PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE ANDINSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION

6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technology

June 2007

Participatory Governance and Institutional Innovation [PAGANINI]Contract No. CIT2-CT-2004-505791 . Deliverable Number 18

FINAL REPORT

Participatory Governance and Institutional Innovation [PAGANINI]

Contract No. CIT2-CT-2004-505791 . Deliverable Number 18

FINAL REPORT

Herbert Gottweis (Coordinator) and Kathrin Braun*

June 2007

* The Final Report was drafted by Herbert Gottweis and Kathrin Braun,

and discussed and commented on by the PAGANINI Consortium, in

particular by Anne Loeber, Yrjö Haila, Bronislaw Szerszynski, Ingrid

Metzler, Maarten Hajer, and Maria Kousis, who all contributed greatly to

the final version of the report. The report is based and draws on the Work

Package reports of the PAGANINI project (see page 3).

1

This report presents the theoretical framework and the empirical findings of the 6th FP research

project on Participatory Governance and Institutional Innovation (PAGANINI ).

The PAGANINI project set out to investigate the ways in which participatory practices contribute

to problem solving in a number of highly contentious fields of EU governance, areas in which

traditional mechanisms of governance can be seen to hamper policy making, as a result of which

institutional experimentation is likely to take place. The policy areas studied in the project – stem

cell research, genetic testing, food scandals and food scares, genetically modified food and nature

conservation – belong to a cluster of policy areas that can be understood as relating to the

―politics of life‖. The project was set up on the premise that a quality exists to the politics of life

that links it to civic participation, and the ways in which and the extent to which participatory

governance in this domain is becoming a component of the European polity merit empirical

investigation.

Part I of this report introduces the theoretical and conceptual framework of the project and its

starting propositions, whereas part II summarizes the findings of the empirical case studies. From

these findings we extracted the main conclusions presented at the end of the report.

2

This reports draws on the following Work Package reports:

Anne Loeber, Maarten Hajer & Jan van Tatenhove (with contributions of

Bronislaw Szerszynski)

WORK PACKAGE 1:

THEORY AND METHOD: INVESTIGATING NEW PARTICIPATORYPRACTICES OF

THE ‘POLITICS OF LIFE’ IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT.

Final Report. Deliverable Number 5.

Herbert Gottweis, Ingrid Metzler & Erich Griessler

WORK PACKAGE 2:

DEFINING HUMAN LIFE: HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH

BETWEEN POLITICS AND ETHICS.

Final Report. Deliverable Number 12.

Work package 2 studies the conflict about human embryonic stem cell

research and therapeutic cloning in Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom,

Italy, on the EU and international level, and against the background of the

situation in the United States and Israel.

Susanne Schultz, Kathrin Braun & Erich Griessler

WORK PACKAGE 3:

THE GOVERNANCE OF GENETIC TESTING: A NON-ANTAGONISTIC SETTING,

‘AUTHENTIC PUBLICS’, AND MOMENTS OF UNEASE.

Final Report. Deliverable Number 13.

Work package 3 sets out to investigate the effects of social controversy in

the issue area of genetic testing on the emergence of new forms of civic

participation in Germany, Austria, the UK and on the EU level.

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Yrjö Haila, Maria Kousis, Ari Jokinen, Nina Nygren & Katerina Psarikidou

WORK PACKAGE 4:

BUILDING TRUST THROUGH PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: LEARNING FROM

CONFLICTS OVER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HABITAT DIRECTIVE.

Final Report. Deliverable Number 14.

Work package 4 focuses on the dynamics of the implementation of

European conservation policy with an emphasis on the protection of

endangered animal species (Habitats Directive, Article 12), specifically on

two model species, the flying squirrel Pteromys volans (Finland) and the

loggerhead sea turtle Caretta caretta (Greece).

Anne Loeber and Maarten Hajer

WORK PACKAGE 5:

LEARNING AFTER THE EVENT: ASSESSING THE INSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF

CIVIC PARTICIPATION AFTER FOOD SCANDALS AND FOOD SCARES.

Final Report. Deliverable Number 15.

Work package 5 addresses changing patterns in governance with regard to

food safety after the outbreak of BSE, the bovine variant of the brain

infliction ‗spongiform encephalopathy‘ in the Netherlands, the UK and on

the EU level.

Larry Reynolds and Bronislaw Szerszynski with Maria Kousis and Yannis

Volakakis

WORK PACKAGE 6:

GM FOOD: THE ROLE OF PARTICIPATION IN A TECHNO-SCIENTIFIC

CONTROVERSY.

Final Report. Deliverable Number 16.

Work package 6 examines the role of public participation in the regulation of

agricultural biotechnology in Europe, with a focus on GM food regulation in

the UK, Greece and on the EU level.

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Table of Contents

I. The project’s theoretical orientation ............................................................................... 5 1. Participation, governance and life: the intertwining of conceptual and institutional innovation 5

1.1 The concept of ‘participation’ in the conventional view on politics ................................. 8

1.2 Participation in the light of conceptual critique: rethinking political space ..................... 10 2. Implications for the project’s organisation of empirical research........................................ 12 3. The new politics of life: disruption of dominant structures and the need for reordering ........ 15 4. Implications for the organisation of empirical research in relation to the ‘new politics of life’: propositions and research questions .................................................................................. 18

II. Case Studies .............................................................................................................. 20

1. Dislocations, institutional ambiguity and the resilience of the state .................................... 20 2. Institutional responses ................................................................................................ 32 3. Risk and uncertainty ................................................................................................... 47 4. The ethicisation of governance ..................................................................................... 61 5. Participation in the co-production of regulatory knowledge and political authority ............... 82

III. Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 113 IV. Recommendations: Participation, Institutional Innovation, and the Governance of Life ... 122

V. References ............................................................................................................... 128

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I. The project’s theoretical orientation1

1. Participation, governance and life: the intertwining of conceptual and

institutional innovation

‗Bien étonné de se trouver ensemble‘? The policy areas studied in the project – stem cell research,

genetic testing, food scandals and food scares, genetically modified food and nature conservation

– at first glance may seem a surprisingly random selection of topics on which to build a research

venture. Yet when these are understood as areas in which the relations between society,

technology and nature are continually redefined and practically given shape in view of very

concrete policy issues, such a diverse collection of topics allows the researcher to probe deeply

into the dynamics of 21st century politics regarding a rather quintessential phenomenon: life. It is

on the basis of this premise that the PAGANINI project was developed, namely to study practices

of governance that concern life as a construct of political and scientific discourse.

What is called here the ‗politics of life‘ presents a relevant area for empirical research, as the

assumptions underlying the relations among society, technology and nature which characterised

the better part of the 20th century seem lately to be undergoing profound changes.

These changes concern

- the assumption that the state is a unified political space;

- the assumption that science presents a universal, certain body of knowledge grounded in

the natural world to obtain direction as to know ‗what to do next‘;

- the assumption that there can be a clear boundary between the realm of science and

knowledge production, on the one hand, and the realm of the political, on the other;

- the assumption that there a clear boundary exists between scientific knowledge

production and other societal processes.

1 The ‗theoretical orientation‘ section of this report is derived from the Work package 1 report ‗Theory and Method: Investigating new Participatory Practices of the Politics of Life in a European Context‘ by Anne Loeber, Maarten Hajer and Jan van Tatenhove (with contributions of Bronislaw Szerszynski).

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Rather than treating public concerns about, say, the safety of genetically modified food crops (for

both the environment and human health) or the desirability of developing and using prenatal

screening technologies as a random collection of contemporary disturbances between scientific

expertise, political institutions and citizens, these phenomena are here considered manifestations

of an ongoing fundamental challenging of the assumptions outlined previously.

As a consequence, the kind of state-initiated social engineering that dominated the better half of

the last century (what James Scott [1998] calls ―high modernist statecraft‖) is unlikely to present a

viable option for governing life-political issues. Both empirical research and recent theoretical

sophistication seem to underscore these doubts, as they bear witness to

A conceptual transformation of the notion of ‗politics‘: The social sciences, and in particular

the political sciences and the social study of science, increasingly acknowledge the

political nature of any act that holds public consequences. This recognition implies that

politics involved in actions that take place outside formal institutions traditionally

considered the exclusive centres of political power are now viewed as valid potential

objects of political research. Attention is drawn to the sites where and the practices in

which politics are being enacted through the articulation of and the struggle over meaning

and morals and their inscription in analyses, plans and material objects (e.g., Beck 1992,

1999; Gomart & Hajer 2002; Mol 2002; Dean 1999:11; Gottweis 2003:255).

A practical and institutional transformation of politics: New arrangements of governance are

developing in which non-state actors (that is, anyone not employed as an elected

representative or in the civil service) are actively participating in processes of policy

analysis, policy formation and implementation and political decision making.

‗Participatory governance‘ in state-initiated institutional designs can be defined as ―the practice of

consulting and involving members of the public in the agenda-setting, decision-making and

policy-forming activities of organizations or institutions responsible for policy development‖

(Rowe & Frewer 2004). Yet it must be stressed that the institutional transformation of politics is

not restricted to state-initiated designs. Rather, the effects of changing relations between science,

states and non-state actors owing to such dynamics as EU integration, globalisation of economic

relations and an increasing privatisation of public regulation become manifest in myriad forms,

for example, governance networks that provide space for the participation of non-state actors,

including those that are not state-initiated.

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Taking the conceptual transformation of politics seriously, the question of public participation,

then, needs to be rethought. Participation can no longer be conceptually restricted to state-actors

in processes of formal political decision making or policy formation. Instead, the question of

inclusion or exclusion must be transformed into questions such as the following:

- What precisely counts as ‗public participation‘?

- What is it exactly that a public participates in?

- How is ‗the public‘ constructed, in relation to what and by whom?

- How are ‗publics‘ and the objects and issues that trigger their coming into

existence mutually constructed and transformed in concrete practices of

participatory governance?

Taking this line of reasoning as a point of departure, the object of research in the PAGANINI

project was designated to be a broad range of contemporary forms of participation, spanning the

conventionally defined, formal participatory arrangements as well as institutionally less articulate

new practices of governance. Furthermore, to fully appreciate the identified forms of

participatory governance, the project partners agreed to adopt a ‗double focus‘ in the inquiry

process: on the one hand, the participatory practices of governance that form the object of

research should be understood in relation to the broader societal – political, economic,

technological – dynamics of which they are a specific expression; on the other hand, the

researcher should have an eye for the micro-politics of meaning that take shape in the practices

under scrutiny.

We shall first elaborate more in-depth the premises regarding the notion of participation that

shaped the focus of the PAGANINI project (sections 1.1. and 1.2). From these considerations, we

derive a series of propositions that have informed and guided the empirical research (section 2).

Subsequently, we shall sketch out the thematic focus of the PAGANINI project, namely ‗the

politics of life‘ and the new challenges it poses to research on governance and participation

(section 3). Part I will conclude with a list of research questions that has guided the empirical

research (section 4).

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1.1 The concept of ‘participation’ in the conventional view on politics

Governance in the political sciences that crystallised in the 20th century has long been defined in

terms of the formal, centralised political institutions by which the intent to govern materializes.

Governing is defined here as the public handling of a problem issue in a way that respects the

interests of a community. In this perspective on politics, the government of a nation-state was

conceived of as the apex of power and authority and the centre of political will formation and

steering activities. Three assumptions underpinned this depiction of what now is known as the

―orthodox understanding‖ of governance (cf. Fox & Miller 1996:14-19):

i) the idea that there was – or at least should be – a clear caesura between norm-driven

politics and a neutral public administration to ‗technically‘ implement political

decisions,

ii) the idea that the relation between the realms of the political and of administration was

one of a hierarchical control, and

iii) the assumption that science, when properly exercised, could inform political decision

making with ―judgements that are beyond question‖ (Collingridge & Reeve 1986).

It is against the backdrop of this conceptualisation of government that David Easton formulated

his much-cited definition of politics as ―the authoritative allocation of values for society as a

whole‖ (Easton 1953). Of course, values are also allocated by and within other systems or

institutions, such as families or firms, but it was the formal political system, Easton posited, that

allocates values for society as a whole (cf. Van de Graaf & Grin 1999). The policy process by

which that function was made operational was portrayed in Easton‘s (1953, 1965) system theory

more or less as a ―conveyer belt‖ (a metaphor used by Stone 1998). Pressures from society are

turned into inputs (in the shape of demands and supports) for the political system, within which

politicians authoritatively order and translate the societal pressures and requests into problems to

be processed by policy makers. It is the latter‘s task to thereupon transform these into policies

that, after having been politically sanctioned, are to yield policy outputs that resolve the

problems. Subsequently, governmental administrators implement these policies. In return, society

may respond by a new round of demands and pressures (Grin & Loeber 2006). Thus, for

conventional political science, its research objects were delineated by the organisation and

operations of government, comprising elections and centralized decision making on issues of

collective interest via councils of elected representatives and the dynamics at the boundaries of

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‗the political system‘. Political science thus referred to what may be called the ―classical-

modernist‖ topography of politics (Hajer 2000; cf. Wagner 2000).

Today‘s practices of governing have long ago gone beyond the scope of the classical-modernist

topography of politics. New ‗government technologies‘ have been developed to overcome the

capacity deficit (Mayntz & Scharpf 1975; cf. Mayntz 1980) that stems from imperfect information

flows between public policy actors and ‗policy target groups‘, and the so-called legitimation

deficit – the lack of public trust in and commitment to traditional democratic institutions.

The trend to experiment with new forms of participatory or ‗interactive‘ policy making or

‗interactive policy analysis‘ has been widely covered in the literature (e.g., Chandler 2000; Joss &

Bellucci 2002; Akkerman et al. 2004). On a conceptual level, the literature has largely focused on

developing taxonomies and systems of classification to assess and analyse the participatory

practices found (e.g. Fiorino 1990; Laid 1993; Collin & Evans 2002; cf. Rowe & Frewer 2000).

Central criteria in the assessment of these practices are those concerning access (who is allowed to

participate; by whom is that determined) and autonomy and influence of the participants vis-à-vis

formal political institutions. The exemplar case for the political sciences is the ―Ladder of Citizen

Participation‖ by Arnstein (1969), which distinguishes between eight levels of participation in

political decision making, ranging from ‗manipulation‘ to ‗citizen control‘. In the latter case,

citizens fully control all stages of decision making, having been granted total sovereignty in

reaching decisions. In the field of policy analysis, a landmark classification system is Durning‘s

(1993), which distinguishes between four types of participatory policy analysis.

However, as previously stated, the sole objects of investigation in the PAGANINI project are not

state-initiated arrangements for formally organised public participation. Other – not necessarily

‗new‘ – types of participatory practices may be discerned when we review the conventional

notion of what counts as politics.

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1.2 Participation in the light of conceptual critique: rethinking political space

It was notably through the social studies of science and technology literature as well as through

macro-sociological studies that the idea of power not being constrained to classical-modernist

state institutions but instead being dispersed in polycentric networks gained a foothold in political

science, changing the perception of what counts as political space. The underlying concept here is

that power is not to be considered a commodity, so to speak, to be shared or not shared with

members of an a priori given public, but as the product of the interactions that take place

between diverse groups of people struggling over meanings, values and, indeed, the legitimation

of action.

In particular, the literature that focuses on the social construction of technology (e.g., Latour &

Woolgar 1979; Latour 1987; Callon et al. 1992) has drawn attention to the generation and

dispersion of power in a wide range of sites, including those for the production of scientific

knowledge. This literature indicates that the boundaries between a ‗political system‘ and society as

a whole are much more fluid than the conventional political science would interpret it.

A similar conclusion is drawn by authors working from a macro-sociological point of view.

Authors such as Castells (1996, 1997), Giddens (1990, 1991), Albrow (1996) and Beck (1994,

1997, 1998) all posit that the nation-state model of politics erodes and transforms into patterns of

governing practices that thrive on flexible networks of actors. Beck clearly states that we look for

politics in the wrong place when formal governmental institutes are solely the object of research.

In his opinion, equally political are the loci of what he calls ―subpolitics,‖ such as the

boardrooms of business and industry, or knowledge institutes. Castells makes a similar yet more

sophisticated argument about the ―displacement of politics‖ and the emergence of a ―network

society‖. According to Castells, in the network society power is no longer concentrated in

modern institutions, such as the state, capitalist firms and corporate media, but is also diffused in

global networks of wealth, information and images, which circulate and transmute in a political

system best described as a ―variable geometry‖ and dematerialised geography (Streeck &

Schmitter 1986).

The emergence of a European multi-level framework for governance furthermore has highlighted

that policy arrangements often comprise actors on the local, regional and global level (Kickert et

al. 1997; Hanf & Jansen 1998; Van Tatenhove et al. 2000). Processes of ‗trans-nationalisation‘ of

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economic, cultural and social relationships and the ‗horizontalisation‘ of the accepted authority of

the nation-state between firms, NGOs and citizens are here seen as concurrent with the process

of European unification.

In sum, characteristic of post-conventional views on governance is that ‗the polity‘ is not

necessarily co-extensive with the territory of the nation-state (Hajer 2003). The loosening

(conceptually and practically) of the ties between the territory and the act of governing has far-

reaching implications for the notion of participation, for if the political community does not

necessarily coincide with the nation-state, then membership in a political community does not

coincide with formal citizenship. Participation, then, may refer to a number of different, possibly

overlapping, ‗polities‘ – and not only to the state. In a world where not only the organisation of

politics but also the construction of identity and a sense of ‗belonging‘ are no longer self-

evidently coupled to territory, ‗the citizen‘ has become plural: he or she is characterised by a

diffuse identity or, rather, can adopt multiple identities and roles depending on the concrete

settings in which he or she operates (cf. Fox and Miller 1996). Moreover, with the territorial bind

the notion of the ‗common good‘ becomes ever more problematic, as not only the content of the

‗common good‘ is politically contested – that has always been the case in democratic states – but

also the group to which the adjective ‗common‘ refers; it cannot simply be presupposed that this

group coincides with the members of the nation-state. Consequently, a relevant empirical

question emerges: What is it that brings people together in the intentional ‗production of

politics‘?

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2. Implications for the project’s organisation of empirical research

The increasing interdependencies between states and their inhabitants worldwide in the second

half of the 20th century render the concept of the nation-state as the organising principle in

politics increasingly problematic. Phrases like Castell‘s ‗displacement of politics‘ or the ‗dispersion

of politics‘ (cf. Hajer & Underhill 2003) are part of a new, emerging vocabulary in the policy

sciences. New concepts have been coined to describe the sites of politics and notably the changing

topography of politics such as ―nodal points‖ (Gottweis 2003:260) and ―public energy fields‖ (Fox &

Miller 1996:100–110). The PAGANINI project considers such new vocabulary useful in order to

move beyond the conventional conception of politics – and accordingly of participation.

To guide the empirical focus, the project postulated to at least take into considerations ‗new

political spaces‘ (Hajer 2000) as an object of research, in addition to formally arranged

participatory practices. New political spaces in the PAGANINI project are sites where processes of

political judgment and decision making take place that exist next to or across the institutions that

are traditionally considered the exclusive centres of political power. These new loci of political

activity are considered to present sites of ‗participatory governance‘ by definition, as they entail the

involvement of non-state actors.

New political spaces provide the settings where ‗reality‘ is re-created and rewritten as the

outcome of new processes of discursive construction. These processes are both inherently

political and inherently social. They are social in that, as an ensemble of ideas and concepts, they

are being ―produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices‖ (Hajer

1995:44). They are political in that such discourses do not merely disclose some underlying reality

but ―actually constitute it‖ (Gottweis 2003:251). The inextricability of discourse from social

practice and the political nature of discursive construction make all practices in which meaning is

articulated the loci of politics. In contrast to the conventional understanding of ‗the political

system‘ the notion of site or ‗space‘ is constructed here without any territorial reference.

Governance hence, in the PAGANINI vocabulary, refers to a regime of practices.

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On the dynamics in governance practices, the PAGANINI project formulated three propositions

derived from the literature as well as from former empirical studies by PAGANINI researchers, to

help focus the empirical research:

Proposition 1: new political spaces can be seen to come into being in relation to the formal codified,

„classical-modernist‟ political institutions, for example., institutes for representative democracy, when the

latter are unable to cope adequately with unruly societal problems.

New political spaces in those cases may emerge as a historical product of an institutional

ambiguity. The concept of ‗institutional ambiguity‘ indicates a situation in which the ‗rules of the

game‘ – the way in which a problem issue can and should be legitimately framed and publicly

handled – are themselves the subject of political deliberation and struggle. Institutional ambiguity,

we assumed, appears when on the one hand, the existing rules and norms that shape politics and

policy making with regard to a specific issue are considered problematic and/or unacceptable,

while, on the other hand, clear rules are considered indispensable by the parties involved to

determine who is responsible, who has authority over whom and what sort of accountability is to

be expected. Sheila Jasanoff (1997) speaks of a ―civic dislocation‖, denoting ―a mismatch

between what governmental institutions were supposed to do for the public and what they did in

reality‖, causing citizens, at least temporarily, to ―disengage from the state‖.

Proposition 2: institutional ambiguity or „civic dislocation‟ and subsequently new political spaces may

occur in reaction to either sudden disrupting events or, alternatively, as a result of more pervasive, lasting

perceptions of scepticism and alienation (cf. Jasanoff 2004a).

Referring to Laclau‘s (1990) concept of ―dislocation‖, we coined the notion of ‗dislocatory

moments‘ , indicating the ―emergence of an event, or a set of events, that cannot be represented,

symbolized, or in other ways domesticated by the [dominant] discursive structure – which

therefore is disrupted‖ (Laclau 1990:41). In those moments, the apparent consensus on

meanings, roles and identities between actors is fundamentally shattered. Please note that such a

dislocation may not only refer to a ‗traumatic event‘ of chaos or crisis but can also be triggered by

lasting scepticism and uncertainty, resulting, for example, from ‗conflicting state imperatives‘.

In other words, dislocatory moments, or series of dislocatory moments, may cause a sense, and a

situation, of institutional ambiguity and impel a need for ‗reordering‘. In so doing, they may be

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seen to trigger the emergence of new political spaces where framings of the problem as well as

the rules of the game are being (re)articulated.

Proposition 3: Moments of dislocation may bring along unprecedented crises in regard to the credibility of

formal political institutions and associated knowledge institutes, and notably disrupt the „passive trust‟

which is presupposed in the formal organisation of government, and which is derived from the classical

means of political participation and representation such as elections, representation of political leadership

and the enactment of scientific expertise.

Essential for situations of institutional ambiguity is that the component parts of trust (which

according to Weinstock [1989] comprise unity, stability, cohesion and cooperation among

members of a collective) are not self-evident, and that therefore one-way communications from

classical-modernist institutes to ‗the citizen‘ no longer suffice. Such communication, which

generally consists of information flows in which a particular framing of the problem is conveyed,

no longer serve to arouse feelings of commitment. In those moments, trust will have to be actively

re-created in and through the actual interaction between human beings.

In cases of institutional ambiguity, the ‗silent contract‘ between citizens and formal political

institutions, including those operating through the enactment of scientific expertise, is broken,

and the state‘s licence-to-operate may be withdrawn.

In some cases, feelings of unease may find an expression in public turmoil and visible protest. A

case in point is the 1980s example of the wrecking of test plots with GMO crops in the

Netherlands by ‗action groups‘ calling themselves the ‗Raging Potatoes‘. In other cases, unease

may be expressed individually, for example, by a patient or pregnant women in the doctor‘s office

faced with conflicting imperatives of self-determination and responsibility on the one hand, and

the impossibility of reducing uncertainty about health risks for oneself or one‘s offspring to a

‗manageable‘ level on the other. Moreover, institutional ambiguity may be experienced not only

by non-state actors but by actors operating professionally in formal political institutions. To

them, social, technological and political dynamics may cause regulatory practices to come across

as ‗conflicting state imperatives‘.

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In the PAGANINI project, thus, the notion of ‗participatory governance‘ denoted the emergent,

iterative and fluid performance of governance in which varieties of actors, who can be identified

not only in relation to the state as pre-given entity but also in relation to attempts to align

problem framings, articulate roles and generate trust, deliberate their problem definitions and

solutions. The practices in which this kind of governance become manifest may include formal

‗participatory arrangements‘ but may also take different shapes.

3. The new politics of life: disruption of dominant structures and the need

for reordering

As said, the project thematically focused on policy areas that cluster in what is designated here as

‗the politics of life‘. The reason for this thematic focus is that in the closing decades of the 20th

century and at the brink of the 21st, we witness the loss of what was once assumed a universally

valid teleological orientation: the mastery of nature. As Ezrahi (1994:29) writes in regard to the

past age:

It is on the basis of [the premise that nature and society are two separate and distinct

domains] that the mastery of nature . . . could appear as a universal human goal, as

something common to all members of human society, thus removing from the idea of

technology the problem of harsh normative choice.

For the reasons described above, the belief in the distinction between the ‗ontological real‘ of

nature and the social reality of politics and other practices of sense making is faltering. That has

consequences for the way in which the risks involved in life-influencing developments (such as

life-threatening diseases or life-generating technologies) are being handled. With the loss of a

potentially ‗unifiable‘ community as described above, the element of normative choice in

attempts at mastering nature, or life, is inherently complex. In regard to life-political issues,

therefore, situations of institutional ambiguity are bound to occur.

The PAGANINI project raises the question how in the newly developing setting of ‗blurred

boundaries‘ between science and politics, and between nature and society the approaches to risk

control and risk management are affected.

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Within classical-modernist modes of governance, ‗risk‘ was conceptualised as being calculable in

terms of statistical probability, as being collective in that it refers to a population, not to the

individual, and as being economic in nature and expressed in terms of the loss of financial value

involved (Ewald 1991). In the new politics of life, the relation between mind, body and non-

human nature is being reframed: risk may involve uncertainty about the information necessary to

assess nominator and denominator in statistical calculations, risk may be experienced

predominantly on the level of the individual, and risk may involve non-economic assessments of

damage and responsibility.

In addition, the very notion of risk and the possibilities for risk control and management in

certain issue areas are contested.

While some contemporary analysts of modern society such as Beck (1997) or McNeill (2000)

concern themselves with what they perceive as ‗real crises‘, that is, crises in the ontological real

and that are brought to the fore in ―risk‖ and ―uncertainty‖ that have to be managed or handled

(e.g., Wynne 1992; Mol & Bulkeley 2002), other authors identify late-modern society‘s core

problems in terms of crisis in the production of scientific and political authority. Instead of taking

crises of ―invisible, elusive, fearful, yet wholly ‗real‘ entities‖ at face value, Jasanoff (1990, 2004b)

directs attention to the relationship between the modern state‘s capacity to produce and maintain

political order and its capacity to produce and use scientific knowledge. The dynamics in the

various ‗spheres of action‘ in society influence one another, Jasanoff argues, in such a way that

developments in, say, environmental science and its outputs are supported and legitimated by

other social practices such as policy-making processes and vice versa. This perspective she refers

to with the phrase ‗co-production‘:2

[C]o-production is shorthand for the proposition that the ways in which we know

and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in

which we choose to live in it. Knowledge and its material embodiments are at once

2 Please note that in the following, the word ‗co-production‘ will refer to this interpretation of the concept and not to Whitaker‘s (1980) interpretation, common in public administration literature, that denotes the co-operation between target group and public officials in implementing policy objectives.

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products of social work and constitutive of forms of social life; society cannot

function without knowledge any more than knowledge can exist without appropriate

social supports. Scientific knowledge, in particular, is not a transcendent mirror of

reality. It both embeds and is embedded in social practices, identities, norms,

conventions, discourses, instruments and institutions – in short, in all the building

blocks of what we term social. The same can be said even more forcefully of

technology. (Jasanoff 2004b:3; italics in the original)

It is from this perspective that practices of participatory governance concerning life-political

issues are approached in the PAGANINI project. This perspective enables us to analyse the reasons

why and the ways in which normatively laden epithets are used at all in debates on nature. It also

allows for an analysis of why and how nature as such ‗causes‘ a range of social, scientific and

political practices to emerge, and how in turn nature is constructed there. In addition, it helps

shed light on the reasons why notably at this juncture, in the closing decades of the 20th century

and at the beginning of the 21st, the way society, politics and science were organised and

conceived of in the course of the past century is time and again called into question, and why

institutional uncertainty is common .

Research within the PAGANINI context started from the hypothesis that current dynamics involve

a dislodgement of the very fundaments of current institutions and thought in science and politics

and in nature and society, and that the basic assumptions with regard to science and those with

regard to politics are being re-examined. As a result of this review, the two spheres of action are

increasingly perceived as not being separated at all.

From this perspective, when life enters our human understanding and attempts at ordering, there

are politics of life. New to the life-political issues of late modernity is that they entail novel

constellations in the constructed relation between mind, body and non-human nature. As a

consequence, they challenge the very institutional arrangements that political and scientific

communities produced in the course of the past centuries to deal with nature as a resource or a

threat to social order and human life, and to eradicate associated uncertainty.

The ‗new politics of life‘ of the 21st century thus concern those issues regarding life in both its

somatic and environmental interpretations and their associated constructions of human identity,

selfhood and individual and collective responsibility, for the ordering of which modernist forms

of governance are found no longer viable and legitimate. Hence, a further hypothesis of the

PAGANINI project has been that life-political issues in late modernist times tend to expose the

18

built-in tensions and implicit assumptions underlying modern governance in such a way that this

mode of ordering is called into question in acute, concrete political and scientific practices.

Inherent to new life-political issues is that there cannot be, at least not self-evidently, a ‗binding,

authoritative allocation of values for society as a whole‘ by the centre of formally institutionalised

state power. The ensuing situations of institutional ambiguity imply the need to develop, in situ

and ad hoc, new modes of governance by which actors can deal with the issues at stake

effectively and legitimately, in a context where no a priori unity or an implicit notion of ‗the

common good‘ as a motive for political action may be assumed, nor a possibility of taking

recourse to an ‗objective truth‘ for knowing what to do as a community. Society thus is faced

with the need to produce modes of reordering which can accommodate for feelings of distrust,

uncertainty and a diversity of values, particularly concerning the teleological orientation of social,

political, or scientific action. Therefore, continuing our hypothesis, it is likely that in the domain

of the politics of life in late modernity, participation and governance become intermingled to an

unusual extent.

4. Implications for the organisation of empirical research in relation to the

‘new politics of life’: propositions and research questions

Although cases of ‗the new politics of life‘ may be empirically diverse, they all may illustrate a

number of themes which are of particular research interest on the basis of the conceptualisation

of governance in late-modernity. Together these themes set an initial agenda for research in

particular case studies:

There is a mismatch between a life-political issue and dominant modes of governance that triggers

situations of institutional ambiguity.

How is this mismatch brought out in the different politics of life areas? How is it

expressed and who perceives it?

Science and politics are co-produced in public, political and scientific discourses.

How do public and political discourses influence what counts as ‗scientific truth‘ or as a

‗fact‘? How do non-scientists participate in scientific knowledge production? How do, on

the other hand, assertions about alleged scientific facts channel and shape policy making?

Who can say what on which grounds about ‗matters of fact‘ and ‗matters of concern‘ in a

19

specific situation? What argument carries force, and what can be said by whom

legitimately? Who and what is decisive in determining who is ‗in‘ and who is ‗out‘?

In the new politics of life areas, the dichotomy of reason (logos; facts) on the one hand and morality, ethics,

and emotions (pathos) is untenable.

Which role do morality, ethics and emotions play in the attempts at reordering reality in

politics of life areas? How do they interact with attempts to formulate ‗truths‘ about the

natural world and justifications about political judgments?

In the new politics of life areas, a mismatch may be perceived between political regulation on the one hand

and problem perception on the other (e.g., between the „universalistic‟ claim that some species need

protecting and the locally perceived need not to bother). Responsibility for ordering and regulating cannot

be presupposed to rest with the nation-state but may be divided or floating between the national, the

European union, the regional, the local level, or between collectives and the individual.

How are such mismatches being addressed in practice?

Who is considered to legitimately take up responsibility for the control of technologies

that might affect the personal, individual life of people (e.g., the state, the individual, the

producer, or the consumer)?

In short, the politics of life may be understood as involving a broad range of issues that concern

the relation between the mind and the body, and between humans and external nature, that

acutely challenge central assumptions in the dominant modernist modes of ordering such as the

dichotomy between facts and values, science and politics, logos and pathos.

Due to the complex relations between science and politics regarding life-political issues, artefacts

and subjects, it is in this policy domain that the inadequacy of dominant, modernist modes of

governance may be urgently felt, and may result in institutional ambiguity. Attempts at reordering

the unruly issues in the face of such ambiguity may therefore well entail the participation of

varieties of actors and new forms of governance that build on and know how to deal with the

‗unruly‘ publics involved. If only for their suggestion to be manifestations of a newly emerging

social order, the politics of life of late-modernity and the practices of participatory governance

through which they become manifest are well worth investigating empirically.

20

II. Case Studies

1. Dislocations, institutional ambiguity and the resilience of the state

As discussed in Part I, our theoretical debate led us to posit that in the life-political areas that we

investigated, institutional ambiguity was likely to occur. Institutional ambiguity comes out when

the existing rules and norms that shape politics and policy making with regard to a specific issue

are considered problematic and/or unacceptable, while at the same time evidence exists that

clear rules are considered indispensable by the parties involved to determine who is responsible,

who has authority over whom, what sort of accountability is to be expected and so on. We

expected such ambiguities to occur in the policy areas under investigation, as we argued that in

those fields the dominant and institutionalised governance structures might be found insufficient

or even at odds with the requirements posed by, for example, new technological developments,

changing attitudes towards the manageability of life, or the desirability of preserving nature.

