Forexample, between 1960-69, the Majenccn (Darood clan) dominated boththe economic and the political scenes of the country. The Hawiye andespecially the Rewin were alienated. The Marchan (again Darood)military govemment of 1969 tried to subdue c1anism and replace it witha united Somalia under the name of Hantiwadaga Cilmiga Ku Dhisan(Scientific Socialism). Nevertheless this regime employed c1anism as away of solidifying its power while at the same time claiming to adhere tothe principles of one nation under scientific socialism. This cover-upseemed to worle. for the first few years mainly because the people weredissatisfied with earlier regimes and had no choice but to suppon anypolitical change. By 1975, however, the Barre regime was not able todistance itself from the deeply-rooted clanism and tribalism whichtogether created and maintained the Somali political organiution forseveral hundred years. By the end of the war with Ethiopia, Somaliaonce again fell into the blanket of clanism. Several tribal groups startedtheir guenilla movement sponsored by the Mengistu regime of AddisAbaba. As a result, Barre began to ally himself more and more withpeople from his clan, from the clan of his mother, and the clan of his

32 UFAHAMU

son-in-law, thus finding himself in the cenler a Marehan-Ogaden­Dulbahante clan-based coalition known as (MOD).19 Such coalitionswork, however, only as long as Somalis perceive an external enemy.Once this enemy ceased to exist. long suppressed internal connielsresurfaced. creating internal conflicts. Thus the idea of nationhood didnot and does not exist. What we have is a group of corrupt triballeaders who mobilize their mba! members in order to compete for thetop position. The clan that looses at any given time regroups and mountsa challenge once more by establishing armed guerrilla factions. If thisgroup takes power, they usually eliminate the previous clan byimprisonment. torture. killing, and forced migration or by thedestruction of the their regional base. This process, which I refer to as"the lose. regroup, and attack scenario." repeals itself once every sevento ten years. For example. the Majerteen dominated the political arenafrom 1960-1969. They were challenged during the election of 1968 andespecially in 1969, when the prime minister was killed. at which timethe military took advantage of the resulting confusion between thedifferent clans struggling for power. From 1969·1990 the Marehandominated the state. By 1975. again the Majeneen challenged theMarehan government, but they were subdued and forced into migration.The 1985 Isaq challenge eventually resulted in the destruction ofHargiesa in 1988. Finally. the Hawiye challenged in 1990, and with thehelp of the Rewin, forced Siyyad Bam: to leave the country. However.at this time there was no single clan powerful enough to subdue the rest.and the result is the current picture in which every clan controls oneportion of the country. Therefore. whichever clan takes over now willface another challenge by the year 2000. unless some fundamentalrestructuring is introduced to the current socio-political structure inSomalia.

In the past, this clan stratification has been tolerated by themajority of the Somali people especially the Hawiye and Rewin clans inthe name of Somali nationalism. The appeal to this nationalism wastheoretically intended to suppress primordial ties. In reality itlegitimized even more stratification. which led 10 a societal pyramid-likestructure with the Darood at the top.20 It is also supposed that theDarood clan had a vested interest extending the concept of greaterSomalia beyond the Somali Republic because it was assumed that themajority of the Somali people in the Ethiopian and Kenyan regions wereof the Darood clan. An even more important reason for the tolerance ofthis stratification was due to the lack of critical consciousness on the panof some of the clans. For example. the vast majority of the Hawiye andthe Rewin population were less educated, mainly because both theItalian and the British colonists gave preferential treatment to the Darood

--------------------------,

KUSOW 33

by providing more of the civil jobs whh more members from the SYLparty, which was mainly dominated Darood members.21 At the presenttime, the situation is clearly different. The number of educated Rewinor especially Hawiye individuals has increased. Most imponantly, thiscritical consciousness has resulted in a heightened clan consciousnessamong the Somali people at large to a point where each clan wants toeither single-handedly control the rest or take secessionist stands. Suchexamples can be found among the Isaq or the recent Darood claim ofseparate entiry within the Nonheastem region.

