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PAST ACTIVISM, PARTY PRESSURE, AND IDEOLOGY: EXPLAINING THE VOTE TO DEPLOY KOREAN TROOPS TO IRAQ* Sookyung Kim, Paul Y. Chang, and Gi-Wook Shin†

* This research was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF–2010–330–B00146). We thank Doug McAdam, Susan Olzak, Andy Walder, Jae Hyeok Shin, members of Stanford University’s Workshop on Social Movements and Collective Action, and anonymous reviewers for Mobilization for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. † Sookyung Kim is a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology, Stanford University. Paul Y. Chang is Assistant Professor of Sociology, Harvard University. Gi-Wook Shin is Professor of Sociology, Stanford University. Please direct all correspondence to Paul Y. Chang at pychang116@gmail.com.

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ABSTRACT Studies have found that participation in social movements has long-term consequences for individuals’ personal life choices and political beliefs. An important but understudied subject in this literature is the impact of past activism on political behavior in an institutional context. The entry of past activists into Korea’s National Assembly offers a unique opportunity to assess the continuing effects of movement participation in the context of institutional politics. Analyzing roll call data related to Korea’s participation in the Iraq War, we explore the relative effects of movement participation and institutional pressure after accounting for legislators’ current ideological position. Results from regression analyses show that while party and ideology remain strong predictors of voting behavior, past participation in social movements continue to influence political action. This study extends the scope of research on the consequences of social movements by pointing to the impact of movement participation on political behavior in an institutional setting.

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Garnering international support for the second Iraq War was much more difficult than

President George Bush’s administration anticipated. In 2003, when the United States

invaded Iraq in search of weapons of mass destruction, international opinion surrounding

the war was divided: while some allies supported the U.S., others raised poignant

criticisms about what they considered to be an unjustified war. The Republic of Korea

(South Korea, hereafter Korea) is a key ally of the U.S. and when called upon to honor

this alliance, it responded by sending more military personnel to Iraq than any other

nation except for the U.S. and the United Kingdom: nearly 3,600 troops at peak

deployment.

The international image of Korea’s support of the U.S. war in Iraq, however,

obfuscated the contentious debates within the country. The domestic discussions

surrounding troop deployment were heated and accompanied by anti-war protests.

Criticisms of war mirrored the concerns raised by other international bodies; namely that

America’s decision to invade Iraq was a unilateral one, that the war impinged on the

sovereignty of the nation of Iraq, and that motives other than “freedom” and “liberty”

were at play. Supporters of war, on the other hand, argued that the U.S. has been an

important ally and maintaining a “healthy” relationship with America positively

contributes to political relations and economic exchange. Anti-war protestors, in turn,

rejected these justifications arguing that to send Korean troops was tantamount to bowing

to American pressure and would reinforce the stereotype that Korea was a client of

American patronage and a pawn of U.S. foreign policy in Northeast Asia.

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Interestingly, the debates surrounding troop deployment to Iraq revisited many of

the same issues that marked Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War in the 1960s

(Brazinsky 2009). Notwithstanding the old debate about American patronage, scholars of

U.S.-Korea relations argue that the alliance between the two countries is not as simple or

as strong as it once was (Feffer 2006; Kim 2002; Shin 2010). Korea transitioned to a

democratic government in 1988 which was, in part, the achievement of social movements

that challenged successive dictators that ruled the country for decades (Armstrong 2002;

Kim 2000; Lee 2007; Shin et al. 2011). The transformation of the political opportunity

structure following democratic transition allowed actors who were historically

marginalized from political power to participate in institutional politics directly. Indeed,

those that participated in the democracy movement in the 1980s found that their past

activism was a source of legitimacy when running for political office. Consequently, past

activists entered institutional politics in record numbers during the general elections for

the 16th (2000-2004) and 17th (2004-2008) National Assemblies, Korea’s legislature. It

was during these two assemblies that the laws stipulating the deployment of Korean

troops to Iraq were deliberated and passed.

Because the debate regarding Korea’s participation in the Iraq War was couched

in the rhetoric of anti-Americanism, which was one of the prevailing ideologies of the

democracy movement (Kern 2005; Moon 2003, 2005), the entry of past activists into the

National Assembly provides an exemplary opportunity to explore the impact of past

participation in social movements on political behavior within the context of institutional

politics. This is especially important as scholars have argued that institutional pressures

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tame the goals and tactics of social movements and that party agendas dominate the

voting behavior of individual legislators (Friedland and Alford 1991; Lipset, Trow, and

Coleman 1956; Michels 1962; Piven and Cloward 1977; Smith 2007). There is much

scholarship on the long-term consequences of movement participation but most studies

have looked at the impact of past activism on personal life choices and/or continuing

participation in extra-institutional collective action (Abramowitz and Nassi 1981;

Fendrich 1977; Jennings 1987; McAdam 1988, 1989). There is also a growing body of

scholarship on the “political consequences” of social movements but these studies have

primarily looked at the impact of extra-institutional mobilization on institutional

outcomes such as agenda setting, policy formation, and electoral processes (for a

comprehensive review see Amenta et al. 2010).

Only a few studies have considered the possibility of the formal entry of social

movement actors into institutional politics and the consequences of the transformation of

activists into institutional politicians (Pettinicchio 2012; Grodsky 2012; Banaszak 2010;

Santoro and McGuire 1997). Assessing the consequences of movement participation on

institutional political behavior is important for not only understanding the Korean case

but may also shed light on the recent wave of democracy spreading in North Africa and

the Middle East; to the extent that this recent wave is motivated by social movements and

that leaders of these movements will occupy important positions in governments that

make the transition to democracy. By analyzing the voting patterns of two bills related to

the deployment of Korean troops to Iraq, this study seeks to expand the literature on the

political consequences of social movements by focusing on the impact of past activism

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relative to pressures stemming from membership in political parties and current

ideological commitments. This article explores the question of whether the sentiments

and values shaped by participation in the democracy movement continue to influence

political behavior, or, on the contrary, are mitigated by institutional pressures. Findings

have implications for understanding the relationship between social movement

participation and institutional politics beyond the Korean case.

THE ENTRY OF PAST ACTIVISTS INTO SOUTH KOREA’S NATIONAL

ASSEMBLY

The entry of past activists into the National Assembly began after democratic transition

in 1988 and significantly accelerated during the presidential terms of Kim Dae Jung

(1998-2003) and Roh Moo Hyun (2003-2008). The election of President Kim marked the

first peaceful transfer of power to an opposition party in South Korea’s history while

President Roh, a stand-out case of an activist-turned-politician, represented the

continuation of progressive rule. Roughly 32% of the members in the 16th National

Assembly (2000-2004) and 33% in the 17th National Assembly (2004-2008) had

significant experiences in the democracy movement.

Specifically, the so-called “3-8-6 generation” – referring to those who were in

their thirties (when the term was coined), were university students in the 1980s, and were

born in the 1960s – constituted the core of activists who entered parliament. Not unlike

the baby boomer cohort in the U.S. or Europe’s “68” generation, members of the 3-8-6

generation were distinguished for their progressive political viewpoints (Lee 2000). The

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opening of political opportunities following democratic transition allowed a significant

number of the 3-8-6 generation to enter politics proper as they found that their past

participation in the democracy movement translated into political capital offering them

moral leverage over career politicians. The Korean media and the larger society paid

great attention to this unique cohort and expected that they would one day transform

Korean political culture as they obtained leadership roles in government (Kim 2004; Ku

and Ch’ŏn 2004; Yu 2004).