Those feelings of unease or even dislocation, we argued on the basis of theoretical explorations

of the issue, could either manifest themselves after sudden disrupting events (dubbed here

‗dislocatory moments‘) or in more pervasive, lasting perceptions of skepticism and alienation.

The empirical research shows that in some cases dislocatory events in the Laclauian sense have

indeed occurred which triggered processes of discursive and institutional reordering. In other

cases, we found that institutional ambiguity and the emergence of new political spaces and

governance patterns have emerged not so much in response to identifiable moments of

dislocation but instead in the context of crisis, lasting skepticism, a creeping awareness of

uncertainty, or ‗conflicting state imperatives‘. Yet, what was perhaps a more surprising finding

was that in many instances existing institutional designs and dominant discursive structures gave

witness of a remarkable resilience. As a result, also in the face of dislocation and/or lasting

perceptions of unease and alienation, rather than fundamental and radical changes and overhaul,

we noticed the emergence of mixtures of old and new institutional patterns and the persistence

of, ‗high modernist‘ modes of governance.

21

In part, our case studies bear witness of dynamics that have been set into motion by dislocatory

events. A key dislocatory event in the field of embryonic stem cell and cloning research, for

instance, was the announcement of the birth of Dolly the sheep in March 1997. The

announcement led to intense sense making, ordering and soul searching. It was met with shock

and horror in Germany, Austria and Italy. And it incited regulatory activities, both on the level of

the countries under study and on the level of numerous international organizations such as the

United Nations, the European Union and the Council of Europe.

What rendered things complicated and unruly, however, was that Dolly was not universally

damned as a nightmare. The birth of Dolly the sheep also generated a great deal of excitement on

the potential benefits of the technology that helped to give birth to the globe‘s first cloned

mammal. Dolly proved that somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) did indeed work, thus

demonstrating that an adult cell could be ‗reprogrammed‘ and go ‗back in time‘. A somatic cell

that fulfills a very specific function could be rebooted into a very early stage and give rise to an

embryo and, progressively, to a foetus. Some scientists and policy makers argued that while this

technology should not be used for human reproductive purposes, the technology as such should

nevertheless have its place in the range of permissible practices. SCNT, so the argument went,

could be used to generate cell lines that are perfectly compatible with patients. The combination

of human embryonic stem (hES) cell and cloning technology gave shape to a whole set of new

medical-therapeutic expectations that promised to offer unprecedented possibilities for dealing

with serious ailments and diseases for which there existed no alternative treatments. However,

while some framed these prospects as unprecedented opportunities, others regarded them as the

crossing of ―fundamental moral boundaries‖ and as the beginning of a public-health nightmare.

Somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT, “therapeutic cloning”) involves the injection of a nucleus from a

differentiated body cell (a somatic cell) into an oocyte (egg cell) from which the nucleus has been

removed. Then, the oocyte is mechanically induced to behave like an ordinarily fertilized oocyte,

i.e., an embryo, and starts to divide and develop like normal embryos. The feasibility of this

technique has been first successfully demonstrated by Ian Wilmut, Keith Campbell and

colleagues, when they produced Dolly the famous sheep. They removed the egg‘s nucleus with its

DNA and replaced it with the DNA of a donor cell. Then, they ―found a way to fool the egg, by

a shock of electricity, into thinking that it was a developing embryo‖ (Wilmut & Highfield

2006:93). The oocyte provided signals that reprogrammed the somatic cell DNA, redirecting it to

divide and develop like early-stage embryos. Subsequently, the embryo was transferred to a

surrogate ewe. The resulting sheep – Dolly – had the same nuclear genome as the sheep that was

the source of the somatic cell (Bonnicksen 2002:2).

22

One could argue that the birth of Dolly the sheep developed such a strong dislocatory power

because of its ―ontopolitical implications‖.3 With ontopolitics we refer to political contestations

in which questions about ―what to do with an entity‖ are related to or translated into struggles

and debates on their categorization. Struggles on what to do with entities are related to struggles

on their very labeling, their categorization and, consequently, their very ontological status. A

cloned mammal, a vital human embryo outside the woman‘s body, a blastocyst derived not

through fertilization but through SCNT, all confront actors with the question of what these

entities actually are and how they can be represented within the moral and epistemological order

(see chapter 3 on risk and uncertainty).

Another case study, in which we can identify a moment of dislocation that set off a series of

institutional responses is the case of BSE and food scares. It was not so much the first clinical

signs of BSE in cows in the UK in 1986 – although quite disruptive of the dominant

understanding of spongiform diseases in mammals – that came to upset standing practices of risk

control, but the concern that the disease might afflict humans too. In 1995, public concern

proved justified when three young people died from what was apparently a new human variant of

the brain infliction Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (nvCJD). Public turmoil in Britain arose when on

March 20, 1996, UK Health Secretary Stephen Dorrel publicly announced the likelihood of a link

between the cattle disease and the newly found variant of the human equivalent. These

developments had a strong impact in various policy fields, among them trade and internal

relations within the EU. The same year, the EU imposed a ban on the export of British beef,

forcing Germany to replace the unilateral ban it had set in place in a first reaction to the British

veterinary problems.

In November 1989, the central government asked the German States (Länder) to restrict trade in

British beef, permitting only certified BSE-free meat of which the spinal cord was removed (a

3 Here, we borrow the name of a concept from John Law (xxxx) and Annemarie Mol‘s work (xxxx, xxxx), without, however, drawing on its intellectual content.

23

measure preceding the worldwide ban on UK beef). When eventually the EU ban was installed,

Germany adopted the EU controls and ceased its own unilateral action (Dressel 1999). Other

measures taken in EU countries among which the Netherlands and Germany included strict

controls on a separate handling in the compounding industry of feedstuffs for ruminants on the

one hand and for poultry and pigs on the other, so as to prevent cross-contamination. The use of

meat and bone meal in feed was banned, and a registration system for cattle was installed in both

countries in 1994. After the British had formally confirmed the possible link between BSE and

nvCJD, more stringent measures were taken. The Dutch Minister of Agriculture decided in

March 1996 to have all British calves in the country killed and their carcasses destroyed (Van der

Most & Smit 1999). In addition to control measures regarding live animals, measures with regard

to beef and beef products of British origin also were reviewed. Already from August 1990

onward, in response to a ruling of the European Commission, imported British beef attached to

the bone was submitted to specific inspections. Initially the import of British meat from farms

that had been free of BSE for at least six years was allowed. By 1996, however, trade and

transport of beef and beef products from the UK to other member states were prohibited

altogether, and a total ban was a fact.

The reasons why BSE proved, in hindsight, a powerful dislocatory event (also in comparison to

other food scares) are manifold. First of all, the assertion that BSE was a zoönosis, that is, an

animal disease that may affect humans, strongly disrupted the institutional organisation of both

policy areast involved: agriculture and public health. Both fields of old had been organised largely

in relative isolation from one another in all three countries under investigation here. The

institutional design that was characteristically divided into a series of arrangements set up to deal

with agricultural production and veterinary care, on the one hand, and a set of arrangements for

dealing with human health, on the other, made it possible that the human risks involved in BSE

went unnoticed for a long time (cf. Van Zwanenberg & Millstone 2005). The landslide that BSE

set in motion once it was identified as a zoönosis included more than mere organisational

rearrangements. BSE cut through the classificatory schemes that modernist institutions use to

routinely separate the realm of the animal from that of the human. BSE presented a clear and

unavoidable incentive to reconsider the boundaries between the two spheres. As a result, the

institutional arrangements for governing the public consequences of food production and

consumption themselves became the object of political conflict, which culminated particularly in

a redesigning of food safety regulatory settings.

24

BSE could have this strong implications, notably in the UK and on the level of the EU, because

of the sheer costs involved in its abatement and its impact on the EU internal market, as well as

its costs in terms of loss of political goodwill in view of the principle of freedom of movement

for animals and goods. A second decisive development was that the BSE-nvCJD turmoil in the

UK developed at the time the Labour opposition began a serious challenge against the

conservatives‘ long-term hegemony and made the ‗mad cow disease food scare‘ into an election

issue. For this reason, and because Britain was hit more severely than any other European

country, it is possible to observe the most extensive institutional responses in the UK (see

chapter 2).

Another reason why BSE may be considered as fundamentally upsetting the dominant food

safety control regimes was that its pathogen agent seemed to escape the analytic tools available

for assessing and managing food-borne diseases. As BSE was constructed as a scrapie-related

brain infliction, the cause of the disease was identified in terms of the ‗protein only‘ hypothesis

(Prusiner 1982; see chapter 3). Problematic to the governing of BSE was that the prion (or

protein only) hypothesis provided almost no clues as to how to proceed. It is inconsistent with

animal disease and zoönoses control protocols which are used in determining which national

measures must be put in place in case of an outbreak of some disease.

The dislocatory power of BSE, respectively nCJD, partly spilled over to the area of GM

(genetically modified) crops, in fact contributing to the emergence of a public energy field

around this issue too. When in 1996 the first GM crops came to the European market, they soon

became the centre of contention. This contention was considerably fuelled through the

announcement by the UK government in March 1996 that a probable link had been established

between the human brain disease of vCJD and BSE, after years of assurances by government

scientific advisers, politicians and the industry that ―British beef is safe to eat‖. Following this

admission 1996 public trust in the regulatory and scientific advice system along with the food and

agriculture industries plummeted. The years 1996–1999 became a period of serious crisis for the

existing European regulatory regime which had been established by the DRD (1990/220). By the

end of 1998, the crisis of legitimacy for those trying to promote GM agri-food in Europe had

become critical. An institutional void around the governance of GM crops had become visible to

all. The 1990/220 deliberate release directive had attempted to govern the release of GM crops as

a separate and distinct category. However, it had provided no machinery for post-market

regulation, assuming that its responsibility ended once the new varieties were released into the

25

fields or supermarkets. Yet now retailers found themselves on the frontline of a new cultural and

political battle that threatened their sensitive and elaborate system of negotiations with consumer

consciousness, based on trading with symbols of naturalness, purity and health. Within this

meltdown of public trust a growing series of improvised measures proliferated, ranging from

national bans by EU member states to boycotts by powerful supermarket chains. Activists

arrested for sabotaging GM test fields escaped punishment, when some courts refused to convict

them, demonstrating the wider lack of cultural legitimacy of the GM project.

This political, cultural, epistemic and regulatory logjam intensified in the following years.

In October 1998, Greece invoked Art. 16 of Directive 1990/220 in order to ban previously

authorized GMO from its territories. In June 1999 five EU member states – Denmark, France,

Greece, Italy and Luxembourg – successfully proposed a de facto moratorium on any new Part C

consents to the European Environment Council. The motion at Council said that, given concerns

about risk, the specificity of European ecosystems and the need to restore the confidence of

public opinion and the market, the Commission should suspend new authorisations until it had

strengthened and widened its risk assessment procedures and put in place a system allowing the

complete traceability of GMOs and products derived from them.4 Thus the last two GM crops

given Part C Consents in 1998 – AgroEvo/Aventis/Bayer‘s HR Maize (T25, import only) and

Monsanto‘s bt resistant maize (MON 810, import and cultivation) – were to be the last under the

old directive 90/220. In addition, the countries of Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany,

Netherlands, Spain and Sweden stated they would take a ―thoroughly precautionary approach‖ in

dealing with marketing applications, urging the Commission to make proposals for the

traceability and labelling regulations as soon as possible.

Hence, what we see in the case of the GMO conflict is less the dislocatory power of a certain

identifiable event, or a series of events than an institutional void created by the clash of two

contradictory imperatives, built into the EU‘s original GMO regulatory framework of the 1990

Deliberate Release Directive (DRD): on the one hand an imperative to foster a climate of

innovation and economic growth, on the other an imperative to address the precautionary

concerns around the potential impact of these innovations on health and the environment. Thus

while being committed to the free movement of GMOs within European space, the DRD

created a special regulatory category of the GMO, with each variety being required to go through

4 Official minutes at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/99/st09/09433en9.pdf, p. 14.

26

a process of approval before gaining admission to this space. However, having highlighted these

precautionary concerns, the 1990 DRD then made no provisions for post-release monitoring,

labelling, or traceability of these products once admitted into the European regulatory space. This

tension shaped the dynamics of the ensuing conflict within the EU, creating a regulatory void

that drew in new participants and which allowed various parties including food retailers, nature

conservation bodies and member states to demand a moratorium and push for a new round of

regulation.

Competing imperatives also contribute to the existence of an institutional ambiguity in the case

of conservation policy. In both the squirrel and the turtle cases, the aim of the conservation

management is to integrate the strict protection of the species within the ongoing activities of

forestry and tourist services, respectively. The conflict between these imperatives in both

countries increased in the late 1990s.

In the turtle case, although failure of implementation tied to the local economy has been visible

since the late 1970s, conflicts over the implementation of presidential decrees and land-use

restrictions intensified because of conservationist pressures to protect the sandy nesting beaches

on Zakynthos which attracted both tourists and loggerhead turtles. Things became worse in 1985

when the conservationists and the relevant NGOs suddenly appeared on the island, attempting to

impose measures and restrictions, without discussing them with the local people and explaining

their motives.

Flow of events: The Turtle

Before the 1970s, scientists in Greece were not directly concerned with conservation issues

(Interview 11b-4, 060406). The first systematic recording of Caretta caretta nests was started in

1977 by Dimitrios Margaritoulis (Warren & Antonopoulou 1990:19), who co-founded a few years

later the Sea Turtle Protection Society (STPS), Archelon. He ―discovered the first turtle nesting

areas on Zakynthos and turned to American expertise, to the Hellenic Society for the Protections

of Nature as well as to the National Council for Physical Planning and the Environment for help.

Scientific research collaborations were set up with the Department of Biology at the Aristotle

University of Thessaloniki and the Goulandris Natural History Museum‖ (interview 6b-4 180705;

Warren & Antonopoulou 1990:19). In 1980, when Greece became a member of the EEC, a new

27

Department of the Environment was formed, the first presidential decree for the protection of

marine turtles was signed5 and a research initiative by the Council of Physical Planning and the

Environment was established to fund the monitoring of the nesting sites. A nationwide survey

during the 1980s identified the areas of densest nesting and led to the establishment of

permanent monitoring and nest conservation projects in the six most important areas which are

located on the island of Zakynthos, on Kiparissia and Lakonikos in Peloponnesus, and on the

island of Crete, on the beaches of Rethimno, Chania, and Messara.

The 1982 Red Data Book (Groombridge 1982) refers specifically to the Caretta caretta population

in Zakynthos as likely to become endangered and classifies it as vulnerable. In the late 1980s,

several nesting beaches in West Laganas had developed into popular tourist sites. In 1988

scientists pointed out the lack of nesting data for comparative studies, and in 1990 Groombridge

confirmed the importance of the Bay of Laganas for the Mediterranean Sea Turtle. The

Mediterranean Association to Save Sea Turtles (MEDASSET) was founded in the same year

(Venizelos & Corbett 2005:11). Concern over the spread of tourist-related development on

nesting beaches led WWF to purchase land in 1994 for $2.6 million (75% from donations and

25% from EC funds).

Since the 1990s, persistent struggles continue involving conservationist NGOs, local interest

groups, EU agencies. and the Greek state. Although a series of presidential decrees, laws and

marine regulations including the creation of the National Marine Park of Zakynthos (NMPZ)

were established, the persistent obstacles in implementing them exert continuous and increasing

pressure on the local ecosystem thus creating a durable issue for the affected local and nonlocal

groups (MEDASSET Update Report 2006).

In 1998, the Habitat Directive was transposed into national law in Greece. Local reactions further

intensified. In 1999 the establishment of a national marine park in Zakynthos was announced.

On the 3 July 1998, the European Commission sent a letter to the Greek authorities requesting

information about the measures enforced for the protection of the loggerhead turtle in

Zakynthos. In addition, on the 16 and 17 July 1998, EC officials went on a mission to Zakynthos

and found the measures implemented as inadequate. In 1998 the EC commenced infringement

procedures against the Greek government and blocked EU Structural Funds to the area

(Dimopoulos 2001). As a result, under Article 69(2) of the rules of procedure, the unsuccessful

party, that is the Hellenic Republic, had been ordered by the European Court of Justice to pay

the costs, a decision finally published on 30 January 2002.

5 Government. Gazette -G.G.- No 163A/18.7.1980.

28

Presently, in the bay of Messara of south-central Crete, heightened concern over Caretta caretta

and the wider local ecosystem is expressed by local NGOs and local community groups but also

by groups at the EU and international levels. In December 2006, local groups including tourism

entrepreneurs, established a ‗Citizens‘ Initiative‘6 aimed at protecting the local environment and

economy from the huge transit port project.

In Finland, the Habitats Directive had been in place before the country had become an EU

member; it had been established three years before Finland joined the EU in 1995. Since about

1998, local controversies have sprang up in increasing numbers and have reached the national

level in publicity. Around 1998, conservation NGOs began to complain to the EU Commission

about the neglect of the flying squirrel in land-use plans. And in that year the first case of a

squirrel dispute went to the court in the case of Konikallio in Forssa.

Flow of events: The Squirrel

The flying squirrel was included in the list of protected species which was appended to the first

Finnish Nature Conservation Act of 1923. In a handbook on Finnish mammals of the mid-1950s

(Siivonen 1956:444–445) the flying squirrel, ―a resident of large forests,‖ was assessed as having

become threateningly rare. In 1975 the species was classified as ―vulnerable‖ in a list of Finnish

endangered species published by WWF Finland. The first national-level systematic conservation

measure focused on the flying squirrel took place in 1984, when WWF Finland founded a

working group to assess causes of the population decline. The first Finnish Red Data List put

together by the Ministry of the Environment was completed in 1985, and the flying squirrel was

classified as a near-threatened, declining species in need of monitoring.

The conservation status of the flying squirrel remained the same in the second Red Data List in

1992. In the third round completed in 2000, the classification criteria were slightly changed, and

the flying squirrel was placed among vulnerable species; the ground for this decision was that its

population was estimated to have declined by 30%.

6 http://www.no-container-port-in-timbaki.net/facts_en.php accessed on January 22, 2007.

29

Two national-level conflicts over the routing of traffic infrastructure rose into broad publicity in

2002. The first of these was the construction of the motorway E18 between Turku and Helsinki

as a part of a European transport scheme. Altogether 47 home ranges of the flying squirrel were

found in the construction zone of the original plan. The Regional Environmental Centres

conceded the Road Office the right to derogate from article 12 of the Habitats Directive, on the

grounds of article 16, but environmental NGOs appealed to court and the Commission. The

motorway was rerouted with an extra cost of seven million euros (the decision of the Supreme

Administrative Court: KHO:2003:99). The second case was the construction of a new main

railroad line in southern Finland (connection line Kerava – Lahti): a private citizen appealed to

the Commission because flying squirrels were living in the construction zone. Similar smaller

local conflicts followed.

One of the first flying squirrel conflicts in land-use planning in Finland took place in Tampere in

2000-2002 (Nygren 2005). The conflict was about the planning of a new suburb in Ojala, at the

eastern border of the city of Tampere. Initially one of the planners had proposed an institutional

innovation to solve the conflict between the competing imperatives of land-use planning and

conservation, proposing to set aside suitable forests for the flying squirrels in the vicinity of

Ojala, but the suggestion was turned down.

The present situation in flying squirrel conflicts in the Tampere City Region can be summarized as

follows: The Tampere City Region is among the fastest growing urban areas in Finland in terms

of population increase. According to the city planners (Ritva Kangasniemi in a seminar on forest

protection, 15 September 2004), about 200 hectares of new land are needed every year for

housing and workplace development. The flying squirrel is fairly common in the region, some

territories are located at a distance of 2–3 km from the centre of Tampere. Consequently, the

protection of the squirrels gives rise to a broad spectrum of conflict situations.

In addition to the problem of competing imperatives, conservation policy is characterized by an

built-in conflict between multi-level governance and local implementation. We can speak of an

implementation ambiguity here. What makes a successful conservation policy tricky, among other

things, is that the deterioration of biodiversity is caused by various activities in sectors of

production, transport and energy that deal with land-use management – that is, basically, all

sectors. This is also implied by the ambitious coverage of the EC Biodiversity Strategy. The EU

Commission, however, lacks competence in the field of land management which has caused a

―capability—expectation gap‖ (Baker 2003:36).

The conservation policy of the EU is bothered by this kind of a heavy historical burden.

Originally, the member states were reluctant to give the Commission competence in matters that

30

extend to land-use management which is a necessary condition of any conservation policy worth

the name. It was the international normative pressure which broke this deadlock. The member

states, however, are poorly equipped to respond adequately to the tasks defined to them by the

Habitats Directive. The point is, though, that conservation policy has to be context-specific in

detail; it cannot be successfully implemented without taking local circumstances into account. In

the case of the Habitats Directive, in order to successfully implement the law, which has been

adopted on the European level, interactions between three different levels are required:

(1) The local level at which public understanding of and respect for the species arise (we

might call this ‗companionship‘);

(2) The regional level at which population trends are monitored. Local decisions have to be

evaluated against regional population trends;

(3) The national and EU level at which conservation policy is formulated and codified.

For a successful interactive process of policy formation and implementation across these

different levels, new political spaces need to be opened up because there can be no simple top-

down solutions to conservation conflicts.

In contrast to the issue areas discussed previously, genetic testing has had a de-escalation of public

controversy and public unrest within the past two decades, although important differences exist

between different fields of controversy concerning the issue. Prenatal diagnosis has become a

widely accepted practice in antenatal care in the countries under study and has ceased being a

dense public energy field. Even many non-pro-life critics of PND and selective abortions choose

not to challenge the regulatory frame of PND fundamentally, mainly because this might risk

reopening the abortion controversy which want to avoid. There are still matters of concern in

this field, such as the issue of late-term abortions and the kind of counselling that should be

provided, but these issues do not really stir public unrest or public debate. The situation is

somewhat different concerning pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). In contrast to PND,

which is mainly governed by professional self-regulation, the question of how to properly

regulate PGD has given rise to public debates. The debate was most intensive and controversial

in Germany but to some extent also took place in Austria and the UK. The intensity of this

public energy field has nothing to do with the frequency of PGD, which is still very rare. On the

contrary, there seems to be an inverse relationship between the commonness of a practice and

the intensity of debate about it; the more widespread a practice gets (see PND), the less

31

controversial the public debate becomes. Rather, PGD, as an interview partner put it, “pushes some

very sensitive buttons of some individuals, on both sides” (Interview 13-3 2006), evoking anxieties about

‗designer babies‘, the status of the embryo and the health of future children. The PGD debates

were especially dense during the millennium change and accompanied by the establishment of

new advisory bodies or new bioethics councils as we will point out in chapter 2 . In recent years,

however, public debate about PGD has calmed down too.

In this case study, the peak of public unrest and public controversy had been in the 1980s when

the possible future implications of human genetics became a subject of heated political debates

ignited by social movements. These movements evoked apocalyptical scenarios (―brave new

world‖, ―total surveillance state‖, ―production of human beings‖, etc.) often based on

deterministic ideas about the implications of technological change for society (Kontos 1985;

Schultz 1996). In Germany a broad range of feminist groups and organisations of disabled people

articulated criticism towards reproductive technologies and genetic engineering (Bradish et al.

1989; Die Grünen im Bundestag 1985). The main frame applied by feminist groups could be

termed an ‗oppression frame‘, portraying women as victims of increasing medicalisation and

alienation by (male) medical experts and scientists who wanted to get access to and control over

procreation and the uterus, human eggs and embryos. Anti-eugenic and anti-capitalist positions

also developed in this context, pushed forward by the radical movement of disabled people, who

called themselves the ―movement of cripples‖.7 They saw genetic testing, PND and selective

abortion as a modern form of eugenics and an instrument to enhance the ―quality‖ of the future

labour force or of the national population. Militant activists such as the feminist guerrilla group

Rote Zora invaded laboratories in Germany and published research papers which they had seized

in their assaults (Bürobert et al. 1996:99; Rote Zora 1989). In the UK, pro-life movements

connected their protest against the new technologies with their moral objections against abortion.

All in all, in comparison to the mid- and late 1980s, the years after the millennium change are

characterized by a non-antagonistic constellation. By ―non-antagonistic constellation‖ we mean a

situation not characterized by the confrontation of two opposing camps, one opposed to and the

7 The journal Randschau and its predecessors (Krüppelzeitung, Luftpumpe) are interesting sources when studying this movement (www.martinseidler.privat.t-online.de/randschau.htm).

32

other in favour of genetic technology, each striving at defeating the respective other camp. To be

sure, we still found a lot of unease about ‗designer babies‘ or ‗a new form of eugenics‘, but it is a

rather subliminal ease, roaming around within an overall non-antagonistic constellation; techno-

sceptic arguments are circulating within a post-euphoric and post-apocalyptic debate that is more

fragmented, sophisticated, professionalised and normalised – a debate whose focus has shifted

from fundamental ―yes or no‖ questions to rather pragmatic questions such as how properly to

organize counselling.

Interestingly, in this case study the absence of fierce antagonist conflict goes together with a

‗discourse intensification and a number of participatory governance arrangements and experiments

such as consultation processes, consensus conferences, or youth conferences. We will come back

to this phenomenon in chapter 5.

2. Institutional responses

What has become apparent from our empirical work is that in the politics of life areas we have

studied, ranging from biomedical to food and environmental issues, there are myriad problems

that, however diverse, are characterised by scientific uncertainty, political controversies, a strongly

perceived need for action, the increasing significance of ethics and morality, conflicting

imperatives and public unrest or unease. How have existing institutions responded to these novel

and complex challenges to governance? Do we see institutional innovations that are better

equipped to cope with these types of challenges?

The second proposition in the PAGANINI project was that the kind of state-initiated social

engineering that dominated the better half of the last century, which was based on the assumed

availability of synoptic, universally valid knowledge and of the ability of states to shape society

and the market, no longer seemed a valid option under late-modernist conditions. As explained in

Part I, we expected so-called new political spaces to become manifest in relation to the formal

codified arrangements that provide the official setting of policy making and politics in the

postwar era in Western societies when the latter were felt to be unable to cope adequately with

unruly societal problems such as the life-political issues discussed here. The empirical question

was to which extent such new political spaces did indeed emerge and which shape they took.

33

Institutional responses to BSE and the issue of food scares more generally are mixed in this

respect. On the one hand, we certainly find an opening-up of the regulatory regime to non-state

actors and non-scientists, and the rearrangement of the institutional settings regarding agricultural

production and human health towards a more comprehensive approach, which set out to cover

both areas in an integral manner. On the other hand, food safety is basically still, 20 years after

the first identification of BSE, being treated in terms of the original regime, namely on an

essentially scientific, modernist basis. ‗Sound science‘ as the source of legitimate and effective

state activities in regard to food safety control is actually re-emphasised. How do we make sense

of these observations? Are the dynamics set in motion by the BSE phenomenon and other food

scares best designated as the mere expressions of ‗a system repairing itself‘? Or should we

appreciate the changes in the institutional landscape regarding food safety control in terms of

fundamental renewal and regime innovation?

In the UK, at the time BSE was first identified, food safety was a shared responsibility between

the institutional arrangements governing issues in respect to human health, and those in charge of

agricultural production. Yet in practice, food safety control was closely tied up with the latter

arrangements. The connection between food safety control and the representation of interest of

the food-producing sector was formalised in the structure of the Ministry of Agriculture,

Fisheries and Food (MAFF).

Perhaps more than a conscious strategy to protect farmers‘ interests against all odds, the

Ministry‘s ‗muddling-through‘ approach vis-à-vis BSE, which was later found inexcusable, might

have been informed by a ‗culture of secrecy‘ that characterised the organisation. In a depiction of

the UK regulatory regime, Halfmann (2003) sketches an elite community of people sharing a

background in exclusive educational centres and relying on the argued reasonability of regulatory

action (rather than on solid scientific proof or legalistic procedures). An interpretation of the

traditional regulatory regime in terms of a ‗culture of secrecy‘ gives depth to the factual

information on how the interface between science and policy in regard to agriculture and food

safety was organised in the UK. This added to the problems caused by the (geographical and

cultural) segregation of the institutes responsible for human health and those responsible for

animal health. If BSE is considered a ‗connecting power‘ between these separate institutional

fields, the Food Standard Agency (FSA), newly established as a result of Labour coming in office

in the wake of the BSE event, may be considered the main institutional rearrangement set out to

bridge the two areas and to explicitly address the problematic culture of secrecy.

34

The FSA

The FSA finds its origins in the ‗James Report‘ that on invitation of the then-opposition leader

Tony Blair suggested a design on the ―structure and functions of a Food Standards Agency‖.

When the Labour Party came to office in May 1997, in line with these recommendations, the

food safety responsibilities of MAFF and the Department of Health were brought together in

June 1997 in a new agency, the Joint Food Safety and Standards Group (JFSSG). This body

which comprised staff members from MAFF and from the Health Department became the core

of the later food agency, the FSA.

The Agency became operational on 3 April 2000, as an independent government department

with offices in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland. Operating ‗at arms‘ length of

government, its independence is among its core credentials. Furthermore, it set out to develop a

new organisational culture based on openness. Formally, its independence is guaranteed through

the Agency's ‗non-Ministerial‘ status (it is accountable through the Secretary of State for Health

to Parliament) and through its right to publish all its information and advice independently.

The FSA‘s remit covers food safety, the protection of consumers‘ interests in relation to food,

and (jointly with the UK health departments) nutrition. The Agency addresses food safety issues

at every stage of the food production and supply chain. Responsible for the agency‘s overall

strategic direction and its compliance with legal obligations is a Board whose members are

chosen for their relationships to different parts of the food industry and food safety sector and

come from different segments of society, ranging from food business to academia. In practice,

the responsible Secretary of State‘s department, Health, integrally adopts FSA‘s proposals for

food safety regulation. Thus, the prime responsibility over all aspects of food safety in the UK is

put in the hand of one, independent body.

In the Netherlands and in Germany too in pre-BSE time post–World War II days, ‗iron

triangles‘ of major players reigned the agricultural sector. Furthermore, as in the UK, the

institutional arrangements for regulating agriculture, public health and, later, environmental

management were quite neatly divided into separate areas of government which did not have

‗much to do‘ with one another.

For many reasons, this situation changed considerably from the mid-1980s onward. In the

Netherlands, with the loosening up of the iron triangle, other ministries, non-agricultural interest

groups and representatives gradually gained influence in agricultural policy formation (cf. Loeber

2004). The outbreak of BSE presented merely an additional incentive for change. One of the

most notable changes on the institutional level in the Netherlands is the change of name of the

35

Ministry of Agriculture. After the outbreak of a series of animal diseases that plagued the nation

and got intensive attention in the media, the ministry struggled to broaden its right to existence.

The notion of ‗food quality‘ was coined as a theme by which the ministry could justify itself vis-à-

vis society outside the agricultural sector while still indicating a strong link with its traditional

focus on the primary sector. The letter ‗V‘ in the ministry‘s formal abbreviation, which previously

referred to Fisheries, now was changed to meaning ‗Food Quality‘ (Voedselkwaliteit). What added

to the new-found identity of the ministry was the fact that the VWA, the Dutch FSA-‗equivalent‘

was brought under its auspices.

In Germany, the outbreak of BSE hit much harder, as it caused great societal concern, and, as

was the case in the UK, here too a change in the Cabinet enforced the implications of the BSE-

induced ‗food scare‘. The Federal Ministry for Nutrition, Agriculture and Forestry was reshaped

into a new Ministry for Consumer Protection, Nutrition and Agriculture, which was designed to

take on all tasks involved in the protection of food and in representing consumer interests that

hitherto had been scattered among various ministries. The left-wing German parties pleaded for a

new agrarian policy, which implied a break-away from standing practice. The measures taken (and

foreseen) with the active support of the new ministry came known as the Agrarwende

(fundamental agricultural turn). Another institutional change was that the Federal Institute for

Consumer Protection and Veterinary Medicine was split up into two institutions for food safety

control: the Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR) was assigned tasks with regard to

scientific research on food safety related issues, the Federal Agency for Consumer Protection and

Food Safety (BVL) was assigned the task of developing early warning systems and systems for

ensuring the traceability of products.

A comparable effort to functionally separate risk-assessment activities from risk management was

made on the level of the EU. The institutional reform that took place as a result of the turmoil in

regard to BSE (in terms of trade and public health) brought along an entirely new European

―transnational‖ governance regime on food safety that cuts across the national/supranational

distinction (cf. Chalmers 2003). A new Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection

was installed in 1999. It set out to integrate varieties of policy concerns – from the protection of

the consumer, public health and the free movement of goods within internal markets to animal

welfare and the idea of a restructuring of the common agricultural policy in more sustainable

terms – into one policy framework under the heading of food safety. This was effectuated with

the General Food Law, a new piece of encompassing legislation that was gradually put into force

36

between 2002 and 2006. A key element in the new regime was the European Food Safety

Authority (EFSA) to which the FSA (UK), the VWA (NL) and the BfR (G) were to serve as the

national counterparts.

The EFSA

The General Food Law provided the legal basis for the new European Food Safety Authority

(EFSA), established in January 2002. The EFSA was set up to bring under one roof the work

previously done by a range of scientific committees and to make the scientific risk-assessment

process more public. Rationale for its creation was ―to protect public health and to restore

consumer confidence‖, to integrate the work of scientific committees on food- and feed-related

issues, and to make the processes of national and international risk assessment more transparent

and better geared to one another. While the EFSA is in charge of risk assessment, the European

Commission together with the European Parliament and the Council are in charge of risk

management.