Clanism and Nationallnlcgration

A very important but almost neglected cause of the current civilstrife in Somalia is failed models of national integration. According 10Coleman and Roseberg, "national integration is regarded as a broadsubsuming process, whose two major dimensions are 1) politicalintegration, which refers to the progressive bridging of the elite-massgap on the vertical plane in the course of developing an integratedpolitical process and a participant political community, and 2) te"itorialintegration, which refers to the progressive reduction of culrural andregional tensions and discontinuities on the horizontal plane in theprocess of creating a homogeneous territorial political community.22The problem with this and other interpretations of national integration isthat they focus on the racial, cultural, religious, and linguisticdifferences among groups within nations. Suct! interpretation ignoresother divisive elements, such as rribalismlclanism, which can be equallyor even more destructive to the process of national integration. Somaliais a gcxxl. example in this case. The Somali people were traditionallydivided into several major clans based on kinship ties and the need for.local support systems. The relationship between different clans wasbased on mutual understanding and the sharing of proximate resources.The political sphere of each clan was local in nature. However, modemc1anism, even though still based on kinship, is propelled by the explicitdrive of some clans to both politically and economically dominate theother clans. Examples of such situations can be found between the Isaqand the Darood. the Hawiye and the Darood, and the Rewin against all.As Samatar explains, "Kinship denotes a central relationship buttreSsedby both blcxxl. ties and deeply revered tradition and custom (xeer}-onewhich mediates individuals and groups. Oanism on the other hand, isthe transformation of kinship by detaching blood ties from tradition andcustom."23 Samatat further suggests that these blood ties are currentlyreplaced by the forces of modern capitalist economic systems. Whether

34

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UFAHAMU

the current relationship between clan families is generated by theintroduction of the capitalist system or the desire to dominate, modemSomalia is for all intents and purposes as divided as any other Africancountry.

In addition to the apparent sociocultural differences, Somalia isplagued by tribalismlclanism which, if unchecked with some fonn ofequal representation, has the capability to destroy the fabric of thenation. As Lewis explains,"These divisive and constricting forces areidentified as 'Tribalism' and equated with similar particularisticattachments in other African countries. H, however, the effects of theseforces are much the same, the institutions that pnxl.uce them differ. Thelinguistically and culturally distinct divisions that threaten the fragilecohesion of most African states are here replaced by kinship ties which,although they lack the trappings of cultural uniqueness, are arguablyeven more deeply entrenched and paralyzing in their effects." It shouldbe noted that Lewis's statement gives the impression that Somalia isdivided only along clan lines, but in reality this clan division is amanifestation of deep sociocultural differences that have beensuppressed for a long time through Somali nationalism.

Given these conditions and results, how do we go aboutreconstructing the country both politicaUy and socioeconomically? Aswe are all aware, Somali nationalism, national integration,detribalization, and strong central governments have all failed. Thus wehave only one option, that is the need of decentralizing authority andpromoting popular participation based on voluntary association, notforced national integration. Civil societies cannot be achieved withoutthe full participation of the people. nor the economic condition of thepeople improved without thier unresttietcd participation and contributionto the welfare of the nation. After all, it is to the people that the verybenefits of development should and must accrue.

In Somalia, the option to this end is to create a federal system ofgovernment based on semi "regional autonomy".2A Considering thepopulation distribution and the politicaVclan realities of the country, fourautonomous regions must be created. These could be divided into: I)Nonhwestem, 2) Nonheastem, 3) Central, and 4) South. These fourregions coincide with the geographical locations of the four largest clansin the country. These are the lsaq in the Nonhwest, the Darood in theNonheast, the Hawiye in the Central, and the Rewin (DigillMirifle) inthe South. However, due to the fact that the migration patterns of thepast 20-30 years have changed the population and clan distributionpatterns of the country, and because other smaller clans are settled ineach of the four mentioned regions, several districts must be createdwithin each of the four regions. These districts must be specifically

KUSOW "created for the smaller clans of each region for the purpose of electingtheir own representatives to the regional parliaments and to the nationalparliament. For example. in the Northwest. several districts toaceommex:late the Issa. Gadabursi. Dir, and Duibahante must be created.Similar situations must be applied to each of the other regions. AsSamatar pointed out. ''The federal government must be based on a two­house parliamentary system, consisting of a house of elders and a houseof representatives. The house of the elders must be given greaterauthority at least in the first ten or so years. Once the political situationof the country matures greater power must be given to the house ofrepresentatives."25 Similar political structures must be established ineach region.