One of the major campaign themes when members of the 3-8-6 generation ran for

office was greater political independence in regards to Korea’s relationship with the

United States. Anti-American sentiments ran strong amongst the protestors in the 1980s

due to the alleged U.S. complicity in the brutal crackdown of democracy advocates in the

city of Kwangju in May 1980 (Brazinsky 2009; Shin and Hwang 2003). The Kwangju

Massacre proved to be a critical juncture in Korean history as it motivated the

radicalization of the democracy movement (Lee 2007). Following Kwangju, activists

turned to radical political ideologies including Marxism, Leninism, and Kim Il-Sung’s

Juche (Self Reliance) Ideology. The rise of anti-Americanism in the 1980s reflected a

shift in the character of the movement compared to the 1970s when activists considered

the U.S. an ally in the struggle for democracy.1 In the 1980s, however, increasing

nationalism fueled anti-American sentiments (Kern 2005; Kim 2002; Moon 2003, 2005;

Shin 1995a, 1995b) and many activists shared the perspective that the U.S. was

responsible for the persistence of military dictatorship in Korea (Brazinsky 2009).

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Anti-American sentiments were manifest in two important dimensions of the

1980s democracy movement. First, the discursive frame (Snow et al. 1986), or the

ideological framework that guided activists’ interpretation of the political situation, was

dominated by the “National Liberation” (NL) camp that emphasized Korean sovereignty

in relation to the superpowers of the world. Leaders of the NL camp were influenced by

Dependency/World Systems Theory (Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1989) and blamed many of

Korea’s woes on its subordinate position in relation to core nations. Along with

dictatorship, the division of the Korean peninsula into North and South was blamed on

the Cold War policies of the former U.S.S.R. and the U.S. It followed that if Korea was

to ever achieve both democracy and reunification, it must first reassess and transform its

relationships with the dominant superpowers including, most importantly, the United

States of America.

Anti-American sentiment also influenced activists’ tactical strategies leading to

several dramatic incidences in the 1980s including violent attacks on all four U.S.

Information Service (USIS) centers in Korea. On December 9, 1980, members of the

Catholic Farmers Association, a democracy-advocating organization, set the USIS

building in the city of Kwangju on fire in retaliation for the alleged U.S. involvement in

the Kwangju Massacre earlier that year (Pak 1999). Similarly, on May 18, 1982, college

students set the USIS building in Pusan on fire while distributing anti-American

pamphlets. In addition, seventy-three students staged a sit-in protest at the USIS center in

Seoul on May 23, 1985, demanding that the U.S. apologize for their role in the Kwangju

Massacre and for propping up military dictatorship in Korea (Brazinsky 2009). And

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finally, in the city of Taegu, a bomb exploded in front of the USIS building killing one

high school student and injuring four policemen (Maeilsinmun 2007). While it is unclear

whether the Taegu bombing was staged by democracy advocates or North Korean spies,

the incident was symptomatic of growing anti-American sentiments amongst student

activists in the 1980s. The great majority of past activists who entered institutional

politics following democratic transition were student activists in the 1980s and

were, consequently, politicized in the context of radical ideologies and the anti-American

sentiments that permeated the democracy movement (Moon 2003, 2005; Shin 1995b).

Although the entry of past activists into institutional politics was heralded by the

media as marking a new era in Korean politics, there is a dearth of systematic analysis

regarding what unique proclivities these activists-turned-politicians bring with them.

One of the first tests for this new generation of politicians came after the September 11

attacks in 2001. George Bush’s declaration of “war on terror” after 9/11 and his decision

to invade Iraq sparked an anti-war movement in Korea. Coalitional organizations, such

as the “Cooperation for Stopping the War and Implementing Peace” and the “Emergency

Council for Anti-war and Peace,” were formed and when the Korean government

announced that it would send Korean troops to Iraq in March 2003 thousands joined anti-

war protests. The anti-war movement became an issue for institutional politicians

starting with the presidential election in 2002 when candidates were often asked about

their position on the “war on terror.” An anti-war bipartisan faction emerged amongst

legislators when, on January 29, 2003, seventeen legislators from both of the major

parties issued a statement expressing opposition to the U.S. plan to invade Iraq. Later, on

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February 25, 2003, twenty-seven legislators representing all major parties launched the

“Anti-war, Pro-peace Assemblymen Association” in an effort to counter the increasing

pressure placed on legislators to support troop deployment: concerned with growing anti-

war voices, party leadership began to exact greater pressure on their members after both

of the major parities officially endorsed the deployment of Korean troops. Party politics,

then, were pitted against individual convictions and party pressure caused some

legislators to change their original anti-war stance in favor of troop deployment (MBC

2004).

THE IMPACT OF PAST ACTIVISM, PARTY PRESSURE, AND IDEOLOGY ON

ROLL CALL VOTES

Legislators consider several criteria when casting their vote for particular bills. The

literature has pointed to various factors including the pressures that parties place on their

members, the desire to meet constituents’ needs, and the individual ideological

orientation of legislators. These are not, of course, necessarily mutually exclusive

influences and several studies note the overlap between the institutional and non-

institutional pressures legislators face (Bernstein and Anthony1974: 1199; McCormick

1985: 122; McCormick and Black 1983: 53; Lindsay 1990: 949). While Lindsay (1990:

949-950) is right that “no perfect method exists by which to establish a member’s ‘true’

policy positions,” this has not stopped people from trying and many studies have been

able to discern the independent, and powerful, effects of institutional pressures and

ideology on roll call votes.

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In addition to the two dominant factors influencing roll call votes proffered in the

literature, party pressure and ideology, our study considers the long-term impact of social

movement participation on political behavior in an institutional setting. The literature

suggests that significant involvement in social movements further solidifies, and at times

radicalizes, the political views actors held before joining a movement (Abramowitz and

Nassi 1981; Fendrich 1977; Jennings 1987; McAdam 1988, 1989). Juxtaposed to this

“radicalization thesis” are the influences associated with institutional politics. Studies of

institutional political pressure suggest that as social movement actors, both individual

participants and organizations, become increasingly assimilated into institutional political

structures, they will eschew radical goals and disruptive tactics in favor of

institutionalized political processes while generally moving towards more conservative

agendas (Friedland and Alford 1991; Gerth and Mills 1958; Michels 1962; Piven and

Cloward 1977). Given these competing predictions we attempt to discern the impact that

past activism has on roll call votes in light of other important influences including party

pressure and individual ideological orientation.2

Consequences of Past Activism

Several attempts have been made to assess the effects of movement participation

on activists’ subsequent lives. McAdam (1988, 1989), for example, argued that

movement participation had significant consequences for both the political and personal

development of participants in the 1964 Mississippi black voter registration drive:

students who participated in Freedom Summer, compared to students who planned on

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joining the program but for some reason did not go (the “no-shows”), retained their

commitment to racial equality years after their experiences of mobilizing black voters in

America’s deep south. In addition, McAdam (1989) showed that the consequences of

movement participation extended to personal life choices as well and that Freedom

Summer participants were more likely to remain politically active, less likely to be

married, and were in occupations with lower income levels compared to the “no-shows.”