The EFSA emphasises the importance of being open about the ‗political sides‘ of science. In a

more or less comparable fashion as the British FSA, it organises its Management Board‘s

meetings as an openly accessible event. Members of the general public are allowed to attend the

meetings as an audience, and the events are broadcasted through the Internet. Furthermore, the

EFSA engages in numerous consultations and discussions (―round table discussions‖). Still, the

EFSA design is criticised by respondents in this case study for having been granted too little

political weight. Similar to the German situation, the political levy of risk management is

sandwiched, so to speak, between the risk-assessment and riskcommunication tasks performed at

the EFSA. First, risks are being assessed, then communicated with the European Commission,

whereupon the decisions and control measures taken there are communicated back to the EFSA,

to be communicated with the national food safety authorities of the member states.

Institutional responses to the novel challenge posed by GM crops were ambivalent too. The EU

chose to take a different regulatory approach to GMO than the US and the WTO and based its

GMO regulatory system on the process behind the products, whereas the US approach was based

on the simple regulation of the end products alone. Therefore unlike the US, the EU considered

GMOs to be a special category that required its own unique regulatory framework. This unique

nature of GMOs and their potential risks is addressed in the preamble of the Deliberative Release

Directive. The preamble goes to state that ―the protection of human health and the environment

requires that due attention be given to controlling risks‖ and that for each GM variety ―a case-by-

case environmental risk assessment should always be carried out prior to a release‖. The twin

37

competing imperatives of techno-economic growth on the one hand and precaution on the other

are both institutionalized in this directive, leading to a simultaneous commitment to both the

deliberate release of possibly harmful products and to an attempt to evaluate and regulate this

possible harm. The preamble argues for a ―step by step‖ approach, whereby:

[T]he containment of GMOs is reduced and the scale of release increased gradually, step

by step, but only if evaluation of the earlier steps in terms of protection of human health

and the environment indicates that the next step can be taken.

The Deliberate Release Directive thus proscribes a two-stage procedure, involving experimental

release prior to commercial release, covered by parts ‗B‘ and ‗C‘ of the directive respectively: Part

‗B‘ covers experimental releases of GM crops such as field trials, while Part ‗C‘ covers consent

for commercial import, processing, feed, or cultivation. A ‗Part B Consent‘ is given by a national

competent authority of each EU member state and is valid in that state only. A ‗Part C Consent‘

is valid for the whole EU under the principle of free circulation of products within the internal

market. For a Part C Consent, first a biotechnology company would submit a dossier of

information (a ‗Summary Notification Information Format‘, or SNIF) to the national competent

authority of any particular member state. Following a favourable opinion by this authority on the

notification, the relevant Member State would then inform the European Commission of its

opinion. If there are no objections raised by the other member states, the national competent

authority that carried out the original evaluation then grants the consent. This consent, once

given by the competent authority of any member state, would be valid for the entire EU. The

principle of the internal market means that the GMO in question must be accepted by every

other Member State, although the directive had a safeguard clause under its Article 16. This

clause allowed a member state to impose its own provisional prohibition on the sale or use of a

GM variety within its territory if it had ―justifiable reasons‖ to consider that product ―a risk to

human health or the environment‖.

While tending towards precaution, the EU‘s Deliberate Release Directive therefore shared with

both the US and the WTO a set of assumptions that confined the area of valid consideration to

strictly science-based concerns around positive harm to health or the environment. Any

assessment of wider social, economic, or cultural factors was ruled irrelevant. Furthermore, the

procedure would be expert-based and technocratic, with little regard for public participation. In

Germany, the establishment of the 1990/220 deliberate release directive was actually used as the

occasion for the German government to revise its gene law and actually restrict the rights to public

participation in GM decision making (Torgersen et al. 2002:52). Thus while moving towards the

precautionary principle, the regulatory framework established by the EU after 1990 was narrowly

38

scientistic and technocratic, allowing no space for participation or for the other framings of the

GMO issue that would emerge in the coming public controversy over the new technology.

The EU‘s approach was innovative in the sense that it took the novelty of GMO into account

and acknowledged rather than denied the issue of uncertainty this novel phenomenon brought

about. The directive was set off as a regulatory mechanism that serves to cope with this

uncertainty. However, the directive left the procedure of doing so to experts and technocrats and

hardly created new political spaces where broader public concerns could be voiced.

The revised directive differs from the 1990 version in several significant ways. These changes can

be understood as a response to the regulatory crisis triggered by the original directive. These

changes were supported by an explicit reference to the precautionary principle for the first time,

contained in both the directive‘s preamble and in the important technical Annex II on risk

assessment.

The principles of risk assessment were significantly extended in Annex II so that they now

included addressing the potential wider and indirect impacts of the crops such as the associated

herbicide management regime, with more trials sanctioned to provide such information. Other

information was also required, such as an assessment of the effects on non-target species and

possible competitive advantages that may be transferred to other plants. The revised directive

also called for mandatory post-release monitoring requirements, including ―monitoring of

potential cumulative long-term effects‖. (Preamble, para 20). Furthermore, the 2001 directive put

a ten-year time limit on consents. Another revision introduced, in response to public and NGO

concerns, included placing some restrictions on the controversial antibiotic resistant marker

genes.

The revised 2001 directive also attempted to address the wider issues of public and political

concern that stretched beyond the narrow technical and scientistic parameters of the 1990

original. Thus the preamble (para 9) states:

Respect for ethical principles recognised in a Member State is particularly important.

Member states may take into consideration ethical aspects when GMOs are deliberately

released or placed on the market as or in products.

While being given some legitimacy, however, ethical concerns were kept separate from and

subordinate to the traditional science-based environmental and health riskassessment paradigm.

39

This is reflected in Articles 28 and 29 of the new directive which codified the commission‘s

relationship to expert authority and advice. Article 28 called for mandatory consultation with

relevant EU-level scientific committees, while Article 29 had the lesser power to recommend

consultation with specialist ethical committees.

Finally, the revised 2001 directive made gestures towards including more space for public

consultation, including mandatory public consultation. Thus Article 9 within section ‗B‘ of the

directive covering national experimental releases, entitled ‗Consultation of and information to the

public‘, called on member states to

consult the public and, where appropriate, groups on the proposed deliberate release. In

doing so, Member States shall lay down arrangements for this consultation, including a

reasonable time-period, in order to give the public or groups the opportunity to express

an opinion.

These features marked a change from the 1990 directive, which had only called for public

consultation on a Part B consent ―where a Member State considers it appropriate‖ (Article 7,

1990/220). However, even under the revised directive the calls for public information and

consultation were still vague, with the mere placing of information on websites or advertisements

in specified newspapers considered sufficient.

Other parts of the new EU regulatory framework for GMOs were established after more lengthy

and contested negotiations in 2003. These were Regulation 1829/2003 on GM food and Feed

regulation and Regulation 1830/2003 on Labelling and Traceability of GM Food and Feed

products. With these regulations, Europe tended towards the establishment of a post-market-

release system of monitoring, testing and regulation around labelling and traceability. The ―right

of consumers to information‖ which forms Article 153 of the EU‘s foundational treaty is invoked

in Article 17 of the food and feed regulation, which goes on to pronounce labelling as the basis

of informed choice. Article 21 of this regulation elaborates:

Clear labelling, irrespective of the detectability of DNA or protein resulting from the

genetic modification in the final product, meets the demands expressed in numerous

surveys by a large majority of consumers, facilitates informed choice and precludes

potential misleading of consumers as regards methods of manufacture or production.

(1829/2003; 21).

40

Here we see the ‗sound science‘ framing of the DRD being trumped or at least qualified by

ethics, values and perceptions. Furthermore, ethical and religious concerns are referred to as

legitimate reasons for labelling and informed choice, mentioned in Article 22 along with

medically based special dietary needs. Thus the EU regulatory system moved further beyond its

original positivist ‗sound science‘ regulatory rhetoric in its governing of the GMO controversy.

With this new regulatory machinery in place, the scene was set in 2004 for the commission‘s

attempt finally to break the regulatory log jam that had led to the ‗de facto‘ moratorium six years

earlier and establish the compromise position of ‗coexistence‘. Things have changed: away from a

narrow focus on positivistic discourses of risk assessment and embracing consumer perceptions;

away from the model of a single high-technology agricultural bioeconomy for Europe, towards a

model of multiple bioeconomies coexisting in the same space; and away from a linear model of

simply checking the safety of GMOs before release, towards one of continuous management to

enable the different bioeconomies to coexist.

The overall scientifico-cultural battle over GMOs had not been won by either side, and neither

had positive proof of safety nor of harm. In the face of this stalemate the new regime of

‗coexistence‘ began to develop, in which ‗market choice‘ begins to eclipse ‗safety‘ as the

authoritative guideline, and the more relativistic discourses of consumer sovereignty and choice

become the dominant regulatory framings in the EU. Thus we can discern a new mode of

governance here whose fundamental logic is not that of the state but of the market – albeit one

guaranteed by the centralised scientific safety assessments carried out by the European Food

Safety Authority – presenting an idealised vision of a new, normalised and less politicised ‗post-

conflict‘ regime of GM governance.

Hence, in the case of BSE and GM crops, new unprecedented phenomena and the political

struggles and turbulences they evoked formed novel challenges to governance to which the

institutions responded by introducing some institutional novelties and transformations. In

contrast, in the conservation case it was rather the introduction of an institutional novelty, the

Habitat Directive in 1992 that evoked some turbulence on the local and the national level and

itself formed a challenge to governance. The challenge, in this case, was to implement it. The shift

from target-specific to comprehensive conservation itself, as has been laid out in chapter 3, and

the institutional instruments through which comprehensive conservation operates can be

regarded as a major institutional innovation. In both cases under study, Finland and Greece, the

41

implementation of the Habitats Directive in legislation has caused a ‗spill-over effect‘: in addition

to conservation legislation, other laws have also been affected.

When the Finnish Nature Conservation Act was renewed in 1997, the final impulse to do so had

come from Finland joining the EU in 1995. The principle of strict species protection, decreed in

the Habitats Directive, is a new element in Finnish nature conservation legislation. In the context

of incorporating the Habitats Directive into Finnish legislation, the Criminal Code had to be

changed too in some aspects. Another relevant new law was the Forest Act, renewed in the late

1990s, as a consequence of the reasoned opinion of the Commission (in 2004; § 14b); also the

Finnish Land Use and Building Act was reformed in this context in 2000.

In Greece, the transposition of the Habitats Directive into national law, originally due in June

1994, materialized in December 1998. Furthermore, in this context, the Greek authorities

updated the national system of nature protection, aiming to integrate national and community

sites in a new network through the enactment of a series of laws (Andreou 2004:5) such as Law

2637/98, transforming game reserves to wildlife reserves, and Law 2742/99, providing for the

creation of Management Authorities (MAs) to manage the network of special areas of

conservation (Natura 2000 programme) that formed part of the Habitats Directive. In 1999 the

Ministry of the Environment produced a master plan, bringing together the sites protected by

national and community legislation, which proposed the creation of 40 MAs that would cover 79

protected sites as well as most of the Natura 2000 sites (Andreou 2004:6).

Yet, the question is whether the institutional innovation set in motion by comprehensive

conservation and the Habitats Directive has actually been followed by adequate institutional

innovations concerning implementation. The problem here is that conservation hardly fits within

the traditional control framing that has shaped state environmental policy in the age of high

modernist statecraft. The ‗classical‘ environmental problems such as urban hygiene, point-source

pollution, and the management of infrastructural services, such as water, sewage and waste, are

readily brought into an agreement with a control framing – in fact, the modern state aims at

transforming such activities into managerial routines that nobody needs to notice, let alone worry

about. This is what the ―first generation‖ instruments of environmental policy have achieved with

some success in the case of curbing point-source pollution, in particular (see, e.g., Jänicke &

Weidner 1995; McNeill 2000). Conservation of nature, however, less easily fits within a control

framing, and this discrepancy gets accentuated in the era of comprehensive conservation. Yet the

42

case studies on Finland and Greece in the project have found that central administrations in both

countries are intent on keeping the situation under control by developing administrative

principles. Local initiative and involvement do not have much role in these efforts.

Work package 4 suggests that what is needed is a more flexible system instead of a control

framing. Such an institutional innovation that allows for such a more flexible form of governance

is captured by the concept of a ‗margin for planning‘. The term ‗margin for planning‘ is used by

the city planners of Tampere (V. Vänskä). Formally, the term refers to the idea that the same goal

can be reached using alternative means; in other words, the planners have degrees of freedom.

The idea is easily coupled with the more formal idea of ‗possibility space‘ (Dyke 1988; Haila &

Dyke 2006). To explicate factors that affect the margin for planning in any specific situation, we

ought to specify the main factors that either constrain or enable decision-making potential in that

situation. The factors are comparable to ‗degrees of freedom‘ in statistical reasoning. The notion

of ‗margin for planning‘ helps to open up new possibilities in situations that may seem fixed.

Concerning both the areas of genetic testing and embryonic stem cell research, we see the

establishment of a series of new institutions from the 1980s to the 2000s that were charged to

advise the government on how to regulate these new biomedical technologies on the one hand

and how to meet public concerns and public unease on the other. The emergence and

proliferation of bioethics advisory bodies on government level is the most conspicuous

phenomenon of institutional innovation in the area of genetic testing and embryonic stem cell

research.

What we can also see is a change from expert-based governance schemes in the 1980s, largely

based on a ‗risks and benefits‘ framing, to governance schemes that increasingly refer to an

‗ethical implications‘ framing. In part, but not generally, the ‗ethical turn‘ is accompanied by the

integration of a new type of experts, such as lay people, citizens, social scientists, or ethicists – we

will come back to this point.

Due to the overlap as regards bioethics bodies, we discuss these two case studies together. On

the EU level, the EGE (European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies), which

had started in 1991 as Group of Advisers to the European Commission on the Ethical

Implications of Biotechnology (GAEIB), plays a certain role in EU stem cell policy. In

43

preparation of FP6 (2003–2006), the Commission came to the conclusion that the decision

whether or not to include hES into research funding should be backed by an Opinion of EGE

(Gottweis 2002:17). This opinion, as Commissioner Busquin [AU: first name?] declared, was the

basis of the Commission‘s policy: in general, the EU addressed the ―new‖ and unruly topic of

ethics by efforts to build up, integrate and ―harmonise‖ expert bodies and expertise in bioethics.

In Germany, a series of new expert bodies were established between the mid-1980s and 1990 that

were designed to give policy advice on biomedicine and biotechnology, including issues of

genetic testing. Such new expert bodies were the Benda Commission, named after its chair, Ernst

Benda, that was established in 1984 in order to advise policy makers on ethical and legal

questions of IVF, gene therapy and embryo transfer (Bundesminister für Forschung und

Technologie 1985); the Parliamentarian Study Commission on Risks and Benefits of Genetic

Technology (Enquetekommission Chancen und Risiken der Gentechnologie), a commission

established in 1987 and composed one half each of parliamentarians and experts; and the Office

for Technology Assessment (Büro für Technikfolgenabschätzung) in the German Parliament,

established in 1990. Although these commissions and bodies partly already referred to ―ethics‖,

―ethical implication‖, or ―ethical issues‖, the main frame through which genetic testing was

interpreted was the ―risks and benefits frame‖. The language of risks and benefits suggested that

risks as well as benefits of this new technology could best be assessed by experts who were not

necessarily only scientists but also jurists and physicians and recruited from the elites in the

scientific, medical and legal professions. In contrast, the 2000 Parliamentarian Study Commission

on Law and Ethics of Modern Medicine already in its title referred to the language of ethics.

Among the members of this commission were a number of experts from the social sciences and

from feminist or disability rights NGOs. In 2001 Chancellor Helmut Schröder set up the

Nationaler Ethikrat (National Ethics Council) exactly at the time when the legalization of

importing hES cell lines was being discussed in Germany. In fact, barely six months after its

creation, it issued a recommendation in favour of allowing the import of hES cell lines. However,

the National Ethics Council had been heavily contested at the time, charged to be a ―counter

project‖ to the Parliamentarian Study Commission (Bogner et al. 2006; K. Braun 2005) and

branded a puppet institution intended to generate ad hoc legitimation for the government‘s

allegedly bio-liberal decisions. The Parliamentary Study Commission on Law and Ethics of

Modern Medicine also devoted a considerable part of its work on stem cell research and came up

44

with a more restrictive opinion in the end, recommending to uphold the German ban on embryo

research but to allow for import of ES cells under certain conditions.

In Austria too, a new national Bioethics Commission was established in 2001 in order to advise

the Federal Chancellor from an ethical perspective on all social, scientific and legal questions that

stem from the scientific development of human medicine and human biology.

In the US, in November 1998, President Bill Clinton, as a deliberate attempt at trust building,

asked the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) for a review of the medical and

ethical issues associated with human stem cell research.

In Italy, the Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica (CNB) and the Dulbecco Commission were

involved with the question of embryonic stem cell research. The CNB had already been

established in the beginning of the 1990s and had since been involved in deliberations on

bioethical questions. The ―Dulbecco Commission‖, in contrast, was an ad hoc commission,

created by Minister of Health Sandro Veronesi in September 2000.

In the UK, the government in 1982 authorised a Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation

and Embryology, the ―Warnock Commission‖, headed by the moral philosopher Baroness Mary

Warnock. The task of the inquiry committee was “to consider recent and potential developments”,

“safeguards”, and “social, ethical and legal implications” (Ziegler 2004:66). Partly as an outcome of the

recommendations made by the Warnock Report, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology

Authority (HFEA) was established in1991. Its purview includes regulating IVF clinics, licensing

research using human embryos, or approving or disapproving contested practices such as sex

selection via pre-implantation genetic diagnosis or creating ‗saviour siblings‘. While it is an

authority and not a bioethics advisory commission in the sense of the other bodies mentioned

previously, it is still charged with taking ethical aspects into account. Fifty percent of the board

members of the HFEA must be ‗lay‘, always including both the Chair and Deputy Chair, and at

least one-third must be medical or scientific experts.

In 1992, the Human Genetics Commission was created as a meta-regulatory agency for human

genetics and as part of a system of arm‘s-length bodies while preserving the statutory body of the

HFEA in regard to assisted reproduction (Cabinet Office & Office of Science and Technology

1999). The explicit aim of this reform was to expand the mandate of the advisory system beyond

the reaction to concrete cases of technological development and beyond the expertise of

45

specialised technocratic bodies. The system of meta-regulatory bodies was assigned the function

not only to react but also to initiate debates. The HGC has made strong efforts to promote

elements of participatory governance in the last years by conducting consultations, citizen juries

and opinion polls bundling the debates on genetic testing. We will discuss the questions as to the

extent these participatory governance initiatives amount to new political spaces in the next

section.

Yet, although a number of new institutions and, in part, novel types of institutions have been

established, at the same time genetic testing and embryonic stem cell research have turned out to

be fields that retained traditional high modernist modes of governance, based on the

constitutionally legitimized institutions such as parliaments, the courts, or even referenda, and

operating through legal bans, referring to a fixed national territory, relying on elite expertise, and

insulating decision making on ―hard issues‖ such as research funding, patenting, or the regulation

of the healthcare system from public involvement. It strikes us that in the countries under study

here, the unruliness of human embryonic stem cell research was neither efficiently tamed nor

tackled with new forms of participatory practices. That is not to say that there was no public

involvement in the issue. In Germany, for instance, an extremely intense and controversial public

debate occurred on the acceptability of pre-implantation diagnosis and hES cell research,

involving the civil society organizations, such as the churches, research organizations,

organizations of the medical profession, and a series of NGOs, all lobbying for their respective

cause and struggling to win over ministers or parliamentarians to their point of view. The main

arenas where this form of public involvement took place were the media, whether in the more

conventional newspapers or TV shows, or on the Internet. A similar form of public involvement

took place in the debate on the law on medically assisted procreation (Law 40/2004) in Italy (see

chapter 3). We can speak of ‗conventional informal modes of participation‘ here: modes of

participation that take the form of lobbying and interest group pressure, of legal participatory

practices, using conventional arenas of political will formation such as the media in order to

exercise influence on public opinion and political decision making by the institutions of

representative democracy. Participants in these types of public involvement have neither been

―invited‖ nor selected by state institutions; informal participation is not state-initiated.

The Italian debate on law 40/2004 is somewhat different, as it also includes an element of

‗conventional formal participation‘, namely the referendum. The form of a referendum is no doubt

a form of direct participation, whereby citizens themselves ultimately make the decision. At the

46

same time, it is a conventional and highly formalized instrument of public participation because

the exact terms of holding a referendum, or the way in which questions may be put in the first

place, are precisely defined by Italian law.

In addition to the resilience of ―old‖ institutions, we also found that, at least in the case of human

embryonic stem cell and cloning research, national boundaries do still matter. Somehow

surprisingly and puzzlingly for an age that we know as a ―global(ized)‖ one, it is the nation-state

that seems to have emerged as the key topographical unit on the map of stem cell regulation.

―States‖ actively shape stem cell and cloning research by drafting regulations that secure the

safety and even proceeding of this line of research and by allocating funds that the private sector

has only reluctantly invested so far. The very act of setting regulations in turn reaffirms national

boundaries and differences between nation-states as regards the technological and research

landscape in the biomedical sector. Furthermore, the very interpretation and meaning of the

seemingly universal cells, embryos and clones differ strikingly from one such topographical unit

to the next; often, they are also imbued with particular ―national‖ meanings, ranging from

narratives of national regeneration over national pride to a language of national (dis-)advantages

in the emerging global stem cell geo-economies. Politics of hES are embroiled in ―projects of

reimagining nationhood‖ (Jasanoff 2005a:7). In short, the politics of hES cell research seems to

be a case in point of the nation-state gaining significance rather than losing it.

On the basis of the preceding, we tend to answer the question whether new political spaces and

new regimes of governance practices emerged in the fields under study with a cautious ― yes and

no‖. No, because we found a remarkable and unexpected resilience of what has been designated

‗high modernist institutions‘ in Part I, which apparently are quite capable of surviving in the face

of obviously dislocating events and/or pervasive, lasting perceptions of scepticism and alienation.

Yes, we would however add, because what we observe to happen is that the resilience of these

institutions is derived largely from a new governance logic that is being developed in- and outside

these institutions. While there is no evidence for a ‗meltdown‘ of modernist practices and

institutions, there is ample evidence of new and innovative approaches to governing life-political

issues under early 21st century economic, ecological and geo-political conditions. Among these

are the increasing dominance of private-sector regulations, the proceeding emphasis of the

individual and the particular in regulation (at the costs of traditional foci like the collective and

the universal), and the ongoing integration of EU and member states‘ policy arrangements into

practices of multi-level governance. Let us now discuss two aspects of the life-political issues

47

under scrutiny that sprang up from our empirical work as both characteristic of, and determining

for, the new governance logic we detect: the element of lasting (scientific) uncertainty in policy

making and the trend towards the ethicisation of governance.

3. Risk and uncertainty

Uncertainty has many different faces, but some of them show up in each of our case studies.

What do we mean by uncertainty? Uncertainty is best defined in relation and contrast to ‗risk‘.

The concept of risk implies that one has instruments and criteria to diagnose, measure and

calculate the possibility of harm or peril of a specific action or event, and then balance this

against its potential ‗benefits‘ and eventually make an informed decision on the basis of such

calculations. Framing events as risks certainly presents a challenge to governance. Yet it also

provides a possibility to politically and technically deal with them, for instance, in terms of a

procedure or an accepted institutional framework for making matters governable.

For various reasons, as explained above, in many of our case studies there were no instruments

or criteria to make the issues calculable and thereby governable, either because they were

altogether missing or because they were themselves politically contested.

With the very notion of dislocation (either understood as event or enduring condition), issues

become unruly because there is either a lack of agreed upon (scientific) knowledge as regards

their prospects, implications and effects or, even in cases in which scientific evidence exists, there

are no fixed and uncontested criteria how to measure, calculate or evaluate these – possible –

implications and effects. In that case, the ‗rules of the game‘ are put up for discussion, along with

the very issues that the game is about.

Furthermore (and related to the last point), the very issues in many of our case studies are

characterised by both scientific and moral uncertainty: novel technologies and unexpected

pathogen variants pose questions in regard to the classification of ‗new‘ entities (―Is the human

embryo a ‗what‘ or a ‗who‘?‖, or ―What was the sheep-clone named Dolly: a natural being or an

artefact?‖; ―What are genetically modified plants? Are they just plants like others or an

unprecedented type of entity?‖ or ―What are prions?‖). A lack of a priori shared moral standards

and criteria to make judgments on these novelties prevent the answers to these questions from

48

being ever unambiguous. These questions are abundant in our case studies, probably due to the

emergence of a whole range of new biological artefacts that the life sciences of the recent past

and the present have brought into being. Stem cells, cloned mammals, laboratory embryos or

GMOs are literally new entities. They do not contain labels on what they are, and, given that they

are new to us, we cannot rely on agreed upon knowledge or categories on where to put them on

our conceptual and regulatory landscapes.8

As a result, these questions have an outright practical-political character. Depending on how we

answer them, we have to stop research or continue it, invent new regulatory categories or use

familiar ones, craft new agencies or rely on traditional institutions. In other words, like ‗risk‘,

(scientific) ‗uncertainty‘ can be seen as a ‗political technology‘ as it does serves to render issues

governable. It forms conditions that actors must acknowledge and deal with. But how? How did

uncertainty come out in our case studies? And how many different ways are there to deal with

uncertainty? Are there better ways and worse ones?

If we look at the issue of human embryonic stem cell research, we find that there is a

considerable lack of reliable knowledge about the future prospects of this medical technology.

Actors struggle with a lack of uncontested ―facts‖ about the future prospects of this field of

research. There are hopes and expectations, and some progress has been made concerning the

establishment and maintenance of embryonic stem (ES) cell lines. But the field is still very much

in the state of an early ―science in the making‖ (Latour 1987) that is characterized by struggles

over the meaning of shared and agreed upon terms and concepts. The proliferation of

uncertainty and scientific controversies that characterizes human embryonic stem cell and cloning

research, however, is not unique to this field of research, but indeed a characteristic of any field

of research that is only just emerging. What renders the uncertainty surrounding stem cell

research special, though, is that the struggle for ―stem cell facts‖ is burdened by political struggles

over the meaning of life in the 21st century. Scientific controversies are translated into political

conflicts and vice versa; political conflicts are translated into scientific ones.

8 What renders them particularly problematic, then, is that they seem to be crafted products of the laboratories of life scientists, that is, those scientists who study nature and life. Therefore, they blur the boundary between the ‗ontological real‘ of nature and the (all too) social reality of politics in a particularly blunt way, thereby contributing to the unruliness of the new politics of life.

49

What is a stem cell? Remarkably, this question cannot be answered easily. Stem cells cannot be

reliably morphologically identified; neither do scientists agree on a set of molecular biomarkers

that signal the presence of a stem cell. Even the most powerful microscope cannot help to set

stem cells apart from other types of cells, and scientists neither know nor agree on the expression

of what set of genes marks a cell‘s ―stemness‖. In the absence of other agreed upon criteria,

scientists rely on functional definitions of stem cells; that is, they define stem cells through what

they are doing and producing (Zipori 2004; Shostak 2006).

From this perspective, then, a stem cell is a cell that is not yet differentiated and that has the

potential to undergo divisions to form other, more specialized, cells that will perform specific

functions in our bodies. Hence, stem cells are, firstly, less specific and less differentiated than

other cells. Secondly, stem cells divide in a way that sets them apart from other cells within our

bodies. Rather than symmetrically, they divide asymmetrically, giving rise to both a more

specialized progeny cell and to an identical stem cell at the same time. Stem cells have therefore

the capacity to self-renew for indefinite period of times.

Stem cells can be derived from (aborted) foetuses, from umbilical cord blood and from various

types of tissues of adult organisms. However, at the present the most promising type of stem

cells seems to be human embryonic stem cells that are derived from early human in vitro

embryos. While the degree of ―plasticity‖ of adult stem cells is the object of scientific

controversies, that is, it is unclear to know how many different types of cells adult stem cells can

give rise to, ES cells are classified as ‗pluripotent‘. This means that they are amenable to giving

rise to all cell and tissue types of an adult organism. In addition, they can be grown indefinitely in

the laboratory (Alberts 2002).

In the future, researchers hope, ES cells could be isolated from embryos and grown and

multiplied in vitro. Subsequently, their vitality would be tamed and redirected into cell-based

therapies for a broad range of diseases, ranging from neurodegenerative conditions such as

Alzheimer‘s or Parkinson‘s disease and spinal cord injuries to diabetes or heart disease. ES cells,

scientists argue, ―could constitute an unlimited supply of diverse cell types that can be used for cell

transplantation‖ (Paul, Li et al. 2002). ES cell-based therapies could also be personalized through

the combination of ES cell technologies with somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), a technique

better known as ‗(therapeutic) cloning‘. The technique involves the injection of a nucleus of a

somatic cell of a patient into an enucleated oocyte, or egg. The resulting embryo would contain

the same nuclear genome as the donor. The cloned embryo would not be transferred into a

uterus, but cultured in vitro until it reaches the blastocyst stage, when ES cells could be derived

from it (Solter & Gearhart 1999).

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In addition to the scientific uncertainty surrounding stem cell research, much attention has been

devoted to the moral and conceptual ordering of one of the key ―materials‖ that stem cell draws

upon: the early human embryo in the laboratory. In the US and in Italy, in particular, the conflicts

about human embryonic stem cell research has been translated into a fierce debate on whether

IVF embryos qualify as a mere ―form of vitality‖ or as a ―person‖. After all, if the human embryo

is categorized as a human being or a ―person‖, it must be protected by law, whereas if it is just a

special form of human tissue it can be treated as a research tool or a therapeutic device. The

ontological status of the human embryo not only plays a decisive role in the controversy on

embryo research but also in that on pre-implantation genetic testing. If the human embryo is a

human being, it is hard to argue that a number of embryos may deliberately be created in the

laboratory just for the purpose of testing, knowing fully well that some of them will have to be

―thrown out‖ depending on the result of the test.

In Germany, the situation was further complicated by the question of whether the cells that are

taken from the blastocyst, either as in the case of PGD for testing purposes, or as hES cell

research in order to establish a stem cell line, are still ―cells‖ or already an ―embryo‖. At least in

this case there seems to be a consensus about the criteria that mark the difference, namely

whether the cell is still totipotent and can develop into an embryo and theoretically into a full-

fledged human being, or whether it is only pluripotent and has lost the capacity of differentiating

into all types of cells. Hence, in this case, science was able to provide an agreed upon answer.

Yet, in other cases, scientific criteria are altogether lacking or contested, for instance, to answer

the question: ―What kind of entity is the product of somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT)?‖ Is it a

human embryo although it has not been the result of the unification of an oocyte and a sperm?

Following the Italian Dulbecco Commission‘s report, nuclear transfer is ―a matter of

reprogramming the nucleus of the somatic cell derived from the patient, through the contact with

the cytoplasm of the oocyte‖ (Ministero della Sanità 2003 [2000]:116). The reprogrammation of

the adult cell, the Commission argued, did not imply its transformation into an embryo. Rather,

the result of this technique could be framed as an artificial cluster of cells that had no natural

potential to develop into a fetus. Or, in the words of the report:

In fact, an oocyte that is reconstructed with the nucleus of an adult somatic cell cannot be

considered a zygote [i.e., an embryo at its first stage of development; I.M.] in the classical

sense, as long as it does not derive from the unification of two gametes. The fact that such

a reconstructed oocyte does not spontaneously give rise to an embryonic development proves

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this. [The development of the reconstructed oocyte into an embryo] can only occur

thanks to an artificial stimulation that forces [the reconstructed oocyte] to develop into a

blastocyst. (Ministero della Sanità 2003 [2000]; emphasis added)

As a technique that produces laboratory artefacts devoid of humanness, ―reconstructed oocytes‖

could be used in research without infringing on bioethical concerns. While the Dulbecco

Commission‘s report forwarded this categorization in order to facilitate research, in the UK a

similar argument was used for the opposite end. In the UK, on 31 January 2001, new regulations

came into effect that opened the door not only for public and private human embryonic stem cell

research but also for somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT). In response to this decision, the Pro-

Life alliance applied for judicial review. It sought a declaration that human embryos created by

CNR are not within the definition of the HFE Act because they were not covered by the HFE

Act‘s definition of a ―human embryo‖ which referred to the product of ―fertilization‖, that is, the

unification of two gametes. Thus, they argued, the new regulations were based on procedural

fault and thus invalid. The judge who rule on the case followed in his judgment the Pro-Life

argumentation. In response to this ruling, however, the Parliament eventually enacted the

―Human Reproductive Cloning Bill‖ to fill in that legal void which had been the result of

suspending the former regulations. The bill was introduced on 21 November 2001 and became

law on 4 December 2001. In this case, the issue could not be settled by science but was eventually

settled by the court.

A similar problem shows up in the case of genetic testing. In this case study, we have examined

the forms of governing three different types of genetic testing: pre-implantation genetic diagnosis

(PGD), performed on a human embryo that has been produced in vitro and not yet transferred

into the woman‘s womb, antenatal diagnosis which is performed on the embryo fetus during

pregnancy, and postnatal diagnosis performed on children or adults. We have to deal with

different forms of uncertainty here. In the case of PGD and antenatal diagnosis, as in the case of

hES cell research, there is a strong moral dimension of uncertainty because these practices

directly or indirectly imply the destruction of human embryos. Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis

is a technology that involves the in-vitro creation of a ―pool‖ of human embryos that are tested

for certain genetic or chromosomal diagnosis. Those embryos that are found to be afflicted by

that genetic or chromosal deviation are not transferred to the woman‘s womb but destroyed – or

stored for research purposes. As regards antenatal genetic diagnosis, performed mainly via

amniocentesis, a ―positive‖ test result opens up no option for therapy but only the option of an

52

abortion. Opponents to these practices argue that they may be able to reduce the ―risk‖ of giving

birth to a child with a genetically or chromosomally caused disability or disease but that

nevertheless these practices are morally wrong insofar as they imply the destruction of a human

embryo via an abortion. In addition, opponents argue, these practices give rise to a new type of

risk, namely the risk of increasing negative attitudes to people with disabilities or chronic diseases

and thus indirectly contributing to discrimination and stigmatisation of these people. In short,

there is a deep moral and political controversy about which risks are worth scientific or political

intervention and whether the goal justifies the means in this case. Hence, the concept of risk and

its applicability is in itself contested.