Some may dismiss this concept as an attempt to divide thecountry. However. that attitude fails to grasp the political reality of thecountry today. In fact, that the country is already divided beyondrepair. For example, the northeastern region (or the ell-BritishSomaliland) has already claimed separate identity. Since 1940, thesouthern region insisted on federalism but was consistently dismissedby the Darood government. Also, popular opinion indicates that thecentral region favors regional autonomy. Most imponantly, the generalreconciliation conference held in Jibouti from July 15-21, 1991, whichwas attended by six different clan groups (with the observation ofseveral international heads of states and international organizations) hasunanimously agreed to the introduction of regional autonomy as anarticle in the future constitution of the country. This indicates that thegreat majority of the Somali peo~le accept the reality of some fonn of afederal system of government. 6 The only questions that remain arehow many regions should be created, and how to adopt the systemitself? Considering the economic and popuiation/clan distribution of thecountry, the creation of four regions is most suitable. other suggestionsnotwithstanding. The assumption behind this line of argument is thebelief that economic and social developments in Somalia can only bereached after ajust political solution is achieved. Another question couldbe how to strategically adopt this fonn of regional autonomy. It must benoted, however, that this system should not inhibit the right ofindividual Somalis to settle where they wish, but rather to affmn theneed for the majority in each region to rule. In order to accomplish thisstmtegy, several steps must be followed:

I) A group of Somali elders, professionals, and scholars must beassembled to detennine the most appropriate regional boundary lines.Specifically, these individuals must be selected equally from either sideof the would-be boundary lines. For ellample. along the Shabelle river

36 UFAHAMU

boundary line, individuals must be selected from the Hawiye and theDigil/Mirifle. Along the northwest/northeast line. individuals must beselected from such clans as the Isaq and the Darood. This process mustbe observed by the United nations.2) A national and regional census coordinated and supervised by theUnited Nations, the international community, and independentorganizations such as the Carter Center must be undertaken. This part isthe most serious part because some clans may decide to transfer theirclan members to other regions in order to sway the census outcome totheir advantage. Thus an appropriate means of conlrolling such fraudmust be established prior 10 the census. This could be achieved byasking individuals to provide testimony 10 their claim of residing in thatregion where they are trying to VOle.

3) A national and regional referendum must be held within one year afterthe results of the above two projects are received. The referendum onregional autonomy could be conducted on a YES or NO basis. If aparticular region approves the regional autonomy while the others donot. that region must be given regional autonomy. Again theinternational community must coordinate and observe this undenaking.

4) All the Cl1JTent "warlords" must be removed from the future politicalreconsb'Uction of the country. This does not mean that they should beremoved by force, but rather that the masses should be provided with apolitically secure environment within which they can express theiropinions and vote for the candidate of their choice. If this is achieved,there is no doubt that the people will vote against the current warlords.The rationale behind this suggestion is the fact that the current supportof the people to any individual leader is achieved through force. Oncethis force is removed. the current warlords will step aside automatically.

5) Finally, what ever type of government results from this process mustbe considered mnsitional for the next 12 years. This government musthold national elections every four years. After these transitional years, asecond national referendum must be carried to decide whether thecountry should continue with the federal system of government, orwhether it should create a centralized democratic parliamentary systembased on the 1960 constitution. The assumption behind this argument isthat with time, the current tension between the clans may subside andpave a way for a more integrated civil society. This. however, dependson ~~w the transitional government behaves itself. If it tries to sway thep~htl~al development of the country towards solidifying power,hijacking the government, and imposing military or some other fonn ofautocratic regime, it wiU be planting the seeds of the next civil war.

KUSOW 37

The role of the United Nations. the United States, and otherregional and inlemational organizations must be geared towardsproviding relief help and creating a secure environmenl within whichsuch political agenda can be carried out and in whicb lhe masses canexpress their discontent without any fear for their lives. I believe this isthe most difficult pan, and the most imponant at the same time. To thisend, the level of lnlCfVellDon by the United Swes or the United Nationsmust be kept at the present level for at least the next two years,otherwise the situation will deteriorate to what it was before. This doesnot mean concentrating on political solutions and ignoring economicissues. but only that polilical considerations should be given priority.Also it is my belief that the economic bases of this crisis merit a sepanllcanalysis which I invite other scholars to look at. Nevenheless. in tennsof short-term economic development, inlemalional agencies andgovernmenlS must emphasize grass-roots or regionally-baseddevelopment projects. These projects mUSI be intended to help Ihepeople lake charge of their lives and decide the directions they wanl tocarry their development 1be moSI importanl development strategy is 10invCSt in agriculture. This is very important for the immediate fulW'e. Hthe people are provided with necessary incentivcs, then the counb'y canstand on its feet again. However, in the long run some thought must begiven to the ways within which pastoralism can be completelyreorganized. Managed pastoralism may be preferable to leaving thenomads 10 use traditional methods. Fishing must also be given prioritybecause the counb'y has a large untapped reserve of fish.