Other studies corroborate McAdam’s findings. Utilizing a three-stage panel

dataset Jennings (1987) found that those who participated in the anti-Vietnam war peace

movement in the 1960s showed “very strong continuities” all the way up until the 1980s,

remaining quite “distinct” from their non-protesting counterparts. Notwithstanding some

“erosion effects,” anti-war student protestors who were middle age in the 1980s were still

strongly committed to the issues associated with their original “political baptism” in the

1960s (Jennings 1987: 379). Abramowitz and Nassi also found that U.C. Berkeley

students who were arrested for their participation in the Free Speech Movement in the

1960s remained politically active fifteen years later and “were distinguished by more

radical beliefs, stronger repudiation of Protestant ethic values, and a stronger family

legacy of social concern” relative to a comparative cohort (1981: 507). Similarly, in

regards to the 1960s U.S. student movement, Fendrich concluded that “persons active in

protest politics who were active when they were college students are further to the left

politically and more active in protest politics as adults” (1977: 155); while Whalen and

Flacks found that these same student activists “tried, through the decade, to organize their

lives in relation to the principles embodied in the movement and counterculture” (1989:

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156). In short, significant experiences in social movements during one’s youth can have

long-term consequences resulting in the solidification of political beliefs, continuing

commitment to social movements, and distinct personal life choices (see also Braungart

and Braungart 1990).

An equally important but less studied subject in the literature is “the interaction of

movement and institutionalized politics” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996: 3). A

growing body of scholarship has attempted to assess the “political consequences” of

social movements focusing on the impact of mobilization on policymaking consisting of:

“(a) agenda setting, (b) legislative content, (c) passage, and (d) implementation” (Amenta

et al. 2010: 291). Soule and Olzak (2004), for example, found that the likelihood of

ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment at the state level was amplified by the

presence of social movement organizations. Most studies exploring the political

consequences of social movements have conceptualized the relationship between

movements and institutional politics as consisting of independent actors where

“challengers can influence individual legislators to vote for the bill” by engaging in a

variety of extra-institutional (e.g. protests) and institutional (e.g. lobbying) tactics

(Amenta et al. 2010: 291).

A new trend in the scholarship, however, has pointed to an alternative

“mechanism of movement influence” exploring cases where activists enter institutional

politics proper and either gain the right to vote themselves and/or set policy agendas as

institutional politicians (for reviews see Amenta et al. 2010; Pettinicchio 2012). While

there are only a few studies, this trend in the literature is important because it allows us to

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move beyond the normal bifurcation of movement activists and institutional politicians

and the common belief that social movements “operate outside of the institutional arena”

(Santoro and McGuire 1997: 503). Taking seriously the exhortation that “Scholars need

to explore further movement action aimed at electoral politics” these studies assess new

ways that social movements influence institutional outcomes (Amenta et al. 2010: 302).

An important study of “social movement insiders” was conducted by Santoro and

McGuire (1997) who conceptualized the identity of “institutional activists” and

operationalized this new group of actors as the percentage of black and women legislators

voting on civil rights and gender equality bills, respectively. Although they found mixed

results for the influence of institutional activists on race and gender legislation (e.g.

affirmative action and comparable worth bills), Santoro and McGuire (1997) paved the

way for further empirical studies. Banaszak’s (2010) study of the “second wave” of the

women’s movement in America, for example, has shown that “insider activists” working

in the federal government played a critical role in the formation and implementation of

gender equality policies. Furthermore, in a recent study, Grodsky (2012) explored the

relationships between social movement participation and the “new political elite” in the

relatively recent democracies of Poland, South Africa, and Georgia. While, in these three

cases Grodsky (2012) found that institutional pressures limited the influence of social

movement actors who became the new political elite, his is an important study of the

long-term influence of movement participation for activists who join the ranks of

institutional politicians.

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This emerging literature points to the need to “broaden the definition of social

movement actors” and highlights the importance of “institutional activists . . . who

occupy formal statuses within the government and who pursue social movement goals

through conventional bureaucratic channels” (Santoro and McGuire 1997: 514, 504).

The merits of this line of inquiry are several: 1. it allows us to consider the long-term

consequences of movement participation in a dramatically different context, 2. identifies

a new mechanism through which social movements are potentially consequential for

institutional outcomes, and 3. directly pits findings about the consequences of movement

participation against the common finding in the political science literature that

institutional pressures, in the form of party conformity, dominate legislators’ voting

behavior.

Institutional Political Pressure

Individuals are bound by the guidelines set by institutional logic and movement

scholars have explored the institutional constraints related to social movements generally

and activists specifically (Friedland and Alford 1991). The argument goes that however

radical activists were before joining the ranks of institutional politicians their behavior is

likely to be tamed by the general tendency to adopt institutionally acceptable goals and

tactics once they are embedded in established political institutions. In their classic study,

Piven and Cloward (1977) showed that poor people’s movements in the U.S. increasingly

gave up disruptive demonstrations in favor of routine institutional tactics, such as voting

drives, once their movement took on organizational form. Their not-so-subtle message is

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that movements are better off remaining outside the realm of institutional politics if they

are to avoid being co-opted by the pressures and logic of established institutions. While

there are many facets of institutional constraint, for the purposes of our study, we limit

the scope of these arguments to institutional pressures associated with parliamentary

politics.

Political scientists have used congressional voting as a test board for analyzing the

various factors influencing individual political action, such as party pressure,

constituents’ expectations, and legislators’ personal preferences (Bullock and Brady

1983; Clausen 1973; Cox and McCubbins 1991; Hager and Talbert 2000; Kingdon 1981;

Poole 1988; Smith 2007; Snyder and Gloseclose 2000). In a comprehensive review of

the literature, Smith found that political parties resort to direct and indirect methods to

“give orders to roll-call voting” and that individual members of Congress “are aware of

the incentives to comply with requests to support the party or its leaders” (2007: 6, 49).

While highlighting the intricacies of parliamentary incentive structures, Smith concludes

that “The evidence that congressional parties exert direct influence on legislators is

substantial . . . the circumstantial evidence that direct party influence is significant is

beginning to appear overwhelming” (2007: 112).

Other studies have shown that party pressure is the best predictor of congressional

voting and competing factors, including a legislator’s personal preference and ideological

orientation, are often overwhelmed by it when voting on legislation (Bullock and Brady

1983; Hager and Talbert 2000; Snyder and Gloseclose 2000). The influence of party

pressure on legislators is particularly powerful in the case of Korea where individuals are

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directly appointed by the party leadership to run for a seat in the National Assembly. In

their study of the Korean parliament Jun and Hix (2006), for example, found that the

party is invariably so powerful that it forces its members to “toe-the-line” even when

individual members’ preferences diverge from the party’s position. Generally speaking

then, the majority of studies on congressional behavior show that party pressure is the

dominant force predicting individual legislators’ roll call votes. In specific situations,

however, other factors can exert significant influence on voting behavior and several past

studies have shown that, when it comes to bills related to military budgets, national

defense, and foreign policy, ideological orientation is a good predictor of how legislators

vote.

Ideological Orientation

Legislators are not only embedded in institutional structures such as political

parties, but also in cultural structures that shape their political behavior. Thus, it is

important to control for legislators’ current ideological position when assessing factors

influencing voting behavior. Most legislators in parliaments around the world fall along

“the familiar left-right or liberal-conservative continuum” (McCormick and Black 1983:

46). As stated above there can be considerable overlap between ideology and party

membership as in the American case where members of the Democratic Party are

assumed to hold liberal views relative to their Republican Party counterparts. But even in

the U.S. studies have found that “Clearly, ideology plays an important independent role”

as well (Poole and Rosenthal 1997: 137).

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Research on voting related to “national security” issues generally, and military

spending specifically, have consistently shown that ideology is a critical factor governing

voting behavior (Avery and Forsythe 1979; Lindsay 1990, 1991; Ray 1981; Fleisher

1985; McCormick 1985; Wayman 1985; Nelson and Silberberg 1987; Carter 1989).

Lindsay (1990), for example, has shown that ideology, operationalized using the National

Security Index, was a stronger predictor of voting on strategic weapons systems relative

to other competing influences including the economic interests of a legislator’s

constituency and party membership, although both had some influence (see also his

follow up study, Lindsay 1991). Similarly, Fleisher (1985) utilized data on the B-1

bomber to show that conservatives were more likely to support higher defense spending

than their liberal counterparts, although this finding was tempered by the changing policy

of the executive branch of government (see also Ray 1981).