The case of genetic testing is also a case in point of demonstrating that an increase of knowledge

does not per se imply a decrease of uncertainty. For one thing, very rarely do genetic test results

provide positive knowledge about one‘s future health status. Only in the case of so-called

monogenetic diseases such as Huntington‘s disease will the test provide a 100% certainty that the

person will develop the disease at some point in life. Monogenetic diseases, however, are rare.

The vast majority of conditions tested for today are so-called multi-factorial diseases or disorders,

meaning that they are related to different types of factors such as epigenetic factors, genetic

factors and the social environment and lifestyle of a person. This type of genetic testing on

genetic risk factors is the result of the expansion of human genetics research to cover nearly all

most common diseases (in industrialised countries), as, for example, heart disease, diabetes,

Alzheimer‘s and cancer (Hopkins & Nightingale 2004).

The most common research strategies today aiming at increasing knowledge about multi-factorial

diseases linked, among other factors, to certain genetic conditions are epidemiological studies and

the search for biomarkers.

Biomarkers are thought to be precursors of a specific disease under investigation long before any

symptoms are recognized (Lock 2005:52). Detecting such biomarkers, which may for instance

indicate an increased probability to development of Alzheimer‘s disease or other complex

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conditions, involves intensive extensive monitoring of thousands of healthy people for signs that

may or may not be significant predictors for future disease (Lock 2005:55).

Epidemiological studies try to establish statistical correlations between certain genetic

characteristics and certain diseases or ―conditions‖ in a particular population by trying to identify

so-called risk factors. Risk factors as such do not necessarily cause a certain disease but rather

indicate an increased probability. To take the example of late onset Alzheimer‘s, risk factors may

include a wide variety of variables such as age, gender, education, family history, Down

syndrome, head trauma and, among other factors, a certain genetic variation (Lock 2005:55). The

correlations between such factors can then be translated into individual risks and attributed to an

individual body as its ―genetic disposition‖.

Typical for the field of ―multi-factorial genetic conditions‖ is the high uncertainty of test results

with respect to the question of whether one person will in fact develop or not develop the

respective disease in the future. Tests on ―low penetrance‖ genetic factors provide unclear,

uncertain diagnostic information on risks thereby leading to the problem of falsely positive or

falsely negative diagnosis. We can term this type of uncertainty epistemological uncertainty: it is

not caused by a lack of knowledge but by the character of knowledge, in this case its probabilistic

character.

One of the tests that has gained most public attention is the genetic test on familial breast cancer

since the mid-1990s (Lemke 2003; Wagenmann 2003/2004; Parthasarathy 2005). The tests on

alterations in the BRCA 1 and 2 genes, which have been conceptualised as the familial breast

cancer genes, are linked to a lot of uncertainties: First, they are only relevant to specific types of

breast cancer, which make up less than 10% of all cases. Second, the probability of a woman with

a positive test result to actually develop this type of cancer in the course of her life has been

calculated with an increasingly less ratio and is currently estimated at less than 70%. Third, test

results do not reveal when a disease will break out and how the disease will develop. Fourth, a

negative test result does not imply that a woman will not still develop a different type of breast

cancer during her life. Consequences that might be drawn from a ―positive‖ test result range

from preventive health care and regular physical examinations to breast amputation.

Today, interestingly in particular, proponents of genetic testing emphasize the scientific

uncertainties inherent in the respective testing practices, arguing for instance that the information

a test provides has only a probabilistic character and does not foretell a predetermined future but,

rather, offers a range of options to the user. We found a ―new modesty‖ here on the part of

human genetics; it is directed against the assumptions of genetic determinism and thereby

simultaneously against critiques of human genetics as based on such deterministic assumptions

and reducing the person to a genotype. The ―new modesty‖ also steals the thunder of those who

54

predict a dark, dystopian future in which control, surveillance and discrimination will be based on

genetic information about a person. What the ―new modesty‖ narrative tells us is that these

concerns are unfounded because genetic knowledge is simply too uncertain and imperfect to

provide the technical tools of such control and surveillance.

Hence, in the case of multi-factorial diseases, genetic test results may on the one hand increase

the person‘s knowledge about his or her health status in the sense of providing data about the

probability of future diseases, whereas on the other hand it increases uncertainty concerning the

meaning of the test results and the ways on how to deal with them and which consequences to

draw from them. Epistemological uncertainty, thus, is linked to what we may term practical

uncertainty. By ‗practical uncertainty‘ we mean a situation in which there is clearly a perceived

need for action (e.g., to prevent the outbreak of a disease or the transferral of a genetic disorder

to a future child), but it is unclear on the basis of which knowledge and according to which

normative standards we are supposed to act. Practical uncertainty implies an element of

normative uncertainty (what would be the right thing to do? According to which normative

standards and criteria?) but also the element of epistemological uncertainty (is breast amputation

really necessary for me?).

In addition, genetic testing is a field characterized by a huge amount of economic uncertainty. At

present, it is unclear whether and how consumers and health markets will respond to genetic

tests, and to what extent a pre-symptomatic and individualised medicine on the basis of genetic

tests will establish. In particular, it is unclear how the free market for lifestyle tests (for example,

for the susceptibility to nicotine addiction, for dietary advice etc.) will develop. Until now the

experiences are limited to pilot experiments. The future of genetic testing depends highly on

consumers‘ behaviour, the change of health, body and risk perceptions and the spread of

individual strategies to acquire knowledge and control about their individual ―genetic risks‖. In

recent years, public anxieties for instance about the confidentiality of genetic test results with

respect to employers or insurance companies in addition to the increasing gap between diagnosis

and therapy has generated a certain sense of crisis, as there is no imminent prospect of new

therapies surfacing that correspond to genetic tests. An indicator of such crisis may be the fact

that biotech enterprises today often undertake ―risk evaluations‖ before they market gene tests,

trying to measure public mistrust in order to avoid scandals. For example, Hopkins and

Nightingale explain the preference of genetic test producers in the UK not to market tests

55

directly but mainly through the National Health System (NHS) as expression of such a risk-

avoiding strategy (Hopkins & Nightingale 2004).

Given the contingency of future markets for genetic tests on consumer behaviour, trust issues

and the general feelings of individuals about genetic tests and their usefulness, reliability or ethical

acceptability, the dimension of life style, feelings, and ethics is of enormous economic

importance. This context might illuminate at least in part why the dimension of ethics and

emotions has become so prominent in the governance of genetic testing in recent years. We will

come back to this in the next chapter on the ethicisation of governance.

Looking at the issue area of BSE and other food scares , we see that it was in particular the

focus on scientific certainty as a requirement and rationale for governmental action that kept the

British government from acting swiftly in the face of potential risks to human health. When in

late 1986 officials of the Ministry of Agriculture in the UK were first informed, through informal

conversations, about a new disease among cows and the albeit vague and seemingly unlikely

possibility that this disease might affect humans, they did not share this information and concern

with the Department of Health (DoH). A lack of scientific evidence kept them from doing so. In

a related yet slightly different reading of the events, respondents indicate that the lack of scientific

certainty functioned as an excuse for policy makers not to act:

And I remember so well, when the whole issue of BSE began [here in the UK] . . . they

always used to say there is no scientific evidence that this disease can pass to humans, our

scientists . . . etcetera. And that was their protection they thought that if there was no

scientific evidence, then they could afford to ignore it (WP5 interview June 2006).

Flow of events: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

In December 1984, a British farmer contacted a vet as he worried over one of his cows. The

problem seemed to spread to other cows, and there was no response to treatment. After losing 9

of his cows, the farmer sent the 10th victim to a local ministerial laboratory, from which the

cow‘s head was sent to the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) in Weybridge. The pathologist

on duty that day was ―excited‖ to find indications of spongiform encephalopathy in the material

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under her microscope (tiny holes in stained sections of the brain): ―What was exciting that this

was in a cow.‖ The supervising senior pathologist who later had a look at the material in contrast

did not make a connection with scrapie, and he put the observed anomalies down as resulting

from toxic poisoning (Information available from Phillips et al. 2000 [BSE-inquiry], vol. 3, pars

1.7 to 1.17). In November 1986, this pathologist, Gerard Wells, was the first to write about a

possible ―bovine variant of scrapie‖, a report he drew up in view of another case of the unknown

disease in cattle in Kent.

The issue was being discussed among scientists in the UK and elsewhere, and several hypotheses

as to the nature and origin of the disease were advanced. An exchange of laboratory material

between Weybridge and the Neuropathogenesis Unit (NPU) in Edinburgh led the latter to

conclude in October 1987 that the brain lesions found in the affected cows were the results of a

‗prion disease‘, a family of inflictions to which scrapie in sheep and a degenerative brain disorder

in humans, Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease, also belonged.

In the UK, where the concern over BSE was strongly cast in terms of a distrust in the state‘s

capacity to handle the potential risks, much more so than in Germany or the Netherlands, there

was a perceived need to act in view of public health in spite of a lack of scientific evidence. Yet how

to act could not be based on scientific knowledge because scientific analyses of the situation were

themselves contested. The controversy whether to act, policy-wise, on public health could not be

settled on the grounds of scientific principles because there was no unanimity about the cause or

even the character of this new disease and the possibility that it might pass over to humans.

Existing control measures to guarantee food safety were designed to detect and fight bacteria and

viruses. As observed previously, the problem with BSE was that these assumptions did not work

in the case of prions. In spite of the verdict of the Neuropathogenesis Unit (NPU) in Edinburgh

that the symptoms found in cattle were to be understood as the effects of a prion disease,

protection measures for viral diseases were taken, mainly as no other regulatory rules were

available. New ‗rules of the game‘ had to be made up all along with the development of scientific

insight in what was happening. A complicating factor was that with scrapie being a ‗low-key‘

phenomenon at the time, there were hardly any scientists working on prion diseases (cf. WP5,

interview June 2006).

57

Prions

‗Prion‘ is an artificially constructed word introduced by Stanley Prusiner in 1982 for

proteinaceous infectious particles (infectious protein), to indicate the ‗protein only‘ hypothesis

postulated earlier by Griffith. This hypothesis holds that proteins may themselves function as a

pathogenic agent, causing diseases without viruses or other alien living bodies entering the body

of the diseased human or animal. Prions are understood to be unusually ‗folded‘ proteins, dubbed

scrapie PrP, which triggers other, normal PrP to copy its pathogenic shape. In this process,

nervous cells are being destroyed, resulting in a specific substance that settles as plaques in the

brain.

As mentioned before, the prion hypothesis provided hardly any stepping stones as to how to

proceed. Eventually, in the early 2000s, a glimpse of ‗proof‘ was observed, as one informant

relates:

The only real guidance, the only real certainty that it came from beef I suppose is . . .

when there was a cluster of cases, five people in one [area] all of whom had bought beef

from a butcher, and because he was a [specialised] butcher, he had the skills to take brains

out of beef and sheep heads, and he used to sell it, not many people eat that but some

people do, some older people did. And what transpired was . . . he would use a knife, and

he would then wipe the knife, and then he would use that knife to cut ordinary beef or

ordinary meat, and it contaminated it. And what nobody knew . . . was that [prions] so

incredibly bond to metal, and you couldn‘t wash them off, you can‘t even sterilize them

off, and therefore . . . it was only really when that came up, you had a direct connection

(WP 5, interview June 2006).

Similarly, scientific uncertainty concerning the potential health effects and environmental effects

of genetically modified plants and their products, or rather the recognition to some extend of

such scientific uncertainty by the EU regulatory framework implied the need to step beyond

given regulatory instruments. The controversy on GM food that exploded in the EU and many

member states in the late 1990s was largely a controversy about the question of whether GM

food should adequately be framed as a matter of risk to the environment or the health of

consumers, however, risks that in principle are amenable to calculation and control, or whether

GM plants and their products are a matter of uncertainty, in that their potential effects are so

complex that almost no one is able to foresee, calculate or contain them. Before the first GM

crops and foods arrived into global markets and ecosystems in the mid1990s, the EU had already

established its regulatory framework around the Deliberate Release Directive (1990/220, replaced

58

by 2001/18). This regulatory framework was based on expert scientific advice about possible

harm to health or the environment and required each member state to establish a ‗competent

authority‘ (CA) which would handle such decisions.

The EU to some extend recognized the condition of uncertainty concerning GM food when, in

the Deliberate Release Directive of 1990 (190/220), it explicitly acknowledged the unique nature

of GMO‘s and their potential risks:

[L]iving organisms, whether released into the environment in large or small amounts for

experimental purposes or as commercial products, may reproduce in the environment and

cross national frontiers thereby affecting other member states; [and] the effects of such

releases on the environment may be irreversible.

The EU adopted a regulatory framework that was inherently more precautionary than that

adopted by the US. Unlike the US, the EU considered the novelty of the genetic modification

process to still contain important areas of scientific uncertainty and potential risk and GMOs to

be a special category that required its own unique regulatory framework. This led the EU to base

its GMO regulatory system on the process behind the products, whereas the US approach was

based on the simple regulation of the end products alone. In the following section we will argue that

categorizing GMOs as a unique and unprecedented type of entities amounts in fact to a

recognition of what we term an ontopolitical quality of the issue.

Thus, the EU regulatory framework can be viewed as a hybrid offspring of a technocratic risk

culture on the one hand, assuming that regulations and new authorities (the CAs), based on

scientific expert advice be able to control the risks implied in this technology, and a culture of

uncertainty on the other, recognizing the unprecedented novelty of the technology and the

potential irreversibility of its consequences. This hybrid regulatory approach produced a series of

hybrid governance responses to the political controversy on GM food as we will show in the later

sections.

In the GM food controversy, ontological questions were not as directly moralized as in the

controversies involving the status of the human embryo but nevertheless politically decisive. The

issue at stake here was whether GM plants were just ―plants‖, as the US authorities saw it, or

whether they belonged to a separate and special ontological category which had not yet been

59

invented. The EU Deliberate Release Directive (1990/220) took the latter stance. The EU‘s

approach differed from that of the US and the OECD which was based on the idea of a

‗substantial equivalence‘ between GM and Non-GM products, measurable by a simple and

reductionist content analysis that assumed the familiarity of the effects sought. The US and the

OECD thus established that GM crops needed no special regulatory category. By contrast, the

EU regulatory discourses began to focus on the containment and policing of a special new

category that in their view was simultaneously a life form, a new technology, a commodity and a

potential form of ‗living pollution‘ that could threaten to contaminate and subvert the natural and

social order. Such a mode of regulation would help to symbolically mark out GM crops, a move

which would have important consequences for the performance of patterns of regulation and

conflict around the technology.

The conflict on the implementation of the European Union‘s Habitat Directive in the case of

the flying squirrel in Finland and the loggerhead sea turtle in Greece similarly cannot be properly

understood without the background of a an increasing cultural awareness of uncertainty. Having

reconstructed the cultural history of nature conservation, work package 4 reveals that the

character of nature conservation has undergone a profound change in recent decades. We

characterize this change as a shift from target-specific to comprehensive conservation. Increasing awareness

that human modification of nature on the global scale brings about an increasing threat of an

extinction avalanche is the main driver of this shift.

Traditionally, the targets of nature conservation were either specified protected species or areas

set aside from all productive activities as nature reserves. Species and areas remain focal points in

conservation, but the shift to comprehensive conservation means that conservation needs are

framed in a new way: on the one hand, what is protected and why is defined through systematic,

comprehensive assessment and classification, for instance, through Red Data Lists of endangered

species, and on the other hand, the ecological context of protected species and areas is

emphasized. The latter aspect is quite natural: the viability of species populations depends on the

continuous suitability of the ecological context in which they live, and protected areas are greatly

influenced by what happens in their surroundings; in the famous phrasing of Daniel Janzen

(1986): ―No reserve is an island.‖

Both ‗sustainable development‘ and ‗biodiversity preservation‘ have arisen as normative ideals,

and a response to this awareness of uncertainty in the context of this shift towards

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comprehensive conservation. In the 1980s ‗biodiversity‘ was conceived as an umbrella term that

gives a comprehensive description of contemporary conservation concerns. This shift towards

comprehensive conservation, while it is a response to the growing awareness of uncertainty,

brings about a new series of uncertainties itself which pose new, unexpected governance

challenges for the public administration on all levels of government. For one thing, conservation

management is torn between the two conflicting imperatives of the strict protection of the

endangered species with the ongoing activities of forestry and tourist services. In addition,

comprehensive protection is reliant on a huge amount of knowledge about rather complex and

ever-changing circumstances such as the size of the existing populations of the species and recent

population trends of that species. The situation gets further complicated when the potential

impact of conservation measures on the livelihood of local people is taken into account or when

the potential impact of prospective construction projects or changes in forestry practices on the

species is to be assessed. In short, the more complex, dynamic and future-oriented conservation

policy becomes, the more it depends on knowledge which will never be able to produce scientific

certainties about each and every possible development, and the more it needs to integrate

potentially conflicting imperatives. Practical uncertainty thus is a constitutive implication of

comprehensive conservation. The shift from the comparatively one-dimensional target-related

approach to the more complex comprehensive approach in conservation practices is, as we will

show in later sections, intrinsically linked to the need for new and more participatory forms of

knowledge production, the ethicisation of conservation policies and issues of trust. We will come

back to the question, which governance responses to these challenges we can detect.

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4. The ethicisation of governance

In empirical research, some of the most striking findings often are those that have caught the eye

without having been at the centre of the research before. Although the PAGANINI project had

started from the assumption that ‗politics of life‘ areas are strongly connected to normative,

moral and value-based factors, such as a sense of responsibility towards non-human nature,

future generations and/or one‘s own body, we had not been aware of the pervasiveness of the

ethicisation or moralization of governance in the areas under study.

Throughout our case studies, issues turned out to be strongly framed in normative terms such as

responsibility, ethical permissibility, moral or immoral actions, relief of suffering, human dignity,

animal welfare or moral obligations. We term this ethicisation or moralization.

In trying to capture this phenomenon, we have to notice that contemporary language is

lacking an appropriate term for the phenomenon we have noted. To come to grips with

different dimensions of this phenomenon, it is useful to draw some preliminary distinctions.

First, the term ―normative‖ refers to rules and norms of conduct that are commonly shared

in a given society, including those codified in legislation, whereas ―morality‖ and ―ethics‖

refer to obligations felt primarily in the personal sphere. The latter terms have divergent

connotations as regards the ―source‖ of the obligations: morality originates in deeply felt

personal obligations (for instance, Christian morality of the Protestant variant), whereas

ethics leans on a search for universal rules (for instance, Platonism, or Kantian ethics). It is

clear, however, that conceptual distinctions do not alone capture the essence of the

phenomenon we have observed. The meanings of the terms shade into one another at the

boundaries. Furthermore, the relations are dynamic in the sense that sudden shifts from one

kind of emphasis to another one are possible and, in fact, have been recorded in our cases.

So, for instance, the obligation to respect and protect nature was originally channelled

toward a search for binding legislation and conventions (the ―normative‖ dimension) but

has lately got a powerful tinge of personal moral obligation. In the case of stem cell research

and genetic testing, the personal and moral pressure that the uncertainty in these fields

creates has given rise to official or semi-official bodies (―ethics committees‖) that try to

formulate general ethical rules. Normative pressure, as a felt obligation to develop adequate

legislation, is at the background in all of the cases but with varying force. And so on.

What we want to capture, primarily, is the phenomenon that actors themselves, that is

participants in governance or public controversies, apply a language of morality and ethics.

In the absence of a generic term which comprises both ―moralization‖ and ―ethicization‖ we

therefore use both terms, although they are not completely interchangeable

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Several aspects are important as regards the phenomenon of moralization and ethicisation: First,

it implies that ―matters of fact‖ cannot be separated from ―matters of concern‖ (Latour 2004),

and questions of ―is‖ from questions of ―ought‖. We have shown in the previous chapter on the

relevance of uncertainty that ―is‖ questions have direct moral and political consequences and that

there is almost no ―neutral fact‖ the establishment of which is not a politically relevant decision.

Second, it displays the practical character of the issues at stake: the strongly perceived need for

action, even in the absence of scientific certainty, and the practical orientation of actors who ask

themselves what they should or should not do. Third, in moralized or ethicised issue areas, people

take the first-person stance on the issues; they raise and discussion questions such as ―what are we

supposed to do?‖ ―what shall we do next?― ‖what is the right thing for me to do here?‖ In other

words, if an issue area or a governance problem has undergone moralization or ethicisation,

actors relate the issue to themselves and their actions and thus take a participant‟s point of view.

They assume that it does matter to some extent what they personally do regarding the issue and do

not assume that it is the exclusive responsibility of others, be it experts or policy makers, to cope

with it. Our case studies demonstrate how this syndrome comes out in practice:

―Ethics‖ and ―morals‖ proved to be of great significance in the issue areas of human embryonic

stem cell research. Work package 2 shows that expressions of concern, affectedness, values and

beliefs seem to be of particular importance in this issue area. It is through such words that new

political spaces begin to emerge, which are characterized by new rationalities and principles of

decision making and in which ‗life‘ is being exposed to the ‗logic‘ of pathos and ethos (Gottweis

2006a, 2006b). However, it seems that the framing of ―stem cell and cloning research‖ as an

essentially bioethical question, as opposed to, say, a social question, facilitates the staging of

―stem cell and cloning research‖ on the (closed) floor of bioethics committees and discourages

arrangements that include a broader range of actors.

However, our comparative study on the politics of hES cell research in the US, Israel, Germany,

the UK, Italy, and on the EU level also makes clear that being an ―ethical issue‖ is not an intrinsic

quality of human embryonic stem cells. Rather, this branch of research has been framed as an

ethical issue to varying degrees and this framing has taken place differently in different cultural

and political contexts. In Israel, barely any controversy took place on the ethical permissibility of

human ES cell and cloning research. Whereas on the occasion of the first passing of The

Prohibition of Genetic Intervention Law in 1998, which was passed in response to the birth of

Dolly, and in the occasion of its renewal, there have been some voices calling for a permanent ban

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of human cloning. However, scientists and bioethicists have been able to ―convince‖ these voices

that it would be ―irrational‖ and ―immoderate‖ to oppose scientific research in principle and to

impose rash bans. Scientific research, so the story went, should be carefully monitored – and

science could be trusted (Gottweis & Prainsack 2006).

Following the birth of Dolly the sheep, the Knesset, (the Israeli Parliament) adopted The

Prohibition of Genetic Intervention (Human Cloning and Genetic Manipulation of Reproductive

Cells) Law in December 1998. In 2004 the law was slightly modified and renewed for another

five years (State of Israel 1999; see Barilan and Siegal 2005; Revel 2005; Prainsack 2006). It

prohibits the deployment of reproductive cells ―that have undergone a permanent intentional

genetic modification (Germ Line Gene Therapy)‖ and human reproductive cloning, setting a

moratorium on both technologies until March 2009. However, while the law bans applications of

―reproductive cloning‖, it leaves ―research cloning‖ untouched. In the absence of primary

legislation, ―research cloning‖ and hES cell research are governed by secondary legislation – the

1980s Public Health Regulations (Human Experimentation) and the 1987‘s Public Health (Extra-

Corporeal Fertilization) Regulations (Shapira without year; see Shenker 2003; Shapira 2002:641).

Their respect and implementation is monitored by a range of ―Helsinki committees,‖ or

institutional review boards. Altogether, the current regulatory regime places a ban on the

production of embryos for research purposes (Shapira without year), but it does not inhibit

Israeli scientists from deploying ―surplus‖ embryos for research purposes or from producing

embryonic structures through somatic cell nuclear transfer. However, scientists engaging in one

of these practices need prior approval from the so called (Supreme) Helsinki Committee for

Genetic Medical Experiments on Humans, a monitoring body within the Ministry of Health. In

its 2003 report to the Ministry of Health, the committee stated that it was ready to approve both

the derivation of hES cells from ―genuinely surplus‖ embryos and applications for somatic cell

nuclear transfer (Shapira n.d.). This comparatively unrestrictive regulatory regime should be seen

in a context where ―even reproductive cloning is not opposed in principle‖ (Prainsack 2006). The

conviction that there is no reason to oppose human reproductive cloning in principle, but good

reason to be careful unless safety issues will be solved, is translated in the legislators‘ choice of a

moratorium on ―reproductive cloning‖ rather than a permanent ban (Prainsack 2006)

In other country cases such as the US, Germany and Italy, the moral acceptability of hES

research became the object of fierce controversies that divided the population into two opposed

―camps‖. In Germany, Christian churches, disability rights groups, feminist networks and many

other actors mobilized a notion of a ―common ethos‖, reminding what the devaluation of human

life had led to in Germany‘s National Socialist past, an ethos which, in their view, lies at the heart

of German postwar society and is derived from the historical experience of the Nazi crimes. It

implies a common will to not become the sort of people any longer who distinguish between

―life worth living‖ and ―life not worth living‖. (Braun 2005) Opponents rejected research on hES

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cells as an ―attack on life‖ and ―human dignity‖, a ―dehumanization‖ of life and even

―cannibalism‖ (Cardinal of Cologne, Joachim Meisner, quoted in Anonymous 2001).

In the US, stem cell politics was characterized by a clash between pro-life groups and patients‘

organizations. This emotional polarization went hand in hand with the absence of successful trust

building, as no undisputed regulatory authority emerged.

In Italy, a very fierce controversy on the ethics of human embryonic stem cell research ended

with the embracement of the Italian embryo as ―one of us‖ and the failure of the attempts to

relax the tight restriction that govern Italy‘s reproductive laboratories. The controversy on

whether there should be stem cells for Italy was quickly translated into moral debates on the

meaning of ―life‖ and ―Italienness‖ in the 21st century. The controversies were kicked off by

harsh contestations of Law number 40/2004, which was passed by the Italian Parliament in

February 2004.

In Italy, human ES cell and cloning research is governed by Law number 40/2004 (Repubblica

Italiana 2004). The law regulates the range of permissible practices of techniques of assisted

reproduction. However, as long as the law bans the production of ―surplus‖ embryos, the

deployment of embryos for research purposes and all forms of cloning, it has important

implications for human ES cell and cloning research.

The restrictions to stem cell research were not the major intention of the legislature, but it

nevertheless made sure that the passing of the law in February 2004 stem cell research would

become a hotly contested and ―unruly‖ issue.

In spring 2004, the Luca Coscioni Association started to collect signatures for a petition for a

referendum that sought to overturn the entire law and supported four additional requests that

aimed to partially cancel the law. The Luca Coscioni Association is a transversal association that

involves a broad range of socio-political actors, such as scientists, physicians, infertile couples and

patients affected by chronicle pathologies. It is named after its founder, Luca Coscioni, who

suffered from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), a disease that figures prominently among the

potential targets of human ES cell and cloning research. His disease confined him to a

wheelchair, and he was able to speak only with the help of a computer. Since 2002 he was the

iconic embodiment of a struggle that was engendered by the aim to facilitate the performance of

human ES cell and cloning research in Italian laboratories.

More than a million signatures were collected. Following the required procedures, the

Constitutional Court controlled the admissibility of the five petitions in January 2005. It did not

65

admit the request for the abrogation of the entire law, arguing that a law was constitutionally

necessary, but it gave a go-ahead to the four ―partial‖ referenda.

The referenda took place on 12-13 June 2005, after almost six months of intense debates

between two antagonistic alliances.

However, for a referendum to be valid a minimum of 50% +1 of the Italian electorate must cast

its vote, but only just a quarter of the Italian electorate went to the polls; therefore, the law

40/2004 with its tight restriction on hES cell and cloning research is still in place.

In 2004, Italy was split into two opposing camps and a group that was later framed as a

―disinterested‖ and ―silent majority‖. One alliance focused on the freedom of reproduction,

freedom from religion, women‘s rights over their bodies, the right not to be hindered in

someone‘s own ethical choice by a governmental morality imposed on individuals, the freedom

of research, the right to receive cures and to live a healthy life and the right to have – at least –

hope in potential therapies in a not-too-distant future. The reference point of this alliance was the

―human being‖ as an adult, biological citizen (Rose & Novas 2006) whose genetic or somatic

corporeality, vulnerability and suffering endows him or her with individual vital human rights and

freedoms, which the state as a good shepherd not only may not interfere with but also must

foster. The contrasting alliance of supporters of the law referred to the need to protect ―human

life‖ too. However, they radicalized the category of a ―human life‖ to include fertilized oocytes

and embryos. They argued that the embryo was ―one of us‖. In addition, they defended Law

number 40/2004 because it ―has finally put an end to the so called ‗Wild West of procreation‘‖.

The conflict that was set on the stage of ―life‖, eventually turned to be a dispute about very

different visions of the meaning of Italianness in the 21st century.

The Italian “Wild West” of reproduction

In the 1980s–1990s a series of cases that troubled genealogies, kinship categories and the ―natural

way of procreation‖ were intensively debated in the Italian media. One of these cases involved a

woman in her mid-60s, who asked a fertility expert to help her become mother with the frozen

sperm of her husband, who had died 10 years before (Valentini 2004). In a similar case, the

tribunal of Palermo gave a widow permission to transfer the frozen embryos that had been

fertilized before her husband‘s death. In 1994 Italian fertility expert Severino Antinori gained

global fame when he helped a woman aged 62 to become mother, and in 1995 a major uproar

was provoked by the birth of a girl in Rome that had been implanted in the womb of the

embryo‘s aunt more than a year after the death of the embryo‘s ―biological‖ mother (Keates

1995).

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In part, what took place in the Italian debate was an attempt by some actors to reconvert

―matters of concern‖ into ―matters of facts‖, referring to ―nature‖ and ―natural laws‖ as an

allegedly ―objective‖ foundation of moral judgements. In this vein, Daniele Paoli (a member of a

rightist party) explained in the discussions in the Senate in 2003:

The [embryo‘s.] right to identity, [its] right to have two parents . . . is a natural law, which

cannot be amended by [political] laws or by a Parliament‘s majority. (Senato della

Repubblica 2003; emphasis added)

We find here that moral sentiments and a language of moral obligations were mobilized on both

sides of the conflicts. However, when we look at the particular role of the Luca Coscioni

Association in this story, we also see a particular new type of expert emerging, the ―afflicted

expert‖, is a person whose special qualification as an expert consists in being physically afflicted

by a disorder for which biomedical research promises to deliver a remedy in the – not so far away

- future. Following his own terms, Luca Coscioni understood and presented himself as an ―expert

of bioethics‖ on his ―own skin‖ (ADUC 2002a). We can term this type of expertise ―embodied

expertise‖, and we will see it again in the UK controversy on stem cell research as well as in the

genetic testing case study. The afflicted expert‘s authority stems from his or her authenticity, and

this in turn from his or her somatic status as being bodily afflicted by one of the diseases targeted

by the contested biomedical practices.

In the UK, the conflict on embryonic stem cell research was mainly framed as one between

pragmatism and dogmatism. Here the figure of the afflicted expert appears in the context of the

December 2000 parliamentary debates on extending the scope of the HFE Act so that it would

permit research on human embryos for the purpose of increasing understanding about human

diseases and disorders and their cell-based treatments.

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The 1990 HFE Act, schedule II states that

. . . a licence . . . cannot authorise any activity unless it appears to the Authority to be necessary or

desirable for the purpose of

(a) promoting advances in the treatment of infertility,

(b) increasing knowledge about the causes of congenital disease,

(c) increasing knowledge about the causes of miscarriages,

(d) developing more effective techniques of contraception, or

(e) developing methods for detecting the presence of gene or chromosome abnormalities in

embryos before implantation,

or for such other purposes as may be specified in regulations.

The Act also outlawed replacing a nucleus of a cell of an embryo with a nucleus taken from a cell

of any person, embryo or subsequent development of an embryo.

In xy, the Human Fertilization and Embryo Authority (HFEA) and the Human Genetics

Advisory Commission (HGAC) in a joint consultation paper recommended ―that the Secretary of

State should consider specifying in regulations two further purposes to be added to the list in

paragraph 3(2) of Schedule 2 being:

- developing methods of therapy for mitochondrial diseases

- developing methods of therapy for diseased or damaged tissues or organs.

In June 1999 the government decided to defer its decision on a possible rewriting of the HFEA

regulations as suggested in the joint HGAC/HFEA report. Under the impact of Dolly the cloned

sheep, the government announced the organization of an expert group chaired by the Chief

Medical Officer, Professor Liam Donaldson on the topic (Department of Health 2000:49). It

took the Donaldson expert group much longer to produce and present the report than initially

indicated. For one thing, it seemed that the government wanted as much of a time distance as

possible between the BSE and the GMO crisis that had peaked in mid-1999. In August 2000,

after almost a year of deliberations, the expert group issued a report that, in essence, reiterated

policy content and direction of the 1998 HCAG consultation paper (Department of Health

2000). After the report was published, the government announced that members of Parliament

would have a free vote to decide on the proposed change in regulations (Tim Radford, The

Guardian, 17 August 2000). The debates in Parliament took place in late December 2000.

In one of these debates, the wheelchair-bound MP Ann Begg delivered one of the most

passionate speeches in which she combined a ―pragmatic perspective‖ with a plea for the ―duty‖

of the parliament to allow stem cell research to proceed as a ―moral obligation‖.