Conclusion

The causes of the current civil strife in Somalia are far beyond"warlordism." It is in large measure attributable to the traditionalsocioeconomic modes of production of the Somali people at large (thaiis agropaslOralism and pastoralism), the unforgiving harsh environmentof the land. misguided development, failed national integration models.and moSt of all the modern c1anism which look the shape of a modemclass creating a pyramid-like stratification structure in which some clanssal aI the top. Thus, these crisis can be in general attributed to resourcecompetition based on clan/class social structure. This problem is furtherexacerbated by the meager resources available to the Somali individual.As a result, the majority of the Somali population are drawn 10 the state,because, even in diminished. circwnstances. it remains a major source ofspoils. and the only available channel for getting what is there to get.Thus, virtually every single clan has constantly been engaged in state

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UFAHAMU

politics by seeking to influence the distribution of developmentresources in its favor. Also. higher and lower public officials alikespend most of their time planning ways in which they canmisappropriate public funds and enrich their clan members.

The purpose of this paper was to examine the deep socio·political elements behind the current civil strife in Somalia. We foundthat contrary to popular assumptions. Somalia is sociocullurally dividedinto different groups with different interests. On the onc hand. we havetwo sociocullurally and linguistically different groups. These are thetwo May speaking groups of Digil and Mirifle., and the four Ma:catirispeaking groups of Dir, Darood. Hawiye, and lsaq. More interesting isthe fact that the overwhelming majority of the Hawiyo-the largest clanwithin the Maxoriri speaking group--demonstntc more socioculnnlsimilarities to the May-speaking group of Digit and MiriOe than. forexample. to the Darood or the Isaq. In addition to these socioculturaldifferences. Somalia is plagued by tribalism which. if unchecked bysome form of representation, can destroy the fabric of the sociery. Thisdoes not necessarily mean thai the Somali crises cannot be J't.solved. Ifthe suggestion of this amhor or other similar ones which emphasizeequal representation among different groups is followed andimplemented properly, Somalia can became a country once more.

NO'lCS AND REFERENCES

IThe name Re...in is uxd in this article inslead of Rahan....yn because that is ...hatIhc pcopk call1htmsclvcs. This name embrlces Ihc Rewm.spcalcing clan f.milics d.Dip and Miri1le. RewUl is !be language of Somalia spoken in the area totIth of theShabcUc Rivet, as opposed to Nonhcm ...hich is spoItcn north d. the Shabclk lfucr.2nis is DOl to dismiJs the destruction that tome of the so·caUed Warlords haveinfficled upoo the CQUnD}' and the people but to abo loot at the docpCf C*JSC' of the,...."3Critical consciousneu is referred to as the objective ....areness of thepeople'scommon plilhl, ...hk:h mulled in clan consciousness, the Ulremeidentification 01 the people with clans as • PJWte of soc:ia.I IUppon..4These are former IUllian. British, French Somalilands, Weslern Somaliland,cWTa1l1yan Ethiopian Province, and the fonner Nonhcm Frontier Districl (no... theNorth Easlem Province of Kenya),5Abdi Kusow, "The Genesis of the Somali Civil War. A ne... Petspcctive.· Paperpresented to the Sixth Northeast African Siudie.s Conference, Michigan SUileUniversity, East Lansinl, MI, April 23-25, 1992.61. M. Lewis. "Seamenwy N.tionalism and the Collapse of the Somali SUlIe."Unpublished paper liven to me by the .uthor in 1992, pp. 1-2.