The importance of ideology has also been found in studies that look at a wider

gamut of issues including nuclear free resolutions (McCormick 1985), foreign policy

such as the Panama Canal Treaties (McCormick and Black 1983), and human rights

issues (Avery and Forsythe 1979). Indeed, in the areas of foreign and defense policy at

least, ideology is reported to be a consistent influence on legislators’ voting behavior

(Lindsay and Ripley 1992; Poole and Rosenthal 1998; Wayman 1985). Notwithstanding

this general finding in the literature, some scholars caution against promoting ideology

and party pressure as the catch-all explanations of voting behavior. Nelson and

Silberberg (1987), for example, found that even regarding defense expenditure bills,

ideology is only related to general spending bills and not on specific weapons programs:

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when it came to specific projects and programs, constituency interest was still a

significant factor affecting voting. In his study of the competing influences of ideology,

party pressure, and constituent interests on defense budget voting, Carter (1989: 343) also

found that all three were important to some degree with the effect of ideology fluctuating

depending on if the bill involved was directly related to purchasing major weapons

systems (a procurement issue; strong effect) versus bills related to the daily operations of

the military (a non-procurement issue; weaker effect). South Korea is not an exception

and scholars have pointed to the ideological divide that separates progressives from

conservatives in the Korean political community (Chang and Shin 2011). Because

ideological orientation can have a direct bearing on voting behavior, we include it is an

important control in our analysis (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Clausen 1973).

Based on the literature discussed above, we draw on the Korean case to

empirically examine the relative impact of past activism and party pressure while

controlling for current ideological commitments. Given that the contentious debate

surrounding Korea’s participation in the Iraq War was couched in the larger issue of

U.S.-Korea relations, and the possibility that participation in the democracy movement

solidified anti-American sentiments, we expect legislators who were past activists to vote

against troop deployment as an expression of their desire for greater Korean

independence vis-à-vis the United States. Similarly, after the troop deployment bill was

passed, we expect past activists to be more likely than legislators that did not participate

in social movements to vote against extending the tour of duty for troops in Iraq. If, on

the other hand, theories of institutional pressure are correct, we would expect to see no

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differences in voting between party members and also no independent effect of past

activism on voting against troop deployment and extension as both major parties of the

Korean parliament formally endorsed the bills.

DATA AND METHODS

The Stanford Korean National Assembly Project

The data for the present study come from the Stanford Korean National Assembly

Project, a project that explores the dynamics of institutional politics in South Korea’s

parliament from the 11th to the 17th National Assembly (1981-2008). We use two sub-

datasets from the larger project: the first dataset includes characteristics of legislators in

the 16th and the 17th National Assemblies and was originally collected by the Joongang

Daily, one of South Korea’s major newspaper companies. The data are based on

legislators’ self-reported personal histories and resumés. We coded these sources for past

activism as operationalized by the number of formal positions held by legislators in social

movement organizations that were part of the democracy movement. Second, we utilize

records of roll call votes from the 16th and the 17th National Assemblies obtained from the

public records of the Korean National Assembly. The former dataset was used to

construct independent variables and the latter dataset was used to operationalize the

dependent variables. The two datasets were merged for the purposes of analysis based on

the unique IDs of individual legislators, the unit of analysis for this study.

Korea’s legislative branch is a single-house system where the leadership of the

political parties picks the candidates that run for office. The 16th National Assembly, that

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passed the original troop deployment bill, was in session from May 30, 2000, to May 29,

2004, and there were a total of 273 seats. The majority party in the 16th Assembly was

the conservative Grand National Party (133 seats) followed by the President’s

progressive Millennium Democratic Party (115 seats), and several other minor parties.

After excluding cases with missing data, we analyze the voting records for 214 legislators

in the 16th National Assembly. The tour of duty extension bill was passed by the 17th

National Assembly which was in session from May 30, 2004, to May 29, 2008. There

were a total of 299 seats in the 17th Assembly with the majority occupied by the new

progressive ruling Uri Party (152 seats) followed by the conservative Grand National

Party (121 seats), and after excluding cases with missing data we analyze the votes of 228

legislators.

Dependent Variables

This study employs two bills stipulating the deployment and extension of Korean

military personnel to Iraq as dependent variables. The initial bill detailed the conditions

for sending Korean troops to Iraq and was passed by the 16th National Assembly on April

2, 2003, with 67% of legislators voting in favor of deployment. A second bill, to extend

the tour of duty for Korean troops already in Iraq, was passed on December 31, 2004, by

the 17th National Assembly with 54% of the Assembly voting in favor of extension. The

roll call vote data offer four possible responses to these two bills: voting yes, voting no,

abstaining but present, and absent during time of vote. For purposes of statistical analysis

and to ensure enough counts per cell we collapsed the responses where legislators were

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present but abstained from voting and when legislators were not present during time of

vote into an “other” category. The “voted yes” category is the reference category for all

models.

Independent Variables

Past Activism

The main criterion applied when identifying past activists in Korea’s National

Assembly is membership in social movement organizations. Social movement

organizations (SMOs), or an “organization which identifies its goals with the preferences

of a social movement,” were a critical component of the democracy movement

(McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1218). We limit the scope of past activism to membership in

SMOs related to the democracy movement when anti-American sentiments were at their

peak. Based on this restricted definition of SMO membership, four types of

organizations were salient in the data: university students’ associations, pro-

democracy/anti-authoritarian organizations, democratic labor unions, and NGOs focusing

on the consolidation of democratic institutions. We operationalize the degree of past

activism as the total number of formal membership in democracy related SMOs

(continuous variable) but also, for technical reasons, use a dummy variable indicating

membership in at least one SMO in models that include interaction terms between past

activism and the margin of victory in election campaigns. Based on this criterion 85 out

of 266 (32%) legislators in the 16th Assembly and 97 out of 297 (33%) in the 17th

Assembly were categorized as past activists. While there is a clear distinction between

23

progressive and conservative parties in Korea’s legislature, past activists were members

of both parties albeit in greater numbers in the progressive parties. As Table 1 shows, in

the 16th National Assembly 48% of the members of the progressive Millennium

Democratic Party (MDP) were once activists compared to 23% in the conservative Grand

National Party (GNP). In the 17th Assembly, 44% of the members in the Uri Party (UP)

were past activists compared to 19% in the GNP.

Table 1: Past Activism by Party Affiliation for the 16th and 17th National Assemblies

Institutional Political Pressure

Following convention in the political science literature, we operationalize

institutional pressure as the formal positions taken by Korean political parties on the

troop deployment and extension bills. The official position of both the ruling party

(MDP) and main opposition party (GNP) was to support troop deployment and members

of both parties were under comparable institutional pressures to conform to the party line.

MDP legislators were under strong pressure to vote for troop deployment as President

Roh Moo Hyun, who ordered the troop deployment, was a member of the MDP. The

conservative GNP, though being the main opposition party, generally supports closer

U.S.-Korea relations especially when the issues pertain to security and economic

relations and thus officially endorsed the troop deployment and extension bills as well. If

members of each party, regardless of individual views and desires, voted in line with their

24

party positions, we would expect to see no difference in how GNP and MDP members

voted on the bill.