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I must begin by declaring an interest. I have a condition that results from a single gene

defect. Ultimately, the cure – if there is to be one – for Gaucher‘s disease will be gene

replacement therapy, but there is no doubt that my problems, such as osteoporosis, could

be helped by the research that we are discussing. Although I have a personal interest, I am

speaking not just because of my own experience, but because of approaches I have

received from constituents. About five weeks ago, in the middle of a busy advice surgery,

a constituent arrived in an agitated state. She sat down. She had great difficulty in speaking

and had quite severe tremors in both her hands and her head. She managed to get out that

she was there to lobby me about supporting the whole issue of stem cell research. It was

at that point that I stopped my constituent and said, ‗It‘s okay, I know the arguments. I

am in favour of the research. I understand what you are getting at.‘ A look of relief came

across her face and she said, ‗You mean that I don‘t have to go into the spiel that I have

prepared? I‘ve had such a morning; I couldn‘t get myself together. It‘s been very difficult.

I‘ve prepared everything, but I know that my words don‘t come our properly and that, if I

had to explain something that was very complicated, I might not be able to do it well‘. . . .

Begg continued:

That reminded me of the problems my uncle faced when he, too, had Parkinson‘s disease.

. . . I am therefore aware of the issues around what had been proposed. I hope that I can

articulate some of the thoughts, feelings, and emotions of those who may be helped by

the research. . . . We have the technology with the potential to alleviate huge suffering. I

believe that the moral argument is on the side of pursuing that technology. (Ann Begg,

HC, December 2000, cc 906–908).

In the following debate, on December 20, Begg also spoke:

If the vote is lost today, I and other hon. Members will have to go back to our

constituents who have Parkinson‘s disease, multiple sclerosis or Huntington‘s disease and

say, ―Sorry, embryo cells can be sued for research into improvements in contraception but

cannot be sued to find a treatment for what is wrong with you. . . .We will have to tell

them, ―Sorry, a group of cells in a laboratory dish, which will die because they have no

means of sustaining themselves, has the same status as you. These cells are so important

that they cannot be used to help alleviate your suffering. . . . I would find it impossible to

explain the logic of that position to my constituents. (Begg, HC, 19 December, c 229).

Another member, Sally Keeble reasoned:

I . . . have had IVF treatment which, in my case, was successful. I am also a theologian. . .

. I have been through a process and know what it is like to look at embryos that are part

of one‘s genetic material. . . . I might not want to give them away as they are part of my

genetic material. However, I must ask what the embryos will do if they cannot create life

or reproduce something of my husband and me. . . . I believe that the means and ends are

69

justified. I hope that the House will agree to the regulations and enable science to

proceed. (Keeble, 20 December, C256-257). (110)

In the issue area of genetic testing, mobilizing moral sentiments like empathy and a feeling of

moral responsibility also played a huge role. Acquaintance with the personal fate of those who

suffered from certain genetic disorders often appeared to form a qualification for being able to

make judgments and decisions on how to regulate genetic testing. Participants in the youth

conference of the Human Genetics Commission (HGC) in Wales, an element of the HGC

―Making Babies‖ consultation process, for instance, were shown a TV feature on the efforts of a

couple to have a ―healthy‖ baby. One interview partner from the pro-life NGO CORE who was

present at the conference remembers that she had no chance to argue against the emotional

impressions incited by this feature:

They showed a television programme which lasted nearly an hour of a couple who was

trying to have a baby and so it was just endless pictures of the sick child and how dramatic

it was. It was impossible to compete with that. My feeling afterwards was: you don‘t move

into discussing big ethical issues after you have watched a hair-tracking programme on

television. (Interview 22-3 2006)

Another indicator for the prominent role of emotions and moral sentiments in the controversy

on pre-implantation genetic diagnosis may be the power of personal life stories presented and

excessively discussed in the media, mainly in the UK. One story referred to in nearly each of our

interviews in the UK (interviews 6-3 2006, 9-3 2006 and 17-3 2006; Brecher 2006; Mills 2006) is

the story is about the possibility that the people from the deaf community could demand to use

PGD to select an embryo with a specific form of inherited deafness. By this means, so the story

goes, the couple could make sure that their child will be like them and like they want it to be:

deaf. The story attracted a considerable amount of attention; it was evoked again and again,

mainly to illustrate the potential troubling consequences a technology such as PGD might have.

Interestingly, however, there has been no such case in the UK. The story refers to a merely

hypothetical setting, originally incited by an article about a deaf lesbian couple in the US who had

looked for a sperm donor (note that they were not asking for PGD!) with a certain genetic condition

linked to deafness (Spriggs 2002). Yet the story circulated as a means to incite empathy as well as

reflections about a complicated and interesting issue to debate . It is presented as an ethical

dilemma, constituted by the value of reproductive autonomy, on one side and the ―welfare of the

child‖ principle as established by the HFE Act, on the other. Apparently, the power of such

personalized stories is not diminished by its mainly hypothetic, fictional character. Another

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example of the power of stories would be story of ―the Hashimis‖ or ―the Whitakers‖, both

families who have become enormously famous because they requested PGD for the purpose of

―tissue typing‖. These stories are about ―suffering‖, the need for making hard choices, but also

about the need for the expert community to show empathy towards such individual cases.

Tissue typing is done by Human Leukocyte Antigen Typing which allows to determine whether

the tissue of the embryo matches with an existing ill family member, in most cases an existing

sibling, who is in need for a tissue or organ transplant That is why this application of PGD is also

known to the public as selecting a ―saviour sibling‖. The HFEA allowed tissue typing in the case

of the Hashimi family but later rejected it in the case of the Whitaker family. The argument was

that the disease of Zain Hashimi, thalassemia, is genetically transmitted, so that the embryo who

would function as a ―saviour sibling‖, was screened for the gene himself or herself, as well as for

the tissue compatibility. In the case of Charlie Whitaker, the Diamond-Blackfan syndrome was

not genetically transmitted, so the embryo as possible ―saviour sibling‖ for Charlie would not be

screened for a genetic condition (Wasserman 2003). The pro-life NGO CORE fought against the

decision in the Hashimi case and went to court arguing against third-party interests being criteria

for PGD; however, after initial success before the High Court, it failed, in the end, in its

intentions (Ziegler 2004:90). Later, the HFEA also allowed cases similar to the Whitaker case.

The HFEA justified its policy change by pointing to a shift in prioritised considerations: while in

the beginning the (small) risk for the embryo tested by PGD to get a ―genetic defect‖ as

consequence of the procedure itself was considered more important, later the HFEA in a more

―contextual‖ way argued with the ―welfare of the family‖ and their right to ―reproductive choice‖

(Mills 2006).

The ethics discourse thus may take the form of stories circulating in the public or pictures and

TV features, or, as in the case of Luca Coscioni or Anne Begg mentioned previously, the exertion

of the afflicted body as a powerful discursive tool. The ethics discourse here is a means to incite

and mobilize emotions as a qualification for making judgments and political decisions. What we

see here is an emotionalised, ethicised style of interpellating political subjects, be it the more

general, unspecific public addressed by the media, or potential voters on a referendum, or

political decision makers such as members of Parliament. Ethics, or more specifically moral

sentiment, appears to have become an important resource in a new way in governance

controversies in the areas under study here.

Concerning genetic testing as a governance issue, we can detect two further aspects of the power

of ethics. One is the role of (bio)ethics as a political technology to render unruly issues, such as

genetic testing in general or PGD in particular, governable. This was what happened in the UK

consultations and public debates on PGD during the last years, which did not focus on the

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general approval or disapproval of PGD but displayed an increasing sophistication of the criteria

on how to judge it, such as the ―seriousness‖ of a condition, ―third-party interests‖ (in the case of

tissue typing), ―health purposes‖ vs. ―frivolous or ‗social‘ reasons‖, ―late-onset‖ and ―low

penetrance genetic conditions‖, the percentage of risk, expected point in time of onset of the

disease, or a lists of inherited diseases to be tested, as well as the ―viability‖ of the embryo. These

factors have entered the debate thus causing an explosion of ever refined and differentiated

criteria to facilitate negotiation and decision making. Following Brian Salter (2005), we can speak

of ethical brokerage, generating intermediate positions and newly refined, ever more

differentiated criteria to open the field for political negotiation and trade-off that might allow for

compromise and intermediate positions in situations where at first glance stances seem non-

negotiable.

Aside from being a political resource and a political technology, we can detect a third function of

ethics in the policy area of genetic testing which, when we apply the concepts of Michel Foucault,

can be understood as a link between the ―conduct of the self‖ and the ―conduct of conduct‖

(Foucault xy). What we have generally observed in the policy area of genetic testing is a discursive

explosion about the contingent social, cultural and psychological modalities of individual decision

making on genetic testing, the anxieties and hopes, moral obligations and dilemmas people feel

about the test as well as its result and the consequences. Much talk in new and old governance

arenas such as consultations, patient panels, citizen juries or parliaments has been devoted to this

subjective dimension of genetic testing, concerning the need for and appropriate form of

psychological counselling before and after such a test is done, how serious a certain genetic

conditions needs to be to justify regulation and the subjective meaning that the condition and the

testing procedure has to an individual, a couple or a family. Hence, a huge interest exists in the

intersection of lifestyles, attitudes and feelings, and genetic testing practices on the level of

―conduct of conduct‖, that is, the level of regulatory governance. This intersection, however, is

equally important as regards the economic future of the genetic testing sector. As we have seen in

chapter 3, the vast majority of genetic tests, namely those for multi-factorial diseases, do not

provide 100% reliable knowledge but essentially probabilistic knowledge and thus bear

considerable uncertainty from the user‘s perspective. One of the critical questions both the

genetic testing industry and the related research sector is facing today is whether health care

systems and/or individual consumers will make sense of this form of knowledge and actually

―buy it‖ despite the uncertainty attached to it. In the absence of available genetic therapies,

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making sense of this probabilistic form of knowledge largely means counterbalancing the ―bad‖

genes by a ―good‖ lifestyle and attitude through exercising, quitting smoking, maintaining a good

diet, seeing a therapist, or having a more optimistic outlook on life. Thereby, the uncertainty of

risk calculations and the paradigm of ―multi-factorial‖ diseases instead of the ―one gene

hypothesis‖, paradoxically foster the ―responsibilization‖ (Rose 1999:74) of the individual.

Responsible behaviour is supposed to minimise risk. In this context, ethics is not so much about

making general moral judgements as about taking responsibility for one‘s lifestyle in the face of

genetic knowledge; adopting a certain ―ethos‖ which orients the way one lives life and the

becoming the person one wants to be. In the context of epistemological uncertainty, as explained

in chapter 3, the government of the individual, the development of the market, and political

regulation are linked to – and by – the significance of lifestyle ethics.

The GM food controversy was to a considerable extend framed in a language of ethics and

morality too, both by NGOs and civil society organizations and by government institutions.

Here, this framing, on the one hand, implied that GM plants and their products were not

exclusively considered as a ―matter of fact‖, a matter on which mainly scientific experts had the

authority to speak and make judgments, but also as a ―matter of concern‖ on which citizens and

their organizations would also have a legitimate right to speak. In this vein, the revised 2001 EU

Deliberate Release Directive attempted to address the wider issues of public and political concern

that stretched beyond the narrow technical and scientistic parameters of the 1990 original. Thus

the preamble (para 9) states:

Respect for ethical principles recognised in a Member State is particularly important.

Member states may take into consideration ethical aspects when GMOs are deliberately

released or placed on the market as or in products.

Thus ethical concerns were included as having some legitimacy within the new official regulatory

framework, although kept separate from and subordinate to the traditional science-based

environmental and health risk-assessment paradigm. This is reflected in Articles 28 and 29 of the

new directive which codified the commission‘s relationship to expert authority and advice. Article

28 called for mandatory consultation with relevant EU-level scientific committees, while Article

29 had the lesser power to recommend consultation with specialist ethical committees.

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The ethics frame thus provides an opportunity for public concerns to be voiced. However, this

tendency was contained and counterbalanced to some degree by the move to keep ―matters of

facts‖ insulated against ―matters of concern‖ and to ensure that the latter were subordinate to the

first. Providing opportunities for public concern to be articulated was not unanimously welcomed

by EU institutions. For instance, the European Commission‘s Strategy for Europe on Life Sciences and

Biotechnology (European Commission 2002:7) acknowledges that the life sciences and

biotechnology

also raise important policy and societal issues and have given rise to a broad public debate.

(European Commission 2002:7)

When it proceeds to discuss this debate, however, it laments that the debate

focused narrowly on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and specific ethical

questions, on which public opinion has become polarised. (Ibid:10)

Most crucially, it then points to important limits constraining how long such debate might be

accommodated within overall considerations of the ―strategic vision‖:

Uncertainty about societal acceptance has contributed to detracting attention in Europe

from the factors that determine our capacity for innovation and technology development

and uptake. This has stifled our competitive position, weakened our research capability

and could limit our policy options in the longer term. (European Commission 2002)

This statement must be understood in the context of the Lisbon Agenda which the EU explicitly

confirms in the Strategy Paper.

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The ‗Lisbon Strategy‘ after the European Council‘s Lisbon meeting in 2000, declared that its

―new strategic goal for the next decade‖ was ―[t]o become the most competitive and dynamic

knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and

better jobs and greater social cohesion‖ (Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23

and 24 March 2000).9 Central to this strategy was to promote research and development and the

private appropriation of the flows of knowledge from public scientific and academic networks, in

order to promote high value technoscientific innovation-based production. The January 2002

Strategy for Europe on Life Sciences and Biotechnology located biotechnology within the Lisbon Agenda

and opens by proclaiming: ―Life sciences and biotechnology are widely recognised to be, after

information technology, the next wave of the knowledge-based economy, creating new

opportunities for our societies and economies‖ (European Commission 2002: 7).

Focusing on ethical questions, in short, threatens the EU‘s capacity for innovation and

competitive position. In the policy area of biotechnology, as we see here, the EU was torn

between conflicting imperatives of economic competitiveness and democracy, the former being

safeguarded by allegedly neutral scientific criteria insulated against ethical debate and public

concern, and the latter providing opportunities of such concerns to beheard and values to be

taken into account. As we will see later on in chapter 4, our conclusion is that the EU and its

member states found themselves obliged to move into the direction of the latter.

While on the institutional level, thus, the meaning of ‗ethics‘ was heavily associated with ‗public

concern‘ and demands to bring these concerns to the fore, on the side of NGOs opposing GM

food, we find that ethics and morality strongly carry the meaning of first-person involvement.

This is expressed for instance by the Greek Orthodox Church when it declares that the meaning

of biotechnology should be found not only in the ethics but in ‗bio-spirituality‘, since at the end,

the ethical is

9 http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm.

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whatever maintains the operation of the self-governed inside of us, whatever preserves

the harmony of our psychosomatic balance and whatever evokes the need of God and the

feel for eternal perspective in our lives. (Hatzinikolaou10 2002, as cited in Zorbas 2005)

Similarly, the Balkan Network, bringing together a variety of groups opposed to GM food from

Balkan regions (Kanellopoulou 2006), including Greenpeace, OTOE, EFET, GSEE and the

Prefecture of Thessaloniki, stressed in its November 2005 declaration:

The movement against GMOs is the expression of a moral choice of citizens, institutions

and organisations with innocent motives and goals. It objects to the degradation of

human values, to the abuse of scientific knowledge [which does] not take into account

common interest.

We are all committed to provide to the coming generations the heritage of a rich variety

of seeds, plants and animals. The distribution of GMOs in the environment threatens

food safety and environmental sustainability of the whole planet.

We call citizens to take this matter into their hands (www.gmostop.org)

Not least does ―ethics‖ as the first-person perspective appear in the figure of the conscious

consumer, taking responsibility for his or her health as well as the environment through buying

food that is labelled as free of GMOs.

Consumer consciousness plays a prominent role in the food scares case too. In fact, what we

find here is the co-emergence of a decisively ethical layer of governance and a shift from a

formerly segmented to a more comprehensive approach. We see a twofold integration process

that took place in response to the dislocatory power (see chapter 1) of the BSE crisis. One of

these integration processes connected the formerly segmented policy areas of public health,

agriculture, environmental politics and animal welfare; the other connected public policy in these

policy domains and individual lifestyle and, in fact, lifestyle ethics, collective responsibility and

individual responsibility for oneself and the environment and the animals. The new discursive

mechanisms that fostered this twofold integration process were the conceptualisation of a

horizontal food chain and the associated coining of the ―farm to fork‖ metaphor.

10 Hatzinikolaou (Harvard & MIT Ph.D. in HST, Biomedical technology, current Metropolitan [Mitropolitis] Nikolaos) has been a member of the Bioethics Committee of GSRT, the chair of the bioethics committee of the Greek Orthodox Church, as well as other bioethics committees.

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„Farm to fork‟ as the EU institutionalised view on food safety

Central principles underlying the General Food Law are the concepts of ‗traceability‘ and ‗food

operator responsibility‘. The notion of traceability pertains to the idea that all those involved in

the production, processing, dissemination and otherwise handling of foodstuffs (―food and feed

business operators‖), must make sure that all foodstuffs, animal feed and feed ingredients can be

traced right through the food chain ‗from farm to fork‘ (i.e., from the farming sector to

processing, transport, storage, distribution and retail to the consumer). Each business unit

(producer, processor, importer and so on) must be able to identify the businesses it supplies or is

being supplied by. This rule-of-thumb incorporated in the General Food Law became known as

the ‗one-step-backward, one-step-forward‘ approach.

The metaphor of the ‗food chain‘ had already a long-standing history before it assumed a new

meaning in the context of food scares. The old ‗vertical food chain‘ metaphor referred to the

hierarchical relationship between animals and men as a source of proteins and other nutrients. In

that biological reading, it had gained considerable weight in conveying the detrimental effects of

pollutant accumulation (‗PCBs from plankton to ice bear‘). Under the influence of BSE and other

food scares, notably including GMO-related discussions, the metaphor not only became a key

concept in the framing of food issues but also took on some entirely different meanings, referring

to the horizontal linkage of producer to consumer. Discourse analysis on the basis of a newspaper

data set for the three countries under investigation in the food scares project indicates that this

novel meaning entered the scene between 1996 and 1998 in the context of the erupting BSE-

crisis. The new interpretation of the phrase rapidly gained momentum in the following two-year

period. An example of the concepts new use is the following quote from a spokesman of a

leading firm:

To have the food chain entirely in our own hands, so as to restrict risks to a minimum.

That is the gig wish for the cattle- and fish feed company Nutreco. The recurring feed

scandals, with the dioxin crisis as a recent all-time-low, have made the firm even more

aware of the need for that. ―It is more than a desire‖, replies Antoon van den Berg,

director of Nutreco‘s animal products division, ―it is our basic philosophy. The super-

market chains are strongly pressurising us to supply safe food. Food of which the origins

are clear, which is traceable back to all suppliers. Our customers demand that, so that is

what we do. To link the farmer to the consumer is therefore our task‖. (Trouw, 31

December 1999)

Thus the metaphor of the food chain transformed from a depiction of vertical, hierarchical

bonds between species, to an image of horizontal, interdependent ties between economically and

organisationally separated units; a collection of units which is, please note, amenable for control.

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Among the issues that came to be re-framed in line with this new chain metaphor and thus came

to be linked to food safety were topics such as the environmental implications of agriculture,

risks in terms of an individually defined, ‗bodily‘ safety and animal welfare.

This ‗leap‘ from a concern for the body to a concern for nature surrounding the human body is

reflected in the institutional redesigns in regard to food safety control as described in chapter 2

(e.g., the linking of the Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority [VWA] to the Dutch

ministry of agriculture). Another indicator of these dynamics is that a safety control system that

had been elaborated by retail companies (the hazard analysis critical control points; HACCP) was

made obligatory in three successive stages for an increasingly larger part of the horizontal food

chain: in 1990, it was formalised for the entire retail sector; in 1995, it was made obligatory for

the food-processing industry as well. Under the influence of the EU General Food Law, it was

also made the standard hygiene code for slaughterhouses. At the time, voices were raised that

pleaded for a compulsory adoption of the HACCP system in the primary sector too. That has not

yet been formalised, but quite a number of farmers already organised their quality control

practices on the basis of this system.

The HACCP system, originally developed the context of space exploration, entails an assessment

of every stage in a production of handling process, detailing for each of the ‗critical elements‘, i.e.,

those aspects of that stage or step that are prone to failure. On the basis of this assessment, for

each element safety measures are elaborated. The associated control system subsequently is a

systemised check on whether all steps and stages and all precautionary measures (e.g., production

workers wearing hair nets or white coats in certain stages of the production process) are

implemented. Supermarkets and other larger retailer businesses in Europe adopted the HACCP

as its standard system for quality and hygiene control.

The new farm-to-fork metaphor opened up a qualitative jump towards considering the ethical

aspects of agricultural production, addressing the different steps of food production, food

processing and consumption as a series of intersecting practices. In addition to being entrepreneurs

producing agricultural goods, the metaphor attributed a new identity to farmers namely as

producers of food (rather than of agricultural produce). In this role, responsibility for public health

issues is put onto farmers as well, an assumption on which new regulatory practices, for example,

making the sector responsible for controlling its own compliance with safety regulations, came to

be built. Further, the new discourse also draws the consumer in an active role into the economic

chain of food production. It adorns him or her with an identity as citizen, to be held responsible

on moral grounds for the ethical aspects of the production of his or her food. The ethical

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discourse draws on non-utilitarian conceptualisations of the relation between human and animal,

as well as on an understanding of the physical world as vulnerable and in need of protection.

Issues such as animal welfare, environmental care and integrated rural development as a

consequence got emphasised as topics for deliberation even in arenas traditionally focusing on

the rationalisation of agricultural production, such as in the EU CAP and at the level of

agricultural policy of member states. In a letter to Parliament, the Dutch Cabinet expressed its

position in these matters in almost biblical terms:

The earth and nature have been bestowed on us; we may make use of these in order to

live prosperously, healthy and safely. Yet we will have to pass her [sic!, intended is ‗the

earth‘] on to subsequent generations, for them to live too prosperously, healthy and safely.

In view of our fellow men [naasten] and generations that come after us we carry a

responsibility. The earth has been given to us to manage [beheren], to labour and to keep

safe [behoeden]. Sustainability and stewardship are all about here and there, about now

and later (Letter of the Dutch Cabinet to Parliament, 4 June 2005)

On another occasion, the Dutch agricultural minister posited that ―the consumption of food is a

moral act.‖11 These views seem to mirror the views on food that have informed the recent meat-

related legislation on the level of the EU. As voiced by the former European Commissioner for

Health and Consumer Protection and Food quality, David Byrne: ―The three key issues

highlighted [here] – ‗Safe, Sustainable and Ethical‘ – must be central to our whole approach to

the food chain, whether in the primary production sector, the food processing sector, the

distribution chain, or even at the final preparation and consumption phase.‖

The traditional rationalisation discourse on agriculture (the very same Dutch agricultural minister

on an other occasion was heard stating that ―agriculture is an economic sector just like any other‖

[WP5 interview September 2006]) which had been dominant in pre-BSE days certainly did not

11 ―[M]inister Veerman zegt namelijk dat het ‗Consumeren van voedsel een morele daad is‘‖ (Speech of the Minister of Agriculture, dr. C. P. Veerman, given on his behalf by R.M. Bergkamp at the inauguration of the international president of Euro-Toques, 23 January 2006 Maastricht).

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vanish; however it was challenged by a new competing ethical discourse that contextualized

agriculture as a series of practices intersecting with a ―chain‖ of other practices.12

The emergence of an ethics discourse on agriculture, as we have seen, can be understood as the

manifestation of a more comprehensive and contextual view on agriculture, understanding it

basically as a form of practice that may have certain effects and as such requires someone who is

responsible. Similarly, work package 5 shows that the meaning of nature conservation has

undergone a series of transformations throughout its history, also implying a tendency from

reductionist to comprehensive views and from a utilitarian to a moral stance towards the issue.

The genealogy of modern nature conservation

(a) The fact of human-caused extinction, as a ‗piece of knowledge,‘ or ‗matter of fact‘ (in

Foucault‘s 1972 terminology, ‗savoir‘). The fact of extinction in the history of life arose within

palaeontology in the 18th century and triggered fierce religion-driven controversies (Mayr

1982:347–349). Darwin‘s breakthrough finally settled the issue about the reality of historical

extinctions; in The Origin, Darwin write a four-page section titled ―On Extinction.‖ The awareness

that humans can drive species into extinction is a late-19th-century phenomenon, by and large.

The ―community‖ of colonial hunters provided clearly one important germinating ground for this

concern (Adams 2004).

(b) Utilitarian conservation. A purely utilitarian perception that the productivity of nature requires

active maintenance and care has ancient roots in some ways, but as a more systematic attitude in

the West it derives from the early 19th century – again, it seems that experience from outside

Europe took the lead (Judd 1997; Wynn 2004; Grove 1997). It seems plausible that the colonial

experience produced some sort of ―moral ecologies‖ that included an incipient understanding of

the significance of nature for livelihood; nature as ‗given,‘ as something to be cherished, not as

something to be ‗conquered‘. This utilitarianism has had an antithesis which has been in a

dominant position until very recently: the perception that the human duty is to dominate the rest

of nature.

(c) The Romantic Movement. The romantic view of nature had strong connections with

nationalism in various countries – in Finland, for instance, in a particularly strong form.

Nationalism and nature conservation got into positive interference with one another: protecting

native species became to be equated with cherishing the national cultural heritage.

12 The discourse-analysis on the basis of the newspaper data set indicates that there are considerable differences in this respect between the UK, the Netherlands and Germany; the ethics and environmental discourse is much less developed in Germany and much more in UK.

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(d) New moral sensibility concerning other living creatures. ―Nature is our friend‖ was a slogan in

popular education that gathered momentum form the late 19th century on. It marks the birth of

new subjects vis-à-vis nature. For instance, since 1870 societies for the preservation of songbirds

have sprang up in Finland (Vuorisalo et al. 1999). Changes in moral sensibility in Greece are

reflected in initiatives by the Hellenic Mountaineers Club, which in the early 20th century

pressured the Greek state to create a law on national parks and at the end of the Civil

War established, along with others, the Hellenic Society for the Protection of Nature

(Kousis 1995:285).

(e) Human biospheric dependence. This perception has roots that go back to the late 19th

century (―biogeochemistry‖, ―biosphere‖), but the biospheric perspective as such was launched in

Euro-American ecology in the 1950s. An early promulgator of the view was the polymath Alfred

Lotka, one of the founding figures of modern population ecology, who viewed it like this: ―(W)e

are far removed from equilibrium – a fact which is of the highest practical significance, since it

implies that a period of adjustment to equilibrium conditions lies before us, and he would be an

extreme optimist who should expect that such adjustment can be reached without labor and

travail‖ (Lotka 1956:279).

In other words, Lotka‘s point of reference was not a stable ―balance of nature‖ as the wording

might suggest, but rather a dynamic, temporally shifting steady-state.

(f) Biodiversity as a normative principle. The goal of biodiversity preservation establishes, or aims

at establishing, a direct continuum from ecological knowledge to a firm action plan; this is ‗co-

construction‘ in Jasanoff‘s (2004) sense. Perhaps the dynamics come from the fact that scientific

questions and governance questions are phrased and framed in similar, even identical, terms.

Biodiversity is a powerful attractor both in the political and in the scientific, knowledge-

producing sphere (Haila 2004).

The concern over nature conservation as such is clearly normatively driven; it is a field of knowledge

in the sense of connaissance, as distinct from savoir, to refer to Foucault‘s terms, and at the same

time a field of practices, comprising governance practices. In order to come to terms with the

specific nature of the challenges modern conservation poses to governance, as work package 5

demonstrates, we have to understand the specific intersection between uncertainty, normativity

and the need for action. The point is that defining specific, strict standards for nature

conservation within the comprehensive paradigm is very complicated. The search for standards

bifurcates into two directions: large-scale/health of the biosphere and small-scale/biodiversity/

continuation of the processes of life everywhere. Neither of these can provide specific normative

standards.

Scientific knowledge-practices play an essential role in the governance of endangered nature.

Hence, at some moments science is close to ‗savoir,‘ in the sense of documenting relevant matters

of fact about the ways human actions are threatening other creatures of nature. Yet, on the level

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of system of knowledge, an essential transition took place in conservation biology with the

modification of human-caused extinction threat from target-specific concept to a statistical

concept (Haila 2002a, 2004). This transition brought about unexpected problems for the

development of thinking within the discipline of conservation biology because demonstrating

extinction empirically is well-nigh impossible, so one must resort to indicators and surrogates of

various sorts (area remains the single most important), but using such indicators and surrogates as

arguments in policy advice opens up new problems (Haila 2004). This has given rise to efforts to

formally quantify extinction risks (Burgman et al. 1993, Akçakaya & Sjögren-Gulve 2000),

however, as we have seen with respect to the concept of risk in the context of genetic testing (see

chapter 3), risk is a probabilistic concept. Even the most well-refined indicators, surrogates,

statistics and scenarios trying to quantify the risk of extinction can never produce positive, 100%

reliable knowledge but just probabilistic prognoses. Hence, comprehensive conservation, actually

quite parallel to genetic testing, displays a built-in element of epistemological and practical

uncertainty: it does rely on knowledge, in fact on an expansion of knowledge, but knowledge

takes the form of probabilistic knowledge, leaving those who rely on it with a series of decisions

to make. At the same time, the very idea of conservation implies the perceived need for action,

the need to act to prevent further extinction, hence the need for action in the face of inescapable

scientific uncertainty. There is a need for action, but scientific knowledge does not provide clear

standards for such action. Actors, thus, are left with the need to make moral judgments oriented

by normative standards they themselves have to find. The moment of ethicisation in the field of

nature conservation does not least stem from this predicament.

There is another twist to the story. A statistical concept of extinction is politically and culturally

significant for the following reason: it lifts the risk of extinction away from specified targets –

species, sites – onto an abstract level. The threat of extinction is everywhere present, no matter

whether it can be actually demonstrated or not. The fate of Amazonian rain forests and the

myriad species living there is continually present in the cultural consciousness of the European

public. It would be difficult to overemphasize the significance of this fact for current European

conservation controversies. This process means that nature conservation gets a new ethical

dimension, grounded in the global worry of the viability of the biosphere. This brings about a

dynamics of ethicisation of conservation in the sense that the older normative grounds are

complemented with a new, global ethical sensibility. The new globally grounded ethical framing

supports the significance of knowledge in this field.

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Not least, in conservation issues, knowledge is explicitly normative through the question, What to

preserve, and why? This is at the same time a scientific question and a governance question.

Merged together, the scientific question and the governance question lead automatically to a

search for norms, and in search for norms actors often tend to turn to ―nature‖ for guidance

because nothing else is available, in other words, they tend to reconvert ―matters of concern‖

into alleged ―matters of fact‖. In an extreme form, this inspires scientists to try to define a

particular state of nature at a particular point of time in the past as a model to be imitated. The

following is a representative citation from a prominent source in conservation biology:

Conservationists must make two key decisions. First, they must decide which time in the

past should serve as the reference period. Second, they must assess the probable

ecological conditions that existed in the area at the time. (Orians & Soulé 2001:6–7)

The selection of which ―facts‖, however, should serve as normative criteria, is itself a political

decision. Hence, the intersection of a comprehensive approach, scientific uncertainty, and the

dynamics of ethicisation brings forth the question of universal normative background with a new

force. The question is: Can the past serve as a normative basis? We will come back to this point

when we discuss the temporalization of governance in chapter 5.

Another aspect of the phenomenon of ethicisation is the growing number and the influence of

national bioethics commissions or other types of ethics bodies on the governance of life. We will

look into this phenomenon in chapter 5..

5. Participation in the co-production of regulatory knowledge and political

authority

Two premises were put centre stage in the theoretical debate on which the PAGANINI project is

set up: it builds on the premise that there is a quality to the politics of life that links it to civic

participation and it builds on the premise that scientific authority and political authority are ‗co-

produced‘ (cf. Jasanoff 2004). The idea was that life-political issues take shape through the

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production of knowledge in a way that is inseparable from their articulation as political

controversies. Indeed, the empirical findings bear witness of this ‗interwovenness‘ between

science and politics in practice (see above). What is interesting is that where the cases disclose

instances of ‗participatory governance‘ – which the project set out to investigate – these involve

without exception both participation in knowledge production and participation in the

production or disruption of political authority.

In Part I (based on work package 1; Loeber et al. 2005) it was argued that a definition of

‗participatory governance‘ as ―the practice of consulting and involving members of the public in

the agenda-setting, decision-making, and policy-forming activities of organizations or institutions

responsible for policy development‖ (Rowe & Frewer 2004) might fall short of covering the

varieties of practices in which actors (state and non-state actors, scientists and lay people, citizens

and consumers, and so on) jointly aspire to govern unruly public problems. When politics is

understood as a struggle over meaning and the allocation and prioritisation of values that comes

out inter alia in technologies, or in, say, scientific and medical practices, the notion of

‗participation‘ is stretched beyond its limits and the above definition is rendered obsolete. Starting

from such a broader understanding of politics and participation, other questions can be asked

such as, What is it exactly that a public participates in? How is ‗the public‘ constructed? In

relation to what and by whom?

Our case studies have confirmed that such a more complex approach to the question of

participation is indeed called for and justified. From the case studies it transpires that, first,

political participation cannot and should not be reduced to participatory governance arrangements.