KUSOW 39

'lbid. p. 2-81M. Lewis, A /HIS'''''''' D"llOtrQ'J: A ".4, 01 P""o,dis. ".dPolitler A.,.., tile HortA". 5•••11 ., ,II, Hor. (London: QdoldUnivetSilY Press. 1961). The exception to this are the werts of Herben Lewis. Lee.cassanelli, Bcmd Hiene, R Tunon, md AbdirWunan Hcni.9Lee V. Cusanelli, Til, SII.,I., 01 Snu"i Sod",: Rrc(}lIIInfCtlll, tlr,HIIID,., of 'tUland P,opl, fro_ 1I00·19fH1 (Philodelphia: University ofPunsylvania Press, 1984).100iana, Puillnan••Agro-Pasllnl Production Strategies and development in the BayRegion: in Thomas Labahn (cd.), ProcIldl",s of 'ht S,cud t.'r'lfatlo1llJ1c"",,,,, ., Solft,dl Stfldus. Volume III (University of Hamburg, 198]), pp.57-69.IlSaid.Samaw, "Somalia: A Country in Tormoil," London: The Minority RighuGroup, 1991. Sec also Said Farah Mohamoud, "The Need to Develop Somalia'sResources: in Annarita PugHelli (cd.), TIl, Pro",4/n,s 01 ,It, ThirdIIf11'ICotlo".' C""freSS of 50moll Studt" (Rome: Italy, 1988). In thiswort. Said raises the questioa of whether Pastoralism as it is lOday can be conduciveto modem dcvdopmc:nt., and his answer is no.12Mobamed Haji Mukhlar, -n.c Emergence and Role of Political Parties in !heIntet"-River Region of Somalia from 194710 1960 (Independence): in UFAHAMU,Vol. XVU, Number 2,1989, pp. 75-95.13May INS Maxaliri.~ the local names by which the two main di.aleas~ knollI'D.The [lISt men 10 the JDUIhcm diak:a. ....1tile the Ia1cr men 10 the nonhcm diaICICt..1.1. M. Lewis, A Modln. Hlsto" o{ 50-"'14: NtHlu ud S'41t I. tiltHor. of Afrlu (London: Loo.grnan, 1980), p. 5.15For a good dc:saiptiof! of Agro-hslCnl S)'SIemS in !be Soulh, _ Diana PuIlnWl,

"Apo-PulOral Production Stnt.elies and development in the Bay Region: inThomas Labahn (ed.), Pro,,,dill,s of til, S,UQ I.ttrlltllio••l CO.'rtSSof So_II Stlldws, Volume III (Un.iversity of Hamburg, 1983) pp. 57-69.160mar. Osman Rabi, "The Somali Nomad,- in Thomas Labahn (cd.),Pro,ttdl",s of til, S,ulCd 1.'''lCotiolCol Co,rus of 50-.011 Studiu,Volume m (Univcrsity of Hamburl, 1983), pp. 57-6917H. AbdulbdirDeriye, "Economic Dependency: Its Cultural Origins and ItsConsequences for Somalia's Development: in lbomas Labahn (cd.), Pr",,,dlll,rof ,II, S,colld Iliterlialioliol SOMOtl S,udl", Volume III (University ofHambw), 1983), pp. 57-6918For a good description of lhe marlr:et corruption in Somalia. sec D.W. Henderson,"Entrepreneuria1 Considerations: in lbomas Labahn (ed.), Prottedlll,s of thlSrrond [lCtlrtloliOllol SOMolI Studies, Volume III (Un.ivctsily of Hamburg,1983), pp. 57-69.19DavWl. Laitain and Said Samalar, Somalia: A Nation in search of. Stale (Boulder:Westview press, 1987), pp. 92; 94-99.20For a similar idea, see Hussien Adam, "Retllinking the Someli PoliticalElIperiencc..-

40 UFAHAMU

Presented as a background paper at the United StaleS Institute of Peace PublicWOrkshop on Political Reconciliation and RcconslruCtion in Somalia, Friday,October 6. 1992. WashingtOn, D. C.21A. A. Castagno, in James S. Coleman and carl G. Roscberg cds.), PoliticalPllrtt" GIld Natl""., I,.t"rall"" Ilf Troplc,II Africa (Berkeley and LosAngeles: University of California Press. 1969).22Jamcs S. Coleman and Cui G. Roseberg (cds.), Political Parties "ltdNGtlo"al Integration 'II Tropical Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles:Univenity of california Press. 1969), pp. 8·9.23A. I. Smatar. ·Somali Studies: Towards an AlternaLive Epestemology," inNortheast Africa" St"dtlS. Volume II, Number I, 1989, pp. I, 2.24Regional AUionomy in this study refers to the right of lhe above mentionedregions to direct bolh politically and oconomically the local affairs oflheir respectiveareas, while at the same time recognizing Lhe sole authority of the fedenlconstitution. 11lese regions can not enPie in inlemltionaJ negotiation, neither canthey engage war against any other region25For Ihe pupose or Ihis paper, political maturilY means Ihe achievement orrelatively rair and SlabJe elections.26sl'lirwayn aha Dib-V- Hcshcsiinl.l Shacbiga Somaiiyccd 00 Ay Ka Soo QaybgaJocnJabhadaha SSDF-SPM-USC-SDM-SDA·USF. Jabuuti 15·21 Luulyo, 1991