The impact of party pressure was complicated at the time the extension bill was

introduced when the MDP reinvented itself as the UP in the wake of several crises that

engulfed the standing progressive party in Korea’s National Assembly. Because of his

controversial policies, including troop deployment, members of the MDP became very

critical of President Roh. In reaction to the internal critiques, loyalists to the President

formed the new ruling UP reducing the MDP to a very small minority party with nine

members following the general elections in 2004. Thus, the UP consisted of President’s

Roh’s closest political allies and was the “president’s party” in a way that the MDP never

was. President Roh Moo Hyun’s leadership was further compromised after a vote of no

confidence was held on March 12, 2004, when the National Assembly moved to impeach

the president. Members of the UP rallied and ultimately blocked the impeachment from

going through but this created the additional incentive within the UP to support President

Roh and his policies. It was in this unique political climate that the bill to extend the

tour of Korean troops in Iraq was debated and passed. Albeit for different motives, both

the GNP and the UP formally endorsed the extension bill and exacted pressure on their

members to support it.

We also include longevity in the National Assembly as a second measure of

institutional constraint as past literature suggests that pressures to conform to institutional

norms can increase over time (Hibbing 1988; Huntington 1965, 1968; Polsby 1968).

Drawing from these studies, it is possible that newly elected legislators, especially those

25

that do not have traditional political backgrounds, are less likely to be influenced by the

pressures of party membership relative to individuals who have been in parliament for a

greater duration of time. Greater time spent in the National Assembly is an important

control when considering the increasing dampening effects of institutional pressures on

individuals’ ideologies. We operationalize longevity in the National Assembly as the

number of terms legislators served (continuous variable) and test whether greater

longevity leads to voting in favor of troop deployment and extension.

In order to control for differences between the types of electoral institution by

which legislators were selected into the National Assembly, we include a dummy

variable designating legislators that were elected through proportional representation

(0=legislators elected through popular vote, 1=legislators selected into the Assembly by

party leadership through proportional representation). We include this variable because

of the possibility that the different electoral institutions provide varying incentives for

successful candidates: those elected based on proportional representation tend to be more

sensitive to party pressure because their positions depend entirely on party leadership

(Hix 2004, Jun and Hix 2006, Mitchell 2000).3 Finally, we include two interaction terms

to assess the relative effects of past activism conditional upon party affiliation and

electoral strength. Given the reasonable possibility that the impact of past activism on

voting is mediated by party affiliation, we include an interaction between the total

number of positions in SMOs and party identity. Also, considering the possibility that

legislators who win their seats in the Assembly by larger margins of victory enjoy greater

security, we include the difference in percentages of votes won between the elected

26

legislator and the second runner up candidate as a measure of electoral strength. We test

the possibility that the impact of past activism on voting is conditional on legislators’

electoral strength by introducing an interaction term between past activism (dummy

variable) and margin of victory in the final models.

Control Variables

In addition to our two central independent variables, we include several controls

in the models. The most important control variable is a measure of legislators’ current

ideological position. As discussed above, past studies have found that ideological

commitments can be good predictors of voting, especially in regards to legislation on

national security, defense spending, and foreign policy. Our measure of ideology comes

from a survey conducted by Joongang Daily in February 2002 and August 2004

(Joongang Daily 2002, 2004). The newspaper asked legislators in the 16th and 17th

Assemblies their views on a host of political (e.g. the US-ROK relations, the National

Security Law), economic (e.g. regulations on conglomerates, class action lawsuits), and

social issues (e.g. the family registry system, the death penalty). Two hundred twenty six

out of 273 legislators in the 16th Assembly and 229 among 299 in the 17th Assembly

participated in the surveys. The survey team created an ideology index for each

assemblyperson by calculating an average from the individual scores for all of the

questions. Although the survey was designed to distinguish four ideological groups

clustered at different points on a 10 point scale – “strongly conservative” (10),

27

“moderately conservative” (6.7), “moderately progressive” (3.3), and “strongly

progressive” (0) – we use the raw ideology scores as a continuous variable in the models.

We also control for several demographic characteristics including age, gender,

education and economic status. Age, in particular, is an important control as the 3-8-6

generation politicians were on average younger than long-standing members of

parliament. In addition, if Jennings (1987) is correct to assume that with age “erosion

effects” will dampen radical ideologies, we would expect to see a greater likelihood of

voting for troop deployment amongst older parliament members, independent of past

activism and party affiliation. In addition to these demographic variables we control for

living experience in the United States (dummy variable) and experiences working for

corporate firms (dummy variable) based on the assumptions that time spent in the U.S.

can influence one’s attitudes about U.S.-Korea relations and that participation in the

state-controlled economy can affect political ideologies. Summary statistics for

independent and control variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Summary Statistics for Independent and Control Variables used in Analyses

Methods

Because our dependent variables are comprised of polytomous nominal categories

without an inherent order to them, we utilize multinomial logistic modeling techniques to

fit the data. The “voting yes” category was used as the reference category for all models

against which the probability of other outcomes are compared. Maximum likelihood

28

methods were used to estimate the parameters of the independent and control variables.

Also, Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi-Square Tests were run for all models and the

significance of the tests indicates that for every model at least one of the predicted

coefficients for explanatory variables is not equal to zero. In addition, LR tests were run

to compare succeeding nested models to ascertain the improvement of the model fit when

adding additional independent variables. Finally, we performed the Hausman test to see

whether the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives holds: we re-estimated

the models omitting each category of the dependent variables and the results indicate that

the assumption holds (Hausman and McFadden 1984).

RESULTS

Table 3 reports results from multinomial logistic models fitted to data on the vote to

deploy Korean troops to Iraq. Model 1 is the baseline model and includes log-odds

coefficients for only our control variables. The results show that older, financially

stronger, and more conservative legislators had higher odds of voting in favor of troop

deployment. In addition, women and financially stronger legislators were more likely to

abstain from voting compared to men and less affluent legislators, respectively.4 Also

higher levels of education significantly decreased the odds of abstaining versus voting in

favor of deployment. Lastly, the more conservative legislators were, the less likely they

were to abstain from voting. Having lived in the United States and past experiences in

the corporate sector were not related to the vote on troop deployment.

29

Table 3: The Effects of Past Activism and Institutional Pressure on the Vote to Deploy

South Korean Troops to Iraq

We introduce variables measuring the impact of institutional pressures in Model 2.

The results for our control variables, more or less, remain the same after introducing

institutional pressure variables. In Model 2 we can see that the number of terms a

legislator served impacted the vote on troop deployment: one additional term resulted in

the odds of voting against sending troops to Iraq to decrease by 49% (=100*[1-exp(-

.673)]). Or to put it conversely, a longer tenure in the National Assembly increased the

probability that a legislator voted in favor of troop deployment. This supports our earlier

suggestion that institutional pressures can have a greater effect the longer one is exposed

to them. Also, we can see in Model 2 that members of other minority parties were

significantly more likely to vote against troop deployment than members of the

conservative GNP. Extrapolating from the log-odds coefficient, we can see that the odds

of voting against sending troops to Iraq for members of other minority parties were 10.99

times (=exp[2.397]) higher than their counterparts in the GNP. On the other hand, being

an MDP member had no significant effect on voting patterns. Evidently, institutional

pressures, as operationalized by the official party position, did not have uniform

consequences for members of the different parties in the National Assembly.

Model 3 builds upon Model 2 by introducing the measure of past activism.

Adding the past activism variable improves the overall fit of the model as indicated by

the significant LR Test between Models 2 and 3 (LR Test = 12.70, significant at the .01

30

level). Results from Model 3 indicate that after controlling for demographic variables,

personal history, and institutional pressures, legislators with greater involvement in the

democracy movement were significantly more likely to vote against sending troops to

Iraq: the odds of voting against troop deployment increased 1.72 times (=exp[.541]), or

72%, for every additional membership in an SMO. In addition, deeper involvement in

the democracy movement was associated with a 1.84 times (=exp[.608]) higher chance of

abstaining from voting than voting yes to troop deployment. Because the regression

equation controls for a legislator’s current ideological position and party affiliation, the

finding shows that past activism had a significant effect on voting independent of

ideological orientation and party membership.