Participation, in both knowledge production and political judgement and decision making, takes

many different shapes and is practised at very different sites, governance arrangements being only

one such site. Second, the critical questions concerning such participatory governance

arrangements cannot and should not be reduced to questions of inclusion and exclusion. Going

beyond such questions of inclusion and exclusion, we rather want to ask:

- Who invites non-state actors and why? What is the context?

- Who actually is ―the public‖? Which public? Who counts as ―the public‖? How is ―the

public‖ constructed and what are the specific assumptions that underlie these

constructions?

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- What is it exactly that a public participates in? What counts as a ―political‖ issue open to

participation, and on the basis of which understanding of politics? How is the political

constructed in these arrangements? Does it comprise questions about the nature and

desirability of the present societal order, or is it restricted to questions that can in

principle be answered within the existing regulatory schemes?

Viewed from this broader perspective, the case studies display a broad range of different face of

political participation.

Participation in knowledge production

Participatory knowledge production takes rather different forms among the cases we studied. In

some cases it forms part of the policy issue at stake, in other cases it forms part of governance

strategies developed to cope with the issue, and in some cases it is part of both. Let us explain

what participatory knowledge production means in the different case studies.

In the case of embryonic stem cell research, knowledge production directly relies on people

getting physically involved in research practice: there could be no hES cell research without

women being ready to donate oocytes or couples agreeing to donate their ―surplus‖ embryos to

this field of research. Somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), the technique better known as

―cloning‖, in particular, could not be done without large-scale donations of human egg cells. This

fact has given rise to some public concerns that stem cell research could lead to a new

exploitation of women‘s bodies or to anxieties on women selling their oocytes.

Thus, the readiness of women to donate their egg cellsor to couples to donate the embryos that

have been produced from their gametes forms a crucial strategic precondition for this research to

be continued. Once pharmaceutical and therapies have been derived from this research, it

additionally relies on human subjects to invest their fleshy bodies in clinical trials. In other words,

whereas formal participatory arrangements are scarce in the field of human ES cell and cloning

research more downstream, upstream participation and lay involvement in the very process of

crafting science is abundant.

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Therefore, a positive attitude towards this research, motivating people to get physically involved,

is of crucial strategic importance for knowledge production in this field. At the same time, this

fact has given rise to some unease and concern in the public which forms part of the policy

problem too. This leaves governance with a twofold and potentially contradictious challenge of

ensuring the supply of body materials but also protecting citizens from getting exploited.

Knowledge production in the field of genetic testing relies on ―involving the public‖ too, albeit

in a different way. As has been pointed out in chapter 3, the vast share of research and

development concerning genetic testing is done in the sector of multi-factorial diseases, not on

monogenetic diseases. Research into the genetic aspect of multi-factorial diseases, both through

epidemiological studies and the search for biomarkers, requires a large- scale involvement of

healthy people, people who do not or not yet have developed the disease under study. Research on

complex, multi-factorial diseases thus is dependent on the participation of huge numbers of

people, providing data which may or may not be useful to study a certain disease. In chapter 5,

we will show that in the policy area of genetic testing, as well as in many other areas under study

in the PAGANINI project, notably the areas of genetically modified food and food scares, we can

observe a certain ―participatory shift‖ in governance that has taken place in the recent one or two

decades. In the field of genetic testing, the participatory shift in governance bears a remarkable

―family resemblance‖ to the ―participatory shift‖ in research. It is our contention that more is

behind this parallel than just coincidence; the two participatory shifts are linked by the growing

significance of lifestyle, lifestyle ethics and people‘s feelings concerning the test and its results and

for genetic testing as a future market and a branch of research. Within the new, systemic and

more complex genetic paradigm that tends to supersede the older, linear, monogenetic paradigm,

the ―speaking subject‖, that is, the actual or potential patient or user of a genetic test speaking

about his or her live, lifestyle, feelings and attitudes is a potentially valuable source of knowledge

concerning the functioning of genes and genetic tests.

There are several social spaces where such speaking is incited and takes place. One of them is

counselling, guided by ever more sophisticated ―non-directive‖ and ―communicative‖ counselling

concepts (Samerski 2002; Vieth 2004). For example, Alison Lashwood, consultant nurse at the

biggest UK PGD clinic, explains that counselling is a rather therapeutic, comprehensive

communication that by far exceeds the aspect of conveying information about the medical

procedures and the risks at stake:

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We spend a lot of time discussing PGD with couples before they undertake it. And the

things we want to talk to them about it: What is the background, what has happened

previously, so that we can understand where they are coming from, why they might be

asking for this and why they think, PGD may help them. (Lashwood, 2006)

The knowledge produced in the counselling setting also has a certain relevance for regulatory

practices, in particular in the UK where the social and psychological situations of a family or

couple requesting PGD are in fact the main criteria for evaluating the ―seriousness‖ of a

condition and thus for approval or disapproval of their demand. Again, the consultant nurse

Lashwood explains:

The severity of a condition, the conception of this, may vary tremendously from family to

family. It is not enough just looking at a situation of a child with a genetic disorder

without looking at that within the context of the family, the family experience, what has

happened before, how many children this couple have. (Lashwood, 2006)

Hence, scientific facts about a genetic disorder are viewed and evaluated in the context of

subjective perspectives and feelings (Interview 17-3 2006). When the HFEA refuses to set up a

catalogue of genetic disorders considered ―serious‖ enough to justify the use of PGD, it argues in

a similar vein. Just as genetic factors are seen to form only one type among other types of factors

causing disease, genetic facts form merely one element that must be taken into account among a

multiplicity of other factors, all of which interact with one another. Hence, we see a ―systemic

shift‖ on the level of counselling too, just as on the level of genetic knowledge production. The

implication of such a systemic paradigm, however, is that it does not allow for a stable, long-term

regulation, based on fixed categories, only for rather flexible case-to-case decision making which

displays an inherent tendency of expanding the indications for PGD.

In some sense, participatory governance arrangements and experiments also provide an

opportunity for inciting speech about life, the complex interactions between social, emotional

and genetic factors of diseases and about the social and psychological context in which people

apply a test and make sense of its results. At the youth conference in Leipzig, for instance,

dealing with such social and psychological aspects of the test figured prominently among the

topics; the youth groups emphasised the need for reflecting on what would be the best practices

of counselling, and a considerable part of the catalogue of demands the young people developed

referred to adequate ways to address the fears, concerns and needs of women confronted with

the possibility of antenatal testing. Patient panels also provide an arena where individuals are

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invited to speak about their personal relations to a genetic disorder, the test as such and its

results, and public consultations on topics such as PGD, sex selection via genetic testing, or

testing for late-onset disorder. Patient panels invite participants to imagine themselves as being

potentially afflicted by a certain genetic disorder and to speak about their attitudes. Thus,

personal speech about ―genes in context‖ plays an important role in knowledge production,

regulation and participatory governance arrangements, and we can observe a participatory shift

on many different levels.

Taking a closer look at the GM food controversy, we find that participatory knowledge

production has taken place to some extent in the context of the National Seed List Hearings held

in 2000 and 2002 over the GM HR Maize variety Chardon LL (T25). These hearings formed not

only newly politicised arenas of political participation but also for participatory knowledge

production. In fact, they provided an opportunity for a participatory intrusion that commented

on, challenged and changed the science, a hybrid space in which participatory knowledge

production was a powerful act of political participation. Interestingly, as we will show in chapter

5, the ―GM Dialogue‖ was launched as a response to this type of ―wildcat participation‖. The

GM Dialogue provided formal opportunities for civic participation; however, these were

opportunities in which science and politics, knowledge production and political participation

would be re-separated from each other, and public values and scientific facts would be

chaperoned by panels of experts and permitted to make no unconstitutional liaison.

National Seed Listing

Following an early EEC directive (70/457/EEC), the sale of a new variety was prohibited unless

it was included in the EEC Common Catalogue and National List. This was originally aimed at

securing minimum standards of seed quality, and the legislation predates the GM controversy and

applies to all varieties not just GM ones. Under this directive, statutory tests and trials are

required to demonstrate that new varieties are ‗distinct, uniform and stable‘ (DUC), have ‗value

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for cultivation and use‘ (VCU) and represent an improvement on existing listed varieties. Seed

listing constituted the last stage in the regulatory process and follows the granting of marketing

consent under the GM Deliberate Release Directive 1990/220.

In March 2000 the addition of the genetically modified product Chardon LL T25 Maize was

proposed to the UK National List, marking the final part of legislative clearance for that variety.

This gave another alarm signal to those opposed to GM plants that, despite the commercial

moratorium during the farm scale evaluations (FSEs), the introduction of the technology was still

moving forward with government approval.

Farm Scale Evaluations

In June 1998 the industry launched SCIMAC (Supply Chain Initiative on Modified Agricultural

Crops), which advocated the managed and regulated introduction of GM Crops, in co-existence

with conventional and organic agriculture, and supported the labelling of GM products for the

consumer. On 5 November of that year, the UK government announced a voluntary agreement

with SCIMAC for a moratorium on commercial GM plantings and a programme of Farm Scale

Evaluations (FSEs) of four GM crops, which would be compared with non-GM crops for their

effects on wildlife biodiversity.

But a latent power existed under the National List legislation for members of the public to

demand a hearing and examine the evidence for the ―distinct, uniform and stable-criterion‖

(DUC) and the ―have ‗value for cultivation and use‘-criterion‖ (VCU) of a variety. Prior to

Chardon LL, objections to seed listing were rare and there had never before been a request for a

public hearing. With this new GM variety, however, there were 223 written objections, including

67 requests for a public hearing. Interestingly, these hearings had been bequeathed a structure

that went beyond usual consultation mechanisms and allowed for what amounted to a two- or

three-stage representation and appeals process, including written representations, cross

examination, a hearing, and an additional tribunal.

At the hearings one of the first problems to emerge was that the DUV testing had been carried

out over only one year, rather than the statutory two years required by the EU Directive. Thus

the £500,000 hearing had to be delayed until 2002. This enabled Friends of the Earth to claim in

a 2000 press release:

This fiasco has only come to light because Friends of the Earth and ordinary members of

the public forced the Government to hold a public hearing on the listing of this GM seed.

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Only a week after the BSE report was published, we now find that the minimum official

testing of this crop has simply not taken place. If the hearing had not happened, this vital

information would never have come to light and the crop would have been given official

approval.

In this case, wildcat civic participation, in a way, made sure that knowledge production, namely

producing knowledge about DUV, took the adequate time and was conducted appropriately at

all.

In the hearings the tests carried out for the GM Maize were scrutinized and cross-examined by

coalitions of NGOs and a host of dissident or independent scientists. The outcome was a

succession of exposures of uncertainties in the science and inadequacies in the tests undertaken,

some of which were acknowledged by the chair of ACRE (Advisory Committee on Releases to

the Environment)13. Hence, dissident civic participation produced knowledge about the nature

and the potential effects of GM plants in their future environmental context that would have

been unavailable without these interventions.

In contrast, in the case of food scares, participatory forms of knowledge production were

designed in response to the dislocations caused by the BSE event. The idea underlying the British

Food Standard Agency (FSA) approach to consumers being on scientific committees is that this

representation helps gear the production knowledge to the particulars of a problem in a specific

place and time. That is imperative because a complicating factor in food safety control today is

that globalisation and societal differentiation render ―the‖ consumer no longer, if it ever was at

all, a meaningful construction. Remarkably, this comes at a time in which ―the consumer‖ has

been attributed increasingly more importance. The adoption and formalisation of (initially

private-sector-based) regulation, similar to the new labelling regime in the case of GMO, has

attributed to consumers the identity of risk managers, on a rational basis (a declaration of

contents in detail on products is considered basis for ―correct‖ decision making on

consumption). That role complements the consumer‘s attributed role and identity discussed

previously, namely that of a moral actor responsible for guarding the welfare of animals (that end

up on his or her plate), the environmental aspects of foodstuffs etc.

13 Professor Alan Gray on Farming Today, BBC Radio 4, 27 April 2002.

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The category of ―the consumer‖ itself has undergone diversification (Loeber 2006). Consumers

are endowed multiple rationalities and identities depending on place, time and specific context.

To regulatory science and risk-control practices, it is a complicating factor, as risk is now

conceptualised as a resultant of a specific combination of food-based pollution with specific

consumer-related characteristics (e.g., age or genetic disposition) and group-related consumption

patterns and ways of life. The ‗multiple consumer‘ implies the need for a diversification of both

risk communication and risk assessment. The latter is a complex challenge, as risk is traditionally

conceptualised in relation to a ‗universalised‘ population rather than as a trait inherent to a

particular quantity and quality of food products,

In short, with the institutional innovations that followed the government‘s responses to the BSE

event and other food scares, extra-scientific factors and contributions by non-scientists play a

larger role in agricultural knowledge production in the area of food safety. Hence to some extent,

we see a more contextualized and more localized knowledge production coming of age in

addition to the ‗sound science‘ approaches to policies of establishing the safety of food.

Concerning conservation as both a system of knowledge and a sector of governance, we find

that participatory knowledge production plays a crucial role here too. Participatory knowledge

production, in fact, forms part of implementing conservation policies. The protection of both the

flying squirrel and the loggerhead turtle has given rise to specific knowledge practices. This

includes assessing the total population size and activities that require more specialized skills such

as surveying the squirrels and monitoring the nesting cycle of the turtles. Semi-professional

nature surveyors are specializing on squirrel surveys. They develop specific embodied working

practices. Volunteers participate in the monitoring work at the nesting beaches of the turtles.

The need to answer the question of squirrel presence vs. absence has given rise to new

knowledge practice. The extremely secretive habits of the flying squirrel set considerable

challenges to the skills of surveyors. The new nature surveyors were usually biologists by

education and hired by planning and consultant offices, municipalities or governmental agencies.

Some larger cities such as Tampere have had suitable people among their own staff. After specific

training, an increasing number of forestry professionals have learned to command the surveying

methodology.

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In our field work we found out that personal, local and embodied experience plays a big role in

surveying flying squirrels. The embodied style of collecting ecological data by the surveyors is

based on a special kind of human-animal relationship. The surveyors are trained in surveying

flying squirrels using the behaviour and habits of the animals as cues, by experiencing and

learning weak signals and different combinations of them, by working in different areas, in

particular, by learning the contexts of droppings which are variable but also have invariants which

the surveyors are able to sense and record.

In the turtle case, volunteers have an essential role in guarding and monitoring the nesting

beaches. One could argue that knowledge needs concerning the conservation of Caretta caretta are

not a complex issue, since tracking the animal‘s nesting behaviour is a clearly visible process.

Nevertheless, the production of scientific knowledge, especially the part concerning survey data,

the debates built around this knowledge by experts and non-experts, as well as the applications

and use of the knowledge have been major issues when discussing the protection of this species.

Turtles have a big circle of life with an adulthood age at 25 years old. . . . They may not

appear at the nesting sites to nest their eggs on an annual basis. For this reason, we need

at least 25 years of surveys to make conclusions about their population.(Interview 18b-4,

040706 & Interview 19b-4, 050706)

This work is done to a large extent by NGO volunteers, mainly foreign students, who are trained

by NGO scientific experts to follow NGO scientific instructions and aims – which has given rise

to some criticism among local people. Some locals raise doubts over the validity of the records

and the data of NGO-led scientific surveys, since these are produced by one and only body,

namely Archelon, also known as the Sea Turtle Protection Society (STPS).

Archelon (or, the Sea Turtle Protection Society, STPS) is an NGO that since 1982 maintains its

role as the basic surveyor of Caretta caretta in Zakynthos and since 1984 in the rest of the turtle‘s

nesting areas in Greece. This is usually done through research projects which include tagging of

the nesting females on the nesting areas, or assignments. Archeron‘s continuous scientific inputs

are of vital importance for the production of knowledge, the validity of the data, as well as the

adoption and implementation of the appropriate conservation strategies. Thus, state bodies,

NGOs and scientific agencies rely heavily on data from STPS surveys, which are carried out

following standards applied by an international community of experts. Official data banks are

mostly focused on geographical nesting information, classification and boundaries, specific

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estimation and records of the number of the nests and the average hatchling and adult population

at the age of reproduction. [AU: Is this series correct? Please revise if not.]

The permission for the surveys is given to Archelon by the Ministry of Agriculture. At the end of

each nesting season, specific reports with the scientific results are sent to the MA on behalf of the

NGO. The data are available to be taken into consideration when needed, most likely for steps to

be taken in the next nesting season. The Ministry of Environment is also informed about the

results (interview 19b-4, 050706).

A nationwide survey on the nesting sites in Greece during the 1980s allowed for the identification

of nesting areas and led to the establishment of permanent monitoring and nest conservation

projects in the six most important areas, i.e., the island of Zakynthos, Kiparissia and Lakonikos

on the Peloponnesos and Rethimno, Chania and Messara on the island of Crete (Irvine,

Margaritoulis, Arapis, 1999). Based on nesting data from several seasons, the significant nesting

areas in Greece were classified as ‗major‘ or ‗moderate‘. ‗Major‘ nesting areas are defined as those

hosting on average more than 100 nests/season and over 6 nests/km/season. Five areas in

Greece fulfill these requirements: the Laganas Bay, Kyparissia Bay, Rethimno, Lakonikos Bay and

Bay of Chania. The Bay of Messara and Koroni are considered as ‗moderate‘ areas (Margaritoulis

& Rees 2003).

In both the squirrel and the turtle cases, the need to get reliable records on the location of the

breeding sites and resting places of the animals has given rise to new knowledge practices. In the

squirrel case, a semi-professional group of surveyors are in charge of the data collection, in the

turtle case, NGO volunteers produce a huge amount of the knowledge needed to implement

conservatin policies. Knowledge production takes place not in the lab or in the office but out in

the forests and on the beaches where it is done by a mixture of scientists, non-scientists,

prospective but not-yet scientists (students), professionals, semi-professionals, and volunteers.

Thus, we can speak of participatory knowledge production in this case too.

As has been laid out previously, participation in the politics of human embryonic stem cell

research largely took the shape of ―conventional formal modes of participation‖ (the

referendum in Italy on Law number 40/2000) and of ―conventional informal modes of

participation‖ (public debates on stem cell research in Germany and Italy). New participatory

governance arrangements, however, hardly played any role at all in this issue area. In contrast to

such formal governance arrangements, the public debates in Germany and Italy had not been

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state-initiated. Neither have participants been ―invited‖ by government institutions. Rather,

participants in these debates were ―self-selected‖ or ―self-appointed‖ and as such usually entered

the debate from a ―partisan‖ position, promoting their respective cause. Hence, participation and

public involvement here have an essentially antagonist structure. The same holds true for the

debate on GM crops and to some extent the debate on genetic testing; however, institutional

responses differ. In the field of stem cell research, the most common government response to

this antagonist structure was to turn to an existing bioethics commission for advice, to establish a

new one, or to do both. This was what happened in Germany with the Parliamentary Study

Commission on Law and Ethics of Modern Medicine (prior to the conflict) and the National

Council on Ethics (newly established).

In contrast, in the case of the GM controversy and the issue area of genetic testing, participatory

governance arrangements were at times set up by state institutions precisely to counter and

mediate this adversarial form of public involvement.

The debate on GM crops both in the UK and in Greece in fact took a rather antagonist form. In

Greece, though, state agencies made no formal attempts to involve lay publics. Greece

exemplifies a group of GM-contending member states in its broad pattern. Unlike the UK, the

antagonist structure of the Greek debate refers to a confrontation not between NGOs and part

of the public and the government but to a confrontation between an alliance between

environmental NGOs and the state on one side and multinational corporations and the EU on

the other. Consequently, the stance Greece took was characterised by a discourse of the policing

of national borders. It invoked Article 16 to ban EU-permitted GMOs from its territory, and, led

by scientists who were aligned with environmental, precautionary discourses, developed a range

of bio-precautionary institutions to detect GMOs in food, feed and seed. There were some slight

vacillations on the part of the government, but any attempts to move towards more pro-GM

positions intensified grassroots and NGO actions.

Participation in the Greek case was confined on the one hand, to multi-level mobilisations and

pressure created by coalitions of environmentalists, local authorities, farmers‘ associations,

consumers, scientists‘ unions and others, and on the other, to the rather close, yet informal

relationship since the mid-1990s between environmental NGOs, such as Greenpeace, and

political ecology groups, with the PASOK government in the setting of biotechnology policy

agendas and the policing of Greece‘s borders against GM plants and food.

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Opposition against GMOs in Greece endured throughout the 2000s when wider grassroots

action against GMOs were taken. Towards the end of 2003, under the initiative of ‗Thessaly

Citizens of the World,‘ the Greek Social Forum and a few other groups, the first anti-GM

network meeting took place in Trikala, with the participation of environmental, social, consumer,

scientific, professional, agricultural and local government groups (Kanellopoulou 2006). In

February 2004 the Panhellenic Movement against GMOs (Panelladiki Kinisi kata ton GTO) was

founded as a grassroots, anti-GM network, with the participation of 142 bodies, including

environmental NGOs, scientific unions, farmers‘ organisations (both organic and conventional),

municipalities, one labour union, food producers and retailers, women‘s groups, consumer

organisations, church bodies and political movements. Particularly striking was the alliance

between the traditional rivals of conventional farmers‘ organisations and environmental NGOs.

As their resolution from this panhellenic conference-assembly shows, participants were as

concerned with political-economic issues, such as the role of multinational companies and the

effects of genetic patenting, as they were for purely environmental issues centred on risk and

uncertainty. Hence, we find a huge amount of what we termed ―conventional informal

participation‖ in Greece in the issue area of GMOs. A broad range of civil society actors were

engaged in a conflict that took a rather antagonist shape, though the adversary of these actors

was not so much the national government but multinational biotech corporations and the EU

insofar as it was perceived as acting on their behalf. Unlike that of the UK, the Greek

government did not feel it was necessary to canalise this adversarial form of public (self-

)involvment into official participatory fora.

As to the UK, we have already pointed out in chapter 5 how the National Seed List hearings had

unexpectedly turned into fora of what we have termed ‗wildcat participation‘. These hearings

formed newly politicised spaces, but they were not the only ones. Other spaces which had

originally not been designed as arenas of political participation got newly politicised too, ranging

from supermarkets, farmers‘ fields, village halls, Magistrates and Crown Courts, to beekeepers‘

conventions. Public involvement or participation in these spaces can be classified as partly

―conventional informal participation‖; however it also took the form of unconventional informal

participation, for instance, when protesters took ―direct action‖ in the form of ―crop-trashing‖.

Another such – unexpectedly – politicized site were the Farm Scale Evaluations (FSEs) that had

originally been designed by the UK government to take the heat out of the debate. The idea of the

farm scale evaluations came into being when in 1998 the industry formed a strategy and in June

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launched SCIMAC (Supply Chain Initiative on Modified Agricultural Crops), which advocates

the managed and regulated introduction of GM Crops, allegedly in co-existence with

conventional and organic agriculture, and supported the labelling of GM products for the

consumer. On 5 November 1998, the government announced a voluntary agreement with

SCIMAC for a moratorium on commercial GM plantings and a programme of Farm Scale

Evaluations (FSEs) of four GM crops, which would be compared with non-GM crops for their

effects on wildlife biodiversity.

In this scenario the limited commercial planting of the herbicide resistant GM crops would go

ahead, but this would be accompanied by farm scale evaluation of this process for ecological

outcomes, such as the effect of the different herbicide regimes on agricultural biodiversity.

However, by 1999 it was being emphasised that these were non-commercial trials, and therefore

‗purely scientific‘. The environment minister clarified the position by announcing a further deal

with SCIMAC in November 1999 agreeing that no commercial cultivation would go ahead until

another three years of the trials. Thus the FSEs were born as commercial scale trials, but sanctified

as pure ‗science‘. These birthmarks raised further scepticism amongst critics in the NGOs and

media that behind the scientific and precautionary rhetoric the FSEs were merely a way of

moving the GM project further towards a goal of mass commercial release.

However, following the development of this strategy, public hostility continued to grow, with the

FSEs providing a new focus for opposition and concern. Before the FSEs, GM had been an

abstract issue; the field trials made them concrete and located. Hence, the FSEs also opened up

new political spaces for informal participation around the issue. This was particularly turbulent,

because the FSE process did not offer the public any formal mechanism for participation in

decisions about whether or where to sow GM crops. The public were informed (via the

government website, by an announcement in a local newspaper and by a letter to the local parish

council), but only after the site had been chosen and the decision to sow has been made.

The FSE trials provoked a whole new set of political critiques and interventions in a number of

registers: of science – that the inevitably reductionist nature of the FSEs would not produce valid

knowledge about the GM socio-ecological complex; of democracy – that the FSEs were being

foisted on local populations without their consent; and of risk – that the FSEs were in themselves

a form of pollution. A pattern of public participation began to emerge around the FSEs, ranging

from village meetings, picnics and trespasses on the sites, to ‗crop-trashings‘. The trials thus

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became the cause and focus of yet more anti-GM activism and popular/civic unrest; rather than

closing down and narrowing the debate into purely ‗technical‘ issues, they produced a more

complex, turbulent situation between 1999 and 2003 – not helped by the fact that for many they

were seen as preparing the way towards mass commercial cultivation. Therefore, attempts to

create a scientific zone purified of all politics were frustrated as politics continued to intrude. As

well as detecting the reactions of weeds and insects to the presence of the new technology, other

actors were drawn into the fields: the nightly crop-trashings widened the experiments into hybrid

politic-scientific spaces (Szerszynski 2005).

The court cases of those arrested in the crop field actions would often become politicised spaces

too, as they turned into high-profile trials of the GM crops rather than the activist defendants.

These courtroom battles occurred across the UK. The trial of 28 Greenpeace activists who

removed part of a crop of GM maize in July 1999 at Lyng in Norfolk was particularly well

publicised and documented. In the trial and retrial, Greenpeace assembled 10 expert scientific

witnesses to help defend the activists, with the intention of putting ‗GM on trial‘ instead

(Greenpeace 2000).

Thus the GM debate was already happening before, between and beyond the officially sanctioned

GM Nation in a variety of novel arenas: supermarkets, farmers‘ fields, courtrooms, seed list

hearings, beekeepers‘ gatherings and many other spaces provided novel and unanticipated sites of

participation in the political battle over the new technology.

As mentioned before, the participatory governance arrangement termed GM Nation was set up in

response and as an alternative to the National Seed Listing hearings.

The idea was born when in September 2002 the Department for Environment, Food and Rural

Affairs (DEFRA) stated that ―the National List system is not the appropriate place to challenge

GM safety assessments‖ and proposed to remove the right to hearings and written

representations. Instead, it announced ―improved, effective and transparent mechanisms‖ of

consultation under the deliberate release directive. The DEFRA document also acknowledged

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―genuine public concern‖ and the need for a ―GM Public Debate‖.14 Thus like a kindly

chaperone, DEFRA was concerned to escort public participation away from the hybrid and

―inappropriate‖ arenas of the national seed list hearings and into new formal arenas made safe for

such participation.

It then issued a consultation paper on these proposed changes to the right to seed list hearings, as

part of a wider round of consultations on the UK‘s plans for implementing the revised deliberate

release directive (2001/18/EC). A total of 60 responses about the proposed changes to the seed

list hearings were received from stakeholders ranging from farmers, organic growers and industry

to NGOs, interestingly with 55 against and 5 in favour. DEFRA itself, echoing the concerns of

those 55 respondents opposed to the changes, conceded that a ―hearing‖ can allow a ―more in-

depth, participative approach and had the potential to permit the cross-examination of witnesses

on both sides in full view of the public‖. We thus find respondents claiming some advantages in

the more antagonistic model provided by the National Seed List hearings over the presentation

of peer group consensus found in more traditional scientific advisory committees and arenas. As

the design and trajectory of the GM Dialogue in the UK is quite instructive with respect to the

chances, limits and ambivalences of participatory governance arrangements, we will discuss this

exercise here in more detail.

In May 2002 the government announced that there should be a ―national dialogue‖ on GM issues

that would be separated into three different strands – a review of the science of GM, a study of

its economic feasibility and a public debate. Preparation for these began in late 2002, with the

main processes running in 2003. The public debate GM Nation was the highpoint of formal

participatory governance arrangements in the GM controversy in the UK.

Hence, a Steering Board was established and a membership appointed that included both a

leading figure from the Five Year Freeze anti-GM coalition as well as from the industry body the

Agricultural Biotechnology Council (ABC). When the steering body had to appoint a contractor

in September 2002 that would actually implement the debate, it found it had little choice, and for

reasons of budgetary and time constraints had to appoint a government agency, the Central

14 http://www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/consult/nationallist/letter.htm.

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Office of Information (CoI). The decision evoked concerns among some members, though, that

it might compromise public confidence in the independence of the exercise from the

government.

Time constraints would continue to shape GM Nation and diminish it in the eyes of its critics.

The process began to be criticised by NGOs, academics and others from these early stages,

complaining about the time limits as critics feared they would exacerbate other problems

including a lack of clarity as to the overall purpose of the debate and its relationship with

governing institutions and official decisions. These complaints connected to questions about the

relationship of the debate to the eventual FSE results, and to the scientific and the economic

strands in the dialogue. They also raised questions about governmental openness to the debates

outcomes (Healey 2004:15, 20, 67). Eventually the Secretary of State granted an extension of the

time period so that it would ―allow for the expected publication of the first results of the farm-

scale evaluations‖ (GM Nation PDSB 2003:14).

A series of nine ―Foundation Workshops‖ were held during November 2002 in a series of towns

to give the public the opportunity to frame the questions for the debate. At this stage, a contrast

between a conception of ‗the general public‘ versus another category of the ‗actively involved‘

emerged, categories that would become significant in the subsequent reception and interpretation

of the debates outcomes by various parties. As the Steering Board put it:

Eight of the workshops involved members of the general public, representing four broad

stages in life and two broad socioeconomic groups. . . . However, the Norwich workshop,

for purposes of comparison, comprised participants who were ―Actively Involved‖ in

GM, half of them supporters and half opponents.

From these foundation workshops, each of which had 18–20 participants meeting for three

hours, the subcontractor charged with this task (Corr Willbourn, Research and Development)

identified six overlapping principle frames for the debate, around food, choice, information

needs, uncertainty and trust, ethics and the targets and intended trajectory of GM technology.

This report was then distilled into a series of tools for public engagement and participation.

The first of these tools was a series of 13 questions that would form the basic structure of GM

Nation. These questions took the form of a series of statements ranging from the optimistic to

the pessimistic towards GM crops. A series of ‗tick boxes‘ were offering 5 choices ranging from

‗agree strongly‘ to ‗disagree strongly‘. These 13 framework questions were distributed in the mass

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open meetings of GM Nation public debates as well as the selected ―control‖ of the ―narrow-but-

deep‖ focus groups. After these 13 closed questions, there followed another 2 more open

questions where participants were allowed 5 dotted lines to express their views. This GM Nation

information pack and feedback form/questionnaire that was distributed at many events, via the

website and post formed a mobile technology of engagement and participation, with the ability to

incorporate many events and situations into ‗GM Nation‘. The Central Office of Communications

declared that wherever a batch of 30 or more feedback forms were ordered they would assume

this represented a GM Nation meeting (GM Nation PDSB 2003:59).

The other tool that emerged from the workshops report was the prepared common ―stimulus

materials‖ that all GM Nation participants would be exposed to before filling in the feedback

form questions. However, some members of the Steering Board won the argument to add more

pluralistic and diverse stimulus material. The board thus enrolled a variety of stakeholders to

prepare their own answers and perspectives to the questions emerging from the foundation

workshops. These were then passed to a subcontracted company Creative Research working with

the science museum to be worked into a more standardized, and perhaps more neutral, format.

Furthermore, by April 2003 the decision to attribute sources was abandoned because of lack of

time to contact all the sources to gain consent. Thus the stimulus materials ended up being bland

statements that were unattributed to any sources. Together, the stimulus material, questions and

feedback form formed a GM Nation tool that attempted to standardise the diverse moments and

modes of participation into a nationally coherent and somehow measurable entity.

The public debate itself was launched on 3 June 2003 with a press briefing and the first of the six

Tier 1 meetings – facilitated roundtable discussions based on stimulus material. The rest of the

Tier 1 events took place in different cities over the next 10 days, attended in total by over 1,000

people. An estimated total of around 40 Tier 2 regional and county-level meetings, took place

between 16 June and 18 July, more varied in form, including expert witnesses and debates around

a motion. Another estimated 629 local Tier 3 meetings were largely organized by town councils

and civil society groups for which the ―toolkit‖ was made available. At each meeting in every tier,

feedback forms were made available so the participants could express further views. The Steering

Board summarised:

Over 4,500 individual requests for materials were received by GM Nation. As a result

20,000 workbooks, 6,000 CD-Roms, over 1,000 videos and more than 70,000 feedback

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forms were sent to members of the general public and interested parties. In addition, the

contents of the workbook and CD Rom were available on the GM Nation website, along

with the feedback form, which was available to complete between 3 June and 18 July

2003. During this period over 27,000 unique visitors to the website were recorded. . . . In

total 36,557 completed questionnaires were received by 18 July 2003 and were included in

this analysis. Of these, 18,771 were submitted in hard copy, and 17,786 were submitted on

the website. 15

In addition to the public meetings of the open debate, in which the participants were ―self-

selecting‖, the Steering Board commissioned a series of ―narrow but deep‖ focus group

discussions in June and July 2003 to act as a control. Ten different groups were convened with a

total of 77 participants, chosen to be broadly representative of the general public and selected to

have no immediate connection or interest in the issue. Each group met twice over a two-week

period.