In Model 4 we assess the possibility that past activism had a differential impact on

voting conditional upon the particular political party a legislator belongs to by

introducing the first of two interaction terms. Introducing the interaction term in the

model changes the interpretation of the marginal effect of past activism (Brambor, Clark

and Golder 2006) and results indicate that for members of parties other than the MDP

(MDP=0), each additional position in SMOs increased the odds of voting against troop

deployment by 258% (3.58=exp[1.275]). For MDP members, greater involvement in the

democracy movement increased the odds of voting against deployment by 28%

(1.28=exp[(1.275)+(-1.028)]). Interestingly, while past activism generally led to voting

against Korea’s participation in the Iraq War, the impact was stronger for past activist

legislators who were in the conservative GNP and other minority parities compared to

those in the more progressive MDP. This pattern held for the impact of past activism on

31

the likelihood of abstaining from voting compared to voting yes: past activists generally

opted to abstain rather than vote yes but this effect was stronger for non-MDP members.

To better understand this interesting finding, additional cross-tabulations between party

affiliation, past activism, and voting were calculated.5 Further analysis revealed that

MDP members who were not activists in the past were more likely to vote against the bill

(12 out of 37 non-activist MDP members, 32.4%) compared to non-activists in the GNP

(6 out of 95 non-activist GNP members, 6.3%). Thus, past activism was not the only

motivation for MDP members to object to Korea’s participation in the war which diluted

the impact of activism on voting for MDP members and explains the relatively weaker

effect. Finally, in Model 5 we introduce our second interaction term to see if past

activism had a differential impact on voting dependent upon the electoral strength of a

legislator as operationalized by the margin of victory by which they won their seat.

Results indicate that the impact of electoral strength on voting against the bill did not

differ for past activists and non-activists.

Notwithstanding the contentious debate within the National Assembly and

protests in larger society, the troop deployment bill was passed on April 2, 2003. While

not as sensational and receiving relatively less media coverage, a second debate regarding

Korea’s participation in the Iraq War emerged when the National Assembly deliberated a

bill to extend the tour of duty for Korean troops already in Iraq. Table 4 reports results

from multinomial logistic models assessing the effects of institutional pressure and past

activism on the vote to extend the tour of duty for Korean troops in Iraq. In our baseline

Model 1 only control variables are included. Similar to what we found in the initial

32

deployment bill, age initially had a significantly negative influence on voting against

troop extension: older legislators were more likely than younger parliament members to

vote in favor of extending the tour of duty for Korean troops in Iraq. Also consistent with

the initial deployment bill, conservative legislators had higher odds of voting in favor of

troop deployment as compared to their progressive counterparts. Interestingly,

conservative-leaning legislators were also more likely to abstain from voting.6 Lastly,

female legislators were more likely to vote against extending the tour of duty.

Table 4: The Effects of Past Activism and Institutional Pressure on the Vote to Extend

the Tour of Duty of South Korean Troops in Iraq

In Model 2 we add the institutional pressure variables and as in the initial troop

deployment bill the number of terms decreased the odds ratio of voting against the bill.

Put differently, those who served longer terms were more likely to vote for the extension.

The most interesting finding in Model 2 is the impact of party affiliation on the vote to

extend the tour of duty. As mentioned above, the transition from the 16th to the 17th

National Assembly introduced significant changes in the structure of political parties in

South Korea and members of the UP were facing unique pressures. In Model 2 we can

see that UP members were more likely to vote in favor of the extension bill compared to

members of the GNP while at the same time less likely to abstain from voting. Evidently,

as members of the newly formed ruling party, the need to back President Roh exacted

great pressure on UP members and it is worth remembering that the UP was formed in a

33

dramatic gesture of support for President Roh, and by extension, his policies. This is in

stark contrast to how MDP members voted in regards to the initial deployment bill.

Model 3 includes the past activism measure and unlike the initial bill, prior

involvement in the democracy movement had no significant influence on voting results.

Past activists were not any more likely than non-activist legislators to vote against

extending the tour of duty for Korean troops in Iraq. In addition, analysis of the

interaction terms did not, for the most part, produce meaningful results: the interaction

term between voting margin and past activism had only a slight effect on abstaining from

voting.7 We speculate that several factors could have contributed to the difference in the

pattern of influence for past activism from the troop deployment to the extension bill. It

is possible that the discussion about extending the tour of duty for troops already in Iraq

versus the debates surrounding whether Korea should participate in the Iraq War at all

(the initial deployment bill) sparked distinct sets of emotional and ideological responses.

Also, the frequency and intensity of anti-war protests subsided by the time the National

Assembly voted on the extension bill which suggests that the issue was less salient in the

media and society at large.8 The absence of large protest events surrounding the

extension bill may have made contemporary social movements generally, and legislators’

past experiences in the democracy movement specifically, less important when debating

the merits and demerits of extending the tour of duty for Korean troops in Iraq. But

maybe more relevant, according to the empirical results, were the significant changes to

the political environment in the 17th Assembly where a new set of institutional pressures

were introduced as party politics and issues of loyalty became salient after the reshuffling

34

of the progressive MDP and UP and the botched attempt to impeach President Roh Moo

Hyun. Whatever the case, it is clear that factors other than past activism were salient at

the time of the extension vote.

DISCUSSION

The Korean case extends the scope of research on the biographical consequences of

movement participation by providing some evidence of the long-term effects of past

activism on the behavior of political actors in an institutional setting. Because past

studies have primarily focused on the long-term consequences of movement participation

for activists’ subsequent personal life choices and/or continuing participation in extra-

institutional collective action and social movements, our study identifies a new arena in

which to assess the impact of past activism (Abramowitz and Nassi 1981; Fendrich 1977;

Jennings 1987; McAdam 1988, 1989). This study speaks to the growing literature on the

relationship between social movements and institutional politics by analyzing the

political behavior of a unique cohort of student activists who entered South Korea’s

National Assembly after the nation successfully transitioned to democracy. Our results

corroborate other findings including Santoro and McGuire (1997) and Banaszak (2010)

who showed that “institutional activists” working in government bureaucracies can

influence politics from the “inside” (see also Pettinicchio 2012).

Building on this literature, our study demonstrates that past participation in social

movements can shape the political behavior of actors who have transitioned to the

institutional setting and subsequently face unique sets of pressures associated with party

35

politics. This is especially true if the legislation under consideration conspicuously pits

party agenda against the values and commitments made when legislators participated in

social movements in the past. The findings from our analysis are especially important as

movement scholars have highlighted the dampening effects of institutionalization on

social movements (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1956; Michels 1962; Piven and Cloward

1977) and scholars studying legislatures have argued that party membership is the

dominant predictor of voting behavior (Smith 2007). Our findings provide a caveat to

this conventional wisdom and for previous scholarship on Korean politics that regards the

party line as the most important determining factor in legislators’ voting behavior (Choi,

Kang, and Shin 2009; Jun and Hix 2006). In addition, while our results support past

studies that have found legislators’ current ideological commitments important for

predicting voting on national security, defense budgets, and foreign policy, the impact of

past activism for the initial deployment bill was significant independent of a legislators’

more broadly defined ideological position. To be sure, where someone stands along the

liberal and conservative continuum matters a great deal but the specific issues one took

up in past protest events can have long-term consequences as well.

The entry of past activists into Korea’s legislature provides a novel opportunity to

examine an alternative mechanism of movement influence on institutional politics. The

situation where a significant number of participants in Korea’s democracy movement

became members of Korea’s parliament allows us to assess whether the commitments

activists made during their initial “political baptism” have long-term impact in an

institutional political setting (Jennings 1987). Generalizing from the Korean case, we

36

speculate that participation in collective action can shape the parliamentary behavior of

nations that transition to democratic governance to the degree that social movement

leaders become part of the institutional political community. Social movements are

playing an important role in the democratic transitions of several nations today including

the recent wave sweeping North Africa and the Middle East. The leaders and participants

in these social movements will likely play an important role in these new democracies as

institutional politicians and it will be interesting to see how their participation in extra-

institutional collective action influences their political behavior once they are on the

“inside.”

It is important to note that our findings suggest that pitting the radicalization and

institutional pressure arguments against each other creates a false dichotomy as the

current study shows that these are not mutually exclusive, nor exhaustive, pressures

legislators face. The voting behavior of legislators who have a history of participating in

social movements might be influenced by the political beliefs solidified through

movement participation but they also face a wide variety of institutional pressures, as

well as their own general ideological commitments. Indeed, Korean legislators faced a

complex set of pressures that stemmed from not only their participation in the democracy

movement but also their memberships in political parties and general identity as

progressives or conservatives. There can also be interactive effects between these

different pressures as we found where the impact of past activism was not uniform across

the different political parties. Legislators, undoubtedly, were not completely

“institutionalized” nor did their past activism completely “radicalize” them. Also, the

37

application of our results may be limited to bills that conspicuously raise issues directly

tied to past movement values. It is notable that the great majority of bills deliberated in

Korea’s National Assembly are passed without controversy and only a few bills that

trigger movement values, such as anti-Americanism, are sensationally contentious.9

Future research needs to pay close attention to the diversity of influences legislators face

including commitments made during extra-institutional political activities, current

institutional pressures, and generalized ideological identities.

The Korean case shows that the impact of activist experiences on institutional

politics may vary depending on other structural factors as well. First, Korea witnessed a

national democracy movement that spanned several decades and engulfed an entire

generation of student activists. The breath and duration of Korea’s democracy movement,

in turn, created a unique “protest generation” (Whittier 1997) that went on to participate

in institutional politics in large numbers. Cases absent of large-scaled and long-term

social movements may not experience the same kinds of movement-institution dynamics

found in the Korean case. Second, the democracy movement dominated the social

movement sector in Korea from the 1970s to the late 1980s and other movements were

subsumed under the master narrative of democracy (Chang and Shin 2011). Thus, past

activists that entered the National Assembly shared a similar “political baptism” which

contributed to relatively clearly defined voting blocs in the National Assembly. It is

plausible that the uniformity of voting blocs based on past activism is dependent on the

diversity and independence of social movements within a broader social movement sector

for different cases.

38

Finally, this study shows the dynamic nature of democratization in Korea. The

impact that past participation in South Korea’s democracy movement had on legislators’

voting behavior showcases the continuing influence of past activism on contemporary

politics. Social movements played a key role not only in democratic transition but also in

the process of democratic consolidation (Kim 2000). Although the National Assembly

eventually voted in favor of sending troops to Iraq, the significance of past activists’

criticism of Korea’s participation in the Iraq War is a testament to the legacy of social

movement participation in the context of institutional politics.

39

Table 1: Past Activism by Party Affiliation for the 16th and 17th National Assemblies

Party Affiliation

Past Activism (Row %)

16th Assembly 17th Assembly

Yes No Total Yes No Total

MDP 39 37 76

(51.3) (48.7) (100.0)

GNP 28 95 123 20 81 101

(22.8) (77.2) (100.0) (19.8) (80.2) (100.0)

UP 50 58 108

(46.3) (53.7) (100.0)

Others 3 12 15 6 13 19

(20.0) (80.0) (100.0) (31.6) (68.4) (100.0)

Total 70 144 214 76 152 228

(32.7) (67.3) (100.0) (33.3) (66.7) (100.0)

40

Table 2: Summary Statistics for Independent and Control Variables used in Analyses

16th Assembly

17th Assembly

Controls Age 57.58 51.82 Gender Male .94 .87 Education (in years) 17.79 18.41 Corporate Experience .21 .14 U.S. Experience .29 .32 Economic Assets (in 10 mil.won)

207.30 124.15

Institutionalization Number of Terms 2.09 1.67 Party GNP .57 .44 MDP .36 UP .47 Others .07 .08 Electoral Institution District .84 .80 Proportional .16 .20 Voting Margin 20.77 14.74 Past Activism Yes .33 .33 No .67 .67 (Metric) (.82) (.79) Total Number of Voters Analyzed

214 228

41

Table 3: The Effects of Past Activism and Institutional Pressure on the Vote to Deploy of South Korean Troops to Iraq

Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

No Others No Others No Others No Others No Others

Controls

Age -.062*

(.030)

.020

(.041)

-.031

(.036)

.059

(.049)

-.033

(.039)

.072

(.052)

-.029

(.039)

.097†

(.057)

-.034

(.040)

.108†

(.063)

Female .036

(1.026)

1.535†

(.908)

.112

(1/132)

2.271*

(1.129)

.464

(1.135)

2.828*

(1.226)

.520

(1.148)

3.046*

(1.291)

-1.444

(2.443)

-39.839

(>108)

Education .012

(.102)

-.343**

(.117)

.032

(.106

-.349**

(.123)

.050

(.108)

-.346**

(.122)

.054

(.108)

-.348**

(.125)

.032

(.129)

-.402*

(.185)

U.S. Experience .002

(.534)

.204

(.682)

-.125

(.558)

.082

(.725)

-.046

(.582)

.349

(.759)

-.015

(.583)

.412

(.810)

-.140

(.594)

-.401

(.891)

Corporate .141

(.637)

.056

(.724)

-.179

(.681)

-.147

(.771)

-.118

(.697)

-.058

(.778)

-.002

(.699)

-.108

(.809)

-.118

(.705)

.101

(.956)

Economic Assets -.011***

(.004)

.001†

(.000)

-.013**

(.005)

.001*

(.000)

-.011*

(.004)

.001**

(.000)

-.012*

(.005)

.001**

(.000)

-.010*

(.005)

.003*

(.001)

Ideology -1.555***

(.269)

-.503†

(.278)

-1.493***

(.295)

-0.577†

(.341)

-1.383**

(.296)

-.363

(.357)

-1.356***

(.300)

-0.299

(.372)

-1.255***

(.300)

-.287

(.425)

Institutionalization

Number of Terms -.673*

(.284)

-.345

(.293)

-.873**

(.311)

-.447

(.307)

-.839**

(.307)

-.601†

(.337)

-.700*

(.318)

-.643†

(.373)

Party

MDP .576

(.571)

-.014

(.812)

.539

(.598)

-.036

(.844)

1.138

(.709)

1.053

(.979)

.530

(.641)

.071

(1.068)

Other Party 2.397† 1.578 2.835* 1.855* 2.881* 2.274* 2.609* 3.068*

42

† p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

(1.249) (.983) (1.253) (.994) (1.292) (1.060) (1.214) (1.267)

Proportional -.575

(.802)

-1.776

(1.124)

-.565

(.851)

-2.072†

(1.220)

-.845

(.917)

-2.493†

(1.294)

Voting Margin -.001

(.018)

-.178

(.112)

Past Activism

SMO (metric) .541**

(.197)

.608**

(.220)

1.275**

(.451)

1.541***

(.476)

SMO (dummy) .962

(.734)

.930

(1.254)