The GM Nation process of public events was planned to finish in July. However, the publication

of the results of the FSEs was postponed from July until September 2003. This led to demands

from the GM Nation steering committee and others to have the timescale of the debate extended

so that the FSEs could be included in the public‘s deliberations, but these demands were rejected

by the government. This refusal raised the question of the entire relationship between the public

debate and the FSEs: whether the GM Nation and the public would be allowed to deliberate on

the scientific results or whether these would be kept as two separate information feeds, with the

deliberative power exclusively reserved for government. This move even raised suspicions at the

ministerial level:

I think the best science that is available ought to be made available to the public. The only

reason that the government wanted to keep them separate was because the FSE results

came out wrong from their point of view. If the FSE results were a clean bill of health I‘m

sure they would have been extremely keen, indeed demanding, that the GM Nation, every

member, should be sent a copy of the results or something, to make sure that they got it

in their head that their was nothing wrong with GM. But it all went wrong. (Interview

with Michael Meacher MP, former Environment Minister)

15 http://www.gmnation.org.uk/docs/introduction_to_feedback.pdf.

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The final report by the Steering Board which attempted to combine information from both the

public debates and the ―narrow but deep‖ groups (GM Nation? The Findings of the Public Debate )

concluded that (1) people are generally uneasy about GM; (2) the more people engage in GM

issues, the harder their attitudes and more intense their concerns; (3) there is little support for

early commercialization; (4) there is widespread mistrust of government and multinational

companies; (5) there is a broad desire to know more and for more research to be done; (6)

developing countries have special interests; (7) the debate was welcomed and valued (GM Nation

PDSB 2003:51-53).

However, challenges to whether participation in GM Nation was truly representative were raised

by the official evaluation team, and echoed by industry and government. In this vein, DEFRA

later commented:

We accept that the findings of the public debate broadly reflect the current state of public

opinion on GM crops. We acknowledge that people are generally uneasy about GM crops

and food, and that there is little support for early commercialisation of GM crops in this

country. However the results suggest that the general public may have a lower degree of

outright opposition to GM than the participants in the debate, while still being very

cautious. The debate has also confirmed that people‘s attitudes towards GM crops are

shaped by a complex range of issues and concerns, and that to some extent GM crops

have become a focus for much wider concerns. (DEFRA 2004)

Simultaneously, from late 2003 onwards, the FSE results were published, which had produced

largely negative results on the four GM crops under study. Backed by the outcomes of GM

Nation and of the FSEs, the government then announced that the commercial cultivation of only

one of the four GM crops, the maize, could go ahead and even this permission was subject to a

number of conditions. GM was in effect kicked into the long grass as an issue in the UK.

After the event, GM Nation quickly became the subject of some controversy, especially over

questions of its ‗representativeness‘. These questions revolved around whether a representative

‗general public‘ had in fact participated, or whether those already critical towards GM crops had

in some sense ‗captured‘ the process. That the latter had indeed happened was a claim made, in

various degrees, by the biotechnology industry, by the government and by the official academic

evaluators of GM Nation. In particular, we see a contrast between what we may term ‗engaged

publics‘ or ‗issue publics‘ on the one hand and the ‗general public‘ on the other. As the official

independent GM Nation evaluation team from the Universities of East Anglia and Cardiff put it:

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[T]he intent was to have a debate that was not dominated by significant pressure groups,

but to access the ―quiet majority‖. We interpret this to entail representative sampling of

the population, as opposed to biased sampling of particular cliques. Representativeness

may be ascertained in several ways: it may be determined according to the socio-economic

and demographic profiles of the sample (in comparison to that of the general public), or

by the attitudinal similarity of sample to population. (Horlick-Jones et al. 2004:22)

Those who attended GM Nation are seen on this basis as being unrepresentative, in terms both of

their demographics and in the intensity of their interest and opinion. Similarly the AEBC and the

Steering Board had built into GM Nation a series of ‗narrow but deep‘ focus groups to create a

representation of a pure, disinterested public to act as a ‗control‘ to balance against capture by

stakeholder networks:

We believe that the Narrow But Deep element provides evidence of grass roots views and

attitudes which might otherwise have been unheard during the debate. If there is a silent

majority, it would show itself here. (GM Nation PDSB 2003:36)

Thus considerable efforts were made to find a ‗pure‘ public, a ‗silent majority‘ stripped bare of

civil society mediation, to stand naked before the state and the social scientist. The point we

would stress, however, is that such a ‗pure‘ public does not simply exist ―out there‖ but inevitably

is the outcome of active processes of goal setting, decision making, prioritisation and selection,

and thus depends on how the format of such participatory exercises is designed.

Throughout the controversy over the representativeness of GM Nation, the expression ‗silent

majority‘ is frequently evoked. Such a silent majority can of course by definition never speak for

itself, but must somehow be articulated from outside. Policy makers and researchers are

confronted with the problem that they search and address a public that hardly becomes visible

and shows up in the events they are staging together with social scientists and PR agencies – such

as scientific cafés, consensus conferences and days of dialogue – as can be seen in the small

numbers of participation and media response to this kind of events. The concept of the ‗silent

majority‘ , however, has a controversial history, deployed by powerful elites as a counterweight to

the critical voices of social movements and civil society. Thus, which form of public is addressed

by participatory exercises, whether it is the silent majority or stakeholders and activists or still

other constructions of publics, is a decision with specific political implications, depending on the

respective context. What is important though is that there is no context-free and politically

―neutral‖ way of constructing ‗the public‘ in such participatory arrangements; the public is

constructed through different ways of interpellation, through the different ways participants are

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―invited‖ and through the format of the exercise as such. Whatever the way to construct the

public will be, it will be based on certain implicit or explicit assumptions and will have certain

political implications.

The construction of different forms of publics through interpellation can also be observed in the

genetic testing case. In our case study, however, we again found that participatory governance

arrangements are just one possible form of public involvement, while non-state initiated forms of

informal participation take place too and should not be overlooked. In Austria, for instance, a

group of representatives from disabilities groups and moderate pro-life activists formed the

platform ―Ethics Commission FOR the Austrian Federal Government‖ because governmental

officials, who did not consider them ―experts‖, denied these activists access to the official

Bioethics Commission. It is therefore the aim of the alternative Ethics Commission to

complement the opinion of the expert-oriented Bioethics Committee and to provide an

additional opinion from lay people who are actually affected by biotechnology.

In Germany, the Aktion Mensch, a huge NGO for people with disabilities and their families,

organized a forum on bioethics in 2002 called ―1000fragen.de‖ (www.1000fragen.de) on a whole

range of issues related to genetics, embryo research, cloning and other biomedical issues. The

1000fragen campaign basically collected questions and concerns citizens had about reprogenetics

and biomedicine in a very broad sense. These questions were published on the Internet and some

of them on advertising pillars, on huge posters in the streets, and in newspapers in a big

advertisement campaign by Aktion Mensch. In a second round, prominent figures from the

public sphere such as public intellectuals, actors, politicians and others were asked to comment

on these questions with their statements being published too. The campaign was much more

visible publicly than consensus conferences that had been organized in Dresden and Leipzig

around that time because of the broad poster and media campaign. Most of the 8,500 questions

collected from citizens referred to the topic of the ―(im)perfect human being‖ – and showed

great concern about ―selection practices‖ linking genetic testing practices to social tendencies of

eugenics (Aktion Mensch 2003; Waldschmidt et al. 2006). The goal of the campaign was to give a

voice to these concerns and to provide a forum to discuss them rather than to give direct advice

to the government (although a publication with the questions collected from citizens was

presented to politicians). The organizers deliberately wanted to facilitate debate on biomedical

developments without the pressure of decision making (―Austausch ohne Entscheidungsdruck‖)

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(Aktion Mensch 2003:11) which allowed the articulation of some broader concerns and more

diffuse unease about the implications of genetic technology for the social order as a whole.

Issues of genetic testing, however, have also become the subject of more formal participatory

exercises in the countries under study. For Germany and Austria, we will rather speak of

participatory governance exercises or experiments than of governance arrangements because, in

contrast to public consultations held by the Human Genetics Commission (HGC) or the Human

Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA) in the UK, the citizen conferences in Germany

and Austria were lacking the status of a well-established policy instrument.

One common feature of these experiments was that they were not connected to the formal

decision-making processes and had no clear addressee on the government side. The Austrian

citizen conference ―Genetic Data: from where, whereto, what for?‖ (BürgerInnenkonferenz

―Genetische Daten: woher, wohin, wozu?‖) was commissioned by the Austrian Council for

Research and Technology development, an advisory body to the government, in Vienna in June

2003 (Felt 2003). It formed part of the Council‘s public relations campaign ―Innovative Austria‖

and was designed by the PR agency Communication Matters (Bogner 2004, Menasse 2004).

There seemed to be some ambivalence as to the question whether the citizen conference was

supposed to funnel its proceedings into the Austrian decision-making process. On the one hand,

the primary aim of the conference was to raise public awareness for science and technology and

not to make any decisions at all. On the other hand, Communication Matters, the organisers,

understood the event as an attempt at institutional innovation, and made some efforts to place it

appropriately in the Austrian decision-making mechanisms. These efforts, however, completely

failed. The most influential politicians in this area either completely rejected or neglected the

consensus conference. Other politicians, such as representatives of the National Council simply

failed to notice the event.

In Germany, citizen conference on the topic of genetic diagnostic was organized in 2001 and a

youth conference on genetic technology took place in 2006 as a kind of citizen conference aimed

particularly for young people. Both conferences were not directly state-initiated but were

organized ―at arms length distance‖ from the state. The Dresden Conference was organized by

the Hygiene Museum at Dresden, which is a foundation, but took place under the auspices of the

German Federal Ministry for Education and Research which was also the funding agency of the

project. The organizers invited 19 citizens, selected through a random process. The organizers

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deliberately chose not to invite stakeholders, activists or professionals who were already familiar

with the issue because of their political or professional activities, but only ―newcomers‖ to the

issue area. Hence, the idea that underlay the format of the conference was clearly the ―pure

public‖. The citizen group was given the opportunity to select from a ―pool‖ of experts from

different sectors of society, ranging from science to disability rights, interrogate them, and

deliberate on the issue during a course of several days. The final vote of the citizen group was

then handed over to the media, to the Minister of Education and Research and to an German

umbrella organization for research funding agencies (Stifterverband für die Deutsche

Wissenschaft) as a ―decision-making aid‖. The vote actually caught some attention in the media

because it displayed a clear-cut gender gap on the issue of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis with

all the women in the group voting unanimously against it. Otherwise, it did not resonate strongly

within the policy community.

The Leipzig Youth Conference too was organized at arms length from the state; it was organized

by the University of Leipzig, Department of Media Education, but initiated and funded again by

the Federal Ministry for Education and Research. Policy makers did not seem particularly

interested in the project; no politician from federal parliament, government or the political parties

was disposed to participate in the central event of this project. Students were invited to produce

films and features on the topic of human genetics and genetic testing, some of which were

presented at the central event on 19 May 2006. There, the students were first given information

on the scientific aspects of human genetics and then called upon to reflect on the ―chances and

risks‖ presented by this technology, to deliberate on those ―chances and risks‖ as a group and

then to produce an exact catalogue of their demands with respect to legal regulation. However,

no policy maker attended the event or was willing to listen to this catalogue. In the end of the

conference, the youth were upset about the disinterest of journalists and politicians in their

product of the allegedly participatory process.

Several observations are striking about this exercise: First, the invitation to reflect and to

problematise referred to the ―second step‖ of the procedure only, after allegedly neutral scientific

facts were presented. The students were not offered conflicting scientific views for instance on

the concept of a gene or the relation between ―genes‖ and diseases. Second, students were invited

to participate, but it was not at all clear in what. There was no initiative of regulating genetic

testing at the time. In addition, no policy maker was interested in what the young people had to

say. The government apparently had enough interest in having young people reflect and

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deliberate on the issue to fund the event but not enough interest in the outcome to show up at

the event. Third, underlying the event was a construction of ―the youth‖ as a homogeneous social

group and as a ―pure‖ public – in the sense of citizens of the future. This hindered the

conference in discussing and deliberating on the obviously quite controversial and heterogeneous

positions presented by different youth groups. The idea of a ―pure public‖ that has been

operative in the design of the Dresden citizen conference and part of the GM Nation exercise

here assumes an additional meaning: ―the youth‖ is constructed as a homogeneous, naïve, and

―pristine‖ group, not compromised by professional or political interests nor capable of internal

conflict and dissent.

In the UK, one of the main instruments of inviting public participation was the consultation. The

Human Genetics Commission (HGC) and the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority

have conducted a number of public consultations on issues of genetic testing such as pre-

implantation genetic diagnosis, sex selection, or broader issues of genetics and assisted

reproduction.

The biggest consultation effort made by the HGC concerned the general question of how to

regulate genetic information. Under the title ―Inside Information‖ the consultation process took

place in 2000–2002, made up of a series of different types of exercises each addressing a different

type of public. What is interesting in general is that through launching this huge participatory

exercise, the HGC did not so much react to public debate as try to incite it.

The consultation consisted of a survey, using a randomly recruited, nationally representative

group of 1,000 people, two public meetings with some 200 students each, a consultation

document (―Whose hands on our genes?‖) including a tick-box section for reply available on the

Internet, discussions with a series of organizations such as the Medical Research Council or the

Wellcome Trust, and correspondence with the consultative panel that had been set up by the

HGC and was constituted by some 100 people affected by a genetic disorder. Hence, we find

different constructions of different publics which can be found in other consultation exercises by

HGC or HFEA too, each giving room to different speaking positions while precluding others:

A survey or opinion poll addresses the ―general public‖, made up of individuals, supposed to

represent the imaginary national population as a whole. This instrument does not give room to

the speaking of position organizations and groups who have a specific view on the issue, thus it

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does not address ‗issue publics‘ or ‗engaged publics‘. In the interviews, HGC and HFEA

members expressed a general scepticism toward the method of opinion polls (e.g., Interview 10-3

2006) because people could participate without being coached first. ―Of course, the disadvantage of the

opinion poll is that people involved in it are not involved” (Interview 17-3 2006; similarly Interviews 10-3

2006, 20-3 2006). Interestingly, especially those interviewees who are considered partisan by the

advisory system were referring to quantitative methods such as polls as a possible form of

participation (Interview 22-3 2006).

The consultation document, in contrast, allowed for responses both from individuals and from

organizations; hence, self-selected participants can use this instrument to make their cause. The

invitation to respond to the consultation paper thus provided some room for engaged publics to

participate.

In addition to these self-selected participants, the HGC also consulted a ‗stakeholder public‘

selected by the commission. Such a selection of relevant stakeholders, of course, never takes

places beyond existing relations of power, who is relevant or deemed to be relevant is not least a

matter of power.

Furthermore, we meet again with the idea of the ‗pure public‘ which was very similar to the

public that was constructed at the Leipzig youth conference: made up of school and college

students addressed as representative of their generation, not of certain views or positions on the

issue. The idea underlying the construction of a ‗pure public‘ seems to be twofold: First, the

exercise serves as a source of knowledge in that it provides information about how ―ordinary

people‖ think and feel about the issue; second, the exercise is supposed to convert participants

from being ignorant into being educated, as one member of the HGC explained with respect to

another ‗pure public‘ consultation exercise:

They specifically wanted to take people who probably know nothing or very little about

the use of genetic information, apart from what they see on television, and to spend two

or three days with them and have real expert witnesses and educate them about the issues

involved, and then ask them, after these few days, how they feel about it. Just to get a

flavour . . . they want a measure of how people would feel, when they are ignorant of the

issue and when they are completely educated. (Interview 4-3 2006)

The consultative panel, finally, forms a case in point of what we have termed ‗embodied

expertise‘ with respect to the role of Luca Coscioni, the ―expert of bioethics‖ on his ―own skin‖

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in the Italian stem cell research debate, or MP Ann Begg inthe British debate (see chapter 3).

Much like Luca Coscioni and Ann Begg, the members of the Consultative Panel claim to have or

are ascribed a certain moral and epistemological authority on the issue, an authority emanating

from the quality of their body and the personal experience of being affected by a genetic

disorder. Authority and authenticity are very close to one another here. Members of the HGC‘s

Consultative Panel, are not necessarily affected themselves, although some of them have family

members who are affected or take care of people who are. Nevertheless, it is authenticity based

on personal experience which qualifies them as a member of this panel. Nevertheless, the panel

of the―affected public‖ is also the result of constructive efforts:

There was a certain amount of engineering involved [in constituting the Consultative

Panel], because they wanted a range of experiences as wide as possible. So people were

asked what the genetic condition was, were they affected directly or were they looking

after someone, or were they someone who had a condition run in the family and they

didn‘t know if they were affected yet, so that kind of thing. It was to get as broad a picture

as possible, and then so there was a little bit of engineering I think, because they would

get a lot of people with a certain genetic condition and not so many with another, and

they wanted to balance. (Interview 4-3 2006)

The purpose of the whole public consultation exercise, as interviewees explained to us, was not

to learn about the quantitative distribution of opinions or to investigate the representative

opinions of democratic majorities, but rather to ―to flesh [is this correct?] out the spectrum of

opinions that are held within the public‖, as one member of the HGC put it (Interview 13-3

2006), to get the maximum range of views to inform the commissions considerations. One

HFEA manager explains that even opinion polls were not s interesting to the HFEA as a

quantitative method, but rather as a method to compare the scope of arguments resulting from a

poll with the scope of responses to the consultation paper (Interview 17-3 2006). Thus, the

quantitative dimension is of minor relevance in opinion polls – when compared to the aim of

fishing for arguments. Another interviewee explained that the HGC was not bound by the

opinions gathered through consultations. Rather, these results form a kind of raw data that need

to be interpreted and ―weighed‖ by the commission itself:

So you have to be quite careful with polling and sort of justify why you come to a

different conclusion. But I sort of rationalised it in my mind, that it is not unlike the way

in which a court or a judge weighs evidence, you know, some evidence is more persuasive

because it is nearer, or because it is more relevant, or because it is more recent, or because

you like the witness better, you trust the witness better. (Interview 20-3 2006)

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Hence, the main goal of such participatory exercises was not to get a representative picture of

public opinion on the issue by which policy makers could get their bearings but rather to educate

the public in different ways in order to generate a measured, non-adversarial debate:

Since the HGC was established it has been quite successful in terms of promoting rational

discussion of the issues. . . . [T]here was no forum within which it was possible to have a

measured debate. Discussion of the issues tended to be more sort of shouting from fixed

viewpoints, so as they were, and hoping to convince whoever, the government, the public,

about the validity of your views simply by the force with which you expressed it. Human

Genetics Advisory Commission moderated that and then the Human Genetics

Commission I think improved even better. (Interview 13-3 2006)

In this context, ‗pure publics‘ or ‗affected publics‘ are preferred at the expense of ‗engaged

publics‘. In general, we found similar scepticism towards the ‗engaged public‘ as in the case study

on GMO. The speaking position of a representative of a political group, an NGO, or an interest

group, in short a ―partisan‖, is depicted in a rather pejorative way by our interviewees as “minority

of highly vociferous groups” (Interview 20-3 2006), a “small set of people” (Interview 6-3 2006), a “self-

selecting sample” (Interview 17-3 2006) that in their view was not at all democratically legitimated.

Altogether, the picture of participatory governance arrangements and experiments that emerges

from the case study on genetic testing shows a strong preference of the ‗inviting side‘ for pure

publics and affected publics and a reluctance towards engaged publics. Furthermore, educational

purposes seem to prevail over purposes of actually influencing and informing policy making.

Hence, ‗the public‘ is not a given entity, existing ―out there‖ so that governments could simply

reach out for it and invite it to participate. Rather, the public is actively constructed through,

among other things, the respective practices of ―invitation‖ themselves.

How different yet are the findings from the food safety case study which discussed the newly

developing regulatory regime of food production and food safety that materialised in the

aftermath of the BSE event. The newly established arrangements were designed (and evolved) to

deal with the challenges of ‗constitutive‘ uncertainty facing issues of food safety, as well as those

related to a potential mistrust of government as a source of legitimate knowledge on food safety.

The approaches to risk governance that notably the FSA, and also other food authorities,

designed and performed we propose to designate as ‗participatory governance‘. ‗Innovative

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participatory practices‘ are observed in regard to two functions in the process of governing : a)

oversight and scrutiny on the one hand, and b) political judgement and decision making on the

other (Loeber 2006). Furthermore, instances of both types of innovation are observed in both

areas of the public energy field of food: agriculture and public health (safety and risk assessment).

Oversight, or public scrutiny, is an essential element in providing legitimacy to political rule: it

concerns the mechanisms that ensure that those in control are themselves controlled. Oversight

in the formal organisation of politics is institutionalised in the shape of Parliament. In civil

society, it is notably the media that performs the ‗traditional‘ control function. Issue-specific

oversight furthermore is provided by NGOs, so-called independent governmental organisations,

and transient focal action groups. In the post-BSE era, the range of actors exercising public

scrutiny regarding food safety control has become principally broadened, and the possibilities by

which oversight can be exercised has been fundamentally enlarged. The most telling expression

of this dynamic is provided by the organisational and operational characteristics of the new

British Food Standards Agency. In stark contrast to the practice of regulation that took place in

the UK traditionally in a culture of secrecy, the deliberations involved in the assessment as well as

management of risks are now completely ‗open‘. The Agency‘s ‗openness policy‘ encompasses

both guaranteeing transparency – enabling others to see and judge the processes of translating

science into politics (policy advice) and vice versa (research agenda) – and enabling access,

making available all potentially relevant information to whomever is interested. The design and

staging of so-called Open Board Meeting, that is, having the board‘s meetings literally witnessed

by a live audience as well as webstreamed via ‗fly-on-the-wall‘ technology is the most eye-catching

case in point. What sets this approach apart from the traditional understanding of ‗participation‘

is that the non-state actors who areprovided access and transparency are not enabled or allowed

to actively take part in the deliberations. The meetings are held ―as though the audience didn‘t

exist‖ (apart from a question-and-answer session at the end). Still, we suggest to speak of these

practices in terms of ‗participation‘. Other examples are the practices of EFSA to webstream its

scientific committee meetings, the Dutch campaign to encourage consumers to ―look into the

chain‖, that is, to trace and check who handled the constitutive parts of their food, and the

project ICT-kanskaart voedselveligheid, a joint initiative of the Dutch Ministries of Agriculture and

Public Health to explore the possibilities of information and communication technology to

enhance a public‘s critical assessment of food safety. We see (Loeber 2006) two reasons for doing

so:

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First, being open and transparent allows for the generation of, and is a source for, legitimacy of

public action. Sources of public legitimacy are usually divided into ‗output‘ and ‗input‘ legitimacy

(Scharpf 1999). Output legitimacy is derived from the desirability of the achievements of an

organisation. Input legitimacy refers to the correctness of the processes (in the eyes of those who

will be affected by the outcome) by which the involved decisions are reached. Input legitimacy is

the ‗classical‘ basis for legitimate government in representative democracies and is formalised

through the principles and procedures by which the ‗trias politica‘ are organised in a modern

nation-state. Yet, characteristic of the state under current ‗post-traditional‘ conditions (cf. Loeber

et al. 2005) is that the formal principles and procedure no longer serve to cover the core aspects

of the political. First of all, the topography of politics is literally changing, through such factors as

the globalisation of production networks, processes of supra-nationalisation (EU) and an

accompanying ―trans-nationalisation‖ of economic, cultural and social relationships. Current

political arrangements furthermore usually comprise actors on the local, regional and global level.

These arrangements furthermore frequently consist of formal and informal associations between

states, markets and citizens and their associations. Because of these flexible networks of actors,

politics take shape outside and beyond the political institutions that are traditionally considered

the exclusive centres of political power (a phenomenon dubbed ―subpolitics‖; Beck 1994, 1997,

1998). What the (post-)modern state is in need of, therefore, is the possibility of exercising public

control over such ‗displaced‘ politics. The dynamics of increasing transparency is key here. By

enabling public scrutiny on processes of deliberation and judgement that concern ‗res publica‘,

namely on matters of food safety, agro-economic interests and public health, the legitimacy of

governing activities is enhanced. By doing so, please note, in regard to processes of assessment,

analysis and judgment that take place prior to such deliberations in the formal setting for such

scrutiny – parliament – it results in what we may call ‗throughput legitimacy‘. The transparency

here provides a source of throughput legitimacy for the governing issues of food safety.

Secondly, ‗opening up‘ (being transparent) serves another function: it enables the creation of a

public. The temporary setting of, for example, the FSA Open Board Meetings creates, for the

duration of the meeting, a common political identity among otherwise widely varied people,

namely as an audience to the deliberations that concern their ―being together as a community‖

(cf. Mouffe, 1992). The open access to the meetings actively ‗produce‘ citizens while engaging

experts in science-based, policy-oriented deliberation. Put differently, the openness policy of the

FSA enables people to be ‗citizen on stand-by‘ (cf. Verhoeven 2006:87; cf. Schudson 1998), even

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when they are not watching the show – and to switch mode to the modus of citizen, as soon as

they feel triggered to be involved. Whether or not state-initiated, any attempt at enhancing the

transparency of processes of political judgment may be considered as an event that help

individuals choose their moment and subject for ―becoming politically active‖ (Loeber 2006; cf.

Eder 2000).

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III. Conclusions

The PAGANINI project has documented in much detail the ―crisis‖ of classical-modernist

statecraft. Classical-modernist statecraft was based on the assumption that, first, society and

market could be shaped from the centre, that is, by the state and, second, that the state, in turn,

could rely on synoptic, universally valid and politically neutral knowledge . Taken together,

governance within the classical-modernist paradigm worked as knowledge-based ‗social

engineering‘, initiated and exercised by state-actors.

The classical-modernist paradigm is seriously challenged, yet remarkably enduring.

The picture that emerges from the case studies as regards the viability of classical-modernist

statecraft is mixed and shows partly inconsistent or contradictory tendencies.

The assumption that governance can be based on synoptic, universally valid knowledge is

shattered indeed. Each of our case studies makes it clear that governance is heavily reliant on

knowledge, but that the knowledge available is insufficient, deeply contested, and highly

uncertain, and, what is more, that actors are increasingly aware of this. Thus, the institutions of

classical-modernist statecraft find themselves confronted and challenged by a culture of uncertainty.

It is precisely this constellation that calls for a rethinking of current practices of governance.

From calculability to incalculability

The new politics of life addresses critical choices about the future of humankind and makes this

manifest in ways that essentially challenge the mode of social and political ordering in terms of

risk. While ‗risk‘ is still an influential concept and a widely applied technology of government, risk

discourse is profoundly challenged by the fact that the criteria, both scientific and normative, for

calculating ‗risk‘, balancing ‗risks‘ and ‗benefits‘, and in part also for distinguishing ‗risks‘ and

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‗benefits‘, are deeply contested. Radical uncertainty has become an inescapable condition of

governance.

It is one of our main conclusions and recommendations that rather than denying

conditions of uncertainty, the national governments of Europe and the European

institutions should make their struggles with (un)certainty open and transparent. This

statement, however, should not be misunderstood as calling for a ―quick fix‖ kind of resolution

of the current challenges for governance. Such ―quick fixes‖ do not exist, and also participatory

governance is hardly the answer to the kind of challenges we have discussed in this report.

Governing the future in the face of uncertainty

The absence of agreed upon criteria to calculate future risks and benefits of course does not

dismiss the need for political action in the present. On the contrary, politics of life areas seem to

be characterized by a strongly perceived need for political action, often for urgent action, a need

for governance activities that cannot be postponed to the day when science will have provided

sufficient, reliable and uncontested evidence and a consensus on normative criteria for

appropriate action. This pressure for action is linked to and partly caused by another salient

feature of politics of life areas; in these areas, the objects of governance, or rather the objects

perceived to require governance, have ‗a life of their own‘; they are constantly evolving, altering,

increasing or decreasing, and manifesting themselves in time. Phenomena of life thus are

inherently dynamic – which makes them particularly unruly and unpredictable and poses specific

challenges to governance, not least the challenge to govern the, as to yet unknown and never

completely predictable, future manifestations and implications of these objects. Governance, in

politics of life areas, largely means governing the future, but this future is unforeseeable and

unpredictable and consists of an endless multiplicity of possible futures. The envisioning – or not –

of such futures in this context has political implications and thus is a political act.

Whether we look at stem cells, stem cell lines, and the prospects of therapies derived from them,

at monogenetic or multi-factorial diseases and the prospects of genetic diagnosis and therapy, at

genetically modified plants and their future environmental or health impact, at the threat of BSE

and nvCFJ, or at endangered species and the prospects of biodiversity, we find that prognosis is

politics; envisioning some possible futures, at the expense of others, and drawing conclusions

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from these visions forms part of the struggle over meaning which, in PAGANINI, we consider

to be politics.

Governance in politics of life areas inevitably means governing the future, but ―the future‖ is an

outcome of envisioning processes that are not normatively neutral and not derived from the

extrapolation of ―objective‖ scientific data. Governance in politics of life areas should

abandon the claim that it is based on normatively neutral prognoses derived from

scientific extrapolation but should arrange for transparency concerning the normatively

laden assumptions and ideas that inform contesting visions of the future and give room

for contesting visions.

Uncertainty and ethics

A further common feature of the politics of life areas that emerged from the case studies

concerns the salience of a language of ethics and morality. Issues turned out to be strongly

framed in normative terms such as ―moral obligations ― or ―responsibility‖, the qualification of

certain courses of action as being ―ethically permissible‖ or not, ―moral‖ or ―immoral‖, or

imperatives to ―relieve suffering‖, to respect ―human dignity‖, ―protect biodiversity‖, or promote

―animal welfare‖. It seems that today in governance the language of logos is increasingly

complemented by a language of ―ethos‖ and ―pathos.‖ Governance in the politics of life areas is

to a remarkable degree confronted with and/or contributing to the interpretation of policy

problems, the supposed causes of these problems as well as possible remedies and solutions in a

language of ethics, morality, and emotions. We can therefore speak of an ethicisation and

emotionalisation of governance that has taken place in politics of life areas.

The phenomenona of ethicisation and emotionalisation relates to the other features of politics of

life areas outlined above, namely perceived need for action in the face of radical uncertainty.

Under conditions of radical uncertainty, ‗facts‘ cannot be separated from ‗values‘, ‗matters of fact‘

not from ‗matters of concern‘. That means however, that actors cannot find sufficient orientation

for decision making and acting in scientific truth (logos) and thus look for orientation in the

realm of normative values and principles, but also by reliance to what David Hume has called

―sentiments‖. Thus, framing governance issues in the language of ethics and pathos seems to be

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correlated with a situation when science has increasingly lost the authority to produce ‗truth‘ as a

basis for governance.

This phenomenon in turn relates to questions of control, responsibility and participation.

The ‘ethics turn‘ is inherently related to claims to participation; in moralized or ethicised issue

areas, people take the first-person stance on the issues; they raise and discuss questions such as

―what are we supposed to do?‖; ―what shall we do next?―; ‖what is the right thing for me/for us to

do?‖ Ethicisation means that actors relate the issue to themselves and their actions and thus take

a participant‟s, in contrast to an observer‘s point of view. Actors assume that it does matter to some

extent what they personally do or not do. Put differently, the ethics turn can be understood as

manifesting the erosion of classical-modernist statecraft based on the assumption that

government is the centre of effective political control within a given territory, that science

provides ‗true‘ and neutral knowledge for governments to use in order to effectively shape society

and that one can be neatly separated from the other. It is the erosion of this model of combined,

yet separated, scientific authority and state control that is manifested by, and promoted further,

by ethicisation; in using the language of ethics, actors deny that the issue can or should be left

exclusively to government control and scientific truth production.

Institutional innovation and institutional resilience

However, this does not mean that the institutions and organizing principles of classical-modernist

statecraft necessarily give way to an opening up of the political, promoted by processes of

ethicisation and claims to participation.

There is some evidence of institutional innovation under conditions of uncertainty. Examples of

such institutional innovation include

- the principle of transparency as inscribed for instance into the structure of the Food

Standard Agency,

- an institutional acknowledgement of novelty and uncertainty, as for instance inscribed

into the precautionary principle in EU policy making (see GMO case),

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- an acknowledgement of complexity and an accordingly comprehensive approach, as

found for instance in comprehensive conservation or the shift from a formerly

segmented to a comprehensive, integrated approach connecting public health, agriculture,

environmental politics and animal welfare in the case of food safety policies in the UK,

the Netherlands, Germany and the EU

Two additional strands of new forms of governance and institutional innovation developed

which show the emergence and proliferation of ethics committees in the realm of governance on

the one hand and a number of institutional efforts to promote public involvement and public

participation on the other.

Besides strands of institutional innovation, as pointed out earlier, there is also evidence that

classical-modernist forms of governance persist and adapt to the new situation of radical

uncertainty, and that the occurrence of dislocatory moments does not necessarily lead to an

opening up of the political. In fact, classical-modernist statecraft seems to display a considerable

degree of institutional resilience in the face of radical uncertainty. This resilience takes different

forms:

Preserving the boundaries between “the political system” and “society”:

In the case of stem cell research, for instance, despite a strong dislocatory event, namely the birth

of Dolly the sheep, the traditional, classical-modernist patterns and institutions of government

have proven surprisingly dominant and unchallenged. The dominant institutions in this case were

parliaments, governments, expert bodies, the courts, and the law, each of them confined to the

territorial boundaries of the state. There were no noteworthy efforts of enhancing public

participation or public involvement in the area of stem cell research in the countries under study.

Preserving the boundaries between “facts” and “values”:

In particular, the assumption that ‗facts‘ can be separated from ‗values‘, and ‗science‘ from

‗politics‘ is still very much alive and structures a great deal of governance practices and

institutions. In many cases, this separation was inscribed into new institutional divisions of tasks,

such as between (scientific) risk assessment and (political) risk management and communication

in the case of the BfR and the BVL in German post-BSE agricultural policy or in the ―facts first‖

approach that is practiced throughout most public participation arrangements, for instance in the

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UK, or the dualism between Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission (AEBC,

supposedly speaking for ―society‖) and Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment

(ACRE, supposedly speaking for ―science‖ and ―nature‖) in the UK .