Interaction Terms

SMO (m) x MDP -1.028*

(.486)

-1.361*

(.539)

SMO (d) x Margin .003

(.026)

.169

(.112)

Constant 9.834***

(2.718)

4.511

(3.390)

8.651**

(2.822)

3.487

(4.062)

7.509**

(2.909)

1.261

(4.376)

6.842*

(2.953)

-.890

(4.845)

7.230*

(3.306)

1.016

(5.705)

LR χ2 140.90*** 153.15*** 165.85*** 173.60*** 140.26***

Df 14 22 24 26 26

LR Test 12.25

(Model 1 vs. 2)

12.70**

(Model 2 vs. 3)

7.75*

(Model 3 vs. 4)

N 214 214 214 214 180

43

Table 4: The Effects of Past Activism and Institutional Pressure on the Vote to Extend the Tour of Duty of South Korean Troops in Iraq

Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

No Others No Others No Others No Others No Others

Controls

Age -.061*

(.028)

-.056*

(.023)

-.057

(.039)

-.027

(.029)

-.056

(.040)

-.027

(.029)

-052

(.040)

-.024

(.029)

-.099†

(.052)

-.024

(.032)

Female .936†

(.527)

.129

(.600)

.132

(.798)

.188

(.797)

.194

(.818)

.180

(.796)

.149

(.824)

.073

(.804)

-2.870

(2.853)

.155

(1.623)

Education .039

(.090)

-.068

(.078)

.005

(.106)

-.049

(.082)

.029

(.110)

-.050

(.082)

.033

(.110)

-.038

(.083)

.049

(.143)

-.023

(.091)

U.S. Experience -.082

(.508)

.339

(.383)

-.840

(.614)

.126

(.414)

-.753

(.623)

.137

(.413)

-.775

(.624)

.112

(.417)

-.301

(.771)

.051

(.458)

Corporate -.571

(.738)

.024

(.493)

-.520

(.835)

-.014

(.529)

-.503

(.829)

.004

(.532)

-.507

(.830)

-.000

(.535)

-1.329

(1.143)

.231

(.572)

Economic Assets .001

(.001)

.001

(.001)

.000

(.001)

.001

(.001)

.000

(.001)

.000

(.001)

-.000

(.001)

.000

(.001)

-.000

(.001)

.001

(.001)

Ideology -.872***

(.183)

.492***

(.136)

-1.775***

(.336)

.113

(.179)

-1.744***

(.341)

.105

(.181)

-1.752***

(.345)

.114

(.183)

-2.231***

(.488)

.146

(.208)

Institutionalization

Num. of Terms -.332*

(.355)

-.468*

(.229)

-.479

(.385)

-.451†

(.233)

-.486

(.386)

-.461†

(.236)

.055

(.432)

-.486†

(.265)

Party

UP -3.905***

(.822)

-1.951***

(.547)

-4.001***

(.844)

-1.935***

(.551)

-4.127***

(.900)

-2.212***

(.597)

-4.488***

(1.100)

-1.788**

(.611)

44

Other Party -.644

(1.174)

.584

(.785)

-.508

(1.221)

.571

(.788)

-.579

(1.223)

.497

(.789)

.572

(1.479)

1.276

(.947)

Proportional .884

(.843)

-.572

(.662)

.753

(.870)

-.562

(.661)

.759

(.873)

-.530

(.672)

Voting Margin -.062

(.049)

.041*

(.019)

Past Activism

SMO (metric) .247

(.156)

-.055

(.175)

.156

(.262)

-.305

(.293)

SMO (dummy) -.436

(.961)

1.848*

(.864)

Interaction Terms

SMO (m) x UP .155

(.312)

.497

(.363)

SMO (d) x Margin .041

(.064)

-.155*

(.067)

Constant 4.288*

(2.161)

.701

(1.884)

11.071***

(3.102)

2.409

(2.145)

10.456***

(3.192)

2.463

(2.162)

10.362***

(3.193)

2.161

(2.184)

14.449**

(4.264)

.899

(2.431)

L. R. χ2 92.71*** 142.88*** 146.01*** 148.11*** 121.94***

Df 14 22 24 26 26

LR Test

50.18***

(Model 1 vs. 2)

3.13

(Model 2 vs. 3)

2.1

(Model 3 vs. 4)

N 228 228 228 228 183

† p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

45

NOTES

1. The rise of anti-American sentiments in the 1980s is important for understanding

the politicization of activists. Pre-participation political orientation and/or anti-

Americanism cannot explain both the motivation to join the democracy movement

and voting behavior after democratic transition as the anti-American discourse

was forged within the context of the democracy movement following the

Kwangju Massacre in 1980.

2. It is possible that the ideological commitments of students motivated their

participation in the democracy movement in the 1980s but there are, unfortunately,

no data ascertaining the change in ideological orientation of student activists

before and after their participation in protests, nor between students who did and

did not participate in the 1980s social movements. There is, however, data

available regarding the ideological positions of National Assembly persons for the

legislatures we analyze in this study and we include this current ideology variable

as an important control to assess the independent impact of past activism on roll

call voting.

3. Because “proportional legislators” were not directly elected by popular vote, we

exclude these cases in the final models (Model 5) in Tables 3 and 4 (42 cases in

the 16th Assembly and 55 cases in the 17th) when we include the margin of victory

as an indicator of a candidate’s strength

46

4. Results regarding gender differences should be interpreted cautiously as there

were a very small number of female legislators in both the 16th and 17th National

Assemblies which influenced the large standard errors for the gender coefficients.

5. Results from cross-tabulations are available upon request.

6. The significant number of abstentions among GNP members, roughly 43%

recorded in the raw data, is also interesting. Scholars have noted that abstention is

more common when the outcome of the vote is both favorable and certain (Cohen

and Noll 1991). Entertaining this possibility, we speculate that the much

pronounced support of the extension bill by UP members ensured the bills passing

which motivated GNP members to abstain from voting to avoid the public

backlash created by the anti-war movement. It is notable that the popular internet

media company OhmyNews criticized the high abstention of GNP members as

“cowardly behavior” (I 2005).

7. There was one statistically significant finding when assessing the mediated impact

of voting margin by past activism on the likelihood of abstaining from voting.

The results for the interaction term constructed from the dummy SMO

membership variable and margin of electoral victory variable indicate that for

non-activist legislators (SMO dummy=0), each percentage increase in the voting

margin positively impacted the odds of abstaining from voting by 4%

(1.04=exp[.041]). For activists, however, greater electoral security decreased the

odds of abstaining by 11% (=100*[1-exp(.041-.155)]).

47

8. Utilizing the KINDS database (www.kinds.or.kr), the most extensive newspaper

database in Korea, we found that The Hankyoreh – Korea’s leading progressive

newspaper – published 122 articles about the Iraq War debate in the three-month

period leading up to the vote on the initial deployment bill (January 3, 2003 –

April 2, 2003) and 58 articles in the three months prior to the vote on extension

(October 1, 2004 – December 31, 2004). We chose The Hankyoreh because we

assumed it was more likely than conservative newspapers to report on anti-war

protests. We then counted the number of anti-war protest events in the articles:

73 protest events before the deployment vote and only 1 protest event before the

extension vote.

9. Most bills deliberated and passed by the 16th and 17th Assemblies were lopsided

with a great majority of legislators voting the same way. In preliminary analysis

we found very few bills where there was a significant degree of dissent when

individual members voted against their party. This highlights the fact that bills

such as the Iraq War vote and the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) vote –

another very contentious bill that raised issues of American patronage – are

uniquely positioned to make salient the discrepancy between the values and

commitments legislators made during their student activism days and their current

loyalty to their political parties.

48

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