Today knowledge acquisition, knowledge management, participation and multi-level governance

connect together in complex ways. Our empirical results point towards a conclusion that

appropriate ways to organize these relationships may vary a lot between different cases. Different

types of knowledge are relevant on different levels of governance. This is very clear in the

conservation case of work package 5: The challenge on the local level is to develop a relationship

of companionship between local actors and the creatures of nature that need protection, based

on an intimate knowledge of the actual sites and regions that are of concern (in some cases even

an intimate knowledge of individual animals or plants!). The challenge on the regional level is to

create an adequate knowledge base, shared and accepted as valid among all relevant stakeholders,

on the favourable conservation status of the species of concern (this is the normative rule spelled

out in the Habitats Directive). On the national and EU level the challenge is to create a

knowledge archive that serves the purposes of control. Quite obviously, the role of formal

science in disciplines such as population ecology and conservation biology gets relatively more

prominent, the higher up we get in this hierarchy. On the local level, the intimate familiarity of

amateur naturalists with the creatures of nature they are passionately interested in is a particularly

valuable resource. Naturalists and their organizations should be systematically recruited into a

supporting network of nature conservation.

Ethics commission that had been set up by governments in order to counsel them on contested

politics of life issues could be found in a number of case studies in PAGANINI (stem cells,

genetic testing, GMO). By and large, such ethics commissions can be considered elitist rather

than participatory institutions. Although this type of ethics bodies differs from traditional expert

bodies in that experts on ethics do not provide advice on ―facts‖ only but on ―values‖ too, these

bodies are closer to the classical-modernist statecraft model of government than to an opening

up of the political. One could say that through ethics commissions the language of ethics is

reintegrated into the – slightly modified – institutions of classical-modernist statecraft.

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Reinventing neutrality through participatory arrangements:

―Participation‖ and ―public involvement‖, as our case studies show, can assume very different

meanings and very different forms. Among these, state-led participatory arrangement cover only

a small part of the whole range of forms participation can take. These arrangements deserve

more detailed discussion:

Participation

At the outset, the PAGANINI project started from the hypothesis that ―in the domain of life-

political issues, the notions of participation and governance seem to have become intermingled to

an unusual extent‖ (WP1, p. 3). Within the empirical research, however, it turned out that things

are more complex and that the concept of participation needs to be rethought. ―Participation‖

and ―public involvement‖, for one thing, cannot and should not be confined to formal, state-

initiated arrangements.

Participation can for instance, as the cases of GMO politics in Greece and the UK demonstrate,

take the form of grassroots and NGO actions, seeking to make their case heard in the public and

exercise pressure on the government through legal means such as lobbying, the mass media, or

advertisement campaigns as in the case of the 1000frage.de campaign on biomedicine in

Germany. We can speak of conventional informal forms of participation here.

Also in the case study on GM plants, we found the politicisation of spaces which had originally

not been designed as arenas of formal civic participation such as supermarkets, farmers‘ fields,

village halls, Magistrates and Crown Courts. Public involvement or participation in these spaces

can be classified as partly ―conventional informal participation‖, partly however it also took the

form of unconventional informal participation, for instance in the form of ―crop-trashing‖.

Then again, we can distinguish a form of civic participation we termed ‗wildcat participation‘,

namely in the case of the National Seed List hearings, because it undermined the supposed

separation of ‗science‘ and ‗politics‘, ‗matters of fact‘ and ‗matters of concern‘. These hearings

had originally not been designed to make political statements or political decisions but to gather

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―facts‖ but they unexpectedly turned into newly politicised spaces where the debate about facts

mingled with political arguments.

What these forms of participation have in common is they are not state-initiated but emerge from

civil society. Participants in these cases have not been ―invited‖ by government institutions nor

have they been selected by formal organizers, on the contrary, actors are self-selected here or

―self-appointed‖ and as such usually entered the debate from a ―partisan‖ point of view,

promoting their respective cause concerning the issue at stake. Consequently, participation or

public involvement that takes place at such unexpectedly politicized sites and is led by civil

society rather than led by the state tends to feature a rather antagonistic structure, characterized

by sometimes adversarial arguments and struggles. We can term the types of publics emerging at

such sites ‗engaged publics‘ or ‗issue publics‘.

On the other hand, we found a number of formal participatory arrangements, mainly in the case

studies on genetic testing and GM plants. Both academic and political discourses on enhancing

―civic participation‖ or strengthening ―participatory governance‖ usually refer to such formal

arrangements which are largely understood as a means to democratise policy making and (re-

)create trust, particularly in contested policy areas such as science and technology policy. Having

looked closer into such formal participatory arrangements within the broader context of other forms

of political participation and governance practices, however, we would rather caution that formal

civic participation has its own implications that require careful consideration.

In contrast to the antagonistic structure of civil society–led participation, formal participatory

governance arrangements were at times set up by state institutions precisely to counter and

mediate this adversarial type of public involvement. The participatory governance arrangement

termed GM Nation, for instance, was set up in response and as an alternative to the wildcat type

of participation at the National Seed Listing hearings.

Formal, state-initiated participatory arrangements, as the case studies on GM plants and genetic

testing show, are often informed by the desire to achieve representativeness among participants,

to mirror the general public, composed of by individual participants taking no particular interest

in the respective issue and possibly, as in the case of the youth conferences we analyzed, being yet

―unspoiled‖ by partisan views and supposedly open ―rational‖ education. The construction of

such pure publics thus may provide an alternative to existing engaged publics or issue publics.

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However, as the case studies have shown, the design of any formal participatory arrangement

involves a considerable amount of ―engineering‖, including arrangements seeking to invite a

―representative‖, disinterested, ―pure‖ public. There is no such thing as ―the public‖ waiting for

pure representation. Formal participatory arrangements are inevitably based on a process of active

construction, involving goal setting, selection, decision making and prioritisation, including the

decision to prioritize the pure public at the expense of engaged publics.

Objectives, ideas, priorities, selection criteria that inform the construction of those ―publics‖ that

are invited for participation should be made transparent. Organizers should be aware that there is

no ―pure public‖ but that inviting non-state actors as participants inevitably involves political

decisions and actions that take place within a specific social and political context and have social

and political implications.

Therefore need for reflexivity about the construction of publics in participatory arrangements.

There should be some room given to ―engaged publics‖ too.

What seems to be going on today is 'old' definitions no longer hold and various groups try to

impose new (partial) definitions of a new order on others. A new, postmodernist logic seems to

be spinning new relations among citizens/consumers and scientists and administrators. There is

no single New Way of governing Europe.

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IV. Recommendations: Participation, Institutional Innovation,

and the Governance of Life

The focus within the PAGANINI project was on participation in politics of life domains and

how Politics of Life domains problematise existing forms of political decision making and

participation. Within the case studies undertaken over the course of the project, the goal was to

observe political participation and participatory democracy: to trace how regulatory questions

turn into issues that are more broadly debated; to examine how novel spaces for political debate

are created, often in unseemly places; to demonstrate how they multiply through institutional

innovations; to study how, in some areas of political decision making, notions of ―risk‖ or

―benefit‖ as something that is calculable are giving way to radical uncertainty; to investigate the

emergence of specific types of discourse within the political sphere termed ―ethical‖ and that

often also refer to sentiments, rather than rational argumentation or economic calculus; and

finally, to research how knowledge used in decision making is created in an increasingly open

process that includes not only scientists but a variety of participants.

When analyzing the PAGANINI case studies, ―modernist‖ techniques of governance were

contrasted with contemporary participatory approaches to governance. Interestingly enough, the

PAGANINI case studies do not suggest a complete shift from one model of governance to

another one. Rather, the empirical findings of the project suggest that modernist techniques of

governance have proved fairly resilient and, in many cases, have adapted well to the new realities

of politics of life domains. As a result, different approaches and paradigms of governance will

often coexist. Ethics committees, an adaptation of technical expert committees to the domain of

values, are a case in point. Ethics committees are more reminiscent of technocratic, elitist forms

of governance and have little to do with broader participation. Still, ethics committees can open

up debates and make them visible to a broader audience; they can become mechanisms to enable

wider participation in governance. And even scientific advisory committees can turn into forums

for public participation, as the British food safety case shows. Thus, in practice, elitist,

technocratic forms of governance often coexist with more open and democratic approaches to

governance.

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In the PAGANINI case studies, one observes a picture of participation that is both more

nuanced and more complex than many studies or commentaries on participation and the

democratization of technocratic decision making would suggest. Participation has indeed

multiplied; participation has also become a new buzzword within government, especially in

Europe. Partly this may well be a reflection of the fundamentally weak mechanisms of political

representation at the European level and an increasingly urgent need, within the organizations

and agencies of the European Union, to engage more and more directly with their citizens. From

the PAGANINI case studies it is clear that participation is hardly a simple, quick fix that can be

applied in any instance where the model of technocratic decision making has failed.

Citizen and consensus conferences are but one mode of consultation and, so the case studies

seem to suggest, certainly not the most common. Tribunals of ―disinterested citizens‖ who agree

to follow certain idealized rules of discourse, are at best an extreme of artificially engineered

participation that simply does not do justice to the numerous modes of participation in regulatory

policy that have emerged over the past few decades. Any government agency dealing with politics

of life domains should make it as their first task to understand, in as much detail as possible, the

various ―publics‖ that are related to any given regulatory question.

Beyond this insight, are there any normative conclusions emerging from this project? What

lessons are to be drawn from the PAGANINI case studies for those in public administrations or

in political positions who need to make decisions now? In what follows, some insights that would

seem to emerge from the case studies are provided. The goal is to provide practical suggestions

on how, in politics of life domains, administrators or government officials can successfully

devise processes of participatory decision making and participation that are likely to yield

outcomes that are durable, scientifically sound, and socially robust.

1. Participatory democracy, both arranged and spontaneous, has become an

essential instrument of governance in politics of life domains in Europe

In all cases studies within the PAGANINI project participatory democracy and participatory

governance have become a crucial instrument to re-build trust in European government. While

participatory governance is by now a well-established and legitimate mechanisms of governance,

efforts to further strengthen mechanisms of participatory governance and participatory

governance in politics of life domains are clearly warranted. However, it was also found that

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participation and participatory governance is by no means limited to state-led efforts only. Such

formal or arranged participation was encountered in a number of cases studies within

PAGANINI. There can be no doubt that formal participation, whatever form it may take, is by

now a political reality. Still, the empirical findings also suggest that formal participation is typically

only one mechanism of participation among others. Furthermore, the complete substitution of

informal or spontaneous participation as opposed to formal or ‖invited participation‖ almost

never seems to succeed. At best, formal participation is an additional mechanisms that may add

to, or complement, other mechanisms of participation. Government agencies may also use

formal participation as a means to limit the impact of other mechanisms of participation. But, not

a single case was found where a full substitution of informal participation by a formally arranged

and supervised exercise was successful. Thus, our conclusion that government agencies should

look at formal mechanisms as an additional and supplementary mechanism of participation,

rather than as a substitute for forms of participation that may appear less easy to control. Finally,

formal mechanisms of participation come with their own limitations, inherent dynamics, and

uncertainty.

2. Acknowledge the fundamental uncertainty of politics of life domains

Uncertainty is a fundamental feature in politics of life domains. While classical techniques of

governance and administration aim at reducing uncertainty to calculable and quantifiable ―risks‖

or ―benefits‖, in politics of life domains this is often not possible. The case studies within the

PAGANINI project suggest that, for governments, it would often be the best strategy to

acknowledge this fact at the outset. While this has happened to a certain extent under policies

that are based on the ―precautionary principle‖, it is important to note here that uncertainty in

politics of life domains is much broader, and also includes uncertainty about the very objects of

regulation and governance, or uncertainty about the benefits of a novel technology (and not just

uncertainty about its risks).

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3. Find ways to account for the instability over time inherent in politics of life

domains

In the politics of life, nothing is stable. The objects of regulation often change over time, as does

the scientific knowledge relevant to political decisions, or the composition of interested publics.

For example, the creation of a new scientific object, such as the discovery of a novel gene, can have

a multitude of societal and political implications and may lead to the formation of entirely new

social groups or new stakeholder publics, as the case of the breast cancer genes BRCA 1 and BRCA

2 has demonstrated. Government agencies would be well advised to find arrangements that, to the

extent possible, acknowledge this inherent instability in politics of life domains. What this really

means, in political or legal terms, will depend on the specific case. In politics of life issues,

government would best adhere to approaches to regulation that allow for quick changes or that

remain entirely informal. In fact, such arrangements may turn out as problematic since political

compromises in politics of life domains often are ―tested‖ in more thorough ways than is the case

for many other areas of politics. Still, there is good indication that formal approaches to regulation

in politics of life areas will be most successful if they acknowledge the inherent instability of the

very ingredients of these regulations—starting with issues deemed problematic, to relevant

scientific knowledge, or the composition of the concerned publics.

4. Focus on the societal robustness, in addition to the scientific credibility or

regulatory coherence of new policies or regulations

In politics of life domains, questions, relevant expertise, and the composition of concerned

publics may vary over time. Yet, at the same time, political decisions do need to be remarkably

robust. Political governance in politics of life domains that is not socially robust stands little

chance of political success. Social robustness is typically more important than scientific credibility

in the narrow sense or, else, regulatory coherence. Note, however, that social robustness is not,

in any sense, a direct substitute for scientific credibility—rather, social robustness is a more

stringent standard. Socially robust knowledge is simply a subset of scientific knowledge. A political

compromise that is socially robust is, by definition, also scientifically credible. Yet, scientific

credibility is only one facet of social robustness—only a fraction of the knowledge produced by

scientists at any given point in time will also satisfy the criteria of social robustness.

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5. Develop an empirically rich understanding of the various types of publics

involved in politics of life domains

The case studies undertaken within the PAGANINI project clearly suggest that participation in

politics of life domains is extremely rich, highly varied, and often happening in surprising

locations and under circumstances that nobody would have predicted. For political actors there

are simply no mechanisms to predict what form participation will actually take. Still, the empirical

evidence suggests that, for political actors, an important step toward societal robustness is to

develop an empirically rich, well informed, and in-depth understanding of the various types of

―publics‖ that are related to a given politics of life domain at any point in time.

6. Acknowledge ethics and emotions as legitimate, and complementary, forms of

political discourse about politic of life issues

In all case studies the surge in importance of ethical discourses was broadly documented. In

ethical and moral discourses scientific knowledge as basis for normative action has been partially

replaced by considerations of values, concern, and what is deemed as ―right‖ or ―wrong‖. At the

same time, a strongly emotional language characterizes many of the discussions in areas such as

stem cell research or on GM Food. Government agencies would often do good to acknowledge

that values and even sentiments about a given question are a legitimate form of political

discourse—rather than simply ignore those who use such arguments. This is certainly not to

suggest that, in politics of life domains, government organizations or the European Union should

base their regulatory decisions mainly on arguments about values and emotions rather than facts.

But creating legitimate political spaces for articulating concerns, values, moral positions, anxieties

and hopes might increasingly become a precondition for successful governance in the domain of

the politics of life.

127

7. Early, proactive, and coherent efforts toward political participation are more

likely to yield success than half-hearted, delayed and contradictory approaches

From a governance perspective, it is key in the politics of life arenas to develop an early,

proactive and coherent effort to deal with new challenges as opposed to half-hearted, delayed,

and contradictory approaches. Here, the interaction with the various publics and an open

understanding of participation form central elements. Time tends to be essential in many politics

of life fields. Neither can trust be generated ad-hoc, nor can political institutions be rebuilt

quickly on demand. Trust in the quality of highly contentious political decisions must be created

pro-actively through a variety of discursive and institutional mechanisms, reforms, designs and

strategies. Only through acknowledging the special character of politics of life domains will

governments be able to face up to the multitude of currents and future challenges in this domain

in Europe.

128

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Work Package 2:

Defining Human Life: Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research between Politics

and Ethics.

Final Report (Deliverable Number 12).

List of interviews

Interviews United Kingdom

All interviews in the UK were conducted by Herbert Gottweis.

Interview 2-2, House of Lords, Officer, London, July 2, 2002.

Interview 2-3, House of Commons, Member of Parliament, London, July 3, 2002.

Interview 2-4, Human Genetics Alert, London, July 2, 2002.

Interview 2-5, Department of Health, London, July 2, 2002.

Interview 2-6, Hammersmith Hospital, MRC, Clinical Sciences Center, London, July 3, 2002.

Interview 2-7, Department of Zoology, Oxford University, Oxford, July 3, 2002.

Interview 2-8, Guy´s Hospital/Thomas Hospital, Assisted Conception Unit, London, July 3, 2002.

Interview 2-9, Church of England, London, July 4, 2002.

Interview 2-10, The Welcome Trust, London, July 4, 2002.

Interview 2-11, Comment on Reproductive Ethics, London, July 4, 2002.

Interview 2-12, HFEA/Oxford University, Oxford, July 5, 2002.

Interview 2-13, UK Stem Cell Bank, National Institute for Biological Standards and Control, Potters Bar, January 17, 2006.

Interview 2-14, Department of Health, London, January 17, 2006.

Interview 2-15, Comment on Reproductive Ethics, London, January 18, 2006.

142

Interview 2-16, HFEA, London, January 18, 2006.

Interviews United States

All interviews in the United States, were conducted by Herbert Gottweis

Interview 2-17, Institute of Cell Biology, Stanford University, Palo Alto, May 22, 2006,

Interview 2-18, California Institute for Regenerative Medicine, Sanf Francisco, May 22, 2006.

Interview 2-19, Pacific Fertility Center, May 23, 2006.

Interview 2-20, Stem Cell Program, University of California, San Francisco, May 23, 2006.

Interview 2-21, California Pacific Medical Center Research Institute, San Francisco, May 23, 2006.

Interview 2-22, Archdiocese of San Francisco, San Francisco, May 23, 2006.

Interviews Austria

All Interviews in Austria were conducted by Erich Grießler.

Interview 2-23, Dialog <> Gentechnik, Vienna, March 16, 2006, Erich Grießler

Interview 2-24, Member of Austrian Parliament, ÖVP, April 7, 2006, Vienna, Erich Grießler

Interview 2-25, Austrian Bioethics Commission, Vienna, March 16, 2006, Erich Grießler

Interview 2-26, Member of Austrian Parliament, Vienna, April 28, 2006, Erich Grießler

Interview 2-27, Federal Ministry for Education, Science and Culture, Vienna, March 14, 2004, Erich Grießler

Interview 2-28, Parliament, Vienna, March 14, 2006, the did not agree to recording.

Interview 2-29, Federal Ministry for Education, Science and Culture, Vienna, March 9, 2006.

Interview 2-30, Community of Vienna, Vienna, April 7, 2006.

Interview 2-31, Community of Vienna, Vienna, April 4, 2006.

Interview 2-32, venture capitalist, Vienna, March 16, 2006.

Interview 2-33, researcher, Vienna, September 2006.

Interview 2-34, former Member of Parliament, Vienna, January 13, 2006.

143

Interview 2-51, Member of the Bioethics Commission at the Federal Chancellery, Vienna.

Interview 2-52, Member of the Bioethics Commission at the Federal Chancellery, Vienna, November, 10 2002.

Interviews Italy

Interview 2-35, Deputy, Palazzo Marini, Rome, September 27, 2006.

Interview 2-36, Associazione Luca Coscioni, Rome, September 28, 2006.

Interview 2-37, Senator, Rome, September 28, 2006.

Interview 2-38, Former Minister of Health, Milan, October 3, 2006.

Interview 2-39, Policy Maker, Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Rome, September 29, 2006.

Interview 2-40, Scientists, University of Milan, October 2, 2006.

Interview 2-41, former Deputy, Piazza Montecitorio, Rome, September 27, 2006.

Interview 2-42, Senator, Palazzo Madama, Rome, September 28, 2006.

Interview 2-43, Scientist, Università di Milano, Rome, February 17, 2006.

Interview 2-44, Associazione Luca Coscioni, Rome, February 17, 2006.

Intervie 2-45, Scientist, Dibit, San Raffaele, Milan, February 10, 2006.

Interview 2-46, Philosopher, Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica, Roma, February 14, 2006.

Interview 2-47, Geneticist, private laboratory, Rome, February 14, 2006.

Interview 2-48, Head of Patients‘ Organization, Rome, February 20, 2006.

Interview 2-49, Geneticist, President of the Associazione Scienza & Vita, Rome, February 21, 2006.

Interview Israel

Interview 2-50, Member of Supreme Helsinki Comittee, Jerusalem, July 2004.

144

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Work Package 3:

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Publics, and Moments of Unease.

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Ziegler, U. (2004). Präimplantationsdiagnostik in England und Deutschland. Ethische, rechtliche und praktische Probleme. Frankfurt/M. & New York: Campus.

Interviews

Interview 1-3: Member of the HGC, London, UK, February, 2, 2006.

Interview 2-3: Austrian Academy of Science, Institute for Technology Assessment, Vienna, Austria, June, 28, 2006.

Interview 3-3: Member of the European Parliament, Green Party, telephone interview Berlin-Strasbourg, France, April, 4, 2006.

Interview 4-3: Secretary of the HGC, London, UK, February, 2, 2006.

Interview 5-3: Institut Mensch, Ethik, Wissenschaft, Berlin, Germany, March, 31, 2006.

Interview 6-3: Member of the HGC, London, UK, February, 2, 2006.

Interview 7-3: Geneticist, Medical University Vienna, Univ.-Klinik für Frauenheilkunde, Vienna, Austria, September, 20, 2005.

Interview 8-3: Member of Parliament, Austrian Peoples Party, Vienna, Austria, August, 21, 2006.

Interview 9- 3: Disability Awareness in Action, telephone interview Berlin-UK, March, 6, 2006.

Interview 10-3: Member of the HFEA, London, UK, January, 31, 2006.

Interview 11-3: Initiative Selbstbestimmt Leben, Berlin, Germany, March, 20, 2006.

Interview 12-3: Aktion Leben Österreich, Vienna, Austria, September, 5, 2006.

Interview 13-3: Genetic Interest Group, HGC, London, UK, January, 31, 2006.

Interview 14-3: Human Genetics Alert, London, UK, February, 2, 2006.

Interview 15-3: Aktion Leben Österreich, Vienna, Austria, July, 3, 2006.

Interview 16-3: Public Relations Agency ―communication matters‖, Vienna, Austria September, 6, 2006.

Interview 17-3: Manager of the HFEA, London, UK, February, 2, 2006.

Interview 18-3: University of Vienna, Institute for Political Sciences, Vienna, Austria, June, 28, 2006.

181

Interview 19-3: Austrian Council for Research and Technology Development, Vienna, Austria, September, 6, 2006.

Interview 20-3: Member of the HGC (until 2005), London, UK, January, 28, 2006.

Interivew 21-3: Ethikkommission FÜR die österreichische Bundesregierung, Vienna, Austria, August, 21, 2006.

Interview 22-3: CORE, telephone interview Berlin-London, UK, March, 14, 2006.

Interview 23-3: Aktion Leben Österreich, Vienna, UK, July, 3, 2006.

Interview 24-3: University of Vienna, Institut für Bildungswissenschaft, Sonder- und Heilpädagogik, Vienna, August, 30, 2006.

Interview 25-3: Science-Center-Networks, former team member of ―dialog<>gentechnik‖, Vienna, Austria, June, 29, 2006.

Interview 26-3: Gen-Ethisches Netzwerk, Berlin, February 15, 2006.

Interview 27-3: Heilpädagogische Fakultät der Universität Köln, Research Project on 1000fragen.de September, 9, 2005.

Conferences/Meetings/Workshops (taped or taken notes)

―Forum Biopolitik‖ Bundeskoordination Internationalismus (BUKO), 5-9.May 2005, Hamburg; (notes).

―Partizipation und Biopolitik‖, Veranstaltung des Nationaler Ethikrats, 18 May 2005, Berlin (notes).

―Patented New World‖, Internationale Fachtagung, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 2-3 June 2005, Berlin (notes).

―Ethical and Legal Issues at the Beginning of Life: Debating ‗Designer Babies‘‖, Symposium: at Middlesex University, School of Health and Social Sciences, 2 February 2006 London (taped and partly transcribed).

―European Biopolitics. Connecting Civil Society – Implementing Basic Values‖, 17-19 March 2005, Heinrich Böll Stiftung (taped) – and on http://www.boell.de/en/04_thema/4205.html.

Youth Conference ―Die nächste GENeration‖, Gewandhaus Leipzig, 19 May 2006 (www.gen-dis-kussion.de).

182

Work Package 4:

Building Trust through Public Participation: Learning from Conflicts over the

Implementation of the Habitats Directive.

Final Report (Deliverable Number 14)

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191

Interviews

Interviews in Finland:

Helsinki

(The interviewees gave permission to disclose their names)

1a Mr. Esko Jaakkola, Environmental Counsellor, Division of Nature Conservation, Ministry of the Environment; May 13, 2005

2a, Mr. Veikko Marttila, Environmental Director, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; August 24, 2005

3a, Mr. Jussi Laanikari, Research officer, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; August 31, 2005

4a, Mrs. Helena Korhonen, Director, Legal Affairs, Ministry of the Environment; June 6, 2006

5a, Mr. Erkki Pulliainen, Member of Parliament (Green Party); September 7, 2005

6a, Mr. Tapani Veistola, project coordinator, Finnish Association for Nature Conservation; May 18, 2005

7a, Mr. Markku Tornberg, Director of environmental issues, Central Union of Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners (MTK); August 22, 2005

The Tampere Region

(Because of the heated nature of the local controversies, the interviews were strictly confidential and only five of them were taped (x); we have used the interviews as background material).

Tampere, city planner, June 23, 2004.

Tampere, regional authority, October 27, 2004 (x)

Municipality, city planner, November 8, 2004

Tampere, NGO, December 14, 2004

Municipality, mamber of the city council, December 20, 2004

Municipality, nature surveyor, December 20, 2004

Tampere, regional authority, January 4, 2005

Municipality, surveyor consultant, January 13, 2005

192

Regional Forestry Center, February 16, 2005

Municipality, civil servant, March 3, 2005

Municipality, civil servant, March 3, 2005

Municipality, city planner, March 7, 2005

Municipality, city planner, March 18, 2005

Municipality, NGO (nature surveyor) March 23, 2005

Tampere, nature surveyor, April 4, 2005 (x)

Tampere, regional authority, April 6, 2005

Municipality, forester, June 3, 2005 (x)

Tampere, NGO, Juna 23, 2005

Municipality, civil servant, August 11, 2005 (x)

Municipality, civil servant, August 13, 2005

Tampere, regional authority, September 8, 2005

Municipality, October 3, 2005 (x)

Greece:

Athens:

interview 1b-4, 14/07/05, Ministry of Environment (YPEHODE) , 14/07/06 Athens .

interview 2b-4, Ministry of Environment (YPEHODE), 14/07/05 Athens.

interview 3b-4 , Office of Public Inspectors, 14/07/05 Athens.

interview 4b-4 , WWF-GROffice, 15/07/05 Athens.

interview 5b-4, GRECOTEL Office, 15/07/05 Athens.

interview 6b-4, ARCHELON Office, 18/07/05 Athens.

interview 7b-4 , Ministry of Tourism, 18/07/05 Athens.

193

Heraklion:

interview 8b-4 , NMPZ MA former-president, 06/04/2006, Heraklion, Crete.

interview 9b-4, Representative of the ‗Ecological Initiative of Zakinthian People‘ and RAPORTO publisher, 06/04/06, Heraklion.

interview 10b-4, Representative of the ‗Environmental Group of Rethimnians‘ and Local Newspaper Journalist, 06/04/06, Herkclion.

interview 11b-04, Medasset Representative, 06/04/06 Heraklion.

Zakinthos:

interview 12b-4, Representative of the ‗Ecological Initiative of Zakinthian People‘ and RAPORTO publisher, 02/07/06, Zakinthos.

interview 13b-4 , Hotel Owner, 02/07/06, Zakinthos.

interview 14b-4, local resident, 02/07/06, Zakinthos.

interview 15b-4, Perfecture of Zakinthos, 04/07/06, Zakinthos.

interview 16b-4, Town Hall of Laganas, 04/07/06, Zakinthos.

Interview 17b-4, hotel and land owner, 04/07/06, Zakinthos.

interview 18b-4, ARCHELON Representative, 04/07/06, Zakinthos.

interview 19b-4, NMPZ Management Agency, 05/07/06 Zakinthos.

interview 20b-4, Technological Institute Representative, 05/07/06 Zakinthos.

interview 21b-4, fishermen representative, 05/07/06, Zakinthos.

interview 22b-4, Perfecture of Zakinthos, 06/07/06, Zakinthos.

interview 23b-4, Perfecture of Zakinthos, 06/07/06, Zakinthos

Chania:

interview 24b-4, Local NGO representative, /08/06

194

Timbaki

interview 25b-4, Local NGO representative, /04/06

195

Work Package 5:

Learning after the Event. Assessing the Institutional Role of Civic Participation

after Food Scandals and Food Scares.

Final Report (Deliverable Number 15).

List of interviewees16

1. Employee Food Standards Agency. Chief Scientist Team. London, 5-7-06.

2. Civil servant Ministerium für Ernährung und Ländlichen Raum. Stuttgart Baden-Würtemberg, 1-9-

06. ***

3. Employee Federal Institute for Risk Assessment BfR. Risk Communication division. Berlin 15-8-

06.***

4. Scientist University of Hamburg. German expert on BSE and food chain developments. Budapest, 9-

9-05.

5. Spokesperson British consumer organisation. Tel. consultation, 6-7-2006.

6. Employee Food Standards Agency. Corporate and Board Secretariat Division. London, 5-7-06

7. Employee Federal Institute for Risk Assessment BfR. Risk Communication division. Berlin 15-8-

06.***

8. Employee Federal Institute for Risk Assessment BfR. Risk Communication division. Berlin, 16-8-

06***

9. Independent TSE specialist Germany. Interview per e-mail July – August 2006.

10. Employee Food Standards Agency. TSE Division. London, 5-7-06.

11. Researcher Fraunhofer-Institüt für System- und Innovationsforschung. Tel. consultation, 6 -7-2006.

12. Farmer; member of the Consumer Platform of the Ministry of Agriculture. Raamsdonksveer, 20-6-

2006.

13. Former consumer representative on UK scientific committee. Weybridge, 19-7-06 .

14. Journalist, expert on food chain issues; former member of the Consumer Platform of the Dutch

Ministry of Agriculture. 19-2-06.

15. Member of Parliament; standing committee on agriculture. The Hague, 7-6-2006.****

16 Anonymised as according to project specifications.

196

16. Appointee Food Standards Agency. London, n.d.s. **

17. Employee Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority VWA. Communication division. The

Hague, 30-6-06.

18. Scientist Open University, Milton Keynes. British expert on agriculture and food chain developments.

Amsterdam, 25-11-05.

19. Spokesperson Royal Netherlands Butchers Organisation KNS. Tel. consultation, 10-7-2006.

20. Committee specialist Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. London, 18-7-06.

21. Former civil servant Dutch Ministry of Agriculture. Utrecht, 19-12-2006.

22. Scientist University of Tokyo. Japanese expert on BSE and food chain developments. Amsterdam, 16-

6-2006.

23. Scientist Wageningen University. Dutch expert on BSE and food chain developments. Nijmegen, 19-

1-06.

24. Employee Food Standards Agency. Communications Division. London, 5-7-06.

25. Former employee EFSA. London, 21-7-06.*

26. Civil servant Dutch Ministry of Agriculture. The Hague, 27-6-2006.

27. Former UK consumer organisation‘s representative. St. Albans, 19-7-06.

28. Employee Federal Institute for Risk Assessment BfR. Risk Communication division. Berlin, 15-8-

06.***

29. Member of Parliament; standing committee on agriculture. The Hague, 7-6-2006.****

30. Researcher Wageningen UR; participant in Food-of-the Future project. Amsterdam, 10-8-06.

31. Former project leader Rathenau Institute. Amsterdam, 27-3-06.

32. Researcher; initiator of the ‗24-hour ministry of food safety‘. Haarlem, 10-7-2006.

33. Project leader Rathenau Institute. Tel. consultation, 22-3-06.

34. Civil servant Dutch Ministry of Health; member of the former Codex Committee on Meat Hygiene.

The Hague, 31-3-06.

35. Member of Parliament; standing committee on agriculture. The Hague, 7-6-2006.****

36. Member of Parliament; EFRA Select committee. London, 18-7-06.

37. Employee Federal Institute for Risk Assessment BfR. Risk Communication division. Berlin, 16-8-

06.***

38. Employee slaughterhouse. Amsterdam, 10-7-2006.

39. Appointee Food Standards Agency. London, 29-5-2002**

All interviews conducted by Anne Loeber, unless otherwise specified: *conducted by Maarten Hajer;

**conducted by Maarten Hajer and David Laws; ***conducted by Katharina Paul, in the context of the

PhD project ‗Food for Thought‘ A Comparative Study of Administrative Innovations in Food Safety

197

Regulation in Western Europe after the BSE Crisis, funded by NWO and ASSR, conducted under the

supervision of Maarten Hajer; ****conducted by Jan Rube, Nanke Verloo and Fleur Cools in the context

of a BA project assignment, conducted under the supervision of Anne Loeber.

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GM-Food: The Role of Participation in a Techno-Scientific Controversy.

Final Report (Deliverable Number 16)

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